Combined and Uneven Development: Towards a New Theory of World-Literature
Postcolonialism across the Disciplines

Series Editors
Graham Huggan, University of Leeds
Andrew Thompson, University of Exeter

Postcolonialism across the Disciplines showcases alternative directions for postcolonial studies. It is in part an attempt to counteract the dominance in colonial and postcolonial studies of one particular discipline – English literary/cultural studies – and to make the case for a combination of disciplinary knowledges as the basis for contemporary postcolonial critique. Edited by leading scholars, the series aims to be a seminal contribution to the field, spanning the traditional range of disciplines represented in postcolonial studies but also those less acknowledged. It will also embrace new critical paradigms and examine the relationship between the transnational/cultural, the global and the postcolonial.
The periphery is where the future reveals itself.

– J.G. Ballard
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A Note on Collaborative Method

This book is the product of intensive discussion and debate. Although our individual specialisms vary widely, from postcolonial studies to American studies to modern European and Scottish literary studies, we are motivated by a common conviction that the existing paradigms of literary analysis, in whatever field, are not equal to the challenge of theorising ‘world literature’ in the new millennium. With a linked history of co-teaching as our departure point, alongside the co-organising of reading groups, conferences and symposia, we approached the task of writing from a basis not simply of shared theoretical interests and determination but of already extensive conversation on the central problems, as we saw them, of our respective sub-fields and of the emerging field of world-literary studies.

That said, the process of collaboration should never be mistaken for the harmonious reconciliation of differences. Several of our disagreements and divergent emphases are sedimented in this work, and our applications of its proposals continue to evolve in different ways. At the same time, and especially in the face of an increasingly hostile environment for critical studies of this kind, we have benefited enormously from the mutual attention, support and unstinting engagement that comes with collective endeavour.

Individual members of the collective drafted sections of the book after its main arguments were established in draft form. These were then edited, revised and rewritten in a multi-phase process by several hands. The result could indeed be termed combined and unequal – but in ways that perhaps highlight, rather than negate, the values of solidarity on which the work is premised.
The way we imagine comparative literature is a mirror of how we see the world. (Franco Moretti 2003: 81)

These are testing times for literary studies. The challenges confronting the discipline today are legion and multiform; they range from the field-specific to the institutional, from the university to the wider spheres of politics and the economy. In addition to internal debates about the coherence and sustainability of the established forms of disciplinary literary studies, we might reference in this connection the ongoing subordination of culture generally to the laws of the market, the apparently declining significance, relatively speaking, of literature itself as a cultural form, and the steady assault on the autonomy of the humanities – and indeed of the university itself in its historical guise as, for better and worse, an ivory tower, a ‘world apart’ – by government, business and media regimes, all bent in their various ways on incorporation, control and instrumentally defined regulation.

1 See Huggan 2001; Brouillette 2007; Strongman 2002; English 2005; and Casanova 2004, all of whom have interesting things to say about the commodification and marketing of literary prestige.

2 See Fredric Jameson: ‘My sense is that this is essentially a visual culture, wired for sound – but one where the linguistic element [...] is slack and flabby, and not to be made interesting without ingenuity, daring, and keen motivation’ (1995: 299).

3 Jameson speaks thus, of the ‘subsumption of whole fields and disciplines under the patronage of private business and, as it were, the assimilation to wage labor of the standard nonacademic type of researchers whose work is subsidized by monopolies who set the agenda and are likely to profit from the results’ (2008: 571). See, among others, Furedi 2006; Maskell and Robinson 2001; Miyoshi 1998, 2000, 2005; Ohmann 2003; Readings 1996; Teeuwen and Hantke 2007; and
The suggestion that literary studies is in crisis has been made before, of course. As long ago as 1981, for instance, Raymond Williams argued that English literary studies had stumbled into incoherence – on the one hand, because the idea of ‘literature’ no longer provided a stable evidentiary basis of study; on the other, because the connotations of ‘English’ were so densely problematical. Asking whether the ‘English’ in ‘English literary studies’ identified ‘the language or the country’, Williams wrote that ‘[i]f it is the language, there are also fifteen centuries of native writing in other languages: Latin, Welsh, Irish, Old English, Norman French. If it is not the language but the country, is that only “England” or is it now also Ireland, Wales, Scotland, North America, Old and New “Commonwealths”?’. (1991a: 194).

In the 30 years since that Cambridge-centred ‘crisis in English Studies’, arguments as to the instability – indeed, on Williams’s reading, the strict unviability – of disciplinary literary studies overall have been sounded with increasing resonance. Scholars in the field have been proposing that the received modes of procedure are in need of radical overhaul. Everywhere today, the institutionalised and consolidated methods, the structuring...
premises and principles, the coherence of the disciplinary object of study itself, are being challenged and opened up to reconsideration and sometimes searching and fundamental critique. In comparative literature, for instance, the very questions of why it is worthwhile to ‘compare’ literary texts at all, and what doing so might involve in a world that is both more transparently, plurally and complexly polyglot and – at the same time, and seemingly paradoxically – more deeply dominated by just one language – English – than ever before, are being discussed. In American studies, similarly, there has been a proliferation of new initiatives aimed at combatting the isolationism and nation-centredness of the field in its established modes, in the interests of reconfiguring it along the lines of systemic (global) and comparative rather than exceptionalist perspectives.6

One does not have to be a card-carrying Bourdieusian to know that academics are rather given to pronouncing the fields or sub-fields in which they themselves work as moribund or in crisis. The strategic function of this time-honoured gesture is to pave the way for those involved to present their own interventions as being in the nature of decisive departures, corrective reconstructions or new beginnings. The goal is to make enough of a splash to attract attention, for one increases one’s own specific capital in a given field by ensuring that one’s own position-taking is registered in it.

In these terms, a certain programmatic scepticism might represent a healthy initial reaction to the kind of work, published under such titles as Death of a Discipline (Spivak 2003), Politics and Value in English Studies: A Discipline in Crisis? (Guy and Small 1993) and ‘Beyond Discipline? Globalization and the Future of English’ (Jay 2001), that gestures rather apocalyptically to dead ends and fresh starts. One such sceptic is Thomas Docherty, who, having correctly noted that ‘[t]he talk of crisis in the discipline compels us to think of ourselves as being at the start of something new or at least something refreshed’, and having observed that ‘institutional forms of literary criticism have a tendency to be complicit with […] marketisation and homogenisation of our work’, proposes and defends the counter-suggestion that ‘Comparative Literature is not “in crisis” at all’ (2006: 26, 27). Point taken.7 Yet we believe that there are nevertheless compelling reasons to view the current evocation of disciplinary turmoil as more than a mere internal power play or strategic ruse. If Williams’s identification of a crisis in literary studies in 1981 can be taken to mark the emergence of various new initiatives – among them, postcolonial,

6 ‘The notion of American exceptionalism is in many ways the foundation of the discipline of American studies’, Michael Denning notes: ‘whether the answers are cast in terms of the American mind, the national character, American myths and symbols, or American culture, the founding question of the discipline was “What is American?”’ (2004: 175). See also Dimock and Buell 2007.

7 See also James F. English, who begins his book The Global Future of English Studies by announcing the ‘strange news’ that ‘the academic discipline of English is not in a state of crisis, [and] that its future actually looks pretty bright’ (2012: 3).
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ethnic and women’s studies, cultural studies itself, the epistemological and methodological interventions of poststructuralism, postmodernism and deconstruction – perhaps the current moment is marked by the recognition that these ‘new formations’ have themselves now passed their sell-by dates. Certainly there appears to be a developing consensus that the literary studies field is going to have to reinvent itself in the years just ahead – not only because, subject to irresistible heteronomous pressures, it is being given no choice, but also because what ‘literary studies’ is taken to be, to mean and to represent – as well as where and how, and by whom and to what ends – have (again) become burning questions to academics in the field.

In this context of disciplinary rethinking and reorientation, the notions of ‘world literature’ and ‘global literature’ have emerged as important nodes of discussion and research. A relatively minor difference in the sub-disciplinary provenance of these two linked initiatives might be registered quickly. It is clear that the thought-figure of ‘globalisation’ is fundamental to them both.8 But where ‘global literature’ might be understood as in the first instance an extension of postcolonial studies – as postcolonial studies under the sign of ‘globalisation theory’, in fact – ‘world literature’ is in the first instance an extension of comparative literature, and might be understood as the remaking of comparative literature after the multicultural debates and the disciplinary critique of Eurocentrism. The term ‘global’ is typically deployed in discussion of contemporary social processes bearing on the modes of production, circulation and reception of literature (and culture, more generally) – hence the significance accorded, as in cultural studies generally, to such concepts as transnationalism, deterritorialisation, diaspora, homogenisation, (post-)modernity, cosmopolitanism, citizenship, and so on.9 Discussants of the new version of ‘world literature’,

8 The underlying premises of this thought-figure are clearly identified by Hirst and Thompson in the opening sentences of their invaluable dissenting study Globalization in Question: ‘[I]t is widely asserted that we live in an era in which the greater part of social life is determined by global processes, in which national cultures, national economies and national borders are dissolving. Central to this perception is the notion of a rapid and recent process of economic globalization. A truly global economy is claimed to have emerged or to be in the process of emerging, in which distinct national economies and, therefore, domestic strategies of national economic management are increasingly irrelevant. The world economy has internationalized in its basic dynamics, it is dominated by uncontrollable market forces, and it has as its principal economic actors and major agents of change truly transnational corporations, that owe allegiance to no nation state and locate wherever in the globe market advantage dictates’ (1996: 1).

by contrast, typically treat ‘globalisation’ not directly but as an underlying determinant at a certain remove – as the sociological pretext or warrant for a fresh engagement with questions of comparative literary method (which is what really characterises the new discussion of ‘world literature’). We might say, in these terms, that ‘world literature’ is what happens to comparative literature when – having, however belatedly, engaged the task of ‘unthinking’ Eurocentrism – it ‘goes global’ (a phrase that one encounters quite frequently, along with the idea of ‘an age of globalisation’). A handy illustration is provided by the advertisement for David Damrosch’s How to Read World Literature in the 2008 Wiley-Blackwell literature catalogue. Damrosch’s book, the catalogue tells us, ‘addresses the unique challenges faced in confronting foreign literature – reading across time and cultures, translated works, and considering the emerging global perspective; it ‘offers readers the tools to think creatively and in an organized way about the great literary works produced around our world’.

We can readily see the ‘postcolonialist’ origins of the discussion of ‘global literature’ in Frederick Buell’s early, but representative, study National Culture and the New Global System (1994). Similarly, we can see the ‘comparativist’ origins of the discussion of ‘world literature’ in Emily Apter’s equally emblematic work The Translation Zone: A New Comparative Literature (2006) – one of whose staple arguments we consider in detail below. Today, however, the discussions of ‘global literature’ and ‘world literature’ are not only often conjoined, they are also pan-disciplinary, extending beyond ‘postcolonial studies’ and ‘comparative literature’ narrowly conceived. Indeed, it is clear that, since the beginning of the new century, the old idea of Weltliteratur – whose specific genealogy can be sketched, as in John Pizer’s succinct survey, from Goethe through Marx and Engels to Auerbach, Said and such contemporary scholars as Sarah Lawall – has been reformulated quite self-consciously to carry the banner for a new, maximally encompassing project that transcends and supersedes the inherited (sub-)disciplinary formations, whether of comparative literature or postcolonial studies or the various ‘national’ literatures (‘English’, ‘French’, ‘Russian’, ‘Japanese’, etc.). Premised on the assumption that the ‘world’ is one, integrated if not of course united – an assumption that had been discouraged during the Cold War, when the opposition between ‘East’ and ‘West’ had prevailed; and not really overturned even by the ‘Three Worlds Theory’ that arose during the

10 See also Bhambra 2007; Dirlik 2002; Gikandi 2001; Krishnaswamy and Hawley 2008; McCallum and Faith 2005; and the essays by Behdad and Cooppan in Loomba et al. 2005. A critical commentary is provided by Brennan 2004.
11 See also Cooppan 2001; Damrosch 2006; Kadir 2004; and many of the essays in Saussy 2006.
12 Exemplary in this regard are Annesley 2006; Dimock and Buell 2007; Gupta 2008; Israel 2004; and Walkowitz 2007.
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Cold War era to challenge that dominant construction\(^\text{14}\) – ‘global’/’world’ literature in its pre-eminent contemporary formulation pushes intrinsically in the directions of commerce and commonality, linkage and connection, articulation and integration, network and system. It thereby distances itself, explicitly or implicitly, from the antecedent lexicon of ‘post-theory, which had been disposed to emphasise not comparison but incommensurability, not commonality but difference, not system but untotalisable fragment, not the potential of translation but rather its relative impossibility, and not antagonism but agonism.

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Our ambition in this book is to resituate the problem of ‘world literature’, considered as a revived category of theoretical enquiry, by pursuing the literary-cultural implications of the theory of combined and uneven development. This theory has a long pedigree in Marxist sociology and political economy and continues to stimulate debate across the social sciences.\(^\text{15}\) But the cultural aspects of Trotsky’s initiating formulation concerning the ‘amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms’ (1967: 432) has received less attention, even as what it highlights draws attention to a central – perhaps the central – arc or trajectory of modern(ist) production in literature and the other arts worldwide; and this aesthetic dynamic is, in turn, complexly related to histories and conceptions of social and political practice. It is in the conjuncture of combined and uneven development, on the one hand, and the recently interrogated and expanded categories of ‘world literature’ and ‘modernism’, on the other, that our project looks for its specific contours. All three of these terms, it seems to us, need to be thought together.

Powerful challenges to traditional ways of doing comparative business have been forthcoming recently from critics such as Pascale Casanova, with her Bourdieu-inflected study of a ‘world republic of letters’ structured by asymmetries of circulation and exchange, and Franco Moretti, whose insistence on the systematicity of world literature borrows explicitly from the language of combined and uneven development as redeployed by world-systems theory. Casanova’s study stresses aesthetic autonomy as a foundational precondition of the literary field; Moretti’s emphasises the heteronomy of literary production to world-economic relations. But both approaches pose a challenge to the received scholarship in the sociology of literature: synthesising the insights of these two lines of thought might enable us to open up a northwest passage in world-literary studies. Certainly, the continuing debates over the cultural implications of globalisation serve as a backdrop for the arguments of both.

\(^\text{15}\) See, for example, Allinson and Anievas 2009; Ashman 2009; Barker 2006; Davidson 2006b; Löwy 2010; Shilliam 2009; and Smith 1990.
and may suggest why, in the early years of the twenty-first century, the relatively old notions of Weltliteratur and combined and uneven development should have emerged as ways of seeking a new materialist basis for a revivified literary comparativism.

