

Slavery, Freedom, and Abolition
in Latin America and the Atlantic World



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Introduction



‡ IN THE EARLY 1880S, THE MEMBERS OF THE SPANISH ABOLITIONIST Society wrote with outrage about the continued use of the stock (*el cepo*) and shackles (*el grillete*) as punishment for slaves in Cuba. At the time, Cuba, along with Puerto Rico, was Spain's last colony in the Americas. It was also the biggest slave society in almost four centuries of Spanish colonial history. Slavery was not abolished there until 1886. Only Brazil maintained slavery longer, finally abolishing the institution two years later in 1888.

Cuban slave owners clung to enslaved labor for as long as possible, especially in the rich western and central sugar regions of the island. The Spanish government abolished the slave trade to Cuba in 1867. It also passed gradual emancipation laws in 1870 and 1880. While the government and its allies sought to portray these measures as humane and enlightened, critics argued that they did not go far enough, pointing to the violence and lawlessness that thrived on the Cuban plantations in the form of unchecked corporal punishment. For even the most minor offenses, slave owners were able to put slaves in the stock. The suffering was horrific: "Any person can imagine what the headstock is like. A refinement of the old and barbarous




FIGURE 1. El cepo de cabeza.

torture of burying someone up to the head. The mosquitoes, flies, and insects of all kinds, whose number is infinite in the Antilles, fatten themselves upon the head and face of the poor slave, who cannot use his hands to defend himself."¹ The use of shackles was equally cruel: "Naturally, this punishment produces many illnesses. The black field hands suffer from sunstrokes or fevers, hernias and kidney ailments. The first of these results from the harshness of the work, which takes place under the open sky in an extreme climate with a sun that burns like no other."²

The authors of the pamphlet noted that in metropolitan Spain, shackles were still employed as punishment but only for the gravest forms of treason or acts of violence. In Cuba, slave owners resorted to the stock and shackles for the most trivial offenses, real or perceived. The law denied the rights of slaves by allowing owners to terrorize them into hard work and obedience: "They do not punish *crimes*. Reader take note. What they punish is the resistance of the black stolen from Africa or from his family. Coerced, wronged, reviled, pressed into laboring gratis for the benefit of a master who forces him to work without the least consideration of his interests."³



FIGURE 2. El grillete. Spanish abolitionists included these images in a pamphlet in order to depict and denounce punishments still practiced on Cuban plantations in the 1880s, during the final days of slavery on the island. Slave owners fought to the last to retain control over enslaved labor. Slaves and their allies faced bitter resistance throughout Latin America during the various stages of abolition. Sociedad Abolicionista Española, *El cepo y el grillete* (Madrid: Sociedad Abolicionista Española, [188?]).

The abolitionists' indignation derived from a series of contrasts that highlighted not only the cruelty of slavery but also its archaism. From the perspective of the lawyers, engineers, journalists, and politicians who composed the Abolitionist Society, most American and Western European nations of the era sought to govern themselves according to the rule of law, constitutional regimes, and market economies based on contract and the freedom of labor. Slavery was the historical residue of absolutist regimes in which power was arbitrary and capricious and unfree labor and monopolies dominated the economies. In this view of progress, slavery must give way to the imperatives of individual liberty.

However, the resurgence and persistence of slavery in nineteenth-century Cuba, far from being the inverse of economic and civil progress, were products of revolutionary changes that had reshaped Latin America and the Atlantic world beginning in the previous century. Hostility to the African slave trade and New World slavery began to flourish in different corners of the Atlantic world in the mid-eighteenth century. This

hostility coalesced into major challenges to both institutions. Slaves in the French colony of Saint-Domingue (Haiti) threw off their bondage between 1791 and 1804 in the greatest slave rebellion the Americas would ever see. Opposition to the slave trade spread through the British Isles in the same era, leading the parliament of the most energetic slave-trading nation to abolish the traffic to its colonies in 1806. In Spanish America, the wars of independence of the 1810s and the 1820s gravely weakened slavery. The newly independent nations passed emancipation laws, usually of a gradual nature, and banned the slave trade altogether.

Yet merchants, planters, and government officials in some regions of the Atlantic world were fully capable of weathering and even exploiting these changes. In the United States, southern slave owners amassed considerable political clout and fended off serious challenges to their power until the Civil War. In Latin America, Cuba and Brazil saw a spectacular resurgence of the slave trade and the opening of new territories to slave-worked agriculture on an unprecedented scale. The decline of competitors such as Saint-Domingue and Jamaica on the world market presented Antillean and Brazilian planters with new opportunities, which they eagerly seized.

A look at the slave population of Latin America is revealing. In 1800 there were 718,000 slaves in Brazil, 212,000 in Cuba, and 112,000 in Venezuela, the three largest slave populations in the Iberian empires. Venezuela soon experienced a violent and tortuous war for independence against Spain. One outcome of the war was the suppression of the slave trade and the passing of a gradual emancipation law in 1821. The number of slaves declined until final abolition in 1854. Brazil also gained its independence from Portugal in this period but through a largely negotiated process that involved little social or military upheaval. The slave trade and slavery continued to thrive. By 1822, the year of independence, the slave population had grown to more than 1.1 million and would increase until slave trade abolition in 1850. Cuba remained loyal to the Spanish metropolis during the era of revolution, partly because of the growth of the slave trade and plantation slavery. By 1842 the slave population had expanded to more than 320,000. After 1800, the transatlantic slave trade brought more than 700,000 captives to Cuba and more than 2 million to Brazil.⁴

These data illustrate that even as political and economic liberalism took hold in much of Latin America and the imperial centers, broad commitment to the legitimacy of the enslavement of Africans and their descendants persisted almost until the end of the nineteenth century.

Why these deeply entrenched ideas and institutions were so resilient and how they were ultimately overcome are the questions that this book will explore.

This work is organized as a narrative of slavery's uneven rise and fall in Latin America and those parts of the Atlantic world to which the region was inextricably connected. The story begins in the eastern Atlantic in the fifteenth century and extends to Cuba and Brazil at the end of the nineteenth. Since much ground will be covered, it might be useful for the reader to keep several organizing ideas in mind:

- The rise of African slavery in Latin America was related to the conquest, subordination, and, in some cases, the decimation of the indigenous population.
- Slavery existed in relation to a broad pattern of unfree and free labor in the Americas, Africa, and the imperial centers.
- In the Americas, Brazil, as a Portuguese colony and then as an independent state, was the most constant and most massive importer of enslaved Africans over the centuries. According to estimates from *Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database* (www.slavevoyages.org), Brazil received close to 5 million of the 10.7 million captives disembarked in the Americas (between the early sixteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries). As a destination for the transatlantic slave trade, Spanish America—with almost 1.3 million captives prior to slave trade suppression to Cuba in 1867—trailed far behind Brazil and the British and French colonies of Jamaica and Saint-Domingue. This situation changed significantly in the late eighteenth century when Cuba emerged as the biggest plantation society in Spanish American history, fully rivaling its Caribbean neighbors.
- Plantation labor was the most powerful motor of the transatlantic traffic. At the same time, enslaved men and women worked throughout the economies of Brazil and Spanish America.
- Enslaved Africans and their descendants in the Americas frequently sought to recreate their religions and forms of social organization in the New World. Paradoxically, the centrality and pervasiveness of the Catholic Church in the Iberian empires often facilitated this process.
- Flight (maroonage) and other forms of resistance by enslaved people, coupled with legally and religiously sanctioned pathways to

silver and agricultural products like tobacco and the potato would transform European and African tastes and economies. Exchange among the American colonies was also important. The licit and illicit movement of goods, people, and ideas across the Americas was a fundamental aspect of the Atlantic empires, despite the efforts of regimes to control the flows to and from their colonial territories. All of the colonial empires participated in the transatlantic slave trade, a far from unified system. Different colonial powers competed for control, though the Portuguese (and the Brazilians) and later the British were the most important carriers of African captives to the Americas.⁵ The Portuguese and Brazilians would cement a south Atlantic slave trade in the seventeenth century that conjoined Brazil and Angola until the middle of the nineteenth century. The Caribbean, the other major terminus of the trade, was part of a north Atlantic system linked to the Gold Coast and the Bights of Biafra and Benin, in which Britain was the major, though far from the only, slaving power.

One final coordinate will help the reader to situate this history: if we follow the circuit of some of these goods and voyagers, we will find that the boundaries of the Atlantic world were not hard and fast. The streams of Peruvian and Mexican silver did not halt in Spain but made their way across the world to China, brought there by European merchants eager to trade with the world's largest economy. Mexican silver reached China not only via Europe but also through the galleon trade that linked Acapulco and Manila across the Pacific Ocean. The circuits of enslaved and unfree labor also stretched beyond the confines of the Atlantic. Portuguese slavers trafficked in captives from the east coast of Africa, while Spaniards sent captives from the Philippines to Mexico. Later in the nineteenth century, as the slave trade from Africa waned, indentured workers from China and India arrived in the Caribbean and Latin America in huge numbers. These examples show us that while the coming together (or collision) of Africa, Europe, and the Americas created a dynamic economic, cultural, and social space with African enslavement and the transatlantic traffic in captives at its heart, the Atlantic complex was also part of an emerging and evolving global system.

CHAPTER ONE

Slavery and Iberian Colonization



[T]o me it seems harsh to make slaves of those whom God and nature made free.

—Miguel de Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, 170

The Iberian Empires and the Atlantic World

‡ AT THE END OF HIS FIRST VOYAGE, THE GENOESE MARINER Christopher Columbus sent a letter to Spain in which he reported on the lands that he called the Indies and the great wealth that would flow from them to his Spanish patrons, the Catholic Kings Ferdinand and Isabella: “their Highnesses can see that I will give them as much gold as they require, if they will render me some very slight assistance.” He also promised spices, cotton, mastic, rhubarb, cinnamon, and “countless other things in addition.” The natives of these lands, whom he called Indians, would be cooperative because they were gentle and generous. They seemed eager to convert to Christianity, in his view. He also thought they would make

CHAPTER THREE

An Era of Emancipation

Slavery and Revolution in the Americas



A Letter from Cádiz

‡ AROUND NEW YEAR'S 1812, DOÑA JOSEFA GIRALT OF SAN JUAN, Puerto Rico, received a letter from her son don Ramón Power, Puerto Rico's representative to the Cortes of Cádiz in Spain.¹ The Cortes was a parliament convened in 1810 to resist the French occupation of the Iberian Peninsula and to draft a constitution that would govern the monarchy in the absence of the Spanish king Ferdinand VII, held captive by Napoleon Bonaparte since the French invasion in 1808. Though Ferdinand capitulated, most Spaniards and Spanish Americans did not. They professed their loyalty to the legitimate ruler and sought means to govern themselves during his captivity. The Cortes was the most sustained and controversial effort. Deputies from the colonies took part in the Cortes, including Power from Puerto Rico. As they debated the nature of the new constitution, completed in 1812, they touched on the most sensitive topics that bound Spain and the Americas together, including the slave trade to Spanish America and slavery itself. Spanish and American deputies raised the possibility of banning the trade in 1811; they also briefly discussed the

gradual abolition of slavery altogether. While defenders of slavery quickly prevailed and halted any further action, the language of abolition and liberation swirled around Cádiz and soon made its way across the Atlantic to the colonies.

Power's letter to his mother was reputedly one of the bearers of this language. A government investigation of how slaves responded to news arriving from Cádiz reported that in his letter, the Puerto Rican deputy advised his mother: "if [the government in Cádiz] ordered that liberty be granted to the slaves, she should be the first to carry it out with hers." Apparently, doña Josefa was so moved that she "burst into tears . . . and tore up the letter," though whether out of joy, anger, fear, or some other emotion is unclear. Those who did receive the news with joy were her slaves Jacinto and Fermín, who, if they did not read the letter, told others that they had heard doña Josefa read it aloud. They took it to mean that they, and all of Puerto Rico's slaves, would be liberated. They quickly spread the news among enslaved friends in the neighborhood.²

Also in January 1812, sailors arriving in San Juan from Cádiz brought similar reports, which were warmly received by enslaved men and women in the city and, soon, in the surrounding countryside. When the brig *Cazador* anchored in San Juan, the ship's carpenter, Benito, possibly a *liberto* (freed slave) because he did not have a last name, began spreading the "false rumor" that the Cortes "had conceded liberty to the black slaves."³ What worried Puerto Rico's governor was that Benito had set sail before he could be interrogated, and he was on his way to Havana, which had a much larger slave population.

In reporting back to the government at Cádiz, the island's Spanish governor, Salvador Meléndez, explained that such rumors of liberation spread rapidly in an environment already influenced by news of slavery's demise in other Caribbean colonies. The overthrow of slavery in the French colony of Saint-Domingue during the revolution there between 1791 and 1804 echoed in Puerto Rico, in part because some French slaveholders had fled to the Spanish colony with their slaves in tow. Moreover, Puerto Rico was getting news of unrest among Venezuela's enslaved and free-colored population.⁴

The claim that the Cortes of Cádiz had liberated Puerto Rico's slaves thus found fertile ground in 1812. According to Meléndez, enslaved men and women in the capital and the countryside, and in more distant towns such as Aguadilla on the west coast, were talking about their freedom and

spreading the news. So, too, were free blacks, including Joaquín Morales, an officer in the moreno militia unit who urged slaves to claim their freedom. In the face of a potential uprising, Meléndez formed an emergency militia force of white troops in San Juan and arrested and interrogated anyone suspected of causing unrest. In the end, he detained twenty-six slaves and free blacks, though not all received punishment. The eleven whom he judged most culpable suffered thirty to fifty lashes.⁵

The events of 1812 in Puerto Rico show us that protest against slavery and claims of freedom spread throughout the Americas and Europe during the age of revolution. From the outbreak of the American Revolution through Spanish American independence in the 1820s, the language of liberty resonated in many New World slave societies, undermining the legitimacy of human bondage. This development was partly an expression of Enlightenment and religious ideologies that saw slavery as cruel, backward, and immoral. Perhaps more important, however, were the social and political transformations that took place in the midst of imperial and anti-colonial warfare. Enslaved men and women and free blacks took part in the battles between empires and for national liberation. Their broad participation shook the foundation of New World slavery to its core, enabling many slaves to claim freedom for themselves and for their families while also forcing military and political leaders to take the first halting steps toward complete abolition of both the slave traffic and slavery. Yet the consequences of warfare were far from linear. If we look again at Puerto Rico in 1812, we see that slaves and free people leapt at the chance to spread ideas of emancipation. At the same time, the Spanish colonial government responded rapidly and effectively to suppress these emancipatory urges: slavery would persist in the island for another six decades. The same was true elsewhere in Latin America. Even as independent Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, and other Spanish American nations passed abolition laws and banned the slave trade, Cuba and Brazil (and the United States) came to rely upon enslaved labor more than ever. Indeed, though abolition gained ground in the Atlantic world, so did slavery: more slaves labored on plantations in the nineteenth century than at any other time in the history of the Atlantic slave complex.

That slavery and emancipation simultaneously flourished in Latin America was not unprecedented. In 1800 the three largest Latin American slave societies, Brazil, Cuba, and Venezuela, all had large free black and mulatto populations even as slave imports remained steady or increased.

In none of them were slaves in the majority. The same would be true throughout the nineteenth century even in Cuba and Brazil, where the slave trade continued to boom until midcentury.

TABLE 2. Population in Brazil, Cuba, and Venezuela, 1800

	Brazil	Cuba	Venezuela
Slaves	718,000	212,000	112,000
Free blacks	587,000	114,000	440,000
Whites	576,000	274,000	185,000
Indians	61,000	n.a.	161,000
Total population	1,942,000	600,000	898,000

Source: George Reid Andrews, *Afro-Latin America, 1800–2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 41.

What these figures indicate, in part, is that since the sixteenth century individual slaves regularly had achieved emancipation, sometimes by their own efforts, sometimes by the actions of individual owners or the colonial state. But the freedom of some came in the context of the enslavement of many others and the continuation of the traffic in captives from Africa, which thrived for more than three centuries. This chapter asks: What conditions and transformations altered this balance between slavery and freedom in Latin America? When and why did the freedom of some ultimately come to seem incompatible with the enslavement of others? To answer these questions, it is necessary to look beyond the legal and religious institutions and customs that facilitated liberation over the centuries in Brazil and Spanish America. Direct attacks on the slave trade and on the political structures that protected slavery ultimately undermined this entrenched institution, giving the enslaved and their allies opportunities to claim freedom not only for themselves but for all people in Latin American societies.

Slavery Affirmed, Slavery Destroyed: The American and Haitian Revolutions

To understand the forces that simultaneously weakened and strengthened slavery in Latin America, it is necessary to take a detour through the empires of Spain's rivals, Britain and France, as they regrouped in the aftermath of the Seven Years' War. Their clashes for supremacy in

the Atlantic world would continue to have profound effects in the Iberian colonies.

Events on the ground in British and French America transformed slavery, though in a paradoxical, unpredictable fashion. The short-lived peace that followed the Seven Years' War left Britain in a commanding position, but the extent of its victories also turned out to have weakened British legitimacy in its North American colonies. While metropolitan officials pondered further expansion in the Western Hemisphere, colonists bitterly denounced the increased number of regular troops stationed in North America and the efforts of the government to impose new taxes to pay for those troops and the war. In the short period that witnessed British imperial ascendancy in the Americas—from the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763 until the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775—settlers denounced the power of the Crown and the metropolitan parliament and demanded greater right of self-government and less meddling from Europe.

When settlers took up arms to overthrow British rule, they did so in the midst of colonies in which slavery figured quite diversely.⁶ The Chesapeake and Carolina Lowcountry colonies were significant plantation societies. In mid-Atlantic cities such as Philadelphia and New York, slaves were a large part of the urban workforce. In the agrarian and urban north, however, slavery was a minor institution, though ports did a thriving business with the sugar islands in the British Caribbean. In the northern colonies, antislavery sentiment had been on the rise since midcentury, especially among the Quakers of Pennsylvania, who were in close touch with their British brethren. Many divested themselves of investments related to the slave trade and slavery, freed their own slaves, and in some cases freed those whom their families had sold long ago. Some northern colonies, including Pennsylvania, passed abolition laws during the revolution, and even before 1775 some had moved to limit or restrict the slave traffic.

Given this uneven terrain, the role of the enslaved and of free blacks varied during the American Revolution. In the first days of fighting, northern militias welcomed black volunteers, some of them formerly enslaved men freed by their owners so that they could serve. Black militia service had precedents. Benjamin Quarles shows that militias from colonies north and south had free black members in the 1750s and 1760s. But by 1776 local governments and the Continental Congress barred free blacks and slaves from the militias throughout the North American colonies.

Northern colonies such as Massachusetts were reversing their earlier policies. Southern colonies had refused to admit black troops from the first moment and would continue to refuse even when hard-pressed by metropolitan counterattacks.

British initiatives forced the rebellious Americans to reconsider their views. In November 1775 the British governor of Virginia, Lord Dunmore, issued a proclamation inviting slaves and servants to flee their masters and side with the British. In return, they would receive their freedom: "I do hereby further declare all indented servants, Negroes, or others, (appertaining to Rebels,) free, that are able and willing to bear arms, they joining His Majesty's Troops, as soon as may be, for the more speedily reducing the Colony to a proper sense of their duty, to His Majesty's crown and dignity."⁷ Despite fierce resistance from Virginia colonists who introduced measures to control the enslaved population and harsh punishments for captured runaways, several hundred enslaved men reached the British lines and carried British arms in Dunmore's Ethiopian Regiment. Across the breast of their uniforms they bore the inscription "Liberty to Slaves."⁸ Dunmore suffered defeat early on in Virginia, but British forces occupied much of South Carolina during the Revolution and there, too, they encouraged slaves to run away and serve in the British army.

