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PART II

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

THE first part of this project contained what could be deduced from the basic hypotheses,¹ more or less *a priori*,² moulded and corrected in accordance with various factual experiences. This second part seeks to infer from the analysis of pathological processes some further determinants of the system founded on the basic hypotheses; a third part will hope to construct from the two preceding ones the characteristics of the normal passage of psychical events.

A.³ *Psychopathology of Hysteria*

[1] *Hysterical Compulsion*

I start off from things which occur in hysteria without necessarily being peculiar to it.—Every observer of hysteria is struck in the first place by the fact that hysterical patients are subject to a *compulsion* which is exercised by *excessively intense* ideas.⁴ An idea will, for instance, emerge in consciousness with particular frequency without the passage [of events] justifying it; or the arousing of this idea⁵ will be accompanied by psychical consequences that are unintelligible. The emergence of the excessively intense idea brings with it consequences which, on the one hand, cannot be suppressed and, on the other hand, cannot be understood—release of affect, motor innervations, impediments. The subject is by no means unaware of the striking character of the situation.

Excessively intense ideas also occur normally. They lend the

¹ [Here, and four lines below, this word is in the plural in the MS., though *Anf.*, 427, gives it in the singular.]

² [Translator's italics.]

³ [The MS. contains no 'B' corresponding to this 'A'.]

⁴ [*Überstark*' (cf. p. 295 above). The same word is used by Freud in the same connection in the 'Dora' analysis (1905e [1901]), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 54, where it is equated with Wernicke's term '*überwertig*' ('super-valent'), used in its turn by Breuer in *Studies on Hysteria* (1895d), *ibid.*, 2, 247. The underlying notion of the present passage had already been stated by Freud in his discussion of the case of Emmy von N. in the latter volume (*ibid.*, 2, 86.) (Cf. Wernicke, 1900, 140.)]

⁵ [The MS. has either '*dieser N*' [Neurone] ('of these neurones') or '*dieser V*' [*Vorstellung*] ('of this idea'). *Anf.*, 427, chooses the former, but the latter seems to make simpler sense.]

ego its individuality. We are not surprised at them if we know their genetic development (upbringing, experiences) and their motives. We are accustomed to regarding such *excessively intense* ideas as the product of strong and justifiable motives. Hysterical *excessively intense ideas* strike us, on the contrary, by their oddity; they are *ideas* which in other people have no consequences and of whose importance we can make nothing. They appear to us as intruders and usurpers, and accordingly as ridiculous.

Thus, *hysterical compulsion* is (1) *unintelligible*, (2) *incapable of being resolved by the activity of thought*, (3) *incongruous* in its structure.

There is a *simple neurotic compulsion* which may be contrasted with the hysterical kind. For instance, a man may have run into danger by falling out of a carriage, and driving in a carriage may after that be impossible for him. This compulsion is (1) intelligible, since we know its origin and (3)¹ congruous, since the association with danger justifies the link between driving in a carriage and fear. It too, however, is not capable of being resolved by the activity of thought. The latter characteristic is not to be termed entirely pathological: our normal *excessively intense ideas*, too, are often incapable of being resolved. One would regard neurotic compulsion as not pathological at all if experience did not show that in healthy people a compulsion such as this persists for only a short time after its occasion, and gradually disintegrates. Thus the persistence of the compulsion is pathological and points to a *simple neurosis*.²

Now our analyses show that a hysterical compulsion is *resolved* immediately it is *explained* (made intelligible). Thus these two characteristics are in essence one. In analysis we learn, too, the process by which the appearance of absurdity and *incongruity* comes about. The outcome of analysis is, expressed in general terms, as follows:

Before the analysis, *A* is an *excessively intense idea*, which forces its way into consciousness too often, and each time gives rise to weeping. The subject does not know why he weeps at *A*; he regards it as absurd but cannot prevent it.

After the analysis, it has been discovered that there is an idea

¹ [So in the MS. *Anf.*, 428, has altered this to '(2)'. The '3' refers back, of course, to the list just above.]

² [This is not a term commonly used by Freud in any of his contemporary discussions of the classification of the neuroses. It does appear in his second paper on the neuro-psychoses of defence (1896b), *Standard Ed.*, 3, 167, where it is used of what he later called the 'actual neuroses'—neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis—as contrasted with the 'psycho-neuroses', hysteria and obsessional neurosis. It seems, however, as though he must be using the term differently in the present connection.]