One of the landmarks guiding our thinking has been Moretti’s firecracker of an article ‘Conjectures on World Literature’ – witty, down-to-earth, erudite and terrifically ‘good to think’ – which has been scattering sparks and setting off flares ever since it first appeared in New Left Review in 2000. So incendiary has Moretti’s intervention proved, indeed (not only in this single article, of course, but across his recent work as a whole), that it has provoked any number of self-appointed Red Adairs in comparative literature to rush to the scene in an attempt to quiet the conflagration – thus far to little effect (and, necessarily so, we like to think). ‘I will borrow [...] [my] initial hypothesis from the world-system school of economic history,’ Moretti wrote in ‘Conjectures’, for which international capitalism is a system that is simultaneously one, and unequal; with a core, and a periphery (and a semi-periphery) that are bound together in a relationship of growing inequality. One, and unequal: one literature (Weltliteratur, singular, as in Goethe and Marx), or, perhaps better, one world literary system (of inter-related literatures); but a system which is different from what Goethe and Marx had hoped for, because it’s profoundly unequal. (2004: 149–50)

Moretti’s recent work provides us with a rich array of things to discuss: the terms of his appropriation of world-systems theory, for instance; the centrality of narrative prose in what he says about world literature (in general); his promotion of ‘distant reading’ and wilful corollary disavowal of ‘close reading’ (which we suppose is in any event more in the nature of an emphasis – tactical and contingent – than of any categorical argument whose propositions are to be construed in principle). But the formulation just cited strikes us as being indispensable in two immediate respects: insofar as it grasps ‘world literature’ as neither a canon of masterworks nor a mode of reading, but as a system; and insofar as it proposes that this system is structured not on difference but on inequality.

16 Compare Moretti in this respect with Damrosch, who, while rejecting the idea that ‘world literature’ is ‘a set canon of texts’, argues that it is to be understood precisely as ‘a mode of reading’: ‘a form of detached engagement with worlds beyond our own place and time’ (2003: 281). Damrosch’s three-part definition of ‘world literature’ also includes the propositions that ‘world literature is an elliptical refraction of national literatures’ and that ‘world literature is writing that gains in translation’. See also Vilashini Cooppan: ‘[w]orld literature, as I tell my students, is not something you are given in full or get by proxy. Not a pre-packaged canon that differs from the traditional one only in its inclusion of a handful of unfamiliar names. Rather, world literature is a way you learn to think, a mode in which you learn to read, and a collective agreement you make to lose something in translation in order to gain something in transformation’ (2004: 30).
The idea of ‘system’ is then one of the primary building blocks of our theory. The term is not treated in Raymond Williams’s *Keywords*, where the associated term, ‘structure’, is explored instead – primarily a noun of process in the fifteenth century, Williams explains, but already by the eighteenth century marked by its emphasis on ‘a particular and complex organization of relations, often at very deep levels’ (1976: 253–59). But we construe ‘system’ similarly, as being characterised by vertical and horizontal integration, connection and interconnection, structurality and organisation, internal differentiation, a hierarchy of constitutive elements governed by specific ‘logics’ of determination and relationality. ‘World-system’ represents a further elaboration on this. Following Braudel (1985), Wallerstein (1974, 1980, 1989), and others, we use the term to indicate a bounded social universe – whose functioning is more or less (that is to say, relatively) autonomous, more or less integrated. In general, ‘world-systems’, in these terms, are not coexistent with the ‘world’ as such, and are hence not ‘global’ or ‘globally dispersed’ systems. The significant exception is the modern capitalist ‘world-system’, one of the indices of whose historical unprecedentedness consists precisely in the fact that it is a *world-system* that is also, uniquely and for the first time, a *world* system.

We propose, in these terms, to define ‘world literature’ as the literature of the world-system – of the modern capitalist world-system, that is. That, baldly, is our hypothesis, stated in the form of a *lex parsimoniae*. Perhaps, therefore, we should begin to speak of ‘world-literature’ with a hyphen, derived from that of ‘world-system’. The protocol commits us to arguing for a single world-literary system, rather than for world-literary systems. Here too we follow Moretti – but also Fredric Jameson, whose argument for a ‘singular modernity’ is – for reasons that we will discuss below – to be vastly preferred over the various theorisations, especially in the field of postcolonial studies, of ‘alternative modernities’. Also relevant in this context is Casanova’s preference for the terms ‘world republic of letters’ and ‘international literary space’ over that of ‘world literature’, since she wants to make clear that what is at issue in her mobilisation of the category of ‘world’ is not simply all the literary writing that happens to exist in the world. To think of ‘world literature’ as the corpus of all the literature in the world would be strictly nugatory or useless. Moretti had written that

> World literature cannot be literature, bigger; what we are already doing, just more of it. It has to be different. The categories have to be different. ‘It is not the “actual” interconnection of “things”’, Max Weber wrote, ‘but the *conceptual* interconnection of *problems* which define the scope of the various sciences. A new “science” emerges where a new problem is pursued by a new method’. That’s the point: world literature is not an object, it’s a problem, and a problem that asks for a new critical method; and no-one has ever found a method by just reading more texts. That’s not how theories come into being; they need a leap, a wager – a hypothesis – to get started. (2004: 149)
Casanova adds to this: in raising the question of ‘world literature’, she writes,

it is not enough to geographically enlarge the corpus of works needing to
be studied, or to import economic theories of globalization into the literary
universe – still less to try to provide an impossibly exhaustive enumeration
of the whole of world literary production. It is necessary instead to change
our ordinary way of looking at literary phenomena. (2004: xi)

The ‘central hypothesis’ of her own book, she then proposes,

is that there exists a ‘literature-world,’ a literary universe relatively
independent of the everyday world and its political divisions, whose
boundaries and operational laws are not reducible to those of ordinary
political space. Exerted within this international literary space are relations
of force and a violence peculiar to them – in short, a literary domination
whose forms I have tried to describe while taking care not to confuse this
domination with the forms of political domination, even though it may in
many respects be dependent on them. (2004: xii)

Casanova is here building on Bourdieu’s resonant observation, at the beginning
of Distinction, that ‘[t]here is an economy of cultural goods, but it has a specific
logic’ (Bourdieu 1984: 1). This insight needs to be followed where it leads, and
Casanova duly goes down this road in The World Republic of Letters, as such
other Bourdieu-inspired theorists as Sarah Brouillette, Anna Boschetti, Gisèle
Sapiro and Michel Hockx have also been doing in their recent work.17

Our own approach to the question of world-literature is posed slightly
differently from this. Casanova is careful to note that the ‘literature-world’s
independence from ‘the everyday world and its political divisions’ is only
relative. ‘[l]nternational forms of literary dependency are to some extent
correlated with the structure of international political domination’, she
acknowledges; ‘literary relations of power are forms of political relations of
power’ (2004: 81). But she nevertheless seems to us to abstract too strongly
from the world of politics: she tends to treat the ‘literature-world’ and the
‘everyday world’ a little too much as parallel universes, with the result that
questions concerning their intersection – questions as to the terms of their
relationship – find themselves being deferred in her study. Since we are
suggesting that world-literature be conceived precisely through its mediation
by and registration of the modern world-system, our focus falls more directly
than Casanova’s on such questions. But our approach differs also from the
work (much of it, again, enormously important) of scholars working on the
political economy of culture, who have sought to identify the encroaching
capitalisation of cultural production – that is to say, the commodification
of culture, as product, especially intensive in the latter half of the twentieth
century – the tendency to monopoly in all sectors of the culture industry,

17 See Brouillette 2007 and the articles by Boschetti, Hockx and Sapiro in a special
2012 issue of Paragraph, devoted to field theory in literature.
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and also the dynamics of cultural imperialism (of what has been called ‘Coca-colonisation’), in terms of which not only monopoly products but also regimes of production and patterns of consumption hegemonic in the core capitalist zones are imposed elsewhere, across the international division of labour.18

To describe the world literary system as ‘one, and unequal’ is to reactivate the theory of combined and uneven development. The theory originated in the work of Engels, Lenin and, especially, Trotsky, although it is Fredric Jameson’s more recent deployment of it that Moretti evidently has in mind. An appreciation of the ‘complex and differential temporality’ of the capitalist mode of production, ‘in which episodes or eras were discontinuous from each other, and heterogeneous within themselves’, is, as Perry Anderson has argued (1984: 101), already observable in Marx’s mature writings from the late 1840s onwards.19 In these writings there is an awareness of the fact that even within capitalist or capitalising social formations, vast rural populations continued to ground the persistence not only of earlier economic conditions, but also of social relations, cultural practices and psychic dispositions.

This identification of unevenness, a staple of Marx’s and Lenin’s work, is then amplified in Trotsky’s writings of the 1930s, in which, on the basis of his consideration first of conditions in Russia in 1905 and subsequently of those in China in 1925–27, he formulated an elaborated theory of ‘uneven and combined development’, by way of analysing the effects of the imposition of capitalism on cultures and societies hitherto un- or only sectorally capitalised. In these contexts – properly understood as imperialist, as Trotsky noted – the imposed capitalist forces of production and class relations tend not to supplant (or are not allowed to supplant) but to be conjoined forcibly

18 See Calabrese and Sparks 2004, whose edited volume features work by several of the best-known scholars in this particular branch of the sociology of culture.

19 In this sense, the famous passages from the Communist Manifesto that seem to evoke a transformation that is as abrupt as it is total are potentially misleading: ‘All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient prejudices and opinions are swept aside, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air’, etc. (Marx and Engels 1998: 38). But just as readings of such passages in the Manifesto as being infused with enthusiasm for capitalism typically ‘forget’ that the writings of Marx and Engels are notable also for recording and protesting the violence of expropriation, the systematised misery and servitude that the imposition of capitalist social relations visited on populations everywhere, so too it is necessary to insist that the authors were well aware of the fact that the ‘capitalist revolution’ was not a once-and-for-all event, but rather a sprawling, bloody and erratic historical process, protracted over centuries.
with pre-existing forces and relations. The outcome, he wrote, is a contradictory ‘amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms’ – an urban proletariat working in technologically advanced industries existing side by side with a rural population engaged in subsistence farming; industrial plants built alongside ‘villages of wood and straw’; and peasants ‘thrown into the factory cauldron snatched directly from the plow’ (1967: 432). The theory of ‘combined and uneven development’ was therefore devised to describe a situation in which capitalist forms and relations exist alongside ‘archaic forms of economic life’ and pre-existing social and class relations.

This general idea has, inevitably, been important to socialist and left liberation movements since the 1930s, as well as underpinning a sizeable sociological literature. Thus Liu Kang (1998, 2000), who argues, in writing about the imposition of capitalism on China in the nineteenth century, that even as the latest techniques in capitalist production, transport, commerce and finance were being introduced in centres like Shanghai and Beijing, over which the Euro-American powers exercised military and political control, the agents of imperialist intervention were actively propping up an archaic landholding system, and supporting landlords, officials, militarists and comprador elites in prolonging prior forms of social organisation. In discussing colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa, similarly, Mahmood Mamdani (1996) points out that while the colonial powers coercively imposed new modes of production and capitalist social relations, they typically sought at the same time to buttress traditional hierarchies, forms and outlooks, and to encourage the survival of ethnically based local power, ‘tribal’ divisions and those indigenous cultural habits deemed conducive to promoting social ‘stability’. And in their analyses of South Asia, a long line of historians have identified the dynamics of British imperial policy in the Victorian era as consisting precisely in simultaneous and contradictory investment in industrial ‘modernisation’ and ‘archaic’ feudal (or semi-feudal) political and social structures.

The significance of the theory of combined and uneven development has been less often registered in the humanities than in the social sciences. But it receives a powerful revisionary elaboration in the work of Fredric Jameson, where it appears as nothing less than a template for any consideration of modern culture, whether in the metropoles or at the peripheries of the world-system. Insisting that it can only be conceptualised adequately through reference to world-wide capitalism (2002: 13), Jameson understands modernity

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20 In addition to the material cited in fn. 15, above, see especially the work of Justin Rosenberg (1996, 2005, 2006, 2007), who revisits and reconstructs Trotsky’s conception, partly by way of debunking ‘globalisation theory’. See also Rosenberg’s exchange with Alex Callinicos in Callinicos and Rosenberg 2008.

21 On the invention of ‘tribe’ as a means of colonial governance, see Mamdani 2013.

22 See Kaiwar: ‘In the colonies, vestiges of older social relations were maintained to ensure a degree of dispersed social control and governance on the cheap, whose main aim was resource removal and market monopolisation’ (2014: 41).
as representing something like the time-space sensorium corresponding to capitalist *modernisation*. In this sense, it is, like the capitalist world-system itself, a singular phenomenon. But far from implying that modernity therefore assumes the same form everywhere, as Jameson has sometimes mistakenly taken it to suggest, this formulation in fact implies that it is everywhere irreducibly specific. Modernity might be understood as the way in which capitalist social relations are ‘lived’ – different in every given instance for the simple reason that no two social instances are the same.

Jameson emphasises both the *singularity* of modernity as a social form and its *simultaneity*. In the idea of *singularity* we hear the echo of a hundred years of dialectical materialist discussion of totality, system and universality – as, for example, in Henri Lefebvre’s great essay ‘What Is Modernity?’ Explicitly evoking the theory of combined and uneven development, Lefebvre ‘insist[s] upon the need for a general concept of modernity which would be valid for all countries, social and political regimes, and cultures’, while distinguishing between ‘the general and the worldwide’ (1995: 188) – the former tendential, the latter empirical, we take it. The concept of *simultaneity*, meanwhile, Jameson derives from Ernst Bloch’s ostensibly oxymoronic formula *Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen* ['simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous']. Modernity is to be understood as governed always – that is to say, definitionally – by *unevenness*, the historically determinate ‘coexistence’, in any given place and time, ‘of realities from radically different moments of history – handicrafts alongside the great cartels, peasant fields with the Krupp factories or the Ford plant in the distance’ (1995: 307). The multiple modes in and through which this ‘coexistence’ manifests itself – the multiple forms of appearance of unevenness – are to be understood as being connected, as being governed by a socio-historical logic of combination, rather than as being contingent and asystematic.