The colonists soon went back on their efforts to eliminate free blacks and slaves from the militias, at least in the north. In 1778 Rhode Island raised a slave regiment, while local governments throughout New England disregarded color when recruiting troops. The southern colonies (with the exception of Maryland), in contrast, resisted arming their slaves even in the face of British assaults and requests from the Continental Congress and George Washington's staff. South Carolina's assembly rebuffed envoys from Washington, as did Georgia's, in spite of British successes and the need for more troops.

The British and the colonists were not the only forces to employ black troops during the American Revolution. So did Britain's European foes, France and Spain, both hungry for revenge and territory after the humiliation at midcentury. Supporting the North American rebellion offered them the opportunity. Among the troops that Spain dispatched from Cuba were *moreno* and *pardo* battalions that participated in the victories at Pensacola and Mobile. France sent hundreds of black and mulatto troops organized in the *Chasseurs volontaires d'Amérique*, units founded in Saint-Domingue during the Seven Years' War. They served in the failed siege

of Savannah, Georgia, in 1779, after which they occupied the Caribbean island of Grenada, which the French had taken from Britain.⁹

In spite of the broad participation of slaves and free blacks (from several empires) in the war for independence, and in spite of the language of liberty that the new nation inscribed in its founding charters, after defeating Britain, the Americans consolidated a government with slave-holding at its economic and political core. The new regime fortified slavery because it relied heavily on the support of Southern planters. The holdouts against black military service in South Carolina and Georgia signified the dynamics of postindependence political and economic arrangements. After the British evacuated in 1783 (including thousands of black refugees, many of whom settled first in Nova Scotia, later in Sierra Leone), slaveholders in the Carolina Lowcountry and Georgia turned to the transatlantic traffic to restore and to augment their enslaved workforces. Such was their demand that they imported captives at an unprecedented rate. Moreover, with the opening of the cotton frontier in the Deep South in the early nineteenth century, the quest for enslaved workers took on new urgency. In a bitter historical irony, even as Britons were organizing to fight against slavery, their industrializing textile sector galvanized the market for slave-produced cotton. The United States agreed to abolish the transatlantic slave trade in 1808, but planters in the new cotton regions opened a vast internal traffic that brought captives from older plantation societies in the Chesapeake. Far from enjoying liberty, many slaves in the independent United States suffered new forms of subjugation as they were transported far from their communities to the expanding southeastern frontier.¹⁰

The American Revolution did unleash an antislavery movement—but in Britain, not in the newly independent republic. Britain's defeat in its North American colonies provided the impetus for more direct action against the slave traffic, which some Britons had sporadically criticized even before the American Revolution. Ever since the emergence of evangelical Christianity in the Anglo-American world in the mid-eighteenth century, religious activists denounced British colonial slavery. The Methodists and the Quakers were at the forefront of these expressions of outrage. Among the enslaved themselves there was a religious revival in the Caribbean and North American colonies, led by Baptists and other sects outside the Anglican Church. However, principled condemnations of the planters and the slavers did not threaten the institution.

The transition from criticism to direct action originated in the circle of Anglican reformers who gathered around the minister James Ramsay in the 1780s. Ramsay had spent more than a decade in Saint Kitts trying to minister to the enslaved population. Stout opposition from the planters eventually led to his expulsion from the island and his return to England. The timing was propitious. Many Britons were convinced that defeat at the hands of the American colonists was a sign of divine displeasure. Ramsay and his circle believed that the way to redeem Britain was to propagate the gospel throughout the empire, especially among the enslaved population of the Caribbean. One of Ramsay's admirers, the Anglican bishop Beilby Porteus, imagined slave societies harmonized and mellowed by the effective spread of Christianity: "a little society of truly Christian Negroes, impressed with a just cause, and living in the habitual practice, of the several duties they owe to God, to their masters, to their fellow labourers and to themselves; governed by fixed laws, and by the exactest discipline, yet tempered with gentleness and humanity."¹¹

Though initially concerned with atonement after the debacle of the American Revolution, these religious reformers soon became active enemies of the slave trade and of Caribbean slavery. Ramsay's 1784 publication, *An Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of African Slaves in the British Sugar Colonies*, galvanized debate in Britain about slavery and the slave traffic. Like a latter-day Bartolomé de las Casas, Ramsay could speak from direct experience in the Caribbean about the sufferings of the enslaved and the cruelty and indifference of the master class. In the face of resistance from the West Indian lobby, Ramsay and his circle, which included highly placed officials and parliamentarians such as William Wilberforce, decided to press publicly for the abolition of the slave trade to the West Indies, seeking to awaken the British public to "that spirit of freedom, which runs throughout the Old and the New Testament."¹² Their goals were manifold. They wished to bring to an end the traffic, the brutality of which was brought to light by Thomas Clarkson's research in British slaving ports. They also hoped that with the traffic in captives suppressed, planters would have no choice but to treat their slaves more humanely, not least by allowing the spread and observation of the gospel. Ramsay argued that the consequence would be "the union of liberty and religion both slowly advancing together."¹³

Such objectives would be difficult to attain; the slave trade to the British West Indies, especially to Jamaica, was very much a going concern

at the end of the eighteenth century. The number of captives disembarked in Jamaica and elsewhere was growing as the antislavery movement gained traction in the metropolis (see table 3). Though it has been argued that the profitability of the West Indian sugar and slave complex was on the decline, subsequent studies have shown that Britain was actually well poised to expand plantation production in Guiana and Trinidad. The New World plantation complex remained not only viable but, in the eyes of many, crucial to British economic well-being. Yet, from this small but influential circle of religious reformers, British antislavery efforts grew into a mass movement that became a major force in defining British politics and self-image for the next century.¹⁴

TABLE 3. Slaves disembarked in British Caribbean colonies, mid-eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries

	Trinidad and Tobago*	British Guiana	Barbados	Jamaica
1751–1775	1,925	0	106,898	232,235
1776–1800	18,732	30,647	28,307	301,769
1801–1825	20,128	41,725	6,813	68,901
Totals	40,785	72,372	142,018	602,905

*The British took Trinidad from Spain in 1797.

Source: Estimates Database, 2009, *Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database*, <http://www.slavevoyages.org>, accessed January 7, 2011.

Among the most vocal advocates of suppressing the slave trade were Afro-Britons, who spoke and wrote about their direct experience with enslavement. Afro-Britons found themselves in a more favorable position in the later eighteenth century after the Somerset Case (1772), a legal decision concerning the fate of an enslaved man, James Somerset, whose master wanted to send him back to the West Indies. Though in strictest terms the decision forbade the master's specific action, many held it to mean that slavery was banned on British soil. As the poet William Cowper wrote in response: "Slaves cannot breathe in England; if their lungs / Receive our air, that moment they are free."¹⁵ Critics of slavery and of the colonial planter class celebrated the Somerset decision as an affirmation of British liberty and a defense of the rule of law in the face of the lawlessness and private power of the slaveholder.

Afro-Britons assumed a more visible presence in British public life after 1772. Though their numbers were small, several became well-known poets and memoirists; others participated in public debates about the slave trade and its suppression. The most prominent black abolitionist at the end of the eighteenth century was Olaudah Equiano, also known as Gustavus Vassa.¹⁶ Equiano published his autobiography, the *Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African*, in 1789 and in several editions thereafter. A subscription supported publication of the work, and the list included eminent abolitionists and reform advocates of various stripes. Like his abolitionist friends and colleagues, such as Thomas Clarkson, Equiano took his *Narrative* and his argument for suppressing the slave traffic on the road. He spoke before large gatherings and offered his book for sale. Readers would find harrowing accounts of the cruel treatment meted out to the enslaved during the Middle Passage and by the master class of the Americas. For example, Equiano described a gruesome encounter on a Virginia plantation where he labored as a youth: "I was very much affrighted at some things I saw, and the more so as I had seen a black woman slave as I came through the house, who was cooking the dinner, and the poor creature was cruelly loaded with various kinds of iron machines; she had one particularly on her head, which locked her mouth so fast that she could scarcely speak; and could not eat nor drink. I was much astonished and shocked at this contrivance, which I afterwards learned was called the iron muzzle."¹⁷

But readers would also find inspiring tales of liberation, struggles to preserve his freedom against those who would reenslave him, religious conversion to Methodism, and economic rationales for suppressing the slave trade. As did leading abolitionists such as Granville Sharp, Equiano argued that trading with Africa in goods other than human beings would be a boon to the British and African economies alike:

This I conceive to be a theory founded upon facts, and therefore an infallible one. If the blacks were permitted to remain in their own country, they would double themselves every fifteen years. In proportion to such increase will be the demand for manufactures. Cotton and indigo grow spontaneously in most parts of Africa; a consideration this of no small consequence to the manufacturing towns of Great Britain. It opens a most immense, glorious, and happy prospect—the clothing, &c. of a continent ten thousand

miles in circumference, and immensely rich in productions of every denomination in return for manufactures.¹⁸

Abolitionists like Sharp and Equiano were willing to back up these commercial arguments with money and work. Many invested in a company whose mission was to resettle freed slaves in Sierra Leone, where they would work as free people and demonstrate the lucrative trade to be forged between Britain and Africa. Among the settlers were the black veterans of the American Revolution who served in the British army in return for liberation.¹⁹

Combining religious fervor, economic liberalism, and mass political mobilization, British antislavery efforts drove Parliament to outlaw the slave traffic to the British colonies in 1807 and were a crucial factor in the suppression of slavery in the 1830s. Moreover, British initiatives against the slave trade became international in their scope. Beginning with the Congress of Vienna (1815), the British government sought to implement slave trade abolition throughout the Atlantic world by securing treaties to that effect with other governments. British warships patrolled off the coast of Africa, Cuba, and Brazil, while British-backed courts condemned captured slavers. In 1850 the navy took its most direct action by invading Brazilian ports and destroying slaving vessels. The traffic from Africa would persist until the Spanish government relented in 1867, but the rise of British antislavery groups nonetheless represented a significant blow that would finally bring three centuries of the transatlantic slave trade to an end.²⁰

An even more definitive movement against slavery was taking place not in Europe but back in the Americas. In the same era in which Evangelicals and popular groups throughout the British Isles were demanding the end of the slave trade, and as planters in South Carolina and Georgia sought to rebuild their fortunes by avidly buying African captives, slaves in the French colony of Saint-Domingue were taking direct action to throw off their bonds. Like the British movement to suppress the slave traffic, the Haitian Revolution (1791–1804) had complicated effects. Revolutionaries destroyed slavery forever in the former French colony of Saint-Domingue (and eventually in the neighboring Spanish colony, Santo Domingo). The Haitian events became a symbol of liberation for enslaved and free people of color around the Caribbean, inspiring revolts in Venezuela and Cuba. At the same time, the destruction of slavery in the Caribbean's richest colony was a spur to slavery's growth in

other corners of the Caribbean and Latin America, especially in Cuba and Brazil, where planters, merchants, and governments took advantage of new openings for their goods and new anxieties about the consequences of slave emancipation.²¹

The French colony of Saint-Domingue on the western end of the island of Hispaniola was a highly efficient, and deadly, producer of sugar, indigo, and coffee.²² A small free population, divided between great planters and smaller property owners, shopkeepers, professionals, soldiers, and administrators ruled over a towering slave population, largely African-born. The free population included whites and people of color. Many of the latter were freed by European fathers and assumed leading positions in the colony through education and the inheritance of wealth, though they found their prerogatives increasingly curtailed in the second half of the century. Some were planters in their own right, though usually of coffee and indigo as opposed to sugar. Others filled positions in the colonial militia or the *maréchaussée*, the gendarmerie dedicated to tracking down runaway slaves. Though discriminated against, they generally identified strongly with the dominant colonial culture.

When revolution broke out in France in 1789, Saint-Domingue's *gens de couleur* saw the new regime as a potential ally against the "aristocrats of the skin" who sought to disbar them from the full enjoyment of their liberty. They found advocates for equality in France. But to their dismay, since many owned slaves, they also confronted a small but influential abolitionist society, the Société des Amis des Noirs, founded in 1788 and dedicated to the gradual abolition of colonial slavery. By the later eighteenth century, more and more enlightened French had come to see New World slavery as a gross injustice. They also saw it as a powder keg ready to explode at any moment.

French abolitionists differed significantly from their British counterparts. Evangelical Christianity played no role in their criticisms of slavery; they were not moved by a desire to spread the gospel to the enslaved or by the wish to redeem their nation in the face of divine wrath. They believed instead in natural rights that were universally applicable to all peoples. Compared to the British, they were small in number, limited to enlightened intellectuals and officials who sought amelioration of the slave's condition and the extension of full rights of citizenship to free people of color. France never witnessed the kind of mass mobilization characteristic of British antislavery efforts, though the intersection of revolution and slave



Portrait of Vincent Ogé, a free-colored merchant and landowner from Cap Français, Saint-Domingue.



FIGURE 8. Portrait of Vincent Ogé (d. 1791): "He loves liberty just as he knows how to defend it." A wealthy free-colored merchant and landowner from Cap Français, Saint-Domingue, Ogé was in Paris in 1789, where he gathered with other prominent members of Saint-Domingue's free-colored population to lobby for equal rights for all free people in the colony regardless of lineage. Their demands met with staunch resistance from white settlers, rich and humble, even though all agreed on the preservation of their property in slaves. John Garrigus argues that Ogé's Parisian experience convinced him of the strong link between militia service and active citizenship, a claim that would resonate among the free-colored population of the colony. Among Ogé's co-conspirators after his return to Saint-Domingue were many veterans of the *Chasseurs volontaires* who had served during the American Revolution and were frustrated by the efforts to marginalize their class in the colony and to exclude them from revolutionary citizenship after 1789. Archivo General de Indias, Mapas y Planos, Estampas, 30 (2).

rebellion in Saint-Domingue beginning in 1791 did place slavery's fate at the center of French colonial politics.²³

Though the members of the *Amis des Noirs* were cautious about abolishing slavery, they were firm advocates of enfranchising the free black population of Saint-Domingue and other colonies and actively promoted this cause. But these proposed reforms ran into fierce opposition from white settlers and their allies in the revolutionary assembly. When it became clear that the whites of Saint-Domingue and their French allies would stall on extending citizenship, several free-colored leaders, such as Vincent Ogé, returned to the colony in 1790 and took up arms to force their claims. Though he gathered several hundred militia veterans about him, Ogé and his supporters dispersed after little more than a skirmish with troops from Cap Français. Ogé and others crossed the colonial border into Santo Domingo, but Spanish officials returned him to the French side, where he was broken on the wheel and beheaded in 1791.²⁴

Later that year, a new rebellion led by free-colored veterans broke out near Port-au-Prince, this time with crucial support from a contingent of well-trained slave troops whom they called "the Swiss." After scoring victories over forces from Port-au-Prince, the *gens de couleur* reached an agreement with local officials to abolish color discrimination among the free population. Tellingly, the Swiss were excluded from this pact; their reward was deportation from the colony because slaveholders saw armed and trained slaves as a menace. When no neighboring colonies would accept the deportees, French officials imprisoned them offshore in hulks. Many were executed, others died of disease and starvation. Their fate spoke eloquently to the limits of revolutionary liberty.²⁵

But openings for action against slavery were presenting themselves, as both the colony and metropolis were divided. While the dominant groups fought among themselves around Port-au-Prince in 1791, slaves in the northern part of the colony seized the opportunity to assert their own demands for freedom. Led by the slave and religious figure Boukman and inspired by African and European ideas of justice and freedom, a huge slave rebellion erupted in 1791 across the northern plain of the colony. The ideology of the French Revolution was important in shaping expectations and initiatives in revolutionary Saint-Domingue, but the African background was also crucial. The majority of slaves in the northern plain were from the Kingdom of Kongo, and through the early phases of their rebellion, several leaders steadfastly spoke the language of kingship to

justify their actions and their political loyalties. After the burning of the city of Le Cap in 1793, the rebel leader Macaya rejected the overtures of the representatives of republican France, Léger Félicité Sonthonax and Étienne Polverel, in a royalist idiom: "I am the subject of three kings: of the King of Congo, master of all the blacks; of the King of France who represents my father; of the King of Spain who represents my mother. These three Kings are the descendants of those who, led by a star, came to adore God made Man."²⁶

Macaya's expression of fealty to three kings demonstrated not only the import of Kongo political ideology but also the rivalry among European states in Saint-Domingue. France's rivals saw in the rebellions that shook Saint-Domingue a chance to advance their own cause, as both Britain and Spain aimed to incorporate the rich colony into their empires. Both sought allies, occupied territory, and supported proxy forces. The British tried to build their support on the great planters of the north and occupied territory there. Spain, from the adjoining colony of Santo Domingo, supported Toussaint Louverture, a well-educated former slave who, according to legend, was a reader of the Abbé Raynal, a philosophe who had augured the violent destruction of New World slavery by a black Spartacus. From obscure origins, Toussaint became one of the leading black generals in the early phase of the revolution. In 1794 he switched his allegiance from Spain to France when the revolutionary government in Paris endorsed the measure of its representative Sonthonax, who had declared slavery abolished the year before in an effort to rally the enslaved masses of Saint-Domingue to fight for France against the British and Spanish invaders, a tactic that reached fruition with Toussaint's conversion to the French side. The leverage against slavery provided by revolutionary and international war was more effective in the Saint-Domingue rebellion than in the American Revolution. In Spanish America a few years later, warfare also proved to be the most powerful solvent of slavery.

For the next several years, Toussaint was the ruler of the colony, which he successfully defended against foreign powers. He respected the abolition of slavery, but he also tried to restore plantation discipline and the export economy through various measures that would compel freedmen to continue laboring on the big estates. Despite Toussaint's loyalty and his efforts to keep the plantations working, France in 1802 sought to restore slavery in its colonies. The French successfully reenslaved freed people in their other Caribbean colonies (Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana).

In Saint-Domingue they captured Toussaint and deported him to France, where he perished in the Fortress of Joux in the Jura Mountains in 1803. But resistance quickly stiffened. The black generals Henri Christophe and Jean-Jacques Dessalines defeated a large European expedition and proclaimed the independence of the new nation, Haiti, in 1804.²⁷

When Haiti proclaimed its independence from France in 1804, slavery and the slave trade were facing major challenges to their survival in parts of the Atlantic world. Haitian independence, won largely by the formerly enslaved whose actions compelled the metropole to abolish slavery, definitively ended both slavery and the slave trade on the island of Hispaniola. A few years later, the British antislavery movement would score a major victory when Parliament voted to ban the slave traffic to the British colonies. The revolutionary era in British North America, France, and the French Caribbean brought about the destruction or weakening of slavery in major plantation societies (Saint-Domingue, Jamaica). At the same time, it ushered in the conditions for slavery's expansion into new territories. Slaveholders in the independent United States saw their hand strengthened by greater political control, consolidation of the southeastern frontier, and burgeoning demand on the world market for their slave-produced cotton.

The Iberian empires would experience similarly uneven developments soon after the American and Haitian revolutions. There, too, anticolonial movements spread and threw into doubt the future of bonded labor and the traffic in captives from Africa. In many regions of revolutionary Spanish America, the slave trade was suppressed and emancipation laws enacted. At the same time, planters in Cuba and Brazil, much like their U.S. counterparts, took advantage of new political and economic arrangements to open frontiers to slave-produced commodities on a vastly enlarged scale.

