

determined them existed. These two relationships contradict each other, and yet, such a contradictory relationship is taken for granted as a matter of common sense.

We must now try to come to grips with "betweenness" as a unity of contradictories and from which we must take our departure. This betweenness must be distinguished basically from relations other than human, that is, from relations between object and object or between one item and another. The former is certainly betweenness, but it stands negatively against its members. The structure of betweenness will be clarified, point by point, in the following analysis.

Scholars have devalued common sense time and time again. But the question to be asked here is whether science brings to light this contradictory relationship that practical common sense comprehends, even though in an unreflective fashion. Rather, I think it probable that science has not noticed it for quite a long time. Otherwise, scholars could never have thought it possible to apply to human existence a logic based on the principle of contradiction. Sociology, which has developed since the nineteenth century, seems at first sight to deal with being in the betweenness. But I would question whether the relationship between individuals and society could be probed more deeply than practical common sense is already acquainted with. Nevertheless, we cannot say yes to this question, much as we might regret that answer. Sociology tries to avoid a confrontation with contradictory relationships in its attempt to think in separation from individuals, as though it were possible to deal with "society" alone. This is why the logic of community existence must be reinvestigated. But what is worthy of notice here is that the relationships of communal existence are, as a matter of fact, not to be dealt with by "logic," but by "ethics," whose starting point we recognize in reciprocal relationships.

4 individual moments making up human existence

The everyday standpoint acknowledges that betweenness is constituted as a connection between individual persons. From this standpoint, the being of individual persons is recognized but the question that remains concerns precisely what individual persons are. From a commonsense standpoint, we can say that they have bodies they cover with clothes and that they come and go by their own will. Therefore, persons are said to be determined by their ego consciousness and through their bodies. Psychology and physiology are established on such a basis. The knowledge acquired through these sciences has, in turn, contributed to the reshuffling of common sense. But the question is whether our daily life is actually carried on by individual persons described as we have described them.

To begin with a very simple case, let us first take into consideration the body of an individual human. There is no doubt among us, it seems to me, that the body is an organism of the sort that physiology expounds. This does not mean that physiology has already exhaustively resolved the hidden issues surrounding the human body. Rather, our position is that we need not oppose the attempt to deal with the human body as an object of physiology. This is supported by the fact that, whenever we become sick, we consult a physician. If this is so, then the question to ask is whether in our daily life we actually deal with our body as an object of physiology. Is it true to say, when we meet a friend and exchange greetings, that we take for granted that the greeting of our partner is a movement of our physiological body? Is it true to say, on seeing my friend run toward me while calling my name, that

I pay attention only to such things as the vehement movement of muscle and the vibration of vocal chords? Everyone knows that this is not the case. In the movements of the human body, that is, in its behavior, we catch a glimpse of the expression of an acting subject, rather than the mere object of physiology. Hence, in the way in which a human body exists in daily life, we see not so much a physiological process as expressions of certain practical act-connections. Whether the person whom I asked to help me obtain a job says "yes" or "no" by shaking her head vertically or horizontally is nonsense from a purely physiological standpoint, but it is of great practical significance. Through such practical act-connections, the human body is viewed, as it were, as an individual "person" and not as a mere biological organism.

The strict physiological viewpoint is more readily apparent in a procedure that treats the human body purely as a physiological object. A surgeon treats a patient on the operating table in such a way. Otherwise the operation could not be performed dispassionately. However, for an operation to be undertaken dispassionately, the framework of "the operation" needs to be carefully set up in advance. To plunge a scalpel into a human body is precisely what should be done, even though it is a criminal act in other instances. It should be performed because she who plunges the scalpel into a body is the surgeon, and the one who suffers from this surgeon's knife is the patient. For the purposes of medical treatment, a surgeon must use the scalpel and without hesitation, if it is deemed necessary. She does so because she acts in her capacity as a qualified surgeon. Moreover, the doctor cannot obtain such qualification unless she has undergone a long period of practice, training, and learning beforehand. Even then, the surgeon is not allowed to perform operations whenever she pleases. First of all, she must explain to the patient and to the patient's family members or friends the reasons why the operation is required and she must secure their agreement. Thus, given the agreement of society, or of those who are closely related to the patient, and within a specified period of time, the patient's body is then to be treated as a purely physiological object. What we must keep in mind here is that such treatment is available only at the hands of a surgeon, and all that the patient's family or friends did was to allow treatment to occur. For the family, a "parent" or "child," not a mere body, is undergoing surgery. Indeed, a family member who may observe the operation often falls down in a faint. After the operation, even the physician tries to deal with his patient as a person who is related as a parent or child or whatever.

Therefore, to deal with a human being as a mere physiological object, we must deprive her of various other qualifications in order to construct an abstract framework of understanding. Such abstraction is theoretically very easy, but practically it involves us in many difficulties. From a theoretical standpoint, it is not so difficult to conceive of another person's body merely physiologically and to regard it as an object of corporeal pleasures alone. From a practical standpoint, troublesome facilities are required to be set up.¹ For example, if one has sexual relations with another, without taking advantage of these facilities, the act can never be mere corporeal contact. Even if one person's hand touches another person's hand, it is contact between two persons who possess specific qualities beyond the purely physiological. Facilities within society are set up to function in such a way as to deprive persons of all of their human qualities and isolate sexual intercourse from distinctively human relations. To demand and enter into such constructions is to exhibit one's intention to treat human beings as if they were animals. Such action must be condemned ethically. Within these facilities, however, one is able to abstract from human relationships that which corporeal contact obviously should imply, as well as those obligations and responsibilities that accompany them. Yet, even these facilities cannot operate in the way originally intended, for a mere physical body is itself an artificial abstraction. This abstraction cannot be strictly maintained unless we grant some inhuman compulsion. Thus, even given such an abstraction, people still endeavor to construct some human connections within it, and if they fail to do so, they are likely to die of despair. The committing of a double suicide is itself a practical revolt against the view that human beings are only physical bodies.

If physical bodies already have their own qualities, then it becomes much more difficult to find distinctive individuality in physical bodies alone. Of what does the individuality of physical bodies consist so far as a human body is concerned? So far as physiological bodies are concerned, they can be spoken of as easily as individual trees. But this is not the case with bodies viewed as expressions of the subjective or as persons in their concrete qualities. A mother and her baby can never be conceived of as merely two independent individuals. A baby wishes for its mother's body, and the mother offers her breast to the baby. If they are separated from each other, they look for each other with all the more intensity. Since ancient times in Japan, any attempt to isolate two bodies such as these from each other has been described

by the aphorism "to wrench green wood." As is evident, a mother's body and her baby's are somehow connected as though one. To contend that there is no such connection between them, because the link connecting them is not an actual cell is valid for physiological bodies but has nothing to do with subjective bodies. Of course, capacities that inhere in mother or child are also capacities inherent in their bodies. For the child, its mother's body is unique and entirely different from all others; and for the mother, her child's body is also uniquely distinctive. Is it not inevitable to think that this bodily connection is such as to make it impossible to regard these two merely as independent individuals? A mother may go out, leaving her baby at home, but she is all the while attentive to it. Her baby also anticipates its mother's return. This power of attraction, even though not physical attraction alone, is yet a real attraction connecting the two as though one. If it is thinkable that a nucleus, with its electrons circulating around it, constitutes one atom and not just separate individuals, then it is equally permissible to think that a mother's body and her child's are also combined as one. To isolate them as separate individuals, some sort of destruction must occur. That is to say, the connection must be shattered by a power stronger than the connective one. To the extent that this cannot be done, then there is no independence of bodies.

Bodily connections are always visible wherever betweenness prevails, even though the manner of connection may differ. Such connections are readily recognized even among friends, let alone between man and woman, as well as husband and wife. That one wishes to visit a friend implies that she intends to draw near to the friend's body. If she does go to visit a friend who is at some distance by streetcar, then her body moves in the friend's direction, attracted by the power between them that draws them together. If it were previously known that her friend's body was absent (that the friend was away), then this attraction could not possibly operate. That one feels lonely during a vacation because friends are scattered indicates that their bodies are so far away from each other that no contact may be possible. If a relationship between friends allows no possibility for bodily contact, then no phenomena of attraction can be imagined.

