Contents

Preface and Acknowledgements

Introduction

Part I: Grand Narratives
1 An Incidental Annexation
2 Rome, Syria, Parthians and Persians

Part II: Organizing Space and Time
3 Political Entities
4 Time and Motion

Part III: Production and Consumption
5 Exploiting the Available
6 Portable Antiquities

Part IV: The Construction of Communities
7 Public Values
8 Impure Genres
9 The Pious World
10 The Military

Epilogue: The Furniture of Hellenism?

End Notes

Appendix

Picture Acknowledgements

Select Bibliography and Notes

Index

Part I: Grand Narratives

1 An Incidental Annexation

In 64 BC a Roman general met with a local king at the city of Antioch in northern Syria and told the king that he was out of a job. Of this fact ancient writers were certain; but they differed as to the motives. Some thought it a question of legitimacy, and that the king had proved himself unworthy in some way. Others considered it a matter of security, that the king was incapable of defending Syria against ‘the despoiling raids of Jews and Arabs.’ Whatever the case, it was this meeting which marks the beginning of the Roman province of Syria, and it was for reasons of legitimacy or security that Rome justified the annexation of an area far more extensive than the kingdom in question. 
Fig. 4. The modern city of Antakya, ancient Antioch. View from the slope of Mount Silpius, the peak of which dominates the city. The long street which can be discerned running diagonally across the picture follows the line of the main thoroughfare of Antioch in Roman times. Beyond it lies the Orontes river.
The protagonists in this curious historical event were Antiochus XIII Asiaticus, a Seleucid dynast whose ancestors had once ruled an empire from the Hellespont to India, and the general Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, better known in English as Pompey the Great. As far as we know Antiochus did not dispute Pompey’s judgement. In his earlier relations with Rome the king had accepted his position as a sort of client, dependent on the favours of Roman patrons far more powerful than himself. Now Pompey would claim the kingdom by right of conquest, even though Antiochus had been an ally rather than an adversary of Rome.
Antiochus was a rather minor casualty in a much grander struggle between the Romans and two more dangerous and powerful eastern kings, Mithridates VI Eupator of Pontus and Tigranes of Armenia. It is this struggle that led to the Roman annexation of Syria, and a brief outline of that struggle is necessary to place the dismissal of Antiochus XIII in context. During the later second and early first centuries BC Rome had been aggressively extending her influence in the eastern Mediterranean, and even in those regions relatively remote from direct interference, rulers had become wary of acting too openly against Roman interests. By the beginning of the first century BC many of the weaker states in the eastern Mediterranean, which generally sought safety in alliances with whatever superpower offered them the greatest security, were beginning to judge that their best chances lay in compacts with Rome. Kings, however, were used to making diplomatic alliances with other kings, and they often found it difficult to steer their way safely through the constantly shifting policies and political intrigues of the ruling aristocracy at Rome. Roman intentions were hard to discern, because the Roman state had no consistent, long-term policy in its dealings with the eastern Mediterranean states, and each of the succession of generals appointed to deal with the kingdoms adopted a different strategy. As Roman aristocrats, these generals were in competition with others of their kind to acquire wealth and honours, and such things could best be attained by securing a high-profile military command. As the Roman empire expanded, the glittering prizes grew ever greater, until the commanders were fighting for supreme control of the empire itself.
Nevertheless there were still some alternatives to Rome in the first half of the first century BC. Some kings commanded sufficient wealth and resources to act independently and even to stand against the Romans, and these powerful rulers were always casting around for allies. Yet joining an alliance against Rome was not a choice to be made lightly, even for a powerful state. While the expansion of the Roman empire cannot have seemed inevitable to contemporaries, the history of the period provided plenty of cautionary examples to illustrate what happened to those who tried to block her expansion. Mithridates VI of Pontus, however, challenged Rome in a bloody dispute which raged for more than two decades. The focus of the conflict was in Asia Minor, but the complexity of dynastic intermarriages among eastern rulers could easily lead to other kings and regions becoming involved. When the Roman general Lucius Lucullus won a major victory over Mithridates in 71 BC, the defeated king escaped and sought sanctuary with his son-in-law Tigranes, the king of Armenia. Lucullus knew that even in defeat Mithridates was very resourceful, and demanded that the Armenian king hand over the fugitive, to prevent the enemy rallying anti-Roman support and raising another army.
It was this chain of events that led indirectly to Rome’s annexation of Syria, and it is perhaps appropriate that Armenia should have played such a central role from the very beginning, because in the centuries that followed the kingdom was a territory bitterly disputed between the Romans and their eastern neighbours the Parthians and Persians, with its political disposition influencing imperial strategies along their respective frontiers. Tigranes had begun his reign (c. 96 BC) as a vassal ruler of the vast and powerful Parthian empire, but in the years following his accession a dynastic civil war in the Parthian realm had allowed him to embark on an ambitious scheme of conquest, southwards into the western parts of the Parthian empire, and westwards to absorb what remained of the enfeebled Seleucid kingdom in Syria. At its greatest extent the empire of Tigranes stretched from the Mediterranean to the Caspian sea. 
The arrival of Mithridates in Armenia must have proved an embarrassment to Tigranes, who was then at the zenith of his power. Nevertheless the Roman demand was refused. Lucullus retaliated by invading Armenia (69 BC) and destroying its capital, Tigranocerta. The Armenian royal governor of Syria withdrew his army to help defend the homeland. Tigranes’ empire disintegrated, leaving local rulers, formerly subject to the Armenian king, negotiating for recognition with the new Roman power-broker. For the Romans the invasion had been a great success, although by invading a kingdom which had been carved out of lands claimed by both the Parthians and the Seleucids, Lucullus was leading Rome into an entirely new sphere of affairs. It is hardly surprising, then, that as Tigranes’ power collapsed the general found himself courted by embassies from the Parthian ruler and the Seleucid claimant, Antiochus XIII, both kings wanting to recover the lands of which they had been deprived by Tigranes.
Fig. 5.1. Silver tetradrachm with a portrait of Antiochus XIII Asiaticus, the last Seleucid king. BMC 000. Fig. 5.2. Silver tetradrachm with a portrait of Tigranes of Armenia. BMC 2.
It is somewhat ironic that Antiochus XIII owed his throne to the conflict that eventually ended with his dismissal. During Tigranes’ occupation of Syria the Roman Senate had recognized Antiochus as rightful heir to the Seleucid realm, and now, as the Armenian forces withdrew, Lucullus did the same. He posed no direct threat to Roman interests (even if some of his more powerful ancestors had been formidable opponents), and his kingdom consisted of a small and unstable domain centred on the city of Antioch and the fertile plain of eastern Cilicia. Strategically the kingdom was not particularly vital to Rome, although it did control a major land route from Cilicia into Syria via the Belen Pass (the ‘Syrian Gates’) in the Amanus mountains.
To some extent, then, Antiochus appeared to have the backing of Rome, and he could perhaps hope to occupy his throne as a Roman ‘client king’. But events changed quickly, with unfavourable consequences for Antiochus. His kingdom was disputed by a relative, and other petty rulers in northern Syria threatened his control of the hinterland. He may even have lost his kingdom to his rivals by the time Pompey arrived. More importantly, Mithridates of Pontus had eluded the Romans, and this proved to be Lucullus’ undoing. The fugitive king made his way home to Pontus, raised a new army and inflicted a resounding defeat on the Roman legions there. The Senate and the People of Rome replaced Lucullus with Pompey, who in a brilliant campaign drove Mithridates overseas (where he later died) and received the formal submission of Tigranes. The Armenian king forfeited his empire but was allowed to retain his ancestral kingdom.
Pompey then took it upon himself to settle affairs in the power vacuum left by the withdrawal of Tigranes from Syria. The empire of Tigranes was Roman by right of conquest, although there were Parthian claims to consider. Syria, however, had never been part of the Parthian kingdom. Pompey could have chosen not to interfere, leaving the region as a patchwork of small independent political entities, as it had been immediately prior to Tigranes’ invasion. It is unlikely, however, that such an option was entertained when the alternative was so much more promising: the extension of Roman influence and control over the east. It was a question of finding out what the states of Syria were like and whether any of them would offer resistance. The political makeup of the region was complex and potentially unstable, which offered Pompey an excuse to intervene to ensure order and security. In the north-west Antioch was the capital of what remained of the Seleucid kingdom. Further east a dynast called Dionysius controlled the cities of Hierapolis and Beroea, and to the north of these lay the large kingdom of Antiochus I of Commagene. The regions south of Antioch and the principality of Dionysius included a number of city states such as Apamea as well as small principalities and areas inhabited by nomadic tribes, some of which may have been the ‘Jews and Arabs’ that Pompey invoked as an excuse for dismissing Antiochus. The Phoenician cities of the coast were independent states, although some were controlled by overlords characterized as ‘tyrants’. The south was dominated by three large kingdoms: the Hasmonaean, Nabataean and Ituraean. Between these three was an inland enclave of city states which later became known collectively as the Decapolis (Ten Cities). 
Whether Pompey regarded the Parthians as a major threat or not is unclear. Even if he did not, there was always the chance that, if left alone, the relatively small states in Syria might gravitate towards the eastern superpower. The Parthians had shown an interest in Syria in the past, and may have aimed at reducing the Seleucids to vassal status during the troubled years prior to the rise of Tigranes. This would have given them access to the Mediterranean, making their kingdom as formidable as any that Rome had yet faced in the east. The Parthians were certainly in a position to build a world-empire centred on Mesopotamia, and even if (as some have argued) they had no pretensions to further western conquests, they were clearly a challenge to Roman interests. Syria was easy prey for the Parthians and Rome; it was merely a question of which power was best able to take it and then control it. To the Romans the region could have strategic value as a launching point for further aggression against the Parthians or the Ptolemaic kingdom of Egypt. Furthermore, the cities and kingdoms of Syria were wealthy, although revenues would have to be offset against the expenses of maintaining armies in the region. We cannot be certain that all of these considerations were weighed up (and Pompey, being a very ambitious individual, was probably acting out of a desire for personal glory as well), but the decision to annex Syria found its first expression in the dismissal of Antiochus XIII. This event marked the beginning of Roman interference and influence, which was to have a profound effect on the communities of Syria and the Near East. As it turned out, Pompey’s political and military gamble of annexation paid off in Rome’s favour, although there was nothing assured about the permanence of Roman rule in Syria at this early stage.
In the spring of 63 BC Pompey left Antioch and marched south with an army, extorting money, executing ‘tyrants’, and reducing the power of some of the native principalities. He seems to have posed as the champion of the Greek-style city states, ‘liberating’ them from the rule of tyrants and dynasts. A civil war in the Hasmonaean kingdom of Judaea drew him further south, where his interventions changed the power structure and extent of the Jewish state, and brought the war to an inconclusive pause. He had planned an attack on the Nabataeans but did not press this after intervening in Judaea. Instead he appointed his deputy, Marcus Aemilius Scaurus, as governor pending a proper senatorial appointee, and departed Syria, leaving Scaurus with two legions.
Pompey had not greatly altered the political makeup of Syria, although the fact of Roman rule now meant that the status of a community was decided by Rome rather than through the community’s independent interactions with its neighbours. The more powerful could negotiate better deals, but Roman control of status, favours and obligations could not be challenged except through open rebellion. For the city states, ‘freedom’ presumably came at a cost, in the form of tribute to Rome. The major dynasts, as ‘friends’ of Rome, may not have had to provide tribute at all, although at least one found it prudent to bribe Pompey to retain his throne. At this early stage Rome had not yet established for certain who were friends and who were enemies. The Seleucids had been deposed, and hostile or potentially rebellious elements had been removed where these were recognizable. The boundaries of Roman power in the region had not been established, although a symbolic border with the Parthian realm along the Euphrates river was to become political reality in later years. The new province of Syria was geographically and politically vague and amorphous, but Pompey may have had a model in mind when he decided to annex the region. He had justified the dismissal of Antiochus XIII by implying that his restoration would only lead to instability. As the conqueror of Tigranes, Pompey had the right to appoint or dismiss local rulers as he judged fit, but his subsequent actions may have stretched the terms of his senatorial appointment, which was to make war on Mithridates and Tigranes, and not to campaign in Syria. The Syrian acquisitions of Tigranes were less extensive than the region which Pompey now claimed, and, if anything, the Roman province of Syria resembled the Syrian provinces which Antiochus’ ancestors had ruled. Through the deposition of Antiochus XIII the Roman state could pose as the legitimate successor of the Seleucids in Syria, providing a fiction of continuity which at the same time justified imperial expansion. The kingdom of Antiochus XIII was very small, but his removal looks like a critical gesture signifying Roman intentions: the Romans would bring order to Antiochus’ ancestral domains.