Independence and Abolition in Spanish America

The French Revolution would exert important and unpredictable influence in New World slave societies well beyond the confines of the French colonial empire. France's military occupation of the Iberian Peninsula in 1808 threw the empires of Spain and Portugal into profound crisis.²⁸ The invasion had differing effects on slavery in the two empires. The Portuguese court embarked for Rio de Janeiro under British escort and remained there until 1822. With Rio as the new capital of the empire and the protection




FIGURE 9. Portrait from an apology for Ferdinand VII of Spain. Ferdinand VII briefly succeeded his father, Charles IV, by means of a palace coup in 1808. He then capitulated before Napoleon Bonaparte at a meeting in Bayonne and relinquished his throne, which was taken over by Napoleon's brother Joseph Bonaparte (Joseph I of Spain). Ferdinand's abdication threw Spain and its overseas empire into political crisis, from which came the revolutions that would undermine slavery in much of Spanish America. This printed portrait of Ferdinand was meant to circulate among his European and American domains and explain that "the beloved King of Spain and the Emperor of the Indies . . . like no other Sovereign . . . resolved to relinquish his sovereignty, rather than see the blood of his Vassals spilled." Archivo General de Indias, Mapas y Planos, Estampas, 1411.

of Europe's dominant economic and naval power, Brazilian ports enjoyed greater freedom, urban and plantation slavery boomed, and political order reigned, at least in the short term (more on Brazil in chapter 4).

In contrast, a political vacuum opened in Spain and its overseas empire. The Spanish ruler Charles IV and his heir, Ferdinand, fell captive to Napoleon Bonaparte in 1808, and Bonaparte's legions commenced the occupation of Spain. However, all did not go as planned by the French. The country was submerged in a violent resistance to the occupying force between 1808 and 1814 as Spanish patriots gathered first in Seville and then in Cádiz to form a new government in the monarch's absence. The most lasting achievement of the Cádiz government was a constitution composed by peninsular and colonial framers in 1812. One of the major goals of the Constitution of Cádiz was to redefine the relationship between the peninsula and the overseas colonies, incorporating the latter into a constitutional regime that gave them broad political representation in a metropolitan assembly. But even as the framers at Cádiz sought to forge a new political order, events in the colonies were overtaking them. The overthrow of the Bourbon monarchy led to an acute crisis of legitimacy in the colonies, which the constitution failed to solve (indeed, as we will see, in some cases it exacerbated the crisis). Though Cádiz tried to assert its authority over all of the Spanish domains, Caracas, Buenos Aires, Cartagena, and other colonial centers formed juntas, or governing assemblies, that argued that in the absence of the monarch political power devolved to self-governing municipalities. As the opportunities for compromise between Cádiz and the American juntas receded, many Spanish American patriots saw this as the moment to fight for independence; in doing so, they set in motion a chain of events that would lead to the dismantling of Spanish dominion from the northern reaches of New Spain to the austral lands of South America. These far-reaching conflicts dramatically altered Spanish American slave regimes.

The Caracas junta's rupture from Spain showed that, as in other Atlantic revolutions, the fate of slavery would figure in the independence struggle in Spanish South America, though slavery was less central in these colonies than it was in Saint-Domingue, the Carolina Lowcountry, Brazil, or Cuba (see table 4).²⁹ Like other cities in Spain and Spanish America, Caracas, upon receiving news of the captivity of the Bourbon rulers, declared its opposition to the French and formed a local junta that would govern in the absence of the legitimate monarch. Within the

governing coalition were strong advocates of independence—including Simón Bolívar, a wealthy planter from an old creole family—who ultimately prevailed upon their colleagues to declare Venezuela's independence in 1811. The Venezuelan constitution of that year spoke directly to the question of slavery and reflected the interests of the dominant economic and social groups. Among its provisions was a distinction between active and passive citizens. Only those possessing substantial property would enjoy the vote. The constitution also continued the segregation of African-descended people typical of Spanish rule by organizing its militia along color lines. The new regime declared the slave trade abolished—the hope of receiving recognition from Britain dictated the necessity of such a ban—but took no action against slavery itself. Thus, while enshrining liberty, the first champions of Venezuelan independence understood that only some would exercise it fully: those with property, often in slaves.³⁰

TABLE 4. Slave population of Spanish South America on the eve of independence

Colony	Slave population
Quito	5,000
Chile	6,000
Río de la Plata	30,000
Peru	40,000
New Granada	78,000
Venezuela	87,800

Source: Peter Blanchard, *Under the Flags of Freedom: Slave Soldiers and the Wars of Independence in Spanish South America* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 8.

But the best-laid plans of creole oligarchs could not necessarily survive the course of events. The independence wars threatened the interests of slaveholders throughout Spanish America because they gave enslaved people opportunities for liberation. The most important development was war itself. Spain struck back at colonial rebels after the restoration of the Bourbon monarch Ferdinand VII in 1814, waging a temporarily successful war of reconquest in Chile, Peru, Nueva Granada, and Venezuela under commanders such as General Pablo Morillo, a seasoned veteran of combat against the French in the Iberian Peninsula. As the wars quickened, so did the demand for troops on both sides. Here is where slaves and free blacks gained important leverage.

Royalist and patriotic forces alike mobilized slaves to fight on their sides during the long years of warfare on the South American continent. Royalists could draw on old precedents by promising freedom in exchange for a term of military service. Such a compromise had existed throughout the colonial period and recognized the basic legitimacy of slavery as an institution in Spanish America, while also honoring the mechanisms for acquiring freedom enshrined in Spanish law since the Middle Ages. Throughout the nineteenth century, from the wars in Venezuela to the final battles against Cuban patriots between 1868 and 1880 (more on this in chapter 4), Spain was able to attract military recruits from the slave population, trading freedom for service to the king and nation, as it had done throughout the old regime. Patriot armies often tried to strike a similar bargain. Many of their initial leaders were slave owners themselves, such as Bolívar in Venezuela, who gradually freed his more than one hundred slaves. But patriot armies found it harder to defend the persistence of slavery in the context of liberal and republican aspirations, the breakdown of traditional forms of order, and the spread of the language of liberation. As Bolívar conceded, "It seems to me madness that a revolution for freedom expects to maintain slavery."³¹

Soon after Spain was definitively expelled from South America in the 1820s, Bolívar looked back, with mixed feelings, on the wars and commented on how the need for manpower had dramatically shaken societies characterized by slave-holding and racial hierarchies:

In the first years of Independence, we needed men who were above all brave, who could kill Spaniards and make themselves feared; blacks, *zambos*, *mulattos*, and whites, all were welcome as long as they fought bravely. No one could be rewarded with money, for there was none; the only way of maintaining ardour, rewarding exceptional actions and stimulating valour was by promotion, so that today men of every caste and colour are among the generals, leaders, and officers of our forces, though the majority of them have no other merit than brute strength. This was once useful to the Republic but now, in peacetime, is an obstacle to peace and tranquility. But it was a necessary evil.³²

Bolívar's assessment of the transformative impact of war on the post-colonial social order had more than a twinge of pessimism about it. Now

free of Spanish rule, how would traditionally hierarchical societies organize themselves once those hierarchies were called into question? Yet Bolívar's gloomy ruminations should not blind us to the vigor of the challenges to colonial slavery and racial prejudice enabled by the independence movements. These challenges become more apparent when we contrast them to Spain's efforts to maintain the old order in these years, as the metropolitan government consistently foundered on the questions of slavery and political equality for the *castas*.

The Spanish Constitution of Cádiz, drafted in 1812, spoke eloquently to the question of slavery in the colonies. Its answers reaffirmed the institution's centrality. Though some critics advocated abolishing the slave trade in emulation of the British, Cuban planters prevailed upon the assembly to suppress any public utterances against the traffic or against slavery. The recent deregulation of the traffic to Cuba had set the stage for a tremendous expansion of the sugar complex around Havana. In deference to the Havana planter class's interests, the Cádiz constitution not only left the traffic untouched but also formalized slavery and racial discrimination in the colonies. This defense of hierarchy and property could be seen in the prescriptions around citizenship. The Constitution of Cádiz barred Africans and African-descended people from the active exercise of citizenship, which affected the proportional representation of the colonies in the Cortes, diminishing their power in relation to the metropole. Lineage thus became one of the qualifications for full political rights, a situation that differed little from the discrimination that had prevailed against the *castas* over the centuries. Moreover, though seeking to incorporate the colonies, Spanish politicians nonetheless rigged the new regime so that metropolitan supremacy would remain intact.

This defense of aspects of the old order would necessarily marginalize large sectors of the colonial populace. Take, for example, the family of Pedro de Ayarza, a well-to-do merchant from Portobello in Panama, just a few years before the independence movements would erupt in Spanish America. Ayarza was a *pardo* who had risen to wealth and local prominence as a merchant and officer in the *pardo* militia. He was able to educate his three sons in style. The eldest, José Ponciano, studied law in Bogotá, the viceregal capital of Nueva Granada. However, when the young man was on the verge of completing his studies, the university registrar refused him his degree because he was a man of color and thus legally barred from the university and the practice of law. In 1795 Ayarza sought to remedy the

situation by taking advantage of a new Bourbon policy that allowed people to purchase legal whiteness, a measure that was known as *gracias al sacar*, and the right to use the honorific title *don*. Ayarza hoped to acquire legal whiteness and the use of the honorific for himself and his three sons. The process was lengthy and expensive. Ayarza had to apply four times over the next several years, employing an agent in Madrid to pursue his case. In the end, the Council of the Indies granted these privileges only to the eldest son, José Ponciano. The decision "extinguished" his color, he could use the title *don*, and he could receive his diploma and exercise his profession. But the council repeatedly turned down the applications of his father and his two brothers, so that while José Ponciano became legally white, the other Ayarzas were *pardos* and remained subject to various kinds of legal discrimination.³³

Such was the hierarchical and segregated colonial order that the Constitution of Cádiz would uphold. In contrast, Spanish officials in the colonies, who were desperate for manpower and local political support, realized how self-defeating the exclusionary policies were and recommended that the government take steps to reward and incorporate the *castas*. The captain general of Caracas, don José Ceballos, urged such measures in a report to the metropolitan government written in the midst of an effective Spanish counterattack against patriot forces in Venezuela and New Granada. Though General Pablo Morillo had temporarily gained the upper hand, Ceballos was dubious that the four thousand troops under his command could hold the colony for any length of time without widespread political support. Analyzing the local population and which sectors might be convinced to side with the monarchy, he concluded that since European and American Spaniards were a tiny minority, it made little practical sense to uphold their privileges. Instead, the crown should rebuilt its support among the *castas* by "extract[ing] them legally from their inferior class."³⁴ Ceballos wrote that one means of doing so would be to use existing legal mechanisms by which *castas* could be declared legally white and thus freed of the handicaps from which they suffered, which the Constitution of Cádiz and the restored monarchy had unwisely enforced.

Spanish intransigence on the question of slavery, the slave traffic, and lineage created new possibilities for the patriot movements. Though often led by traditional oligarchs like Bolívar, the independence movements required and attracted ever greater support from all sectors of society. Slaves were recruited as soldiers. Free blacks and mulattoes not only served

in but also rose through the ranks of the insurgent armies. When Bolívar returned to Venezuela in 1816 after several years of exile in Jamaica and Haiti, he was greeted by men of color such as Manuel Piar, a general who organized and commanded effective fighting forces that served as the new foundations of the liberation movement.

Most of those who took part in the independence movements filled more humble but nonetheless crucial positions. Throughout the struggles in South America, enslaved men and women claimed their freedom because of their service or that of a family member to the *patria*. The historian Peter Blanchard has recovered many of these claims. In the 1820s, on the eve of independence, an official in the liberating armies in Peru recognized that favoring the freedom of soldiers' spouses was urgent: "I believe that this woman and other slave wives of the soldiers of this Army must be given preference in the lottery offered by the Government to benefit this unfortunate caste; for it is only fair that the first fruits of the endeavors of those who fought for freedom should be their families." This recommendation reflected the wisdom accumulated in the long years of conflict against Spain on the South American continent as slave soldiers and their families became active in the campaigns from the beginning. In 1813 the slave Francisco Estrada went before the court in Buenos Aires to demand freedom for serving the local forces in the invasion of the Banda Oriental (Uruguay). Estrada had taken his family with him, and after two years of hard service he requested that they all be liberated. The enslaved woman Juliana García made similar demands for herself and her children in Buenos Aires in 1818. She and her husband had fled captivity in Montevideo to join the Buenos Aires forces. They trekked throughout the continent, from Montevideo to the heights of Upper Peru (Bolivia), in support of the independence movement. Like other enslaved people, she claimed that the *patria* must reward such dedicated service with liberation.³⁵

Thus, as the liberators fought back against Spain and gradually achieved independence between 1820 and 1824, they had to acknowledge that years of warfare and demands for liberation and equality from the slaves and free blacks serving in the military had weakened slavery and colonial-era racial hierarchies. Political leaders drafted constitutions that did away with the explicit discrimination and segregation that the Constitution of Cádiz defended. Color and lineage would no longer be criteria for active citizenship (though in some places, property would). The new regimes also suppressed the slave trade and passed emancipation

laws. Even though these laws in the main Spanish American slave-holding countries—Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru—were of a decidedly gradual nature and would not end slavery until midcentury (see table 5), they nonetheless differed significantly from the Spanish effort to preserve slavery and to foment the slave trade during the revolutionary crisis. When it came to deciding to abolish slavery in Spanish America, independence mattered.

Table 5. Dates of abolition of slavery in independent Spanish America

Argentina	1853
Bolivia	1851
Central America	1824
Chile	1823
Colombia	1852
Ecuador	1851
Mexico*	1829
Paraguay†	1869
Peru	1854
Uruguay	1842
Venezuela	1854

*With the exception of Texas, still part of Mexico but also caught up in the expansion of slavery in the southeastern United States.

†Forced by Brazil when its armies occupied Asunción during the Paraguayan War (1864–1870).

Source: George Reid Andrews, *Afro-Latin America, 1800–2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 57.

External forces also explain why abolition laws took hold: the British government effectively enforced the suppression of the slave trade to the newly independent republics. In the 1820s Britain made slave trade abolition a condition of recognizing independence. One of the questions that its envoys had to put to new regimes was explicit: "Has it abjured and abolished the Slave Trade?"³⁶ Though the independent governments banned the trade, in some cases even before opening negotiations with Britain, there was pressure after independence to reopen it in some quarters. Peru opened a trade in slaves from Colombia in the 1840s. It also turned to the traffic in indentured Chinese workers, while slaveholders advocated the

resumption of the African slave trade. Uruguay and Argentina circumvented agreements by allowing Portuguese and Brazilian slavers to outfit their ships and to fly their flags for illegal expeditions to Brazil. Britain would respond aggressively to these subterfuges by demanding new treaties (including with Spain and Portugal) that permitted the Royal Navy to seize and destroy ships found with slaving equipment.

British diplomacy and new laws and expectations combined to weaken slavery in the independent republics. Yet slaveholders did not give up without a fight. Chile, Mexico, and the Central American Federation abolished slavery soon after independence, but where slavery was more widespread in South America, efforts to impede final abolition were stubborn; there was in effect a backlash by slaveholders, who sought to reassert the primacy of property rights and, in some countries, to reopen the slave traffic or a close alternative, the trade in indentured Chinese workers.

Despite slaveholders' stubbornness, enslaved people in the newly independent South American republics took advantage of political and legal conditions to force slavery's decline and ultimate demise. Slaves continued to resort to flight, escaping from rural haciendas and seeking cover in urban centers such as Lima and Buenos Aires. Under the new regimes, they could appeal for liberation or transfer to another owner in cases of cruelty or violent treatment. They might win their freedom through lotteries established to liberate a certain number of slaves each year. In several Spanish American cities, emancipation funds managed by political parties and religious associations purchased the freedom of enslaved men, women, and children. In Guayaquil, Ecuador, the local government established a *junta de manumisión* that was to oversee the purchase of freedom by banking deposits from enslaved men and women and by collecting an inheritance tax dedicated to manumission, though the latter source of revenue was less reliable than the former. Indeed, slaves had shown their commitment to such an undertaking from the moment of independence. In 1822 a group of enslaved men petitioned the new government for the right to establish their own manumission fund, whereby each would contribute a portion of their wages to a common pool to be used to purchase the freedom of all. "Liberty for captives has always been a privileged concept," they wrote in their petition. "We hope it will be even more so under the just, humane and honorable government we now enjoy."³⁷

Abolition became a political issue after independence. Liberal parties attacked slavery as a vestige of the colonial past that denied the liberty and

equality promised by the new governments. They used abolitionism as a means to attract electoral support in regions with large free black populations, such as Cauca in southwestern Colombia, where one Liberal Party leader observed that "the slaves who lose their chains bring to society gratitude for the government that has lifted the yoke off them."³⁸ Such tactics reflected how the wars for independence had changed attitudes toward slavery in Spanish American societies. Colonial hierarchies and forms of domination were denuded of their veneer of inevitability. What took shape during the independence struggles in the new Spanish American nations were ideologies that formally declared the equality of all peoples regardless of lineage or status under the colonial regime. These were not slaveholding republics like the United States (or a slave-holding monarchy like Brazil) but republics committed, at least in their stated intentions, to fraternity and equality or, in the words of a recent study of early independent Colombia, to "racial harmony" after long centuries of discrimination. In such political and ideological circumstances, slaveholders could hold onto their property as best they could, but they could not convince the majority that slavery was a social good.³⁹

In this regard, the Spanish American republics differed notably from their North American counterpart. One of the most acute and knowledgeable observers of the New World, the Prussian scientist and traveler Alexander von Humboldt, in 1826 noted the impact that the wars of independence across the Americas had had upon slavery. An advocate of gradual abolition, Humboldt wrote with dismay about the rapid spread of slavery through the southeastern section of the independent United States. In contrast, he praised the leaders of the newly independent Spanish American republics for showing foresight superior to their North American counterparts: "One cannot sufficiently praise the prudence of the legislation of the new republics of Spanish America. Since their origin, they have seriously occupied themselves with the total extinction of slavery. This vast part of the world has in this regard an immense advantage over the meridional part of the United States, where the whites during the war with England established liberty for their own benefit and where the slave population, which now numbers 1.6 million, is growing even faster than the white population."⁴⁰

As Humboldt's observations show, the impact of revolution and independence on slavery was far from homogenous. By the early decades of the nineteenth century, the traffic in enslaved Africans had ceased to flow

to such major plantation centers as Jamaica, Saint-Domingue, and the southern United States. The abolition of slavery was widespread, from the northern states of the independent United States to the independent regimes of Spanish America, though only in Saint-Domingue/Haiti did slavery come to a sudden and radical end. Abolition was seldom a decisive moment of truth but rather the culmination of many struggles, local and international, against the slave trade and slavery. Slavery lingered in much of Spanish America after independence, but the actions of enslaved people, abolitionists, and political parties in combination with the effective ban of the slave trade overcame the rearguard measures of slaveholders who were determined to defend their property.