With regard to a human body specifically, the incommunicability of bodily sensation is often spoken of. For example, when another person experiences pain we can certainly share in it mentally but cannot actually share the physical pain itself. Indeed, the pain in another person's leg is not my pain. Generally speaking, another person's bodily sensations are exactly what we cannot feel in our own body.

But to conclude that it is out of the question for us to share bodily sensations with others in some sense is a fabrication. For instance, when we stand together, exposed to the scorching heat of the sun, we share the heat. When we are exposed to a cold wind, we can feel the cold together. Therefore, in a life in which we share the same work, we also always share similar bodily sensations. We are far from having even roundabout methods with which to infer another person's bodily sensations from facial expressions alone, to take a single instance (i.e., to analogically infer that it is the same with the other, in comparison with one's own facial expressions, and the bodily sensations they represent). Rather, we assume that we feel the same bodily sensation. Therefore, those who together feel the heat can say simultaneously that it is hot. Or, when one says that it is hot, the other can readily consent without delay.

Were it not for this communicability of sensations, we would be unable to extend even the compliments of the season to another. Difference in bodily sensations can be discerned only on the basis of such **communicability** and as its determinations. Were this not so and were bodily sensations entirely incommunicable, then how could common words expressing them have emerged? Because we already share pain or heat with one another, we are able to infer, from seeing another person frown, that she is in pain or is experiencing sensations of heat. Apart from this ability to communicate, a facial expression would lose its meaning altogether. Words cannot emerge in a situation where even facial expressions are incommunicable. Therefore, that common words expressing bodily sensations are available to us is already clear proof of this communicability. When another person has pain in her leg, it is true that I do not have the same pain in my leg. I cannot share the actual pain which she has in her leg. However, in the event that both of us are hit on the leg by stones at the same time, we would then share the same pain. The truth is that the incommunicability of pain makes its appearance as a lack of such **communicability**. But it is not the case that pain is essentially incommunicable. Hence, we ought not to negate the connection between one body and another by appealing to the incommunicability of bodily sensations.

The following objections may be raised: Is it not the case that what I call a connection between one body and another is merely a psychological relation? Is not the attraction between a mother and her child, as well as between friends, psychological rather than physical? To be justified in insisting that there is a connection between one body and another, the existence of the attraction, which is bodily but not psychological, must

be demonstrated. However this may be, a human body is a physical solid. The attraction between one physical solid and another is nothing but a physical one. And it is not easy to find this sort of physical attraction between one human body and another. These latter objections seem irrefutable, for attempts to take a human body for a physical solid and to account for a power that sets it into motion as the nonmaterial mind, and then to deal with the relationship between them have for years been the main themes pursued by anthropology. For this anthropological standpoint to be justified, one must, first of all, make sure that a human body *is* a mere physical solid. In reality, this is not so easy as one might suppose. In the previous example, we found a human body transformed into a physical solid on the operating table. To regard a human body as a mere physical solid is nothing but a provisional supposition set up for the sake of medical treatment. Apart from the purpose of concretely curing "a person," this supposition has no validity. Moreover, the reason why the viewing of a human body merely as a material solid has been influential lies in our having become accustomed to thinking of a human body as if it were graspable by merely looking at it, instead of through a variety of practical considerations. A human body, when merely looked at, is nothing but a thing extended in space, like a chair used for sitting. If it is objected that a human body differs in form from a chair, then it would be acceptable to conceive of it as the same as a sculpture or a doll placed side by side with it. After all, is it not the case that human bodies are "material solids" that have the same common form as the latter? The distinction that makes one a living person and the other a doll is recognized only by inference and is, therefore, not something immediately given. This distinctive way of looking at things arises only within a position in which the practical attitude has become completely eliminated and thus is not in accordance with actual everyday reality. When I discover a friend of mine waiting for me beside a bronze statue, the friend is never immediately given merely as a material solid having the same form as the statue. Instead, I discover my friend there, from the beginning. When I shake hands with my friend, it is not that I first touch her hand as a material solid and afterwards come to infer that this material solid is put into motion by my friend's mind. Rather, from the outset, I touch my friend herself. There is no momentary period of time in which a human body is experienced as a mere material solid. (According to Max Scheler, we perceive shame in a blush and pleasure in a laugh. The phrase *first of all, a mere material solid is given*, is entirely false. Only for a physician or an investigator of natural phenomena, that is, only for those who

artificially eliminate the phenomena of expressions as primarily given in everyday experience, are such things as purely material solids given.)² After I beat another person's body, can I excuse myself by saying that I performed this violence because of my slight dislike of the form of this material solid and that I had no intention of offering an insult to the mind that dwells there? What is more, to speak of the matter in accordance with a merely observing attitude, this observing activity already subjectively involves within itself an element of the human body. It may well be that the agent who looks is a knowing subject. But this subject's looking is an activity performed with her eyes. Therefore, even if someone touches a thing with a finger, for the purpose of observing it, it is, nonetheless, the observer herself who touches it with her finger. This is true even from a merely observational standpoint and even more so from a standpoint of practical action, according to which to say that a subject moves is tantamount to saying that a human body moves. There is no distance between a subject and a human body. Hence, whether considered theoretically or practically, a human body is subjective through and through, so long as it is an element in the activity of a subject.

The viewing of a human body only as a solid material object does not call into question the reality of the subjective human body, although it does focus on the objective one. As a consequence, what is dealt with is nothing more than either a relationship between a subjective ego and an objective human body or a relationship between an objective ego and an objective human body. From ancient times this viewpoint has made it impossible to have a correct understanding of the human body. However, contemporary philosophy requires us to reject this traditional viewpoint, and to return to the facts themselves. (For instance, Scheler insists that, while dealing with the human body as the objective realm of the intentionality of "consciousness of . . .," it is given independent of and prior to the individual sense organs, sensations, and individual external perceptions, not only as an entirely unified phenomenal fact but also as a subject which finds itself in such and such a specific way (i.e., *Subject eines So-und Andersbefindens*). As a result, the human body lays the foundation of the givenness of the body/soul (*Leibseele*) or *Körperleib*. This "basic foundational phenomenon" is called the *human body* in the strict sense of the term.³ What is not in accord with the concrete facts of experience is the view that something psychological, accompanied by no bodily events, and a process of the physical body entirely unrelated to bodily experiences subsist in the form of an opposition between body and mind existing independent of each other.⁴

When we are aware of something in our mind, this experience already involves the human body as an element within it. As well, when we put our human body into motion, the movement of mind is already involved as an element in this motion. For instance, let us consider smiling with pleasure. Within the bodily experience of pleasure a human body is already involved as a feeling and moving agent, which produces a smile, which is itself a bodily motion. Hence, this bodily motion is already filled with mind, which jumps with joy. The phrase, *a mind jumps with joy* already indicates the inseparability of mind and body. The grasping of a human body subjectively makes this clear enough. And, from an everyday standpoint, this inseparability is already understood in and through the practical connections involved.

To hold the view that the relationship between one human body and another is a psychological relation, involving an element of bodily experience as well is common enough. To account for this relationship as though it were merely a psychological relationship without giving heed to the relationship between one human body and another is an obvious error. To whatever extent a mental element is involved, human bodies are attracted by and related to each other. These connections are neither merely physical nor merely psychological or physical/psychological. Generally speaking these connections are not objective connections, but subjective ones, which are inherent in human bodies.

Therefore, it is evident that a human body is not, of its own accord, something individually independent. To make it individually independent, we must cut its connections with other human bodies and completely dissociate it from its attraction to others. That is to say, only by destroying or negating the connections between human bodies do we render them capable of being grasped as existing apparently independent of one another. At the same time, this implies the destruction of the capacity for human connections that a human body carries on its back. And this destruction of the capacity is acquired only on the condition that we revolt against the betweenness inherent in existence. A mother can become independent of her child for the first time only when her body revolts against the relationship between parent and child and becomes thereby dissociated from her bodily capacity to be a mother such that her breast swells toward her child. In the same way, husband and wife cut off their bodily connection through divorce, and friends cease to attract each other after a quarrel. The destruction of betweenness results in the birth of opposing bodily tendencies such as dislike, avoidance, and repulsion.

