



## CHAPTER

# 1 1 'Service to the Gods'

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## Abstract

'Service to the gods' is the Greek expression for 'religion,' and this chapter describes philosophers' accounts of this 'service', with special attention to Plato's *Euthyphro*. It is made up of two parts, 'religious correctness' (*hosiotetes*) and 'proper respect' (*eusebeia*). This 'service' is analogous to that owed by children to parents in return for the good things the parents have provided. To perform this service is a matter of 'sound thinking' (*sophrosyne*) and makes the gods propitious and the humans dear to them. The rewards of this service to the gods include, among other things, health, wealth, success in agriculture, and safety in war.

**Keywords:** *eusebeia*, *hosiotetes*, *sophrosyne*, health, wealth, agriculture, safety, *Euthyphro*

**Subject:** Classical Philosophy, Religion in the Ancient World

'What other species than humans "serves" gods?' So Xenophon in his *Memorabilia* has Socrates ask.<sup>1</sup> The answer, 'None', is assumed (1.4.13). In the same book Xenophon claims that Socrates, far from 'not recognizing the gods' (*μη νομίζειν θεούς*), 'especially of all men was seen "serving" the gods' (1.2.64). Scholars virtually unanimously repeat the claim that the Greeks had no single word for 'religion', and that is correct. The Greeks did have, however, a brief phrase, *θεραπεία τῶν θεῶν* ('service to the gods') to designate 'religion' if we take 'religion' to be the 'proper respect' for the gods and the proper performance of all the activities directed or of concern to them.<sup>2</sup> The fullest discussion of 'service to the gods' is to be found in Plato's *Euthyphro*, and we begin our discussion with a series of propositions made concerning it in that dialogue. All the propositions are made or accepted by Euthyphro; some are proposed by Socrates and some of these well might have been acceptable to him even though he is dissatisfied with the conclusion of the discussion.<sup>3</sup>

1. Justice has two parts: one involves 'proper respect' (*εὐσεβείας*) and 'religious correctness' (*ἁσίων*), that is, the part concerning the 'service to the gods'; the remaining part of justice concerns the 'service' to human beings. (12e6–9)
2. ↳ 'Religious correctness' (*ἁσιότης*) and 'proper respect' (*εὐσεβεία*) are 'service to the gods'. (13b4–6)
3. The 'service to the gods' is the 'service' that slaves give their masters, a 'subordinate's service' (*ὑπηρετικὴ θεραπεία*). (13d5–8)
4. If someone knows how in prayer to say and in sacrifice to do things that bring *charis*<sup>4</sup> to the gods, these things are 'religiously correct', and such things preserve private households and the common affairs of cities. The opposites of these things that bring *charis* all do not 'show proper respect', and they overturn and destroy all things. (14b2–7)
5. 'Subordinate's service' to the gods is to make requests of them correctly and to give them gifts correctly. (14d6–e2)

6. 'Religious correctness' then would be for gods and men a commercial craft (*τέχνη ἐμπορική*) with one another. (14e6–8)

7. From this commercial craft (that is, from 'religious correctness'), the gods receive as benefits honour (*τιμὴ*), gifts betokening honour (*γέρα*), and *charis*. (15a6–11)

8. What is 'religiously correct' is 'dear' (*φίλον*) to the gods. (15b1–6)

As we examine these propositions in the *Euthyphro*, we must note that *θεραπεία τῶν θεῶν*, or 'service to the gods', is a concept familiar to even if not frequently expressed by Hesiod, Herodotus, tragedians, and the orators,<sup>5</sup> and we can thus be confident that it is not merely a theoretical construct of philosophical theology. What we have in this passage of the *Euthyphro* is the interplay of statements of conventional religious views of 'service to the gods' and of philosophical attempts to define better and question those popular views.<sup>6</sup>

p. 31 By consolidating the eight propositions, we can develop this brief, preliminary description of the 'service to the gods': 'Service to the gods' is 'religious correctness' and 'proper respect for the deities'. It is to make requests of them, that is, to pray to them, correctly and to give them gifts, that is, to sacrifice, correctly. Correctly done, these cultic acts are 'dear' to the gods and generate *charis* in them and preserve private households and cities. Wrongly done, they do not show 'proper respect' and overthrow and destroy all things. From 'religious correctness' on the part of humans the gods receive honour, gifts betokening honour, and *charis*. The 'service to the gods' is like the service slaves give their masters, and, finally, it is one part of justice, that part which concerns the gods contrasted to that part of justice which concerns humans.