Syria before Rome
The Seleucid kingdom had been carved out of Alexander the Great’s empire, itself created through conquest of the Persian empire. Many characteristics of these later empires can be detected in the Persian empire, which straddled Mesopotamia, stretching westwards into Syria, Asia Minor and Egypt, and eastwards into Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The rule of Persia’s Achaemenid kings was sanctioned by divine right, and the empire associated with the person of the king. Submission to the king, who was the source of justice and order, was the only major imperial demand expected of all the empire’s subjects. In spite of the centralized, despotic nature of their rule at the centre of the empire, the Achaemenids accepted and carefully managed the diverse cultures of the provinces through a policy of decentralized authority, permitting, or perhaps accepting, a high degree of local autonomy. Although most high administrative posts were reserved for Persians, some governors were of local origin, and Persian rule is characterized in the sources as lenient and fostering cosmopolitanism by allowing local elites to remain in charge of their native lands and peoples and to maintain their own traditions. As their empire expanded, the Achaemenids adopted and adapted the local forms of social control. Persian imperialism did not, it seems, involve imposing Persian culture on everyone. However, an education system provided a cohesive ideology for the elites of the empire, although its form of transmission appears to have been predominantly oral rather than literary. Thus, in spite of the looseness of Persian political control and the diversity of the empire’s cultures, the diffusion of elite culture gave the empire an impressive degree of integrity. The king’s powers were extensive across communities through his relations with the elites, but could not always be applied intensively within communities.
Evidence for the Persian period in Syria is poor, and the quality of the information varies from place to place. It has been assumed that the region was not heavily urbanized, except for the Phoenician coast, where the Persians actively supported cities, but the paucity of evidence from outside Phoenicia hardly allows us to be certain. Many Hellenistic cities were founded on old sites whose population and status in the Persian period is unknown, and which can be determined only through confident archaeological identification of their Persian phases. Our best evidence comes from the Phoenician cities, which provided ships and sailors for the Persian fleet. In their long-distance economic contacts all over the Mediterranean the Phoenician states were encouraged by the Persian rulers. Thus Phoenicia benefited from its position on the periphery of the Persian empire. The cosmopolitan nature of Achaemenid rule is evident in the art of Phoenician cities like Aradus, Byblus and Sidon. Local rulers are depicted in Persian dress, but their badges of office and coin types often combine local, Persian, Egyptian and Greek elements. In certain ways the Phoenician cities resembled the independent city states of Greece, and in spite of their conflicts with Athens and its allies, as agents of Persian imperialism they were open to Greek influences. Greek marbles were imported, and the highly Hellenized styles of some of the sculpture suggest Greek, or Greek-trained sculptors at work. Elite burials indicate the adoption or adaptation of a variety of traditions: the Phoenician upper classes were buried in sarcophagi of Egyptian style, Lycian style and, perhaps in imitation of Philhellene Persian elites in Asia Minor, in imported Greek marble sarcophagi with elaborate figured reliefs of thoroughly Greek style. Architectural elements make it clear that the cities also boasted buildings of Achaemenid imperial style. The coastal regions at least demonstrate a network of overseas exchanges and a lively hybridization of cultures, but one cannot speak of a deliberate policy of ‘Persianization’. 
Fig. 6. Part of the sanctuary of Eshmun near Sidon: the Persian phase of the complex included this series of terraces which have been likened by some to a Mesopotamian ziggurat.
	With Alexander the Great’s invasion of the Persian empire, and the death of its king Darius in 330, the entire Persian dominion became a Macedonian prize. This event marked the beginning of what since the nineteenth century has been called the Hellenistic period. Although it signalled a new phase of elite power, many regions of the Hellenistic east witnessed the continuity of traditions, and the Persian ideas of the king as the embodiment of empire, decentralized control through local rulers, and a widely diffused imperial elite culture were maintained by Alexander and his successors, although now the imperial elite culture was Greek and had a strong literary bias. Greek became the language of the court and high-level administration from the Mediterranean to India, and colonies and settlements of Greek-speakers were established all across the former Persian domains. This does not necessarily mean that local cultures in the heavily colonized regions declined, although in many parts of Syria their persistence through the Hellenistic period is hard to trace. The impact of Macedonian rule during the few years between Alexander and the establishment of the great Hellenistic kingdoms of the Seleucids and Ptolemies is difficult to assess. Along the Mediterranean coast of Syria and Palestine, which was the area most receptive to foreign imports and ideas, excavations have revealed that the cities were importing significant quantities of black-gloss pottery from Athens at the end of the fourth century, probably in conjunction with other more perishable goods which have left little or no trace. There was a notable influx of Greek and Macedonian settlers in the late fourth and early third centuries BC. Alexander established a standardized coinage in gold, silver and bronze which circulated widely throughout his empire, although this operated in conjunction with local coinages in some areas. A universal currency was convenient for long-distance trade, yet, as we will see in chapter 6, it was not a prerequisite for widespread economic links between different parts of the Mediterranean or elsewhere. But like Greek literacy a universal currency, stamped with the symbols of a central authority, contributed to the diffusion of an imperial ideology and power over wide areas.
	The Seleucid kingdom took its name from the founder of the dynasty which ruled it for two and a half centuries. Although it tends to be called a ‘Syrian’ empire, Syria formed only a part of the kingdom, and its origins in Babylonia (rather than Syria proper) mark the Seleucid kingdom as a Middle Eastern empire, which, like its Achaemenid and Alexandrian predecessors, was centred on the Fertile Crescent. Seleucid history began inauspiciously. In 320 BC a young Macedonian officer named Seleucus was appointed governor of Babylon, but he was forced out in the complex power struggle between generals that followed Alexander’s death. For the next two decades a large part of Alexander’s empire was dominated by the governor of Phrygia, Antigonus the One-Eyed. Other governors, particularly Ptolemy of Egypt and Lysimachus of Thrace, feared for their own positions and formed an alliance against Antigonus. Seleucus, now Ptolemy’s protégé, retook Babylon in 312 BC and, allied with both Ptolemy and Lysimachus, drove Antigonus into Asia Minor, finally defeating him in Phrygia in 301. In the division of territory that followed, Seleucus was given northern Syria, which remained Seleucid territory for the next two and a half centuries, and Ptolemy occupied the south. Seleucus went on to defeat Lysimachus, and found himself presiding over an empire stretching from the western coast of Asia Minor to India. Babylonia remained the keystone to his possessions, a bridge between the eastern and western halves of his empire which any rival would have to cross in order to conquer the whole. 
The impact of Seleucid rule on the culture and political geography of Syria is examined below, and we will return to it at various points in the chapters which follow. The impact of Ptolemaic rule in the south, which lasted in the south for about a century, is rather more difficult to evaluate, because there is not a great deal of evidence available. Some scholars explain the relative lack of evidence by arguing that there was comparatively little development in the south under the Ptolemies, who preferred to rule through traditional forms of government rather than encouraging the development of Greek cities as the Seleucids appear to have done (fig. 7). Like the Seleucids the Ptolemies founded settlements, although the extent of the programme of urbanization (if it could be called such) appears to have been much less ambitious than the Seleucid one, and it is often impossible to distinguish city from fortress given the evidence available to us. Among the more important Ptolemaic foundations were Ptolemais, founded at the coastal site of Akko, Philadelphia (Amman), Berenike (Aqaba), and Scythopolis in Galilee.
Fig. 7. The unfinished palace of the Tobiad Hyrcanus at Tyros (Iraq al-Amir), Jordan. First half of the second century BC. The Tobiads were a Jewish dynasty installed in the region of Ammanitis under the Ptolemies and then the Seleucids.
The Seleucid period was a crucial phase in the diffusion of Greek culture in Syria. For a start, it witnessed the development of a programme of urbanization based on the model of the Greek polis, which was also the form of local government most favoured by Rome in the eastern Mediterranean. The programme had been initiated by Alexander, but it was Seleucus and his son Antiochus I who carried it forward by founding numerous cities in their empire. Northern Syria was one of the regions that received particular attention. Some of the work there was probably done by Antigonus the One-Eyed, but Seleucus and his descendants deserve credit for fashioning northern Syria into an urbanized region with great centres like Antioch, Seleucia, Laodicea, Apamea, Beroea, Chalcis, Hierapolis and Zeugma. The Seleucid foundations not only provided Greek and Macedonian colonists with land and a familiar lifestyle organized around the institution of the polis; they were also intended to operate on behalf of the rulers as instruments of economic and political control over their respective hinterlands. The four great ‘sister cities’ known collectively as the Tetrapolis, which consisted of the ports of Seleucia and Laodicea and the two cities of Antioch and Apamea in the Orontes valley, dominated the rich agricultural lands of the north-west. New foundations were given dynastic names, or formerly existing settlements were refounded with dynastic names, a deliberate act which associated the landscape and political geography of the empire with the family of the king, and not merely with the person of the king himself. Although the major foundations ceased after Antiochus I, there are hints that many Seleucid cities witnessed substantial growth during the second century BC. Seleucus’ urban network persisted through the Roman period, being supported and augmented under Roman rule. 
To what extent the Seleucids found it prudent to legitimate their rule through association with the Achaemenids as well as Alexander the Great and the Macedonians cannot be known for certain, but it is worth noting that Seleucus was the only full-blooded Macedonian of the dynasty. Like many other Macedonian officers he had been married to a Persian on Alexander’s instructions; unlike those other officers he made a point of staying married to her after Alexander’s death. Their son and successor Antiochus I was therefore half-Persian, and all subsequent members of the dynasty had Persian blood. The capable Antiochus continued the work of consolidation initiated by his father, elaborating on the system of symbolic identity for the Seleucid empire. He initiated a universal dating system, the Seleucid era, which began in 312 BC, the year Seleucus recovered Babylonia. This association of time itself with the dynasty stood in marked contrast to the traditions employed by rival dynasties, which dated by regnal years of kings or other traditional systems. It is perhaps ironic that the era was so successful that it outlasted memory of the dynasty itself, and later became known as the ‘era of Alexander’ or ‘of the Greeks’ (see chapter 2). Antiochus may also have been responsible for organizing civic cults of Seleucus. In these Seleucus was worshipped as the founder of the city, so that the dynasty became intimately linked to notions of civic identity. Seleucus became an ancestral figure for citizens within the empire as well as for the dynasty itself, and as with the Seleucid era these civic cults continued to be observed in Roman times. And whereas Seleucus had legitimized his rule by continuing to issue coinage using the designs employed by Alexander the Great, Antiochus began issuing coins with portraits of himself and his father. Thenceforth it was commonplace to find portraits of the reigning king on Seleucid coins, in contrast to coins of other Hellenistic dynasties who legitimized their rule through portraits of Alexander or a founding ancestor, or patron deities. The Seleucids were liberated from the need to refer constantly to founder figures on their coinage, perhaps because other media, such as time itself, helped to provide this form of legitimation. 
	Seleucus’ successors spent much of their time fighting rivals in Asia Minor, southern Syria and Palestine and the eastern provinces. Seleucid ambitions in the Mediterranean arena led to fierce competition with other Hellenistic kingdoms there: the Ptolemies of Egypt, the Attalids of Pergamum and the Antigonids of Macedonia. The need to be close to this arena is thought to have been a major reason for the westward shift of the Seleucid empire’s core and its eventual concentration in Syria. Even Seleucus I had found it prudent to appoint his son Antiochus as joint king, to administer the eastern half of the empire, while Seleucus himself supervised diplomacy and conflict with his western rivals. But this westward shift may be partly the bias of our sources: Greek writers, who were mainly concerned with events in the Mediterranean basin. Generally speaking, the bias of our sources ensures that whenever the Seleucid kings moved east, they move out of history, and only rarely do we have any details of their activities there. Wars and problems in the western part of the empire during the second half of the third century BC suggest that the Seleucid empire was starting to decline, but it is almost impossible to determine what was happening in Mesopotamia and the vast eastern provinces for much of this period.
Decline or no, it was Antiochus III ‘the Great’ (222-188 BC) who is credited with consolidating Seleucid rule in the eastern parts of his empire and in Asia Minor, and, more significantly for us, with wresting southern Syria and Palestine from the Ptolemies. The conquest of the south effectively made the whole region part of the Seleucid kingdom (and may explain why Pompey could regard the south as much the victor’s prize as the north). Antiochus’ involvement in politics further west brought him into conflict with a new Mediterranean power: Rome. During the first decade of the second century BC the Romans started interfering in Greece, and by doing so encroached upon the ambitions of Antiochus. The king’s attempts to extend his influence there led to an all-out war in which the Romans defeated him on the Greek mainland, and then struck at him in Asia Minor. It is all too easy to see the Roman victory as ordained, but at the time it cannot have seemed so. The Seleucid kingdom was among the richest and most formidable powers in the ancient world, and this struggle would determine who was to dominate the eastern Mediterranean for the foreseeable future. Thus when Antiochus was completely defeated at the Battle of Magnesia in 190/189 BC and the Romans imposed a heavy fine on the Seleucid kingdom, forcing Antiochus to relinquish Asia Minor, the focus of Mediterranean power shifted decisively westwards, and the discourse of power among the Hellenistic kingdoms was increasingly framed by reference to the city on the Tiber. The Taurus mountains were to be recognized as the western boundary of the Seleucid empire, and the rest of Asia Minor was to be surrendered to other states and kingdoms, most of which were Rome’s allies. The Seleucid kingdom remained powerful, but the damage done to royal prestige encouraged Seleucid client rulers on the peripheries of the empire to make bids for independence. The loss of Asia Minor perhaps inhibited the empire’s ability to compete with many other important Mediterranean states effectively, and the heavy indemnity imposed by Rome may have engendered a financial crisis in the kingdom for several years until the fine was paid (though this is far from certain). Another factor contributing to Seleucid decline was the frequent warfare between rival claimants to the Seleucid throne in the second half of the second century BC. These disturbances were often sponsored by Rome and other Hellenistic kingdoms, so Syria, as the most accessible part of the empire for these rival powers, tended to be the battleground for these disputes rather than other more easterly areas of the empire. The increasing concentration of royal activity in Syria, and need for the kings to reside and protect their interests there, led to neglect of other regions.
Fig. 8. Silver tetradrachm of Antiochus III. BMC 28.
	In the second century BC Rome was still too far away to achieve control of the Seleucid empire. But while the Battle of Magnesia was the last major clash between Rome and the Seleucids, the Romans continued to meddle in eastern affairs in a somewhat erratic manner, which proved detrimental to Seleucid power. Rome had demanded hostages from Antiochus III after the Battle of Magnesia, and used these to manipulate the succession, which subsequently divided the royal house into warring factions. Secessionist regimes, such as the Maccabees of Judaea, could count on Roman support, if not physical aid. Antiochus IV Epiphanes (175-164 BC) complied with a Roman ultimatum that he abandon newly won conquests in Ptolemaic Egypt, which seriously threatened the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean. Rome lent nominal support to a usurper, Alexander Balas, who in 150 BC overthrew the legitimate Seleucid monarch Demetrius I. For the Romans, a weak Seleucid kingdom was better than a strong one, although indirectly, and probably unwittingly, the Roman contributions to Seleucid decline assisted the rise of the Parthians. The Babylonian keystone of the Seleucid empire was to fall to this new eastern rival rather than to Rome. As a result, the power that eventually eclipsed that of the Seleucids in most of their former territories was not Rome, but this dynasty which had its origins in Central Asia. 
The early history of the Parthian kingdom is obscure; they used an era going back to 247 BC, but what event this Parthian year zero commemorated is uncertain. The rulers were known as the Arsacid dynasty (after its founder, Arsaces) and they ruled over an Iranian tribe who were originally nomadic and known as the Parni. The tribe and its kings became known collectively as Parthians after the old Achaemenid province in northern Iran where they first established themselves as an important power. The Parthian kingdom remained under Seleucid influence until about the time of its formidable king Mithridates I (c. 171-138 BC), who captured Iran and southern Mesopotamia (Babylonia) from the Seleucids and even took the Seleucid king Demetrius II prisoner (140 BC). His successor and namesake Mithridates II (c. 123-87 BC) consolidated Parthian rule in the new territories and, as a result of a diplomatic accord with the Chinese emperor Wu-Ti, established a trade link which later became the so-called ‘Silk Road’, a channel of trade between China and the west which the Parthians jealously (and very profitably) controlled. For the Seleucids, Parthian control of Iran and Babylonia severely reduced the resources of their kingdom and lessened their chances of recovering what was lost.
No longer in possession of Asia Minor, and with the steady incursions of the Parthians to the east, the Seleucid empire declined rapidly during the second half of the second century BC. The reign of Alexander Balas (150-145 BC) was particularly disastrous. The Parthians under Mithridates I established themselves in the east, the Ptolemies gained a temporary influence over Syria, and following Alexander’s death the Seleucid kingdom entered into a prolonged feud between the sons of Demetrius I and Alexander Balas’ successors. The Parthians took Babylonia and defeated two Seleucid armies sent to recover the keystone. Rulers were forced to make concessions of independence to many of the wealthier and more powerful cities: Tyre in 126/125 BC, Tripolis in 112/111, Sidon in 111 and Seleucia in 109/108.  The Jews established an independent state, as did other groups in the region, and by the end of the second century BC the Seleucid kingdom was effectively reduced to northern Syria, north-western Mesopotamia and the plain of eastern Cilicia. Disputes over the succession continued, contributing to further decline. Yet it was from an unexpected quarter - from Tigranes of Armenia - that the final blow to the Seleucid kingdom came. There is a claim that Tigranes invaded at the invitation of the Antiochenes, who were weary of the constant, internecine strife of the Seleucids. More probably Tigranes took advantage of an already weakened kingdom and a population which no longer identified strongly with the dynasty to achieve his own, opportunistic ends. Civil wars had no doubt divided and destroyed loyalty to an empire embodied in the person and blood line of the king. After a long period of relative invisibility, local cultures of Syria and the Near East begin to emerge into our view at the end of the Seleucid empire, as regional powers asserted themselves. Yet it was not only the non-Greek element of the subject population that broke with the Seleucids; the Greek city states did so as well. The Seleucid experiment of linking their hegemony with the Greek-style polis ultimately failed.
That ultimate failure should not overshadow the Seleucids’ tremendous success down to the middle of the second century BC. But when studying Seleucid imperialism we are faced with the difficulty of differentiating between uniquely Greek institutions and standard imperial ones, and with distinguishing what was unique about the Seleucid empire. There are various similitudes and differences. In their struggles with their western rivals one might detect a continuation of Achaemenid and Alexandrian claims to a universal world-empire. If so, this distinguishes the Seleucids from other Hellenistic kingdoms, which do not seem to have aspired to world conquest, and seen in this light the confrontation between Antiochus III and Rome was a clash of similar imperial aspirations. Antiochus III established an imperial ruler cult (not to be confused with civic founder cults), but in doing so he may have had similar cults established by the Ptolemies in mind. An understanding and respect for established cultures in the empire which they ruled was a characteristic the Seleucids shared with the Achaemenids, but this did not prevent them from encouraging the development of Greek cities, a form of cultural imperialism which distinguishes them from the Persians. In the third century the Seleucids were great supporters of urbanization, perhaps believing that a network of cities would help to reinforce their rule. This support is thought to have declined after the death of Antiochus I, but a revival of the tradition (albeit on a less grand scale) occurred under Antiochus III and Antiochus IV. Following the conquest of the south by Antiochus III the city of Berytus (formally renamed Laodicea in Canaan) expanded significantly in size. The city’s orthogonal layout suggests planned expansion, although this seems to have adhered to an earlier, probably Persian, plan. The conquest of the south was accompanied by the adoption of the universal Seleucid era there. Ptolemaic coinage was demonetized and quickly replaced with Seleucid issues. Passing references in the textual sources refer to the adoption of Greek institutions by native cities of the Phoenician and Palestinian coast. Such actions indicate that Seleucid imperialism, however we define it, remained vigorous into the second century.
The archaeological evidence is patchy, but it points to cultural patterns that we might expect of an empire, Greek or otherwise. Cities and towns which were settled by Greek colonists, or those on the coast with easy access to the Mediterranean world, exhibit greater Hellenization of their material culture than villages and the countryside. In other words there was greater diffusion of Greek culture and symbols horizontally, between the cities and elites, than vertically from the cities and elites to the mainly rural lower classes. The majority of the population remained speakers of Semitic languages, and the further down the social scale, the less likely these people were to be Hellenized. Even among the elites local styles of art and architecture were sometimes blended with Greek and Achaemenid imperial styles, producing what is sometimes called a ‘hybrid’ material culture. Old, pre-Hellenistic pottery forms were often retained under the Seleucids, alongside new, Hellenistic types, suggesting that this hybridization extended to the preparation and display of food. Even so, pottery made in Greece and Asia Minor spread extensively through the Seleucid empire, and was imitated locally. The Hellenistic pottery forms of Syria do not show the same degree of Hellenization as those of Asia Minor, in that a smaller range of shapes is imitated. It has been tentatively suggested that Greek colonists had a major part to play in disseminating these Greek-style imitations and their originals. In places where Greek colonies were few, we find few imitations and local forms are predominant. Furthermore, the forms imitated at places inland, far from the Mediterranean, are those of the main period of colonization, in the late fourth and early third centuries BC. These forms were retained, suggesting little further influence (which coincides with the fact that there were no large influxes of Greek colonists after the middle of the third century). The difficulties of transmitting Greek culture vertically through the local rural populations are suggested by the fact that the proportions of Greek and Greek-style fine ware pottery are much higher in towns and cities than on rural sites. A common Greek type, widespread on Hellenistic sites of the region, is the so-called fish plate, which is a dish with an overhanging rim and a floor sloping down to a central depression (fig. 9). The form seems to have emerged at Athens c. 400 BC. Its distinctive shape was likely to have been related to a very specific (and very Greek?) function, although it is unlikely that this was confined to serving fish as the modern name for this shape suggests. Various other bowl and plate forms are typically Greek, and imported or imitated in both fine and coarse ware. Local or regional imitation could have led to a decline in imports of the originals. This seems to have happened in the case of Attic black-gloss forms, popular in Syria in the late fourth century, which were supplanted by Syrian copies. Antioch appears to have been a major centre of fine ware production, and from the mid-third century BC the city began exporting a new, mould-made form, the so-called Megarian bowl (also produced at other centres in the eastern Mediterranean), all over the coastal regions of Syria. This in turn was imitated locally. From the middle of the second century a new gloss ware, known nowadays as Eastern Sigillata A, was produced on a massive scale somewhere in the region, probably at or near Antioch or in eastern Cilicia. Although it was originally made with black or brown glosses in addition to red, as the industry continued to grow during the first century BC red (the favoured colour of most Roman sigillata wares) became predominant. It may be no coincidence that these changes to Eastern Sigillata A parallel the decline of the Seleucids and the advent of Rome in Syria, and production of this ware was unhindered by the Roman annexation (see p. 000). Finds of Rhodian amphoras in southern Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf provide tantalizing hints of long-distance trade between the Mediterranean and these regions under Seleucid rule. The absence of later amphoras may mean that this trade was cut short by Parthian invasion, but at present the evidence is very limited. Greek pottery forms are thus a potential index of the level of Seleucid imperialism and links with the Mediterranean world, even if there are many regional and local variations in pottery assemblages. 
Fig. 9. Hellenistic fish plate from the excavations in Beirut. This particular form was made at Antioch.
The Seleucids tend to receive less notice in general accounts of the ancient world than their rivals the Ptolemies or the Antigonids (no doubt because the written sources for them are so much poorer), and Seleucid history is usually framed in terms of a slow decline following early years of promise. In narratives of Middle Eastern history they feature as an interlude in the accounts of Achaemenid, Parthian and Sasanian imperialism. The oral traditions of the Parthians and Sasanians eventually succeeded in expunging the Seleucids from collective memory in Iran. Yet although the Seleucid kingdom was supplanted by Rome and the Parthian realm, and was eventually all but forgotten, some of the institutions which the Seleucids created and supported had a profound influence, as will be shown in later chapters. Furthermore, Roman claims to a universal empire and its highly Hellenized culture made it a suitable successor to the Seleucids in Syria and the Near East.

2 Rome, Syria, Parthians and Persians

Pompey’s ‘settlement’ of 64-63 BC did not result in the recognition of an agreed boundary between what was Roman and non-Roman. Yet a boundary of sorts was clearly present, dividing Roman possessions from Parthian. Syria and Mesopotamia were now politically separated between one empire ruled by Latin-speaking Italian elites and another controlled by a Parthian-speaking aristocracy. The Euphrates became both a symbolic and a very real political boundary, even if in cultural terms the river served as a highway, bringing greater homogeneity to the local cultures that existed along its banks. From the very beginning this boundary was problematic. Some would see it as unnatural, an artificial frontier circumscribing the potential offered to the power which, like the Achaemenids and Seleucids, managed to straddle Iran, Mesopotamia and Syria. The Euphrates was a temporary compromise between two contenders, Rome and the Parthians, both perhaps aiming at a world-empire. It would take a number of defeats east of the river for the Romans to realize that further expansion across this symbolic divide would be extremely difficult. But renewed attempts at conquest in the second century AD suggest that the Roman ideology of a universal empire continued to conflict with what was practically possible.
The political and military history of Rome’s eastern frontier can be portrayed as a struggle between Rome and two successive states to the east, the empires of the Parthians and Sasanian Persians, to create a world-empire which incorporated the whole of the Fertile Crescent. According to this view, a geographical precondition for a superpower was to acquire control of the Fertile Crescent together with Iran and the eastern Mediterranean. These regions were axial to Achaemenid, Seleucid and Muslim power, and the marginalization and rapid decline of Seleucid power can in part be attributed to the loss of Iran and southern Mesopotamia after the mid-second century BC. However, such a narrative may obscure what the different contenders thought they were doing, and what they hoped to achieve. Nevertheless any historical account of Roman Syria can scarcely ignore Rome’s conflicts with its neighbours and the strategies that were adopted by both sides. The Parthian and Sasanian states were the most serious rivals to Roman imperialism until the Muslims in the seventh century. An ideology of eternal victory may have made it difficult for Rome to accept these rivals on equal terms, even if repeated military campaigns demonstrated that a Roman conquest was likely to be impossible. With the Parthians Rome tried to adopt the superior position of patron, attempting to treat the Parthians like vassals through the taking of hostages, or by imagery of submissive Parthians bending to Roman will. For a brief period the Sasanians were able to turn the tables, taking the emperor Valerian captive, portraying the Sasanian king victorious over a succession of Roman emperors, and even compelling Rome to pay tribute - although this latter humiliation could perhaps have been viewed by Rome as one of her regular subsidies to barbarians beyond the frontiers. 
	In spite of their power it is very easy to exaggerate the threat posed by these eastern states. The bulk of Rome’s armies were concentrated on the Rhine and Danube frontiers; if some estimates are accurate, nearly half of the forces available to Rome in the second century were deployed there. Less than a quarter were stationed in the east. The centralized, ‘civilized’ Parthian and Sasanian states were perhaps less of a continual threat than the decentralized forces on the northern frontiers, and therefore did not require a perpetual show of force; and although serious, wars with the two eastern empires were more intermittent and could often be resolved by the opposing heads of state reaching an understanding. During times of peace both sides could regard each other as a partner in shielding civilization from barbarism, whereas this can hardly have been the case in Rome’s relations with her northern neighbours. Moreover, many of the eastern troops were not positioned to participate frequently in attacks across the Euphrates, being posted to Judaea or Arabia, where they were used to police the local population and to control nomads. Consequently major wars in the east required concentrating troops at a mustering-point and bringing in reinforcements from abroad. If the empire was divided between more than one emperor, as it frequently was from the mid-third century onwards, it was sometimes difficult to request troops from one’s colleagues, whose priorities lay elsewhere. A divided empire restricted the abilities of emperors to conduct large-scale offensives aimed at conquest of the Fertile Crescent (assuming that that was their aim). Roman forces in the east could serve as a deterrent, but they were not necessarily well suited to offensives.
Conflicts also arose for control of states positioned in the interstices between the empires. Whoever had influence in Armenia could also dominate Mesopotamia and the regions to the north, such as Colchis and Iberia. For both Rome and her eastern rivals domination of Armenia was strategically crucial, and long-term peace could be achieved only through a resolution which allowed both powers a way of controlling it simultaneously. 