B, which justifiably gives rise to weeping and which justifiably recurs frequently so long as a certain complicated psychical action has not been performed against it by the subject. The effect of *B* is not absurd; it is intelligible to the subject and can even be combated by him.

B stands in a particular relation to *A*.

For there has been an occurrence which consisted of *B* + *A*. *A* was an incidental circumstance; *B* was appropriate for producing the lasting effect. The reproduction of this event in memory has now taken a form of such a kind that it is as though *A* had stepped into *B*'s place. *A* has become a substitute, a *symbol* for *B*. Hence the incongruity: *A* is accompanied by consequences which it does not seem worthy of, which do not fit in with it.

The *formation of symbols* also takes place normally. A soldier will sacrifice himself for a many-coloured scrap of stuff on a pole, because it has become the symbol of his fatherland, and no one thinks that neurotic.¹

But a hysterical *symbol* behaves differently. The knight who fights for his lady's glove *knows*, in the first place, that the glove owes its importance to the lady; and, secondly, he is in no way prevented by his adoration of the glove from thinking of the lady and serving her in other respects. The *hysteric*, who weeps at *A*, is quite unaware that he is doing so on account of the association *A*—*B*, and *B* itself plays no part at all in his psychical life. The symbol has in this case taken the place of the *thing* entirely.

This assertion is correct in the strictest sense. We [can] convince [ourselves] that whenever anything is evoked, from outside or by association, which should in fact cathect *B*, *A* enters consciousness instead of it. Indeed, one can infer the nature of *B* from the provoking causes which—in a remarkable fashion—evoke *A*.

¹ [The same example re-appears in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *ibid.*, 4, 177.—In this discussion Freud seems for the most part to be using 'symbolization' in the very general sense of 'displacement'. In his contributions to *Studies on Hysteria* (1895d) he had used the term in the more restricted sense of the 'conversion' of mental states into physical sensations. (See, for instance, *ibid.*, 2, 178–80.) These uses are only loosely connected with those found more often in Freud's later writings, especially in connection with dreams. In these an essential condition seems to be that the meaning of the symbol should be absent from consciousness, as is not the case in the next paragraph. The various uses of the concept of 'symbol' were considered by Freud in Lecture X of the *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17), *ibid.*, 15 (especially 152).]

We can sum the matter up: *A* is compulsive, *B* is repressed (at least from consciousness).

Analysis has led to the surprising conclusion: that for every compulsion there is a corresponding *repression*, that for every excessive intrusion into consciousness there is a corresponding *amnesia*.

The term 'excessively intense' points to quantitative characteristics. It is plausible to suppose that *repression* has the quantitative meaning of being denuded of *Q*, and that the sum of the two [of the compulsion and the repression] is equal to the normal. If so, only the distribution has changed. Something has been added to *A* which has been subtracted from *B*. The pathological process is one of *displacement*, such as we have come to know in dreams—a primary process therefore.¹

[2] *The Genesis of Hysterical Compulsion*

Several significant questions now arise. Under what conditions does a pathological symbol-formation of this kind [and] (on the other hand) repression come about? What is the operative force in this? In what state are the neurones of the excessively intense idea and those of the repressed one?

Nothing could be surmised here and nothing further constructed, if it were not that clinical experience teaches us two facts. First, repression is brought to bear invariably on ideas which evoke a distressing affect (unpleasure) in the *ego*, secondly on idea[s] from sexual life.²

It may already be suspected that it is this unpleasurable affect which puts repression into operation. We have already, indeed, assumed the existence of a *primary defence* which consists in the current of thought being reversed as soon as it comes up against a neurone the cathecting of which releases unpleasure. [Cf. pp. 322 and 329–30.] The justification for this [hypothesis] arose from two experiences: (1) that the cathexis of this neurone was certainly not the one that was being sought for, when the thought-process aimed originally at establishing a situation of ψ satisfaction; (2) that when an experience of pain was brought to an end by a reflex, the hostile perception was replaced by another [p. 322].

We can, however, convince ourselves more directly of the part

¹ [Much of the foregoing argument reappears, on rather different lines, in the 'Dora' analysis (1905e), *ibid.*, 7, 54–5.]

