
The Throes of Democracy: Brazil since 1989

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Bryan McCann

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The Throes of Democracy: Brazil since 1989 was first published in 2008

Published in Canada by Fernwood Publishing Ltd, 32 Oceanvista Lane,
Site 2A, Box 5, Black Point, Nova Scotia B0J 1B0
<www.fernwoodpublishing.ca>

Published in the rest of the world by Zed Books Ltd, 7 Cynthia Street,
London N1 9JF, UK and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010,
USA

<www.zedbooks.co.uk>

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Cover designed by Andrew Corbett

Set in OurTypeArnhem and Futura Bold by Ewan Smith, London

Index <ed.emery@the.freemiversity.net>

Printed and bound in Malta by Gutenberg Press Ltd

Distributed in the USA exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of
St Martin's Press, LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
US CIP data are available from the Library of Congress.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication
McCann, Bryan, 1968-

The throes of democracy : Brazil since 1989 / Bryan McCann.

ISBN 978-1-55266-277-9

1. Brazil--Politics and government--1985-2002. 2. Brazil--Politics and
government--2003-. 3. Brazil--Social conditions--1985-. 4. Brazil--
Economic conditions--1985-. I. Title.

F2538-3M39-2008 981.0674 C2008-903372-8

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transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic or otherwise, without
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Abbreviations

INCRA	Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (The National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform)
IURD	Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus (Universal Kingdom of God Church)
MDB	Movimento Democrático Brasileiro
MIR	Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (The Revolutionary Left Movement in Chile)
MPB	Música Popular Brasileira
MR-8	Movimento Revolucionário 8 de Outubro (The October 8 Revolutionary Movement)
MST	Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (The Landless Workers' Movement)
NGO	non-governmental organization
OSCIP	Organização da Sociedade Civil de Interesse Público (Organizations of Civil Society in the Public Interest)
PCB	Partido Comunista Brasileiro (The Brazilian Communist Party)
PCC	Primeiro Comando da Capital (The First Command of the Capital)
PDS	Partido Democrático Social (The Democratic Social Party)
PDT	Partido Democrático Trabalhador (The Democratic Workers' Party)
PFL	Partido da Frente Liberal (The Liberal Front Party)
PMDB	Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (The Brazilian Democratic Movement Party)
PRB	Partido Republicano Brasileiro (The Brazilian Republican Party)
PRP	Partido Republicano Progressista (The Progressive Republican Party)
PSDB	Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (The Brazilian Social Democracy Party)
PSOL	Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (The Socialism and Freedom Party)
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores (The Workers' Party)
PTB	Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (The Brazilian Labor Party)

AI-5	Ato Institucional No 5 (Institutional Act Number 5, the fifth of a series of decrees by Brazil's military dictatorship that effectively shut down Brazil's National Congress, allowed for government media censorship and suspended the right to habeas corpus)
AP	Ação Popular (Popular Action, a militant student group that maintained ties to the Catholic Church)
ARENA	Aliança de Reconstrução Nacional (The National Renewal Alliance)
BNDES	Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (The National Bank for Social and Economic Development)
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China
CEB	Comunidade Eclesial de Base (Christian Base Community)
CEBRAP	Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento (The Brazilian Center for Analysis and Research)
CPT	Comissão Pastoral da Terra (Pastoral Land Commission: a Catholic Church office advocating agrarian reform; historically allied with MST)
CUT	Central Única dos Trabalhadores (Unified Workers' Central)
CV	Comando Vermelho (Red Command: prison-based gang of Rio de Janeiro)
DEM	Demócratas (centre-right political party)
EMBRAPA	Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation)
FAFEG	Federação das Associações das Favelas do Estado da Guanabara (<i>favela-dwellers'</i> resident association federation)
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia: a Marxist revolutionary faction)
GM	genetically modified