## Components of the 'Service to the Gods'

The gods whom one is 'to serve' are usually undefined, just 'the gods'.<sup>7</sup> In his discussion of marriage in the *Laws*, Plato's lawgiver asserts that newly formed, nuclear families are to 'serve the gods' in accordance with laws/traditions (6.776a7–b4) and are to leave behind grandchildren to be 'servants' (*ὑπηρέτας*) for the gods (773e5–774a1). The gods may also be a special group such as 'the gods of the family and city' (Pl. *Lg.* 5.740b8–c2) and the gods who oversee childbirth (Arist. *Pol.* 7.1335b15–16). Individual gods also appear. Plato has Socrates claim that 'no greater good has yet occurred in the city for (the Athenians) than my "subordinate's service" (*ὑπηρεσίαν*) to Apollo' (*Ap.* 30a5–7).<sup>8</sup> So, too, Plato has humans as 'servants' of Ares and of Eros in the more mythical and playful passages of the *Phaedrus* (252c4–5) and *Symposium* (196c1–2).

p. 32 The citizens of the *Laws* are to 'serve' the homeland since she is a goddess, and ↵ they are to think about her as they do about the local gods and *daimones* (5.740a5–b1). Heroes, too, have their 'service' (Arist. *Mund.* 4.00b23), and in the *Republic* (5.469a8–b1) the tombs of the guardians are to be 'served' as if the guardians were *daimones*.

In his *Symposium* (4.48–9) Xenophon has Hermogenes boast that he is so 'dear' (*φίλοι*) to the gods that they regularly send him good omens and indications of the future. 'How', Socrates asks, 'do you "serve" (*θεραπεύων*) them to be so "dear" to them?' Hermogenes responds, 'I praise them, spending no money, and I give back to them some of what they give me, and I maintain "good speech" (*εὐφῆμιω*) so far as I can, and I willingly commit no deception in matters in which I make them witnesses.'

Plato's lawgiver speaks of the good man's sacrifices, prayers, dedications, and 'all the "service" to the gods' (*Lg.* 4.716d6–7; cf. *Rep.* 2.362c1–4). If we combine the two lists we have as initial components of 'service to the gods' prayers, sacrifices, dedications (both as first-fruits and others), good speech in relation to the gods, and the upholding of oaths. To these we may add other related 'services' such as 'service' to things belonging to the gods (*τὰ ἱερά*), that is, sanctuaries and, presumably, objects (Pl. *Lg.* 9.878a6–7 and *Ep.* 8.356b2–3). *Manteis* (soothsayers) are 'servants' (*ὑπηρέται*) of the prophesying god (*Ion* 534c5–d4), and the city is 'to serve' (*ὑπηρετούσα*) the oracles of Apollo (*Lg.* 11.914a2–5).<sup>9</sup> All these components of the 'service to the gods' contain fundamental practices and beliefs of contemporary Greek religion, and in the following chapters we discuss the treatment of each in the Greek philosophical tradition.

p. 33 Since the focus in this chapter is on ‘service to gods’, we must investigate the relationship of the ‘server’ to the ‘served’, that is of the human to the god. Is the server, as Euthyphro claims, commonly portrayed as a slave in ↪ service to the god? *θεραπεία* and its cognates are used most commonly of physicians treating patients, children serving parents, humans tending animals, slaves serving masters, and, as we have seen, of humans serving gods.<sup>10</sup> In the context of human ‘serving god’, the ‘service’ is clearly that of an inferior to a superior, as the term *θεραπεία* might suggest and as the phrase *ὕπηρετική θεραπεία* in the *Euthyphro* and elsewhere makes absolutely clear. The ‘service’ paid by humans to gods seems to be put into one of three analogies: that, as by Euthyphro, of slaves to masters; that, mostly in Aristotle, of subjects to kings; and, most commonly, that of children to parents. Let us treat each in turn.