The Spanish American republics were distinct from other revolutionary American societies in their espousal of racial harmony. The United States disenfranchised most blacks and made slavery even crueler by opening a new slave trade from the old plantation regions to the new cotton frontier. Haiti drove whites from its boundaries as former slaves and free people of color secured their independence from France. In both, independence accentuated racial antagonisms.⁴¹ Spanish American republics did not instantly rid themselves of the colonial legacies of discrimination, but the long wars of independence gave rise to broadly supported efforts to overcome them. During those years the former Spanish colonies traveled a long way from the era of colonization, when even critics of slavery's brutality such as Alonso de Sandoval had justified the institution with the story of Noah's curse on Ham and other biblical sanctions. During the revolutionary era and after independence, in contrast, the language of liberty and equality took root among much of the population; slavery's defenders found themselves in the minority. However, the same could not be said for Latin America as a whole. Huge slave-worked plantations and a flourishing traffic in African captives were still to be found. Both emerged more vital than ever in the independent Brazilian monarchy and in Spain's last American colonies, Cuba and Puerto Rico.

PORTRAIT THREE

Simón Bolívar and the Problem of Equality



✦ THE SPANISH AMERICAN WARS OF INDEPENDENCE UNDERMINED slavery in South America and led many free people of color to aspire to the dismantling of the colonial legal handicaps that enforced inequality. While revolutionary leaders were wary, they ultimately came to understand that such challenges to the colonial order would help them to overthrow Spanish rule. If Spain stood for slavery and legal discrimination, then the independent republics of South America would represent liberty and equality. But doubts persisted among the old colonial elite that now aspired to control free republics. Among the skeptics was the most prominent of the revolutionary leaders, the Venezuelan Simón Bolívar.

Bolívar was keenly attuned to how Spanish American societies had changed because he found himself involved in the clash between the desire for equality and mobility and the need for political and social order during the battles against Spain and then in the postindependence effort to create viable states. In 1816 Bolívar returned to the South American continent after several years of exile in the Caribbean, where he had become an abolitionist. While in Haiti, he promised his benefactor Alexandre Pétion

that he would abolish slavery when he defeated Spain and achieved independence. His major ally upon his return to Venezuela was the mulatto general Manuel Piar, who had organized and trained effective forces in the eastern regions of Venezuela around the Orinoco River. Here Bolívar found the manpower and the regional base from which to begin the reconquest of his home and then to take war to the Spaniards in neighboring colonies. Despite their successes in the region, Bolívar and Piar soon found themselves at odds for control of the revolution. Bolívar took decisive action by having Piar arrested and executed for treason and insubordination. What he feared was that Piar would lead the free population of color against the white leadership, creating a *pardocracia* (rule by the pardos), inspired by the ruler of Haiti and Bolívar's erstwhile supporter, Pétion. Justifying the execution, Bolívar denounced Piar "for proclaiming the odious principles of race war."¹

After independence, Bolívar again confronted what he considered an attempt to impose pardocracia, this time in Gran Colombia by the general José Padilla. Padilla had risen from humble origins in Caribbean Colombia and taken part in the epic struggles of the era, including naval service for Spain at Trafalgar in 1805 (where the British admiral Nelson destroyed the Spanish and French fleets). As Spanish authority began to break down, he chose to serve the cause of independence in Cartagena and Venezuela. He was in exile in Haiti with Bolívar and returned with him to Venezuela in 1816, proving himself in numerous actions against the Spaniards and loyalists, including the liberation of Cartagena in 1821. Yet Padilla soon ran afoul of white elites who distrusted him for his origins and his popularity among the pardos of Gran Colombia. Passed over for the high offices he considered his due, he several times issued manifestoes that denounced the machinations of white leaders. In 1824 he wrote to the people of Cartagena that: "this is not the first attempt by my enemies, the enemies of my class, to discredit me before the government, before my fellow citizens, before the entire world; one can see right away, I don't belong to the *old families*, nor do I draw my origin from . . . the ferocious Spaniards."² His vindication of his rights alarmed Bolívar, still fighting in Peru to drive the Spaniards from their last South American redoubt. To one of his allies, he wrote that Padilla and his admirers "want absolute equality, in the public and domestic areas alike; and next they will want pardocracia, which is their natural and unique propensity, in order to then exterminate the privileged class."³ Though nothing came of the conflict in

1824, when Padilla plotted with other military leaders to take control of Cartagena, in 1828 Bolívar had him arrested and executed, while sending into exile his white coconspirator, Francisco de Paula Santander. Bolívar admitted in letters that his actions spoke of a double standard for whites and nonwhites: "what torments me even more is the just clamor with which those of the class of Piar and Padilla will complain."⁴

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CHAPTER FOUR

The Resurgence and Destruction of Slavery in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Brazil



When we reached the beach, and stood on the sand, oh! how I wished that the sand would open and swallow me up. My wretchedness I cannot describe. It was beyond description. The reader may imagine, but anything like an outline of my feelings would fall very short of the mark. . . . The next boat that was put to sea, I was placed in; but God saw fit to spare me, perhaps for some good purpose. I was then placed in that most horrible of all places,

THE SLAVE SHIP.¹


† SOMETIME IN THE MID-1840S, THAT SLAVE SHIP TRANSPORTED Mahommah Gardo Baquaqua from the great slave port of Ouidah (in present day Benin) to Pernambuco in the Brazilian northeast, a route traversed by hundreds of thousands of captives over the centuries. In Pernambuco the local free population flocked to the newly arrived *tumbeiro*: "When a slaver comes in, the news spreads like wild-fire, and down come all those that are interested in the arrival of the vessel with its cargo of living merchandize." Baquaqua's master in Pernambuco was a baker who lived in

the environs of Recife. He was one of five slaves owned by the family. His immediate task was helping with the construction of a new house, hard labor "such as none but slaves and horses are put to."²

Baquaqua was captured, enslaved, and then transported to Brazil in the 1840s. His fate illustrates how, even as abolitionists suppressed the slave traffic to some parts of the Americas and as revolutionary movements wrecked slavery in Haiti and much of Spanish America, slavery and the traffic became more entrenched in Latin America's largest slave-holding societies: Brazil and Cuba. Though all of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies relied upon slavery and the traffic, the major recipients of the transatlantic trade in the Iberian world were these two countries. Together they accounted for more than half of the 10.7 million captives disembarked on American shores via the Middle Passage from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century, when the traffic was finally suppressed (in 1850 in Brazil, 1867 in Cuba). The nineteenth century remained an era of ferocious slaving, with Brazil receiving over 2 million captives, Cuba more than 700,000.³

The main impetus for the slave traffic from Ouidah and Angola to Brazil continued to be the plantation economy, particularly the coffee fazendas in the southeast (in the period 1826–1850 close to eight hundred thousand slaves were disembarked in the southeast). However, slave-holding was pervasive throughout Brazil's economy and society. That Baquaqua's Pernambucan master was an artisan of modest fortune hints at why the institution was so resilient in Brazil. Brazilians of limited means could hope to enhance their wealth by buying and selling slaves and exploiting their labor in a variety of ways. For example, the freed African Antonio José Dutra became a slaveholder because slaves were the form of property most within the reach of Brazil's middling groups, at least until the suppression of the slave traffic in 1850. Dutra went from enslavement to slave-holding, owning some thirteen slaves whom he employed in his barbershop and his musical band in Rio de Janeiro before his death in 1849.⁴

Yet other elements of Baquaqua's life story reveal that even as the slave traffic continued to flow between Africa and the Americas, commitment to abolition was rooted in many regions of the Atlantic world and influenced Brazil and Cuba. The Pernambucan baker sold Baquaqua to a Rio de Janeiro ship's captain. On a voyage to the United States in 1847, abolitionists in New York City encouraged Baquaqua and other



MAQUINAS DE MOLER.

FIGURE 10. Sugar mill, mid-nineteenth-century Cuba. The Cuban sugar complex was more than a repetition of previous sugar booms in Jamaica and Saint-Domingue because the productive capacity of Cuba's sugar haciendas far surpassed that of its Caribbean predecessors. Planters harnessed cutting-edge technology to slave labor. This image from the Flor de Caña plantation depicts a steam-driven mill with horizontal rollers, both significant improvements on earlier mills that had vertical rollers and were driven by animals, wind, or water. Samuel Hazard, *Cuba with Pen and Pencil* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Low, and Searle, 1873), 366.

slaves aboard ship to flee from their enslavement. The great emporium was once a center of slave-holding, but the state of New York had abolished slavery several decades earlier, as had many of the northern states. Local judges ruled that Baquaqua was not legally entitled to flee from his Brazilian master, but members of the Underground Railroad engineered his escape from New York to Massachusetts and thence to Haiti. In Haiti he joined American Free Baptists who were committed to spreading the gospel and abolishing slavery, much like the British abolitionists of the late eighteenth century. His involvement in those circles ultimately led

him to journey to evangelical and abolitionist strongholds around the Atlantic world, including the Canadian end of the Underground Railroad in Chatham, and finally to Liverpool, where he hoped to find support for a Christian mission to Africa.⁵

The conditions of the Atlantic economy encouraged the expansion of the slave trade, the introduction of new technologies on Latin American plantations, and the opening of vast hinterlands to plantation production, but the currents of abolition and emancipation touched even those places where slavery and the traffic in captives seemed most resilient. The specter of the Haitian Revolution haunted plantation belts and port cities, the Royal Navy and the British government heightened pressure on those governments that protected the slave trade, slaves such as Baquaqua fled their captivity or rebelled against it, and abolitionists like those in New York City who encouraged the Brazilian slave to jump ship agitated against slavery throughout Europe and the Americas. This simultaneous apotheosis and vulnerability of Latin American slavery is the defining feature of its last century of existence.




FIGURE 11. Sugar refining in Antigua, 1820s. William Clark, *Ten Views in the Island of Antigua* (London: T. Clay, 1823).



FIGURE 14. A senzala (slave dwelling), Fazenda Pau D'algo, São José do Barreiro, São Paulo, Brazil. In the nineteenth century coffee surpassed sugar as Brazil's major export crop and slaves flowed to the country's southeast, both from Africa and, after the suppression of the transatlantic trade at midcentury, from other regions. This plan showed Brazilian readers the layout of a Saint-Domingue coffee plantation. Coffee had been in rapid ascent as an export from the French colony in the later eighteenth century, before the Haitian Revolution. After the revolution, Brazilian planters moved to fill the gap in the world market, with slave labor forming the foundation for its new export boom. The slave barracks demonstrate the heightened vigilance and surveillance on the coffee fazendas. Photograph by Dale Tomich, used with his permission.

their movements more closely. The traffic in slaves from Africa grew until midcentury despite British pressure to end the slave trade. In the late 1850s and early 1860s Spanish and Cuban slavers used steamships to carry huge cargoes of captives, as many as fifteen hundred in one voyage.⁸ When the transatlantic traffic entered into crisis, Cuban and Brazilian planters turned to other sources. In Cuba traffic in indentured Chinese workers from the 1840s to the 1870s brought more than one hundred thousand unfree laborers to the island; there was also a trade in defeated Maya rebels

from Yucatán in the 1860s. Puerto Rico lagged far behind Cuba in the scale of its plantation complex. Nonetheless, when faced with the virtual end of the traffic in slaves to the island in the 1840s, planters relied on the colonial state to coerce nominally free peasants onto the large estates as laborers. In Brazil an internal slave traffic decisively shifted the enslaved population to the southeastern coffee regions. This process was already under way before slave-trade abolition in 1850, as the overwhelming number of slaves disembarked in Brazil in the first half of the nineteenth century landed in the southeast. Table 6 gives some indication of this shift from older slave-holding centers in the north (Bahia, Pernambuco) to the center and south (Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, São Paulo).

Table 6. Slave population of Brazil, 1819 and 1872

	1819	1872
North	606,251	508,846
Center	375,855	752,013
South	125,283	249,947
Total	1,107,389	1,510,806

Source: Laird Bergad, *The Comparative Histories of Slavery in Brazil, Cuba, and the United States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 120–21.

Abolitionists were dismayed at how slavery's growth in Cuba and Brazil eluded their intentions. In 1822 the British antislavery leader Thomas Clarkson published a short tract against the African slave trade that was quickly translated into Portuguese, Spanish, and French. The author sounded a bitter and desperate note at the resilience of the traffic in Africa and thence to the Americas: "The melancholy facts which we are going to announce, have generally a reference to the slave-trade, as formerly carried on by the English, yet they are applicable to the same trade as carried on by any nation whatever. . . . Human nature is alike in all the countries of the universe. The evils attendant upon it are not casual: they are inseparable from the very nature of the traffic. Consider, that it is the demand for any article which occasions it to be sold. In the present case, the article consists of *men, women, and children.*"⁹

The abolitionists had gained a tremendous victory when Parliament voted to abolish the traffic to the British colonies in 1807. Moreover, the government followed up on promises of more far-reaching action by negotiating

with other states to bring the traffic to a close. Initially, it appeared that these measures were having some success. The United States banned the trade in 1808. During the negotiations at the Congress of Vienna at the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, Britain brought other governments to the table, including those with the most vested interests in perpetuating the traffic: Spain and Portugal. But by the time Clarkson published his *Cries of Africa to the Inhabitants of Europe*, it was clear that those governments were actively circumventing the treaties signed with Britain. Indeed, the traffic to Cuba and Brazil would reach new heights in spite of formal commitments to restricting or abolishing it. As Clarkson regretfully observed, the market for enslaved people continued to flourish, propelled by the vast demand for tropical commodities like Cuban sugar and Brazilian coffee.

Cuba: Capital of Spanish American Slavery

When the Spanish Crown deregulated the slave trade to Cuba at the end of the eighteenth century, it did so in fits and starts, effectively breaking with more than 250 years of policy. Unlike Portugal with its vast trading network and colonies on the African continent, Spain had no African presence aside from small footholds across the Straits of Gibraltar. The Crown had early on decided to farm out slave trading, first through a system of licenses granted to private individuals and then through the *asientos* sold, or conceded under duress, to foreign powers, most recently in the eighteenth century to the British. After the Seven Years' War, the Crown decided that it needed to develop the plantation economies of its Caribbean colonies to provide greater revenues that would pay for its ongoing clashes with Britain. To that end, it took gradual steps toward developing the slave traffic under its own control. Such measures included the acquisition from Portugal of the islands of Anabón and Fernando Po in the Gulf of Guinea. The hope was that the islands would serve as the kind of trading forts used by the Portuguese, British, French, and other powers to participate in the trade in captives on Africa's west coast. However, for a variety of reasons this sort of regulated trading system did not develop as planned. Instead, under intense lobbying from Havana, Spanish officials opened Cuba and other Caribbean colonies to a virtually free trade in slaves in 1789. Spanish and creole traders could traffic directly with the forts of rival powers in Africa or in neighboring Caribbean colonies such as Jamaica, while foreign slavers could carry slaves to Havana. Spain

had resisted such a system for centuries, but under tremendous military pressure from Britain and lobbying from colonial planters, it finally committed to the wealth promised by plantation production in Cuba and the smaller Caribbean islands.

Havana planters led the charge in urging such reforms, and they were amply rewarded. Madrid implemented a wide array of policies that made planters more secure in their property rights and more attuned to the commercial possibilities of the Atlantic economy. From the end of the eighteenth century Spanish and creole traders began to participate directly in the traffic, carrying human cargoes of vast numbers, such as the Spanish slave ship *Moctezuma*, which disembarked 820 slaves in the early nineteenth century.¹⁰

Opposition to the traffic, while overcome, was widespread, both in Cuba and in Spain. Events in the colony and the metropolis during the resistance to the French occupation of the Iberian Peninsula (1808–1814) give us some sense of the slave trade's opponents. In 1811 the Cortes of Cádiz, while drafting the new constitution, debated a ban on the slave trade to the Americas. One deputy, the Spaniard Agustín de Argüelles, who had spent time in England during the debates over slave trade abolition, sought to take the debate even further; he publicly addressed how slavery itself could be abolished. Havana's pro-slave-trade advocates overcame these first stirrings of Spanish antislavery sentiment in 1811; as we know, the Constitution of 1812 was eloquently mute on the question of slaving and slavery, but pleas for suppression of the traffic continued to circulate in the metropolis. Joseph Blanco White, one of the most astute and persistent critics of the Spanish colonial regime, published an anti-slave-trade tract from his London exile with assistance from the British Foreign Office. Blanco White was acquainted with the leading British abolitionist, William Wilberforce, having translated some of his writings into Spanish. He was also widely read on the topic. Central to his objections to the slave trade was the evidence presented by the explorer Mungo Park, who traveled extensively in West Africa and recounted the machinations of the internal and transoceanic traffics.¹¹ In his antislavery tract of 1814, Blanco White reserved especially harsh words for the Cuban planters who so vigorously defended the slave trade. He asked his Spanish readers to put themselves in the place of the Africans torn from their families and their homes. Having just freed themselves from the French occupation, they must identify with captives victimized by warfare:

Do not forget that you too have seen foreigners set foot in your homeland. Leave in peace that of others. Leave those unhappy Africans the scarce portion of goods that Heaven has bestowed on their land. Leave them in peace so that they can advance little by little along the road of civilization. You should not treat them worse than you would the beasts in the wilderness just because they are poor. They are poor and ignorant. But the same blood runs in their veins that runs in yours. The tears that their eyes shed are just like yours. Like you, they are parents, children, and siblings. Martyrs of Spanish patriotism! . . . From this day forward stop the *Spaniards* from going to the coast of Africa to surpass in cruelty and injustice those invaders that destroyed your soul. You, who know what it is to have them ripped from your homes by foreign soldiers, leave the father his children, the husband his wife.¹²

More direct attacks came from within Cuban slave society. In spite of the profound changes to the Spanish Antilles and the surrounding Caribbean islands, there was strong continuity in many of the legal and religious aspects of slavery in Cuba and Puerto Rico.¹³ Throughout the nineteenth century, enslaved men and women purchased their freedom and demanded the right to change owners once they were *coartados*. They also continued to gather in religious and military associations with long histories in the Caribbean. Free men of color served in *pardo* and *moreno* militia units. Slaves gathered in the *cabildos de nación*, associations based on African ethnic affiliations. The laws, customs, and forms of sociability that had developed over the centuries clashed with the new rigors of the plantation and the deregulated slave trade.

The friction between two different types of slave society sparked into open rebellion in 1812 when Spanish authorities uncovered, and then suppressed with great violence, an island-wide conspiracy of slaves and free people of color intended to abolish slavery.¹⁴ The leader of the aborted uprising was José Antonio Aponte, a free man of color who served in the colonial militia, like his father and grandfather before him, and who belonged to a *cabildo*. The sociability protected in the militias and *cabildos* allowed conspirators, free and enslaved, to gather and to plan and communicate with like-minded groups around the island. Though enslaved and free people lived under different circumstances and had different interests, both suffered increased discrimination and discipline during the plantation and



DULCE-SELLER.

FIGURE 15. Dulce seller, Havana, Cuba. Amid the plantation boom in nineteenth-century Cuba, older forms of enslavement and labor persisted. Not all slaveholders were sugar planters, and not all enslaved people worked cutting and grinding cane. Many slaveholders owned but a single slave, whose labor was their source of income. Enslaved women had for centuries provisioned the cities of colonial Latin America. Working in a cash economy, they might save enough money to begin the process of *coartación*. Their owners might also manumit them, a practice more common in the cities than in the country and more frequent among enslaved women than enslaved men. Samuel Hazard, *Cuba with Pen and Pencil* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Low, and Searle, 1873), 167.