Jameson speaks then of the singularity of modernity, of modernity as a globally dispersed general ‘situation’. ‘Modernity’ does not mark the relationship between some formations (that are ‘modern’) and others (that are not ‘modern’, or not yet so). So it is not a matter of pitting France against Mali, say, or New York City against Elk City, Oklahoma. Uneven development is not a characteristic of ‘backward’ formations only. Middlesbrough and North East Lincolnshire are in the United Kingdom as well as London and the Home Counties – and London itself, of course, is among the more radically unevenly developed cities in the world. To grasp the nettle here involves recognising that capitalist development does not smooth away but rather *produces* unevenness, systematically and as a matter of course. Combined and uneven: the face of modernity is not worn exclusively by the ‘futuristic’ skyline of the Pudong District in Shanghai or the Shard and Gherkin buildings...
in London; just as emblematic of modernity as these are the favelas of Rocinha and Jacarezinho in Rio and the slums of Dharavi in Bombay and Makoko in Lagos, the ship graveyards of Nouadhibou and the Aral Sea, the vast, deindustrialised wastelands north, east, south and west, and the impoverished and exhausted rural hinterlands. These constitute the necessary flipside of the mirroring opacities of a postmodern topos like the Portman Bonaventura Hotel, famously analysed by Jameson in his ‘Postmodernism’ essay. One liability of this otherwise continuously suggestive survey – or at least of its reception – has been a tendency to conflate its analysis of a dominant cultural logic with a descriptive account of ‘culture’ in general. The result has been to encourage acceptance or dismissal of its synoptic generalisations without reference to the second half of Jameson’s argument, its dialectical complement as it were, in his widely deprecated essay ‘Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism’. Unless these torn halves are brought into relation, Jameson’s theses lose their crucial emphasis on the structural connectedness between a cultural dominant expressive of the completed triumph of commodity logic and a condition in which this triumph is not only incomplete but arrested in a kind of freeze frame. Modernity is neither a chronological nor a geographical category. It is not something that happens – or even that happens first – in ‘the west’ and to which others can subsequently gain access; or that happens in cities rather than in the countryside; or that, on the basis of a deep-set sexual division of labour, men tend to exemplify in their social practice rather than women. Capitalist modernisation entails development, yes – but this ‘development’ takes the forms also of the development of underdevelopment, of maldevelopment and dependent development.\(^\text{24}\) If urbanisation, for instance, is clearly part of the story, what happens in the countryside as a result is equally so. The idea of some sort of ‘achieved’ modernity, in which unevenness would have been superseded, harmonised, vanquished or ironed out is radically unhistorical. Capitalism, as Harry Harootunian has written, has no really normal state but one of constant expansion; and expansion requires the permanent production of excess, surplus, in order for it to survive. Part of the price paid for continual expansion is the production of permanent unevenness, permanent imbalance between various sectors of the social formations, the process by which some areas must be sacrificed for the development of others, such as the countryside for the city […] the colony for the metropole, or even one city for another. (2000b: xv)\(^\text{25}\)

\(^{24}\) Thus Claudio Lomnitz, who – writing with reference to Latin America’s ‘unusually long history of national independence’ – observes that the subcontinent’s ‘long republican history made the tension among capitalist development, modernization, and modernity especially evident, and indeed it led the dependency theorists of the 1960s to puncture the development narrative being promoted on the capitalist side of the Cold War divide, by insisting that underdevelopment was not a lack of development but rather a specific kind of development’ (2012: 349).

\(^{25}\) See the commentary in Pratt 2002 and Young 2012.
This formulation stands as a compelling repudiation of the various recent attempts to pluralise the concept of modernity through the evocation of ‘alternative’ modernities. Inasmuch as these invariably derive from an initial assumption as to the ‘western’ provenance of modernity – rather than situating it in the context of capitalism as a world-system – they are both misguided and unnecessary. Of course, if one believes that modernity is a ‘western’ phenomenon, it is only possible to understand its global dispersal in terms of the ‘universalisation’ of the ‘west’ – to be celebrated or, as in the avowedly anti-Eurocentric conception currently so influential in postcolonial studies, deplored as imperialistic. As Harootunian has argued in outlining his own opposition to such ‘fashionable descriptions’ as “alternative modernities”, “divergent modernities”, “competing modernities,” and “retroactive modernities,” to postulate ‘the existence of an “original” that was formulated in the “West”’ is inevitably to suppose that the form of appearance of ‘modernity’ elsewhere must be both belated and derivative – ‘a series of “copies” and lesser inflections’ (2000a: 163). No wonder then that theorists who view modernity in these terms and yet are committed to the critique of Eurocentrism should want to argue for ‘alternative’ modernities!

Against this postcolonialist line of thought – which seeks to make an end run around the orthodox Eurocentric conception of modernity as a gift to be given or withheld by the capitalist homelands, but succeeds only in ratifying this baleful conception – however, the account elaborated by Jameson (and Harootunian) emphasises modernity’s singularity and global simultaneity, while insisting that singularity here does not obviate internal heterogeneity and that simultaneity does not preclude unevenness or marked difference. Harootunian speaks, thus, of ‘modernity as a specific cultural form and consciousness of lived historical time that differs according to social forms and practices’, an idea that allows for ‘differing inflections of the modern’ (2000a: 62). In these terms, the specific modes of appearance of modernity in different times and places, or the representations of them in works of literature – St Petersburg in the 1870s, say, Dublin in 1904, rural Mississippi in the 1930s, a village on a bend in the Nile in the Sudan in the 1960s, Bombay in 1975, Glasgow in the 1990s – ought to be thought about not as ‘alternative’ but as ‘coeval or, better yet, peripheral modernities (as long as peripheral is understood only as a relationship to the centers of capitalism[…])}, in which all societies shared a common reference provided by global capital and its requirements’ (2000a: 62–63). If modernity is understood as the way in which capitalism is ‘lived’ – *wherever* in the world-system it is lived – then ‘however a society develops’, its modernity is coeval with other modernities, ‘is simply

26 The case for ‘alternative’ modernities has been advanced most notably by Gaonkar 1999. See also Gaonkar 2001. For a critique, see Lazarus and Varma 2008.
27 This line of thought is represented in the work of Dipesh Chakrabarty, Ashis Nandy, Timothy Mitchell, David Scott and Tsenay Serequeberhan, among others. Powerful critiques are marshalled in Chibber 2013 and Kaiwar 2014.
taking place at the same time as other modernities’ (Harootunian 2000b: xvi). This should also challenge our uncritical habit of conflating epistemological and chronological primacy (‘modernity happened in Europe first and best, and then in other places’, etc.), and get us into the habit of systemic thinking in terms of non-linear conjunctions. Additionally, such a view suggests that the only plausible usage of the idea of ‘alternative modernity’ is to signify a future, post-capitalist (i.e., socialist) modernity (a case for which is made in Liu Kang 1998).

We take our cue, in this book, from this reconceptualisation of the notion of modernity, which involves de-linking it from the idea of the ‘west’ and yoking it to that of the capitalist world-system. However, our central concern lies less with the politico-philosophical category of modernity as such than with its literary correlates – we are chiefly interested in the literary registration and encoding of modernity as a social logic. We are operating therefore with a preliminary tripartite conceptualisation – modern world-system/modernity/world-literature – in terms of which the latter is understood in the broadest sense as the literature of the modern capitalist world-system. We understand capitalism to be the substrate of world-literature (or, to borrow the phrase that Nicholas Brown uses as the subtitle of his 2005 study Utopian Generations, its ‘political horizon’); and we understand modernity to constitute world-literature’s subject and form – modernity is both what world-literature indexes or is ‘about’ and what gives world-literature its distinguishing formal characteristics. Questions of periodisation inevitably arise here. If we follow Wallerstein and others in speaking of the instantiation of capitalism as a world-system around 1500, it nevertheless seems clear that it is only in the ‘long’ nineteenth century, and then as the direct result of British and European colonialism, that we can speak both of the capitalisation of the world and of the full worlding of capital. World-literature, as we plan to deploy the concept, would then presumably be understood as a development of the past 200 years, though its formal conditions of possibility would have begun to be established some three centuries earlier.

28 ‘To understand China’s modernity or its alternative modernity, overdetermined by complex and multiple structural relations, the centrality of revolution and political struggle in the field of cultural production must be acknowledged. China’s alternative modernity can be best grasped as an ongoing process replete with contradictions: its revolution aiming at constructing socialism in a Third World, unindustrialized economy is alternative to the Western capitalist modernity in political and economic senses, and its emphasis on cultural revolution is also alternative in a cultural sense. But Chinese revolution is an integral part of modernity that is at once fragmentary and unifying, heterogeneous and homogenizing. Its project of modernity is as incomplete as its vision is unfulfilled’ (Liu 1998: 168).
Later in this book we will explore a selection of modern-era fictions in which the potential of our method of comparativism seems to us to be most dramatically highlighted. In our analysis, we will treat the novel paradigmatically, not exemplarily, as a literary form in which combined and uneven development is manifested with particular salience, due in no small part to its fundamental association with the rise of capitalism and its status in peripheral and semi-peripheral societies as an import which is in Jameson’s words ‘as much a component of modernization as the importation of automobiles’ (2012: 476). The peculiar plasticity and hybridity of the novel form enables it to incorporate not only multiple literary levels, genres and modes, but also other non-literary and archaic cultural forms – so that, for example, realist elements might be mixed with more experimental modes of narration, or older literary devices might be reactivated in juxtaposition with more contemporary frames, in order to register a bifurcated or ruptured sensorium of the space-time of the (semi-)periphery. A brilliant summary instance of such patterning is to be found in an early passage from *South of Nowhere*, a novel by the Portuguese author António Lobo Antunes, which ought to be as well known as Coetzee’s *Dusklands*, but isn’t, just as Multatuli’s *Max Havelaar* ought to be as well known as Conrad’s *Lord Jim* or *Heart of Darkness*, but isn’t. ‘Understand’, writes Antunes’s narrator,

*I am a man from a narrow old country, from a stifling city shimmering in the reflections of its tile façades. Even the sky is cluttered with flocks of pigeons. My sense of space here is also determined by a view of the river flowing into the sea but pressed in by two wedges of land. I was born and raised in a dwarfed crochet universe […] This universe forbade me the eroticism of the ninth canto of the *Lusiads* and taught me daintily to wave good-bye with my handkerchief instead of simply taking my leave. It policed my spirit, in sum, and reduced my concerns to the problems of spindles, to the hourly calculations of the office clerk whose flight to the Indies went only so far as licking stamps at the Formica-topped tables of the post office.*

(Antunes 1983: 28)

In light of the novel’s adeptness at mixing and repurposing narrative modalities, familiar from the analyses of Lukács and Bakhtin, we can draw attention to a further contemporary crisis pressing the case for a reconsideration of world-literature: that of cultural forms. By this we refer not to the historical opposition between mass, popular and elite cultures, terms now outmoded by the completed triumph of cultural commodification everywhere. Instead, the very processes driving the changes in the contemporary world-system have led to a breakdown of traditional boundaries demarcating genres and media, such that world-literary space is now characterised by new forms of convergence, synergy, competition and displacement. We want to suggest that the novel, and particularly the experience of reading and writing novels, has changed irrevocably within
an altered mediascape in which diverse cultural forms, including new and newly recalibrated media, compete for representational space and power. The consequence has been that hybrid genres and interactive platforms have retrospectively altered our understanding of the historical development of the novel, prompting reappraisal of its strategies and affinities in light of an expanding communicational economy.

To grasp world-literature as the literary registration of modernity under the sign of combined and uneven development, we must attend to its modes of spatio-temporal compression, its juxtaposition of asynchronous orders and levels of historical experience, its barometric indications of invisible forces acting from a distance on the local and familiar – as these manifest themselves in literary forms, genres and aesthetic strategies. Any typology of combined and uneven development will offer a catalogue of effects or motifs at the level of narrative form: discrepant encounters, alienation effects, surreal cross-linkages, unidentified freakish objects, unlikely likenesses across barriers of language, period, territory – the equivalent of umbrellas meeting sewing machines on (animated) dissecting tables. These are, in essence, dialectical images of combined unevenness requiring not just simple decoding but creative application. Consider the opening lines of Earl Lovelace’s *Salt*:

Two months after they hanged his brother Gregoire, king of the Dreadnoughts band, and Louis and Nanton and Man Man, the other three leaders of African secret societies, who Hislop the governor claimed to be ringleaders of an insurrection that had a plan, according to the testimony of a mad white woman, to use the cover of the festivities of Christmas day to massacre the white and free coloured people of the island, Jo-Jo's great-grandfather, Guinea John, with his black jacket on and a price of two hundred pounds sterling on his head, made his way to the East Coast, mounted the cliff at Manzanilla, put two corn cobs under his armpits and flew away to Africa, taking with him the mysteries of levitation and flight, leaving the rest of his family still in captivity mourning over his selfishness, everybody putting in their mouth and saying, ‘You see! You see! That is why Blackpeople children doomed to suffer: their own parents refuse to pass on the knowledge that they know to them.’ (1996: 3)

We might then see the ‘accordionising’ or ‘telescoping’ function of combined and uneven development as a form of time travel within the same space, a spatial bridging of unlike times – in Lefebvre’s sense, the production of untimely space – that leads from the classic forms of nineteenth-century realism to the speculative methodologies of today’s global science fiction.

Our play with the Jamesonian triptych of modernisation/modernity/modernism leads us to believe that the temporal parameters of its third term, modernism, whose relation to world-literature it must be part of our work to specify, need to be set back rather earlier than they conventionally are, to incorporate the great wave of writing from the mid-nineteenth century
Combined and Uneven Development

onwards that is construable precisely – as in Marshall Berman’s reading (1983), for instance – as an encoding of the capitalisation of the world, its tangible transformation at both of the levels – ‘economic civilization’ and ‘material civilization’ – specified by Braudel in his magisterial study Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century (1985). We need to do away once and for all with the still-dominant understandings of modernism that situate it both in terms of writerly technique (self-conscious, anti- or at least post-realist, etc.) and as a Western European phenomenon, whose claims to being the literature of modernity are underscored precisely by this geo-political provenance. The discussion of later and differently situated modernisms is of course well under way in contemporary literary scholarship.

But we are interested in setting the work written by writers celebrated as ‘modernist’ alongside coeval and even antecedent work by writers from peripheral and semi-peripheral locations – Pérez Galdós, Machado de Assis, José Rizal, Hristo Botev, Knut Hamsun and Lu Xun, for instance – writers seldom considered in this context because critics have rarely thought through the full implications of the link between modernism, modernity and modernisation.

It is worth stressing that even if the logic of what Marx identified as the commodity form is not solely reducible to the processes of reification and commodification, it lies at the heart of combined and uneven development. We must take stock of the curious salience of the commodity fetish in the work of many metropolitan writers in the mid-nineteenth century, at a point when commodification achieved sufficient density to become the organising principle of society and insinuate itself into the fabric of everyday life to become, for the estranged perspective, visible – perhaps for the first time – as the uncanny coloniser of consciousness and the puzzling substrate of the new bourgeois ‘common sense’. There is perhaps a twenty-five-year window, from 1835 to 1860, when this set of problems takes centre stage in such writers and artists as Dickens, Baudelaire, Hoffmann, Hawthorne, Poe, Grandville and Daumier – and then disappears beneath accreted layers of normalised perception. (Perhaps it is this latter development – the normalisation of commodity logic – that determines the emergence of naturalism?) We might then speculate that this ‘window’ reappears whenever and wherever commodification installs itself as an unfamiliar logic – especially if we bear in mind Wallerstein’s repeated emphasis (1996) that the production of capital entails ‘the commodification of everything’: ‘commodification’ is a never-ending

29 ‘[M]any works written around the First World War struck me as being part of a much more extensive history (from, say, 1800 to 2000), of which they constituted merely one moment. A moment of great inventiveness and complexity, to be sure – the high point of the whole process, if you like – but no longer an autonomous, coherent reality demanding a specific category’ (Moretti 1996: 3).
rather than a once-and-for-all process; it ramifies both extensively – through the ceaseless development and conquering of new markets – and intensively – through the equally ceaseless quantification of quality. So – again – this is not a story that moves from ‘west’ to ‘east’: what is normalised as commodity logic in the time of Dickens finds itself being estranged by the new eco-semiotic regimes of subsequent eras.