- cesta básica basic market basket
 ciranda a ring-dance of Pernambuco
 Comissão Pastoral da Terra Pastoral Land Commission
 coronel powerful rural landowner
 Correios Brazil's postal service
 crente believer (practicing Protestant, predominantly used for Pentecostal denominations)
 cuica traditional samba friction drum
 descarrego literally "discharge," the unburdening of spirits
 Diretas Já! literally "Direct [elections], now!" a movement that swept across the nation in the early 1980s
 dízimo literally "tenth," a tithe
 encosto encroachment by evil spirits
 Escândalo das Sanguessugas literally "Bloodsuckers' Scandal"
 Esquadrão da Morte Death Squad
 Estado Novo the Getúlio Vargas dictatorship of 1937-45
 evangélico evangelical (practicing Protestant, predominantly used for Pentecostal denominations)
 favela community of largely self-built housing constructed on irregularly occupied land, outside the formal bureaucratic structure of the city
 forró popular accordion-based musical genre with roots in rural Northeastern musical styles
 grilagem claim-jumping and falsification of rural land deeds
 Igreja Renascer em Cristo Reborn in Christ Church
 Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus Universal Kingdom of God Church
 indulto reprieve, commutation of sentence, clemency, pardon
 jogo do bicho literally "the animal game," a popular - albeit illegal - numbers game
 justiceiro justice-maker
 laranja literally "orange," one who serves as a frontman in a duplicitous financial transaction
 latifúndio large rural estate
 Lei Rouanet a tax provision that permits firms in Brazil to donate funds to cultural institutions in lieu of having a certain portion of

Glossary

- acaí fruit of the açai palm, high in antioxidants
 antenado literally "[individual] with antennae," slang for "tuned in," savvy
 aparelhamento the stocking of bureaucratic positions with political loyalists
 Assembléia de Deus Assemblies of God, a Pentecostal denomination
 Associação dos Moradores Residents' association; the local *favela* governing council
 axé an umbrella term for several pop musical genres originating in the bloco afro styles of Salvador, Bahia
 bancada evangélica literally "[the] evangelical bench," Brazil's Protestant caucus in Congress
 bancada ruralista literally "[the] rural bench," an interparty coalition of rural politicians
 bloco literally "block," a carnival parade band
 bloco afro a carnival parade band emphasizing pan-African roots and connections, originating in Salvador, Bahia
 boca literally "mouth," a source of narcotics or a major drug-dealing location
 Bolsa Escola literally "School Purse," a federal grant intended to keep children in school
 Bolsa Família literally "Family Purse," an expanded version of Bolsa Escola
 caipira an unsophisticated rustic, a "hillbilly" or "country bumpkin"
 Caixa Econômica Federal Federal Savings Bank
 Câmara dos Deputados literally "Chamber of Deputies," Brazil's lower house of Congress

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
- marajá literally "maharaja," civil servants who obtained princely salaries during the dictatorship
- mensalão literally "big monthly [payment]," a political slush fund controlled by the PT
- música sertaneja an umbrella term for pop musical styles emphasizing rural themes and connections
- novela soap opera
- pagode pop samba variant of Salvador da Bahia, based on earlier variations from Rio de Janeiro
- pandeiro tambourine
- Pão de Açúcar Sugarloaf
- paulistano native of São Paulo city
- pistolão a letter of reference from a powerful patron, written on behalf of a family member or dependent
- Plano Real literally "Real Plan," Fernando Henrique Cardoso's monetary policy under the presidency of Itamar Franco, intended to steady Brazil's economic growth
- proibidão literally "really prohibited," the banned genre of funk glorifying crime
- queima de arquivo literally "archive burning," evidence suppression or witness suppression
- quilombo runaway slave communities
- rock besteiro easygoing rock and roll, often with blithe or nonsense lyrics
- rock cabeça literally "head rock," variant of rock and roll with intellectual and political pretensions
- sertão Brazil's arid hinterlands
- surdo bass drums
- traficante trafficker
- tribo tribe
- Zona Sul South Zone of Rio de Janeiro

Chronology

- 1930 Getúlio Vargas seizes power
- 1945 Vargas's *Estado Novo* overthrown
- 1950 Vargas elected president
- 1954 Vargas's suicide in office
- 1961 Jânio Quadros renounces the presidency
- 1964 President João Goulart overthrown by a military coup
- 1968 Institutional Act 5 (AI-5) initiates the full-blown dictatorship
- 1969 Kidnapping of US Ambassador Charles Burke Elbrick
- 1977 Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus founded in Rio de Janeiro
- 1978 Military President Ernesto Geisel initiates slow process of "abertura"
- 1980 Formation of new political parties allowed; PT and PDT founded
- 1982 First open elections for state governors
- 1984 MST holds first national gathering at Cascavel
- 1985 José Sarney enters office as first civilian president since 1964
- 1988 New Constitution approved
- 1989 Fernando Collor elected president
- 1991 *Sertaneja* music reaches national popularity
- 1992 Collor impeached; massacre at Carandiru prison in São Paulo
- 1993 Massacre in Vigário Geral, Rio de Janeiro; Chico Science e Nação Zumbi release *Da Lama ao Caos*
- 1994 Real Plan initiated. Fernando Henrique Cardoso elected president
- 1995 IURD Bishop Sérgio von Helde kicks statue of Nossa Senhora da Aparecida on live TV
- 1996 Massacre in Eldorado dos Carajás, Pará
- 1997 Cardoso re-elected as president