Rome and the Parthian kingdom
The Parthians
Our knowledge of the Parthian state comes as much from Roman and Sasanian writings as from the Parthian kingdom itself, and it is perhaps unwise to place too great a weight on such sources. This means it is rather difficult for us to discern what Parthian imperialism meant. Mithridates I adopted the custom of styling himself king of kings, and it is perhaps he who emphasized a link between the royal Parthian house of the Arsacids and the Achaemenids. There are reports from Roman sources that the Parthians took this connection seriously with regard to their dealings with Rome, regarding themselves as the rightful inheritors of the Achaemenid empire, which included Syria, Asia Minor and Egypt. They may also have posed as the legitimate successors of Alexander the Great. The Roman historian Tacitus mentions the ‘menacing terms’ with which the Parthian king Artabanus in AD 35 referred to ‘the old boundaries of the Persian and Macedonian empires, and to his intention of seizing the territories held first by Cyrus and afterwards by Alexander.’ Some modern commentators have questioned the veracity of these Parthian objectives, and they may, of course, be the product of Roman rhetoric and scare-mongering, but they could also indicate that Rome considered the Arsacid rulers a serious threat, and that the Parthians were indeed regarded as the successors to the dangerous Persian kings who had menaced the Greek world from the sixth to the fourth century BC. 
The king and court exercised government over a variety of states, which were administered by nobles and vassal-kings. Some self-governing Greek cities founded by Alexander and the Seleucids were included in the political makeup of the empire. In very general terms the political geography of the Parthian realm was not too far removed from the initial arrangements of the Romans in Syria, where a complex array of semi-independent political entities was administered by a few imperial officials (see chapter 3). Arsacid right to rule was legitimized by a claim to be connected by blood to the Achaemenids, and by a claim to have been appointed by heaven as God’s viceroy on earth. Like the Achaemenids the Arsacids were Zoroastrians, although they appear to have been very tolerant of other religions in their empire. The status of Parthian kings was far above that of their subjects. As with the Seleucids and Ptolemies, royal blood was of paramount importance for kingship and a defining feature of their state; hence it was difficult for outsiders to challenge the legitimate line, and most, if not all, usurpers were related to the ruling Arsacid dynasty until the successful challenge of the Sasanian Ardashir in the AD 220s. 
	Nobles and vassal kings contributed soldiers and military assistance to their king, to whom they were presumably bound by an oath of loyalty. Little is known about the hierarchies of the Parthian kingdom, although there is some evidence to suggest that Seleucid court titles were adopted. The Parthian elite was far more stable than the Roman elite with regard to the continuity of power within families: some of the noble clans, such as the Suren, remained influential under the Sasanians, long after the dynasty’s fall. Although they might not covet supreme power for themselves, the great families exercised a high degree of influence over internal politics, even to the extent of overthrowing and assassinating unsatisfactory rulers. This might explain why Parthian kings were generally cautious in their dealings with the Romans: a king’s reputation among the aristocracy rested on his success, and aggression was always a gamble. A council of nobles appointed the king, and the Suren family reserved the right to crown him. Some interpret the relationship between the royal and subordinate families as antagonistic, one that pitted the powers of the core against those of the periphery, with the king trying to assert central authority over the nobles, who preferred control to be less centralized. If so, it was a struggle in which the nobles eventually gained the upper hand and weakened the Parthian kingdom. But it also confirms the impression that the Parthian nobility colluded in Arsacid right to rule, rather than challenging this ideal. Overall, the relatively loose structure of Parthian power proved satisfactory in both the defence and government of the empire; vassal-states maintained their identities and privileges and this may be one of the reasons why they were more likely to resist the imposition of government by another power such as Rome.
	The Parthian language was used at court and for administration, but many other languages were spoken in the empire. Not all of them were literary: Armenian was not written at all until the fifth century AD. The use of Greek on coins and royal inscriptions is notable; a conscious continuation, perhaps, of Seleucid traditions. It is worth noting that late Seleucid silver coins, and Roman imitations of them (see chapter 6), appear to have circulated in Parthian Mesopotamia alongside Parthian coins down to the very end of Parthian rule, while their counterparts with portraits of Roman emperors did not. The Seleucids may therefore have served as an additional source of legitimation for Arsacid rule, at least in the first centuries of their empire. The symbols of Parthian royalty mixed Greek and Persian elements: the white cloth diadem of Hellenistic kings mingled with long hair, beards, torcs, long-sleeved jackets and trousers. Parthian coins gave the kings Greek titles, and the ruling class is credited with taking some active interest in Greek culture. We are told that when news reached the Parthian court of the defeat of a Roman invasion force in 53 BC, they were watching a performance of Euripides’ Bacchae. One of the greatest Greek geographers, Isodore of Charax, came from a Parthian vassal-kingdom at the head of the Persian Gulf. A school of philosophy was established in Babylon. Cities like Seleucia on the Tigris were granted autonomy in their own affairs. However, this may not mean that any special respect was reserved for the Greeks: the Parthians, as heirs of the Seleucids, respected whatever local cultures existed and employed Greek symbols of power to stress their own legitimacy and continuity. But Greek was only one of many cultures persisting under Parthian rule. Texts from Babylonia show traditional Babylonian religions continuing as they had under the Seleucids, and in other parts of their empire local cultures passed from one dominion to the other uninterrupted. A turning-point in the Hellenization of the Parthian west came in the first century AD, when the Greek city of Seleucia on the Tigris revolted against Parthian rule and held out for seven years before surrendering. The excavators suggest that following the re-establishment of Parthian control, buildings began to incorporate Parthian elements, whereas before the styles were mainly Greek. The two-columned porticoes placed at the entrances to large halls found in the phase between the second century BC and first century AD dropped out of use, and instead the vaulted hall or iwan, typical of Parthian architecture, became the characteristic architectural element. From the first century AD onwards, the Greek element in Parthian royal iconography begins to decline. On coins the Greek inscriptions become degraded to the point of unintelligibility, and are accompanied by Parthian inscriptions. By the time that the Sasanian kingdom was established, the Parthians seem to have forgotten the ‘real’ history of the Achaemenids and Macedonians, having replaced those traditions with epics from eastern Iran, which in turn were used by the Sasanians to help legitimize their dynasty. The break with the past may have been assisted by the fact that the Parthians had no tradition of written history of the sort practised in the Roman empire, and relied more heavily on oral recitals from memory. Without the backup of writing it was relatively easy to manipulate collective memory in order to replace one tradition with another over a few generations. 
	The Parthian realm was under a lot of pressure by the second century AD, with the rise of the Kushan kingdom to the east and Roman attacks in the west. But it was still able to put up shows of strength, such as the invasion of Syria under Marcus Aurelius in the 160s, and defeat of the emperor Macrinus in AD 217. Internal rebellion, rather than external attack, brought Arsacid rule to an end; yet Roman aggression contributed significantly to its decline.

From Pompey to Augustus
The first formal encounter between the Parthian kingdom and Rome had been in Anatolia in 92 BC, to discuss mutual interests there, but Rome was not drawn into Parthian affairs until Lucullus’ invasion of Armenia. The defeat of Tigranes and his submission to Pompey placed Rome in the position of power-broker in the region. Roman armies marched through northern Mesopotamia and south into Adiabene, and the Parthian inability to challenge them, coupled with the fact that Tigranes had been able to take their land, no doubt convinced many members of the Roman elite that the Arsacids could be subdued. The history of subsequent Roman-Parthian conflicts was to prove that judgement unsound. Nevertheless, prior to the Roman annexation of Syria it looked as if Rome might rapidly achieve domination over Armenia and Mesopotamia as well.
	The decades following Pompey’s annexation were marred by civil wars in the Roman world, in which cities and allies had to supply money and military assistance to the different factions. The period also witnessed intermittent attempts to conquer Mesopotamia by ambitious commanders. Appointment as governor of Syria provided Roman aristocrats with opportunities for personal enrichment and military glory: Aulus Gabinius accepted too many bribes and had enemies in Rome who could bring him down; his successor in office, Marcus Licinius Crassus, was perhaps more impervious to slander but not to Parthian weapons. Gabinius had been planning a campaign across the Euphrates; and Crassus had the forces - seven legions - to realise such a campaign. In 53 BC he invaded Mesopotamia, intent on conquest and plunder, but instead led a Roman army to disaster at Carrhae. Crassus and three quarters of his soldiers were killed by the Parthians, and in the aftermath of the defeat local rulers sought to curry favour with the Arsacids. The nomadic Rhambei, who dwelt in the steppe on the west bank of the Euphrates in the vast region north of Palmyra, transferred their allegiance to the Parthian king, and between 51 and 50 Parthian forces were active in northern Syria. The Roman province was under threat little more than a decade after its annexation.
Some sort of political instability in the Arsacid realm may explain why the invaders did not manage to secure northern Syria, particularly after a violent civil war broke out between Pompey and Julius Caesar. Most of the Roman troops in the province were withdrawn to assist Pompey’s cause, and the cities were forced to provide finance, recruits and ships. All to no avail; in 48 Pompey lost the war and fled to Egypt, where he was killed. The Antiochenes, wary of being seen to help the loser, had refused to grant him asylum in Syria.
	Caesar toured the east shortly after Pompey’s death. The civil war was over, but the Roman world was still polarized into pro- and anti-Caesarian factions. The great general honoured cities such as Laodicea and Antioch, and his compacts with local dynasts requested that they should consider it their duty to safeguard Roman interests in Syria. But which Roman interests, given that there were two camps? In the summer of 46 BC a rumour circulated that Caesar was dead, and this was sufficient to provoke a renegade Pompeian called Caecilius Bassus to demonstrate where his sympathies lay. In the aftermath of Pompey’s defeat Bassus had fled to Tyre, a city which he now seized. From there he managed to win over the Syrian legions and engineered the murder of Caesar’s nephew Sextus, who had been appointed governor. Bassus gained the support of local dynasts and the Parthians. He established his headquarters in the fortress of Apamea and resisted Caesarian attempts to overthrow him. In 44 the governors of two provinces in Asia Minor arrived with huge armies and besieged Bassus at Apamea, without success. But in the same year Julius Caesar was assassinated in Rome, and his ‘republican’ murderers began organizing their armies for a struggle against Caesar’s supporters. One of these republicans, Gaius Cassius Longinus, arrived in Syria in 43. He had governed the province after the death of Crassus, and may have been able to make use of old connections there to secure his power base. Cassius won over both rebel and Caesarian legions and Bassus was able to step down without losing face. The republicans also initiated negotiations with the Parthian king, sending an envoy, Quintus Aetius Labienus, to the Parthian court to ask for military assistance.
	Cassius withdrew most of the Roman troops to join the republican forces in Macedonia for the final confrontation with Caesar’s supporters. The defeat of the republican forces at Philippi in 42 led to a temporary peace in the Roman empire, but the two principal beneficiaries of the victory at Philippi, Mark Antony and Caesar’s heir Octavian, soon began to quarrel. Antony placed two of the defeated republican legions in Syria, which, as it turned out, was an error of judgement. At the Parthian court, Cassius’ envoy Labienus and King Orodes decided to launch an invasion of Syria, to be led by the Roman commander and the king’s son Pacorus. They overwhelmed the republican legions (some of whom deserted), and while Labienus led an expedition west into Asia Minor, Pacorus took his armies south, accepting the submission of Syrian states as he went. The Roman province was lost to the Parthians (40 BC), who now acquired their outlet on the Mediterranean. 
Tangible evidence of the invasion is sparse. Coins issued at Antioch and Apamea during the Parthian occupation show that the cities abandoned new dating systems which had been adopted under the Romans and reverted to dating by the Seleucid era (which they had used prior to the Roman annexation). Labienus himself struck gold and silver coins with his own portrait, probably in Asia Minor rather than Syria. Overall the rapid disintegration of Roman control illustrates the precarious nature of their rule in Syria at this time; but the subsequent collapse of Parthian domination does not suggest that the invaders were any more secure. Antony had problems dealing with the increasingly hostile machinations of Octavian, but in 39 he sent a deputy, Publius Ventidius Bassus, with an army to recover the east. Ventidius’ campaign was remarkably successful; in the engagements Labienus and Pacorus were killed, and the Parthian army was forced to withdraw. The Roman commander then set about restoring Roman control of the Syrian province. This proved to be a complex task; many states and dynasts now had reason to oppose Rome, being either Parthian appointees, such as the Hasmonaean Antigonus in Judaea, or had conspicuously aided the Parthians, such as the Phoenician island state of Aradus, and Antiochus I, king of Commagene. Ventidius besieged Antiochus in his capital, Samosata, forcing him to capitulate, and the Roman Senate, exasperated with a prolonged dynastic feud between the Hasmonaeans of Judaea, appointed the Idumaean Herod as king in their place (p. 000). The siege of Aradus ended in 37, and Herod finally overthrew his Hasmonaean rival with Roman assistance.
Fig. 10. Auspicious moment: relief from the sanctuary on Mount Nemrut showing the horoscope of Antiochus I of Commagene, thought to depict the configuration of the stars when Pompey confirmed him as king, on 7 July 62 BC: Jupiter, Mercury, Mars and the Moon are in conjunction with Leo.
	With Syria secured, Antony began preparations for an invasion of the Parthian kingdom. Revenge for Carrhae had been high on the agenda of empire: Caesar had planned a campaign which was cut short by his assassination, and the intervening years had been occupied with internal conflicts. Initially Antony attempted to cross into Mesopotamia at Zeugma. However, he found the opposite bank of the Euphrates too strongly defended by the Parthians, so he marched north and east via Armenia. His army was more than twice the size of Crassus’ force, but his invasion of the Parthian realm proved inconclusive. In 34 he made Armenia a Roman province after deposing its king, yet this was hardly compensation for his failure to secure a worthy victory over the Parthians. During these years Antony’s position worsened as his financial and political situation deteriorated. War with Octavian looked increasingly likely, and he worked to gain the support of local dynasts and the Ptolemaic queen Cleopatra, which in Cleopatra’s case meant making concessions of territory to her. In 37 - 36 the Ptolemaic queen had acquired coastal cities between Orthosia and Berytus, Damascus, the Ituraean kingdom of Chalcis, and lands which belonged to Herod and the Nabataeans. A son of Antony and Cleopatra, Ptolemy Philadelphus, was declared king of Syria, Phoenicia and part of Asia Minor, and another son made king of Armenia. If these arrangements had any political reality, Antony was unable to enforce them, for he was soon obliged to withdraw his forces for a final battle with Octavian. 
The Parthians did not attempt to invade Syria in retaliation, but they took advantage of the Roman withdrawal from Armenia to set up a descendant of Tigranes as king there. When Antony was defeated at Actium in 31 BC, Syria fell into the hands of Octavian. Late in 30 BC, with Antony and Cleopatra dead and Egypt annexed to the empire, Octavian arrived in the province, and local communities had to negotiate their status with yet another Roman warlord. Among them were the dynasts who had supported Antony. Of these some, like Herod, were successful in convincing Octavian of their value to his regime; others were not so successful, and were deposed. However, once the situation in the east had stabilized, the deposed dynasties were restored. This was a clear indication that eastern dynasts were reliant on imperial favour, and that the emperor could depose or instate kings at will. But it was also a sign that Rome would respect some of the existing configurations of power - for the moment. 
Favours were also extended to or retracted from cities. During his later visit to Syria in 20 BC Octavian, now styled Augustus, deprived Sidon and Tyre of their liberty ‘for dishonouring the treaties which they had struck with Rome’. Rewards and punishments had been meted out to cities under the republican generals, and the demands of loyalty would see the same happen under the emperors. The first few decades of Roman rule had hardly been easy for the communities of the region.

Julio-Claudian Diplomacy
Under Augustus Syria became an imperial province, its governors being appointed by the emperor rather than the Senate. The province was still relatively isolated from the rest of the Roman empire, being almost completely separated from the Roman provinces of Asia Minor by the client kingdom of Cappadocia. The legionary garrisons were all stationed in the north, and there was no major military presence in the south. Should military intervention in the south prove necessary, as it did on occasions such as rioting following the death of Herod in Judaea, the Syrian governor would normally have to bring forces from the north. Quite apart from the time this would take and the logistical problems encountered in organizing supplies, any removal of troops from the north would also expose the province to potential attack from the Parthians. Fortunately for Rome, the Parthian kingdom’s political and military fortunes appear to have been waning, and it is difficult to gauge the extent of the Parthian threat in this period. But the lessons learned from the failures of Crassus and Antony were well taken. Instead of all-out attack on Parthian territory, Roman efforts shifted to greater reliance on diplomatic intrigues. In this Augustus and his successors directed much of their efforts towards securing Roman influence over Armenia (see below).
Troubles in the Parthian kingdom could prove advantageous to Rome. Renegade Parthian usurpers realized that the Roman empire could be used as a refuge, and such pretenders could be kept by Augustus as bargaining-counters in any negotiations with Parthian kings, or be persuaded to launch attacks on the kingdom from Roman territory. Octavian was faced with a situation of this sort right at the beginning of his reign. In c. 30 BC the legitimate Parthian king, Phraates IV, defeated a usurper, Tiridates, who fled to Syria with his supporters, taking Phraates’ son with him as a hostage. Tiridates was allowed to remain in Syria, and from here the usurper made an attack on Mesopotamia. Although he issued coins in 26/25 BC styling himself ‘Friend of the Romans’ it is not clear whether Rome offered him any military or financial support. Phraates rapidly gained the upper hand, and both sides appealed to Augustus. In 20, after prolonged negotiations and threats of war, a settlement was reached: Tiridates was to remain in Roman territory, to be maintained at Roman public expense as king-in-exile. Phraates’ son was sent back to his father, and in return Phraates surrendered the Roman military standards captured from Crassus and Antony. 
Augustus exploited the return of the standards for its immense symbolic value; the failed campaigns against the Parthian kingdom had done serious damage to Rome’s self-image as a perpetually victorious empire, and the settlement could be hailed as a kind of Parthian submission. Augustus and his stepson Tiberius were in Syria at the time that the negotiations were completed, but it is not known whether Tiberius, who received the standards, travelled to the Euphrates to take charge of them from the Parthians. The concept of the Euphrates as a boundary received political reinforcement a few years later when an island in the river was used as the site for negotiations by Augustus’ grandson Gaius Caesar and the Parthians (AD 1/2), and in Strabo’s great geographical work composed during the reign of Augustus, the Euphrates is described in specific terms as the boundary of the Parthian empire. Such recognition presumably meant formal acceptance of an autonomous Parthian sphere of affairs.
In order to secure the succession and prevent civil war Phraates retained his chosen heir and sent his other children to Augustus. The acceptance of Parthian hostages at Rome illustrates how complex were relations between the two great powers. The securing of royal hostages had long been standard Roman practice from potentially dangerous vassals, or kingdoms beyond the boundaries of the empire, but it is hard to view the Parthian realm in a client’s role with regard to Rome. Augustus no doubt wanted the Arsacids to be seen that way. Parricide was not unusual in the Parthian royal house, and rulers had good reason to fear their offspring (Phraates himself was said to have killed his father Orodes and his brothers). But if the arrangement was intended to be of mutual advantage to both sides, it did not have that result. The death of Phraates still led to a civil war, in which the Parthian nobles supported various contenders. Augustus acceded to the demands of at least one faction to send Vonones, one of the hostages, but if this was an attempt to gain influence over the Parthian throne it failed. Vonones was driven out of Parthian territory, and was eventually forced to retire to Syria. 
The complex history of relations between Rome and the Parthians cannot be covered here in any detail. One of the reasons why that history is so complex is that the reigning Parthian kings were frequently challenged by other members of their family, leading to periods of instability and civil conflicts, with both sides attempting to accommodate themselves with Rome. The troubled reign of Artabanus (c. AD 10-38) resulted in various accords and hostilities between him and the emperors, none of which led to all-out war. Artabanus threatened to invade Syria, and was especially anxious that the Romans remove Vonones to a safe distance from the border of his empire. Even after the death of Vonones, Tiberius still held some of the Parthian hostages, and used at least two of these against Artabanus, releasing them in the hope that they would attract sufficient following to undermine the authority of the king. The usurpers’ bids for power were unsuccessful, but they helped weaken the Parthian regime. A peace was concluded in 37 under Caligula. At a meeting on the Euphrates, the Romans formally recognised Artabanus as king of the Parthian realm and in exchange received a son as hostage. But the death of Artabanus not long after, and a subsequent civil war in the kingdom, made the treaty increasingly irrelevant, so that by 49 the emperor Claudius was prepared to support another pretender, Meherdates, in his unsuccessful bid to secure the Parthian throne. 

The Disposition of Armenia
During the reign of Tiberius (AD 14-37) most of the eastern frontier came under direct Roman control. In Asia Minor the kingdom of Cappadocia was annexed, as was the kingdom of Commagene in Syria. Direct Roman control now extended all along the upper reaches of the Euphrates. These changes were supervised by Tiberius’ nephew Germanicus, who was sent to the east with imperium (the power to act as the emperor’s proxy) in AD 17. Among Germanicus’ achievements in while in the region was a diplomatic settlement in Armenia. This kingdom, which lay to the east of the newly consolidated Roman frontier, had been a bone of contention between Rome and the Parthians before, and emerged once again as a problem in the early first century AD. When his bid to control his ancestral kingdom failed, the renegade Vonones had attempted to install himself as king of Armenia, without success. Following that incident the Armenian throne had remained vacant until Germanicus appointed a neutral nominee, Zeno of Pontus (who was given the throne name Artaxias III). The choice proved satisfactory to Artabanus, Rome and the Armenians, even though it meant that the Armenian rulers were no longer descended from the royal house that had produced kings like Tigranes. But after Zeno’s death, the Romans and Parthians disputed the succession and another solution was needed. At the end of Claudius’ reign (54) the new Parthian king, Vologaeses I, tried to resolve the issue in his favour by invading Armenia and installing his brother Tiridates on the Armenian throne. 
This pre-emption by the Arsacids prompted Claudius’ successor Nero to break with the Augustan preference for diplomacy and to organize a retaliatory strike. The emperor appointed a highly competent general, Corbulo, to command of the neighbouring Roman province of Galatia-Cappadocia. Corbulo invaded Armenia in 58 and drove Tiridates out, installing a Roman nominee called Tigranes in his place. Roman hegemony had been affirmed by military power, but the situation remained unstable. Corbulo was then given the governorship of Syria, from whence presumably he could monitor events. Tigranes proved to be a menace; he was openly hostile to his Parthian neighbours, and before long provoked a Parthian invasion of his kingdom. With this the two empires appeared to be on the brink of a major conflict. War was averted by a combination of diplomatic compromise and military threat. Nero’s government proposed that Tiridates be reinstated, on condition that he travelled to Rome to be crowned by the emperor. The Parthians, however, were able to gain control of Armenia and even defeated a Roman army there. The Roman response was to elevate Corbulo to an extraordinary command over the eastern legions of Galatia-Cappadocia and Syria, making it clear that unless Roman demands were met, there would be a war over Armenia. Eventually, under pressure, Vologaeses agreed, and Tiridates travelled to Rome. Although this settlement under Nero was acceptable to both sides, the political realities of an Arsacid on the Armenian throne compromised the Roman position more than the Parthian. For the remainder of the first century, however, it proved a satisfactory compromise. The Arsacid rulers of Armenia were nominal vassals of Rome, receiving their crowns from the emperors.