In these terms our project involves remappings of both the history of modernism and the intertwined trajectories of world-literary wave formations. Theodor Adorno has already given us a reading of modernism as the (modern) culture that says ‘no’ to modernity. His argument, more precisely, is that modernism ought to be conceptualised as a cultural formulation of resistance to the prevailing – indeed, the hegemonic – modes of capitalist modernisation in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe. Hence the ‘modernisms’ of, for example, Ibsen and Dostoevsky, Breton and Woolf, Kafka and MacDiarmid – all hostile, in their various ways, to ‘industrial civilisation’ and its objectifying (or desubjectifying) social thrust. Provided we are prepared, for the sake of argument, to abstract from the precise determinants, contours and coordinates of this ‘modernist’ projection, the Adornian conception is relatively elastic. It can readily be extended forwards in time to apply to such writers of the latter half of the twentieth century as Lorine Niedecker and Geoffrey Hill, John Berger and Gloria Naylor, Elfrieda Jelinek and Jose Saramago, Roberto Bolaño and Nadine Gordimer, and also backwards – certainly as far as Romanticism, say, and such obvious figures as Percy and Mary Shelley, Hölderlin, Heine and Mickiewicz. But it can also, and notwithstanding Adorno’s own deep-seated Eurocentrism, be extended geographically – or rather geo-politically – to incorporate such writers as Lu Xun and Lao She, Aimé Césaire, Gabriela Mistral and Miguel Asturias, Saadat Hasan Manto, Ismat Chughtai and Mahasweta Devi, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Nawal El Saadawi and Abdelrahman Munif, in whose work the dissenting registration of capitalist modernisation takes the historically unforgoable form of a critique of imperialism.

Certainly it is the case, as Nicholas Brown has pointed out in his consideration of the relation between modernist (that is to say, ‘Euro-modernist’) and independence-era African literatures, that both of these formations revolve around and are animated by the same world-historical process. ‘The mere fact that European imperialism names a key moment in the spread of capitalism as a global economic system already implies a certain baseline of universality’, Brown writes, before cogently drawing the key implication that ‘there can be no question of merely applying the methodological norms developed for [the] one literature [‘Euro-modernist’] to the texts of the other [African]’. Rather, what is required is to ‘reconstellate […] modernism and African literature in such a way as to make them both comprehensible within a single framework within which neither will look the same. This framework

31 In this connection, see Löwy and Sayre 2001.
Adorno understood modernism as being imbued with a (more or less explicit, more or less self-conscious) criticality. But his emphasis on dissidence – the identification of modernism with resistance – is too categorical for us to adapt without qualification to our thinking about world-literature. The Adornian conception issues in a hyper-canon, comprising expressionism, serialism, Beckett’s drama and hardly anything else: it notoriously ignores the celebratory wing of fascist modernism (as in Marinetti) and the contradictory juxtapositions of reactionary plots and vanguard formal structures (as in *The Waste Land*, for instance). In proposing a definition of world-literature as literature that ‘registers’ the (modern capitalist) world-system, we, by contrast, are not suggesting that only those works that self-consciously define themselves in opposition to capitalist modernity be considered world-literary – nor even that world-literary works are those that stage a coded or formally mediated resistance to capitalist modernity. As we understand it, the literary ‘registration’ of the world-system does not (necessarily) involve criticality or dissent. Our assumption is rather that the effectivity of the world-system will necessarily be discernible in any modern literary work, since the world-system exists unforsoably as the matrix within which all modern literature takes shape and comes into being. Obviously this ‘registration’ of the world-system will be more self-evidently marked, more transparently at issue, in some works than in others. The fictions that we have selected for analysis below, for instance, seem to us to plot with particular clarity and resonance the landscape of the world-system: its hills and valleys, nodes and contours, lines and textures, balance and compaction. But it would be possible to elucidate the world-literary dimensions of any modern work, even one that set out

32 In a subsequent passage, Brown notes that such a ‘reconstellation’ would involve a deconstructive demystification of the very ideas of ‘western’ and ‘non-western’ literature: ‘The question’, as he puts it, ‘would not be whether the most vital writing of the second half of the twentieth century was produced by Third World writers: it was. The question is rather what we mean by “literature” and what we mean by “West,” what agendas reside in those words and whether they have any meaning at all […] What we usually call “non-Western” literature is rarely the expression […] of some other culture, if by that we understand some other set of norms and rules that has developed along its own internal logic; rather, it must be thought of in terms of the positions that economically, ethnically, sexually, and geographically differentiated subjects occupy within the single culture of global capitalism that has more or less ruthlessly subsumed what was once a genuinely multicultural globe.

All of this should be obvious, even if our entire mainstream multicultural discourse is built around its explicit denial. But the recognition of what multiculturalism denies should not be taken to signify a celebration of, or acquiescence to, the power of some henceforth inescapable ‘Western’ tradition. Indeed, the capitalist monoculture dissimulated in multicultural discourse is not strictly speaking “Western” at all’ (2005: 6).
very purposefully (as does Ian McEwan’s On Chesil Beach, for example) to chart strictly private and socially incommensurable consciousness, experience or memory.

Here, too, Fredric Jameson’s work is particularly important to us, since he has been concerned centrally with the relations between capitalist modernity and literary form. Thus while his essay on Third World literature has regretfully received attention only because of its claims about ‘national allegory’—claims which in our view have been tendentiously misunderstood—we find remarkable and illuminating his commentary in that essay on the ‘crisis of representation’ in non-metropolitan cultures that were, and remain, ‘locked in a life-and-death struggle with first-world cultural imperialism […]’ a cultural struggle that is itself a reflection of the economic situation of such areas in their penetration by various stages of capitalism, or as it is sometimes euphemistically termed, of modernization’ (1986a: 68). The proposition that the violence entailed in the imposition of capitalism in such societies made for the ‘generic discontinuities’ of the literatures subsequently produced (83) receives elaboration also in ‘On Magic Realism in Film’, another of Jameson’s essays addressing Third World cultures – published, like the ‘Third-World Literature’ essay, in 1986 – in which he provisionally proposes that magic realism be considered as ‘a formal mode […] constitutively dependent on a type of historical raw material in which disjunction is structurally present’, and in which the content

betrays the overlap or the coexistence of precapitalist with nascent capitalist or technological features. In such a view […] the organizing category of magic realist film […] is one of modes of production, and in particular, of a mode of production still locked in conflict with traces of the older mode […] [T]he articulated superposition of whole layers of the past within the present (Indian or pre-Columbian realities, the colonial era […] is the formal precondition for the emergence of this new narrative style. (1986b: 311)

34 We take it that the ‘crisis of representation’ to which Jameson refers here is that of working simultaneously within and against imposed cultural forms, of deploying these without thereby subordinating oneself to their received ideological valences: in taking up the form of the novel, for instance, ‘Third World’ writers sought to appropriate it, to make it over or ‘refunction’ it, by way of turning it into an instrument through which their own very distinct cultural and political aspirations could be expressed.
35 See also the argument in the concluding section of Jameson’s book on postmodernism that modernism itself must be seen as ‘uniquely corresponding to an uneven moment of social development’, in which there is a ‘peculiar overlap of future and past’, such that ‘the resistance of archaic feudal structures to irresistible modernizing tendencies’ is evident (1995: 307, 309). Jameson illustrates this
Our contention is that the features of ‘combined unevenness’ that Jameson identifies in magical realism are evident also (although not in quite the same ways) in other modern(ist) literary forms: primitivism, early surrealism, Kafka’s supernatural naturalism, even critical realism. In a footnote to the ‘Third-World Literature’ essay, Jameson furthermore suggests – decisively, for our purposes – that this way of thinking about combined unevenness demands a new type of literary comparativism: namely the ‘comparison, not of the individual texts, which are formally and culturally very different from each other, but of the concrete situations from which such texts spring and to which they constitute distinct responses’ (1986a: 86–87, fn. 5).

The premise of ‘combined unevenness’ developed here repudiates at a stroke the idea – linked, presumably, to the political mantra that ‘globalisation’ is a tide lifting all boats – that the ‘world’ of world-literature is a ‘level playing field’, a more or less free space in which texts from around the globe can circulate, intersect and converse with one another. It is remarkable how pervasive this idea of a ‘level playing field’ is in contemporary literary critical discourse. Particularly among those committed to a reconstructed model of comparative literature there is discernible a tendency to suppose that ‘after’ the multiculturalism debates and the disciplinary critiques of Eurocentrism and Orientalism, comparative literature was now finally free to become genuinely, authentically comparative – a supposition perfectly encapsulated in the title of an article by Jonathan Culler: ‘Comparative Literature, at Last’ (2006). Thus Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, who writes that it has been her ‘long-standing sense that the logical consequences of our loosely defined discipline [i.e., comparative literature] were, surely, to include the open-ended possibility of studying all literatures, with linguistic rigor and historical savvy. A level playing field, so to speak’ (2003: 13). Inasmuch as it has elsewhere been one of Spivak’s signature gestures to deconstruct particularisms that masquerade as universalisms, and to draw out their ideological presuppositions, it is difficult to appreciate the grounds on which, here, she chooses to subscribe to the idealist fantasy that a ‘level playing field’ is a ‘logical consequence’ of

36 He adds that comparative analysis of this kind ‘would necessarily include such features as the interrelationship of social classes, the role of intellectuals, the dynamics of language and writing, the configuration of traditional forms, the relationship to western influences, the development of urban experience and money, and so forth’ (Jameson 1986a: 86–87, fn. 5).
comparative literature as a discipline. In our view, comparative literature – in the Euro-American academy, at least – has pretty much always commenced from an unalloyed and irrevocable Eurocentric particularism. In *Death of a Discipline*, however, Spivak holds out an olive branch to the discipline. What she is ‘advocating’, she says, is not ‘the politicization of the discipline’, but ‘a depoliticization of the politics of hostility toward a politics of friendship to come’. To the extent that we understand them, we view these tactics as deeply misconceived. For it seems to us that what is called for is precisely not the ‘depoliticization of the politics of hostility toward a politics of friendship to come’, but, on the contrary, the active *politicisation* of the discussion on the basis of a steady and thoroughgoing *critique* of comparative literature as a disciplinary projection, both in the past and as it continues to exist today.

Some contemporary comparativists have wanted to project the ‘level playing field’ gesture backwards in time, to propose that the deepest intrinsic tendency of comparative literature was always ‘global’ or ‘universalistic’ in this sense. Emily Apter, for instance, argues that ‘Comparative literature was in principle global from its inception, even if its institutional establishment in the postwar period assigned Europe the lion’s share of critical attention and short-changed non-Western literatures’ (2006: 41). She attempts to defend this empirically counter-intuitive thesis by redrawing the lines of the received

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37 Elsewhere – in South Asia, Latin America, China and the Arab world, for instance – literary comparativism has often had a very different critical underpinning.

38 A splendid and somewhat whimsical example of the ‘orthodox’ Eurocentrism of comparative literature is to be found in Hazel S. Alberson’s 1959 article ‘Non-Western Literature in the World Literature Program’. We write ‘whimsical’, because the exoticisation of ‘non-western’ culture appears despite Alberson’s best intentions and most earnest aspirations, in an essay explicitly directed against cultural arrogance and condescension. ‘The pressures upon all of us to become acquainted with non-western countries are more urgent and more vital than in Goethe’s time’, she writes, at the high point of the Cold War. ‘Today we are faced with a ONE WORLD. No longer can we hide behind the façade of our ignorance and our provincialism, no longer can we be indifferent to those parts of the world we do not know. Today the reality of the Orient with its varied cultures, its different orientations, its problems, is here, not to be made over in our image but to be understood and to be accommodated. It always seems to me that there should have been a Fifth Freedom – Freedom from Contempt which comes with ignorance’ (Alberson 1960: 45–46). All this is deeply humane, and rather affecting. Alberson believes that ‘in exploring [literary works from the “non-West”] with our general knowledge of literatures and our comparative approach we can introduce the East within the perspective of the West, arouse a respect for the traditions of the East, erase some of the contempt that springs from ignorance and promote a larger tolerance’ (49). But she gives the game away, betraying in the process also the narrow and strictly time-bound provincialism of her own cultural formation, when she adds: ‘I will admit that at times the literature of the Orient can seem like its foods – highly spiced, exotic, with strange flavours – but they are usually concocted on the basis of staples with which we are are quite familiar, just as is their literature’ (49).
history of comparative literature, such that Leo Spitzer’s period of residence in Istanbul is afforded exemplary significance, rather than – as in most accounts – Erich Auerbach’s. Her point is that where the manifestly Eurocentric Auerbach claimed to feel himself in the wilderness in Istanbul, cast out of ‘Europe’ and hence adrift of the civilised world, and made no attempt to learn Turkish (Apter suggests that his rather self-pitying accounts were ungenerous at least, and in fact inaccurate), Spitzer made himself rather more at home in the city, learning Turkish and setting up a school of philology that published actively. Apter’s speculation is that Spitzer’s example ‘might have significant bearing on attempts to redefine comparative literature today as a “worlded,” minoritarian comparativism’, inasmuch as it might be taken to signify that ‘early comparative literature was always and already globalized’ (45–46). Thus she reproduces the table of contents of the 1937 issue of the Publications de la faculté des lettres de l’Université d’Istanbul – which featured ten articles: four in German, three in French, one in English and two in Turkish – and argues that the multilingualism of this issue ‘attests to a policy of non-translation adopted without apology’ which ‘[i]t is tempting to read […] as the in vitro paradigm of a genuinely globalized comparative literature, as evidence of critical reading practices that bring the globe inside the text’ (54–55, 61). For Apter, Spitzer’s philology ‘affords its micrological counterpart as close reading with a worldview: word histories as world histories; stylistics and metrics in diaspora’ (64). It is this ‘worlded’ model – ‘always already’ spectrally present within comparative literature as a promise to be redeemed – that she sees as having resurfaced over the course of the past decade in literary studies overall – hence her bold claim that ‘[i]n many ways, the rush to globalize the literary canon in recent years may be viewed as the “comp-lit-ization” of national literatures throughout the humanities’ (41).

All of this strikes us as deeply unconvincing. Let us note in passing that, whatever might be said in this respect about, say, ‘French’ or ‘German’ or ‘Spanish’ as sub-disciplinary formations, Apter’s purported defence of comparative literature against ‘national literature’ programmes fails to hit the mark against English. For ‘English’ has never been ‘national’ in the sense evidently imagined by Apter. On the contrary, it has always, and for any number of reasons (not all of which do it credit, to be sure), been deeply invested in the worldliness of language and literature, in their political instrumentality and social power. It is for this reason, for example, that it has been within departments of English that materialist, feminist, anti-racist and anti-imperialist criticism has found room to breathe in recent decades. It is true that these progressive tendencies have often led minority existences in English departments, which have mostly been given over to distinctly orthodox, if nevertheless very varied, work. But criticism of this kind could neither have arisen nor have sustained itself in the chill formalist climate of the established comparative literary scholarship.