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- 2001 Widespread power shortages contribute to Cardoso's declining popularity
- 2002 Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva elected president
- 2003 Cardoso's Bolsa Escola social program becomes Lula's much-expanded Bolsa Família
- 2004 Brazil officially approves planting of genetically modified soy; Orkut launched
- 2005 The mensalão scandal weakens Lula's administration
- 2006 Bloodsuckers' Scandal; the PCC shuts down São Paulo; Overmundo launched; Lula re-elected; the CV shuts down Rio de Janeiro
- 2007 São Paulo's murder rate declines sharply; Supreme Court upholds indictment of mensaleiros



Introduction

In 1882, when Brazil was still an empire ruled by the aging Dom Pedro II, the novelist Machado de Assis published a short political allegory in one of Rio de Janeiro's daily newspapers. "The Most Serene Republic" recounted the electoral travails of a colony of spiders blessed with the ability to speak and vote. The spiders, modeling their electoral rules on the Venetian Republic, wove for themselves a bag and filled it with balls bearing the names of candidates for office. All went smoothly until it was discovered that one candidate's name appeared on two balls in the bag. The spiders voted to shrink the bag's opening in order to clamp down on fraud. In the next election, another candidate's ball was left out of the bag - an omission that the electoral officer insisted must have been an inadvertent mistake. The spiders returned the bag to its original size. Subsequent elections were tarnished by an unending series of unforeseen eventualities, and each time the spiders adjusted the process, hoping for a more republican result next time around, confident they would eventually get it right.

Machado satirized both the sterile parliamentary debates of the empire's senate and the hope that matters might improve dramatically under a republican government. A hundred and six years after he published his allegory, a diverse and contentious constitutional assembly stitched together the founding document of a new republic, Brazil's third crack at the form. Its members were entrusted with closing the door on over two decades of military dictatorship and creating formal rules that would sustain the nation's fledgling democracy, giving it room to grow. The constitution they produced in 1888 seems designed with the arachnid republic in mind - it is

and calls for emendation of key articles are a recurring motif in Brazilian political debate. Congressional spiders apply themselves with great zeal to these and other legislative tasks, producing a robust and learned body of law with an inconsistent relationship to actual practice.

The anthropologist and political columnist Roberto DaMatta often invokes Machado's allegory in his analysis of these efforts, noting that the Most Serene Republic does not need better electoral bags, it needs better republicans. In Brazil's political arena, the only thing more predictable than renewed calls for constitutional tinkering is fresh political scandal, which burgeons seasonally in impressive variety, providing constant fodder for the vibrant news media.

The young republic stumbles forward nonetheless. Brazil's first republic survived just over forty years, from the end of the Brazilian Empire in 1889 to the Revolution of 1930, which brought to power the Getúlio Vargas dictatorship. Its second, inaugurated with the fall of Getúlio Vargas in 1945, was cut off as a teenager by the military coup of 1964 and the long dictatorship that followed. Its third emerged from the long decline of the military dictatorship in the 1980s, and has by now, in 2008, passed through a troubled childhood and fraught adolescence, entering its third decade with every prospect of attaining vigorous maturity. Brazil has notably not solved the conundrums of constitutional rule, either in crafting laws that will contain its exigencies or in constraining its officials to follow them. But it has created a political arena characterized by vigorous competition, open debate and impressive levels of popular representation.

Electoral rules are only the beginning of this, but they are an important one: from its foundation as an independent nation in 1822 through the ratification of the 1988 Constitution, the voting population was limited by property or literacy requirements and obstructed or distorted in practice by a variety of other customary ruses. Voting is now obligatory for all citizens over sixteen, and elections

reliability of the electoral system: for better or for worse, since the 1980s Brazilians have chosen the officials who represent them.

The more profound expansion of citizenship has been social and economic. Old codes of deference have rapidly become vestigial, old structures of dependence have been weakened. Until relatively recently, living in a *favela* (an informal settlement) was often considered a source of embarrassment, particularly for those seeking jobs in the formal sector. It is now increasingly a source of pride and a valued credential for jobs in municipal government and with NGOs. Before redemocratization, most middle-class families relied on live-in servants, usually paying them a minimum wage that was far short of a living wage. The "maid's quarters" of middle-class apartments are now used mostly for storage space, and "diaristas," or freelance cooks and cleaning women, are more likely to work for several employers and to command salaries significantly better than the still-paltry minimum.