p. 34 Euthyphro's claim that ‘the service to the gods’ is a service ‘which slaves give their masters’ might seem natural but in fact it is quite exceptional in the philosophical tradition.<sup>11</sup> Only in the *Phaedo* does Plato have Socrates speak persistently of the gods as ‘masters’ (*δεσπότες*), a designation that develops logically from Socrates' prior description of human beings as ‘one of the possessions of the gods’ (62b6–8). Slaves are the possessions of their masters, and, as Socrates puts it, humans are in ‘service’ (*θεραπεία*) to the very best overseers, that is, the gods. These divine overseers are then termed ‘masters’, and it is argued that a wise man would not flee serving a master better than himself but would wish to remain with him always (62c9–63a10). This leads, in turn, to Socrates' description of the gods he expects to find in the underworld as ‘very good masters’ (63c2–3; cf. 69e1–3).<sup>12</sup> Later in the *Phaedo* Socrates imagines swans as the ↪ servants (*θεράποντες*) of Apollo and that they sing most beautifully before death because they are about to go to their master. Since they have prophetic skills from Apollo, they foreknow the good things in Hades and feel greater pleasure at the time of death than at any other time. So Socrates, given his situation on this day, believes himself a ‘fellow slave’ (*ὁμόδουλος*) of the swans and the ‘sacred property’ of the same god Apollo (*ἱερός του αὐτοῦ θεοῦ*), with similar prophetic knowledge of the good things in Hades and equal good spirits in the face of death (84e3–85b7). Socrates' conception in the *Phaedo* of god as master and human as slave follows from the initial proposition that man is property of the gods, and this development of it is peculiar to Socrates and unique in the early philosophical tradition.<sup>13</sup> It is, of course, related to Socrates' conception of his divinely inspired mission and his service to that, a topic we treat in more detail in Chapter 3. Here it must be noted that, despite the statement in the *Euthyphro* and its prominence in the *Phaedo*, the conception of god as master and human as slave, or, more precisely, of god as a good master and human as a good slave, is but one, and the least common, analogy of gods' relationship to humans in the philosophical tradition.

p. 35 If gods are likened to kings, as Aristotle (*Politics* 1.1252b24–7) claims they were, we may see a second analogy of ‘human server’ to ‘divine served’ in that of a ‘subject’ to a ‘king’. I have previously proposed this analogy, the strongest support for which lies in the honour and its causes that both kings and gods enjoy. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle claims that honour (*τιμῆ*) is the prize (*γέρας*) for virtue and benefactions (*ἐνεργεσίας*), and that ‘the one who provides no good to the community is not held in honour, because a ↪ communal thing is given to the one who benefits the community, and honour is that communal thing’ (8.1163b3–8). We have seen in *Euthyphro* 15a6–11 above, proposition 7, that *τιμῆ* and *γέρας* are just those benefits that accrue to gods. In the *Politics* Aristotle has, among the various types of rulers, kings in particular rewarded with *τιμῆ*: ‘Of gains those of money are tyrannical, those referring to *τιμῆ* are more kingly’ (5.1311a5–7). The kingship itself is a *τιμῆ*—as both ‘honour’ and ‘office’—and according to Aristotle ‘it is based on worth, either private virtue or family, or on benefactions, or on these things and ability. For all who have benefited or were able to benefit their cities and peoples attained this *τιμῆ*’ (5.1310b33–6). The king, like a god, benefits his subjects and receives for that *τιμῆ*, both as his ‘office’ and as ‘honour’. A very similar nexus of a god's and a king's *τιμῆ* in tragedy led me to formulate the analogy in this way:

The king has an office and functions (*τιμῆ*), and for this he is honored, usually by the freely given gifts of his subjects. In these he delights and takes pleasure, and in return he helps those who honor him. Deprived of the honor due him, the king may become angry, punish his rebellious subjects, and reassert his authority, but that is a perversion of the proper relationship. So, too, a god has *τιμῆ* as a function, a *τιμῆ* which the god is concerned to maintain. For this the god expects from humans *τιμῆ* as honor and worship, and this *τιμῆ* is to be rendered in sacrifice and other cult acts. Like a king, a god is justifiably angered when his *τιμῆ* as function is not respected, when the *τιμῆ* owed him is not given, and he punishes the rebel. (Mikalson, 1991: 197)<sup>14</sup>