... , then common monarchical political imaginations—references to the king of Spain and the king of Kongo were current in the conspiracy—allowed them to come together to fight against slavery. Surrounding Caribbean influences were also apparent. Aponte recruited supporters to his cause by showing them his *libro de pinturas*, a book of paintings of revolutionary and monarchical figures (which has never been recovered by historians but is known through the voluminous testimony of Aponte and others). Among the book's portraits were those of the great Haitian generals Toussaint Louverture, Henri Christophe, and Jean François. The last was well known in Cuba as Juan Francisco because he had allied with Spanish forces during the battles for control of Saint-Domingue. When Spain signed a peace treaty with France and evacuated its forces in 1795, Juan Francisco arrived in Cuba, where his brief presence clearly had a lasting effect. Thus, even where planters and slavers were most triumphant in the nineteenth century, they still contended with the diverse antislavery forces unleashed in the revolutionary era.

But the traffic's defenders were also highly motivated and actively depicted the trade to Cuba as a positive and necessary factor in the imperial economy as they combated opponents in Spain and in the colony. Even during the revolution in neighboring Saint-Domingue, Cuban planters such as Francisco Arango y Parreño insisted that such a rebellion could never take place in a Spanish colony "because the French looked at slaves as beasts, and the Spanish looked at them as men" protected by wise laws and customs.¹⁵ Two decades later in 1811, in a petition that Arango y Parreño authored on behalf of the municipality of Havana intended to discourage government action against the slave trade, Cuba's planters drew attention to the "immense profit that all branches of our national industry have drawn from devoting the negroes to the service of all of our rural estates." They argued that "without negro slaves, there would not be colonies," an ominous warning to political and business leaders in the metropole.¹⁶ In 1821 one of Cuba's representatives to the Spanish Cortes published a pamphlet to counter those critics of the traffic to Cuba. "I am not, let it be said, a defender of slavery," wrote the priest Juan Bernardo O'Gavan, "but of *work*, without which there is no production, population, energy, wealth, or power; nor is there any means by which to perfect the intelligence of men and to keep them from falling into barbarism, brutality, disorder, and misery."¹⁷ In other words, not only was the traffic vital to the colony and to the metropole but it was also a means

of civilizing barbarous Africans by carrying them to Cuba and forcing them to submit to the salutary labor of the plantation: "Black Africans are the most indolent and lazy of all known people. But they become open to work on the Antillean haciendas, and their creole children are truly robust. . . . In the name of a *well understood* humanity, and to improve the lot of these savages, wise legislators should not only compel them to work but also facilitate and protect their conveyance to the gentle climate of our Antilles."¹⁸

What Arango y Parreño and O'Gavan requested of Madrid, they received, at least in part. Spain offered protection for the slave trade, but in exchange, especially after Spanish American independence, it demanded greater political control and conformity. The slave traffic flowed unabated to Cuba even though Spain signed a treaty with Britain that would bring it to an end in 1820. It soon became clear to contemporaries that Madrid had no intention of enforcing the treaty, as the volume of the traffic actually increased through the 1830s. Puerto Rico, too, tapped into the traffic despite the treaty banning it. Though the traffic and the sugar plantations grew to a new scale in both islands, the slave regimes of the last Spanish colonies differed considerably. A glance at the populations of Cuba and Puerto Rico quickly shows that slavery took root much more deeply in the former (table 7).

Table 7. Population of Puerto Rico and Cuba, 1800

	Slave	Free-Colored	White	Total
Puerto Rico	25,000	65,000	72,000	162,000
Cuba	212,000	114,000	274,000	600,000

Source: George Reid Andrews, *Afro-Latin America, 1800–2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 41.

Cuba and Puerto Rico remained Spanish colonies for the rest of the nineteenth century, in no small part because of the slave trade and the great wealth that flowed from Antillean plantations. After the Spanish American revolutions, Spanish investors and merchants descended upon Cuba in particular, now the focus of Spain's much reduced American empire. To the displeasure of creole elites who wanted to direct the local economy, the Spanish immigrants, such as the Basque Julián Zulueta, came to dominate credit and slaving on the island. They also turned to planting




FIGURE 16. Diagram of the slave ship *Brookes*. Spanish critics of the slave trade to Cuba sometimes borrowed from foreign antislavery advocates. British abolitionists spread this image of the British slave ship *Brookes* throughout the Atlantic world. The Barcelonan translator of the book in which the image appeared wrote that news from Havana of the capture of the slave ship *Relámpago*, carrying more than 150 captives, moved him to publish in Spanish the British abolitionist's bitter denunciation of the slavers. Outraged that the Spanish government refused to enforce the treaty signed with Britain in 1817, he wrote that the traffic was "the most criminal act that man can commit. All of us are horrified to have as a relative or as a friend a man so depraved that he dedicates himself yet to this barbarous traffic." Thomas Clarkson, *Grito de los africanos contra los europeos, sus opresores, o sea rápida ojeada sobre el comercio homicida llamado Tráfico de Negros*, trans. Agustín de Gimbernat (Barcelona, Spain: Imprenta de José Torner, 1825).

themselves, like their creole rivals opening haciendas of vast scale and technological sophistication.²⁹ As planters and slavers constructed robust plantation belts in the early decades of the nineteenth century, they kept a wary eye on the changes that had taken place around them. The period after Spanish American independence witnessed a hardening of Spanish rule in the two islands, despite their loyalty. The demise of slavery elsewhere in the Caribbean benefited the Spanish colonies but it also threatened their stability, shaping official and elite attitudes and policies. Cuba and Puerto Rico were surrounded by independent nations and colonies

that the Spanish government considered enemies and grave threats: Haiti, the British West Indies, and the United States.

The actions and intentions of independent Haiti always preoccupied Spanish officials. In the 1830s Spain finally made a lasting transition to constitutional government after the death of the hated monarch Ferdinand VII. In earlier constitutional eras, 1810–1814 and 1820–1823, Spain had extended new political rights to the colonies. This time, in contrast, Spanish politicians decided to rule the remaining colonies with an iron fist. They voted to expel from the new parliament the Cuban and Puerto Rican deputies until "special laws" applicable to the colonies could be drafted (more on this below). In the meantime, the Spanish captain general of the colony would assume almost unlimited authority. One of the rationales given for this drastic move was the possibility of a slave rebellion like the Haitian Revolution taking place in Cuba. Until well into the nineteenth century, Spanish officials in Havana and San Juan passed rumors back to Madrid about suspected invasions from Haiti. Related to the fear of Haiti was the specter of "Africanization" conjured by Spanish officials and by some Cuban critics of the slave trade. Haiti thus served not only as a symbol of emancipation for some Cubans but also as a pretext for fierce political repression.²⁰

Events in the British Empire also echoed in the Spanish Antilles. The British government sought to terminate the slave trade to Cuba and Puerto Rico through bilateral treaties, naval patrols, and mixed courts in the Caribbean. Spanish governments signed treaties with Great Britain banning the trade in 1817, 1835, and 1845, though they consistently turned a blind eye toward the burgeoning contraband trade to both islands. British pressure could bring Madrid's officials to the bargaining table, but it could not convince them to act decisively to close the trade.²¹ In spite of this complicity, officials and planters feared that the Spanish government would capitulate to British demands, not only banning the trade but also freeing the thousands of slaves illegally imported into the colonies. Such rumors raged in the metropolis and colonies in the early 1850s after the British took preemptive action, using its full naval might, to suppress the Brazilian trade.²²

The abolition of slavery in the British West Indies between 1834 and 1838 was also cause for concern in Cuba and Puerto Rico. Planters and officials worried about abolitionist provocateurs infiltrating the colonies. For instance, in 1837 the Spanish consul in Kingston, Jamaica, reported

to Madrid that antislavery activists "are trying to send some agents from their seat here to the province of Cuba (I fear that some might already be there) with the end of trying to induce the blacks to stage an uprising."²³ Ominous reports also arrived periodically from Spanish representatives in the United States about abolitionist and independence plots.

Finally, Spaniards and Antilleans felt the looming presence of the United States. Though the persistence of slavery in the United States provided ideological and political cover for Spain and its Caribbean colonies, the ambitions of southern slaveholders to annex Cuba as a slave state was yet another regional menace. In the 1840s and 1850s southern filibusters launched raids on Cuba and other Caribbean islands. In the 1850s rumors spread through Cuba and Puerto Rico that five thousand armed men were departing the United States for Santo Domingo. According to reports from San Juan and Havana, once they availed themselves of Santo Domingo and its secure deepwater harbor at Samaná Bay, they would easily take Cuba and Puerto Rico.

Threats to the colonial order came not only from neighbors but also from within the colonies. Apologists like Arango y Parreño and O'Gavan glossed over the nature of the emerging plantation complex by heralding the wisdom of Spanish laws and congratulating themselves for evangelizing and civilizing barbarous Africans. The reality was quite different. Cuban planters resisted the state's efforts to impose new slave codes meant to mitigate the violence of plantation slavery. They sought to reserve justice to themselves as they pressed their slaves into the brutal work conditions of the sugar mills. Like Saint-Domingue and Jamaica in the eighteenth century, Cuba became a slave society marked by great unrest and appalling violence. Homicides and suicides increased during the nineteenth century as some slaves took matters into their own hands, either by killing their tormentors or by seeking release from their suffering on the plantation. While some planters diagnosed suicide as a symptom of African barbarism, less disingenuous observers such as the count of Villanueva, a powerful planter and official, admitted that "their state of servitude should be considered as the main cause of their suicides."²⁴ More organized acts of defiance also took place. The Aponte rebellion of 1812 was but the tip of the iceberg. Smaller uprisings on plantations, often led by African-born slaves, became a feature of the colonial landscape. So did more widespread conspiracies like that of Aponte. In 1844 officials uncovered a plot, known later as the Conspiracy of La Escalera, among

free blacks, slaves, and British abolitionists, the goal of which was to abolish slavery and create a free country under British protection. Spanish officials suppressed the conspiracy in spectacular and brutal fashion, traumatizing colonial society.²⁵

The contentiousness of plantation society was not lost on Spanish governors. In this regional and internal context, the Spanish state opted to clamp down on its Caribbean colonies. Even as Spanish political leaders consolidated constitutional government in the metropole in the 1830s, they erected a regime based on extraordinary military rule in Cuba and Puerto Rico. After the independence of the great majority of the American colonies, Spanish leaders were in no mood to make political compromises with creoles in Cuba and Puerto Rico. Justifying their decision to deny the colonies elected representation and constitutional rights by reference to the threat of slave rebellion, invasion, and other forms of foreign subversion and internal rebellion, Spanish political leaders gradually formulated a colonial regime characterized by "centralization of [military] command, absence of political representation, and degradation of the institutions of the late imperial period."²⁶ Despotic rule nonetheless appeased some sectors of the colonial elite because of the economic trade-offs: with Spanish rule came the continuation of the slave trade in the face of British demands to end it.

Brazil and the South Atlantic

Brazilian slave society differed from Antillean because the slave trade had been entrenched since the sixteenth century and because Brazil's planter class was the ruling class of an independent state. Brazilian independence was a far less conflictive process than the getting of independence in neighboring South American countries such as Venezuela, Argentina, and Peru. The arrival of the royal family in Rio de Janeiro in 1808, in flight from the invading armies of Napoleon and under British protection, signaled a major shift in Portuguese rule. Brazil was now the center of a global empire. Rio's new status as the home of the Court stimulated trade and the export of slave-produced goods. When a revolutionary government in Lisbon insisted that the monarchy return to Europe in 1821, the heir to the Braganza throne, Dom Pedro, made a pact with colonial elites and broke from Portugal in 1822 with minimal use of force.

The independent Brazilian monarchy consolidated economic and social trends at work in the later stages of Portuguese rule. An important

consequence of the Court's arrival in 1808 was the conversion of Rio into a major center of urban slavery. In 1799 slaves made up slightly more than one third of the city's population: 14,986 out of a total population of 43,376. On the eve of independence in 1821 slaves were almost half of the much larger total population of Rio and its environs: 40,376 out of 86,323. Rio was also a very African city: in 1832, 73.3 percent of enslaved people were from Africa; in 1849, 66.4 percent.²⁷

The traffic in slaves to other regions in Brazil increased during the last days of Portuguese rule and the early years of independence. In 1810 and 1815 Portugal signed treaties with its protector, Britain, placing limits on the traffic and calling for its eventual demise. In the short term, the Portuguese agreed to limit slaving to their possessions south of the equator, keeping alive the longtime connection between Brazil and Angola but shutting down operations from the Bight of Benin, the source of hundreds of thousands of enslaved Africans destined for Bahia in the northeast. After independence, the Brazilians not only kept alive the Angola connection but also rejuvenated the traffic from Ouidah on the Bight of Benin.

Bahian merchants had established their dominance in this African region since the early eighteenth century. In the nineteenth century the Bahian-born trader Francisco Félix de Souza, resident in Africa since 1804, reopened the traffic from Ouidah to his native region, which was undergoing a short-lived resurgence in sugar production. Moreover, he founded a new quarter in the city of Ouidah called Brazil, home to his extensive family and to other Brazilian-born merchants and ships' captains. Ouidah's Brazil neighborhood bordered on another district, Maro, home to dozens of Brazilian slaves forcibly returned to Africa after the suppression of a Muslim-led rebellion in Bahia in 1835. Other enslaved and freed Brazilians sojourned in Africa in this era. One such traveler was Rufino José Maria, a *Mâle*, the Brazilian term for Muslim Yorubas. Rufino most likely arrived in Brazil as a captive shortly after independence. By the 1830s he was a free man crisscrossing the Atlantic as a sailor and trader on slavers such as the *Paula* and the *São José* that regularly voyaged to Angola in search of human cargo. On one of Rufino's voyages, aboard the *Ermelinda*, the ship was detained by a British patrol and taken to Sierra Leone, where Rufino settled for several years before returning to Brazil.²⁸

The careers of de Souza and Rufino indicate that Brazil's intimate connection to Africa was uninterrupted by independence. Even as a




FIGURE 17. Coffee vendors, Rio de Janeiro, nineteenth century.

colony, Brazil had carried on much of this traffic outside Portuguese control. What would change after independence was that the local planter class would assume greater political control over their own affairs. Moreover, the weight and direction of the slave traffic would shift from the northeastern sugar regions and the mines of Minas Gerais to the southeastern coffee plantations, as coffee supplanted sugar, gold, and diamonds as the most lucrative export. In 1820, on the eve of independence, 539,000 arrobas of coffee were exported through Rio de Janeiro; by 1859–1860, 10,606,394 arrobas passed through Rio to Atlantic markets (the Brazilian arroba equaled 31.7 pounds). The price fetched by coffee also increased significantly during that time.²⁹

The great coffee barons of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and São Paulo were the political stalwarts of the independent slave-holding state, though there were moments of conflict between planters and the monarchy. The most profound came in 1831 when the emperor Pedro I moved to enforce an earlier agreement with Britain that would squeeze the slave




FIGURE 18. Barbers, Rio de Janeiro, nineteenth century. After the arrival of the Portuguese Court in 1808, Rio de Janeiro's population surged. Slaves and freed people continued to fill many sectors of the urban economy. Jean Baptiste Debret, *Voyage pittoresque et historique au Brésil*, 3 vols. (Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, 1834-1839).

traffic, one of the pillars of the new regime carried over from the old. Pedro I's acquiescence threw Brazil into a temporary crisis. When Pedro abdicated his throne in favor of his young son and a regency government, the Court loosened its control over the vast Brazilian periphery. What ensued was a decade of turmoil that witnessed numerous revolts against the central authority in Rio. Slave uprisings, especially the Muslim revolt in Bahia in 1835, also challenged the dominant order. In response, a new conservative party took shape in the southeastern coffee zones of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, dedicated to restoring the monarchy's authority and defending the slave trade in the face of British pressure. By the 1840s the conservative political group called the *saquaremas* (named for a town in the coffee regions of Rio de Janeiro province) forged a new




FIGURE 19. Senzalas (slave quarters), Fazenda São Luis, Vassouras, Brazil.

partnership with the young emperor Pedro II (r. 1831-1889) upon the pillars of centralized political authority and defense of the slave trade and of slavery.³⁰

One pillar of the new order was shakier than the others: the slave trade. Though Pedro I had sought to assuage Britain, the Brazilian government that succeeded him allowed the traffic to flourish; between 1826 and 1850 the various plantation regions of Brazil combined to import more than one million slaves. Some diehard saquaremas went so far as to advocate openly cancelling the agreement with Britain. In the face of Brazilian defiance, hardened with the ascendancy of Pedro II and the conservatives, the Royal Navy decided to apply decisive force against slavers. In 1850 British warships entered Brazilian ports such as Santos and Cabo Frio, where they bombarded, captured, and burnt ships outfitted for slaving voyages. Brazilian shore batteries were impotent in the face of Britain's superior firepower. These actions provoked an immediate response from the Brazilian monarchy and Council of State. Weighing its options, the council decided that the lesser evil was to pass an effective law prohibiting the slave trade so as to preserve national sovereignty in the face of British aggression. Within a few days the Chamber of Deputies and then the Senate passed a new law with teeth in it for the suppression of the traffic.




FIGURE 20. Man working on drying terraces, Fazenda Cachoeira Grande, Vassouras, Brazil. The historian Stanley Stein took these photographs in the late 1940s in the heart of Brazil's coffee-growing country, the Paraíba Valley. The slave quarters and other buildings, including the planter's home, storehouses, and shelters for animals were built around a beaten earth square, the *terreiro*. After the slaves picked the coffee beans, they stored them in drying terraces in thin layers, which were turned over the course of the day. The Brazilian coffee fazendas relied on fairly simple techniques and tools. The major inputs were land and labor. The planters of Vassouras resisted abolition, clinging tenaciously to an aging labor force. They also worked the land to the point of exhaustion. By the later nineteenth century, the once-booming export economy of Vassouras was in crisis. Dynamism in the coffee sector was to be found in frontier territories in the Paraíba Valley, where planters opened new fazendas with fresh land and relied increasingly on free immigrant labor. Arquivo Edgard Leuenroth/Unicamp.