² [So in the MS. It will be seen presently (p. 352) that the intended meaning is that an idea must be *both* distressing *and* sexual in order to be repressed.]

played by the defensive affect. If we investigate the state of the repressed [idea] *B*, we discover that that idea is easy to find and bring into consciousness. This is a surprise, for it might well have been supposed that *B* was really forgotten, that no memory-trace of *B* remained in ψ . But no, *B* is a mnemonic image like any other; it is not extinguished. But if, as is usual, *B* is a complex of cathexes, then a *resistance* arises, which is uncommonly large and hard to defeat,¹ against activity of thought with *B*. We can at once recognize in this resistance against *B* the amount of the *compulsion* exercised by *A*, and we may conclude that the force which in the past repressed *B* is to be seen here at work once more.² At the same time we learn something else. We only knew, indeed, that *B* cannot become *conscious*; nothing was known about the relation of *B* to thought-cathexis. We now learn that the resistance is directed against thought being in any way concerned with *B*, even if it [*B*] has already been made partly conscious. So that instead of excluded from consciousness we may put *excluded from the process of thought*.

Thus there is a defensive process emanating from the *cathected ego* which results in hysterical repression and, along with it, in hysterical compulsion. To that extent the process seems to be differentiated from the ψ primary processes.

[3] *Pathological Defence*

Nevertheless, we are far from a solution. As we know, the outcome of *hysterical repression* differs very widely from that of normal defence, of which we have precise knowledge. It is quite generally the case that we avoid thinking of what arouses only unpleasure, and we do this by directing our thoughts to something else. If, however, we accordingly³ manage to bring it about that the incompatible [idea] *B* seldom emerges in our consciousness, because we have so far as possible kept it isolated, yet we never succeed in forgetting *B* in such a way that we could not

¹ [*'Schwer zu besiegender'* in the MS. *Anf.*, 430, has *'schwer zu beseitigender'* ('hard to get rid of').]

² [This observation of the identity of the forces at work in resistance and repression was to become, as Freud remarked more than once in later years, the corner-stone of psycho-analysis. See, for instance, the *Autobiographical Study* (1925*d*), *ibid.*, 20, 29-30. The observation is already to be found in *Studies on Hysteria* (1895*d*). See, e.g., *ibid.*, 2, 157.]

³ [*Anf.*, 431, prints *'dann noch'* ('in addition to this'). The MS. is doubtful, but probably reads *'darnach'*, which seems to make better sense.]

be reminded of it by fresh perception. Now an arousal of this kind cannot be precluded in hysteria either; the difference consists only in the fact that then, instead of *B*, *A* always becomes conscious—that is, is cathected. Thus it is *symbol-formation* of this stable kind which is the function that goes beyond normal defence.

The most obvious explanation of this increased function would be that the greater intensity of the defensive affect is responsible for it. Experience shows, however, that the most distressing memories, which must necessarily arouse the greatest unpleasure (the memory of remorse over bad actions), cannot be repressed and replaced by symbols. The existence of a second precondition for pathological defence [p. 350]—sexuality—also points to the fact that the explanation must be looked for elsewhere. It is quite impossible to suppose that distressing sexual affects so greatly exceed all other unpleasurable affects in intensity. It must be another characteristic of sexual ideas that can explain how it is that sexual ideas are alone subjected to repression.

One further remark must be added here. Hysterical repression evidently takes place with the help of *symbol-formation*, of *displacement* on to other neurones. We might think, then, that the riddle resides only in the mechanism of this displacement, that there is nothing to be explained about repression itself. We shall hear, however, in connection with the analysis of, for instance, obsessional neurosis, that there *repression without symbol-formation* occurs, and indeed that there repression and substitution are chronologically separated. Accordingly, the process of repression remains as the core of the riddle.

[4] *The Hysterical Proton Pseudos*¹

We have seen that hysterical compulsion originates from a

¹ [These words are in Latin script here in the MS., but in Greek script at the beginning of the next section. This arrangement has been reversed in *Anf.*, 432 and 435. The term occurs in Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* (Book II, Chapter 18, 66a, 16), a work dealing with the theory of the syllogism which was later included in what came to be called the *Organon*. The chapter deals with false premisses and false conclusions, and the particular sentence asserts that a false statement is the result of a preceding falsity ('*proton pseudos*'). Andersson (1962, 195–6) has, however, shown that a Viennese physician, Max Herz, used the same term in a similar context in a paper read by him before the neurological section of a scientific congress in Vienna in 1894. Of this section Freud was then the secretary. (Cf. a letter to Fliess of February 7, 1894, *Anf.*, 91, Letter 16.)]

peculiar kind of *Qj* motion (symbol-formation), which is probably a *primary process*, since it can easily be demonstrated in dreams; [and we have seen] that the operative force of this process is *defence* on the part of the ego, which here, however, is performing more than its normal function [p. 352].¹ We need an explanation of the fact that in the case of an *ego-process* consequences follow to which we are accustomed only with primary processes. We must expect to find special psychical determinants here. We know from clinical evidence that all this only occurs in the *sexual* sphere; so perhaps we shall have to explain the special psychical determinant from natural characteristics of sexuality.