An Unsustainable Lightness?
An equally serious crisis under Nero was internal: the Jewish revolt, which began in AD 66. There had been frequent religious and political crises in Judaea since the death of Herod in 4 BC, but under Claudius and Nero the situation worsened. It seems likely that Rome, used to ruling through elites, misjudged the degree to which the elites it had backed in Judaea commanded popular support. The incident provides a fascinating insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the Roman system of ‘government without bureaucracy’ (see chapter 3), and what happened on those rare occasions where the pro-Roman elites were unable to control the masses. A riot in Jerusalem led to the death of the pro-Roman high priest and the city being seized by the rebels. The revolt spread throughout Judaea, prompting the governor of Syria to march south with a legion, a large number of auxiliaries and supporting troops from client rulers. The rebels successfully defeated the Roman army, and to all intents and purposes much of Judaea was lost to Rome. Nero responded by appointing another capable general, the future emperor Vespasian, and giving him a command separate from that of Syria. A new province was created specially for him: Judaea. The only drawback was that he would have to pacify it. Vespasian set about his task with characteristic vigour. In 67 he arrived with three legions and began reducing Galilee. By 68 the Romans had regained control of much of Judaea, so that in the summer of 69 when Vespasian began his bid for empire in the civil conflict with his rival Vitellius, he could leave his son Titus to prosecute the siege of Jerusalem and the rebel strongholds of Herodium, Masada and Machaerus. In the following year Jerusalem was taken and the Temple sacked. The three fortresses still held out, but these were taken one by one over the years between 70 and 74.
	The crisis of military power in the south illustrates the frailty of Roman rule in Syria and the lack of political integration at this point. Archaeology also presents us with a picture of local indifference to the discourse of Roman power. Regional architectural styles, incorporating non-classical elements of decoration and design, are still apparent in many parts of the province, in contrast to the high degree of homogeneity observed from the later first century AD (see chapter 8). Many local Syrian city coinages lack the imperial portrait under Augustus and his Julio-Claudian successors, in contrast with neighbouring Asia Minor or Egypt where the use of the imperial portrait as a communal symbol of the Roman empire was commonplace. However, we should beware of extending the apparent lightness of political and military integration to the economy as well. Pottery and glass show clear economic links with Italy and the rest of the Mediterranean in the Julio-Claudian period (see chapter 6). Indeed, trade with Italy seems to have declined in the later first century, at precisely the time when political and military integration was increased. This fact may reflect the development and growth of regional markets. A link between the improvement of transport and communications, the development of regional supplies for goods, and the spread of Roman military power through the province of Syria is a plausible one; armies could be stationed only in those regions where adequate infrastructures for supplies existed (though some would argue that the army was responsible for developing those infrastructures). The slow advance of the army into more remote regions, observed from the later first century onwards, must reflect advances in that infrastructure. Furthermore, there are clear signs that Roman intrusion into the social structures and cultural life of the peoples of the province had already begun with the annexation under Pompey, although this process seems to have accelerated under Augustus. These are themes explored in the chapters which follow.

Flavian Consolidation
The reign of Vespasian proved to be a crucial one in the development of the Syrian province. In 72 the kingdom of Commagene, which had been annexed and restored twice under the Julio-Claudians, was permanently added to the province of Syria. With this a substantial stretch of the upper Euphrates, facing Parthian Mesopotamia, became a military frontier under direct Roman control. Other dynasties disappeared in later years. It is thought that Emesa was annexed between 72 and 78/79 (the dynasty is last heard of in 72: see chapter 3). When the Herodian king Agrippa II died c. 92/93 under Vespasian’s son Domitian, his large kingdom in the south was also annexed, so that by the reign of the emperor Nerva (AD 96-8) of the Near Eastern ‘client’ kingdoms only the Nabataean realm remained. There is also good evidence for improvements to military infrastructure for communications and supplies. A project of canalization around Antioch, much of which involved the army, is thought to have been for military purposes. A milestone of AD 75 shows that a Roman road was being constructed across the Syrian steppe, probably between Palmyra and Sura on the Euphrates, giving Rome direct access to the middle Euphrates valley from central Syria. But how far Roman control extended down the Euphrates at this point is uncertain.
Fig. 11. Roman bridge on the road between Samosata and Zeugma, probably built by legionaries of the legio IV Scythica, which spans the Cendere river (the ancient Chabinas), a tributary of the Kahta river, which is itself a tributary of the Euphrates. Both ends were originally flanked by a pair of columns with Latin dedications by the four cities of Commagene to Septimius Severus, his wife Julia Domna, and their sons Caracalla and Geta; the column naming Geta was removed after his murder by Caracalla in 212. Traces of an earlier inscription remain on one of the columns, perhaps dating to Flavian times; the bridge and road may have been part of a more general programme of consolidation and development in the Flavian period.
All of these changes point to greater military integration and the expansion of direct Roman control under Vespasian. However, some scholars have drawn attention to the fact that changes were already taking place at the end of Nero’s reign, in connection with the compromise of Corbulo’s settlement. These included the acceptance of Parthian domination over Armenia as a military fact, regardless of the symbolic relationship between Armenia and Rome. This acceptance probably explains why the kingdom of Pontus in northern Asia Minor was annexed in 64/65, further extending direct Roman control over the eastern frontier. Flavian military activities even further to the north-east, aimed at securing the Caucasus against the Sarmatians, may also have a Neronian origin. To the south Damascus, which had possibly been under Nabataean control for much of the first century, was certainly brought under direct Roman control by c. 63. The huge central Anatolian region of Galatia-Cappadocia was elevated to a military province under Corbulo, but whether it retained its status in Nero’s later years is unknown. If not, it had recovered this status under Vespasian, who had two legions there. The upper Euphrates became a military frontier with an Armenian ‘buffer’ beyond, flanking Parthian Mesopotamia. 
	Vespasian’s actions can be interpreted in the light of Corbulo’s Armenian settlement, but it may also have aimed at securing Syria for offensives against the Parthians. We know very little of relations between the Parthian kings and the Flavian emperors. Vespasian rejected a proposal by the Parthian king Vologaeses for a joint Parthian-Roman defence of the Caucasus against the troublesome Sarmatian tribes beyond, and turned down offers of Parthian assistance in the civil war against Vitellius (though this may be because the offer came too late). The king of Commagene was deposed on a charge of colluding with the Parthians, but there may be nothing to this accusation which provided a pretext for the Roman invasion. There are vague hints of some sort of hostilities slightly later in Vespasian’s reign. Parthian support during the reigns of Titus and Domitian for two impostors pretending to be Nero look very much like a response to Roman support for pretenders in the Parthian realm. In the past the Romans had intended to undermine the authority of aggressive Parthian kings or to exploit periods of political instability by this means. The Flavians had usurped the empire, so now the Parthians sponsored false Julio-Claudian claimants. It is difficult to assess the seriousness of these incidents, and like the Roman-sponsored usurpers in the Parthian territory, the false Neros attracted an impressive following, but neither proved a serious challenge to Flavian authority. Nevertheless impostors had occasionally succeeded in the past: the career of the Seleucid usurper Alexander Balas was proof that under the right circumstances such a strategy (in that case pretending to be a son of Antiochus IV) could work.
The evidence thus hints at a ‘grand strategy’ of consolidation under the Flavians, without which the period of aggression against the Parthian kingdom in the second century would have been less feasible. It enabled Rome to embark on a scheme of annexation beyond the Euphrates. It may also have been prompted by the realization that, during the Jewish war, internal rebellion could threaten the security of the east. 

Aggression and Expansion
The second century witnessed the full integration of Syria and the Near East into the eastern Roman empire on all fronts: cultural, political and military. Syrian elites began to enter the Senate, and the ruling classes of the province embraced the cultural movement sweeping the eastern Mediterranean known as the Second Sophistic (see chapter 8). Regional architectural styles declined and were replaced by more homogeneous imperial forms. Cities constructed the sorts of buildings we associate with the ‘Graeco-Roman’ city: public fountains, theatres, hippodromes, colonnaded streets. The emperor’s portrait became a common device on local civic coins. The century saw the advance of the military into the Syrian and Arabian steppe and desert, and by the early third century Roman power had advanced down the middle Euphrates as far as Bijan island (see below). There was a Roman military presence at the Azraq oasis in Arabia, and possibly one some 400 kilometres (250 miles) east at Jauf at the far end of the Wadi Sirhan. In Armenia and northern Mesopotamia, Rome began to gain the upper hand. Invasions of southern Mesopotamia (Babylonia) failed to secure any permanent control, but by the end of the century most of northern Mesopotamia was under Roman rule or influenced by Rome. 
	In 106 the Nabataean kingdom was annexed, becoming a province called Arabia, separate from the province of Syria. The motives for the annexation are obscure. The transition does not appear to have involved any major military activity. It is assumed that Rabbel II, the last Nabataean king, had died before his kingdom was incorporated. In any case, the legate of Syria seems to have occupied the kingdom without opposition. If this was part of a strategy leading to the emperor Trajan’s invasion of the Parthian kingdom, it is hard to see how the two events were linked. It can be regarded as a strengthening of direct Roman rule by annexing the last major ‘client’ kingdom of the east, but Trajan’s campaigns in Mesopotamia brought a new one into the empire by encompassing Osrhoene, the kingdom centred on the city of Edessa. Economic motives, such as the seizure of the lucrative trade routes through the Nabataean kingdom, are possible, but it is debatable to what extent Roman conquests were motivated by economics. Rabbel may have followed the example of certain earlier ‘client’ kings by bequeathing his kingdom to the Roman people on his death, leaving Rome with a legitimate claim and little option but to intervene. But all this is speculation; nothing is known of the circumstances.
	The annexation of Arabia had not brought Trajan to the region, but shortly after this he turned his attention to the east. The Parthian kingdom was divided between Vologaeses III and the usurper Osroes. Osroes had attempted to impose a king of his own choosing in Armenia, violating the settlement reached under Nero. The instability of both the Armenian and Parthian kingdoms allowed Trajan to achieve something which had eluded Crassus and Mark Antony, and which the emperors of the first century had not sought: a decisive Parthian victory.
	Trajan’s Parthian war was the first in a succession of major Roman offensives against its eastern neighbour. In the autumn of 113 the emperor set out for the east, rejecting Parthian requests to show support for the Armenian succession and not to prosecute the war. The following year he annexed the Armenian kingdom, deposing and killing Osroes’ nominee Parthamasiris, even though Parthamasiris had submitted to him, no doubt hoping that this ploy would lead to recognition. Parthamasiris’ fate galvanized neighbouring rulers, who hastened to be received by the emperor and confirmed in their kingdoms. Late in the campaigning season of 114 the Romans took the city of Nisibis, which had been under the control of the Parthian client state of Adiabene, and during their march back to Syria the kingdom of Osrhoene made a formal submission. In 115 Trajan campaigned in northern Mesopotamia, reducing Parthian vassal states, and forming a new transeuphratene province which was called Mesopotamia. During the winter of 115-16 a major earthquake struck Antioch, severely damaging that city and Apamea, but while the emperor himself narrowly escaped death when the building he was in collapsed, the event did not deter him from continuing his campaigns. 
In 116 the main thrust against the Parthians began. The details are unclear, but it seems that Trajan divided his forces, one army marching down through Adiabene and the other following the Euphrates south into Babylonia. The Parthian usurper Osroes was driven away and his capital at Ctesiphon captured. This was the first time that the Romans had marched down the Euphrates river valley; and from then on this became a standard route for attack by armies on both sides, be they Romans, Parthians or Sasanians. The Roman advance continued south to the Parthian vassal kingdom of Characene, which formed an alliance with Rome. Trajan is reported to have reached the Persian Gulf, but whatever his intended next move, his plans were cut short by rebellions to his rear. Pro-Parthian forces worked to undermine Roman influence: the powerful state of Hatra rebelled; a widespread Jewish insurrection in the Roman world spread to Mesopotamia; and in retaliation Roman armies burned the Greek city of Seleucia on the Tigris, sacked Edessa and besieged Nisibis. Trajan’s next act may have been a compromise, or it may have formed part of his original plan. A son of Osroes, Parthamaspates, was crowned king by Trajan at Ctesiphon. A Roman nominee claimed the Parthian throne, but his position was as precarious as that of earlier pretenders sponsored by the Julio-Claudian emperors. The revolts posed a serious threat to the safety of the Roman armies in the south, and in 117 Trajan began his retreat. He besieged Hatra, without success, and by the autumn his forces had withdrawn from Parthian territory altogether. Once again, the Euphrates formed the boundary of the two empires. Trajan set sail for Rome, but his health was failing and he died in Cilicia in August 117.
Fig. 12. Sestertius of Trajan, issued at Rome c. AD 116, commemorating ‘Armenia and Mesopotamia subjected to the power of the Roman people’. BMCRE III, 221-222.
Although Trajan’s successor Hadrian (AD 117-38) decided to forsake his predecessor’s Mesopotamian conquests, Trajan’s invasion produced some lasting consequences, which proved damaging to the Parthian regime. The king of Edessa had been overthrown in the anti-Roman rebellions, and Parthamaspates, who had survived Trajan’s withdrawal from the Parthian kingdom but had been rejected there, is found ruling Edessa under Hadrian, implying some sort of cordial relation between Rome and this Parthian vassal state across the Euphrates. The kingdom of Characene, a former Parthian vassal state near the head of the Persian Gulf, remained supportive of Rome and outside Parthian control until it was reconquered by Vologaeses IV in AD 150/151. The pro-Roman stance of Characene between 116 and 150 fostered trade via the Gulf with India and further east, and probably contributed to the expansion of the so-called caravan trade from which cities like Palmyra profited greatly (see chapter 6). In the decades following their humiliation at the hands of Trajan the Arsacids attempted to reassert their influence, threatening the Roman east at least three times during the reign of Hadrian and his successor Antoninus Pius (AD 138-61), and culminating in an invasion of Syria and Armenia in 162 under Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus (AD 161-69).
In Judaea there was a popular revolt under Hadrian, known as the Bar-Kokhba war (132-35). It appears to have been based in the countryside south of Jerusalem, the Judaean hills and the desert of Judah, and centred around the person of Shim‘on ben Kosibah. The reasons for the revolt are obscure; it may have been a response to legislation which interfered with Jewish religious and cultural observances (including, perhaps, a ban on circumcision), or to the foundation of a Roman colony on the site of Jerusalem c. AD 130, which received the name Aelia Capitolina (after the war Jews were forbidden to enter the city). The Romans succeeded in putting down the revolt a few years after it began, but not without serious losses. The emperor himself is thought to have commanded the war for a while. As a result of this conflict Hadrian changed the name of the province to Syria Palaestina, which looks like a deliberate attempt to dissociate the name of the province from the Jewish people.
In 148 the Parthian king Vologaeses IV succeeded to the throne. He seems to have been capable, ambitious and successful, and set about reducing the legacy of Trajan’s conquests. Pro-Roman Characene was reconquered and deprived of its autonomy. He invaded Armenia in 155, but was persuaded to withdraw through Roman diplomacy rather than war. In 162 he returned, defeating a Roman army and installing his own nominee as king. He then moved on to northern Mesopotamia, where he overthrew the pro-Roman ruler of Edessa and installed a Parthian nominee. Vologaeses was now in a very strong position, and able to threaten the Roman province of Syria, which he promptly invaded. Its governor and armies were unable to stem the attack, and towards the end of the year the emperor Lucius Verus arrived and consolidated the Roman position with eight legions. Verus did not conduct the campaigns in person, but shifted his centre of command between Antioch and Laodicea during the four years of campaigns, AD 162-66, while a series of campaigns were waged on his behalf by competent generals. The Parthians were defeated on the Euphrates at Sura, and, having turned the tables, the Romans pursued a devastating war against the Parthian west. Armenia was recaptured and a Roman senator and former consul called Sohaemus, presumably a descendant of one of the eastern client rulers of the first century, was installed there as king. A Roman army then annexed northern Mesopotamia and, taking the route down the Euphrates, reached Seleucia and Ctesiphon and burned them. A new, Mesopotamian, frontier was established on the River Khabur, and Roman control now extended down the Euphrates as far as Dura Europus (a city which had been briefly annexed by Trajan).
	The hostilities provoked by Vologaeses had left Rome in an even stronger position in the east rather than weakening her. The Romans had asserted their domination of the Edessene kingdom of Osrhoene and in Armenia, and direct Roman control now embraced the north-western part of Mesopotamia, perhaps including the important Mesopotamian city of Nisibis. A curious series of silver coins was produced for Mesopotamia in the names of the two emperors Aurelius and Verus and their wives, sometimes with the name and titles of the king of Osrhoene, Ma‘nu, and others with the inscription ‘for the Roman victory’. The Mesopotamian city of Carrhae issued civic bronze coins for Aurelius and Verus, and thus for the first time asserted its position as a Greek city of the Roman world. But we do not know where or even whether Roman forces were garrisoned in Mesopotamia.
	Lucius Verus died in 169, leaving Marcus Aurelius sole emperor. The governor of Syria from c. 166 was Avidius Cassius, a native of the Syrian city of Cyrrhus and one of the chief figures in the Parthian campaign. By about the time that Verus died Marcus Aurelius is thought to have raised Cassius to a higher command over the eastern provinces, while the emperor himself waged war on the empire’s northern frontiers. In the spring of 175 false reports of the death of Aurelius circulated, and Cassius was proclaimed emperor by his armies. For a short time the situation was extremely grave. Cassius controlled the resources of the wealthy eastern provinces and a considerable military force. Aurelius had set out for the east when news reached him of Cassius’ murder at the hands of his own officers (summer 175). Even so, the emperor thought it prudent to visit the east to reaffirm his authority in person, which aside from meting out punishments presumably involved securing the allegiance of local elites as well as that of the armies. The historian Cassius Dio adds that as a consequence ‘a law was passed at this time that no one should serve as governor in the province from which he had originally come, inasmuch as the revolt of Cassius had occurred during his administration of Syria, which included his native district.’ Does this signify that the rebellion had some local or ‘national’ character? It seems unlikely. However, a native usurper might command greater loyalty among the local elites than a stranger. While not a national movement, the rebellion of Cassius could have had a local component.