Brazil's transatlantic trade, the most potent current of enslaved Africans to the Americas, was finally running its course.³¹

The abolition of the slave trade transformed the dynamics of Brazilian slavery, but it did not strike a fatal blow against the great planters of the southeast. They were able to adapt, much like their North American counterparts, by opening an internal traffic that sent slaves from declining or stagnant regions such as the northeast to the expanding coffee zones in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. While they experimented with free labor and pondered the viability of mass immigration of Asian and European workers, the southeastern planters stubbornly clung to slaves as the core of their labor force until abolition.³²

Middling property owners like Antonio José Dutra, the freed African-born slave who established himself in Rio as a barber, musician, and slaveholder, saw their interests and possibilities most damaged by the traffic's suppression. While the traffic from Africa remained open, slaves represented the most accessible form of property in the Brazilian economy: "Slavery was truly ubiquitous in Brazilian life in the early nineteenth century: slaves made up nearly half of Rio's population, and nearly all wealthholders participated in slaveholding." After abolition, the price of slaves in Brazil steadily increased, ultimately pushing middling owners like Dutra out of the market. Slave-holding thus became more concentrated within Brazilian society and more regionally concentrated in the southeastern coffee sector.³³

Slaves, Free People, and Constitutions

Dutra's world illustrates one of the key characteristics not only of Brazilian but also of Antillean slave society: the large free population. In Brazil, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, the enslaved might gain their freedom through self-purchase or manumission. This system had thrived for centuries. However, the equilibrium between slavery and freedom in Cuba and Puerto Rico differed from that in Brazil. In the latter, the free black population had grown in tandem with a large slave population, which was constantly replenished through the south Atlantic slave trade. In Cuba and Puerto Rico, in contrast, the large-scale slave trade was a relatively recent phenomenon. The trade and the rigors of the expanding sugar plantations clashed with the kind of slave societies that had grown in the islands since the sixteenth century. The tension between slavery and freedom was perhaps greater in the Spanish Antilles than it was in Brazil.³⁴

Spain heightened this tension through the constitutional reforms it introduced beginning with the Constitution of Cádiz. Though the metropole governed Cuba and Puerto Rico through exceptional rule, it did so through the fiction of a temporary measure whose contradictions would be ironed out in the future. That is to say, Spain considered the islands to be provinces within the constitutional regime solidified in the 1830s and the residents of the islands to be Spaniards who would one day enjoy the same political and civil rights. However, this fiction of metropolitan and colonial unity carried within it important exclusions. First, the category of Spaniard applied only to those who were free. The hundreds of thousands of slaves in the Caribbean colonies were tacitly excluded from the political community. Second, even free people of color, though considered Spaniards, were barred from the exercise of political rights because of their African lineage. This act of exclusion also affected a large sector of the Antillean population. When the struggles over the legitimacy of Spanish rule and the dismantling of slavery converged later in the century, much of the Cuban and Puerto Rican populace found itself legally and politically marginalized within the Spanish colonial system. Independence would thus gain more adherents among those who found no recourse from Spain, a process parallel to that which unfolded during the breakdown of empire in Spanish America earlier in the century.³⁵

We have seen that this exclusiveness unintentionally provided one of the levers of independence and liberation during the Spanish American revolutions. Though many patriot leaders were deeply wary of recruiting and freeing slaves, once they had decided to do so they found it impossible to proclaim national liberation without demanding the liberation of the enslaved as well. While Spain fought to maintain slavery and a racially exclusive political community, patriot forces, in response to the participation of slaves and free people of color in the wars, turned against slavery and embraced a broad view of citizenship. Over time, Spain found itself increasingly isolated and finally defeated, in no small part because of the loss of loyalty among slaves and free blacks in Spanish America. A similar dilemma would confront the Spanish colonizers when rebellion broke out in Cuba in 1868.

In contrast to Spanish intransigence, independent Brazil adopted a more flexible and open political community that incorporated free Brazilian-born (but not African-born) blacks as citizens. Those creoles

liberated from slavery would thus find some inclusion within the fledgling state, though wealth and property remained qualifications for the full exercise of political rights.

During the revolutionary era, the Portuguese Court had avoided the fate of its Spanish counterpart by fleeing the Iberian Peninsula under British protection and reestablishing itself in Rio de Janeiro. With the imperial center now located in the Americas, the Portuguese were especially sensitive to events in the neighboring Spanish American colonies. They were also well aware of the constitutional debates taking place in Cádiz. Indeed, when the Lisbon Cortes met in 1821 and 1822 to remake the Portuguese domains as a constitutional monarchy, it borrowed heavily from Spain's 1812 constitution.³⁶ However, in this foundational moment the Portuguese and Brazilian divergence from Spanish attitudes toward the enslaved and free blacks was striking. Portuguese deputies proposed duplicating the measures from the Constitution of Cádiz that openly discriminated against large sectors of the colonial populace. They met with strong resistance from Brazilian deputies who insisted that banning the free Brazilian-born population from the exercise of political rights would lead to significant unrest in the colony. Ultimately the Portuguese deferred to the Brazilians. Soon thereafter Dom Pedro led the break from Portugal and oversaw the drafting of the Brazilian constitution. Once more defenders of enfranchisement carried the day.

Brazilian framers were not necessarily more egalitarian than their Spanish counterparts. They were responding to a distinct colonial reality and adapting it to the new regime. Colonial Brazil differed from colonial Spanish America in that it had a direct link to Africa, especially Angola, via the slave trade and other commercial networks over the centuries. The traffic to Brazil was thus more constant and more voluminous. Historians have argued that the counterpart to the constant traffic in slaves was a steady reliance on *alforria*, manumission or self-purchase, as a means of maintaining social equilibrium in the colony. Not only did Brazil have a huge enslaved population, but it also had a huge and growing free black and mulatto population. Such was the system that Brazilian political leaders sought to protect after independence: stalwart commitment to the slave trade and to slavery coupled with a modest policy of *alforria* and political and economic inclusion among the free population. Ironically, then, commitment to broader political rights in Brazil derived in part from a staunch pro-slavery and pro-traffic ideology.³⁷

Abolition

If slavery was so firmly entrenched in the economic, social, and political orders of these nineteenth-century Latin American slave societies, how did it finally come to an end? Unlike the United States, where civil war destroyed slavery suddenly, in Brazil and the Spanish Antilles abolition was a gradual, tortuous process. Multiple antislavery initiatives involving armed uprisings, legislation, and the actions of enslaved people and abolitionists chipped away at the rambling but sturdy edifice of slavery in Brazil and the Spanish Antilles. The governments and the big planters used delaying tactics as best they could so that enslaved labor would remain at the core of the plantation. But broad mobilization against slavery would ultimately force them to relent (see table 8).

TABLE 8. Benchmarks in the abolition process, Spanish colonies and Brazil

1868	Uprising for independence takes root in Cuba's eastern provinces (i.e., outside the major plantation and population centers). The war would continue until 1878. Leaders of the rebellion abolish slavery in the regions they control.
1870	Moret Law passed in Spain. Gradual measure affecting Cuban and Puerto Rican slavery: frees those born to enslaved mothers but binds them to owners until adulthood. Frees those age sixty and over.
1871	Rio Branco Law passed in Brazil. Similar to the Moret Law. Frees those born to enslaved mothers, also binding them to owners.
1873	Spanish Cortes abolishes Puerto Rican slavery. <i>Libertos</i> (freed slaves) required to sign three-year contracts with former owners.
1878	The Pact of Zanjón brings to an end the war in Cuba. One of the measures emancipates those slaves who fought in the separatist insurgency.
1880	<i>Patronato</i> system promulgated by Spanish government. Cuban slaveholders, now called <i>patronos</i> , still entitled to labor of <i>patrocinados</i> (the enslaved). Sets 1888 as deadline for complete abolition.
1885	Saraiva-Cotegipe Law in Brazil liberates the elderly (sixty-five and over).
1886	Definitive abolition of Cuban slavery.
1888	Princess Isabel, regent of Brazil, signs the Golden Law, abolishing slavery.

The decade of the 1860s was the turning point for Antillean slavery. The U.S. Civil War and slave emancipation, along with a renewed British initiative against the slave trade, forced the Spanish government to begin tinkering with the colonial regime. Most importantly, discussions of slavery's fate commenced. The Spanish Abolitionist Society, composed

mostly of Puerto Rican and Spanish liberals and republicans, organized in Madrid. The government definitively banned the slave trade in 1867. It also convened a body of Spanish and Antillean experts to deliberate on the amelioration and gradual abolition of slavery. At the time, the slave populations of the two islands differed significantly: that of Cuba was over 370,000, that of Puerto Rico around 40,000.³⁸

The most disruptive events occurred in 1868—the outbreak of revolution in Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. Like the French invasion of Spain in 1808, the political tumult of 1868 initiated a period of unrest and uncertainty that tested the strong commitment to colonial slavery. The most central of these in shaping the fate of colonial slavery was the Cuban uprising in the island's eastern end. Slavery's fate came to the fore because of warfare, as in the Spanish American revolutions. Once again the Spanish government sought to protect the interests of slaveholders, even as it initiated abolition, while the independence movement soon turned against slavery, in no small part because of the support it received from the enslaved in the regions where it was active. Led by slaveholders on the margins of the colonial regime, the rebellion had the unintended effect of crippling slavery because slaves fled from their masters to the insurgency. The language of national liberation became entwined with the idea of liberation from slavery. Ultimately, the rebel leadership capitulated to facts on the ground and declared slavery abolished in its territories soon after the uprising.³⁹

Developments in the colonies had an impact on metropolitan politics. Under a new constitutional monarchy (the Bourbon monarch Isabel II had fled into exile after the 1868 revolution) led by liberals and republicans after decades of conservative dominance, the Spanish government formulated a gradual emancipation law, the Moret Law of 1870, named for Segismundo Moret y Prendergast, the minister of overseas provinces. Moret sought to assuage the concerns of Antillean planters, the military, and metropolitan merchants and producers with vested interests in the colonial market. The law liberated all children born to enslaved women but tempered their freedom by binding them to their mother's owner until they reached adulthood. It also liberated the elderly (those sixty and over) and sought to curb excessive corporal punishment.⁴⁰

Resistance and criticism were immediately forthcoming. Public demonstrations in Spanish cities denounced the government for catering to the interests of the Antillean planter class rather than to the enslaved workers of Cuba and Puerto Rico. A report from an antislavery demonstration in

Seville in 1873 showed the jubilation at these new challenges to the Cuban and Spanish defenders of slavery. Among those carrying banners bearing antislavery slogans was a black man who "was hailed by a black woman from a balcony. She asked for liberty for her race. The black man answered her, waving his banner. Energetic and frantic applause and cries of long live liberty for the slaves interrupted his sentences."⁴¹

The Spanish Abolitionist Society attacked the Moret Law as timid, unjust, and impolitic. The abolitionists argued that immediate abolition would undercut the Cuban uprising by winning the loyalty of the enslaved population. They also believed that immediate abolition was in the best interest of the Antillean and Spanish economies. Diehard economic liberals in the society held that once true market relations and individual liberty were introduced in the colonies, wealth would expand significantly. Citing the examples of emancipation in other New World settings, they argued, somewhat misleadingly, that only such radical action would avert a crisis in the Antillean economies. Puerto Rican abolitionists were instrumental in developing this argument in cooperation with doctrinaire liberals in Spain. With slavery declining on the island, many reformers, and some planters, believed that abolition with indemnification would benefit the plantation sector.

In contrast, Cuban slavery continued to thrive and planters there remained defiant. For Cuban planters, the Moret Law was a grave threat to their property and to the productivity of their plantations. Like planters in the Brazilian southeast, they clung to a core slave labor force until the final moment of abolition. Laird Bergad has shown that one effect of the Moret Law, which freed tens of thousands of slaves on both islands, was to concentrate enslaved workers in the most productive sugar-producing regions of Cuba. Astrid Cubano-Iguina has shown a similar dynamic at work in Puerto Rico, where planters were generally more amenable to some form of compensated abolition. The arch-conservative planter José Ramón Fernández opened perhaps the largest sugar plantation in the colony in the environs of Manatí in the 1850s. He fought bitterly against the abolitionists through the 1860s and 1870s while he continued to buy slaves to work on his Hacienda Esperanza.⁴²

In Puerto Rico, such planter resistance was less successful. Indeed, slaves on the Hacienda Esperanza found allies among Puerto Rican abolitionists, who encouraged them to flee or helped them secure freedom through legal means.⁴³ Moreover, the Spanish Abolitionist Society and

its political allies were more inclined to attack Puerto Rican slavery head on because the total slave population was so much smaller than Cuba's. In 1873 the Spanish Cortes passed an abolition law that freed the more than twenty thousand men and women who remained enslaved in Puerto Rico. However, conservative opponents did succeed in throwing up one more hurdle to freedom. The libertos (freed slaves) of Puerto Rico were legally required to work for their former masters for an additional three years.

In Cuba, the path to abolition was longer and more treacherous. When the Spanish general Arsenio Martínez Campos negotiated a peace agreement with the independence movement after ten years of warfare, the Pact of Zanjón, he recognized the emancipation of slaves who had joined the rebel ranks. But during the war the Spanish military had successfully controlled the western and central regions, home to the vast majority of the plantations and the enslaved men and women who toiled on them. In 1880 the metropolitan government passed a new law that abolished slavery in name but upheld it in practice. Beginning in that year, slaveholders were to be called *patronos* and their slaves *patrocinados*. Implied in this language was the idea of protection rather than domination. In reality, the new system, called the *patronato*, maintained prerogatives traditionally exercised by slaveholders, including the right to use corporal punishment and to sell their *patrocinados* (see figures 1 and 2). This measure was another concession to the big sugar planters who were determined to hold onto their enslaved workers.

Yet the new regime did include some significant innovations that proved to be "a set of weapons with which those *patrocinados* willing and able to press their claims could attack their masters."⁴⁴ Among these were a firm date for abolition in eight years, quotas that liberated a large percentage of *patrocinados* beginning in 1884, the right of *patrocinados* over eighteen to receive stipends for their labor, measures to ensure the integrity of families and proper supply of food and clothing, education and provision for freed children, and an enhanced process of self-purchase. The government also established greater oversight of its own rules, weakening the usual predominance of the slaveholder. Moreover, once the rebellion came to an end in 1878, abolitionist sentiment spread among sectors of colonial society that were eager to make the full transition to free labor and to help *patrocinados* take advantage of their new protections.

In this transformed legal and political setting, many *patrocinados* pushed hard to liberate themselves and their families. Of the 113,887

patrocinados, some 13,003 (11 percent) achieved freedom by indemnifying their patrono; 7,423 (7 percent) gained their liberation when oversight juntas ruled that their patronos were not living up to the measures prescribed by the patronato. In other words, enslaved people hastened their liberation by buying their way out of the patronato or by denouncing their patrono for violation of the 1880 law. This latter tactic was used by twenty-nine patrocinados who in 1881 denounced the plantation owner for failing to pay them their stipend. When he responded that he had given them credit at the plantation store, they answered that they paid for their own goods by bartering with the storekeeper. Ultimately the junta in Havana sided with the patrocinados and ordered them freed.⁴⁵ So effective were these initiatives that in 1886 the government abolished the patronato, two years before it was set to expire. Latin American slavery was now limited to one country: Brazil.

As in most Latin American countries, war disrupted the stability and legitimacy of slavery in Brazil. During the Paraguayan War that pitted Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina against Paraguay between 1864 and 1870, several thousand slaves were freed for fighting for the Brazilian army when the government purchased them from their owners. There were also some runaways who found shelter in the army.⁴⁶ Nonetheless, politics, not warfare, were paramount in ending Brazilian slavery. Though the southeastern planters adapted successfully to the Atlantic trade's suppression, they faced a serious challenge from an unsuspected quarter: Pedro II, the emperor whose throne they had strengthened. In response to the war, emancipation in the United States, and the Spanish government's tentative first steps toward abolition, the emperor undertook a campaign within the corridors of power to begin an emancipation process in Brazil. Through parliamentary maneuvering, Dom Pedro succeeded in securing the Rio Branco Law of 1871, a free womb law that resembled in many ways the Moret Law of 1870, though it did not liberate the elderly as the Spanish law did.⁴⁷

The resemblance was no coincidence. The Brazilian government closely followed the emancipation process in Cuba and Puerto Rico. Its representative in Madrid regularly dispatched copies of Spanish laws and debates as well as summaries of the latest news from the Antilles. These would come to include the Moret Law (which was also debated actively in learned and political circles in provincial capitals such as Pernambuco), the law abolishing slavery in Puerto Rico in 1873, and information about

the traffic in indentured Chinese workers that flourished in Cuba from the 1840s to the 1870s.⁴⁸

Once again, however, Brazilian planters effectively countered the measure despite being overridden by the emperor. The Rio Branco Law gave slaveholders the choice of reserving for themselves the labor of those children until they reached adulthood or turning them over to the imperial government when they reached the age of eight. The government would then assume responsibility for their education and compensate the owner. Historians have found that they overwhelmingly opted for the first choice. By 1884 the government reported that of the 363,307 children registered as free, only 113 were in the care of the state. Those born free by the letter of the law found themselves bound to slaveholders in practice.⁴⁹

The futility of the Rio Branco Law and the 1885 Saraiva-Cotegipe Law that would free the elderly but strengthened certain slaveholder prerogatives ultimately provoked a widespread antislavery movement in Brazil, one instigated not by the monarchy but by frustrated enslaved people, politicians, professionals, and artisans in cities such as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Santos. Local governments in regions peripheral to the slave economy, such as Ceará, also took matters into their own hands when it became clear that conservative politicians in Rio and southeastern planters were more than able to thwart abolition. The diagnosis of the most prominent abolitionist, Joaquim Nabuco, son of an eminent politician from Pernambuco and himself a rising star in the capital, points to the sense of betrayal and distrust felt by many Brazilians after the obvious failures of the Rio Branco Law to make serious inroads against slavery:

Since the law of September 28, 1871, was passed, the Brazilian government has been trying to make the world believe that slavery has ended in Brazil. Our propaganda has tried to spread to other countries the belief that the slaves were being freed in considerable numbers, and that the children of the slaves were being born *entirely* free. . . .

The Brazilian people, however, understand the entire matter. They know that after the passage of the law of September 28 the life of the slaves did not change, except for those few who managed to redeem themselves by begging for their freedom.⁵⁰



FIGURE 21. Sign from an immigrant hostel, São Paulo, Brazil. Although Brazilian government and business leaders had sounded the idea of large-scale immigration of free laborers since independence, only with the approaching demise of slavery did serious efforts at recruitment, carried out by various branches of government and by private organizations, get underway. Workers, in turn, were less than eager to migrate to a society where slavery, and therefore the legal possession and abuse of labor, was still in place. But as slavery came to an end, the floodgates to São Paulo and other parts of Brazil were opened. In total, from 1882 to 1934 more than 2.3 million immigrants came to São Paulo, mostly from southern Europe but also from Asia. Cuba, too, became a site of mass migration, largely from Spain. Between 1880 and 1930 approximately one million Spaniards immigrated to the island. There was also significant intra-Caribbean immigration in the early twentieth century. One goal among planters and other employers in encouraging immigration was to flood the labor market to keep down wages. Photograph by the author.