Now, as it happens, there is a special psychical constellation in the sexual sphere which might be of service for our purpose. I will illustrate it (it is known to us empirically) by an example.²

Emma is subject at the present time to a compulsion of not being able to go into shops *alone*. As a reason for this, [she produced] a memory from the time when she was twelve years old (shortly after puberty). She went into a shop to buy something, saw the two shop-assistants (one of whom she can remember) laughing together, and ran away in some kind of *affect of fright*. In connection with this, she was led to recall that the two of them were laughing at her clothes and that one of them had pleased her sexually.

The relation of these fragments [to one another] and the effect of the experience are alike unintelligible. If she felt unpleasure at her clothes being laughed at, that must have been corrected long ago, ever since she has been dressing as a [grown-up] lady. Moreover, it makes no difference to her clothes whether she goes into a shop alone or in company. That she is not simply in need of protection is shown by the fact that, as happens with agoraphobia, even the company of a small child is enough to make her feel safe. And there is the quite incongruous fact that one of them pleased her; it would make no difference to this either, if she were accompanied. Thus the memories aroused explain neither the compulsion nor the determination of the symptom.

Further investigation now revealed a second memory, which she denies having had in mind at the moment of Scene I. Nor is


¹ [In the MS.: '*welche aber hier mehr leistet als normal*'. *Anf.*, 432, inserts a '*nicht*' before the '*mehr*' ('is performing no more'). There is no sign whatever in the MS. of '*nicht*', which is in any case contra-indicated by the sense.]

² [Freud seems not to have mentioned this case elsewhere.]

there anything to prove this. On two occasions when she was a child of eight she had gone into a small shop to buy some sweets, and the shopkeeper had grabbed at her genitals through her clothes. In spite of the first experience she had gone there a second time; after the second time she stopped away. She now reproached herself for having gone there the second time, as though she had wanted in that way to provoke the assault. In fact a state of 'oppressive bad conscience' is to be traced back to this experience.

We now understand Scene I (shop-assistants) if we take Scene II (shopkeeper) along with it. We only need an associative link between the two. She herself pointed out that it was provided by the *laughing*: the laughing of the shop-assistants had reminded her of the grin with which the shopkeeper had accompanied his assault. The course of events can now be reconstructed as follows. In the shop the two assistants were *laughing*; this laughing aroused (unconsciously) the memory of the shopkeeper. Indeed, the situation had yet another similarity [to the earlier one]: she was once again in a shop alone. Together with the shopkeeper she remembered his grabbing through her clothes; but since then she had reached puberty. The memory aroused what it¹ was certainly not able to at the time, a *sexual release*, which was transformed into anxiety. With this anxiety, she was afraid that the shop-assistants might repeat the assault, and she ran away.

It is quite certainly established that two kinds of ψ processes are mixed up together here, that the memory of Scene II (shopkeeper) occurred in quite a different state from the other one. What happened can be represented thus [Fig. 16]:



[Fig. 16]

¹ ['*Sie*' in the MS., which grammatically can only refer to the memory.]

Of these, the blacked-in ideas¹ are perceptions which are also remembered. The fact that the sexual release too² entered consciousness is proved by the otherwise incomprehensible idea that the laughing shop-assistant had pleased her. The outcome—not to remain in the shop alone on account of the danger of assault—is quite rationally constructed having regard to all the pieces of the associative process. However, nothing of the process (represented underneath³) entered consciousness except the element clothes; and thought operating *consciously* has made two false connections in the material at its disposal (shop-assistants, laughing, clothes, sexual feeling): that she was being laughed at on account of her clothes and that one of the shop-assistants excited sexual pleasure in her.⁴

The whole complex (unblacked-in⁵ [circles]) is represented in consciousness by the one idea clothes, clearly the most innocent one. Here a repression accompanied by symbol-formation has taken place. The fact that the outcome—the symptom—is then quite rationally constructed [see above], so that the symbol plays no part in it, is in point of fact a peculiarity of the case.

It might be said that it is quite usual, as happens here, for an association to pass through unconscious intermediate links until it comes to a conscious one.⁶ In that case, the element which

¹ [I.e. those represented by blacked-in circles.]