The pervasive nature of these transformations in the post-dictatorship period means that to study Brazil since 1989 makes a great deal of sense, domestically as well as internationally. Brazilians recognize this transition much more deeply as redemocratization in the wake of long dictatorship than as the end of the Cold War. But the international context has also played a decisive role, not only in the recasting of leftwing political strategies in the wake of the Cold War, but in the rise of the pervasive "Washington Consensus" that governed global relations in the late twentieth century, holding that only economic growth can reduce poverty and that growth can be achieved only by reducing trade restrictions. The emergence of digital media, the global spread of informal urban economies, the rise of genetically modified crops – all these international trends of the past two decades have had immense consequences in Brazil, taking on unpredictable local manifestations. From both international and domestic perspectives, Brazil has changed extraordinarily since the close of the 1980s, and this change has now progressed to the point

where it can be annotated and studied historically.

old networks binding patrons and clients have in many cases been superseded by exchanges at a cash nexus of shifting location, where power relations are less personalist but not egalitarian. But the combination of economic growth and the erosion of social hierarchies has yielded not only greater mobility and autonomy, but created a more diverse and representative public life. The anthropologist James Holston describes this transformation as "insurgent citizenship," noting the multiplicity of ways in which poor and working-class Brazilians since the 1980s have achieved greater leverage in the housing market, in employment negotiations and in the use of public space. These achievements remain limited primarily to Brazil's cities, but that is another transformation - over 80 percent of the population is now urban.

"Insurgent citizenship" has by no means eliminated inequality - Brazil remains highly unequal, despite recent progress. Nor is the expansion of political, social and economic citizenship itself a guarantee of successful democracy. Brazil has become more pluralistic, with a greater array of actors entering the public arena, making heretofore marginal demands suddenly central, stretching the fabric that wraps the body politic in ways that were unpredictable a few decades ago. Brazilians cannot be easily bracketed by class, religion, race or region in ways that were until fairly recently not only common but at least relatively enlightening. All these categories have witnessed great internal differentiation and external shifting, overlapping in unexpected ways. This pluralism requires more complex interparty negotiations and renders authoritarian solutions obsolete. But the combination of pluralism and a weak rule of law produces turf battles between interest groups, the consolidation of criminal networks and their increasing stake in the informal economy. Brazil's high rates of urban violence, among the most serious threats to its democracy, are a testament to the dangers of this combination.

In all these ways, developments within Brazil fall into patterns evident across the Global South, particularly in its largest and most dynamic nations. The Washington Consensus has changed the poli-

bargaining power by cultivating executive alliances and occupying administrative space.

The regional machines - political cartels headed by local bosses - had prospered within the tightly controlled congress of the dictatorship, which used them effectively to carry out local development projects while creating an appearance of popular support. The 1988 Constitution enabled the perpetuation of these machines by granting an outsized representational weight to sparsely populated states: there is one federal deputy for every 26,000 citizens of Roraima, and one for every 366,000 from São Paulo. Disproportionate representation has a cascading effect, allowing congressmen from sparsely populated states to create new municipalities, with each municipality opening numerous opportunities for political appointments and the required transfer of federal funds. These factors have made the regional machines forces that cannot be ignored in the construction of national political alliances.

The discipline of the Washington Consensus and the evolution of the regional machines, in turn, explain why Brazil's macroeconomic complexion and its congressional horse-trading remained relatively consistent despite the rise to power of the once-radical left. The leftwing credentials of its last two presidents notwithstanding, Brazil has never been more capital-friendly. And although these opponents of the military regime have controlled the executive branch since the mid-1990s, the same regional strongmen who once cultivated close ties to the ruling generals continue to survive as Brasília's ineluctable dealmakers.

These same factors explain why the rise of the political left since the 1990s proved either less radical or less disruptive, depending on one's perspective, than it did in neighbors Venezuela and Bolivia and in Ecuador. Brazil was already considerably further along than these nations in its incorporation of popular sectors into the political, social and economic citizenry, making its transition less volatile. The sectors of the left that came to power, moreover, had been

international investors and domestic social movements with surprising success.