More substantially, Apter’s emphasis on translation, multilingualism and philology not only fails to challenge, but in fact reinscribes the idealist version
of comparativism central to comparative literature in its dominant institutional form. Although she refers repeatedly to ‘globalisation’ in thinking about what comparative literature does, and how it does it, Apter’s failure to say anything at all about the structure of the world-system renders moot her claims for the universalism inherent in the discipline. It is all very well to call for ‘critical reading practices that bring the globe inside the text’, but it is difficult to see how the referencing of ‘globality’ here differs from the orthodox construction of ‘the world’ in comparative literature as a virtual universe of circulating languages and literatures, cultures and values.

Against ‘national’ particularism, Apter advocates ‘a paradigm of translatio […] that emphasizes the critical role of multilingualism within transnational humanism’ (61). One problem here is that comparative literature has always been disposed to uphold a merely quantitative notion of multilingual competence, to celebrate multilingualicality as though it in itself conduced to social harmony and equality. The fact that the ten articles in the Istanbul literary review are written in four different languages seems to have blinded Apter to such other, less congenial, facts as that eight of these ten articles are in the hegemonic languages of metropolitan northwestern Europe and that, with only one exception, they all tackle problems to do with these languages or the literatures written in them. Apter speaks of ‘close reading with a worldview’, but the evidence that she adduces in support of her contention that the ‘worldview’ in question here is no longer Eurocentric but genuinely globalised is thin, to say the least. As Apter herself knows very well, a daunting number of colonial administrators and Orientalist scholars were fluent in Farsi or Arabic or Zulu or Urdu without in the least feeling the need to question their Eurocentrism.

Compare Rey Chow, who makes the excellent point that, although she ‘deeply appreciate[s] the intellectual and personal benefits of knowing multiple languages, it appears problematic […] to equate comparison with multilingualism per se. In that equation, so often voiced in the decision-making processes of hiring committees and other professional situations, language has come to be viewed as a stand-in for method, and the ability to use a particular language, more or less as the equivalent of having knowledge itself – indeed, as a privileged – because nativist – way into a culture, a key that opens all doors’ (2004: 290). We will consider Chow’s own critique of comparative literature below.

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40 The multilingualicality of this particular issue of the Publications de la faculté des lettres de l’Université d’Istanbul also seems less portentous when considered against the backdrop of the vibrant cosmopolitanism of Turkish (and especially Istanbul) intellectualism generally in the period. See Kendall, for instance, who points out that of the 47 journals appearing in Istanbul in 1876, ‘only 13 were in Turkish: the others were in mainly Greek, Armenian, and French’ (2002: 331). ‘Western’ literature and culture were actively debated by Turkish writers, journalists and intellectuals from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards. See also Konuk 2010 for a splendid contextualising analysis of Turkish intellectual life during World War II.
The argument has been made, by Lawrence Venuti (1998), among others, with respect to translation, and Louis-Jean Calvet (2006), with respect to the ‘ecology’ of languages themselves, that languages, literary forms and literary productions never enter the world on their own terms. A fundamental inequality – not intrinsic, but fully social – marks their capacities as representational practices; and this inequality is then overdetermined by the social logistics of translation, publication, reading, pedagogy, and so on.41

Moreover, the idea of ‘close reading with a worldview’ is itself unconvincing to us in its apparent assumption as to the ideological neutrality of critical method. Whatever might be said about Moretti’s injunction to scrap ‘close reading’ altogether in favour of ‘distant reading’ (and Apter is writing with Moretti’s provocation firmly in mind), it is surely a mistake, given its irreconcilable formalism, to attempt to defend the received disciplinary practice of ‘close reading’ in any strict sense. For the price of the rigorous examination of language and literature in institutionalised ‘close reading’ has invariably been abstraction from their social determinants and structuring conditions of existence.

It is of course necessary to acknowledge that translation – a mediating social practice, after all – is inextricably bound up with cultural misrepresentation, linguistic domination and social inequality. It might seem, in these terms, that comparative literature’s refusal of translation and its commitment to reading in original languages is a culturally progressive gesture. But as Chow has argued very convincingly, ‘language as such tends to be viewed as a neutral fact’ by literary comparativists:

seldom is it pointed out in discussions of comparative literature, that languages and cultures rarely enter the world stage and encounter one

41 Thus Calvet: ‘even if to the linguist’s eye all languages are equal (the most widely spoken languages and those that are in the process of disappearing, those languages in which hundreds of thousands of books have been written and those that have not been transcribed), the world’s languages are in fact fundamentally unequal. To be sure, absolutely any dialect form of a little-spoken language of the Amazon basin or Africa deserves to be analysed just as much as English, Chinese or French and, so long as one undertakes the necessary labour of coining new words, everything can be said, written or taught in absolutely any language. But the fact remains that a discourse which would represent English and Breton, or French and Bobo, as socially equivalent would be both unrealistic and ideological: all languages do not have the same value, and their inequality is at the heart of the way they are organized across the world. To maintain the contrary would be an act of blindness or a sort of demagogy, granting the same importance to a mosquito as to an elephant, to a human being as to a butterfly: there are “elephant languages” and “mosquito languages” which it is difficult to consider on the same level, except of course from the point of view of the science which describes them. This comes down to saying that “elephant languages” and “mosquito languages” are all languages, a remark that borders on tautology’ (2006: 4).
another on an equal footing, that “languages embed relations of dominance,” and that the notion of parity embedded in comparison as it currently stands would need to be recognized perhaps as a form of utopianism that tends to run aground in practice. (2004: 296)

Comparative literature’s insistence on multilingualism is more often the leading edge of an unambiguous fetishism of language (and hence of the authority of professional experience) than of any commitment to cultural dialogue or social mutuality. Behind it we typically encounter thoroughly idealist assumptions as to the ineffability, universality and timelessness of literature – the gamut of assumptions that Terry Eagleton once addressed under the rubric of ‘the ideology of the aesthetic’ (1990).

An enabling counter to the doxic position on the impossibility and undesirability of translation is provided in Andrés Neuman’s novel Traveller of the Century, which features an extended discussion of translation in the contexts of core/periphery social relations. At a literary salon, the traditionalist Professor Mieter puts forward the comparativist position as typified by Apter, arguing against translation on the grounds that literature is ineffable and that translation does violence to its integrity. ‘You must all agree’, he contends, ‘as discerning readers of poetry, that each poem possesses an untransmissible essence, a distinctive sound, precise forms and connotations that are impossible to adapt to another language with a similar perfection’ (Neuman 2012: 330). The response given to this statement by Hans, one of the novel’s protagonists, and himself a translator, strikes us as being full of consequence: ‘I think being faithful is a contradiction’, he suggests,

because the moment another text emerges, faithfulness is no longer achievable, the poem has been transformed, it has become a different poem. We have to take as a given the impossibility of rewriting anything literally, not even a single word. Some translators are wary of this transformation, seeing it as a betrayal rather than a variation. But if it is well done, if the job of interpretation gives the right result, the text may even be improved, or at least become a poem as worthy as its predecessor. And I would go further – I think it is the translator’s duty to offer the reader an authentic poem in

42 See also Gupta 2008: 147ff.
43 In her recent work Against World Literature, Apter makes her case against ‘translatability’ (and, implicitly, for the continued relevance of a comparative literary studies powered by ‘high theory’) even more starkly: ‘I have been left uneasy in the face of the entrepreneurial, bulimic drive to anthologize and curricularize the world’s cultural resources, as evinced in projects sponsored by some proponents of World Literature […] A primary argument of this book is that many recent efforts to revive World Literature rely on a translatability assumption. As a result, incommensurability and what has been called the Untranslatable are insufficiently built into the literary heuristic’ (2013: 3). It is striking that this argument, which links the predatory spread of ‘World Literature’ to the homogenising tendencies of globalized capital, is never extended to the ‘translatability’ of Theory itself; it may be that Apter takes the latter’s ineffability for granted.
his own language precisely in order to remain faithful to the poetic nature of the original [...] Let us not deceive ourselves – even an original poem has no single interpretation, to read a poem is also to translate it, we can never be completely sure of what a poem is saying even in our own language. As I see it, a translation is not made of an authorial voice and one that obeys it, rather it is more akin to a meeting of two literary wills. In the end, there is always a third person – isn’t there? – who is a third discordant voice, which turns out to be that of the reader. (331)

What Hans introduces here is the idea of a continuum – something approaching an identity, in fact – between the acts of reading and translating. If to read is already to ‘translate’, then the seeds are already sown for the view that, even if translation is by definition a ‘political’ act, something may be gained by it, not merely something lost.44 We are further enjoined by this insight to grasp reading and translating as themselves social rather than solitary processes, and thereby to attend to the full range of social practices implicated: writing as commodity labour, the making of books, publishing and marketing, the social ‘fate’ of a publication (reviews, criticism, the search for, creation and cultivation of a readership, etc.). As Hans puts it in Traveller of the Century,

[a] work doesn’t begin and end with its author, it forms part of a much broader group, a kind of writing collective that includes translators. Translation is neither a betrayal nor a substitute, it is another contribution, a further push to something that is already in motion, like when someone jumps into a moving carriage [...] No good translation can ever distort the translated work – it simply exaggerates the mechanisms of reading itself. (334)

‘Efforts to rethink the study of world literature will continue’, Sarah Lawall has written, ‘as long as there is a discrepancy between the lively expectations generated by the term “world” and the pinched reality elicited by conventional approaches’ (quoted in Damrosch 2003: 129). We would like to construe this thought-provoking formulation along materialist lines. Across the full range of disciplinary literary studies, the structurality of the capitalist world-system is typically misrecognised, if it is not ignored (or even denied) altogether. The misprision generally takes the form of an idealist recasting of capitalism – and/or of imperialism and modernity – in civilisational terms as ‘the west’.

44 See Eliot Weinberger 2001: ‘Translation liberates the translation-language. Because a translation will always be read as a translation, as something foreign, it is freed from many of the constraints of the currently accepted norms and conventions in the national literature’ (‘Anonymous Sources: A Talk on Translators and Translation’, http://www.fascicle.com/issue01/Poets/weinberger1.htm). Accessed 10 April 2010.
The effect of this idealism is to undermine, in our view fatally, contemporary efforts to rethink the object of disciplinary literary studies. Let us examine briefly three instances of this idealism in operation, and consider their implications: Edward Said’s *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) and two representative and ground-clearing articles by Susan Bassnett (2006) and Rey Chow (2004), respectively. These three pieces come from very different points on the literary critical spectrum, both methodologically and ideologically: Said stands significantly, of course, at the disciplinary crossroads between ‘English’, ‘comparative literature’ and ‘postcolonial studies’; Bassnett offers an endorsement of comparative literature in the wake of the disciplinary critique of Eurocentrism; and Chow argues that this critique has been cosmetic only, and that comparative literature remains fundamentally Eurocentric. Our argument will be that despite the stark differences between them in almost every other respect, Said, Bassnett and Chow all demonstrate the same tendency to substitute the civilisational category of ‘the west’ for the category of capitalist modernity as the object of their analysis – a substitution that has the inevitable effect of dematerialisation.45

In *Culture and Imperialism*, Said proposes that it has been the belated discovery on the part of contemporary scholars of ‘the enormously exciting, varied post-colonial literature produced in resistance to the imperialist expansion of Europe and the United States in the past two centuries’ that has served most decisively to throw the received paradigms of literary scholarship into question (1993: 71). He mobilises the category of the ‘post-colonial’ here following Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, who had used the term ‘to cover all the culture affected by the imperial process from the moment of colonization to the present day’ (1989: 2). Said tends to speak in this context of contra-puntalism, as in his characteristic identification, in *Culture and Imperialism*, of ‘overlapping territories, intertwined histories common to men and women, whites and non-whites, dwellers in the metropolis and on the peripheries, past as well as present and future’ (1993: 72).

The larger point that he is concerned to make is that *imperialism* is the ‘major, I would say determining, political horizon of modern Western culture’ (1993: 70). His argument, in fact, is two-edged. On the one hand, he suggests that imperialism is fundamental to modern ‘western’ culture – is, in fact, that culture’s very substrate or grounding instance. On the other hand, he suggests that precisely this truth, or reality, has been ignored, systematically and symptomatically, within ‘western’ culture itself: within literary studies, a ‘massive avoidance’ – which, were it a matter of consciousness, rather than of ideology or, better, of epistemic ‘atmosphere’, might be said to amount to the mother of all conspiracies – ‘has sustained a canonical inclusion and exclusion: you include the Rousseaus, the Nietzsches, the Wordsworths, the Dickenses, Flauberts, and so on, and at the same time you exclude their relationships with the protracted, complex, and striated work of empire’ (70).

45 See also Lazarus 2002.
Writing at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, Said argues that 'the relationship between empire and culture' has only just begun to find registration in literary studies (1993: 71). We have been quoting thus far from the chapter in *Culture and Imperialism* significantly entitled 'Connecting Empire to Secular Interpretation'. The contention in this chapter is that from the mid-eighteenth century to the time of his own writing in the late twentieth, the literary field has been blind to its own enabling conditions, modes of operation and ideological effects. The thrust of literary scholarship during this period has sometimes been nation-centred (and occasionally narrowly chauvinistic) and sometimes (as in Goethe or Auerbach, for instance) comparativist and even universalist in its rhetoric. But even in its more expansive, comparativist guises, which Said himself vastly prefers, the scholarship has been constitutively Eurocentric: the field has been organised ‘epistemologically [...] as a sort of hierarchy, with Europe and its Latin Christian literatures at its centre and top’ (52).