The Severans
The assassination of the emperor Commodus in Rome on New Year’s Eve 192 led to a civil war, in which a candidate put up by the emperor’s Praetorian Guard was challenged by nominees of the armies in Britain and Gaul, the Danube, and Syria. The candidate from Syria, the governor Gaius Pescennius Niger, established control over the whole of the eastern Mediterranean from Asia Minor to Egypt, and gained a few footholds in Europe. It seems that he could also count on the support of the Parthian king Vologaeses V and his vassals, the rulers of Adiabene and Hatra. Niger’s principal rival, the Danubian candidate Septimius Severus, secured Rome, and Niger’s authority in the east weakened following successive defeats at Cyzicus and Nicaea in north-western Asia Minor. Egypt and Arabia went over to Severus, and there were revolts in the cities of Syria. The final confrontation came at Issus, where centuries earlier Alexander the Great had triumphed over Darius. Niger was soundly defeated and fled to his supporters in Parthian territory, but was overtaken and killed (194).
Fig. 13. Silver denarius of Pescennius Niger.
	The historian Cassius Dio wrote that during this civil war the Mesopotamian kingdoms of Osrhoene and Adiabene rebelled, laying siege to Nisibis, a Roman stronghold which lay more or less equidistant between them. The statement illustrates how ignorant we are of the details of this period. Osrhoene is known to have been within the Roman orbit, whereas Adiabene is thought to have been within the Parthian. One can speculate that some diplomatic understanding between Rome and Adiabene had been achieved (and hence its apparent support for Niger), but little more. This is also the first certain indication that Roman forces were stationed as far east as Nisibis. Osrhoene and Adiabene appear to have taken advantage of the war to pursue their own designs, but later claimed that they had been fighting against Niger (and must therefore have switched sides). All to no avail: for Severus directed his armies against them immediately after Niger’s defeat, taking the titles Parthicus Arabicus and Parthicus Adiabenicus in honour of his victories. The kingdom of Osrhoene survived, as is shown by a boundary stone of AD 195, but on a greatly reduced scale: it seems to have been restricted to the city and territory of Edessa. The rest of north-western Mesopotamia then became a province also known by the name Osrhoene.
	During Severus’ war against his other rival Clodius Albinus in the west (AD 196-7) the Parthians retaliated, invading Mesopotamia and besieging Nisibis. In 197 Severus returned to Syria with three newly raised legions, I, II and III Parthica. His second Parthian war followed the pattern established by Trajan and Lucius Verus. First he secured the north and then marched his armies down the Euphrates to sack Ctesiphon (197/198). There followed a retreat up the Tigris, with a detour to besiege, inconclusively, the Parthian vassal-state of Hatra. He launched another attack on Hatra in 199, and may have concluded a treaty with the local rulers of that city. If so, this would be the first piece of evidence we have of the gravitation of Hatra towards the Roman sphere, an action for which it was later to pay dearly. At some time during or after the conclusion of the war (199) a province called Mesopotamia was established alongside that of Osrhoene. Severus claimed to have created a ‘bulwark of Syria’ through the establishment of the two Mesopotamian provinces. Cassius Dio was unconvinced, and complained that it was expensive and produced very little for Rome. His objections are often quoted, but in the long term Severus’ strategy was vindicated. While the ‘bulwark’ failed to protect the provinces of Syria from invasion in the middle of the third century, subsequently most of the fighting was concentrated in Mesopotamia, leaving Syria unharmed. However, the acquisition of Mesopotamia was seen as a major transgression by the Sasanians, who fought hard to recover it.
	Following Pescennius Niger’s defeat, Severus had divided the province of Syria in two: Syria Coele in the north and Syria Phoenice in the south. This seems to have been another measure aimed at curbing the power of the governor and the potential for military revolt. For the first time in Syria there was large-scale production of imperial coinage, in the form of the silver denarius. The mint is uncertain but it was probably Antioch. This may be indicative of imperial desires for the region to be more independent of supplies of this coinage from Rome; it also highlights the growing importance of the city of Antioch as something more than just a major polis of the eastern Mediterranean. During the second century Antioch had served as the capital city of the empire: Trajan had moved his court there during his Parthian campaign, and so had Lucius Verus. Rome, the symbolic centre of the empire, was beginning to lose its importance as the political capital. Imperial duties now involved spending time in the provinces rather than at Rome, and from the late second century it was commonplace for the emperors to accompany their troops on campaign, even if, for much of the third century, it was felt important to visit Rome as early in the reign as possible. Emperors were often created on the peripheries, by the armies, rather than at the centre, yet they still found it prudent to invest in formal recognition by the Roman Senate and a period of residence at Rome. But campaigns demanded the emperor’s presence on the peripheries of the empire, with the result that certain provincial cities acquired the infrastructures necessary to serve as imperial capitals. Antioch, as a former capital of the Seleucid kingdom, had sufficient dignity (and possibly still had Seleucid palace buildings) to serve imperial needs. Initially, however, Severus punished the city. Civil war provided rival cities with opportunities to challenge each other by supporting different contenders (see chapter 7). It was a risky business, since there could be only one winner in the struggle for empire, and cities that backed the loser could be punished by the victor. Antioch was particularly vulnerable. As the chief city of Syria it was highly likely to be seized by a usurper based in the province. Consequently Severus punished Antioch for its support of Niger, demoting it to village status and annexing it to the territory of its neighbour and rival Laodicea, which had declared for Severus. In the long term, however, this demotion did nothing to inhibit Antioch’s role as an imperial capital. It is possible that Laodicea, which was made a metropolis following Niger’s defeat, took over the role of chief meeting-place for the provincial imperial cult (see chapter 9), but later shared this position in some way with Antioch after the latter was restored. We do not know exactly when Antioch was restored, but it seems to have regained full status by the beginning of the third century. Other cities were also rewarded for their support against Niger: Heliopolis, Tyre, and Sebaste in Samaria, while their pro-Niger rivals were punished. This might appear unusually vindictive, but such measures were a way of maintaining Roman hegemony and keeping subject communities in line.
	In the Parthian realm a prolonged civil war began when two brothers, Vologaeses VI and Artabanus V, opposed each other from about AD 212. Severus’ son Caracalla, now sole emperor, took advantage of the situation. He deposed the kings of Osrhoene and Armenia, declaring the kingdoms annexed to the Roman empire, although a rebellion in Armenia prevented the Romans from establishing authority there. Nevertheless these acts could be seen as an attempt to consolidate Rome’s position before attempting to annex more of the Parthian kingdom. In what happened next it is very difficult to distinguish genuine intent from treachery. Caracalla submitted an extraordinary request to Artabanus of Parthia: the hand of Artabanus’ daughter in marriage. Any offspring from the union could potentially claim the right to rule in both empires. This attempt to combine the two civilized powers is sometimes interpreted in the light of Caracalla’s apparent fascination with Alexander the Great. The marriage consciously imitated the union between Alexander and the Persian Roxane. It is impossible to know whether the request was serious, but Artabanus agreed to a meeting. If Caracalla truly had been planning to unite the two empires through intermarriage, he had by then changed his mind. Instead of welcoming them, the Romans fell upon the Parthians and massacred them. Artabanus himself escaped, and Caracalla began a campaign (216) against the Parthians. After marching through Adiabene and Media he returned to winter at Edessa, from which he presumably hoped to conduct an attack on Ctesiphon in 217. But he fell victim to a conspiracy on a journey between Edessa and neighbouring Carrhae, and was replaced by Macrinus, his praetorian prefect. The new emperor had to contend with Artabanus’ retaliatory invasion of Mesopotamia, and at Nisibis the Romans suffered a resounding defeat and agreed to pay an indemnity for the damage Caracalla’s campaign had caused. It was not a particularly spectacular debut for Macrinus. On the diplomatic front the emperor achieved success in Armenia by offering reparations to its Arsacid monarchy for the actions of Caracalla, but his hold on power was precarious. Macrinus’ status made his suitability as emperor questionable: he was of equestrian, not senatorial, rank (the Senate, however, had acquiesced to his rule). Caracalla had been popular with the rank and file, and there were other members of the family living in Syria who could challenge his position. Caracalla’s influential mother Julia Domna was still alive, and resident at Antioch where Macrinus had set up court. Her subsequent suicide may not have lessened his problems. 
	A rebellion was engineered by the adherents of the remaining members of the Severan house who were based at Emesa. Julia Domna’s sister Julia Maesa lived there, together with her two daughters, both of whom had a son. In 218 the eldest of these boys was proclaimed emperor in opposition to Macrinus, and won the support of troops stationed at nearby Apamea. Macrinus was unable to stem the revolt, and in a battle near Antioch he was defeated and overthrown. The new emperor, Bassianus, was given the throne name Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, like Caracalla, and he appears to have posed as either the adopted or real son (through an incestuous relationship) of Caracalla. He is better known to posterity as Elagabalus or Heliogabalus, the Roman name of the Syrian deity of Emesa whose high priest he was.
	Once Elagabalus’ position seemed secure, he set out for Rome, choosing an overland route through Asia Minor and the Balkans. In about 219 two of the Syrian legions rebelled against him, proclaiming as emperor Verus, the governor of the province of Syria Phoenice. The details of the rebellion are extremely obscure and little is known, except that it failed and some Syrian cities were punished or rewarded for their dispositions during the rebellion. A palace assassination in AD 222 disposed of Elagabalus, and the second of Julia Maesa’s grandsons, Severus Alexander, took the throne. In the east the Roman empire had reached its greatest extent. The Roman army was established in the steppe and deserts of Syria, Arabia and Mesopotamia, perhaps as far as the Tigris and certainly as far as the middle reaches of the Euphrates. However, Roman supremacy was shortly to be upset, for in the Parthian kingdom something had happened which was to change the balance of power in the Fertile Crescent.

Rome and Persia
The battle at Nisibis between Macrinus and Artabanus proved to be Rome’s last major confrontation with a Parthian king. Hostilities between the two great powers, however, were only one facet of a complex story of political activities, and in spite of the intermittent conflicts and aggressive campaigns over the previous two and a half centuries, Rome’s relations with its eastern neighbour had generally been stable. There were regular diplomatic links between the empires, as evidenced by a document of c. AD 208 in which the governor of Syria Coele instructed the commander of the garrison at Dura Europus on the middle Euphrates to receive a Parthian envoy. But diplomacy might also have contributed to Parthian decline as much as Roman military aggression. Roman relations with Mesopotamian vassals of the Parthian kings had been established from the earliest days of Rome’s presence in the region, and these diplomatic efforts included attempts to exploit the decentralized Parthian system of power by establishing alliances with, or trying to influence, Parthian vassals. The organization of power in the Parthian empire had always involved a certain degree of tension between the king of kings and his vassal rulers, which the Romans could turn to their advantage. But usurpers arising within the Parthian empire could also exploit this tension. Eventually one of these vassals proved strong enough to challenge the established hegemony. The vassal ruler Ardashir of Fars (Persis) brought Arsacid supremacy to an end. Allied with other Parthian vassals who were dissatisfied with Artabanus V, Ardashir overthrew the Parthian king c. AD 224 and ushered in a period in which Rome was forced on to the defensive in the east. 
Fig. 14. Drawing of the relief at Firuzabad, Iran, showing the victory of Ardashir over Artabanus V. On the right, Ardashir topples the Parthian king from his horse.
A monumental relief beside the Sasanian road at Firuzabad in his native Persis shows the decisive battle of Hormizdegan in heroic style: Ardashir and his son Shapur are seen toppling Artabanus and his grand vizier Darbendan from their horses, whilst a Sasanian cavalryman sweeps up another Parthian and holds him prisoner (fig. 14). The Arsacid family was not destroyed, but now it was reduced to vassal status. As under the Parthians, the major offices of state remained in the hands of a few great families. That of Sasan held the kingship (Ardashir’s dynasty was named after an ancestor called Sasan); that of Suren produced commanders-in-chief of the army, as they had under the Parthians. As under the Parthians, the nobles frequently exercised a strong influence over the Sasanian king, and, if he did not suit their interests, he might be deposed. The concept of royal blood remained strong, making it difficult for usurpers to establish themselves, although this was precisely Ardashir’s problem: as a usurper against the Arsacids, he had to fight hard to establish his authority.
	To legitimize their rule Ardashir and his immediate successors concocted an imperial identity which looked back to empires of earlier times. Ardashir’s family hailed from the same region as the Achaemenid kings, and he could claim that he was recovering his ancestral right to that empire after it had been usurped by Alexander. It is fairly clear that the Hellenistic and Parthian past was of no use to the Sasanian kings, and recollection of the past five centuries rapidly faded under Sasanian rule. The very name Iran is derived from Eranshahr, ‘empire of the Aryans’, a concept created by the Sasanians in the third century. The Achaemenids had identified themselves culturally as ‘Aryans’, linking themselves to myths of ancient Iranian kings, and the concept of Eranshahr provided an identity for the Sasanian empire and at the same time legitimized the ‘Aryan’ Sasanians as the rightful rulers. Iran was juxtaposed with Aneran, the non-Sasanian powers, and the Sasanian attitude towards those non-Sasanian powers was initially antagonistic. Roman sources claim that the Sasanian kings sought to recover lands which were formerly part of the Achaemenid empire, just as the Parthians are said to have done. Iranian sources are more ambiguous, although the kings might claim to be kings of ‘Iran and Aneran’. Some prefer to read the ‘insider’s’ view as evidence that the Sasanians made no claims to Roman territory beyond Mesopotamia, and that their raids on Syria were expeditions fought for glory and plunder with no intention of conquest. But claims that they wanted to recover the lands of the former Achaemenid empire concur with other aspects of Sasanian ideology, and if third-century Sasanian rulers did not intend to conquer Syria and the Near East, by the beginning of the seventh century AD when the king Khusrau II successfully annexed the region their policy had clearly changed.
Within the Sasanian state there was a tendency towards greater centralization than there had been under the Parthians, perhaps in an attempt to forestall any potential rebellions by quasi-independent vassals. The number of official titles used at court increased during the course of the third century, suggesting the evolution of a more complex bureaucracy than had prevailed under the Arsacids. Royal iconography finally abandoned Greek influences. Ardashir created a new crown for himself, and henceforth all Sasanian kings had distinctive personal crowns, rather than the Hellenistic diadem normally worn by the Parthian rulers. Ardashir also introduced a new coinage in silver, which broke entirely with earlier traditions. Unlike Roman and Parthian coins the Sasanian ones were produced from broad, thin pieces of silver, and were so different in appearance that they could never be mistaken for the issues of previous or contemporary rivals (fig. 15). 
	The link between Zoroastrian religion and the kingship seems to have been stronger than it had been under the Parthians. Some see this as further evidence of a state-guided sharpening of Iranian cultural and religious identity. But the impetus appears to have come from the Zoroastrian priests, particularly Kartir, spiritual advisor to king Shapur I and his successors. These priests sought to influence the kings, and sometimes to initiate persecutions of non-Zoroastrians, and the political strength of Zoroastrian orthodoxy seems to have depended heavily on the religious inclinations of individual kings. In general the Sasanian rulers, like their Arsacid predecessors, appear to have been tolerant of other religions. There are hints that non-Zoroastrian religious communities were formally recognized by the state through the institution of religious leaders, each one responsible to the king for his sect. 
	Roman attitudes to the Sasanians were even more ambivalent than they were towards the Parthians. The Iranians could hardly be considered savage barbarians in the same sense as the Germanic foes on the northern frontiers, and Sasanian prowess at fending off Roman invasions demonstrated that they were a worthy opponent. On the one hand they were a threat to Roman interests in the east, provoking the Romans into undertaking campaigns in imitation of the razzias of Trajan, Lucius Verus and Septimius Severus, while on the other imperial rhetoric sometimes hinted that the Sasanian obstacle to Roman world-domination was accepted. A late antique metaphor for Rome and Persia as the ‘Two Great Lights’ implies a mutual cultural purpose. In spite of hostilities the two empires had a common interest in preserving civilization in the face of the barbarian onslaught, a task which tended to draw them closer together. Some have seen the foundation of a new Roman capital at Constantinople in the fourth century as symptomatic of a more general process of political gravitation eastwards towards Rome’s rival Ctesiphon. When the Roman emperors adopted Christianity, religion was even more strongly identified with the ruling power than in Persia, and gave the Roman empire a new sense of communal identity that paralleled the less rigorous use of Zoroastrianism by Sasanian kings. For emperors and elites in late Roman times the pomp of the contemporary Sasanian court provided a model to emulate as much as the traditions of Augustus and his successors. Thus there were various cultural and ideological points of convergence between Rome and Persia, but there was little hope of one empire culturally assimilating the other.
Fig. 15. Silver coin of Ardashir. On the obverse a bust of the king, wearing his personal crown; on the reverse, a Zoroastrian fire altar with two attendants.

Rome on the Defensive
	Having overthrown Artabanus, Ardashir set about winning the submission of the other Parthian vassal-states. It was a difficult task. Coins struck in AD 227/228 at Seleucia on the Tigris are in the name of a Parthian king, Vologaeses VI, the rival and brother of Artabanus V. If the date given on the coins is not a die-engraver’s error, it provides tentative evidence for a possible Parthian challenger to Ardashir a few years after the fall of Artabanus. But nothing else is known. More importantly, the new regime’s struggle for hegemony had dramatic repercussions on the edge of the Roman world, where vassal-kings and -states declared for or against Ardashir. Some, such as the powerful Mesopotamian state of Hatra, were opposed, and may have sought an alliance with Rome. Thus a conflict between Rome and the Sasanians was almost inevitable.
	In those states that were conquered, Ardashir often installed relatives as rulers. He was unable, however, to depose the Arsacids in Armenia, and Hatra remained defiant. Northern Mesopotamia, which the Romans had occupied within living memory, was regarded as legitimate Sasanian territory and targeted almost immediately after the Parthian dynasty was overthrown. By about AD 230 Ardashir had laid siege to Nisibis and was launching raids into Roman Mesopotamia. The emperor Severus Alexander appears to have tried negotiation and, when that failed, arrived in AD 231/232 to conduct a three-pronged attack on the Sasanian west. The outcome of this ambitious war looks inconclusive. The Romans were successful in Media, but appear to have been defeated on the Euphrates. Even so, this may be the point at which Hatra, a powerful former vassal of the Parthians, was brought into a fuller alliance with Rome. If Rome had become accustomed to victories in the east, the ambiguous outcome of Alexander’s campaign suggested that it was well not to be complacent. Confrontation with Rome had not dampened Ardashir’s determination, and with further Sasanian action in Mesopotamia (including, c. 240, the sack of Hatra), firm action was needed to preserve Rome’s interests in her easternmost possessions.
	The young emperor Gordian III arrived in 242 to conduct a campaign. The date more or less coincides with the end of the Edessene dynasty of Osrhoene. Caracalla had deposed the dynasty and made Edessa a colony, but now - after an interval of about twenty-six years - the dynasty was restored in 239/240. The circumstances are completely unknown; whether the local dynast was exploiting Rome’s weakness or whether the Romans found it expedient to have a client king in Edessa organize his own defence against the Sasanians cannot be determined. Reliance on locals is a distinct possibility, and Rome was to rely increasingly on local initiative during the decades which followed. Coins issued in the kingdom show the new king Abgar and Gordian together, implying imperial approval. But the experiment at Edessa did not last long, for by the end of 242 the colony had been restored and the royal house of Osrhoene had disappeared for good. By this time Ardashir had died and his son Shapur, joint king during Ardashir’s last years, had to face Gordian’s invasion alone. He was more than up to the task. Although defeated in Mesopotamia in 243, Shapur was victorious in 244 when the Roman army invaded southern Mesopotamia along the Euphrates. Gordian either died in the battle or afterwards during the Roman retreat, a victim (or so it was later claimed) of the machinations of the two brothers from the Hauran who were his Praetorian Prefects, Marcus Julius Priscus and Marcus Julius Philippus. The latter succeeded Gordian as emperor, and concluded a peace with Shapur. As under Macrinus, the Romans agreed to pay an indemnity. Other details of the agreement are unclear, as is whether the Romans made any serious territorial concessions.
	Philip set off for Rome while his brother Priscus held an extraordinary command over the eastern provinces. The rule of Priscus is said to have been unpopular, and it seems to have prompted the usurpation of a certain Iotapianus, who was proclaimed emperor. The location of this rebellion cannot be pinpointed precisely, even though the usurper struck coins - the sources name Syria, or Cappadocia - and Iotapianus does not appear to have lasted long. Philip himself was overthrown in 249, but the actions of his successors in Armenia (the details are obscure) were regarded by the Sasanians as a breach of the earlier peace agreed with Philip, and provided the pretext for a fresh round of hostilities. Shapur invaded Syria in the 250s, wiping out a Roman army on the Euphrates at Barbalissus and sacking various cities, including Antioch. The exact date of this campaign has been the focus of much debate: 252, 253 or 256, or perhaps two separate campaigns in different years. While Antioch suffered no permanent damage as a consequence of these invasions, Zeugma seems never to have recovered fully from its sack, remaining a city more in name than in extent. The same fate appears to have befallen neighbouring Doliche, the centre of a well-known cult of Jupiter. During the early 250s northern Syria seems also to have suffered from the ravages of a usurper named in the sources as Mariades or Cyriades, who appears to have had supporters at Antioch and perhaps had links with Shapur. Our evidence is too fragmentary to attempt anything other than the most tentative reconstruction of events, but it is clear that Rome’s control over the east was becoming increasingly insecure.
	Preoccupation with barbarian invaders elsewhere diverted imperial attentions away from the region for several years. A Persian attack on Emesa c. 252 or 253 apparently failed, and the issue of coins in the city in the name of a certain Lucius Julius Aurelius Sulpicius Uranius Antoninus (fig. 121) may be connected with this event. That some of his coins add the name Severus could indicate a connection, real or pretended, with the Severan dynasty, and he may have been a priest of the god Elagabal (the appearance of this Emesene deity appears on his coins is not conclusive proof). What is significant is the fact that a local notable could successfully organize some kind of defence against the Persians, and pose as emperor. In this sense Uranius Antoninus anticipates the growth of Palmyrene power two decades later.
	We do not know what happened to Uranius Antoninus, and he probably did not survive the arrival of the legitimate emperor Valerian in 254. Our knowledge of events in this period remains vague. Occupation, if not reoccupation, of places like Dura Europus was maintained until c. 256, after which the Romans abandoned any claim to territory on the Euphrates below the confluence of the Khabur. Henceforth Roman and Sasanian disputes centred on Mesopotamia.