However, human bodies become independent of each other only relatively, yet this does not mean that they become absolutely independent individuals. Hence, for the sake of acquiring individual independence as a body, the revolt against all sorts of betweenness and the destruction of all sorts of capacities is required. You must dissociate yourself even from the capacity as a man of being attracted to a woman. From this extreme vantage point, two examples may be imagined. The first is that of a human body transformed into a mere material solid object which is no longer a person. A human body that is no longer either a parent or a child, not a man or a woman, cannot any longer be "a person." It may certainly be said to be an individual material solid, but this does not exhibit any individuality such as is characteristic of a human being. Individual material solids can never in themselves constitute betweenness. On the other hand, what we are seeking are individual persons who constitute betweenness. Thus, it is to be taken for granted that such persons cannot be found in material solids deprived of their capacity to produce betweenness.

The second example is that a human body that, while carrying on its subjectivity to an extreme, finally dissociates itself from every sort of relational capacity. This body is neither that of a man nor a woman nor is it to be conceived of as a believer belonging to any religious association. A believer possesses one of the capacities prescribed by a betweenness-oriented existence, and hence, a believer's body has a necessary connection with some religious association. Then, is what remains left at the extremity a human body standing before God as one of His creatures? Even she who prays alone in separation from all connection still has her body that kneels and clasps its hands in veneration. But this is precisely a body that is affiliated with God, which is obviously revealed through this prayerful facial expression. Thus, it is not so much an absolutely independent body as an absolutely dependent body. That is to say, in the extremity in which we examine the individual independence of a body, we reach a point at which individual independence necessarily perishes. This is what in Buddhism is described as "the dropping off of body-mind." Even Buddhists who abandon every kind of human privilege in aid of gaining absolute enlightenment and who remain tenaciously engaged with Buddhist truth with a willingness to kill even the founder of Buddhism in order to detach from a connection with all religious association, nonetheless finally end up sitting meditation, which is to a great extent a bodily activity. When they break through this bodily meditation, their body becomes

entirely emptied. That is to say, the subjective body terminates in absolute emptiness, when its individuality is carried to the extreme. This is a real feature and characteristic of the individuality of a human body.

At this point a conclusion is reached. Insofar as betweenness is constituted, one human body is connected with another. And insofar as this connection is completely destroyed, then either the human body is a material solid, unable to constitute betweenness, or it terminates in absolute emptiness. To the extent to which we look for a human being's individuality in her body, we have no alternative but to reach this conclusion. Is it possible to look for her individuality in the consciousness of ego?

Modern philosophy took its departure from the consciousness of ego and attained its climax there as well. Even in contemporary philosophy, whether it be phenomenology or fundamental ontology as is expanded by Heidegger, the central question is, in the final analysis, the consciousness of ego. However, it is not easy to consider this issue briefly. Insofar as the question of looking for the individuality in the consciousness of ego is concerned, there is no ambiguity. The reason for this is that by starting from the consciousness of ego, the issue of looking for the individuality of the consciousness of ego does not even arise. I am conscious of myself, therefore I am, but it is not clear whether another ego exists. Only my ego exists with certainty. All other beings are nothing but what is mediated through the thinking activity of this ego. The ego exists as independent from the outset. Whether individual independence is recognizable in the consciousness of ego has no meaning here at all. Rather, the question of greater importance for this discussion concerns how it is possible to know that, in addition to this ego, other egos exist as well. Kant once remarked that it is a shame for philosophy that this question still remains problematic. Even for contemporary philosophy, it is still one of the questions under dispute. (See, for example, Max Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*: "Vom fremden Ich." In this work Scheler considers six meanings involved in this question in some detail, and "the evidence of Thou" is expounded as the key to a solution to this problem. Volkelt, to whom Scheler refers, agrees with this view. They agree in that they reach the same conclusion, but they are divided in their method.)

However, we took our departure from the fact that everyday reality consists of practical connections between one human being and another. There is no doubt about these connections, for they are immediately evident to us. We must ask who are these individuals who constitute this kind of betweenness and whether their individuality is

already recognized in the consciousness of ego. This problem is not easy for modern philosophy to resolve, but for us it is immediately evident. The independence of the ego, about which there is no doubt for modern philosophy, must be called into question from the outset, given our standpoint. Thus, the ways of handling this question are precisely the converse of each other. This difference results because, although the one way is concerned only with the relationships between human being and nature, without heeding the relationships between one human being and another, the other begins with human relationships. In other words, whereas the former confines itself to the standpoint of contemplating objects alone, the latter proceeds by investigating subjective practices.

Consider what the phrase *I am conscious of* implies for our everyday practical relationships. As Descartes points out, the *cogito* implies that I perform such acts as seeing, perceiving, imagining, doubting, having an insight into something, affirming, negating, wanting or not wanting, loving, hating, and so on. It is not that what is called *I* exists in separation from these acts, and then performs them. I am I through becoming conscious of something. Consciousness of "I" cannot be isolated from its "objects of consciousness." There is no activity of seeing apart from seeing something, and there is no activity of loving apart from loving something. Therefore, strictly speaking, we must describe the intentionality of consciousness as "I am conscious of *something*." However, in our daily lives we look at, doubt, or love a *Thou*. That is to say, "I become conscious of *Thou*." My seeing *Thou* is already determined by your seeing me, and the activity of my loving *Thou* is already determined by your loving me. Hence, my becoming conscious of *Thou* is inextricably interconnected with your becoming conscious of me. This interconnection we have called *betweenness* is quite distinct from the intentionality of consciousness. Activity inherent in the consciousness of "I" is never determined by this "I" alone but is also determined by others. It is not merely a reciprocal activity in that oneway conscious activities are performed one after another but, rather, that either one of them is at once determined by both sides; that is, by itself and by the other. Hence, so far as *betweenness-oriented* existences are concerned, each consciousness interpenetrates the other. When *Thou* gets angry, my consciousness may be entirely colored by *Thou's* expressed anger, and when I feel sorrow, *Thou's* consciousness is influenced by *I's* sorrow. It can never be argued that the consciousness of such a self is independent.

The dictum that "I am conscious of *Thou*" is a simplified formulation of the consciousness of betweenness. Moreover, the

interpenetration of consciousnesses, however different in degree, cannot be got rid of, for it ranges from the most intimate *I/Thou* relationship to a temporary one such as is constituted by passengers on the same streetcar. That there are many passengers on the streetcar determines the consciousness of *I*. Even in the case in which the consciousness of *I* is never directed to other persons, that is, a mode of consciousness in which one finds oneself together with other persons and, yet, has no relationship with them, is nonetheless already codetermined by them. Here we have a manner of consciousness totally different from that in which we find ourselves with persons with whom we are well acquainted. We certainly recognize this difference, however vague the consciousness involved may be. Because of this, the passengers in the streetcar possess a definite attitude toward each other as passengers, and the society formed within it assumes a specific character as such.

The interpenetration of the consciousnesses of self and other is conspicuously recognizable in emotion. (A book that deals with this issue in detail is Scheler's *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, vol. 2.) We share the same emotions as others in situations in which the relationship between oneself and the other is quite intimate and in which a sense of community is to a considerable extent realized. For parents who have a child, concern for their child is shared by both. Therefore, were they to lose their child, their grief would be a common grief. They would feel the same grief at the same time. Father and mother know from the start that they are lamenting the same lament, without having to pay attention to each other's experiences. We could enumerate other examples in which disciples have lost their admired teacher or followers have lost a leader to whom they had dedicated their lives. In such cases, the independence of the consciousness of ego is almost completely lost sight of.

What is ordinarily called *sympathy* is not a common emotion as was illustrated previously. It is not that parents who have lost their beloved child are able to sympathize with each other. Instead, true sympathy lies in our ability to feel another person's emotional experiences and to share them. Thus, together with a friend we may lament the death of her child and share her grief. The grief is obviously not the same grief that would be experienced at the death of our own child. Still, it might well be called *grief* nonetheless. Even if I have no reason to lament and find myself in a particularly delightful frame of mind, my consciousness tends to take on a gloomy air overall because I feel

my friend's grief. As a consequence, I not only shrink from acting flippantly but even consider it inexcusable for me to find enjoyment, in contrast with my friend who grieves. In this case, my ego consciousness is penetrated by her grief.