The fundamental task that Said therefore enjoins upon his colleagues in the literary field is to ‘unthink Eurocentrism’. This is partly a matter of opening oneself to the existing archives and burgeoning new literary production from the world outside the ‘west’, for he argues, surveying the scholarship of the past 200 years, that ‘[w]ithout significant exception, the universalizing discourses of modern Europe and the United States assume the silence, willing or otherwise, of the non-European world. There is incorporation; there is inclusion; there is direct rule; there is coercion. But there is only infrequently an acknowledgement that the colonized people should be heard from, their ideas known’ (58). But ‘unthinking Eurocentrism’ also involves revising our construction of ‘western’ culture itself. We cannot simply add or assimilate new material to an otherwise unchanged canon in accordance with unaltered modes of disciplinary practice. The constitutive Eurocentrism of old-style ‘Victorian studies’ for example, would not be transformed were we merely, so to speak, to ‘add colonialism and stir’. Said enjoins us instead to reinterpret the Western cultural archive as if fractured geographically by the activated imperial divide, to do a rather different kind of reading and interpretation. In the first place, the history of such fields as comparative literature, English studies, cultural analysis, anthropology can be seen as affiliated with the empire and, in a manner of speaking, even contributing to its methods for maintaining Western ascendancy over non-Western natives [...] And in the second place our interpretive change of perspective allows us to challenge the sovereign and unchallenged authority of the allegedly detached Western observer. (1993: 59)

This injunction – it would be more accurate, perhaps, to understand it, as Raymond Williams has taught us, as a dispersed and historically specific political imperative, rather than through reference to a single scholar, no matter

how influential – has been at the heart of much of the work produced across the full range of literary studies over the course of the past quarter-century. Said’s identification of the inextricability of ‘culture’ from ‘imperialism’ – the ‘integration and connections between the past and the present, between imperializer and imperialized, between culture and imperialism’ (1993: 72) – strikes us as being of indispensable importance. But we need to register a major weakness in his understanding of the key concept of imperialism. This weakness has already been addressed and explored in some of the criticism directed at Said by his materialist followers and interlocutors in postcolonial studies. There are various ways of registering the problem in shorthand. One of them is simply to point out that while the terms ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’ run like a rich dye through all of Said’s work, there are far fewer references to the term ‘capitalism’. Another is to observe the anomalousness of his repudiation of Marxism: as Benita Parry has pointed out, we can scarcely fail to remark on the fact that Said’s work on culture and imperialism ‘neglected that very analysis which has done most to explain modern colonialism and imperialism as integral to capitalism’s beginnings, expansion, and ultimate global entrenchment’ (Parry 2013: 107).

The main problem is that Said presents imperialism as a political dispensation rather than as a process of accumulation on a world scale, under conditions of capitalist monopoly. Imperialism for him implicates military conquest,

47 A mere recitation of some key titles might be sufficient to demonstrate this: Rule of Darkness: British Literature and Imperialism, 1830–1914 (Brantlinger 1988); Gender, Race, Renaissance Drama (Loomba 1989); The Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in India (Viswanathan 1989); Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms (Lowe 1991); The Poetics of Imperialism: Translation and Colonization from ‘The Tempest’ to ‘Tarzan’ (Cheyfitz 1991); Macropolitics of Nineteenth-Century Literature: Nationalism, Exoticism, Imperialism (Arac and Ritvo 1991); Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination 1830–1867 (Hall 2002); Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492–1797 (Hulme 1992); Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (Pratt 1992); Cultures of United States Imperialism (Kaplan and Pease 1993); Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (McClintock 1995); Out of Place:Englishness, Empire, and the Locations of Identity (Baucom 1999); Literary Culture and US Imperialism: From the American Revolution to World War II (Rowe 2000); Fabulous Orients: Fictions of the East in England 1662–1785 (Ballaster 2005).

48 Said presents his argument here as a break from the dominant forms of aesthetic philosophy since Kant: ‘Cultural experience or indeed every cultural form is radically quintessentially hybrid, and if it has been the practice in the West since Immanuel Kant to isolate cultural and aesthetic realms from the worldly domain, it is now time to rejoin them’ (1993: 68).


50 Parry continues: ‘Because his focus is exclusively on colonialist exploitation, Said’s writing […] neglects the ubiquity of class inequality and the assaults visited on workers and the poor in the core capitalist countries and the semi-peripheries as well as the peripheries’ (2013: 107).
alien governance, systematised top-down violence, social asymmetry, cultural and symbolic domination, and Eurocentrism as a set of deeply patterned ‘structures of attitude and reference’. It is characteristically about domination rather than about exploitation or class struggle or the imposition of a mode of production. The tendential severing of imperialism from capitalism leads Said to neglect the structuring dynamics, agencies and vectors of modern historical development. Situating imperialism in civilisational terms as an ‘ongoing contest between north and south, metropolis and periphery, white and native’ (1993: 59), he typically refers us to ‘the west’ as its originating force – as when, in Orientalism, he speaks of ‘a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient’ (1979: 3). In the absence of a materialist conception of imperialism, ‘the west’ in Said’s work comes to stand in for the socio-historical process that it tacitly references, but at the price of mystification.

A second liability of Said’s conceptualisation follows directly from this first. A further consequence of his conflation of imperialism and ‘the west’ is that the latter instance tends to suffer homogenisation: both historically and geo-politically, its internal divisions and differences, the trajectories of its development, are flattened out and disregarded. It is not only that between the categories of ‘the west’ and ‘Europe’, no significant difference is registered – such that, for example, the United States is presented as a more or less organic outgrowth of ‘Europe’, merely with a broader geo-strategic base. Also observable in Culture and Imperialism is a steady if reductive progression from ‘England’, ‘France’ and ‘the United States’, to the ‘major metropolitan’ formations, and thence to ‘the west’ itself. The fact, as Lucia Boldrini has pointed out, that ‘[m]any European countries have no imperial history if not a passive one, having themselves been “colonised”, subjugated or controlled by other political powers’ (2006: 15–16), is never taken into account by Said. Although Boldrini’s complaint about the ‘continuing identification of Europe on the one hand with some Western European countries and, on the other, with “the west” and therefore with colonial history – of the reduction, that is to say, of Europe to the colonial history of some of its states’ (15), is not directed at Said’s work, it is easy to see its relevance to any appraisal of Said.

It is because Said’s work both homogenises ‘the west’ and construes it as the agent of imperialist domination that he has sometimes been accused, by critics to his left and to his right, of ‘Third-Worldism’. There is no need to rehearse this dispute here. What can be noted, however, is that the...
tendency to essentialise ‘the west’ has become a staple ingredient, across
the range of literary scholarship, of much of the work that – following Said’s
injunction – has been directed to ‘unthinking Eurocentrism’.52 We can see this
very clearly, for instance, in Rey Chow’s influential call for a ‘post-European’
perspective in comparative literature, to which we will turn shortly. Before
doing so, however, it will behove us to look at Susan Bassnett’s ‘Reflections
on Comparative Literature in the Twenty-First Century’, since it is to the kind
of thought exemplified in Bassnett’s essay that Chow is evidently responding.
Bassnett wants to take stock of comparative literature after the disciplinary
critique of Eurocentrism. This critique is taken to have been levelled, absorbed
and appropriately acted upon. ‘[W]e have come a long way in three decades’,
Bassnett writes airily, en route to a restatement of the value and vitality of the
‘western’ literary canon and the tradition that it inscribes and memorialises.53
She readily concedes that it was important for scholars of literature generally
to take to heart the central argument brought against mainstream scholarship
by the critics of Eurocentrism – which argument she introduces under the
rubric of ‘plurivocality’: the call for multiple voices to be attended to, ‘rather
than one single dominant voice’ (4). (It is worth registering in passing here
the distance between this concept of ‘plurivocality’ and the Saidian notion of
‘contrapuntalism’. For all that might be said against it, the latter, as we have
seen, identified ‘overlapping territories’ and ‘intertwined histories’ which,
according to Said, it was necessary to think together, as registrations of a
vast social experience binding all its participants, even if antagonistically
and unequally.54 ‘Plurivocality’, by contrast, identifies only the multiplicity of
discourses; it has nothing to say about their interrelations.) But in a passage
directed explicitly at Gayatri Spivak, Bassnett suggests that while a compara-
tivist approach to literature governed by this model of plurivocality ‘works for
anyone approaching the great literary traditions of the northern hemisphere
from elsewhere’, it is not

particularly helpful for those of us who have as a starting point one or other
of those great traditions. The question remains as to what new directions

52 See the analysis of the ‘fetishism’ of ‘the West’ in postcolonial theory in Lazarus
2002.
53 ‘[T]here is a need now to look again at the idea of the canon, not least because
of the way in which Western foundation texts have found their way into other
literatures – think of the impact of naturalism on southern Indian literatures,
of the extraordinarily creative use of Homer and the epic tradition by the St.
Lucian Nobel laureate Derek Walcott, of the current translation boom in China,
as Western writing is translated, imitated and rewritten in exciting new ways. A
fundamental question that comparative literature now needs to address concerns
the role and status of the canonical and foundation texts that appear to be more
highly valued outside Europe and North America than by a generation of scholars
uneasy about their own history of colonialism and imperialism’ (Bassnett 2006: 5).
54 See the dedication to Nayantara Sahgal’s 1985 novel Rich Like Us: ‘To the
Indo-British Experience and what its sharers have learned from each other’. 
in comparative literature there can be for the European scholar whose intellectual formation has been shaped by classical Greek and Latin, by the Bible, by the Germanic epic, by Dante and Petrarch, by Shakespeare and Cervantes, by Rousseau, Voltaire and the Enlightenment, by Romanticism and post-Romanticism, by the European novelists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, by generations of writers who have borrowed, translated, plagiarised and plundered, but whose works run inexorably to some degree through the consciousness of anyone writing today. (4–5)

Some of the implications of this deeply tendentious formulation are worth exploring in detail.\footnote{The tendentiousness of Bassnett’s argument can be exposed merely through counter-citation of Sophie Bessis’s elegant demolition of its general premises. Bessis writes of Eurocentric evocations of a ‘Greco-Roman tradition’: ‘In fact, since Petrarch and others gave it an initial form in the fourteenth century, the founding myth of an exclusive Greco-Roman source has functioned as an implacable machine for the expulsion of oriental or non-Christian sources from European civilization. Erased: the Babylonian, Chaldean, Egyptian and Indian influences on Greece, from the pre-Socratics to the late descendants of Alexander. Disregarded: the huge prestige that Egypt always enjoyed within the Greek world, whose literary figures happily recognized what they owed to its sciences and its religion. Obscured: the crucial dimension of the Hellenistic era, that hybrid of Hellenism and the East. Passed over in silence: the cultural pluralism of a Roman empire for which the barbarians were men from the North, not the familiar peoples along the southern shores of the Mediterranean’ (2003: 13).

\footnote{In which case, one would want to know the grounds on which Bassnett’s idealist}
What Bassnett proposes as a bedrock – the cord that supposedly binds together and unites into a single ‘Great Tradition’ the various micro-traditions of the constituent cultures, nations and peoples of ‘Europe’/‘the northern hemisphere’/‘the west’ – is in our view a strictly ideological construction, which it would be better to construe as a post facto justification for the currently prevailing global dispensation. The problem is not only that Bassnett’s presentation tends to erase the violence structurally entailed in ‘inter-cultural’ relations in the contexts of colonialism and capitalist modernity – specifically, the relations between ‘Europe’ and the world beyond its historically porous and often shifting boundaries. (What she terms ‘interconnectedness’, in this respect, and sees as a positive good might with greater historical warrant be described as Conrad described it in Heart of Darkness: ‘robbery with violence, aggravated murder on a great scale’ [2007: 8].) Just as important is the fact that her essentialism serves to mystify the history of Europe itself. It is worth reminding ourselves that, far from representing any intrinsic civilisational unity or ‘community of values’, the ‘making of Europe’ involved (and continues to involve) conflict, division, violence and mutual animosity. The ‘Europe’ that would come to impose itself on the rest of the world in the modern era – and that would present itself in civilisational terms in doing so – was, as Robert Bartlett has argued very eloquently, itself the product of ‘internal’ conquest, colonisation and enforced cultural change:

Conquest, colonization, Christianization: the techniques of settling in a new land, the ability to maintain cultural identity through legal forms and nurtured attitudes, the institutions and outlook required to confront the strange or abhorrent, to repress it and live with it, the law and religion as well as the guns and ships. The European Christians who sailed to the coasts of the Americas, Asia and Africa in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries came from a society that was already a colonizing society. Europe, the initiator of one of the world’s major processes of conquest, colonisation and cultural transformation, was also the product of one. (1994: 313–14)

positioning of the ‘inter-connection’ between these ‘civilisations’ is to be preferred over Samuel Huntington’s rather grimmer, ‘realist’ theory of a ‘clash of civilisations’.

57 In fact, Bassnett’s argument is in places so definitively Eurocentric (in the restricted sense of ‘Europe-centred’) as to render implausible even her own conflation of ‘Europe’ with ‘the west’ and ‘the northern hemisphere’. It is difficult to know, for instance, how North American or Russian readers are to position themselves in relation to the advice that ‘it is important not to lose sight of where we, as Europeans, stand in relation to our own literary history’. The facts that significant sections of the Russian intelligentsia have consistently defined themselves in explicit opposition to the category of ‘the west’ (while insisting on their fidelity to ‘Europe’) and that significant sections of the US intelligentsia have consistently defined themselves in explicit opposition to the category of ‘Europe’ (while insisting on their fidelity to ‘the west’) have evidently not given Bassnett pause.
Reciting the names of Dante and Shakespeare and Cervantes, evoking Latin and the Bible and the Enlightenment, Bassnett conjures up the image of a literary tradition freely available, as something like a family inheritance, to all ‘Europeans’ – but not, evidently, to ‘non-Europeans’.58 (Her thesis is made more convoluted still – not to say, more untenable – by the fact that on her reading the category of ‘Europeans’ would include [some? most? all?] North Americans, Australians, etc.) One could play Bassnett’s game in reverse here, and recite other names that point in a completely different direction: Andalusian Arabic, Bulgar, Drevani, Muromian, Curonian and Pomeranian, for instance – now extinct ‘European’ languages, obliterated (and along with them the cultural identity of the people who spoke them) in the long march of ‘Europeanisation’; or Cornish, Welsh, Occitan, Breton, Livonian and Sardinian – dominated and/or sub-national languages that still survive in Europe despite the fierce pressures exerted upon them by hegemonising forces (often trans- or super-national cultures and languages), whose imposition it has proved impossible to resist. It takes nothing away from Shakespeare and Cervantes, the epic and the Bible, English and German, surely, to recognise that it has often been precisely in the name of the selective tradition identified through reference to them (and such as them) that politically dominant forces in Europe have rained violence and terror upon their neighbours, by way of subduing and subordinating them – a process involving first deculturation and then enforced acculturation. It is not only in extra-European theatres that English, French, German, Italian and Russian have been imposed on speakers of other languages, by way of breaking their resistance and undermining their cultural integrity.

Bassnett’s article is written partly by way of attempting to re-energise comparative literature after the critique of Eurocentrism – a critique which, for all its indispensability, is seen to have left the discipline somewhat demoralised. Hence her suggestion that ‘the perspectives of Southern hemisphere scholars’ are ‘not particularly helpful for those of us who have as a starting point’ the Great Tradition represented by the ‘western’ canon. Her argument is clearly predicated on an assumption as to the distinctiveness and the internal unity of ‘Europe’/’the northern hemisphere’/’the west’ as a civilisational bloc

58 We are reminded here of what Karl Heinz Bohrer has written recently of Ernst Robert Curtius: ‘Curtius’s conception of Europe [was] as a delightful garden in which major writers and thinkers meet, from Virgil to Goethe, from Balzac to Miguel de Unamuno, from Ortega y Gasset to T.S. Eliot and Jean Cocteau’ (2012: 591). However, Bohrer identifies this idealism in Curtius as a compensatory utopianism – an historically specific determination that is quite obviously different from that animating Bassnett’s understanding: ‘Curtius’s idea that the different national writers belonged together in the spiritual present of European literature was utopian in the sense that it responded to the two wars and the state of continental Europe as a landscape in ruins. It was the anticipation of a longed-for alternative, the illusion that ideas could literally move mountains, the mountains in question being the borders separating countries’ (591).
irreducibly different from, if not necessarily in opposition to, other civilisa-
tional blocs (e.g., that represented by ‘the southern hemisphere’). We have
attempted to demonstrate that, because of its essentialism, this construction
of ‘Europe’ mystifies the history of Europe, as well as, of course, the relations
between Europe and the rest of the world.