Interlude on the Middle Euphrates 
During the second century the invasion route along the Euphrates to southern Mesopotamia had proved strategically important to Rome, and following the wars under Lucius Verus the Roman presence was slowly extended along the middle Euphrates until it reached as far south as Kifrin and the island of Bijan (fig. 16). In the years before the Roman conquests Palmyra had played some military role in this region, to support its trade links with southern Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. Palmyra still had some part to play in garrisoning sites here, even after regular Roman soldiers were stationed on the middle Euphrates in the later second century, but how the two forces interacted is uncertain. 
Fig. 16. Map showing sites on the middle Euphrates.
For once, however, we have an extraordinarily full documentary record. Excavations at Dura Europus, a city annexed by Rome under Lucius Verus and sacked by Shapur in the mid third century, yielded dozens of papyrus and parchment documents as well as graffiti and inscriptions, providing valuable evidence for a wide variety of activities on this part of the river. The region had strong social and economic connections with Roman Mesopotamia, as is shown by documents from Dura and a recently discovered archive from this region (see p. 000), and the presence in abundance of coins of Mesopotamian cities. A unit of regular auxiliary troops, the cohors XX Palmyrenorum, was its principal garrison.
Concrete evidence for the extension of Roman control along the river south of Dura came from excavations conducted by international teams in advance of the construction of the Qadisiyya dam at Haditha on the Euphrates, which flooded part of the middle Euphrates valley in the early 1980s. Palmyrenes seem to have been prominent in the military occupation of this area, and probably controlled outposts along the river before the Roman conquest of Mesopotamia. A Palmyrene officer is known to have been in charge of Anatha (‘Ana) in the Severan period, and a Palmyrene inscription refers to a Nabataean cavalryman there as early as AD 132. Archaeological sondages on the island settlement of ‘Ana yielded plausible evidence of Roman presence in the form of hard-fired, red, ribbed ‘brittle ware’ cooking pots characteristic of Roman sites in the region, though the precise dates for this material are insecure. Much stronger archaeological evidence for the Roman presence came from the larger site of Kifrin, which lay on the east bank of the river and may have been the settlement of Bechchouphrein mentioned in papyri at Dura. A detachment of Palmyrene soldiers from Dura was perhaps stationed there, and may have occupied the heavily fortified zone (which the excavators dubbed the ‘citadel’) at the north-western end of the site. Structures included what appear to be administrative buildings in Parthian/Hatrene style, tombs, and a Roman bath. Graffiti and inscriptions on potsherds attest to the use of Latin, Greek and a Hatrene-style Aramaic script. Further downstream the heavily fortified island of Bijan seems to have been occupied by Palmyrenes, and the material excavated there include brittle ware pots, coins of the Severan period, and potsherds inscribed with Palmyrene and Latin characters, as well as a local script closely resembling that of Hatra. 
The Roman occupation of the left bank of the Euphrates this far downstream might have been linked to Roman relations with Hatra in this period. Three Latin dedications from that city attest to the presence of Roman soldiers there, between at least AD 235 and c. 240, when the city fell to the Sasanians. Of the coins found at Kifrin, the Roman issues are almost exclusively Severan, although there is also a small hoard of silver coins ending with issues of Gordian III, c. 243/244. But there is also a significant number of coins from Hatra, which is located about 150 kilometres (90 miles) away to the north-east. Thus it is possible that the Kifrin belonged to Hatra, or it relied on Hatrene support, and that an alliance with Hatra led to a Roman presence at Kifrin. With Hatra’s fall to the Sasanians c. 240, the Romans were forced to withdraw from the area. Documentary evidence from Dura indicates a Persian raid on the middle Euphrates did indeed take place at about this time. A Roman evacuation of Kifrin and Bijan might explain why, when Shapur invaded Syria in the 250s, the first place he mentioned in his list of conquests was the island of Anatha (‘Ana), upstream of the aforementioned sites. By this time the southernmost outposts, perhaps briefly reoccupied by Gordian on his march down the Euphrates, had been abandoned by Rome. 
The Romans were finally driven out of this region in about AD 256, when the Persians took Dura Europus. Dramatic and rather grisly evidence for the fall of Dura was uncovered during excavations of the city’s western wall. The Persians attacked this in two spots, one at the south-western corner of the city, and the other to the north of the city’s main gate. Shortly before the siege the defenders had reinforced the city walls by constructing earth embankments along the inside and outside (fig. 17). It seems that the Persians first attempted to undermine the wall north of the gate by digging a tunnel under a tower (tower number 19 on the excavators’ plan; see fig. 112b) and a section of wall, hoping to create a large breach. On the flat plain west of the city, however, it was difficult for the besiegers to conceal what they were doing, and the defenders dug a counter-mine to intercept the Persians. But when they broke into the Persian mine, a battle ensued underground in which the defenders were overwhelmed. In the panic those inside the city blocked the entrance to the counter-mine to prevent the Persians from entering, but did so before the wounded and the tardy on their own side had had time to escape. The Persians then set fire to the wooden props of this counter-mine, so that most of it collapsed, burying some sixteen to eighteen Roman soldiers along with their weapons, armour and coins (the latest of which dates to AD 256). Having blocked off the counter-mine to prevent any further attacks, the Persians then fired the props of their own mine. Part of the wall and the south western corner of the tower 19 sank about 2.5 metres (8¼ feet) into the mine, but remained upright, supported by the embankment (colour plate 16). The tower caught fire, as had probably been intended, but the flames were rapidly deprived of oxygen as the interior had been sealed off by the defenders. In the south-western corner of the city the besiegers had better luck. They built an assault ramp between towers 15 and 14 (the latter occupying the south-western angle of the fortifications). Anyone on the ramp would be exposed to missiles from tower 14, so the Persians decided to undermine the tower. This time the entrance to the mine was concealed in a ravine to the south-west and the defenders may not have known about it until it was too late. Like tower 19, tower 14 sank and remained upright, but the undermining was more extensive and probably rendered it useless to the defenders. Another, much wider mine was dug next to the assault ramp and went straight under the wall into the city. This was probably intended to enable the assailants to attack the defenders in the rear as they concentrated on beating off the Persians on the ramp. This ramp and tunnel were probably the means by which the Persians broke into the city, bringing the Roman occupation of Dura, and the city itself, to an end.
Fig. 17. Dura Europus, showing the western ramparts which bore the brunt of the Sasanian assault.
	With the fall of Dura the Romans seem to have evacuated this section of the Euphrates altogether. Henceforth the southernmost military post was Circesium, located at the confluence of the Euphrates and Khabur rivers.

Palmyra
In AD 260, during a campaign against the Persians, the emperor Valerian was defeated in Mesopotamia by Shapur and taken prisoner. The capture of Valerian was a tremendous symbolic as well as military victory for Shapur, who could now portray himself as having triumphed over three emperors (the others being Gordian III and Philip). The Persian armies then broke up into raiding parties, plundering Syria and Cappadocia. But this was the last of Shapur’s successes. The Roman army regrouped under two commanders, Macrianus and Callistus (or Ballista), and forced the Sasanians to retreat. Shapur then suffered a defeat at the hands of Septimius Odaenathus of Palmyra, and withdrew from Roman territory. Nobody negotiated for the return of Valerian, who was taken as a hostage to Iran, where he remained for the rest of his life. 
Macrianus and Callistus decided that their next move would be to try their luck against Valerian’s son and co-ruler, Gallienus. The two sons of Macrianus, Macrianus Junior and Quietus, were proclaimed emperors. Macrianus Senior and Junior then set off for Europe to confront Gallienus, whilst Callistus and Quietus remained in the east. In 261 the European expedition was defeated by an army loyal to Gallienus and the two Macriani were killed. In Syria Odaenathus of Palmyra overthrew Callistus and Quietus. Gallienus had gained nominal control of the east, but he owed much to the Palmyrene leader.
In spite of the number of surviving inscriptions referring to him, the career of Odaenathus cannot be constructed with confidence. After the defeat of the Persians, the forces of Palmyra seem to have been responsible for bringing order to Syria and Mesopotamia, and Odaenathus played a key part in this process. He must have commanded a substantial militia in order to be able to take on Shapur and the usurpers Callistus and Quietus. Gallienus remained in direct command of the central portions of the Roman empire, but he was otherwise preoccupied with barbarian invasions and checking the power of an independent ‘Romano-Gallic’ empire in the west. There was little hope that Gallienus could protect Roman interests in the east, so he relied on others to protect those interests for him. What authority enabled Odaenathus to act as he did can hardly be established for certain on the evidence as it stands at present, but in protecting Roman interests he clearly led Palmyra to a position of eminence in the Syrian region. As the central power weakened, Palmyra took on the task of preserving the Roman empire in the east. Odaenathus remained loyal to Gallienus throughout his lifetime, but the situation seems to have changed following his death c. 267/268. He was succeeded by his son Vaballathus, but real power resided in the hands of Odaenathus’ wife Zenobia. 
Fig. 18. Palmyra. The so-called ‘Baths of Diocletian’, which some have suggested was a palatial residence of Zenobia. The columns in the foreground surround a rectangular basin or impluvium, resembling the installations found in Italian houses. The entrance to the complex from the grand colonnade is marked by re-used Egyptian granite columns (visible in the background, to the right). In the background on the left, the grand colonnade and the monumental arch.
Although Palmyra had achieved some sort of political supremacy, its economic standing may have been in decline. Trade links between the Persians and Romans were not as they had been between the Parthians and Romans. References to caravans from Characene and southern Mesopotamia, common in second-century inscriptions, disappear in the third century. In the Persian Gulf region where the Palmyrenes traded, Roman goods such as glass were frequently used as prestige objects for elite burials up to this time, but thereafter they are replaced by Sasanian goods. Palmyra was land-locked, having no direct outlet on the Mediterranean. The details are sketchy, but Palmyra was also involved in some sort of conflict with the nomadic Arab tribes of the Syrian and Arabian steppe, and sought to assert her authority in these remote regions. Palmyra’s economic and political insecurity, caught as she was in the middle of a Roman-Persian stand-off, may have prompted the enterprise which followed.
Gallienus was succeeded in 268 by Claudius who, although he reigned for only two years, laid the foundations for the recovery of the central empire, a process which was vigorously pursued by one of his successors, Aurelian (AD 270-5). Before reducing the ‘Romano-Gallic’ empire, Aurelian had to turn his attention to the east where, following the death of Claudius, Palmyra had begun acting too independently for his liking.
In 270, the year of Aurelian’s accession, the Palmyrenes attacked the province of Arabia, and then launched an invasion of Egypt. They also extended Palmyrene domination into Asia Minor. Vaballathus’ portrait began to appear on coins minted at Antioch and Alexandria (fig. 149.2), but in deference to Aurelian the emperor’s portraits were placed on the flip side to the portraits of Vaballathus. Vaballathus’ images and titles avoided any references to his holding imperial power. Perhaps one of the most extraordinary assertions of power to survive from this period are milestones in the names of Vaballathus, ‘the most illustrious king of kings and corrector of the entire Orient’, and Zenobia, ‘the most illustrious queen, mother of the king of kings’. Some are in Latin, the usual language of milestones, but others are unique in that they are inscribed in Greek and Palmyrene. In erecting such markers the Palmyrenes were appropriating a typical ‘Roman’ symbol.
The remainder of the story is well known. At its greatest extent the Palmyrene empire included Syria, Arabia, Palestine, Egypt and the eastern provinces of Asia Minor. When Zenobia found she could not negotiate with Aurelian, Vaballathus was proclaimed emperor. Coins were struck giving him imperial titles, and in the name of Zenobia as empress, without any reference to Aurelian. But Aurelian regained Antioch and Alexandria in 272, and the Palmyrene forces were unable to block his advances. Another defeat followed near Emesa, and a siege of Palmyra followed. Zenobia was captured and the city surrendered in 272. In 273, after Aurelian’s departure, Palmyra rose in revolt and the emperor returned, sacking the city. Not everyone in Palmyra had accepted the dominance of the family of Odaenathus, it seems: one of the latest known Palmyrene inscriptions proclaims that a man of senatorial rank, Septimius Haddudan, ‘had aided the army of Aurelian Caesar’. Zenobia herself was taken to Rome for Aurelian’s triumph, and granted an estate near Rome where she spent the rest of her days.
The episode of Palmyra under Zenobia illustrates how remarkably resilient was the Roman empire in circumstances which might have torn other empires asunder. It cannot be seen as a Syrian rebellion against Rome. The Palmyrene elites felt sufficiently integrated into the Roman world not to abandon their commitment to it. When the centre was weak, the elites of the periphery took matters into their own hands in an attempt to preserve the whole. The usurpation of Uranius Antoninus during a similar period of weakness two decades earlier may have been a response to the same sorts of problems. Tenuous though the centre’s authority might be, circumstances had changed considerably since the Parthian invasion in 40 BC, when many local rulers had sought to escape Roman control. But it was difficult to surrender peripheral power to the centre once the crisis had passed. Far from providing a focus for ‘national’ sentiment in Syria, in their rebellion against Aurelian the Palmyrenes remained steadfast to the ideal of empire, even down to their claim to be acting through the legitimate authority of Vaballathus Augustus and Zenobia Augusta. 
The destruction of Palmyra brought an end to one of the more distinct cultures that had evolved in Syria under the aegis of Rome (see chapter 8), and led to other groups, such as the Roman military and the Arab tribes of the steppe and desert, exercising greater influence over this region of the Syrian interior. There had been nothing new in Rome’s reliance on regional powers to organise their own defence and to safeguard her interests. In previous centuries she had supported ‘client’ kings with their royal armies. But Palmyra’s very success in this respect had proved both the city’s downfall and a threat to the centre’s hegemony. Nevertheless, in the centuries that followed, the emperors continued to find it expedient to rely on local configurations of power in the more marginal areas of Syria and the Near East.

The Struggle for Mesopotamia
The collapse of Palmyrene domination of the eastern provinces and the re-establishment of central Roman control more or less coincided with the death of Shapur. The Sasanian king had not attempted any further offensives against the Roman empire during the final decade of his rule. Although he had been defeated in the west by Odaenathus, he had successfully established Sasanian rule from southern Mesopotamia to north-west Pakistan, and from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf - no mean achievement for the son of a usurper against the Arsacids. He was able to pass on his successors a fairly stable empire, but in the west they would have to contend with the aggressions of a restored Roman empire ruled by a succession of energetic military commanders.
In the Roman world the restoration of central Roman control did not prevent provincial armies from challenging the ruling emperor. Probus, the commander of the eastern armies, usurped the empire in 276 and won; in 278 the governor of Syria Coele, Saturninus, usurped Probus and lost. Like Aurelian, Probus worked hard to restore the fortunes of the state. He eventually succumbed to a mutiny in 282 and was replaced by his Praetorian Prefect Carus, who launched a devastating attack on the Sasanian empire in 283. It was the first fully successful military action against the newly established Sasanian regime, even though Carus himself was assassinated during the campaign. The Roman invasion adopted the familiar strategy of taking the route down the Euphrates and into southern Mesopotamia, capturing Ctesiphon and forcing the Sasanian king to flee. A peace was obtained, by which the Persians recognized Roman control of northern Mesopotamia. 
Rome was also to gain control over Armenia in the following years. The emperor Diocletian (AD 284-305) promoted an Arsacid called Tiridates to the Armenian throne while the Sasanians tried to impose a member of their own family. Early in the fourth century Tiridates adopted Christianity, which rapidly gained a foothold in Armenia, and which may have been in part an affirmation of identity on the part of the Armenians, placing them in opposition to the Zoroastrian Persians. Narseh, who succeeded his nephew Bahram II as king of the Sasanian empire in 293, began challenging Roman interference in the region. Initially he was successful, expelling Tiridates from Armenia and invading Mesopotamia, where he defeated Diocletian’s deputy emperor Galerius in 297. The following year, however, Galerius returned with a new army and inflicted a resounding defeat on Narseh in Armenia, capturing the royal harem and following up the victory with a campaign into southern Mesopotamia, advancing as far as Ctesiphon. The humiliated Narseh sought a peace, and Diocletian stipulated that the Sasanians relinquish all claims over Armenia as well as northern Mesopotamia. The truce was to last forty years.
The late third and early fourth century saw the restoration of Roman power in Syria after decades of weakness. Little is known of the period between the fall of Palmyra and the time of Diocletian, but Diocletian’s reign marks a major change to the administrative and military organization of the empire, which had important consequences for Syria and the Near East (see chapters 3, 4 and 10). Under Diocletian’s collegiate system of emperors the number of imperial capitals increased, and Rome lost its importance as a centre of power as the emperors moved around and took up residence in the provinces. The city of Antioch functioned as an imperial capital for prolonged periods: Galerius was frequently in residence there from his investiture in 293 until his Persian campaigns of 296, and the senior emperor Diocletian, under whom a palace was constructed in the city, was present on several occasions, particularly between 296 and 302. Between 305 and 313 Galerius’ deputy and successor Maximinus was frequently resident at Antioch, and perhaps in the south at Caesarea Maritima as well. Antioch became an imperial capital again when Constantine’s son Constantius set up court there in 335. 
Roman military presence in the more remote areas of the Syrian provinces expanded during this period. New military installations constructed by Diocletian and his successors, aimed at improving communications and fortifications in the steppe, may have been a response to the end of Palmyrene hegemony over the Arab nomads of these regions. Now these peoples had to be monitored and dealt with directly by Roman troops. The result was that these peoples came to be incorporated within the military structure of the empire (see below).
By 312 the dominant emperor in Diocletian’s rapidly disintegrating collegiate system was Constantine, who shared the empire with Licinius and Maximinus. All three were rivals rather than colleagues. Maximinus was defeated and overthrown by Licinius (313), and Licinius himself was eventually defeated by Constantine (324). By this time the Sasanian empire had found a strong ruler in the person of Shapur II (AD 309-79). Shapur was prepared to dispute Roman control of the territories ceded by Narseh, and much of his long reign was spent trying to recover them. In 330 he invaded Armenia but was repulsed, and in the following years he harried Roman Mesopotamia. Constantine appointed his nephew Hanniballianus as ruler of Armenia, with the unusual Persian-sounding title rex regum, ‘king of kings’, which looks rather like a direct challenge to Shapur’s authority. More ominous were Constantine’s preparations for a major war with the Sasanians. These were supposedly provoked by Persian persecutions of Christians; and from now on there was often a religious dimension to Roman-Sasanian conflicts as the two states sought to promote their favoured faiths. However, Shapur was spared all-out war with the emperor’s death in 337, which terminated whatever plans he had formulated. The succession of Constantine’s three sons Constantine II, Constans and Constantius, divided the military resources of the empire, greatly reducing the support that any one of the new emperors could draw on. Dynastic squabbles soon reduced the emperors to two, Constans and Constantius (340). 
Constantius’ principal residence until 350 was Antioch, from which he oversaw the protection of the east, as Shapur contested the territory gained by Galerius in 299. The emperor’s policy was defensive rather than offensive. He may have erred on the side of caution, but he managed to preserve his half of the empire intact in spite of internal and external pressures. Rather than embarking on risky schemes of invasion and conquest, he sought to ensure that the eastern frontier was well maintained, keeping his armies at full strength and in good order, building or strengthening fortresses (fig. 19), and using strategic diplomacy where circumstances permitted. Compared with the aggressive policies of his colourful successor Julian, the exploits of Constantius in the east look equivocal and rather lacklustre, but to his credit Constantius managed to prevent the Persians from annexing any of Galerius’ conquests, whereas Julian’s campaign led to disaster.
Fig. 19. Roman bulwark in Mesopotamia: the great fortress of Amida (Diyarbakir) on the Tigris was constructed by Constantius II while he was Caesar under Constantine.
Shapur launched raids into Mesopotamia almost immediately following Constantine the Great’s death in 337, an act which led to a series of inconclusive razzias by both sides over the following years. The Persians besieged Nisibis three times between 337 and 350, but were unable to take the city. The Romans crossed the Tigris in 340 or later, invading Adiabene and perhaps capturing Nineveh in 343, and a battle was fought in the vicinity of Singara in 343 or 344, in which the Persian crown prince was killed. In 350 Constantius suddenly found himself sole surviving son of Constantine, but he was still unable to throw the full weight of the Roman army against Persia. The west was now held by the usurper Magnentius, who had overthrown and killed Constans. Constantius was forced to turn his back on the eastern front, and left to engage Magnentius, appointing a cousin, Constantius Gallus, as Caesar in command of the eastern provinces (351). Gallus set up court at Antioch, but his rule proved very unpopular with the aristocracy of the city, who managed to undermine his authority. Once Magnentius had been dealt with, Gallus was summoned by the emperor, arrested, tried and executed (354).
	In 359-60 Shapur, who had been busy dealing with problems in other parts of his empire, returned to Mesopotamia, capturing key Roman fortresses there (among them Amida, whose siege is vividly described by an eye-witness, the historian Ammianus Marcellinus). This crisis drew Constantius back east, but the emperor had little time to organize an offensive before learning of another rebellion against him in the west. In 361 Constantius turned westwards again, to challenge Gallus’ brother Julian, who had been proclaimed emperor in Paris and was marching against him. On the way he contracted a violent fever and died, leaving Julian sole master of the Roman world.
	Julian took on Constantius’ plans to wage war on the Sasanians. He arrived in Antioch in 362 and set up court there, before marching against the Persians in the spring of the following year. The Persian campaign was probably intended as a repeat of the victories of Trajan, Lucius Verus, Septimius Severus and Carus. Among those accompanying Julian was Hormizd, Shapur’s brother, who had fled to the Roman empire in 324 and perhaps hoped to be made king. The attack was two-pronged, one army crossing Mesopotamia and the other marching down the Euphrates. Near Ctesiphon Julian defeated the Sasanian army, but he did not take the city itself. His army began the march north to meet the Mesopotamian division, but in another confrontation with the Sasanians the emperor was fatally wounded (June 363). He had reigned less than two years.
	The retreating army now chose Jovian, the commander of the imperial guard, as Julian’s successor. In exchange for an unharrassed retreat he agreed to cede the strategic Mesopotamian fortress cities of Nisibis and Singara, as well as abandoning Roman influence over Armenia. The Persians finally regained much of what they had lost over half a century earlier, and most of these territories were never again to be ruled by Rome. The treaty was supposed to last for thirty years; unlike many other treaties it did not lapse with the death of either signatory. For Shapur this was fortunate, as Jovian died on the journey to Constantinople (364), and the empire then passed into the hands of a senior army officer called Valentinian, who elevated his brother Valens to share the duties of empire. 
	The Sasanian acquisition of Nisibis changed the balance of power in Mesopotamia. Shapur began consolidating the new frontier, settling Arab tribesmen as soldiers in the frontier regions. He also seems to have wanted to reduce certain vassal-states to direct rule. He was particularly interested in imposing direct rule over Armenia, even though this would violate the treaty of 363 (this conceded Sasanian influence over Armenia, but not its absorption). Valens was distracted for several years by the rebellion of Procopius (AD 365-6) and a Gothic invasion of Thrace, but Shapur’s activities brought the emperor to Syria in 370. The emperor set up court at Antioch, and ruled from there for much of the rest of his reign. Summer campaigns against the Sasanians became a regular feature in the years that followed.