Spurred by skepticism concerning the government's intentions, different groups and governments throughout the Brazilian Empire worked against slavery. Many cities had private emancipation funds, such as the *Emancipadora* of São Paulo, that purchased the freedom of slaves from their owners. Also in São Paulo, Luiz Gama, a *rábula* (a type of attorney) who was sold as a child into slavery by his own Portuguese father,

specialized in winning the freedom of people illegally enslaved according to the terms of the anti-slave-trade agreement with Britain. Before his death in 1882 he helped liberate more than five hundred enslaved people. By the 1880s these small-scale efforts to liberate some slaves were coalescing to undermine slavery as a whole. By that time, such an attack was necessarily aimed at the southeastern coffee plantations where the internal traffic had concentrated the vast majority of the empire's slaves.⁵¹

The planters were sensitive to their isolation and took some measures to counter it. They sought to increase their policing power by deputizing the military, but the army refused to cooperate. Even though they had aggressively traded with other Brazilian provinces since the ban on the transatlantic traffic in 1850, they sponsored legislation banning the internal trade so as to preserve significant slave populations, and thus slaveholding interests, in other provinces. Some also promoted immigration from Europe as a way of recruiting new workers once slavery came to an end, though it was only when slavery was finally abolished that European immigrants started arriving in significant numbers.⁵²

These maneuvers failed to win allies or to impede the increasingly confrontational tactics of the abolitionists and slaves. Ceará and other peripheral provinces abolished slavery within their borders. Abolitionists in the core regions undertook more aggressive actions, especially those based in São Paulo and Santos. Leaders such as Antônio Bento organized raids on coffee plantations, the goal of which was to encourage mass flight by slaves. Slaves led by the abolitionists escaped on foot or by rail to the cities so that the quilombos of Santos and Rio de Janeiro swelled. The quilombo in the Rio neighborhood of Leblon became famous as a site of abolitionism. The main product of the local economy was the camellia, known as the *camélia da liberdade* (the camellia of liberty), a symbol and secret password for abolitionists in the southeast that joined opponents of slavery across the social spectrum, from the runaways of Leblon to Princess Isabel, daughter of the emperor, who was known to wear them at public events. Increasingly isolated and faced with unrelenting civil disobedience by abolitionists and the enslaved, the conservatives of São Paulo finally relented as Princess Isabel, regent of Brazil while her father, Dom Pedro, was absent from the country, signed the Golden Law of 1888 that brought Brazilian slavery to an end.⁵³

In both Brazil and Cuba the abolition of slavery brought with it the subversion and overthrow of the regime created to defend slavery. In Cuba

abolition would strengthen the independence movement. The ideal of an egalitarian nation forged in the struggles for independence and the abolition process remained potent. The convergence of anticolonial and anti-slavery mobilization undermined the regime constructed in the first half of the nineteenth century on the foundations of the slave trade, slavery, and political exclusion of various kinds. Just nine years after the abolition of slavery, a new and much larger war for Cuban independence broke out in 1895 with an explicitly egalitarian, anti-racist political ideology. As in Spanish South America in the 1810s and 1820s, the long legacy of slavery and formal discrimination came to be seen as incompatible with the promises of an independent nation.⁵⁴

The actions of former slaves were essential in pushing Spanish rule in Cuba to the brink. In Brazil the actions of slaves and abolitionists in the 1880s precipitated a political crisis and abolition, but it was the planters who helped to bring down the imperial government a year later in 1889.⁵⁵ The Crown's efforts since the 1860s to abolish slavery created a rift with the southeastern planters who had formed the backbone of its legitimacy since independence. The decision to capitulate to the civil disobedience of the 1880s, abolishing slavery immediately and without indemnification, turned the planter class against the monarchy. When the military rose and declared a republic in 1889, the monarchy was isolated because, without slavery, it could no longer count on the powerful slave-holding allies who had defended it since independence. They watched passively and approvingly on the sideline as the Braganza dynasty came to an inglorious end.

The dynasty's passing was historically significant. Since the fifteenth century, African slavery had been entwined with Iberian expansion and colonization in the Atlantic world. That the offshoot of the Portuguese monarchy in Brazil capitulated underscored the close link between slavery and the old political and social order, as had the overthrow of the Spanish monarchy earlier in the century. Such connections were clear to contemporaries. In 1892, four hundred years after Columbus's first voyage to the Caribbean, when the admiral pondered enslavement as the core of new overseas settlements, the writer and political leader Juan Gualberto Gómez commented during the festivities marking the anniversary in Havana that: "One would imagine that we Cubans are all fraternally united in the effort to commemorate in the same manner and with equal passion the Fourth Centennial of the discovery of America; that we have suspended the political fights, put aside all opposing ideas and tendencies,

and forgotten all that divides and separates us."⁵⁶ Such equanimity was impossible, he argued. The four hundredth anniversary of Columbus's voyage confronted Cubans with the divisive legacies of conquest and colonization: the subordination of the colony to Spain and the whole bundle of practices and institutions that perpetuated inequality based on wealth, color, and lineage. Like other Latin Americans, Gómez hoped that the end of slavery would lead to a new era of equality. While abolition was the crucial first step, it was also the beginning of the new struggle to bring all people into the full exercise of freedom as citizens in independent nations.

Notes

Introduction

1. Sociedad Abolicionista Española, *El cepo y el grillete (la esclavitud en Cuba)* (Madrid: Sociedad Abolicionista, 1882 [?]), 12–13. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.
2. Sociedad Abolicionista, *El cepo y el grillete*, 19.
3. Sociedad Abolicionista, *El cepo y el grillete*, 21 (emphasis in the original).
4. George Reid Andrews, *Afro-Latin America, 1800–2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 41; Leslie Bethell and José Murilo de Carvalho, “1822–1850,” in *Brazil: Empire and Republic, 1822–1930*, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 45–46; Rebecca J. Scott, *Slave Emancipation in Cuba: The Transition to Free Labor, 1860–1899* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 7. On the number of slaves who reached Latin American shores via the transatlantic traffic, see Estimates Database, 2009, *Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database*, <http://www.slavevoyages.org>, accessed June 21, 2010. Note that the database at [slavevoyages.org](http://www.slavevoyages.org) is an ongoing research project, so the figures undergo refinement.
5. See the cogent summary in David Eltis, “Was the Abolition of the U.S. and British Slave Trade Significant in the Broader Atlantic Context?,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 66 (October 2009): 715–36.

49. Fray Iñigo Abbad y Lasierra, *Historia geográfica, civil y natural de la Isla de San Juan de Puerto Rico* (Río Piedras, Puerto Rico: Editorial Universitaria, 1966), 185.
50. Abbad, *Historia geográfica*, 154–56.
51. Abbad, *Historia geográfica*, 157–58.
52. See the cogent summary of Cuban reforms in Allan J. Kuethe, “The Early Reforms of Charles III in the Viceroyalty of New Granada, 1759–1776,” in *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru*, ed. John R. Fisher, Allan J. Kuethe, and Anthony MacFarlane (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 25–29. See also Kuethe’s in-depth study *Cuba, 1753–1815: Crown, Military, and Society* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986); and Aline Helg, *Liberty and Equality in Caribbean Colombia, 1770–1835* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).
53. Kuethe, “Early Reforms of Charles III,” 27.
54. See the summary in Hubert H. S. Aimes, *A History of Slavery in Cuba, 1511–1868* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1907), 20–53; and David R. Murray, *Odious Commerce: Britain, Spain and the Abolition of the Cuban Slave Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 1–21. For an important overview of Spanish policies regarding the slave trade, see Josep M. Delgado i Ribas, “De la marginalidad a la centralidad: La trata de esclavos en el sistema imperial español,” in *Slavery, Antislavery, and Empire: Spain and Spanish America in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Josep M. Fradera, Stephen Jacobson, and Christopher Schmidt-Nowara (forthcoming). On Arango y Parreño and his vision of Cuban plantation society, see Manuel Moreno Fraginals, *The Sugarmill: The Socioeconomic Complex of Sugar in Cuba, 1760–1860*, trans. Cedric Belfrage (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976); and Dale Tomich, “The Wealth of Empire: Francisco Arango y Parreño, Political Economy, and the Second Slavery in Cuba,” in *Interpreting Spanish Colonialism: Empires, Nations, and Legends*, ed. Christopher Schmidt-Nowara and John Nieto-Phillips (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005), 55–85.
55. See Jacques A. Barbier, “Commercial Reform and Comercio Neutral in Cartagena de Indias, 1788–1808,” in Fisher, Kuethe, and MacFarlane, *Reform and Insurrection*, 96–120; P. Michael McKinley, *Pre-Revolutionary Caracas: Politics, Economy, and Society, 1777–1811* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Johnson, “Manumission.”
56. The origins and motivations of British antislavery efforts are matters of long-standing debate and controversy. A good introduction can be found in Thomas Bender, ed., *The Antislavery Debate: Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem in Historical Interpretation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
57. Christopher Leslie Brown, *Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 33–101. See also David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975).
58. Christopher Leslie Brown, “Empire without Slaves: British Concepts of Emancipation in the Age of the American Revolution,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 56 (April 1999): 280.
59. Sharp became involved in imperial matters through his defense of enslaved blacks in Britain. See Simon Schama, *Rough Crossings: Britain, the Slaves, and the American Revolution* (New York: Ecco, 2006), 21–57.
60. Brown, “Empire without Slaves,” 286–91.

Portrait Two

1. L. Virginia Gould, “Urban Slavery-Urban Freedom: The Manumission of Jacqueline Lemelle,” in *More than Chattel: Black Women and Slavery in the Americas*, ed. David Barry Gaspar and Darlene Clark Hine (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 298–314.
2. Júnia Ferreira Furtado, *Chica da Silva: A Brazilian Slave in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 131–32.
3. Furtado, *Chica da Silva*, 111.

Chapter Three

1. My account of the events in Puerto Rico comes from the documents collected in “Intento de sublevación, 6 de mayo de 1812,” in Centro de Investigaciones Históricas, *El proceso abolicionista en Puerto Rico: Documentos para su estudio*, vol. 1, *La institución de la esclavitud y su crisis, 1823–1873* (San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1974), 115–32.
2. “Intento de sublevación,” 125–26.
3. “Intento de sublevación,” 126.
4. “Intento de sublevación,” 117.
5. See Guillermo A. Baralt, *Esclavos rebeldes: Conspiraciones y sublevaciones de esclavos en Puerto Rico (1795–1873)*, 3rd ed. (Río Piedras, Puerto Rico: Ediciones Huracán, 1989), 27–28.
6. This discussion draws upon Benjamin Quarles, *The Negro in the American Revolution* (1961; Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Ira Berlin and Ronald Hoffman, eds., *Slavery and Freedom in the Age of the American Revolution* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1983); and Davis, *Problem of Slavery*.
7. Quoted in Quarles, *Negro in the American Revolution*, 19.
8. Quarles, *Negro in the American Revolution*, 28.

9. See Allan J. Kuethe, *Cuba, 1753–1815: Crown, Military, and Society* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986), 78–112; Leví Marrero, *Cuba: Economía y sociedad*, vol. 13 (Madrid: Editorial Playor, 1986), 134–42; and Garrigus, *Before Haiti*, 205–10.
10. See the essays by Philip D. Morgan and Allan Kulikoff in Berlin and Hoffman, *Slavery and Freedom*.
11. Quoted in Brown, *Moral Capital*, 362.
12. James Ramsay, “Examination of The Rev. Mr. Harris’s Scriptural Researches on the Licitness of the Slave Trade” (1788), in *The Slave Trade Debate: Contemporary Writings For and Against* (Oxford, UK: Bodleian Library, 2007), 249.
13. James Ramsay, “An Inquiry into the Effects of Putting a Stop to the African Slave Trade, and of Granting Liberty to the Slaves in the British Sugar Colonies,” (1784), in *Slave Trade Debate*, 46.
14. Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944); Seymour Drescher, *Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of Abolition* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977). See also the critique of Williams and Drescher in Dale Tomich, “Spaces of Slavery, Times of Freedom: Rethinking Caribbean History in World Perspective,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 17 (1997): 67–80.
15. Quoted in Adam Hochschild, *Bury the Chains: Prophets and Rebels in the Fight to Free an Empire’s Slaves* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), 50. See also Schama, *Rough Crossings*, 44–57.
16. Equiano identified himself in his work as “Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African.” Until recently historians, including Vincent Carretta, accepted his claim of African birth, his recounting of his capture and enslavement in Africa, and his description of the Middle Passage. However, Carretta has raised questions about Equiano’s origins because of documentary evidence he uncovered: baptismal and naval records that indicate South Carolina as Equiano’s birthplace. See his book *Equiano, the African: Biography of a Self-Made Man* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2005). Carretta has debated this question with Paul Lovejoy. Lovejoy defends the accuracy of Equiano’s claims by inferring his Igbo identity and worldview, while Carretta concludes that, short of new evidence, historians cannot decide if he was African- or American-born. See Paul Lovejoy, “Autobiography and Memory: Gustavus Vassa, alias Olaudah Equiano, the African,” *Slavery and Abolition* 27 (December 2006): 317–47; Vincent Carretta, “Response to Paul Lovejoy’s ‘Autobiography and Memory: Gustavus Vassa, alias Olaudah Equiano, the African,’” *Slavery and Abolition* 28 (April 2007): 115–19; and Lovejoy, “Issues of Motivation—Vassa/Equiano and Carretta’s Critique of the Evidence,” *Slavery and Abolition* 28 (April 2007): 121–25. See also Hochschild, “Where Was Equiano Born?” in *Bury the Chains*, 369–72. The question, and relevance, of Equiano’s origins is also taken up in James Sweet, “Olaudah Equiano, Domingos Álvares, and the Methodological Challenges of Studying the African Diaspora,” *American Historical Review* 114 (April 2009): 279–306.
17. Olaudah Equiano, “The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African. Written by Himself,” (1789), in *The Interesting Narrative and Other Writings*, ed. and intro. Vincent Carretta (New York: Penguin, 1995), 62–63.
18. Equiano, “Interesting Narrative,” 235.
19. On the travails of the Sierra Leone endeavor, see Schama, *Rough Crossings*.
20. On British mobilization and the politics and ideology of abolitionism, see Davis, *Problem of Slavery*; Seymour Drescher, *Capitalism and Antislavery: British Mobilization in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Drescher, *The Mighty Experiment: Free Labor versus Slavery in British Emancipation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Howard Temperley, *British Antislavery, 1833–1870* (London: Longman, 1972). On British efforts against the major slavers in Portugal, Spain, Brazil, and Cuba, see Leslie Bethell, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil, and the Slave Trade Question, 1807–1869* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Murray, *Odious Commerce*; and João Pedro Marques, *The Sounds of Silence: Nineteenth-Century Portugal and the Abolition of the Slave Trade*, trans. Richard Wall (New York: Berghan Books, 2006).
21. See David Patrick Geggus, ed., *The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001); and Dale Tomich, *Through the Prism of Slavery: Labor, Capital, and World Economy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004).
22. This discussion of the Haitian Revolution relies on C. L. R. James, *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution*, 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage, 1963); Robin Blackburn, *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848* (London: Verso, 1988), 161–264; Fick, *Making of Haiti*; David Patrick Geggus, *Haitian Revolutionary Studies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*; and Miranda Frances Spieler, “The Legal Structure of Colonial Rule during the French Revolution,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 66 (April 2009): 365–408.
23. See Drescher’s comparison of antislavery movements in *Capitalism and Antislavery*, 52–57.
24. John D. Garrigus, “Thy Coming Fame, Ogé! Is Sure: New Evidence on Ogé’s 1790 Revolt and the Beginnings of the Haitian Revolution,” in *Assumed Identities: The Meanings of Race in the Atlantic World*, ed. John D. Garrigus and Christopher Morris (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 19–45; and Garrigus, *Before Haiti*, 195–263.
25. Geggus, “The ‘Swiss’ and the Problem of Slave/Free Colored Cooperation,” in *Haitian Revolutionary Studies*, 99–118.

26. Quoted in John K. Thornton, "I am the Subject of the King of Congo": African Political Ideology and the Haitian Revolution," *Journal of World History* 4 (Fall 1993): 181.
27. The new nation was initially divided. In the north, home to the great sugar estates, the rulers Dessalines and Christophe tried to maintain Toussaint's system on the plantations. In the south, the free-colored rulers Alexandre Pétion and Jean-Pierre Boyer divided lands among the free population, creating a large peasantry. During a period of political turmoil in the north, the southerners invaded and instituted a system similar to theirs while unifying the country. Under Boyer, Haiti also invaded Santo Domingo in 1822, suppressing slavery and again dividing lands, though this latter measure eventually provoked widespread resistance to Haitian rule, which brought about the end of the occupation in 1844. On the Spanish and French ends of the island during the revolution and after Haitian independence, see Wendell G. Schaeffer, "The Delayed Cession of Spanish Santo Domingo to France, 1795-1801," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 29 (February 1949): 46-68; and Frank Moya Pons, "The Land Question in Haiti and Santo Domingo: The Sociopolitical Context of the Transition from Slavery to Free Labor, 1801-1843," in *Between Slavery and Free Labor: The Spanish-Speaking Caribbean in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Manuel Moreno Fraginals, Frank Moya Pons, and Stanley L. Engerman (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 181-214.
28. There is a huge literature on this topic. On the independence movements in Latin America, see John Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808-1826* (New York: Norton, 1973); and John Charles Chasteen, *Americans: Latin America's Struggle for Independence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). On resistance and collaboration in Spain and Portugal, see Charles Esdaile, *The Peninsular War: A New History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
29. Important overviews of slavery and the Spanish American revolutions are Andrews, *Afro-Latin America*, chaps. 1-3; and Peter Blanchard, *Under the Flags of Freedom: Slave Soldiers and the Wars of Independence in Spanish South America* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008).
30. John Lynch, *Simón Bolívar: A Life* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 41-64.
31. Bolívar quoted in Peter Blanchard, "The Language of Liberation: Slave Voices in the Wars of Independence," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 82 (2002): 514.
32. Quoted in Lynch, *Simón Bolívar*, 108.
33. Twinam, "Pedro de Ayarza," 194-210. See also Jordana Dym, *From Sovereign Villages to National States: City, State, and Federation in Central America, 1759-1839* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006), 91-92, 116-20; 135-38. Even in politically stable Central America, municipal governments that professed loyalty to Spain during the French occupation incorporated free people of color into local governance, showing the significant divergence between Spain and the American colonies.
34. James F. King, "A Royalist View of the Colored Castes in the Venezuelan War of Independence," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 33 (November 1953): 537.
35. See Blanchard, *Under the Flags of Freedom*, 1-2, 141, 151.
36. James Ferguson King, "The Latin-American Republics and the Suppression of the Slave Trade," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 24 (August 1944): 391.
37. Camilla Townsend, *Tales of Two Cities: Race and Economic Culture in Early Republican North and South America: Guayaquil, Ecuador, and Baltimore, Maryland* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), 191; and Townsend, "In Search of Liberty: The Efforts of the Enslaved to Attain Abolition in Ecuador, 1822-1852," in *Beyond Slavery: The Multilayered Legacy of Africans in Latin America and the Caribbean*, ed. Darién Davis (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 38.
38. Manuel María Alaix quoted in James E. Sanders, *Contentious Republicans: Popular Politics, Race, and Class in Nineteenth-Century Colombia* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 76. Other studies of abolition in postindependence Spanish America include John V. Lombardi, *The Decline and Abolition of Negro Slavery in Venezuela, 1820-1854* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1971); George Reid Andrews, *The Afro-Argentines of Buenos Aires, 1800-1900* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980); Peter Blanchard, *Slavery and Abolition in Early Republican Peru* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1992); Carlos Aguirre, *Agentes de su propia libertad: Los esclavos de Lima y la desintegración de la esclavitud, 1821-1854* (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 1993); Christine Hünefeldt, *Paying the Price of Freedom: Family and Labor among Lima's Slaves, 1800-1854* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Guillermo Feliú Cruz, *La abolición de la esclavitud en Chile*, 2nd ed. (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1973); Jerry W. Cooney, "Abolition in the Republic of Paraguay: 1840-1870," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas* 11 (1974): 149-66; Alberto R. Crespo, *Esclavos negros en Bolivia* (La Paz: Academia Nacional de Ciencias, 1977); and Dennis N. Valdés, "The Decline of Slavery in Mexico," *The Americas* 44 (October 1987): 167-94. On Uruguay, Nelson Martínez Díaz, "La resistencia a la abolición en los países del Río de la Plata," in *Esclavitud y derechos humanos: La lucha por la libertad del negro en el siglo XIX*, ed. Francisco de Solano and Agustín Guimerá (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1990), 625-34; and O. Nigel Bolland, "Colonialism and Slavery in Central America," *Slavery and Abolition* 15 (August 1994): 11-25. See also the references in note 37.
39. Marixa Lasso, *Myths of Harmony: Race and Republicanism during the Age of Revolution, Colombia, 1795-1831* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007).
40. Alejandro von Humboldt, *Ensayo político sobre la isla de Cuba* (Madrid: Ediciones Doce Calles / Junta de Castilla y León, 1998), 305-6.
41. Lasso, *Myths of Harmony*, 156-58.