The fleeting Washington Consensus that rose to nearly unquestioned dominance with the end of the Cold War and then dissipated with the intensification of new conflicts early in the twenty-first century was kinder to Brazil than to most of its counterparts in the Global South. (It might be argued that the doctrine behind the Washington Consensus has by no means disappeared, but the discipline that went with it no longer holds much sway in Latin America.) Brazil's emergence as one of the world's most powerful producers of commodities, both raw and refined, has given it leverage in global trade, unmatched by its peers. Brazilian ethanol, oil reserves, soy, orange juice, and steel, to name only a few sectors, have enabled the country to keep inflation at bay – beating back the economic dragon of the 1980s – and to dictate the terms of its global economic engagement. Its expansion in high-tech sectors like airplanes and automobiles has given it enviable diversification and domestic market strength.

In contrast to some of its Latin American neighbors, Brazil has buttressed its global trading power without exacerbating domestic inequality or plunging the remnants of an industrial working class into poverty. Inequality rose in Brazil during the hyperinflationary 1980s and then began to decline slowly, with its rate of decline increasing along with the emergence of new social spending programs since 2000. Poverty also increased over the 1980s and into the early 1990s, and since then has fallen faster and farther than inequality. When looked at since the 1970s, Brazil's progress in both these areas has been mediocre. When looked at since the low point of the late 1980s and early 1990s, its progress has been impressive and encouraging.¹

In consequence, Brazilians tend to be rightfully skeptical of international paradigms that confine the nation to some kind of peripheral role on the world stage. If the concept of a "Third

development, one that is not permanent but which also cannot be considered simply a transitional phase on the way towards a different kind of international model.

International observers often perceive Brazil as the object of both fascination and sympathy that, when uninformed, borders on condescension. Exotic Brazil, of samba, sex and football prowess, is one side of this coin; impoverished Brazil, of hunger, exploitation and violence, the other. Brazilians are keenly aware of these international perspectives and laugh them off or resent them as the case appears to demand. But whatever the issue, they necessarily tend to see the domestic contingencies much more richly than they do the broad international outlines. If sympathetic international observers often group Brazil into a peripheral category and see it as one of those nations that suffers the consequences of foreign depredations, Brazilians tend to emphasize the nation's difference, and to see the ways local actors have contributed to create current realities, which therefore seem more easily subject to alteration than one might guess from abroad. As a result, the Brazilian perceptions tend to be both more optimistic and more realistic.

Brazil is different, after all, and the images of exotic Brazil that attract the longing foreign gaze are part of that difference. Brazil's extraordinary cultural vibrancy can be traced to certain demographic and economic factors, and these are relevant. The forced importation of millions of African slaves up through the mid-nineteenth century left a legacy of deep inequality, but also laid the groundwork for a unique combination of African and European cultural forms and patterns with local inventions. The celebration of this combination in the early twentieth century coincided with the rise of domestic cultural industries, enabling the creation of genres, styles and schools of enduring vitality. Further patterns of international immigration and domestic migration yielded layers of innovation and variation within broad patterns. Yet there is a sense of mystery and compulsion here beyond demography and economy: Brazilians invent and

into broader international trends, and it is illuminating to consider these comparatively. Brazil is often compared with Russia, India and China, a grouping of emerging mega-markets now recognized by the shorthand BRIC. Brazil has grown considerably more slowly than its BRIC colleagues, but looks relatively strong in regard to most other indicators. Brazil's combination of natural resources, commodities leverage, high-tech investment and relative lack of population pressures gives it prospects of greater economic stability than its peers. Although Brazil's inequality indices remain worse than those of Russia, India and China, a lower percentage of Brazilians than Indians remains among the very poor. Access to basic infrastructure and sanitation is considerably better for Brazil's urban poor than it is for India's.

Brazil's press is far freer and more robust than that of Russia or China. Its political institutions are more stable than those of Russia and India and more representative than those of China. It lacks the entrenched ethnic and religious conflicts of its colleagues. Brazil's slave-owning past has bequeathed a legacy of enduring racial inequality, and this inequality has become a topic of increasingly vigorous political debate and the target of a range of policies. This is a serious and pressing topic, but is not complicated by a history of recent violence, by passionate territorial feuds, or by a highly volatile international dimension. In all these aspects, it looks relatively benign in comparison with social conflicts in Russia, India and China.