The Rise of the Federate Arabs
The sources for the late empire mention Arab tribes of the Syrian and Arabian steppe more frequently than the sources of preceding periods. This may in part be due to the relative abundance of late Roman sources concerned with Syria and the Near East, but this increased notice may also reflect a growing importance of nomads to Roman military and political strategies in the region. There is thought to be a link between the collapse of Palmyra and the ascendance of these groups, so that in the vast areas where once Palmyra had made alliances and fought with the nomadic groups on behalf of Rome, now Rome had to do these things without her Palmyrene intermediary. Any tribe which had an alliance with Rome was expected to protect Roman interests, particularly against attack by other Arab nomad tribes. We find the tribes being used on major military campaigns, and there are hints of some fairly substantial conflicts of interest between Rome and her allied tribes at the provincial level. In many cases the details of the arrangements are far from certain, although in modern discussions the allied tribes are usually referred to as federates. In return for state subsidies, the federate tribes organized and carried out raids on enemy territory and provided recruits for the army. One tribe appears to have been predominant throughout the entire region, and its chief received official recognition from the Romans. By the sixth century these chiefs were receiving the title of phylarch (originally used to designate a tribal chief but later employed by Rome to refer to a commander of auxiliary troops). The dominant tribe was responsible for collecting tribute for Rome from other tribes in their area of influence. These federates were not simply rough nomad militias. Their camps became fortresses, and many former nomads are thought to have adopted a more sedentary lifestyle. Nevertheless these soldiers were expected to form an important mobile element in the defence and policing of Roman territory.
We also find the Sasanians utilizing Arab tribes living on the peripheries of their empire, particularly the Lakhmid tribe from al-Hira on the southern Euphrates. Such tribes could be used against the Romans and their allies. On both sides, Roman and Sasanian, Arab tribes became institutionalized within military and political structures, and to some extent their religious leanings were shaped by the great powers. From the fourth century onwards the gradual adoption of Christianity by federate tribes helped cement a sense of identity with Rome and against Zoroastrian Persia and the pagan Arab tribes, but questions of orthodoxy and heresy sometimes led to conflict between Rome and her tribal allies. When Arab allies of the Sasanians became Christians, they tended to adopt Nestorianism, the sect prominent in the Persian empire but regarded as heretical by the Roman orthodoxy. 
A political desire and military need to influence the tribes at the boundaries of the Roman and Sasanian empires may help to explain the Sasanian campaigns against the Arabs in 326, when Shapur II crossed the Euphrates in the south, beyond the frontiers of Roman Arabia and Syria, to establish his authority over the tribes in those regions. These campaigns are also thought to explain the remarkable funerary inscription in Arabic found at Namara, in Roman territory east of the Hauran. This commemorates a certain Imru’ al-Qays, a ‘king of (all?) the Arabs’, who is considered to have been a prominent ally of the Romans. It is not certain who Imru’ al-Qays was, but if he is to be identified with a Lakhmid chief of that name, it would appear that he defected to Rome some time before his epitaph was inscribed in 328/329, perhaps as a direct result of Shapur’s actions against the Arabs. An alternative view is that he died while raiding Roman territory on behalf of Shapur. The reading and interpretation of this important inscription is disputed, and consequently it is difficult to fit Imru’ al-Qays into any confident historical narrative. 
The dominant pro-Roman tribe in the fourth century appears to have been the Tanukh, but their exact status is uncertain, and it is extremely difficult to reconstruct a history of relations between the different tribes and Rome. Occasional references to Arab or ‘Saracen’ allies in the sources usually neglect to tell us their tribal affiliations. The accession of Constantius II (337) was marked by a brief revolt of at least some of the federate Arabs, perhaps as a reaction against Constantius himself, who tended towards a heretical form of Christianity known as Arianism. Later, the Arian emperor Valens found himself in conflict with the Arab foederati, resulting in a serious rebellion or ‘Saracen war’ of 375-8, which was led by a certain queen Mavia (which tribe or tribes she ruled remains unclear). Religious differences may have been the cause of the troubles, although Mavia initially could have been a pagan and adopted Christianity only during the revolt. The rebellion seems to have been widespread, covering the inland areas of Phoenice, Arabia and Palaestina and even reaching Egypt. A Roman force was defeated by Mavia’s warriors, and Valen’s government, now hard pressed by the Goths in the Balkans, came to terms. Mavia obtained consent for an orthodox religious leader to be appointed for her people, which appears to have been her principal concern at that point. She was certainly not opposed to Roman rule in general, and sent a cavalry force to Thrace to assist Valens in his campaign against the Goths. Too late, as it transpired: Valens and a large part of the Roman army were annihilated at the battle of Adrianople (378), but in the aftermath the Saracen cavalry performed with savage efficiency by destroying a Gothic column advancing on Constantinople. In 383 there was a further Arab revolt in Syria, probably organized by the Tanukh, which Roman armies successfully subdued. The conflict may have led to the end of Tanukh hegemony over the Arab foederati, since from this point on we encounter the leaders of another tribe, the Salih, as the dominant figures among the Arabs of southern Syria and Transjordan.

The Divided Empire
The death of Valens left the eastern half of the empire without an emperor, and in 379 the young and inexperienced western emperors Gratian and Valentinian II appointed the capable general Theodosius to rule the east, where the situation in the Balkan provinces was now extremely grave. In the same year Shapur II died, and under one of his sons and successors, Shapur III, the Romans and Persians finally reached an agreement concerning Armenia. The kingdom was partitioned between them. Persarmenia, the Sasanian portion, was far larger than the Roman part, but Theodosius probably considered it a worthwhile compromise to secure peace. The six western satrapies of the Armenian kingdom ruled by Rome retained their traditional rulers and military forces, but the satraps had to recognize the Roman emperor rather than the Persian-appointed Armenian king as their overlord.
Contemporaries might have agreed with the judgement of modern scholars that the problems of the empire were too great to be handled by a single emperor, but the division of the Roman world between the imperial houses of Valentinian and Theodosius resulted in some complex political arrangements. Gratian was overthrown and killed by the western usurper Magnus Maximus in 383, leaving his brother Valentinian controlling Italy and the central provinces of the empire. By recognizing Maximus, Theodosius made it clear that he would not avenge Gratian, until Maximus invaded Italy in 387, forcing Valentinian to seek refuge at Theodosius’ court. The eastern emperor then marched against the usurper and defeated him. Valentinian was restored, but not for long. In 392 this last remaining representative of the house of Valentinian was assassinated, and the west was usurped by the pretender Eugenius. Theodosius, who now ruled with his two sons Arcadius (appointed in 383) and Honorius (appointed in 393), withdrew a large number of troops from the eastern provinces to fight him. Although victorious, Theodosius died shortly afterwards (395), and the empire was divided between his sons. Honorius took the western half and Arcadius the east. The political and military organisation of the empire had been structured along territorial lines since the late third century, but from the reigns of Valentinian I and Valens the division between east and west grew more pronounced. The weaknesses of a divided empire had become apparent under Theodosius, Gratian and Valentinian II, but after AD 395 the political and military partition became permanent. Now, under Arcadius and Honorius, the two halves evolved as separate and sometimes competing entities. One side might come to the assistance of the other, or, if an emperor had died, his counterpart in the other half of the empire might have to approve a successor, but the empire was increasingly unable to act as a single force.
Theodosius died at a particularly awkward moment. Most of the imperial field army was with him in the west, under the command of the half-barbarian commander Stilicho. Stilicho used his authority to consolidate his power and influence over Honorius and the western empire. His position was resented in the east, where Arcadius’ government strenuously opposed him. From 395 relations between the two halves of the empire were often covertly and sometimes openly hostile. East and west intrigued against each other, and appeared to be on the brink of war between 405 and 408, conflict being averted only with Stilicho’s murder. To easterners the western empire came to seem more and more like a foreign power, to be dealt with almost in the same manner as the Sasanians or barbarian federations. The increasing instability and decline of the western empire saw to it being treated as a kind of junior partner by the eastern emperors, who enjoyed greater political stability and continuity than their western counterparts. Several times the eastern emperors intervened in the western succession, and western emperors found it prudent to secure recognition from Constantinople. As before, the division of the empire also reduced the amount of manpower that either half could harness to solve a military problem, but now an expedient solution to barbarian threats was to encourage the enemy to attack the other half instead.
The reigns of Arcadius (383-408) and his son Theodosius II (402-50) were relatively free from conflict with Persia. No major confrontation occurred until the conflict in Mesopotamia of 421-2, and that too was quickly settled. The prolonged hostilities that characterized Roman-Sasanian relations in the fourth century were succeeded in the fifth by a greater degree of co-operation. Relations between Arcadius and Theodosius II and the Sasanian rulers appear to have been good, at least down to the 420s. The frontiers of both empires were under pressure from the barbarians, and both sides appear to have recognized that the survival of the two empires was necessary to prevent civilization from being destroyed. 
One joint strategy (if it can be called such) involved the protection of the ‘Caspian Gates’, a remote pass in the Caucasus Mountains. Although the Sasanians controlled the pass, its defence was expensive and difficult, and the Romans were aware that the barbarians beyond the pass threatened Roman as well as Persian lands. The importance of an effective defence was made patently clear when in 395 the Huns managed to break through the Caucasus and moved on to ravage Armenia, Cappadocia and Syria, reaching major cities like Edessa, Antioch and even Ctesiphon. As early as the first century the Romans had shown an interest in protecting this pass against the formidable Sarmatian barbarians beyond. Nero had planned an expedition there, and the Parthian king Vologaeses had proposed some sort of Roman-Parthian co-operation in defending the pass, which Vespasian had rejected. In the third century Philip the Arab agreed to pay Shapur I some sort of subsidy, and Rome intermittently recognized the need for financial assistance thereafter. After Jovian’s treaty, and the permanent division of Armenia between the two great powers, Roman access to the region was curtailed and the burden of defence fell heavily on the Sasanians. Nevertheless it would appear that the Sasanian rulers were keen to seek Roman financial assistance, and at some point either towards the end of the fourth or beginning of the fifth century the Romans accepted that they should pay a subsidy (or at least were prepared to discuss payment). In regarding protection of the Caspian Gates as a joint effort, Rome recognized the Sasanian empire as a colleague in the defence against barbarism, meaning that refusal to pay for these defences could be viewed by the Sasanians as a serious negation of Rome’s obligations in the partnership. However it is unclear to what extent there was any formal agreement for regular payments in the long term, and complaints lodged by the Persians make it plain that fifth century emperors often chose to ignore the matter, perhaps because they did not consider it an obligation.
The Sasanian ruler most likely to have been responsible for improved relations between Persia and Rome is Yazdgard I (399-420). He seems to have courted minority groups in his empire, such as Christians and Jews, in an attempt to subdue the power of the Persian nobility and the Zoroastrian priesthood, and sought to maintain frequent diplomatic links with the Roman world in order to avert crises. But this relaxed atmosphere did not survive his death in 420, and, if war was infrequent, suspicion and mistrust reigned at both courts in subsequent years. Persian persecution of Christians and Roman refusals to pay for the Caucasus defences contributed to further conflicts in 421-2 and 440 or 441. But rather than framing their disputes solely in terms of battles over territory, the two superpowers seem to have been drawn into conflict increasingly over ideological and financial matters. The Caucasus defences provided one pretext; religion provided another. Persian Christians could view the Roman empire as a refuge, and their flight from persecution was a potential affront to the majesty of the Sasanian king. As a Christian empire Rome could claim that an attack on believers was also an assault on the dignity of the empire and its faith. Squabbles over land continued, but most attacks look more like punitive plundering expeditions than serious attempts to annex territory. The arena was very much the same. Mesopotamia, Septimius Severus’ ‘bulwark of Syria’, was still the stage for military conflict, and the Christianity of the Armenians remained a potential problem for the Sasanians. Syria, Arabia and Palestine, however, were not exempt from attack, as pro-Sasanian Arabs, led by the Lakhmid tribe from al-Hira, were not averse to leading raids against the Syrian provinces. These Arab warriors were to remain faithful clients of the Sasanians throughout the fifth and sixth centuries. 
Even Arab allies of Rome could prove troublesome. We find Arab tribes, perhaps under the leadership of the tribe of the Salih, fighting against Roman forces in the region of Damascus in 452 or 453. During the reign of the emperor Leo (457-74) an Arab called Amorcesus (probably a Hellenized form of the Arab name Imru’ al-Qays) emerged as a powerful figure in the Hijaz, taking control of an island called Iotabe which was a lucrative trading post at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. In seizing Iotabe and ejecting the Roman customs officers stationed there Amorcesus seems to have been acting entirely in his own interests. At the time Leo was heavily involved in actions against the Vandals in north Africa, a costly project which absorbed a considerable amount of Roman manpower. In spite of his actions Amorcesus managed to gain legitimate status as an ally of the Romans and was appointed ‘phylarch of the Saracens around Petra’ by the emperor, and even received the courtesy of an official visit to Constantinople at public expense. For the Romans, who had far more serious matters to deal with elsewhere, appeasement and assimilation were expedient ways of coping with disturbances on the desert peripheries.
By the third quarter of the fifth century the western Roman empire was in serious decline. The dominance achieved there by barbarian commanders was seen in Constantinople as a plausible reason for its disintegration, and Leo was determined to ensure the same did not happen in the east. The eastern army was heavily infiltrated by Arian Germanic barbarians, whose power Leo sought to curb by promoting various Isaurians (from southern Asia Minor) and by treacherously killing the most powerful of the Gothic officers. Among those Isaurians who profited was the general Tarasis, who became an increasingly important figure during Leo’s unsettled government. Tarasis adopted the name Zeno, married Leo’s daughter Ariadne, and eventually succeeded to the throne (474). His chaotic reign began badly. The new emperor found that he was far from popular, having earned the hostility of Leo’s wife Verina, who was anxious to have him removed in favour of her brother Basiliscus. When Basiliscus usurped the throne in 475 Zeno was forced to leave the capital in disgrace, but he made a remarkable comeback the following year when the general Illus, another Isaurian sent by the usurper to capture the fugitive, switched sides and returned with Zeno to depose Basiliscus. However, relations between the restored Emperor and his new ally degenerated, and Verina exploited this to her advantage. Illus was made magister militum per orientem and Verina was put under his guard, but the two became co-conspirators and at Tarsus in 484 they elevated a general called Leontius to the rank of Augustus, in opposition to Zeno. Their supporters included a number of notable figures, among them such unlikely allies as Pamprepius, an Egyptian Neoplatonist, and Calendio, the patriarch of Antioch. The rebels then occupied Antioch, but Edessa and Chalcis refused to accept the official portraits of the usurper. Zeno’s forces subsequently ejected them and their supporters from Antioch and drove them into the mountains of Isauria. Verina died there shortly afterwards, but Illus and Leontius were besieged in their Isaurian stronghold until their capture and execution in 488.
The situation in the Persian realm was scarcely better than in the Roman empire. During the third quarter of the fifth century the Sasanians were under intense pressure from the Hephthalite Huns who threatened their north-eastern frontier. Just as the Gothic barbarians had acquired power in the Roman empire, so the Hephthalites gained ascendancy in the Sasanian. In 476 King Peroz was captured by them and forced to come to some very disadvantageous terms to secure his release. In 484 came an even greater disaster: Peroz and his army were wiped out by the barbarians, and various members of the royal family fought to obtain Hephthalite support in their bids for the throne during the final decades of the fifth century. The kings were short of money to pay their Hunnic allies, and in desperation turned to the Romans for financial aid.
By now, however, the Romans were in no mood to provide help. Illus and Leontius had sought Persian backing with a large quantity of gold, and the first Persian request for more funds from Zeno was particularly ill timed, reaching the emperor while he was still fighting the rebels. Financing a precarious Sasanian monarchy propped up by rapacious Hephthalite sponsors was hardly a promising investment, and the Romans quickly found a permanent pretext for refusing any more Sasanian requests for cash. It concerned the Mesopotamian city of Nisibis, which had been ceded to the Sasanians after Julian’s death in 363. Now the Romans claimed that the treaty of 363 had stipulated that Nisibis was to remain in Persian hands for a mere 120 years, so that in 483 it should have been returned to Rome. There is no evidence that this was so, but it was a ploy adopted by both Zeno and his successor Anastasius (491-518) in the face of repeated Sasanian demands for help, and a policy which prompted a war between 502 and 506. A peace treaty resolved the matter, in which Rome agreed to pay some money in return for Persian assurances that Roman fortresses in Mesopotamia would be left unmolested. Nisibis, however, remained in Persian hands, and in about 505-507 Anastasius ordered the construction of the fortress of Dara on a site nearby, as part of a general programme aimed at improving defences and infrastructure in the eastern provinces. Dara provided the Persians with a new grievance - it was built in flagrant contravention of a treaty agreed between Theodosius II and Bahram V in 422, in which both sides had promised not to build any more fortresses in the frontier regions. It would seem that the Romans had decided that their cash-strapped neighbours could best be deterred from plundering raids by an improved system of defences.

The Rise of the Ghassanids
The western empire finally came apart in the 470s, and with this the succession of western emperors ended. The west’s collapse put the eastern empire under even greater pressures in the sixth century, as its emperors diverted resources to lengthy campaigns aimed at recovering the lost western provinces. The best troops and commanders were required for these campaigns. To fight wars on several different fronts was impossible, and in the Syrian region some contingency was required to hold the Sasanians and their Lakhmid allies at bay. Now the ‘Saracen’ foederati became an important element of Roman defences in the east.
The Salih, who had replaced the Tanukh as the dominant tribe among the  foederati, seem to have declined in importance in the later fifth century. Two other Arab tribes emerged as powerful forces on the fringes of the Roman east: the Kindites from central Arabia and the Ghassanids. These lay outside Roman control in the late fifth and early sixth centuries, and raids on Palestine and Syria may have been orchestrated by the Kindites. Details are sketchy, and little is known of relations between the Arab tribes and Rome during the first decades of the sixth century, although Anastasius allowed the Ghassanids to settle in Roman territory and arranged a treaty with the Kindites. The Kindites seem to have been in competition with the Lakhmids, although the latter eventually prevailed and reasserted themselves as the dominant group. With Kindite power broken and Lakhmid power restored, the Romans sought to find a suitable Arab tribal leader to keep the Lakhmid ruler al-Mundhir in check. They were looking west, and needed security in the east. In particular they needed a commander who could weld the loyalty of the tribes and their leaders together and liaise more efficiently with the Roman commanders. A kind of ‘phylarch of phylarchs’ was necessary if Roman forces were to respond adequately to the Lakhmid and Persian threats. Such a commander would be expected to accompany regular Roman troops on campaign as well as conducting independent operations. They found a likely candidate in the person of al-Harith of the tribe of Ghassan. 
The Ghassanids had been operating on the fringes of Roman Syria and Arabia since at least the fifth century. They had controlled the island of Iotabe when the Romans recaptured it, and it is possible that Amorcesus, who seized the island during the reign of Leo, was a chief of the Ghassan. Initially the tribe would have been subordinate to the Salih, but by the early sixth century the Ghassanids seem to have replaced the Salihids as the dominant tribe, and were soon recognized by the Romans as foederati. 
Fig. 20. The interior of Sergiopolis (Resafa), a city founded in AD 431 at the site of an important shrine for Christian pilgrims: the tomb of the martyr Sergius. In the sixth century Sergiopolis became an important religious centre for the Ghassanids.
Al-Harith was given his command in 529, and proved himself a valuable ally of the Romans over the next four decades. Already during the Roman suppression of a Samaritan revolt in Palestine in 529 he had played an important supporting role. Al-Harith was more than a match for the Lakhmid al-Mundhir, sacking al-Hira and, later, defeating and killing him in battle near Chalcis. But the Romans found the independence of their Arab allies disconcerting, and often sought to restrain them, leading to a great deal of mistrust on both sides.
The Ghassanid presence extended roughly from Damascus to the Hijaz, with the Hauran and Golan as their heartlands, but they were to be encountered over an even wider area than this. A church-like structure outside the city walls at Sergiopolis (a major centre of pilgrimage for the Ghassanids and other Arab tribes) bears an inscription naming one of the tribe’s rulers. It has been taken to be some sort of Ghassanid official residence, but this function is disputed. The Ghassanid phylarch may have used it as a temporary audience chamber and a means of asserting his authority over the Arab tribes making the pilgrimage to Sergiopolis. An important centre of the Ghassanid confederacy was at Gabitha (al-Jabiya) in the Golan, but this may have alternated as a seasonal centre with the palatial complex at Qasr al-Abyad (Khirbet al-Bayda) east of the Jebel Says. No one place served as the Ghassanid capital, and their diffused social and political organization was reflected in their use of a variety of fortified centres spread over a wide area of the Syrian hinterland.