Even when intimate relationships, or relationships in which one "feels with" another are not in evidence, nonetheless the interpenetration of consciousnesses still occurs. This is evident in the infectious quality of emotions. For example, one who is seized by melancholia, perhaps due to fatigue, is soon in high spirits once more on entering the company of friends who are engaged in chatting in a silly fashion and on participating in this silly talk for a time. Social gatherings and clubs that developed in Europe were established with the aim of encouraging this infectious quality of the emotions. To escape depression, people attend gatherings and go to various clubs, where they may encounter cheerful faces and listen to funny stories. In such circumstances, no one refers to his or her own pain or grief. Rather, what one does is not to sympathize with others, but to cheer up one another collectively. Moreover, it is recognized that a cheerful mood is regularly occasioned by the interpenetration of one or more consciousnesses. What is called *mass psychology* is frequently carried out by utilizing this infectious quality of the emotions. It sometimes happens that this infectiousness recurs again and again so that the emotions inherent in a crowd of people are extraordinarily heightened. Surely none will assume that the consciousness of ego, which moves in the midst of such emotions, is strictly independent.

The account of the infectiousness of the emotions is found in its extreme form in Scheler, who develops the notion of unified feeling. For Scheler, *I* and another *I* are completely identified. Among the ideal types of unified feeling he expounds is also the interpenetration of consciousnesses, which is not necessarily based on the community of being. Consider, for instance, the pathologically unified feeling that occurs between a hypnotist and the hypnotized person, or the psychology of a child who is absorbed in play or is fascinated by dramatic performances, or a mental state in which someone is charmed by something. Nevertheless, what stands out as an ideal instance of unified feeling is the intense infectiousness of those emotions closely connected to the community of being. To illustrate with a few examples, Scheler refers to the consciousness of identification between oneself and the other prevalent among primitives and recognized in totemism, or *Extasis* as found in the mystic cults of ancient religions, or in sexual intercourse

in intimate love affairs, or in that love which terminates in the unity of self and other as found between mother and child, and so forth. These are instances in which the consciousness of ego perishes, so to speak.

To the extent that the consciousness of *I* is grasped as that which intends the other person as its object, then it is not mere intentionality but a betweenness in which the reciprocal penetration of consciousnesses is evident. But the consciousness of *I* also includes an intention of "things" or of "matters of fact" apart from human relations. However, this conscious activity is a oneway intentionality; one not determined by its counterpart. As a result, are we not led to the conclusion that here, only the consciousness of *I* is in evidence?

Even in this case, however, inasmuch as the relationship between self and other persists behind the scenes, the consciousness of ego does not emerge independently. When I see something together with another person, it is not *I* alone who sees the object, I see it together with that person. Therefore, the sense of "feeling with" another is also here instantiated. That consciousness by means of which I feel the beauty of a picture and your consciousness of this picture cannot be said to be entirely independent of each other. We may all "feel" the same beauty. Yet, the differences in people's ways of feeling are likely comparable only because of the existence of this common feeling. An outstanding illustration of a common feeling is the feeling of fright in response to a great earthquake. In this case, our consciousness is not directed toward persons but toward the earthquake itself, and we are all collectively frightened, without having enough time to take into account another person's experiences. Whenever we meet with an unexpected event, our consciousness is clothed in such characteristically communal reactions. For instance, in the event of an electric streetcar emitting fire as the result of an explosion, the passengers who stand up simultaneously feel the same fright. In this event, that they stand up simultaneously is itself an expression of this common feeling.

The same can be said of consciousness becoming conscious of the ego. Fichte, in maintaining that the easiest way to assist people in gaining a clear-cut understanding of the concept of ego, said: "I would like to say to someone the following: think of some object, for instance a wall in front of you, or your desk. There is no doubt that over and above this thinking about some object, you also recognize 'a thinking agent'. This thinking agent is you yourself. In thinking, you immediately become conscious of the activity of thinking."⁵ Incidentally, in the case in which the "I" who is teaching and the "Thou" who is taught are together thinking of the wall, then both are also thinking of the ego, which

itself is thinking of the wall. Apart from this community of 'I' and 'Thou', Fichte's claim makes no sense at all, and one would be unable to teach another to understand the concept of ego. It can be taught only because the issue of the ego commonly enters into conscious awareness. For this reason, even when we say that we become conscious of the ego, it cannot be a consciousness of the "I" alone, especially at that place where the relationship between self and other is involved.

What is required for us to search for the independent consciousness of the "I" is the positing of the standpoint of the "I" as existing alone, in which there is no one else with whom the "I" shares the same consciousness. This is the case when, while alone, I look at the wall in my study and think of my self that is looking at it. However, in this case if I become conscious of the wall as a wall, then social consciousness has already intervened. What is called a *wall* is that "form" society imprints on clay or sand as a specific tool (that is, as a part of a house). The form does not belong to the consciousness of "I" alone, but rather exhibits a meaning common to all those who are concerned with this tool. Hence, for us to look at the wall as a wall indicates that we are conscious of a meaning that is expressive of this particular thing and indicates that we have already significantly entered the realm of common consciousness. If so, then, to look for that consciousness which exists independently, we must go back to some sort of primitive consciousness in which we do not yet look at the wall as a wall. That is to say, something like the sensation of a stretch of some color must be substituted for the notion of the wall, and an agent possessing this sensation must be posited as equivalent to what is usually called the *ego*, so to speak. In this way, the consciousness of the "I" acquires its independence under the guise of a collection of sensations.

Nonetheless, the results we have just obtained are not in accordance with the facticity of the situation. The consciousness we possess in our daily lives is never a mere collection of sensations. Even when we remain in our study alone, we are still conscious of a wall as a wall, of a desk as a desk, and of a book as a book. It is not that we first possess sensations of color, or tactual sensations, and then proceed to construct a definite thing by bringing them together to form a unity. When looking for a book, we usually already have an eye for a specific book prior to perceiving it; and when looking at a desk, we usually already look at it with the view of writing upon it. This means that from the beginning we must concern ourselves with tools and assume that there is no more primitive consciousness than this concern. The reduction of the perception of objects as tools to sensations is rendered possible only

from within a specific psychological standpoint, in an artificial and purposely abstractive fashion.

We can now say that there is great difficulty in grasping the consciousness of "I" as independently individual. As Gabriel Tarde pointed out, even with natural phenomena, it is not that we come to consciousness of them by beginning with sensations. Instead, we perceive natural phenomena as lending themselves to a definite interpretation from the outset. Generally speaking, we directly perceive phenomena as already named by our native language, for instance, *yoake* ("daybreak"), *taiyo* ("the sun"), *seiten* ("fine weather"), *ame* ("rain"), *kaze* ("wind"), *yūgure* ("evening"), *yoru* ("night"), and so on. In the perception of these phenomena, we are already conscious of the communality of identical contents of consciousness. In combination with language, common sense, and those scientific theories prevalent in an age, all play a role, providing a number of prism facets that affect the contents of consciousness. In societies in which sun worship was in vogue, individuals perceived the sun as something divine. For that common sense which is affected by natural science, the sun is perceived as a heavenly body. In either case, the sun is perceived in a specific way from the start, but it is not the case that the same sun is perceived differently as judgment or manners of inference differ. Sun worshippers did not possess the mere sensation of sunlight. Indeed, long before they acquired the capacity of judgment or of inference, even from childhood, people had already been provided with a specific form of social consciousness. This is also true of human desires. Human desires are already characterized by specific social forms. For instance, an appetite makes its appearance as a desire for bread, rice, a meat dish, or seafood specifically, all instances peculiar to the cultural location where this appetite arises. That there are fixed forms of cooking is already proof that an appetite is the appetite of a community, rather than being strictly individual. What is more, were it not for the communal character of appetite, there could be no restaurants, grocery stores, greengrocers, or seafood stores, nor could there be such economic activities as farming, fishing, animal husbandry, and so on. In the same way, the desire for clothing and housing, as well as sexual desire itself, are based on communal consciousness and are socially qualified or modified.

What makes this communal consciousness manifest in a particularly bold form, is the phenomenon of "fashion." Fashion makes its appearance within the modes of clothing, food, and housing already historically and nationally fixed as more detailed common favorites. Even though individuals did not, to begin with, become conscious of a

common favorite as their own, nevertheless, they do feel it to be their own favorite to the extent that they are inclined to view deviations from this common favorite as either something funny or ugly. The same is true of spoken language and thought. It is not that words that are "in fashion" cannot express their own unique sort of consciousness, but rather that they are capable of expressing it much better. When an idea comes into vogue, it tends to be regarded as excellent on the ground that it belongs to some majority's way of thinking, and what is opposed to it is condemned as something worthless. No standpoint forsakes the independence of the consciousness of "I" more thoroughly than this one.