Both sides of the analogy are, though not explicitly, embedded in the *charis* relationship, both when it is functioning properly and when it is not.<sup>15</sup>

p. 36 The analogy of children serving parents to humans serving gods is, in contrast to that of slaves/masters, widespread in both philosophy and literature, and, in contrast to subjects/kings, is explicitly stated. It is also expressed in the same language: of 'service', *charis*, and honour. We discuss this and aspects of the religious side of the child/parent relationship in more detail in Chapter 4 and here offer only some examples to illustrate the analogy. In Plato's *Laws* the lawgiver requires that families leave behind a male heir as a 'server' (*θεραπεύτην*) of the gods of the family and city and of those still living and those who have died (5.740b8–c2; cf. 6.773e5–774a1 and 9.878a6–7). By those 'still living' he means 'parents' and by the dead 'ancestors' (*προγόνους*), and only the former are of concern now.<sup>16</sup>

In *Memorabilia* 2.2.13–14 Xenophon has Socrates ask his son Lamprocles,

Do you not think it is necessary to 'serve' (*θεραπεύειν*) the mother who loves you most of all? Do you not know that the city is concerned with and brings to court no other lack of *charis*? It overlooks those who, treated well, do not return *charis*, but if someone does not 'serve' his parents, it brings him to court and rejects him in the scrutiny and does not allow him to be an *archon*, because, if he were sacrificing, the sacrifices would not be made with the 'proper respect' (for the gods) and he would not do anything else well or justly....If you have 'sound thoughts' (*σωφρονητής*), you will ask that the gods forgive you if you have committed some wrong against your mother, lest they think you lack a sense of *charis* and will not be willing to do good things for you.

The 'service' owed parents is in terms not of affection but of the *charis* owed in return for goods received, as with the gods. In another discussion of *charis* Xenophon's Socrates makes the point more explicitly: 'Who might be done greater goods than children by their parents? The parents brought them into existence and made them see such beautiful things and share in such good things as the gods provide to humans' (*Mem.*

p. 37 2.2.3). And for that parents deserve  $\hookleftarrow$  *charis*. Thus children are to 'serve' their parents as humans do gods, in the context of *charis*, in return for goods received.<sup>17</sup>

We have seen honour associated with 'service to the gods', and so, too, is it with 'service' to parents. 'Honour', Aristotle claims, 'must be given to parents just as to gods' (*EN* 9.1165a24),<sup>18</sup> but in the honours paid to parents, like those to gods, 'no one might ever pay back their value, but the person "serving" (*ὁ θεραπεύων*) to the limit of his means seems to be a decent (*ἐπιεικής*) man' (8.1163b15–18).<sup>19</sup> Plato's lawgiver claims that what he has said about the 'service to the gods' is relevant also to the honours and dishonours of parents (*Lg.* 11.930e4–6), and that the gods heed a parent's prayer about his children, for their benefit if he is honoured, for their harm if he is not (11.931b5–e9). Parents are not gods, but honouring or dishonouring them brings much the same results as honouring or dishonouring the gods.

When Socrates in a discussion of the unwritten laws asks whether it is not the law/custom among all humans to respect (*σεβειν*) gods, Hippias responds, 'Is it not the custom everywhere to honour parents?' And Socrates agrees that it is (*Mem.* 4.4.19–20). The distinction here is between 'proper respect' (*σεβειν* or *εὐσεβειν*) for the gods and honour for parents, and it seems that in the philosophical tradition 'service', *charis*, and honours are shared among gods and parents, but *εὐσεβεια* is largely reserved for the gods.<sup>20</sup>

p. 38 Children, Aristotle claims (*EN* 9.1162a4–7), have 'affection' (*φιλία*) for their parents as humans do for gods, as towards those 'good and superior'.<sup>21</sup> They do so 'because [their parents] have done  $\hookleftarrow$  well the most important matters. For they are the cause of their existing, of their being raised, and when born of their being educated.' Among the acts of those who are 'religiously correct' (*τοις ὀσίοις*), according to Plato's lawgiver (*Lg.* 4.717b5–d3), are the honours of living parents. Parents deserve such honours,<sup>22</sup>

because it is right (*θέμις*) for one owing one's first and greatest debts, the most important of all debts, to pay them back and to think that whatever he possesses and has all belong to those who begot and raised him. He is to provide these things in 'subordinate's service' (*ὕπηρσειαν*) to his parents to the utmost of his ability, beginning with property, secondly the things of the body, and thirdly the things of the soul. He is paying back as loans the cares and attention and the long ago labours of those labouring very hard, all given on loan for the young, and he is giving them back to very old people who very much need them in old age. Through his whole life he must especially have had and maintain good speech (*εὐφημίαν*) towards his parents because there is a very heavy



punishment for light and flighty words.<sup>23</sup> Nemesis, the messenger of Justice, has been assigned as an overseer over all such matters.