Brazil's greatest deficit in the BRIC context is in the area of education, where its performance is poor. As recently as the 1970s, public education beyond the primary years was effectively limited to the middle class, which enjoyed access to safe, stimulating and high-quality schools. Public education is now nearly universal and has declined drastically in quality. Middle-class families in Brazil's major cities have for the most part put their children in private schools, leaving underfunded and chaotic public schools for those

termed the throes of democracy – a struggle to incorporate the forces unleashed by the simultaneous collapse of the military regime and the rise of the Washington Consensus, and to restrain them within the boundaries of a democratic republic. As chaotic as it occasionally seems, this struggle has defining tendencies, and tracing these reveals the existence of broader patterns.

Six of these may be considered decisive: these are the patterns that have changed Brazil the most since the 1980s and that are intimately connected to other transformations. They are the rise of the left wing to political power, the growth of urban violence, the conflict in agrarian Brazil between agribusiness and landless workers, the explosion of cultural diversification, particularly in popular music, the growth of Pentecostalism and the emergence of digital media. Considering each of these in turn will clarify Brazil's transformation, making sense of the unfolding of domestic struggles that have given local shape to broad international influences.

The left wing has not only risen to power but has largely set the terms of political debate. No national politician will currently admit to being of the right, and politicians of varying commitments have been able to use the specter of rightwing proclivities to put their opponents on the defensive. Once elected, however, leftwing politicians must engage in expedient negotiations with regional political machines that are deeply invested in maintaining their own position, greatly restraining the impetus for thoroughgoing reform.

The collapse of authoritarian power, the continued existence of venal and truculent police forces, and the growing importance of Brazil in the transshipment of drugs have produced startling violence in the nation's major cities, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in particular. Rising urban violence has exacerbated local geopolitical divisions, particularly those between the informal, autoconstructed favelas and the formal neighborhoods and their institutions of power. Local interest groups, including criminal networks, have learned to profit from these divisions, while the residents of both the favelas

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power without eliminating rural poverty or resolving long-simmering agrarian conflicts. Instead, these conflicts have been incorporated into the mechanisms of the state and have become primarily a competition for federal resources partially obscured by radical rhetoric. These rhetorical battles also overshadow larger concerns about the conditions of rural labor and the defense of unique natural resources, concerns which have yet to inspire coherent policies.

Brazilian culture, in all its manifestations, has also become more pluralistic. Popular music, long a source of national pride and international glory, has blossomed in unpredictable ways. Music scenes in diverse regions have reconfigured genre boundaries and broken the dominance of the Rio-São Paulo axis over musical distribution. In the field of religion, a Pentecostal boom has spread like wildfire over what was once almost universally a Catholic country. Pentecostal denominations compete furiously with one another and across faiths, forcing the Catholic Church, among others, to formulate its own charismatic response. The rapid expansion of digital access has also yielded profound cultural consequences, shaking hierarchies and altering patterns of production. But strong state influence and the continuing prominence of nepotism and family connections give some measure of continuity to cultural production, structuring the unique Brazilian culture market.

Each of these transformations has offered both promise and peril. The chapters that follow explore their consequences in the construction of the fragile spider's web of Brazilian democracy.

1 | The rise of the left

"They say politics is the art of swallowing toads. Wouldn't it be fascinating to make the elite swallow Lula, that bearded toad."² Such were the sentiments of Leonel Brizola upon running third in the opening round of the 1989 presidential elections, behind Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Fernando Collor de Mello. Brizola, an old-school populist and the sitting vice-president of the International Socialist Organization, instructed his loyal followers to support fellow leftist Lula in the run-off election.

Brizola's support made the 1989 election close, but was not enough to overcome the concerted opposition of Brazil's business class, its landed gentry and, most importantly, its media titans. The Globo media empire cast its decisive weight behind Collor de Mello, the inexperienced scion of an oligarchic family from the impoverished northeastern state of Alagoas. Collor de Mello had little to recommend him for the nation's highest office, but most figures of influence found his message of market expansion more palatable than Lula's campaign for aggressive socialist reform. Economist Roberto Campos, Brazil's high priest of free-market discipline, famously quipped that if Lula were to be elected, there were only two possible outcomes (*saídas*), one via Galeão, the other via Cumbica – the international airports of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Campos merely expressed the consensus among most Brazilians of means that a Lula victory would bring economic disaster, at least for them.

Lula kept at it, running again for president in 1994 and 1998, finally winning in 2002 and securing re-election in 2006. But between his narrow loss in 1989 and his decisive victory in 2002, a remarkable transition unfolded. When the bearded toad finally etched into