² [*'Auch'* in the MS.; omitted in *Anf.*, 434.]

³ [*'Unten dargestellten'* in the MS. This refers to the unblacked-in circles in the lower part of the diagram. (The blacked-in circles in the upper row stand, as in the case of Fig. 15, p. 341, for *conscious* elements; the lower row, of unblacked-in circles, stand for *unconscious* elements.) The editors of *Anf.* seem to have misunderstood this and to have supposed that the phrase related to the position of the diagram on the page. They accordingly altered it to *'oben dargestellten'* ('represented above'), apparently under the impression that this was a slip of Freud's, for the diagram is 'above' in the MS., just as it is in *Anf.*, 434.]

⁴ ['False connections' had been discussed at length by Freud in his case history of Emmy von N. See *Studies on Hysteria* (1895d), *Standard Ed.*, 2, 67-70 n. Elsewhere in his early writings the term is more often used specifically of displacement of affect, e.g. in the first paper on the neuro-psychoses of defence (1894a), *ibid.*, 3, 52.]

⁵ [In the MS. *'lichtgehalten'*. *Anf.*, 434, alters this to *'gebrochene Linien'* ('broken lines').—Incidentally, this is a striking example of the use of the word 'complex' in the sense of a repressed group of ideas, whose introduction is usually attributed to the Zurich school. See an Editor's Note to a paper of Freud's on legal proceedings (1906c), *ibid.*, 9, 100-2.—Cf. also footnote 2 on p. 149 above.]

⁶ [This sentence does not read quite grammatically in the MS. and has been re-arranged in *Anf.*, 435, as given above. There is no question about its meaning.]

enters consciousness is probably the one that arouses special interest. In our example, however, it is noticeable precisely that the element which enters consciousness is not the one that arouses interest (assault) but another one, as a symbol (clothes). If we ask ourselves what may be the cause of this interpolated pathological process, only one presents itself—the *sexual release*, of which there is also evidence in consciousness. This is linked to the memory of the assault; but it is highly noteworthy that it [the sexual release] was not linked to the assault when this was experienced. Here we have the case of a memory arousing an affect which it did not arouse as an experience, because in the meantime the change [brought about] in puberty had made possible a different understanding of what was remembered.¹

Now this case is typical of repression in hysteria. We invariably find that a memory is repressed which has only become a trauma by *deferred action*. The cause of this state of things is the retardation of puberty as compared with the rest of the individual's development.

[5] *Determinants of the πρώτων ψεύδος ὅστ[ερικόν]*²

Although it does not usually happen in psychical life that a memory arouses an affect which it did not give rise to as an experience, this is nevertheless something quite usual in the case of a sexual idea, precisely because the retardation of puberty is a general characteristic of the organization. Every adolescent individual has memory-traces which can only be understood with the emergence of sexual feelings of his own; and accordingly every adolescent must carry the germ of hysteria within him. There must obviously be concurrent factors as well, if this universal determining effect is to be limited to the small number

¹ [The hypothesis stated in this sentence (which is discussed in the two following sections) governed Freud's views on the aetiology of hysteria throughout this early period. He examined it shortly after writing the present work in a long footnote to his second paper on the neuro-psychoses of defence (1896*b*), *Standard Ed.*, 3, 166–7, where further references will be found. The whole idea had the ground cut from under it by the discovery a year or two later of infantile sexuality and the recognition of the persistence of unconscious instinctual impulses. Nevertheless, the notion of the 'deferred action' of a trauma did not lose its whole validity, as is shown by a footnote to the 'Wolf Man' case history (1918*b*), *ibid.*, 17, 45 *n.*]

² [See footnote, p. 352. The word at the beginning of this heading is in the plural in the MS., but is changed to singular in *Anf.*, 435.]

of individuals who actually become hysterics. Now analysis indicates that what is disturbing in a sexual trauma is evidently the release of affect; and experience teaches us to recognize hysterics as individuals of whom one knows in part that they have become *prematurely* sexually excitable owing to mechanical and emotional stimulation (masturbation), and of whom one can assume in part that a premature sexual release is present in their innate disposition. But premature *beginning* of sexual release or *prematurely intensified* sexual release are clearly equivalent. This factor is reduced to a quantitative one.

In what, however, does the significance of *prematureness* in sexual release reside? Here all the weight falls on the prematureness, for it cannot be maintained that sexual release in general is an occasion for repression; this would once again make repression into a process of normal frequency.