The relationship of parent to child does not, apparently, require a return of affection but concerns quite specifically the proper ‘service’ for the many good things the child has received from the parents. It is analogous to the *charis* owed to the gods for their gifts, and it is expressed, as we have seen, in the same terms of ‘service’ and honours. The relationship of children to parent is thus analogous to that of humans to god, but not identical. As Aristotle notes (*EN* 9.1165a24–7), different honours are owed in different relationships, and the honours and ‘service’ owed to parents and gods are different. Also, when gods are mistreated in the *charis* relationship, they act directly. When parents suffer the same, they turn to the gods for recompense. Despite this, and keeping in mind that the fundamental issue is ‘service’ for goods rendered, we may see in the child to parent relationship the closest and most widely used analogy of the human server to the divine served.

p. 39

## ‘Service to the Gods’ as A Commercial Craft

If the predominate analogy of human server to divine served is the child to the parent, it calls into question Socrates’ labelling of ‘service to the gods’ in the *Euthyphro* as ‘commercial’, that is, as between a buyer and seller (14e6–7). This characterization of the ‘service to the gods’ is apparently neither Socrates’ nor Euthyphro’s own view. Socrates expresses it only as a conclusion drawn from how Euthyphro describes ‘service to the gods’, and Euthyphro assents to the label only reluctantly.<sup>24</sup> The explicit description of ‘service to the gods’ as a commercial craft is also unique to the *Euthyphro*.<sup>25</sup> In the *Eudemian Ethics* Aristotle contrasts the relationship between god and men to that between sellers, lenders, and their clients. Aristotle’s god is content receiving the sacrifices which his worshippers have the means to make.<sup>26</sup> The seller and lender will not accept the client’s claim of not having the means to pay what is owed (7.1243b11–14). So, too, in the coin of honour. As we have seen, Aristotle claims that ‘honour must be given to parents just as to gods’ (*EN* 9.1165a24), but in the honours paid to parents, like those to gods, no one can pay full worth (8.1163b15–17). In the *Memorabilia* (4.3.15) Xenophon has Euthydemus dispirited because no human can return to the gods *charis* worthy of their benefactions. It is in the human’s inability, just as the child’s, to pay ‘full worth’—in sacrifices or honour or *charis*—to the gods for the great benefits received that the idea of ‘service to the gods’ being a commercial exchange between men and gods breaks down. We do far better to return to the *charis* relationship, in which there is a mutual exchange of pleasing favours, wherein these favours may be very different in nature, scale, and financial value.

p. 40

## Benefits From ‘Service to the Gods’

Many benefits accrue to humans from performing individual components of the ‘service to the gods’, as we shall see later, but some are explicitly associated with that ‘service’ itself. Xenophon has two statements of this in the *Oeconomicus*, the first by Ischomachus to Socrates (11.7–8):

I will describe to you what practices I try to spend my life performing, so far as I can. Since I seem to have learned that the gods have made it not right (*θεμιτόν*) for men to succeed without knowing what they must do and taking care that these things be done, and to some of those who are wise and taking this care they grant to be *eudaimones*, but others not, so I begin by ‘serving the gods’, and I try to do as is right for me when I am praying to find health, strength of body, honour in the city, goodwill among my friends, honourable safety in war, and wealth that increases in a good way.

In 5.19–6.1 Socrates himself tells Critobulus:

I thought that you knew, Critobulus, that the gods are no less in authority over the tasks in agriculture than over those in war. You see that those engaged in war, before their war activities, please (*ἐξαρεσκομένους*) the gods and ask them by sacrifices and omens what they must and must not do. Do you think it is less necessary to make the gods propitious (*ιλιάσκεσθαι*) concerning agricultural activities? For you know well that people with ‘sound thoughts’ (*σώφρονες*) ‘serve’ (*θεραπεύουσιν*) the gods also for the sake of wet and dry crops, cattle, horses, sheep, and all their possessions.<sup>27</sup>

And Critobulus answered: I think you are right when you order me to try to begin every task with the gods, because they are in no less authority over the tasks of peace than those of war.