Justinian and his Successors
In the sixth and seventh centuries the Roman empire underwent a major transformation. It expanded, over-reached itself, and in the early seventh century collapsed almost entirely. The west was reconquered (and much of it rapidly lost again) at the expense of security in the east, particularly on the Danube and in Syria and Mesopotamia. Roman culture became more heavily Christianized, breaking with many classical traditions of the past. Religious dissent became increasingly unacceptable; the emperor represented orthodoxy and his views were not to be challenged. Syria was a hotbed of divergent religious views, and thus important sections of its population were viewed as heretics. Many cities appear to have declined in wealth and importance, and the Arab foederati were able to exercise a greater degree of influence over the frontier regions. 
Disasters, both natural and man-made, feature prominently in the history of the first half of the sixth century. Bad harvests, disease and plagues of locusts receive attention in the sources, as do a series of devastating earthquakes. In 526 Antioch was destroyed, and two years later further quakes hit the city, also causing serious damage to the neighbouring cities of Laodicea and Seleucia. Antioch was renamed Theoupolis, City of God, in the hope, perhaps, that the divine patron would protect it better in future. In the mid-fifth century more earthquakes struck the region, particularly affecting the cities of the Phoenician coast, Palestine and Arabia.
The man-made disasters were chiefly caused by the Sasanians and their Arab allies. After the treaty of 506, peace with Persia endured until the end of the reign of Anastasius’ successor Justin I (AD 518-27). The catalyst for the war seems to have been religious: the Persians attempted to impose Zoroastrianism in the north-western regions of their empire, and a Persian vassal, the Christian king of Iberia, appealed to the Romans. The Sasanians struck first, opening the war on the south-eastern shore of the Black Sea and in Mesopotamia. By 529 they were targeting Syria as well. Justin’s nephew and successor Justinian inherited the war, but it was a conflict he was anxious to conclude as quickly and efficiently as possible.
The new emperor was immensely ambitious. He intended to unite the Mediterranean under a single ruler by restoring the Roman empire to something approaching its former glory. Perhaps he feared that the diminished eastern Roman empire would become a satellite of the larger Sasanian realm if something were not done to improve the empire’s dignity and extend its economic base. He was more interested in conquering the west, however, than in pursuing military activities in the east, where he adopted a policy of bribery and conciliation to maintain the peace while his armies waged war in north Africa and Europe. An important element of this plan was the appointment of al-Harith the Ghassanid. For the first time since the third century Syria was bearing the brunt of Persian hostilities, in which the Lakhmids played a major role. A young general, Belisarius, was placed in command of the Roman army. He rapidly distinguished himself, but the war in the east dragged on for several years and was interrupted only with the death of the Sasanian king Kavad. Kavad was succeeded by his youngest son Khusrau I (531). The new king needed to consolidate his position and agreed to an ‘endless peace’ with Justinian in 532. The peace was just what Justinian wanted, and among other concessions he agreed to pay a huge sum of gold for the Caucasus defences. Finally he was able to turn his full attention to the west.
Justinian’s successes in the west during the 530s suggested to contemporaries that the Roman empire was reviving, although the reconquest may have strained the truncated empire’s resources to their limits. For the next decade most of the military might of the empire was concentrated in the west. Khusrau had spent this period reorganizing the administrative structure of his empire, and once his affairs were in order he decided that the time was right to initiate hostilities on Justinian’s eastern front. There were the usual grievances: non-payment of the Caucasus subsidy and the continued garrisoning of Dara. A squabble between the Ghassanids and Lakhmids over grazing rights in Palmyrene provided a pretext. The Sasanian king then accused Justinian of trying to subvert the Lakhmids. Justinian, tied down with obligations elsewhere, tried to negotiate with the Sasanians, but to no avail. In March 540 Khusrau took an army up the Euphrates valley and moved quickly into Syria. He was the first Persian king to have done so since Shapur I, three centuries earlier. Sura fell, Hierapolis paid a ransom, and then Beroea was sacked when its inhabitants were unable to raise the money demanded by the king for their safety. In June Khusrau and his army reached Antioch. The Roman forces fled the city, and when the Antiochenes refused to pay a ransom, the great metropolis was devastated and large numbers of its citizens were taken prisoner. The king also visited other places in northern Syria, including Daphne, Seleucia, and Apamea, extorting money where he could. But he made no plans to annex what he had conquered; the aim seems to have been merely to acquire booty to alleviate his financial difficulties at home (the Hephthalites still demanded tribute). Justinian offered a bribe, and Khusrau retreated, forcing protection money from cities such as Chalcis on the way. On the way he laid siege to Dara until the inhabitants paid him off. The captured Antiochenes were deported to Ctesiphon and installed in a settlement nearby called ‘Khusrau’s Better-than-Antioch’.
The emperor had little option but to retaliate. Belisarius and al-Harith invaded Mesopotamia, using a large number of troops drawn from Syria. The Romans laid siege to Nisibis but failed to capture it. The threat of a Lakhmid attack on Syria alarmed the commanders of the Syrian troops, and when plague broke out among the soldiers Belisarius was forced to withdraw his sick and rebellious army. A Persian army returned in 542, obtaining a large ransom from Sergiopolis before retreating. The weaknesses in the Roman military structure of the east were becoming apparent: in the cities, which were key points for the defence of the provinces, the inhabitants displayed a worrying tendency to surrender to the invader rather than fight, attempting to arrange ransoms contrary to the wishes of the military commanders and the imperial government; and regional commanders preferred not to operate for prolonged periods away from their provinces. These were problems which the Romans were unable to correct before the Syrian provinces collapsed in the face of a new enemy in the seventh century.
Plague and war dominated life on the eastern frontier over the following years, during which neither the Romans nor the Sasanians managed to achieve any decisive victory. Meanwhile the Ghassanids and Lakhmids waged a war of their own. Rome’s abilities to maintain control over its Arab allies were limited: during Belisarius’ campaign in Mesopotamia, al-Harith had taken his warriors across the Euphrates, but it proved impossible to monitor or regulate what he was doing. Eventually Khusrau found himself contemplating a war on two fronts when the Hephthalites renewed hostilities in the Sasanian east, and he sought to bring his conflict with the Romans to an end. In 561 the two sides agreed to a fifty-year peace. The Persians finally recognized the Roman right to the fortress of Dara, but insisted that no new forts be built in the frontier regions. In addition the Saracen allies of both empires were to abide by the treaty. 
The greatness of Justinian cannot be denied, and his achievements were many. His policies in Syria, however, were difficult to reverse if anything went seriously wrong. Although he inherited a treasury surplus, his ambitious projects may have exhausted it. It was claimed that Justinian was responsible for cancelling pay owed to eastern frontier troops (the limitanei) and demobilizing them. If there is any substance to the claim, it may have taken place after the ‘endless peace’ of 532, when Justinian turned his attention fully to the west. Although the demobilization is unlikely to have been universal, the absence of Justinian’s later bronze coinage in Palestine and Arabia, and the abandonment of many forts there during the sixth century, has been taken by some scholars as evidence for a diminution in the empire’s forces in these regions, which were also where reliance on foederati was most intense. It is perhaps significant that the historian Procopius, who wrote an account of Justinian’s building programmes, does not credit many fortifications in Arabia to this emperor. The phylarch system was cheaper to maintain than fortresses and garrisons, but the antagonism between the Ghassanids and Justinian’s successors undermined it.
Fig. 21. The fortified town of Zenobia on the Euphrates, the defences of which are attributed to Justinian. Note the high citadel on the left.
Justinian’s methods of conciliation and subsidies were not those of his nephew and successor Justin II (565-78). To him Justinian’s bribes were expensive and a sign of Roman weakness. With the benefit of hindsight the policies which he adopted might seem foolish, but at the time he probably wished to check the slide into reliance on Arab foederati on the eastern frontier. The Romans had been able to deal with potentially rebellious barbarian allies before by using treachery and violence. Justin refused to send subsidies to various federate Arab tribes, and they subsequently deserted to the Lakhmids and began raiding Ghassanid territory. The Ghassanid leader, al-Mundhir, the son of al-Harith, defeated the Lakhmids and asked the emperor for more funds to continue the war and press his advantage. Justin refused. In 572 he cut off Ghassanid subsidies and plotted to kill al-Mundhir. The story goes that he sent two letters, one addressed to the magister militum per orientem, instructing him to invite al-Mundhir to a conference and then to arrest and execute the Arab leader, and a second addressed to al-Mundhir himself, which contained the invitation. Somehow the letters were transposed and al-Mundhir received the instructions for his betrayal. The story may be fiction but something clearly happened to estrange al-Mundhir from the Roman cause. However, the cutting of finance to the allies, who expected payment for their services, could be viewed by the Ghassanids as sufficient betrayal in itself.
An Armenian rebellion against the Persians in 571 triggered a further round of hostilities with Persia, culminating in another Sasanian invasion of Syria. The Armenians appealed to the Christian emperor for assistance. Justin responded by refusing to pay the annual subsidy in accordance to the treaty of 561 and threatening to attack Khusrau if the interests of the Armenian Christians were not respected. A Roman expedition ended in disaster: the army failed to capture Nisibis, and was chased by a Persian force to Dara, where it was forced to surrender at the end of 573. Another Persian army moved on to northern Syria, looting and devastating, and sacking Apamea. The Ghassanids refused to lend assistance to the Roman cause. Once again the Roman defences of Syria had demonstrated how decrepit they were. 
The loss of Dara was a major blow to Justin’s confidence. Since the reign of Anastasius it had replaced Nisibis (which had been ceded to Persia by Jovian) as Rome’s principal bastion in eastern Mesopotamia. Its capture was said to have initiated the emperor’s final descent into lunacy. Within a couple of years he was unable to govern at all, and his wife Sophia ran the empire along with a deputy emperor, Tiberius. To calm him in moments of extreme madness, the chamberlains were reputed to have threatened him with the return of the former Ghassanid phylarch by saying ‘Al-Harith will come!’. 
All the while the Roman position on the eastern frontier was deteriorating. Khusrau estimated that he had the advantage and would not settle for a comprehensive peace. The Ghassanids and Lakhmids were busy fighting a war of their own, but Roman initiatives managed to bring the Arab tribe back under imperial supervision, and in 575 an agreement was reached. Years passed, and the war dragged on. Tiberius concentrated his efforts on building up an army which would strike some sort of decisive blow and enable him to negotiate with the Persians from a position of strength. In 578, the year of Justin’s death, he appointed the general Maurice as magister militum per orientem. Maurice’s successes in Armenia and Mesopotamia brought Tiberius to within a hair’s breadth of achieving his aim, but the death of Khusrau wrecked his plans. The new king, Hormizd IV, refused to accept peace under Tiberius’ terms, and the conflict continued. Maurice and the Ghassanids invaded Persian Mesopotamia and inflicted a defeat on Hormizd in 581. The campaign, however, met with only limited success, and Maurice began to suspect that the fidelity of the foederati lay elsewhere than with Rome. He was convinced that it was time to reassess the value of the Ghassanid confederacy to Constantinople. 
The Ghassanid leader, al-Mundhir, was accused of treachery. This time he was captured and exiled. The Ghassanids then demanded the return of some of al-Mundhir’s property at Bostra, and when the Roman commander refused they defeated his forces and killed him. Revolts forced Tiberius to recognize al-Mundhir’s brother, and then his son Nu‘man, as successive phylarchs, but they seem to have been unable to maintain authority over the Ghassanid confederation, which now began to disintegrate.
Tiberius, who by now was on his death-bed, arranged for Maurice to succeed him (582). There was little love lost between the Ghassanids and the new emperor, and the Ghassanid confederation’s position worsened. With the decline of the tribe of Ghassan went security along the eastern frontier. There were also some serious religious differences to contend with. Constantinople regarded the monophysite Ghassanids as heretical. It is possible that in this confused period the orthodox Salih found themselves in favour once more, but by now they were weaker and less influential than the Ghassan, so any exercise of Roman power through them would be correspondingly diminished.
The Roman empire, which was under intense military pressure on virtually every front, was also in serious financial difficulty. War with Persia continued, although both empires appear to have reached something of a stalemate. Both were quite capable of launching punitive raids deep into each other’s territories, but neither achieved much in the way of lasting successes. Then, quite unexpectedly, a curious chain of events brought hostilities to a close. A Persian general, Bahram Chobin, rebelled against Hormizd (589). The latter was already unpopular with the nobility, and news that Bahram was advancing on Ctesiphon with an army led to the king’s overthrow. His son Khusrau II was elevated in his place. Bahram, however, refused to come to terms with Khusrau, and the new king was forced to flee. He headed westwards, to the Roman empire. At Circesium Khusrau despatched an embassy to the emperor. Bahram also sent a mission. Both proposed generous terms to Maurice, the surrender of fortresses and relieving payment for the Caucasus. Maurice decided that Khusrau’s offer was the more advantageous. If he sponsored a takeover in Sasanid Persia, it would undoubtedly offer him a chance to influence the resulting government. Bahram’s rule was unstable, particularly since he was not of Sasanian royal blood, and key fortresses such as Nisibis declared for Khusrau. Early in 591 Khusrau set out for Persia with a Roman army. Bahram was defeated in a series of engagements and was eventually killed.
As a result of this victory two decades of fighting ended. Mesopotamian fortresses captured by the Persians, including Dara, were returned to Roman control, and the king also relinquished claims over Armenia. In such ways Khusrau acknowledged Maurice’s help in restoring him to his throne; nonetheless he was a strong-minded and independent ruler, and by no means a puppet of the Romans. Furthermore, the extraordinary circumstances of his elevation did not endear him to all members of the Persian nobility. 
In spite of frequent periods of warfare, the relationship between Romans and Sasanians in the fifth and sixth centuries was far better than it had been in the days of Ardashir and Shapur I. When the Sasanian king Peroz had been captured by the Hephthalites in 476, Zeno reputedly helped to pay part of the ransom. In the early sixth century Kavad, in an attempt to secure the throne for his youngest son Khusrau, had proposed that the emperor Justin adopt him. The proposal was rejected in the belief that it would give Khusrau a legitimate claim to both empires. The very contemplation of such an adoption, however, indicates how far relations had changed since the third century. In a certain way the association between Rome and Persia in the sixth century resembled those of the two halves of the Roman empire in the fifth: although neither side trusted the other entirely, both sides could sometimes view the other as a possible source of political (and even military) support in times of difficulty. Political bonds between both empires developed as the sixth century progressed, but hostilities between the empires would also indirectly undermine both powers.

Persian Ascendancy
Khusrau was determined to curb Lakhmid power, especially after the conversion of their leader Nu‘man to Christianity. He imprisoned Nu‘man in 602, and then appointed the leader of another tribe, the Tayy, as ruler of the pro-Persian Arabs in the south-west. The experiment was not a success, and with the decay of the Lakhmid state, stability in this border zone of the Sasanian empire came to an end. An independent tribe, the Bakr, gained ascendancy in the region, and in 604 the Bakr and their allies defeated the Sasanians and pro-Persian Arabs at the battle of Dhu-Qar. Although it did not erase Sasanian control in the area, the defeat was humiliating for the Persians, and must have weakened their authority there.
	The Romans were also having problems with their former allies, the Ghassanids. Even though the tribe was no longer pre-eminent, it was still a powerful force whose independence could cause the Roman government embarrassment. When the Ghassanids took it upon themselves to raid Persian territory, Maurice had to reassure an angry Khusrau that he had not incited them. Both the Romans and the Persians had soured relations with their principal Arab allies in the Near East, inadvertently weakening their own position along the edge of the Arabian desert, a region which, at the time, can hardly have seemed a major threat to the security of either empire.
	In 602 the Roman army in the Balkans revolted and set up the centurion Phocas as emperor. Maurice was overthrown and executed, and Phocas embarked on a hapless reign in which the political and administrative errors of his predecessors finally bore fruit. Some of the problems can be ascribed to events beyond the emperor’s control, but in many cases the catastrophes were triggered by his own actions. Relations with Persia were predictably negative. Khusrau refused to acknowledge the murderer of his imperial sponsor Maurice, imprisoning Phocas’ ambassador. The usurper’s attempts to convert the Jews to Christianity had a particularly disastrous effect on cities in Syria, many of which had a large Jewish population. Antiochene Jews rioted and started killing Christians, and Christians had responded in kind. Soon Phocas was faced with grave military crises on the northern and eastern frontiers. In the Balkans he was unable to stem the invasions of Slavs and Avars. Narses, the commander of the eastern armies, raised a rebellion in Mesopotamia in 603, but rapidly lost ground when forces loyal to Phocas attacked him. Besieged in Edessa, Narses allegedly decided to seek assistance from Persia. But Khusrau seems to have required little prompting from a desperate Roman rebel to launch a major invasion of Mesopotamia, and Narses reportedly withdrew to Hierapolis as the Persians advanced. From Mesopotamia the Sasanians moved in to occupy Armenia and central Asia Minor. By 606 the provinces of Syria were under threat. This time the Persians did not enter simply as raiders. This time they intended to stay.
Another rebellion against Phocas began in north Africa, spread to Egypt, and from there gathered momentum across the empire. In 610 the rebels deposed and killed Phocas in Constantinople and replaced him with their own nominee, Heraclius. The new emperor ruled an empire in deep crisis. Now more than ever the Roman world looked as if would become a satellite of the Sasanian empire. In about 611 the Persian general Shahrbaraz took Antioch, then Damascus in 613, and Jerusalem in the following year. There is little indication of any organized resistance by the population, except in Jerusalem, where the Christians staged a rebellion, massacring Persians and Jews. Shahrbaraz laid siege to the Holy City and sacked it. Now the Christians found themselves the victims. Large numbers of them were killed, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was burned to the ground, and the relics of the Crucifixion were taken to Ctesiphon. Jews from the neighbourhood of Jerusalem joined the Persians in exacting retribution upon the Christian population. It was easy for Christians to accuse the Jews of being Persian collaborators, and rejoicing at the Christian empire’s imminent demise. Some Jews, however, shared a Christian opinion that the world was about to end with the apparent collapse of the Roman empire. For some, then, identity with the Roman world ran deeper than religion. However, it may well be the case that many of the inhabitants did not have cause to regret the end of Roman political and religious control. The social and religious tensions caused by orthodox Christian rule (see chapter 9) could have made rule by a pagan king preferable to Constantinople in certain quarters.
Very little is known about Syria and the Near East under Persian control. The period is too short to be recognized easily in the archaeological record, and most of our information has to be gleaned from literary sources. The Persians do not seem to have devastated Syrian towns and cities, and preferred to negotiate a peaceful surrender wherever possible. Only in those places where they encountered resistance did they practise more destructive policies. By supporting religious minorities such as Jews or non-orthodox Christians such as Nestorians and monophysites they appear to have been exercising a policy of divide and rule, breaking the political and cultural power that orthodox Christians had over Syrian society. 
The destruction of Jerusalem and the capture of the relics was a disastrous blow to Roman confidence. The provinces of Syria had been lost, and they were to be recovered by the Romans only for a brief period of about eight years before being lost again through conquest from an unexpected quarter. Although short, Sasanian dominion over the region produced a political and military discontinuity which was difficult for the Romans to redress.

Heraclius and the Persian Wars
By 619 the Persians had taken Egypt. This, combined with the destruction and pillaging of the Holy City, and the Slav and Avar conquests in the Balkans, suggested to some contemporaries that the empire was suffering divine retribution for some misdemeanor, and was on the brink of total collapse. To restore order and recover the lost provinces would be an immense undertaking, requiring some drastic new strategy. Heraclius first set about the vital tasks of strengthening his power base and replenishing the treasury. Finally, in the spring of 622, he set out from Constantinople with a large host. The Romans managed to outmanoeuvre the forces of Shahrbaraz in Asia Minor, inflicting the first of a series of defeats on their Sasanian adversary. Over the next five years the armies of both empires engaged in a bitter struggle, in which Heraclius led his soldiers against the Persians in person. Partly through battle, partly through negotiation and partly through subterfuge Heraclius managed not only to retain what was left of the empire but also to inflict resounding defeats on the Persians in their own territory. At Nineveh in 627 the Romans achieved a decisive victory over the Sasanian army and advanced on Ctesiphon unopposed. Khusrau fled his palace and Heraclius burned it. The king’s refusal to accept terms exasperated the nobility and military commanders, who wanted an end to the war which was sapping the strength of the kingdom. A plot was formed, and Khusrau was replaced by his more pliable son Kavad II. 
	Heraclius wanted to revive the status quo, not to destroy the Sasanian empire. The struggle to gain control of the Fertile Crescent had been won by the Romans, but their weakened empire was in no position to secure what was theirs by right of conquest. Kavad agreed to a peace, ceding all of the captured territories, and returning the holy relics captured in Jerusalem. So it was in 628 that Syria and the Near East were returned to the Roman empire and the Christian world. Heraclius had achieved a brilliant victory. For nearly two decades many of the eastern provinces had been under Persian control, and from near-defeat the empire had recovered and prevailed. It was to be Rome’s last victory over Persia. The weakened Sasanian kingdom began to dissipate into anarchy, and, like its Parthian predecessor four centuries earlier, would soon be toppled by a foe more injurious to Roman interests. But at the time no one could have predicted that within a decade the Roman east would be lost to the empire forever.