Then where should the independence of the consciousness of "I" be looked for? To illustrate with an example, it can be looked for in bodily sensations or in sense feeling. This is where Scheler, who put emphasis on community feeling, looked for independent individual consciousness. It is not that he thought that all bodily feelings leave no room for sympathy. A distinction must be made between sense feeling, which is located in a specific part of the human body, and life feeling.⁶ Sense feeling makes its appearance in various kinds of pain or pleasure; for instance, in sensations such as eating food, drinking, touching, the carnal appetites, and so forth. Life feeling is concerned with healthy feeling, or enfeebled feeling resulting from illness, or feelings of vigor or fatigue. Although feeling pain, one may also feel sensations of vigor and strength simultaneously. Similarly, one can feel fatigue, while feeling pleasure. For this reason, these two feeling types constitute spheres that are distinct. What is particularly noteworthy here is that ascendent and descendent tendencies of life as well as health and its deterioration can be felt not only in one's life but also in another's, thereby making the sharing of feelings with others possible. Nevertheless, the pain or pleasure that is felt in a specific place in one's physical body can be neither felt nor directly sympathized with by others. The taste of food and the texture of cloth are entirely peculiar to each individual and leave no room for communally perceived qualities. Commodities corresponding to shared feelings may render possible the connecting of people with each other, but food and clothing specifically must be distributed among them and, hence, may actually separate them from one another. These features are characteristic of bodily feeling.

Were this view tenable, however, then communal eating or fashion could not be understood. Although we may evaluate the same picture together with others, we taste food by dividing it among us.

Its taste depends on each person's peculiar sense of taste. In spite of this, is it true to say that tastes differ from one to another? Do we not enjoy the same sweetness when we taste sugar, dividing it among us? If one person tastes sugar and finds it bitter, we would lose no time in finding her medical care on the assumption that she is sick. We attempt to deal with her as a person who is normally able to taste the same sweetness, although she is temporarily deprived of this ability. Based on the phenomenon that people experience the same taste, "communal eating" has played a socially important role since ancient times. Ranging from sacrificial food in the totemistic period, through banquets in ancient times, as well as the Sacrament in which one takes part in the sharing of Christ's body and blood within Christianity, to the dinner parties so prevalent in the present age, all such activities take advantage of eating as an expression of human interconnection. If it were true that bodily feelings separate people from one another, then such instances could not have occurred. Likewise, a happy family may be associated with such things as dining together or a person's eating at the same mess with others is likely an expression of these people being close friends; these are examples that may well prove that the consciousness of community is based upon a common sense of taste. It is also evident that this sort of community is not based on the communal character of the sense of taste alone. Were it not that the communal character of the sense of taste is an important factor, then it would not have been possible for phenomena such as communal meals to have become such grand-scale social events as they were and are. All that I have said about the communal character of appetite is also true of the cases under consideration. In connection with clothing, the communal character of touch can also be investigated in the same way. And the same can be said with respect to other bodily feelings. I think it correct to say that the economic activities of society are based not so much on the communal quality of mental feelings, as on bodily feelings.

I think it of no use to attempt to find the individuality of consciousness in sensefeelings. Therefore, the only way yet untried is to look within the center of conscious activities, that is, within the personality, which is "the unity of consciousness" or "the point of individuality." It may be that we share with others the sense of taste, the act of seeing, or even the act of thinking. However, the agents involved in these activities are not the same. *I* acts as *I*, and *Thou* acts as *Thou*. Even when all the qualities by which personality is qualified are removed, such as family and friendly relationships, jobs, societal impact, and the requirements of the state, there still remains the *I* that is the

agent operating through these acts. This is the deep-rooted point of individuality, which cannot be shared. What illustrates this most clearly is the consciousness of *I* taken as a succession of *nows*. It is only that consciousness originally belonging to *I* that we retain. *I* is not capable of retaining another person's consciousness. For this reason, the unity of retention is entirely individualistic in nature. Even when parents suffer deep grief at the loss of their child, that which renders this experience of grief possible is that which each individual consciousness retains. Unless all the events that occurred in the relationship they bore to their child were retained in the same consciousness in a unified manner, inclusive of her life and possibly her death, then grief could not possibly arise. Behind the various sorts of community must lie the noncommunal unity of individual consciousness.

This assertion is made on the assumption that an act of consciousness consists in a one-directional act of intentionality. Given this, it may well be that the unifying agent of this activity of consciousness is individualistic. What happens, however, if it is true that the conscious acts of an individual are codetermined by another person's acts? What is sought must be a betweenness-oriented retention. In fact, the retention of consciousnesses that interpenetrates into another can and must be communal. For example, suppose that something important is spoken within an intimate relationship between an *I* and a *Thou*. It is never the case that *I*, when listening to a series of spoken words, experiences a mere succession of sounds, that is, a succession of *nows*. Instead, *I* grasps the manner in which an advance on her relationship to *Thou* is made in parallel with what *Thou* speaks. The *koto* of which *Thou* speaks discloses the manner in which *Thou* is concerned with *me*, and at the same time, draws out the manner in which *I* concern myself with *Thou*. Therefore, if words are broken off in the midst of saying something of importance, it is not that *I* hears a mere succession of sounds that are somehow interrupted. Instead, *I* feels a strong tension, that is, an extraordinary continuity of words about to be spoken. Or, if I am impressed by something said and this something is intermingled with the rest of what is spoken, then *I* may pause in my listening at that one thing, even though words continue to flow one after another. The continuity is interrupted. What *I* hear is not a succession of sounds, but the *koto* that expresses the betweenness of *I* and *Thou*. Even though this *koto* is spoken by *Thou* by means of her voice, the *koto* itself is communally retained between *I* and *Thou*.

Only through this communal retention does the betweenness of *I* and *Thou* arise, with its own historical development. A series of spoken

words is, in practical reality, primarily an expression of this betweenness and not a mere succession of sounds. For words to be a mere succession of sounds, subjective betweenness must be discarded. Whenever a partner with whom we are intimately related comes to speak to us, there is of necessity an expression of her business or feelings. We cannot listen to a mere succession of sounds without catching hold of the meaning of this expression. If we do not listen to what a partner says because our attention has been arrested by something else, then we do not listen to the succession of sounds either. Let us consider a situation in which we have no intimate concern with anything. For instance, as casual passengers on a train, we happen to hear other passengers talking with one another. Do we hear only a succession of sounds? No, not at all. To the extent that we understand the meaning of their dialogue, we experience bodily the betweenness of others, which may then develop even further. The state of our mind differs depending on whether the dialogue is an expression of good friendship or a quarrel. Were we merely aware of a succession of sounds, such things could not occur. Of course, if the language we happen to overhear is foreign to us—one we cannot understand at all—then only a mere succession of sounds would be heard. This is why the sound of our own language is not as distinct as that of a foreign language. Therefore, when one deals with a series of words as mere successive sounds in an attempt to investigate the consciousness of retention, one is engaging in an experiment to attempt to artificially discard the meaning of the words. We must conclude that what is conceived of as the consciousness of retention is nothing more than an artificial and abstract consciousness.

This is true not only of words, for even when we listen to a melody, we never listen as though to a mere succession of sounds. Instead, we comprehend directly the meaning conveyed by these sounds. To illustrate this with a simpler example, let us consider a fire alarm. It consists of a repetition of three consecutive sounds. But instead of hearing it as a succession of three sounds, we hear it as a fire warning from the outset. And upon hearing it in this way, we immediately stand to open the door and lose no time in getting out of the house. This is so because the fire alarm is a societal expression. Moreover, that it is such an expression rests on the supposition that to retain the succession of these three consecutive sounds is a retention not merely in individual consciousness but also in communal consciousness. Were it not for this communal retention, it could not be established as a kind of expression.

An act of retention may be conceived of as being extremely individualistic, because it is the act that unifies various activities. We so con-

ceive it only because, first of all, we draw out the consciousness of an individual and think of it abstractly. It is not that an act of retention is itself essentially individualistic. The same can be said of a unifying or operating agent of acts. It could also be a communal unifier or operator of communal acts. Only when we deal with it as a unifier of individual acts have we no choice but to conceive of it as individualistic. Hence, although an individual is here presupposed, it is not something revealed here. Whoever insists on the noncommunal character of personality, as Scheler does, while expounding a communal feeling seems to have arrived at the unifier of acts by eliminating every sort of communal character. Yet, Scheler arrived at the concept of an individual only in the sense that the personality as a whole regarded as a spiritual community (such as a church or a nation) is also individualistic. This personality as a whole is a unifying agent inherent in the center of spiritual activities. It performs its activities in the same manner as an individual personality.