p. 41 It is a sign of ‘sound thinking’ (*σωφροσύνη*) ‘to serve the gods’, and that ‘service’ includes ‘pleasing them’ and ‘making them propitious’. Xenophon has Socrates describe Virtue’s warning to Heracles, ‘If you wish the gods to be propitious (*ἰλεως*) to you, you must “serve” (*θεραπευτέον*) them’ (*Mem.* 2.1.28). Such ‘propitiousness’ (*ἰλαότης*), though not limited to the gods,<sup>28</sup> is particularly associated with them ↪ (Pl. *Euthd.* 273e5–274a1).<sup>29</sup> Gods are made propitious by sacrifices, prayers, song, dance, and statues.<sup>30</sup> ‘Served’ and propitious, the gods assist in divination<sup>31</sup> and, as we see in the passages from the *Oeconomicus* above, in health, bodily strength, honour in the city, goodwill of friends, safety in war, acquisition of wealth, and success in agriculture. And Ischomachus and Critobulus take all this to mean that they should begin with the gods. Those who ‘serve’ the gods are also ‘dear’ to them (*φίλοι*, Xen. *Smp.* 4.49, above and *θεοφιλεῖς*, Pl. *Rep.* 2.362c1–6). Plato’s lawgiver offers an excellent conclusion to this summary of the benefits of the ‘service to the gods’ in a statement that he considers ‘the finest and truest of all statements’, that ‘for the good person to sacrifice and associate always with the gods by means of prayers, dedications, and all the “service to the gods” (*θεραπεία θεῶν*) is the finest, best, and most useful thing for the *eudaimon* life’ (*Lg.* 4.716d5–e1).<sup>32</sup> The *eudaimon* life was certainly described differently by the different philosophers, but Aristotle claims that both ‘the many’ (*οἱ πολλοί*) of Greeks and the sophisticated ones, that is, the philosophers, assume that *eudaimonia* is ‘living well’ and ‘faring well’ and is pleasurable. ‘The many’, however, in distinction from the philosophers, include more obvious things drawn from their own lives, such as health, wealth, and honour.<sup>33</sup>

p. 42 We may now fill out and correct our preliminary description of the ‘service to the gods’ drawn from Plato’s *Euthyphro*. ‘Service to the gods’ is ‘religious correctness’ and ‘proper respect’ for the deities. It is to pray, sacrifice, and make dedications correctly, and to begin every task with the gods. To perform this ‘service’ is a matter of ‘sound ↪ thinking’. This ‘service’ ‘pleases’ the gods and makes them ‘propitious’. The human performs this ‘service’ as he would for a parent, in return for the good things he has received. Cult acts, properly done, are ‘dear’ to the god as are those who perform them. These acts establish and maintain a *charis* relationship between men and gods, a mutual exchange of pleasing favours. The gods receive honour and gifts betokening honour; humans, in turn, have safe and prosperous families and cities, success in agriculture, war, and divination, and, most importantly, may find *eudaimonia*. The difference in the character and value of the favours given and received distinguish this relationship from the purely ‘commercial’, where exchanges of equal value are expected. And, finally, this ‘service’ is one part of justice, that part that concerns the gods.