It might be worthwhile here to place Bassnett’s argument in relation
to the debate about European ‘identity’ sparked off by Jürgen Habermas’s
call for the development and projection of a European presence capable of
counter-balancing ‘the hegemonic unilateralism of the United States’ (2005:
6). Writing in May 2003, in the shadow of the US-sponsored invasion of
Iraq, Habermas asked whether there were ‘historical experiences, traditions,
and achievements offering European citizens the consciousness of a shared
political fate that can be shaped together’ (7). He answered in the affirmative,
but only after rejecting firmly the civilisational idea of Europe evoked by
thinkers like Bassnett. For Habermas, that idea would be merely the corollary
of the particularist chauvinism sponsoring the ‘bellicose past’ that ‘once
entangled all European nations in bloody conflicts’ (12). He proposed instead
an idea of ‘Europe’ predicated precisely on a break from this past through
the reflexive creation of ‘new, supranational forms of cooperation’ (12). A
similar argument is proffered by the Swiss writer Adolf Muschg, who writes,
in dialogue with Habermas, that

What holds Europe together and what divides it are at heart the same
thing: common memories and habits, acquired step by step through the
process of distancing oneself from fatal habits. Europe is what Europe
is becoming. It is neither the Occident nor the cradle of civilization; it
does not have a monopoly on science, enlightenment, and modernity. It
shouldn’t attempt to ground its identity in any other way than through its
own experiences: any claims for exclusivity can only lead into the same
delusion and pretension through which Europe of the nineteenth century
believed itself to represent the rest of the world, and entitled to dominate
it. (2005: 25)

The idea here is of Europe as a counter-hegemonic work in progress – a
strictly contemporary project negatively motivated by recognition that the
effects of all of the previous projections of ‘Europe’ – which took themselves
to be gestures of civilisational self-assertion – have been catastrophic.\(^{59}\) Yet
even this carefully historicised and radically contingent construction\(^{60}\) is

\(^{59}\) See also Bauman 2004 and Todorov 2005.

\(^{60}\) Or one could describe it as deconstructive. Habermas’s manifesto actually
appeared under the joint signatures of himself and Jacques Derrida. Derrida was
too ill at the time to contribute directly, and managed to append only a short
preface. But he indicated that he wished to have Habermas’s piece appear under
his own name also. The manifesto – ‘both an analysis and an appeal’ (Habermas
2005: 3) – duly appeared simultaneously in the \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}
susceptible to criticism on the grounds that it generalises unwarrantedly from
the modern experience of the historically dominant European nations to all of
Europe. A latent essentialism lurks in the background of Habermas's refun-
tioning of the category of 'core Europe' (‘Kerneuropa’) and his suggestion that
this 'avant-gardist core of Europe' must play the role of 'locomotive', powering
While we certainly appreciate the necessity of defending France and Germany
– whose governments opposed the rush to war against Iraq – from the wrath
of the Bush administration, the assumption that avant-gardism or progressive
values are to be found in ‘core’ or ‘old’ Europe seems to us both impolitic
and high-handed. Hence, presumably, the anger directed at Habermas's
manifesto by certain commentators – not only in ‘east’ and ‘central’ Europe,
but also in Scandinavia and the Iberian peninsula – unwilling to accept his
apparent marginalisation of them as ‘non-core’ Europeans.

61 Habermas was responding to the then-US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld,
who had infamously castigated France and Germany as ‘old Europe’, praising
instead the ‘new Europe’ of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, among
others, whose leaders supported – or at least refrain from publicly disavowing
– the American-led offensive.

62 See also the discussion of the Habermas/Derrida intervention in Rita Felski’s
introduction to a special issue of New Literary History devoted to ‘rethinking
Europe’ (Felski 2012).

63 See for example the dissenting pieces by Esterházy, Stasiuk, Krzeminski and
Keel in Levy, Pensky and Torpey 2005. Esterházy begins his piece with the witty
observation that ‘Once, I was an Eastern European; then I was promoted to
the rank of Central European. Those were great times (even if not necessarily
for me personally), there were Central European dreams, visions, and images
of the future; in short, everything (everything one needs for a round table, but
that is spoken in haste and unfairly). Then a few months ago, I became a New
European. But before I had the chance to get used to this status – even before
I could have refused it – I have now become a non-core European’ (2005: 74).
Stasiuk, too, protests that Habermas's idea of 'core Europe' is not only truncating
but falsifying, beginning his article with a cascading list of peoples evidently
relegated by Habermas to the status of non-core Europeans: ‘Albanians, Bosnians,
Bulgarians, Estonians, Croats, Lithuanians, Macedonians, Moldavians,
Montenegrins, Poles, Romanians, Serbs, Slovaks, Slovenians, Czechs, Ukrainians,
White Russians’. And he adds: ‘And just so it doesn't appear too simple, let’s add
the “belt of mixed population” – as Hannah Arendt calls the diverse, amorphous
areas somewhere between Germany and Russia – that is, small heaps of Germans
and Russians scattered here and there. To this, we can add, for example, the
Gagausians and Aromunians, the restless international Sinti, the Crimeans and
the Turks who didn’t get back to their native lands on the Bosporus before it
unexpectedly shrank’ (2005: 103). For his part, Keel, self-consciously writing from
‘the Scandinavian perspective’, takes the opportunity to remind Habermas that if
Danes in the modern era have participated in the ‘bellicose past’ that Habermas
sees as having ‘entangled all European nations in bloody conflicts’, ‘it has not
been exclusively as instigators but also as subjects struggling against German
domination: ‘Around the year 1700’, he writes, ‘some 20 per cent of Copenhagen's
Rey Chow’s article ‘The Old/New Question of Comparison in Literary Studies: A Post-European Perspective’ appeared two years before Bassnett’s, and so does not, of course, address the latter directly. But Chow writes self-consciously from what Bassnett calls the ‘perspective of the Southern hemisphere’: indeed, she might be seen as offering a ‘Third-Worldist’ critique of precisely the model of comparative literary scholarship that Bassnett both champions and seeks to represent. Chow begins, thus, by identifying the performative contradiction represented by comparative literature’s ‘cosmopolitanism’ or ‘universalism’ whenever the focus is shifted from the European to the world stage. On the one hand, the commitment to comparativism in the discipline gestures towards inter-cultural reciprocity:

As part of a cluster of concepts that sees linguistic cosmopolitanism and the peaceful coexistence of national and cultural traditions as its telos, comparison in comparative literature is understandably grounded, as the etymology of the word suggests, in the notion of parity – in the possibility of peer-like equality and mutuality among those being compared […] Hence […] comparative literature often proceeds with investigating multiple literary traditions on the assumption that there ought to be a degree of commonality and equivalence – and thus comparability – among them; that they are, somehow, on a par with one another despite their obvious differences. (2004: 290)

On the other hand, this ‘mutuality’ proves to be highly selective. It operates only between (some) ‘European’ literatures and cultures, never between ‘Europe and its Others’. Chow quotes as exemplary in this respect Wellek and Warren’s formulation, in their Theory of Literature (1949), of the basic predicate of comparative literature as a discipline:

it is important to think of literature as a totality and to trace the growth and development of literature without regard to linguistic distinctions […] Western literature, at least, forms a unity, a whole […] and, without minimizing the importance of Oriental influences, especially that of the Bible, one must recognize a close unity which includes all Europe, Russia, the United States, and the Latin American literatures. (Quoted in Chow 2004: 294)

One might have expected Chow to criticise the essentialism evident in Wellek and Warren’s statement – their insistence on the singularity and specificity of what they call ‘western’ culture. But she does not. Nor does she comment on the fact that their formulation is altogether blind to the radically
discrepant and incongruent histories of the ideas of ‘Europe’ and ‘the west’. She focuses instead on Wellek and Warren’s bracketing of the ‘non-West’ and the implications that derive – in her view, inevitably – from it:

Wellek and Warren’s formulation of comparison, which may be named ‘Europe and Its Others,’ remains a common norm of comparative literary studies in North America today. In this formulation, the rationale for comparing hinges on the conjunction and; the and, moreover […] signals a form of supplementation that authorizes the first term, Europe, as the grid of reference, to which may be added others in a subsequent and subordinate fashion […] The and thus instigates not only comparison but also a politics of comparison: on the one side, the infinite opening of histories, cultures, languages in their internal vicissitudes in such a manner as to enable their studies to become ever more nuanced and refined; on the other side, a crude lumping together of other histories, cultures, and languages with scant regard to exactly the same kinds of details and internal dynamics of thought that, theoretically speaking, should be part of the study of any tradition. These other histories, cultures, and languages remain by default undifferentiated – and thus never genuinely on a par with Europe – within an ostensibly comparative framework. (Chow 2004: 294–95)

Proposing that Eurocentrism is, as it were, ‘hard-wired’ into the disciplinary machinery of comparative literature, Chow calls not for a revision of the discipline, but for the generation of an entirely new notion of comparativism, implicating a new form of critical practice: ‘The incommensurability between what scholars might want to uphold as the ethical as well as theoretical ideal of an inclusive world literature, on the one hand, and the actual events that take place in the name of comparison, on the other, requires us to conceive of a radically different set of terms for comparative literary studies’ (297).

There is much in this proposal – and in Chow’s general critique – that we find attractive and congenial. We echo her call for a new form of comparative critical practice. The problem, however, is that she mis-identifies both the nature and the historical dynamic of the dominant social instance that she wishes to counter and oppose. Linking her project explicitly to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s influential campaign to ‘provincialise Europe’ – an agenda as thoroughly ‘Third-Worldist’ as her own, and for pretty much the same reasons – Chow promotes a ‘post-European perspective’ in literary studies. However, the persistent slippage in her commentary between geo-historical and ideological categories – ‘European’ on the one hand, ‘Eurocentric’ on the other – fatally undermines her argument, transforming a potentially compelling ideological critique into an ineffectual complaint about ‘European’ civilisation, which, she supposes, has always, or at least throughout modern history, presented itself as ‘culturally superior’.

Thus ‘the dominance of European conceptual models’ (emphasis added) – not ‘Eurocentric models’ – is deplored, and ‘Europe’ is incoherently identified not merely as the ‘source’ but as the very form of domination on the world stage.
This way of putting things has the effect of homogenising ‘Europe’, mystifying its ‘internal’ history and flattening out the unevenness of its ‘internal’ development. (It’s a bit rich for Chow to complain that her antagonists are guilty of ‘a crude lumping together of […] histories, cultures, and languages with scant regard to exactly the […] kinds of details and internal dynamics of thought that, theoretically speaking, should be part of the study of any tradition’ [77], when this exactly describes her own commentary on ‘Europe’.) In this respect, what Paulo de Medeiros has written in general of contemporary attempts to unthink Eurocentrism pertains directly to Chow:

Within the general attack on Eurocentrism […] there are two related flaws: first, the amalgamation of everything European into a fictive unity that, even if it might have some correspondence to the dream of homogeneity, has no real counterpart in a fragmented and divided Europe, more often than not torn against itself and amongst its constituent members; second the forgetting exactly of those parts of Europe that ‘Europe’ itself tends to forget, its own, anything but central, dominated others. (1996: 43)

Chow’s ‘Third-Worldism’ also leads to a dehistoricisation and dematerialisation of the dynamics of ‘modernity’. Her suggestions that ‘comparison’ in literary scholarship ought to include a critique of the uneven distribution of cultural capital among languages themselves (2004: 303) and that such scholarship ought to take as its object ‘a type of discursive situation, involuntarily brought into play by and inextricable from the conditions of modern world politics’ (301), for instance, sound very promising, until we realise that, on her understanding, capitalism evidently plays no part in ‘modern world politics’. Instead, the latter are evidently to be thought of as being about the encounter between civilisational blocs: ‘Europe’ (including the United States, of course) and its various ‘others’. Even when ‘imperialism’ is named, the term is inevitably prefixed by the qualifier ‘European’, thus making it clear that what is centrally at issue for Chow is the imposition of ‘European’ culture upon other cultures.

Fredric Jameson has urged us to take on board the implications of the fact that ‘the United States is not just one country, or one culture, among others, any more than English is just one language among others. There is a fundamental dissymmetry in the relationship between the United States and every other country in the world, not only third-world countries, but even Japan and those of Western Europe’ (1998: 58). Chow is deaf to this suggestion. She proceeds as though it were possible to achieve the ‘provincialisation’ of ‘Europe’ in the absence of any plausible account or understanding of what has grounded and enabled ‘European’ dominance over the course of the past five hundred years. The fact that this idealist understanding is counter-posed to the dominant understanding, equally idealist, does not in our view make it more compelling. We would argue that the idea of a new comparativism in literary studies only makes sense in the context of an overarching theory of the (capitalist) world-system.
We can pursue the critique we are making further by turning our attention for a moment to the belated ‘worlding’ of American literature. Where US writing is concerned, the liabilities of nationalist exceptionalism are widely recognised today. But if the contemporary desire, as Lawrence Buell reminds us, is to think ‘“against” or “beyond” nationness’, critical practice has tended to lag behind this desire; for many of the ‘[d]iscourses that aspire self-consciously to transnational or global reach [...] end up recontained by nation-centered mentalities’ (Buell 2007: 227–28). The converse is also true: the search for larger frameworks often leads to a decisive underestimation of the roles played by nation-states in the trajectory of the world-system. Even when it is accompanied by protestations of sympathy for the wretched of the earth, this sort of underestimation characteristically bespeaks unquestioned privilege. That is to say, it is only those citizens inhabiting the privileged spaces of dominant nation-states in the contemporary world system who tend to speak confidently of their ability and desire to transcend nations. While the desire to escape from what Buell, drawing on Casanova,64 calls the ‘Herderian imperative’ to situate nation-ness as the generative matrix of all aesthetic production is readily understandable, a premature dismissal of the material effectivity of the nation paves the way, in some contemporary criticism, for the adoption of an even less plausible analytical framework: a militantly idealist transcendentalism that glories in literature for its civilizational (that is to say, community-building) capabilities, across, athwart and, indeed, in defiance of the boundaries (historical as well as geographical) of any actually existing social order. Often encountered in such contemporary slogans as ‘planetarity’ and ‘epochal time’, this new form of transcendentalism avows to release literary and cultural studies from concerns about not simply nation-statism, but capitalist modernity also.