In what way do individual personalities participate in the activities of this personality as a whole, and what kinds of activities as a whole are performable, if we exclude from consideration the communal activities of individual personalities? Scheler provides no answer. If we press him for an answer, it would likely be found in the distinction between the social sphere and the secret one that is attributed to individual personalities, as well as to personalities as a whole.⁷ If individual personalities are members of the personality as a whole in one way or another, then they are social personalities. They are also secret personalities in their own individuality. The same may be said of the personality as a whole. Insofar as a particular personality as a whole is a member of the greater personality as a whole, it is a social personality. Yet, it is also a secret personality in its solitude. Even if the personality as a whole is itself a secret personality, it is no secret to the member personalities that constitute it. Therefore, an absolutely secret personality can be found only among individual personalities. What is at stake here is the existence of an absolute solitude, or so Scheler thinks. But if personality is described in terms of the unity of acts or as a performer of acts, then where does the distinction between "secret" and "social" come from? The performance of acts as social, is capable of communal characteristics. As a consequence, we are led to conclude that, if attention is paid only to aspects of personality that are attributable to the performer of actions, then the solitude of personality cannot be brought to its extreme. Thus, Scheler insists that absolute solitude is an essentially negative relationship that we cannot eliminate by any means

among finite personalities. If so, then personality is individualistic not by reason of its being a center of acts but because it is a negation of all communal characteristics. The essence of individuality lies in the negation of communal characteristics.

Scheler did not possess a complete understanding of the meaning of this negation. But in truth there is no other place at which one can land in one's search for individuality and independence of the consciousness of *I* except that of the negation of this communal character. No matter which aspect of consciousness we may lay hold of, none can be said to be essentially independent. The independent consciousness of *I* is acquired only when isolated from any connection at all with other consciousnesses. Just as we are able to abstractively produce an individual's consciousness of retention by wiping away all elements of betweenness, so our own selfhood is recognizable only at the extreme point where all betweenness is eliminated. What is essentially communal makes its appearance under the guise of noncommunality, which is individuality. Hence, individuality itself does not have an independent existence. Its essence is negation, that is, emptiness.

This becomes evident if we try to conceive of the absolute independence of the individual. In the modern world, philosophers of individualism have pursued the individual reality inherent in individuals to the very end. Where did they arrive by moving in this direction? An individual is regarded as "the unique one." Only the individual is real and the self-existence of the individual is taken as authentic. In Kierkegaard, to illustrate with an example, this "unique one" is rendered capable of being an individual, not out of the human self alone, but only by virtue of the fact that the human self stands before God. It is true that an individual becomes established by being concerned with herself alone, in complete separation from any relationships to others. But this relation of the self to herself arises only within the relationship with God. An individual is said to be isolated only with respect to her relationships with the general public but not with God. God participates in every nook and cranny of the unique one's existence, such that not a single point is independent of Him. If so, we can say that this unique one is not a unique one in the most complete sense of the word. Indeed, the independence of an individual is entirely dissolved in God. This also holds true for the absolute solitude of which Scheler speaks. A secret individual personality is said to be solitary only in the face of God. It is solid only in its relationship with human beings but not with God. The existence of a secret personality is based on God entirely. Incidentally, the idea of the dissolution of individuality also

appears in Nietzsche's individualism, which, however, insists on the negation of God. What he describes as "the self" is the will to power as the life of the universe, and his concept of the superman should be regarded as the *terminus ad quem* of humankind's endeavor. Therefore, the self that holds sway over all other persons and subjugates them is, in its true form, a giant self that appears in the entire history of the human world. Conceiving of an individual as the only reality terminates in dissolving individual life and submerging it into the life of the universe.

Further consideration of God or the cosmic self will appear later. What is clearly indicated here is that the pursuit of the absolute independence of the individual terminates, in truth, not with the individual but with the Absolute, where the individual is more than likely to lose its own reality. The dialectical theologians have come to recognize this point most acutely. Therefore, if we wish to make certain of the independence of the individual, then we must separate him or her not only from the worldly community, but also from the Absolute, to speak even more fundamentally. But the Absolute is no longer the Absolute, as standing opposed to the individual. Hence, it is impossible for the individual to be separate from the Absolute. To speak of this in terms of faith, an individual cannot hide anything whatsoever from God. The only possibility of an individual's independence lies in the individual existing in the Absolute and yet in disobeying Him. To borrow terminology peculiar to the dialectical theologians, we can say that we obey God in the form of our disobedience. This indicates that the negation of obedience is also a form of obedience. Thus, the individual cannot get out of the Absolute, however vehemently he or she may rebel against God. It must be that what is not the Absolute is also a manifestation of the Absolute. If this is true, then the independence of the individual is made possible only by not being independent. Here the independence of the individual is pursued only in the direction of negation.

What is meant here is that the independence of the individual is a mode of the deficiency of community. And this view holds true not only of absolute community, such as is established in connection with the Absolute, but also of every community inherent in betweenness-oriented existence. What illustrates this most conspicuously is the phenomenon of "solitariness." We are able to get out of and be separated from human relationships, and thereby to posit ourselves as "solitary," through our own will, through another person's will, or through the force of destiny. This is the negation of community. The negation of

being affiliated with a family, or of communal existence, as is described by the terms *friendly*, *sociable*, and *vocational*, is what makes a human being solitary. However, the problem remains as to whether we can afford to become really independent in such a state of solitariness. Not at all. Solitariness is precisely an independence of no independence. First of all, it can never be that negated being (that is, a family or communal existence) is transformed into something entirely indifferent for solitary persons. She who has lost her family and has become solitary carries on a deficient way of life in just this way. Because of this, the deficiency becomes all the more apparent. For instance, nobody feels more strongly about a child than she who has lost her own child. By disappearing, her child becomes manifest in and through everything else. Not only does all that is left behind point to the child's being but even those things thought to have no connection with the child while alive (for instance, such things as trains, cars, snow, rain, dogs, or horses) and in those things, generally speaking, the child did have interest and that played a significant role in the child's life, now remind her of that beloved child.

If this is true, then, paradoxically, she who has lost her family feels the being of her family most strongly. This also holds true for the solitary person who has abandoned her family voluntarily. By discarding the being of her family, she acquires positive significance for her own being. Her being turns out to be a being that brings a negation into realization. This is the reason why a man's "entering the priesthood by getting out of his own house" holds such great significance. Furthermore, if the supposition is valid that solitariness, as a mode of deficiency, actually manifests that deficiency all the more robustly, then it becomes immediately evident why "solitariness" possesses the same meaning as "loneliness." Loneliness is a feeling of deficiency. Hence, a strong appetite arises for something that is lacking. In the case of entering the priesthood, he who abandons the being of his family is driven by his appetite to appease this lack by appealing to some greater authority and finally to God. If this is so, then the phenomenon of solitariness exhibits not so much that individual independence essentially inherent in an individual as its very opposite. As a mode of being deficient in community, it rather shows that a human being does not desire an isolated and independent existence.

Hegel provides a keen insight into this problem. In an attempt to speak of "love" as the prescription of "family", he draws out a contradictory structure which is, in general, applicable to human community.⁸ According to Hegel, love consists, generally speaking, in the conscious-

ness of "the unity of the self and other." A human being (that is to say, we human beings, insofar as we are involved in social ethics-oriented relations) is not merely an isolated and independent *I*, even in her natural and direct state. Only by abandoning independence is it possible for the *I* to obtain the self-awareness of *I*. In other words, *I* becomes aware of itself as *I* only by knowing that it (*I*) is the unity of the self and other. Therefore, the primordial element constitutive of love lies in this, that *I* does not wish to be an independent and unique personality. That is to say, *I* finds itself unsatisfied, and feels that something is lacking in solitude. At the same time, the secondary element constitutive of love lies in the fact that *I* acquires itself in and through the other's personality and the other acquires herself in and through *I*. We can say, therefore, that love consists of the contradiction that the self acquires itself by abandoning itself. In later years, Hegel came to expound this truth by basing on it his arguments on the structure of the family. When younger, he tried to establish his social ethics on this fact. Therefore, for social ethics, *I* can be *I* only by virtue of its not being isolated and independent.