## Notes

- 1 *Τί δὲ φύλον ἄλλο ἢ ἄνθρωποι θεοῦς θεραπεύουσι*; Cf. Pl. *Prt.* 322a3–4, *Menex.* 237d6–e1, and *Lg.* 10.902b4–6. On c see Burkert, 1985: 273 and Mikalson, 1991: 200.
- 2 For the less common *ὑπηρεσία τῶν θεῶν* and *λατρεία τῶν θεῶν* being the equivalents of *θεραπεία τῶν θεῶν*, see pp. 9–10.
- 3 On this see McPherran, 1996: 45–51, 71 and Brickhouse and Smith, 1989: 91–6.
- 4 On nature of *charis*, see pp. 14–15 and 206–7.
- 5 e.g. Hes. *Op.* 135; Hdt. 2.37.2; Eur. *El* 744, *Ion* 111 and 187, *Ba.* 82, and *IT* 1105; Lysias 6.51; and Isocrates 11.24. For more examples, see Mikalson, 1991: 297 n. 228.
- 6 Furley, 1985 properly re-established (against Burnet, 1924: 5–7) *Euthyphro* as ‘a rigid adherent to traditional mores’, ‘a high-priest of the conventional dogma’, and, if not ‘representative of the average Athenian’, a ‘religious pedant’. Parker, 1998: 121 terms him ‘a representative of conventional piety’. See also Geach, 2005: 24; Bailly, 2003: 21; and Emlyn-Jones, 1991: 10–11. On *Euthyphro*’s unconventional views regarding the prosecution of his own father for murder, see Edwards, 2000. For a revival of Burnet’s views of *Euthyphro* and the suggestion that he may have been the author of the *Derveni Papyrus*, see Kahn, 1997a. This suggestion has generally not been accepted (Betegh, 2004: 64).
- 7 Above, Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.13; Pl. *Euthyphr.* 12e6–8, 13b4–d2, *Phd.* 62d1–5. See also Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.28, *Oec.* 5.20; Pl. *Rep.* 4.443a9–10, *Lg.* 4.715c2–4, and [Pl.] *Def.* 412e14–413a2; Arist. *Pol.* 7.1329a31–2; and Zeno, D.L. 7.119. That gods might ‘serve’ humans is raised sarcastically in Xen. *Mem.* 4.3.9.
- 8 Cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 7.2.15.
- 9 As a sidelight, Socrates in [Plato]’s *Alcibiades* 1 has the four pedagogues of the Persian king ‘serve’ the gods by teaching the king the ‘magic’ (*μαγείαν*) of Zoroaster (121e5–122a2). For the instruction probably being in magic, not in the ‘theology of the *magoi*’, see Denyer, 2001: 180.
- 10 Some examples from Plato alone: doctors treating patients, *Plt.* 293b8–c1, 295c2, 298e3, *Chrm.* 156b8 and c5, 157a1–3,