The tendency is notably exemplified in Wai Chee Dimock’s *Through Other Continents: American Literature Across Deep Time* (2006). Dimock seeks to emancipate US writing and culture from nationalist exceptionalism by recourse to more expansive geographic and temporal registers. Concepts borrowed from the disciplines of astronomy and geology are metaphorised and pressed into service to provide the justification for a literary critical practice involving epochal loops of time and the tectonic collision of textual elements, such that (very) distant times and places are conjoined and juxtaposed. ‘Literature is the home of nonstandard space and time’, Dimock writes: ‘Against the official borders of the nation and against the fixed intervals of the clock, what flourishes here is irregular duration and extension, some extending for thousands of years or thousands of miles, each occasioned by a different tie and varying with that tie, and each loosening up the chronology and geography of the nation’ (2006: 4). Dimock’s move from history and geography to the discourse of ‘deep time’ testifies to a pronounced animus towards the

64 See the discussion of ‘the Herderian Revolution’ and ‘the Herderian effect’ in Casanova 2004: 75–81.
social sciences. Her substitution of a geological for a geographical cartography and her conjuring of maximally suprahuman time-frames function alike to render literature – the final object of her enquiry – irrecoverable to historicist methodologies of any stripe. Literature, on her reading, is not amenable to analysis through reference to temporally or spatially bounded power relations. It eludes explication through these means. She cites the ‘large-scale model’ that is Wallerstein's world-system, but only to propose, ‘[w]ithout disagreeing with him’ (!), that ‘there are other phenomena, not reducible to capitalism, that also unfold against long durations, requiring scale enlargement for their analysis’ (5). These ‘other phenomena’ include ‘world religions’ – which ‘invite us to think of the world’s population as a locally inflected and yet globally connected unit’; the ‘morphology of language’ – which ‘presents us with an array of vernaculars, creolized forms developed through centuries and spread across continents;’ certain ‘categories of experience, such as beauty or death, that seem not entirely predicated on the temporal and spatial boundaries of the nation-state’; ‘long-lasting genres, such as epic and novel’, likewise demanding expanded frames of reference; and ‘the concept of a global civil society’, whose purview is for Dimock both global (requiring us to think at the level of planetarity) and pan-historical, reaching back centuries (5).

It is difficult to know what to make of this inventory. So far as we know, nobody has ever proposed either that the categories of beauty or death are ‘entirely predicated on the temporal and spatial boundaries of the nation-state’, or that the development and dispersion of ‘world’ religions are ‘reducible to capitalism’. But Dimock seems to want to infer from the statement that the development and dispersion of ‘world’ religions are not reducible to capitalism that capitalism has not been a powerful determinant of this development and dispersion. This inference is unwarranted. By the same token, to recognise that the categories of beauty or death are not ‘entirely predicated on the temporal and spatial boundaries of the nation-state’ is not to demonstrate that these categories ought to be analysed without reference to the nation-state (and/or, indeed, to other historical forms of bounded sociality). Dimock seems determined to delegitimate any investigation into the ways in which capitalist modernity has distinctively restructured linguistic, phenomenological, socio-cultural and demographic patterns. Through Other Continents conflates the individual, the particularistic and the local with the species, the universal and the geo-galactic so as to elide the registers of the national and of the international, and all mediating registers of time-space – whether economic or cultural – that might open onto a conversation about transformation or social change. The catechistic fusion in her study of the human (or of the literary work as aestheticised ‘more-than-human’) and the ineffable (time-space beyond human comprehension) works to silence questions directed to conflict, domination, exploitation and temporal rupture or discontinuity.

Dimock sets out to disarticulate American nation-statism – ‘the temporal and spatial boundaries of the nation’ – from ‘other expressive domains’,
most particularly the literary. The problem, as she puts it, is that when we use the term ‘American’ to describe literary work, ‘we limit ourselves, with or without explicit acknowledgement, to an analytic domain foreclosed by definition, a kind of scholarly unilateralism. Literature here is the product of one nation and one nation alone, analyzable within its confines’ (2006: 3). But her would-be revisionary initiative – to ‘bind […] America to the rest of the world’, to ‘thread America texts into the topical events of other cultures, while also threading the long durations of those cultures into the short chronology of the United States’, to ‘bind […] continents and millennia into many loops of relations’ (3) – has three main weaknesses. Ironically, each of these, in its own way, bears witness to the persistence in Dimock’s thought of the elitist (and exceptionalist) Americanism that, at the level of political self-consciousness, she rightly seeks to problematise and move beyond.

Dimock’s initial problem is that her nomination of literature as an instance of ‘global civil society’ remains blind to the materiality of literature as a social institution. She wants us to think of reading – and of literary culture more generally – as communicative action, whose effect is to thread together the ‘single reader, doing his reading in one particular locale’ (9) and the planetary and trans-historical – that is to say, the individual on the one hand, and all times and all places, on the other. Thus she refers us to Robert Pogue Harrison’s proposition ‘that we think of literary culture […] as a “lexical” civil society, made up of strings of words, nuances, and etymologies reflecting the long histories of linguistic usage, and weaving our lives into a semantic network, at once endlessly localized and endlessly extended’ (8). The problem here, of course, is that this virtuality is construed as an actuality, as a substantive effect of literary culture as an actually existing domain of action. Seeking to construe the literary field in analogy with Michael Walzer’s formulation of global civil society, Dimock asks us to entertain the idea of a

playing field called ‘literary culture’ brought into being by that most minute, most intimate of acts, the act of reading. This act, pursued within the compass of a word, a phrase, a sentence, generates relational ties that can nonetheless extend for thousands of miles and thousands of years. It is an NGO of sorts, an NGO avant la lettre, an unusually fine-grained as well as long-lasting one, operating on a scale both too small and too large to be policed by the nation-state. (8)

That we are cued to think of this ‘playing field’ as ‘level’ directs us immediately to the idealism underlying Dimock’s thought experiment. She imagines literary culture to constitute a ‘low-skill, low-stakes, low-level playing field, where people of no particular consequence can become momentarily consequential, can have some say, can take it upon themselves to step forward and “propose, debate, and decide”’ (8). The image put before us is explicitly of literary culture in analogy with a non-governmental organisation such as Amnesty International. Yet the effect of Dimock’s historically particular mobilisation of the NGO as a model here is to reinscribe an ‘aid mechanism' according to
which metropolitan elites administer resource allocations to and for peripher-
alised regions outside of these localities’ own state apparatuses and electoral
procedures – a mechanism that has been rightly and extensively criticised by
participants, activists and scholars of ‘aid and development’. Literature on
this reading becomes a self-credentialising mechanism that structures the
development of underdevelopment as classically theorised by Samir Amin
and Andre Gunder Frank. Prioritising the literate over the non- or weakly
literate hinterlands, and the individual over the communal or the collective,
Dimock imagines literary culture as a settled field, as trans-historical as the
various geological formations and as aloof from dissension, competition and
dispute. While we might harbour some reservations about Casanova’s notion
of a world republic of letters, for reasons that we have already discussed, her
theory might be evoked here as a powerful and plausible counterstatement to
Dimock: for Casanova rightly insists that unequal power relations are consti-
tutive of the literary field and structure it in all of its aspects and dimensions.
Hence her rousing proclamations, early in *The World Republic of Letters*, that
literature comprises ‘a world of rivalry, struggle and inequality’ (2004: 4),
and that ‘[i]ts history is one of incessant struggle and competition over the
very nature of literature itself – an endless succession of literary manifestos,
movements, assaults, and revolutions. These rivalries are what have created
world literature’ (12).

The second problem for Dimock is that her fusion of esoteric deep time and
place marks a return to an old variant of cultural anthropology. ‘To accept the
earth as an astronomical object’, she writes, in a commentary on Gary Snyder,
‘is to embrace a religion affirming the primacy and equality of matter, a primacy
and equality that cross the boundaries between species, even as they cross
the boundaries between the animate and the inanimate’ (2006: 174). Along
with its surface preference for the ‘new materialism’ studies over historical
materialism, this stance suggests a benign version of the romantic conceit
that, before the arrival of Europeans, aboriginal peoples lived in musicalised
content, in harmony with the natural world, free from fear of the unknown or
the need to block greed through taboo. Those who espouse ‘humanness’ in
these terms and propose that the ‘archaic past redefines species membership
itself’ are disinclined to attend to the trans-historicality of secular cycles of
war, environmental mismanagement and epidemics, or to register the record
of the vast translocations of populations resulting from their desperate search
for survival in the face of scarcity or locally engendered ecological disruption,
or their flight to escape capture and domination as bound, coerced labour by
neighbouring factions, groups or peoples. Dimock calls for a ‘science-inspired
humanities’ and, counter-posing ‘science’ and ‘social science’ as paradigm-
atically at odds with one another, suggests that ‘[n]on-Western cultures
would especially benefit from [the] elongated field’ corresponding to the
‘scientific’ problematic: ‘not just Buddhism, but all ancient cultures with a
time frame asymmetrical to the shape of European history, and crucial to the
fate of the earth if modernity is to be saved from being a runaway locomotive’
Combined and Uneven Development

(175). In dissenting from Dimock’s programme, we might refer here to Adam Curtis’s telling argument that the ideology of the (‘resilient’) self-harmonising ecosystem developed alongside the neoliberal ideology of deregulation of public resources and the rise of an extreme version of laissez-faire economics. However unwittingly, Dimock’s New Age-influenced eco-spirituality mirrors neoliberal attacks on statal forms of regional self-determination in the ‘Third World’. When literary culture is presented as a vegetational concept (under the rubric of astrologic and geologic paradigms), the now extra-human speech act, freed from time and space, primordial and external to consciousness, is deprived of the means to function as an agent of political engagement.

A third weakness in Through Other Continents is revealed in the way that Dimock frames her initial example, Thoreau’s Walden. Her suggestion is that, in and through its referencing of the Bhagavad Gita, Thoreau’s text – conceived in Concord, Massachusetts – finds itself ‘irrigated’ by that ‘ancient text from Asia’. ‘Swept by that text and its torrents of time, Walden in turn flows outward, circumnavigating the globe, gliding past Europe and Africa on its way back to India’ (2006: 9). Two problems arise simultaneously here. The first is that Dimock’s identification of a subterranean affinity between a contemporary American text and an ancient Asian one squares all too comfortably with a philosophy of history that sees the modern west in precisely civilisational terms as the trustee of the world’s cultural heritage: the ‘concord’ between Walden and the Bhagavad Gita stands conspicuously in place of conversation between Thoreau and any South Asian intellectuals of his own time. One way of making this point might be to observe that Walden was published in 1854, twenty years after the publication of ‘Macaulay’s Minute’ and three years prior to the onset of the ‘Indian Mutiny’ in 1857; another would be to note that respect, even reverence, towards such ‘treasures’ as Petra, the pyramids, Chichen Itza or Angkor Wat was a marked feature of colonial discourse throughout the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. Eager to promote her argument that literary culture contributes to humanisation, Dimock forgets that supremacist, racist and imperialist ideologies have often gone hand in hand with fervid and learned commitment to the glories of the ancient past.65 The appropriate

65 Dimock begins In Other Continents with an account of the ransacking of the Iraqi National Library and the Islamic library in the Religious Ministry in Baghdad by American Marines in April 2003. ‘Operating under a military timetable, and under the short chronology of a young nation’, she writes, the Marines ‘were largely indifferent to the history of the world’ (2006: 1). The implication that the action of the Marines was in some sense attributable to their status as representatives of a ‘young nation’ with a ‘short chronology’ is immediately belied by Dimock’s own reference to a prior sacking of Baghdad and despoliation of its archives at the hands of a Mongol expeditionary force in 1258. Meanwhile, the fact that they were operating under the long chronology of an ancient nation scarcely caused those who ordered the destruction of the Babri Masjid in 1992 or the Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2001 to scruple.
counter-statement to Dimock is provided by Susan Buck-Morss, who writes, in a forum addressed to her book *Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History* (2009), that ‘[w]ithin the existing model, universal history is cosmopolitanism for the privileged. The past is considered universalized when UNESCO incorporates it into the project of World Heritage, declaring historical sites as cultural treasures – “masterpieces of creative genius” – that remain the property of the state on whose territory they are located, and whose past greatness they display’ (2010: 184).

A second problem here is that Dimock’s postulation of a virtual universe in which ancient and contemporary texts roam freely in mutual recognition operates as a kind of secularised creationism, a humans-walking-with-dinosaurs imaginary. The metonymic drift from one text to another, one moment of communion to another, one world to another (through these communicating texts) very obviously flattens out historical specificities, gradations and differences. So what is ignored here is precisely the question of the specificity of the mode of this communication and exchange – how do they meet and through whom do they talk? In many ways – especially in its mistaking of evidentiary material as interpretive method – Dimock’s project resuscitates Cold War models of the field. The centrality of the New England Transcendentalists (Emerson, Thoreau, Fuller) and their regional followers (Lowell, Henry James) to *Through Other Continents* would hardly disturb a Cold War Americanist. By combining these elite nineteenth-century regional writers with New Age ecosystemic claims, Dimock has forged a means of reconsecrating a canon whose self-evident centrality has otherwise long been under attack. It is striking, moreover, how the questions raised by the particular conjunctions of ancient and modern in her examples, themselves expressions of combined and uneven development, go unasked. Her account is unsurprisingly silent concerning the specific forms and means of importing classical Vedic texts to antebellum New England, and the role they might play in its cultural economy; nor does she explore how the uses to which they were put differ across national and regional boundaries. Rather than analyse how particular transportation and communication networks developed in mid-nineteenth-century America in relation to those elsewhere, Dimock implies that non-American texts are primarily interesting inasmuch as they provide ‘ec-centric’ cultural prestige to core texts that continue to feature prominently on undergraduate syllabi. In this way, landmarks of world culture are made to give themselves up for symbolic exploitation, to the extent that

66 As Mark McGurl has noted, ‘Faced with arguments that leap from Margaret Fuller to ancient Egypt, and from Gilgamesh to Henry James, a contemporary media theorist might be compelled to note how tenuously materialized Dimock’s connections across deep time appear to be. What about the media of transmission from Hafez to Emerson and from Emerson to us? What about the long chain of objects, institutions, and techniques that may have had their own agendas in that meeting of minds? What story does this hardware tell?’ (2012: 535).
their antiquity is used to illumine and revivify, however fleetingly, the glory of the familiar canon.

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As this selective overview of recent efforts to renew the project of comparativism indicates, the challenge of 'world literature' excites expectation and arouses anxiety in equal measure; and this anxiety frequently manifests itself at the level of methodology as a swerve towards civilisational categories in place of historical and materialist ones. The question remains: if 'the way we imagine comparative literature is a mirror of how we see the world', what 'world' does world-literature demand be made visible? What methodology might substitute for the persistent forms of misrecognition that characterise extant comparative approaches? If literature as a form of knowing is to retain its specificity, what knowledge can it convey of the irreducibly conflictual terrain of interrelations that is the modern world-system?