Portrait Three

1. Quoted in Lynch, *Simón Bolívar*, 107.
2. Padilla quoted in Helg, *Liberty and Equality*, 195 (emphasis in original).
3. Bolívar quoted in Helg, *Liberty and Equality*, 196.
4. Bolívar quoted in Helg, *Liberty and Equality*, 209.

Chapter Four

1. *The Biography of Mahommah Gardo Baquaqua: His Passage from Slavery to Freedom in Africa and America*, ed. Robin Law and Paul Lovejoy (1854; Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2007), 151–52. Baquaqua's is one of the very few slave narratives of Latin America, though it was written in North America with assistance. From Brazil there is the brief sketch by Luiz Gama in Roberto Schwarz, "Autobiografía de Luiz Gama," *Novos Estudos*, no. 25 (October 1989): 136–41, penned as a letter to a friend in 1880. Two others are from Cuba: Juan Francisco Manzano, *Autobiography of a Slave / Autobiografía de un esclavo*, trans. Evelyn Picon Garfield (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1996) (originally published as an English translation in 1840; the original Spanish edition would not appear until the twentieth century); and Miguel Barnet, *Biography of a Runaway Slave*, trans. W. Nick Hill (Willimantic, CT: Curbstone Press, 1994), the story of Esteban Montejo as narrated by the Cuban anthropologist and novelist Miguel Barnet, who interviewed the ancient Montejo in the 1960s. For an incisive study of Afro-Latin American writing during the era of slavery and abolition, see William G. Acree Jr., "Jacinto Ventura de Molina: A Black *Letrado* in a White World of Letters, 1766–1841," *Latin American Research Review* 44, no. 2 (2009): 37–58. Scholars have sought out other genres of black writing and narrative during the era of Latin American slavery. See Kathryn Joy McKnight and Leo J. Garofalo, eds., *Afro-Latino Voices: Narratives from the Early Modern Ibero-Atlantic World, 1550–1812* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009).
2. *Biography of Baquaqua*, 158, 159.
3. Estimates Database, 2009, *Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database*, <http://www.slavevoyages.org>, accessed January 12, 2011.
4. Zephyr Frank, *Dutru's World: Wealth and Family in Nineteenth-Century Rio de Janeiro* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004). See also B. J. Barickman, *A Bahian Counterpoint: Sugar, Tobacco, Cassava, and Slavery in the Recôncavo, 1780–1860* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).
5. See Robin Law and Paul Lovejoy, "Introduction: The Interesting Narrative of Mahommah Gardo Baquaqua," in *Biography of Baquaqua*, 1–84.
6. Blackburn, *Overthrow of Colonial Slavery*; Berlin, *Generations of Captivity*; and Tomich, *Through the Prism of Slavery*.

7. For cogent summaries, see Dale Tomich, "The 'Second Slavery': Bonded Labor and the Transformation of the Nineteenth-Century World Economy" and "World Slavery and Caribbean Capitalism: The Cuban Sugar Industry, 1760–1868," in *Through the Prism of Slavery*, 56–71, 75–94; and Rafael de Bivar Marquese, *Feitores do corpo, missionários da mente: Senhores, letrados e o controle dos escravos nas Américas, 1660–1860* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2004). The cotton plantations of the Deep South in the United States were similarly characterized by their voracious need for enslaved labor and the new scale of cultivation and export. See Berlin, *Generations of Captivity*, 161–244; and Walter Johnson, *Soul by Soul: Life inside the Antebellum Slave Market* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
8. Murray, *Odious Commerce*, 298.
9. Thomas Clarkson, *The Cries of Africa to the Inhabitants of Europe: or, A Survey of the Bloody Commerce Called the Slave-Trade* (London: Harvey and Darton, 1822), iv (emphasis in the original).
10. Josep M. Fradera, "La participació catalana en le tràfic d'esclaus (1789–1845)," *Recerques* no. 16 (1984): 124.
11. The Scotsman Mungo Park traveled in West Africa in the 1790s at the behest of Britain's African Association in search of the Niger River's source. His published account of his travels included vivid descriptions of slaving and warfare. Though Park himself was reserved on the question of slave-trade abolition, British abolitionists eagerly read and cited his work for its descriptions of the traffic in captives in Africa and the depredations of European and African slavers.
12. José María Blanco White, *Bosquejo del comercio de esclavos*, ed. and intro. Manuel Moreno Alonso (1814; Seville, Spain: Ediciones Alfar, 1999), 195–96 (emphasis in the original).
13. Cogently discussed in Alejandro de la Fuente, "Slaves and the Creation of Legal Rights in Cuba: *Coartación* and *Papel*," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 87 (November 2007): 659–92.
14. This discussion draws upon Matt Childs, *The 1812 Aponte Rebellion in Cuba and the Struggle against Atlantic Slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).
15. Francisco Arango y Parreño, *Representación hecha a S. M. con motivo de la sublevación de esclavos en los dominios franceses de la isla de Santo Domingo* (1791), quoted in Tomich, "Wealth of Empire," 74.
16. Francisco Arango y Parreño, *Representación de la ciudad de la Habana a las Cortes* (1811), quoted in Tomich, "Wealth of Empire," 73.
17. Juan Bernardo O'Gavan, *Observaciones sobre la suerte de los negros del África, considerados en su propia patria, y trasplantados a las Antillas Españolas: Y reclamación contra el tratado celebrado on los ingleses el año 1817* (Madrid: Imprenta del Universal, 1821), 4 (emphasis in the original).
18. O'Gavan, *Observaciones*, 7 (emphasis in the original).

19. Scarano, *Sugar and Slavery*; and Moreno Fragonal, *The Sugarmill*. On Spanish immigrants in the Cuban plantation complex, see Angel Bahamonde and José Cayuela, *Hacer las Américas: Las élites coloniales españolas en el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Alianza, 1992). On immigration to Puerto Rico, in addition to Scarano, see Astrid Cubano-Iguina, *El hilo en el laberinto: Claves de la lucha política en Puerto Rico (siglo XIX)* (Río Piedras, Puerto Rico: Ediciones Huracán, 1990).
20. Josep M. Fradera, *Gobernar colonias* (Barcelona, Spain: Ediciones Península, 1999); Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, *Empire and Antislavery: Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, 1833–1874* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999), 1–50; Sibylle Fischer, *Modernity Disavowed: Haiti and the Cultures of Slavery in the Age of Revolution* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004); and Ma. Dolores González-Ripoll et al., *El rumor de Haití en Cuba: Temor y rebeldía, 1789–1844* (Madrid: C.S.I.C., 2005).
21. Murray, *Odious Commerce*; Robert L. Paquette, *Sugar Is Made with Blood: The Conspiracy of La Escalera and the Conflict between Empires over Slavery in Cuba* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1988); and Joseph Dorsey, *Slave Traffic in the Age of Abolition: Puerto Rico, West Africa, and the Non-Hispanic Caribbean, 1815–1859* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003).
22. In Spain in the 1850s, numerous translations of the U.S. antislavery novel *Uncle Tom's Cabin* were in circulation, as were adaptations for the stage. Their presence indicated considerable anxiety over British efforts to suppress the slave traffic to Cuba. See Lisa Surwillo, "Representing the Slave Trader: *Haley* and the Slave Ship; or, Spain's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*," *PMLA* 120 (2005): 768–82.
23. Consulado de S.M. Católica en Jamaica, Kingston, May 22, 1837, in Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid)/Estado, legajo 8036, expediente 1, number 23.
24. Count of Villanueva quoted in Manuel Barcia Paz, *Seeds of Insurrection: Domination and Resistance on Western Cuban Plantations, 1808–1848* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008), 81.
25. On La Escalera, see Paquette, *Sugar Is Made with Blood*, and Barcia Paz's typology of rebellions in nineteenth-century Cuba in *Seeds of Insurrection*, 25–48.
26. Josep Maria Fradera, *Colonias para después de un imperio* (Barcelona, Spain: Edicions Bellaterra, 2005), 326.
27. Mary C. Karasch, *Slave Life in Rio de Janeiro, 1808–1850* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 62 (on total population), 11–28 (on African origins), 8 (on Africans as percentage of enslaved population).
28. On de Souza and Ouidah, see Robin Law, "The Evolution of the Brazilian Community in Ouidah," *Slavery and Abolition* 22 (April 2001): 3–21; and Alberto de Costa e Silva, *Francisco Félix de Souza, Mercador de Escravos* (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Editora Nova Fronteira, 2004). On Rufino, see João José Reis, Flávio dos Santos Gomes, and Marcus J. M. de Carvalho, "África e Brasil entre margens: Aventuras e desaventuras do africano Rufino José Maria, c. 1822–1853," *Estudos Afro-Asiáticos* 26 (May–August 2004): 257–302.
29. Stanley J. Stein, *Vassouras, a Brazilian Coffee County, 1850–1900: The Roles of Planter and Slave in a Plantation Society* (1957; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 53. See also Laird Bergad, *The Comparative Histories of Slavery in Brazil, Cuba, and the United States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 157–64.
30. Ilmar Rolhoff de Mattos, *O tempo Saquarema* (São Paulo: Editora Hucitec, 1987); José Murilo de Carvalho, *Teatro de sombras: A política imperial* (São Paulo: Edições Vértice, 1988); and João José Reis, *Slave Rebellion in Brazil: The Muslim Uprising of 1835 in Bahia*, trans. Arthur Brakel (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
31. Bethell, *Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade*. For a recent assessment of the factors leading to the trade's suppression, see Jaime Rodrigues, *O infame comércio: Propostas e experiências no final do tráfico de africanos para o Brasil, 1800–1850* (Campinas, Brazil: Editora da UNICAMP, 2000). See also the assessment of the political situation in Murilo de Carvalho, *Teatro de sombras*.
32. Stein, *Vassouras*; and Emília Viotti da Costa, *Da senzala à colônia*, 4th ed. (São Paulo: Editora UNESP, 1997).
33. Frank, *Dutra's World*, 41.
34. For an excellent evocation of these tensions, see Childs, *1812 Aponte Rebellion*.
35. Fradera, *Gobernar colonias*; Jaime Rodríguez O., *The Independence of Spanish America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Herzog, *Defining Nations*; and Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, *The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the Nineteenth Century* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 15–52.
36. The following discussion relies on Rafael de Bivar Marquese and Márcia Regina Berbel, "The Absence of Race: Slavery, Citizenship, and Pro-slavery Ideology in the Cortes of Lisbon and in the Rio de Janeiro Constituent Assembly (1821–1824)," *Social History* 32 (November 2007): 415–33; Márcia Berbel, Rafael Marquese, and Tâmis Parron, *Escravidão e política: Brasil e Cuba, 1790–1850* (São Paulo: Editora Hucitec, 2010), chap. 2; João Paulo G. Pimenta, *Brasil y las independencias de Hispanoamérica*, trans. Víctor y Pablo García Guerrero (Castellón de la Plana, Spain: Publicacions de la Universitat Jaume I, 2007); and Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), chap. 6.
37. Marquese and Berbel, "Absence of Race." On manumission and its function, see also Stuart B. Schwartz, "Sugar Plantation and Slave Life," in *Slaves, Peasants, and Rebels: Reconsidering Brazilian Slavery* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 39–63; Marquese, "Dinâmica da escravidão no Brasil." On the limits of citizenship under the Brazilian monarchy, see Richard Graham, *Politics and Patronage in Nineteenth-Century Brazil* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990).

Another question that warrants closer study is the role of colonial jurisprudence in shaping the nineteenth-century constitutional regimes.

- Tamar Herzog shows that under the Spanish monarchy, Africans and African-descended people were legally classified as foreigners resident in Spanish domains, a measure that shaped metropolitan attitudes under constitutional rule. Were Portuguese and Brazilian attitudes different because of Portuguese rule in Angola and other parts of Africa? Did Africans and African-descended people within the Portuguese domains enjoy the same legal status as other groups? See Herzog, *Defining Nations*; and Herzog, "Communities Becoming a Nation: Spain and Spanish America in the Wake of Modernity (and Thereafter)," *Citizenship Studies* 11 (May 2007): 151-72.
38. Arthur F. Corwin, *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba, 1817-1886* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967); and Schmidt-Nowara, *Empire and Antislavery*, 100-125.
 39. Karen Robert, "Slavery and Freedom in the Ten Years' War, Cuba, 1868-1878," *Slavery and Abolition* 13 (December 1992): 181-200; and Ada Ferrer, *Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868-1898* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).
 40. Scott, *Slave Emancipation in Cuba*, 63-83.
 41. Schmidt-Nowara, *Empire and Antislavery*, 153.
 42. Laird Bergad, *Cuban Rural Society in the Nineteenth Century: The Social and Economic History of Monoculture in Matanzas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Astrid Cubano-Iguina, "Freedom in the Making: The Slaves of Hacienda La Esperanza, Manatí, Puerto Rico, on the Eve of Abolition, 1868-1876," *Social History* (forthcoming), cited by permission of the author.
 43. Shown with exquisite detail in Cubano-Iguina, "Freedom in the Making."
 44. Scott, *Slave Emancipation in Cuba*, 141.
 45. See Scott, *Slave Emancipation in Cuba*, 148, 159-60.
 46. See the summary of the debate over the impact of the Paraguayan War on Brazilian slavery in Kraay, "Arming Slaves in Brazil," 167-70. Kraay himself sees limited consequences beyond those slaves who actually became free through service.
 47. Murilo de Carvalho, *Teatro de sombras*, 50-83. See also Roderick J. Barman, *Citizen Emperor: Pedro II and the Making of Brazil, 1825-1891* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 193-274; and Jeffrey Needell, *The Party of Order: The Conservatives, the State, and Slavery in the Brazilian Monarchy, 1831-1871* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).
 48. Celso Castilho, "Brisas atlánticas: La abolición gradual y la conexión brasileña-cubana," in *Haití: Revolución, independencia y emancipación*, ed. Rina Cáceres and Paul Lovejoy (San José, Costa Rica: Editorial UCR, 2008), 128-39. See also, for example, the report on the effects of the Moret Law in Cuba dated Madrid, September 25, 1875, Biblioteca Itamaraty, Madri, Oficios 1875-1880, 220/1/15.
 49. Sidney Chalhoub, "The Politics of Silence: Race and Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century Brazil," *Slavery and Abolition* 27 (April 2006): 81. See also Stein, *Vassouras*; and Viotti da Costa, *Da senzala à colônia*, on coffee planters and abolition.
 50. "'We Are Seeking Our Country's Highest Interests': An Abolitionist Analyzes Slavery and Calls for a Break with the Past (1883)," in Conrad, *Children of God's Fire*, 452. This passage is excerpted from Nabuco's book *O abolicionismo*, available in an English translation: *Abolitionism: The Brazilian Antislavery Struggle*, trans. and ed. Robert Edgar Conrad (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977). For more on Nabuco, see Angela Alonso, "O abolicionista cosmopolita: Joaquim Nabuco e a rede abolicionista transnacional," *Novos Estudos* no. 88 (November 2010): 55-70.
 51. See the memoirs of the abolitionist Antonio Manuel Bueno de Andrada, "A abolição em São Paulo. Depoimento de uma testemunha," *O Estado de São Paulo*, May 13, 1918. His mother directed the Emancipadora in cooperation with the Liberal Party. As a student in the Escola Polytechnica in Rio de Janeiro, he moved in abolitionist circles among students and faculty, including the director, Rio Branco, maestro of the 1871 law. For an overview of the many abolitionist initiatives, see Robert Edgar Conrad, *The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, 1850-1888* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). See also Seymour Drescher, "Brazilian Abolition in Comparative Perspective," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 68 (August 1988): 429-60. On emancipation funds, see Celso T. Castilho and Camilla Cowling, "Funding Freedom, Popularizing Politics: Abolitionism and Local Emancipation Funds in 1880s Brazil," *Luso-Brazilian Review* 47, no. 1 (2010): 89-120.
 52. For a close study of race and labor after emancipation, see George Reid Andrews, *Blacks and Whites in São Paulo, Brazil, 1888-1988* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991). For data on immigration to São Paulo, see Thomas H. Holloway, *Immigrants on the Land: Coffee and Society in São Paulo, 1886-1934* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980). On mass migration to Latin America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in broader perspective, see José Moya, "Modernization, Modernity, and the Trans/formation of the Atlantic World in the Nineteenth Century," in Cañizares-Esguerra and Seaman, *Atlantic in Global History*, 179-97. On Cuba, see Jordi Maluquer de Motes, *Nación e inmigración: los españoles en Cuba (ss. XIX y XX)* (Oviedo, Spain: Ediciones Jucar, 1992).
 53. Conrad, *Destruction of Brazilian Slavery*, 239-77; Robert Brent Toplin, "Upheaval, Violence, and the Abolition of Slavery in Brazil: The Case of São Paulo," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 49 (November 1969): 639-55; Maria Helena Machado, *O plano e o pânico: Os movimentos sociais na década da abolição* (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Editora UFRJ; São Paulo: EDUSP, 1994), 143-73; and Eduardo Silva, "Black Abolitionist in the Quilombo of Leblon, Rio de Janeiro: Symbols, Organizers, and Revolutionaries," in Davis, *Beyond Slavery*, 109-22.

54. See Ferrer, *Insurgent Cuba*; and Rebecca J. Scott, *Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba after Slavery* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).
55. Emília Viotti da Costa, "1870-1889," in Bethell, *Brazil*, 161-213.
56. Juan Gualberto Gómez, "Crónica política," *Revista Cubana* (Havana), October 31, 1892, quoted in Schmidt-Nowara, *Conquest of History*, 86.

Portrait Four

1. Schmidt-Nowara, *Empire and Antislavery*, 151.
2. Schmidt-Nowara, *Empire and Antislavery*, 139.
3. Conrad, *Destruction of Brazilian Slavery*, 179. See also Edmar Morel, *Dragão do Mar: O jangadeiro de abolição* (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Edições do Povo, 1949); and Raimundo Girão, *A abolição no Ceará* (Fortaleza, Brazil: A. Batista Fontenele, 1956).

Conclusion

1. Stein, *Vassouras*, 289.
2. Rafael de Bivar Marquese, "African Diaspora, Slavery, and the Paraíba Valley Coffee Plantation Landscape: Nineteenth-Century Brazil," *Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center* 31, no. 2 (2008): 195-216; Stein, *Vassouras*, 207. See also the recent study, including a CD, of the jongos Stein recorded: Silvia Hunold Lara and Gustavo Pacheco, eds., *Memória do jongo: As gravações históricas de Stanley J. Stein, Vassouras, 1949* (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Folha Seca; Campinas, Brazil: CECULT, 2007).
3. Christian, *Local Religion*; and Stuart Schwartz, *All Can Be Saved: Religious Tolerance and Salvation in the Iberian Atlantic World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008).
4. Andrews, *Afro-Latin America*; and Scott, *Degrees of Freedom*.

Glossary

(sp) = Spanish
(port) = Portuguese

- aldeias** (port): Indian settlements under clerical control.
- asiento** (sp): Exclusive contract to provide slaves to the Spanish colonies, generally conceded to foreign traders.
- bandeirantes** (port): Backwoodsmen, usually associated with São Paulo and the slave trade in Brazilian Indians.
- bozal** (sp): Slave brought to the Americas from Africa, not acculturated.
- cabildo de nación** (sp): Associations of enslaved Africans in Cuba. Organized according to ethnic groupings (nations).
- carta de alforria** (port): Certificate of freedom.
- casta** (sp): Person of mixed parentage, often associated with African lineage.
- coartación** (sp): Self-purchase.
- confraternity**: Lay religious association.