- b3–4, *Prt.* 345a4, 354a5, *Grg.* 464b6, c4, 501a1, 517e3 and 6, *Rep.* 1.341c6–9, 2.369d9, 3.407e1–2, 408b4, e2–5, 410a1, *Lg.* 3.684c4, 4.720a3 and 6, d2, 9.865b3, 10.902d2; children serving parents, *Men.* 91a4–5, *Rep.* 4.425b2–3, 5.467a2, *Lg.* 5.740a5 and c1, 10.886c7, 11.931a8 and e2; humans tending animals, *Grg.* 516e5, *Rep.* 1.343b3, *Lg.* 5.735b3 and 6; slaves serving masters, *Smp.* 175c1, *Rep.* 9.579a3, *Lg.* 1.633c2, 7.808a4, 11.915a3–4 and [Pl.] *Alc.* 1.122c2.
- 11 As in the literary tradition. For tragedy, see Mikalson, 1991: 200, 297 n. 228, and 298 n. 233.
- 12 At another level, again in the *Phaedo*, Socrates argues that ‘nature’ assigns to the soul ‘to rule and be master’ (δουλόζειν) and to the body ‘to be the slave (δουλεύειν) and to be ruled’. In this the soul is similar to the divine and the body is similar to the mortal (79e9–80a9). By analogy one can conclude that the mortal should as a slave obey the divine as its master. In *Lg.* 5.726a2–727a2 it is argued that the soul is ‘the most godly (θειότατον) of our possessions’, but still second in this to the gods. The soul, therefore, must be honoured as a master more than our slavish possessions, but less so than the gods who are masters (δεσπόται).
- 13 For humans as ‘possessions’ of the gods and *daimones*, see also *Critias* 109b6–7 and *Lg.* 10.906a6–7. In 10.902b8–c2 all living creatures, including the sky, are gods’ possessions and therefore objects of their concern. In *Euthd.* 302d4–6 Apollo, Zeus, and Athena are termed, in an Athenian context, ‘ancestors and δεσπόται’, and in *Lg.* 7.796b6 Athena is δέσποινα. These are honorific, cult-type titles and do not imply servitude of their devotees. Cf. *Phdr.* 273e8–274a2. At *Lg.* 6.762e1–7 ‘slavery to the laws’ is equated to ‘slavery to the gods’ (τοῖς θεοῖς οὔσαν δουλείαν). Finally, Plato has Parmenides claim (*Prm.* 133d7–134e6) that, because gods deal in absolutes and humans do not, gods exercise perfect, absolute ‘mastership’ and ‘knowledge’, unrelated to their human counterparts, and hence gods could not be ‘masters’ (δεσπόται) of humans.
- 14 Cf. Mikalson, 2005: 23. Dover, 1972: 32 formulated much the same analogy, speaking of ‘ruler’ instead of ‘king’: ‘The Greek’s relation with one of his gods was essentially the relation between subject and ruler. A ruler is a person whose actions and decisions cannot always be predicted or explained by his subjects; he can be placated, in normal times by normal tribute; he makes rules—which he himself does not necessarily obey—and punishes subjects who break the rules; but he does not concern himself with what lies outside the province of his rules, and a prudent subject will pay his tribute, obey the rules, and keep out of the ruler’s way.’
- 15 On Aristotle’s claim (*EN* 8.1158b33–1159a8) of the impossibility of a φιλία relationship equally between gods and their worshippers and kings and their subjects, see discussion of gods and φιλία in Ch. 4.
- 16 See England, 1921, on 5.740c1. Cf. 4.724a1–2. On ‘service’ owed to parents, see also *Pl. Rep.* 4.425b1–3 and 5.467a1–2 and *Lg.* 5.740a5–6, and Morrow, 1960: 467–8. On ‘service’ owed to dead ancestors, *Xen. Mem.* 1.3.1 and 2.2.13 and *Pl. Rep.* 4.427b7–9, *Lg.* 4.723e4–5, and Morrow, 1960: 461–7.
- 17 Cf. *Pl. Lg.* 4.717b5–d6 and *Arist. EE* 7.1242a32–5.
- 18 Cf. *Pl. Rep.* 3.386a2–3.
- 19 Cf. *EN* 9.1164b2–6. For the link of ‘service’ and honour of parents, see also *Pl. Lg.* 4.723e4–5 and 10.886c6–7.
- 20 Cf. *Pl. Lg.* 4.717a6–b6 where gods enjoy both πημαί and εὐσέβεια, the parents only πημαί. Note the distinction οὔτε ἀνθρώπους αἰδοῦμενος οὔτε θεοὺς σεβόμενος in 11.917b3–4. The distinction is most clearly stated in Lycurgus, *Leoc.* 15, πρὸς τε τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσεβῶς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γονεάς ὁσίως, and is clearly reflected in Gorgias’ Funeral Oration, *VS* 82 B 6: σεμνοὶ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τῷ δίκαιῳ, ὅσοι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς τοκέας τῇ θεραπείᾳ. For exceptional cases of ‘proper respect’ (εὐσέβεια) directed towards parents, occurring only when parents are paired with gods, see *Pl. Rep.* 10.615c2–3 and *Smp.* 188c2–6.
- 21 Dirlmeier, 1991: 530 views this as not Aristotle’s view but as a ‘Gebote der Volksmoral’.
- 22 On ‘religious correctness’ as it concerns parents, see Ch. 4.
- 23 On εὐφημία in relation to the gods, see Ch. 2.
- 24 I owe these observations to Andrew S. Mason.
- 25 For less explicit descriptions of it as such, and for the importance of *charis* in understanding the correct relationship, see Parker, 1998: 118–21; Yunis, 1988a: 101–2. Cf. Mikalson, 2005: 26–7.
- 26 Cf. *EN* 9.1164b4–6.
- 27 On *sophrosyne* as ‘sound thinking’, see pp. 12–13.
- 28 Of the dead, *Pl. Rep.* 4.427b6–8; of living philosophers, 6.496e1–3.
- 29 Cf. *Pl. Lg.* 7.792d2–5. On the odd extension of *ιλαότης* in this passage, see England, 1921, *ad loc.*
- 30 *Pl. Lg.* 4.712b4–6, 7.803e1–804b4, and 10.910b2–3. Empedocles, who, as we shall see (pp. 69–70), rejects animal sacrifice, makes his Aphrodite ‘propitious’ by statues, painted dedications of animals, perfumes, offerings of myrrh and incense, and libations of honey (frag. *VS* 31 B 128).
- 31 *Xen. Mem.* 1.1.9 and 1.4.18. Cf. *Pl. Laches* 198e4–5.
- 32 Cf. *Pl. Ti.* 90c4–6. Xenophon in the *Cyropaedia* (8.1.24) has the Persians thinking that ‘they themselves will be more *eudaimon* if they “serve the gods”’ just as does Cyrus who is ‘most *eudaimon* and a ruler’.
- 33 On these aspects of *eudaimonia*, see Aristotle, *EN* 1.1095a18–25, b14–17, 7.1152b6–7 and 1153b14–15 and Introduction, pp. 7–9.