The essential independence of an individual disappears when considered from either side of body or mind. It is obvious that I do not mean by this that an individual actually ceases to exist. What I mean to say is that if we try to grasp an individual in our ordinary life as truly individualistic, it comes to nought. As a result, even though our **betweenness-oriented** being subsists between one individual and another, we cannot posit this individual as an individualistic being whose existence precedes the already existing betweenness.

By deliberating thus, we are in a position to reject the individualistic view of a human being prevalent in seventeenth and eighteenth century thought. Hobbes expounded on human communal existence from the viewpoint of individualism at about the same time that Descartes lived. Hobbes presupposed the isolated and independent individual that we have sought thus far in vain. He thought that primitive human society or the state of nature consisted purely of individualistically oriented human beings. In the state of nature, people regarded each other as enemies and inevitably waged war against each other. Between person and person only fear held sway. But isolated individuals enter into a "contract" and thereby establish the state for the purpose of escaping this intolerable situation. By means of this contract, the security of life, order, and the law (rights) are constructed. For this reason, the state is only the sum total of atomic individuals, and their connections are nothing more than those deliberately produced by the

calculation of personal advantage and disadvantage. Hobbes's view is a typical example of an individualistic view of society. However, where is the absolute individual supposedly to be found? She cannot be found either historically or ethnologically. Thus, we have no choice but to dogmatically imagine an absolute individual based only on the evidence of the ego. Nonetheless, when we take into account practical existence, the evidence of *Thou* is even more fundamental than that of the ego. When we deal with the social existence of a human being, it is a mistake for us to take our departure from the evidence of *I*. Consequently, the supposition of the absolute individual is but an imaginary one, without foundation.

Marx pointed this out most acutely. He made clear that the isolated individual is nothing more than an imagined product, but also that it was worked out in accordance with a definite historical and social situation in mind. According to Marx, the further back one goes in history, the more one discovers that human beings belonged to "a great whole," for instance, to a family, a tribe, or a *polis*. There was no place where isolated persons existed. The same can be said of feudal societies. However, it is not until the emergence of the bourgeois class and free competition had begun to develop in the sixteenth century that the isolated individual first came to be supposed. Thinkers in the eighteenth century, such as Rousseau, tried to conceive this history in a converse fashion. It is the converse of the seemingly factual to think that individuals, who are essentially independent of each other, should construct social relations by means of contracts. Instead, it was out of definite social relationships that there arose the perspective of independent individuality. Therefore, "human beings are social animals (*zōion politikon*) in the literal sense of the word. It is not only that they are social animals, but also that they are animals able to isolate themselves only within a society. It happens rarely that isolated individuals produce something outside of society. For example, production of this kind may occur among civilized persons who happen to be thrown accidentally into an uninhabited region. But even these persons already possess within themselves the force of society as their driving energy. For this reason, to say that a truly isolated individual produces anything at all, is as nonsensical as to say that words develop of themselves, even if there are no partners to live and talk together."⁹

Thus, Marx's criticism is raised primarily from an historical standpoint, and granted this restriction, it is entirely justifiable. The absolute individual has never existed in human history. Therefore, individuals who construct society through contracts or, generally

speaking, individuals who precede a betweenness-oriented being are mere fictions. It is acceptable, of course, to think that this view is generally taken for granted.

However, the contention that the absolute independence of an individual does not exist, does not mean that an individual is not independent in any sense. Even though an individual is not individualistic in essence, nonetheless she still stands in opposition to society precisely as an individual. As the negation of communal character, she stands in a negative relationship with the community. Hobbes had clear-cut insight into this. For Hobbes, society and the individual are separate from each other. In accordance with their nature, human beings rebel against communal life. Social aims and individual aims run counter to each other. Hence, coercion is required to ensure that an individual will obey the laws of society. The individual experiences that coercive force which is opposed to and holds sway over her as an individual. Hobbes erred in arguing that isolated persons construct these coercive systems artificially. Still, his insight into the negative relationship between society and the individual as a result of coercion must be held in high esteem. So far as this point is concerned, Marx, who had accused Hobbes of error, was actually mistaken. In the society of which Marx spoke, that is, that Hegel described as "a system of desires," individuals are only cogs in the wheel of a machine and, consequently, have no negative moments such as suffering from the coercive sanctions of society. Individuals, in the materialistic view of history, are mere puppets that inevitably reflect the substantial movements in society. But, is society to be thought of as an organism in which individuals constitute merely its cells?

Gumplowicz's theory of social groups is an elaboration of this problem from a macroscopic standpoint.¹⁰ He rejects the individualistic view of society prevalent in the eighteenth century and attacks the theory of organism in vogue in the nineteenth century as well. Just as an isolated individual is a fiction, so it is a mere dream to conceive of the "society of humankind" as a single organism. Rather, the truth lies somewhere between. The social world has always persisted only in and through groups. What Gumplowicz describes as a social group is a crowd of people who are connected through various shared communal interests and concerns. At issue here is a conception of community characterized in terms of life, blood relations, vocation, language, religion, custom, common historical destiny, and so forth. For such reasons, even a primitive gathering is a social group; and the proletarian class, full of fighting spirit, is also a social group. These specific social

groupings constitute "a society," and there is, in fact, no such abstraction as one single society of humankind that includes these social groupings. Incidentally, a social group is, in this view, an organism in which individuals are regarded as cells constitutive of the group. Gumpłowicz says quite frankly that the greatest error committed by individualistic psychology lies in its supposing that it is the individual human being that thinks (*der Mensch denkt*). Because of this error, the ground of thinking was sought within an individual. But the agency that thinks within a human being is not "he" or "she" as an individual but the social group. Not the individual but rather the social group is the thinking, feeling, and tasting subject. All that individuals do is to think and feel as though thoughts and feelings were their own thoughts and feelings, whereas in reality they are the thoughts and feelings accumulated by social groups from ancient times. Hence, an individual's consciousness is a product of the social environment and a reflection of social consciousness. There is no individual independence nor individual freedom. An individual thinks, feels, and acts only in the way prescribed by a social group. For this reason, according to Gumpłowicz, morality is a matter of mere necessity but not of obligation. A social group, therefore, implies no use of coercion nor do individuals necessarily rebel against society. Only social groups move in the actual world.

Here we confront a new problem. I think it is justifiable for scholars who try to understand human society to reject taking their departure from "I think" and to look for the origin of individual consciousness within social groups. But, are they justified in wiping out completely the independence of the individual and in wasting no time in expounding, in place of it, the independence of the social group? Do societies that do not stand in opposition to individuals, that is, societies themselves conceived of as thinking and willing subjects, exist prior to individuals, exist in the actual world? Gumpłowicz maintains that "groups think" rather than that "a human being thinks." But, what are these groups like that are not "human beings?" Are the communities that we have always confronted in our attempts to locate the independence of the individual actually equivalent to this sort of social group?

5 the element of the whole in a human being

Our attempts to pin down the nature of the individuals who compose betweenness has disclosed that they are, in the final analysis, simply dissolved into community. Is it possible for us to come to grips with something whole that determines individual members composing betweenness just as they are? Can a society or a social group, which serves as that which renders individuals capable of appearing as individuals, be comprehended in its essential features?

No matter how sociologists try to understand a society or a group or how unavailable a definite concept of society may be because its theories are divided into many branches, we cannot deny that something social or related to a group operates actively in the realm of practice. Those engaged in this activity take it as a matter of common sense that a family, a group of friends, a vocational companion, a village, a town, a company, a school, a political party, a state, and so forth are social. Even so, does it follow from this that social relations subsist as something independent of individuals?

Let me take into account *ka-zoku* ("a family") as that society most intimately related to us. As the word *ka* (which means, in Japanese, "a house") indicates, the notion of a family is here expressed in terms of "a house." A house is a definite space, partitioned by a roof and several walls, and divided into a kitchen centering around a cooking range, a sitting room with a table as its center, a bedroom provided with beds, a guest room provided with an alcove in which a picture or calligraphy is hung, and so forth. And in each of these distinctive realms,

6 the negative structure of a human being

In our previous attempts to come to grips with individual persons who constitute betweenness, we came to realize that they are, in the final analysis, dissolved within a community. Individual persons do not subsist in themselves. On the other hand, we have now come to realize that in our attempts to come to grips with something communal, that is, the whole, what we have encountered is simply the negation of the alleged independence of individuals. The whole itself also cannot subsist in itself. Moreover, when it is said that the whole arises in the negation of the independence of individuals, there is already a recognition of the independence of individuals who are thus negated and restricted. Hence, we must say that individual persons subsist in their relationship with wholeness. Likewise, when it is said that the independence of individuals is established through the negation of community, there is already recognized that wholeness thus negated and rebelled against. Hence, the whole must be regarded as subsisting in its relationship with the independence of individuals. If this is so, then both individuals and the whole subsist not in themselves, but only in the relationship of each with the other.

The relationship with the other that is now under consideration is a negative relationship in both cases. The essential feature characteristic of the independence of an individual lies in its rebelling against the whole, and the essential feature characteristic of the wholeness of the whole lies in its negating the independence of an individual. Hence, an individual is one whose individuality should be negated for the sake

of the whole that is to be established, and the whole is that ground against which an individual rebels to establish itself. That the one exists in relation to the other means that it exists by negating the other and by being negated by it as well.

What I have described as a human being's existence as betweenness is that which renders individuals and societies capable of occurring in their reciprocal negations. Therefore, for human beings, we cannot first presuppose individuals, and then explain the establishment of social relationships among them. Nor can we presuppose society and from there explain the occurrence of individuals. Neither the one nor the other has "precedence." As soon as we find one, it already negates the other and thus stands as that which itself has suffered from the negation of the other. For this reason, it is correct to hold that what is here called *precedence* is meant only as negation. However, this negation is always present in the establishment of individuals and society and hence is not to be found separate from them. In other words, this negation itself makes its appearance in the form of individuals and society. Insofar as individuals and society are already established, then society consists of the relations among the individuals constituting it, and individuals are individuals only within society. The view that society is to be regarded as a collection of reciprocal activities or human relationships as well as the view that it is a subjective group existing beyond individuals must be judged to have at least caught a glimpse of a human being's existence as betweenness. With the reservation that such views fall just short of a fundamental grasp of human existence as betweenness, they are all acceptable. Fundamentally speaking, these views arise without exception in negation. Therefore, the reciprocal activities of human beings and the subjective group each reveals its authentic nature only in negation.

On the basis of the preceding two chapters, we can now claim to have reached the negative structure of the human being's existence as betweenness. We must now take the further step and investigate this structure in detail. For this purpose, I think it necessary to pursue the mediation of expressions again. Betweenness as a social fact must be taken into account there as well.

Betweenness, when expressed objectively as a social fact, is the theme sociologists have been dealing with for a long time. A well-known scholar who put emphasis on society as just this "betweenness" was Tarde. In contradistinction to the world of physics, whose primary law consists of the regularity of periodical and oscillatory motions, and biology, whose law consists of heredity, Tarde explored the social world

whose law consists of "imitation." He says that the essential characteristic of society is imitation and that a social group is a gathering of beings who have relationships imitating each other both directly and indirectly.¹ It is obvious that the society of which he speaks is an "object," just as nature is an object. The difference is that, although the laws of nature do not depend on the laws of society, the latter do depend on the former and the imitation under consideration is a psychological phenomenon; that is, consists of the reciprocal relations of individual consciousnesses. These relations are not, however, dealt with within individualistic psychology. Therefore, investigation must be carried on not about intracerebral (*intra-cerebrale*) psychology but about intercerebral (*inter-cerebrale*) psychology; that is, the study of conscious relations existing among multiple individuals.² This investigation must take its departure not from the consciousness of the individual ego but from the relationships between one subject and another; that is, from the evidence that consists of the "consciousness of consciousnesses." This is the study of sociology.

Society is not a substance independent of individual consciousnesses but consists of those psychological relationships between one individual consciousness and another; namely, as imitation. Just as psychology deals with individual consciousness in an objective manner, so sociology attempts to deal with imitative relationships in the same manner. Tarde reduces these relationships to that which holds between two individuals only, specifically between adults and youngsters. A youngster learns to speak, think, and behave just as an adult speaks, thinks, and behaves. Even though this adult has lived a communal life for a long time and that her activities of speaking, thinking, and behaving have already arisen in and through imitation, this youngster directly models himself after this adult individual but not after the social group that is independent of this individual. Therefore, the youngster's imitation is occasioned through the individual adult close to him, and through such imitation, he, first of all, enters into the society of adults. Prior to that, a youngster is a living being to be sure but is not yet an individual within a society. This is also what the adult herself has experienced. The words she teaches this youngster are what she has learned by imitating an adult. In tracing this string of imitation, we eventually terminate the series with the persons who originally invented these words. This is what Tarde speaks of as "the radiation of imitation from the originator." A youngster undergoes this radiation of imitation through an adult. Hence, this adult plays the role of originator for this youngster. The adult herself is, however, nothing more than a

transmitter of the radiation of imitation. She is a representative of the radiation of imitation, that is, of society. That a youngster can become an individual by imitating another individual, means that society has created an individual. A human being becomes individualistic at the same time that one becomes social.

Tarde takes this relation for granted as a basic fact of a large society. Social life consists of the intersection of an infinite number of radiations of imitation. Just as people in ancient society were puppets handled by prophets, demagogues, their ancestors, and so forth, so it is that even in democratic societies such as are prevalent in the modern world, people nevertheless move under the control of the radiation of imitation initiated through inventors, originators, reformers, and so forth. The only thing to be noted here is that the tendency to imitate is much more heightened in the modern world than in ancient times, because the progress of civilization now consists in rendering the speed-up of reciprocal imitation much easier. People remain rather unaware of such imitation under such circumstances.

This excellent observation of Tarde shows us a side of social facticity in a very clear-cut way. But another important fact is intimately connected with this facticity to which he tries to close his eyes. He insists that a youngster becomes an individual within a society simultaneously with his beginning to imitate. But the question to ask is, in what way does the individuality of an individual result from this imitation? If it is true, as Tarde assumes, that the consciousness of an individual is constituted by imitation, then the reason why this consciousness becomes independent as the consciousness of an "individual," is quite beyond our comprehension. If it is supposed that a youngster speaks, thinks and behaves just as an adult does, then he is, as Tarde argues, "a puppet handled" by an adult, but not certainly a youngster who differs significantly from this adult. If this is true, then we cannot even speak of the relationship between the consciousness of an adult and that of a youngster. Imitation is the communalization of consciousnesses, but not the cause of their individualization. So when Tarde says "a youngster becomes an individual within a society simultaneously with his beginning to imitate," he already presupposes an individual prior to this imitation, that is, prior to a society, and thereby insists that this individual enters society simultaneously with his imitation. Such an individual is, in Tarde's opinion, a biological one that already possesses an innate tendency toward imitation. Hence, in the background of an individual's existence within society lies the biological world. Then, the individuality of an individual is derived only from this biological world,

and a society is none other than the communalization of consciousnesses. If so, then the relationship between a youngster prior to imitation and his mother, is not yet a social relationship. Moreover, those pedagogical relationships in which an adult compels, scolds, and disciplines a youngster must be excluded from the so-called social facts as well. For, if the consciousness of a youngster is nothing more than an accumulation of his imitations of adults, then there is no room for negating these imitations and compelling him to adopt another definite way of thinking and behaving. I suspect that this view perverts the truth to a considerable extent.

It can be said that this one-sidedness is generally recognized among sociologists who try to grasp society as betweenness. This is the case with George Simmel. Against Tarde's attempt to reduce all conscious relationships among individuals to imitation, Simmel tried to make it clear that such reciprocal psychological activities make their appearance not only in the phenomena of imitation, but also in such forms of relationship as superior/inferior relationships of obedience, competition, division, the formation of political parties, and so forth. In contradistinction to Tarde's conception of sociology as psychology, which deals with the relationships between consciousnesses, Simmel insisted that "the psychological phenomena" of reciprocal activity should be dealt with, not in a psychological fashion, but in a sociological one. Simmel held that one should derive reciprocal activities or relationships of individuals from their psychological nucleus and consider only the forms of relationships or the types of reciprocal activity. A wider vision appears here than Tarde showed, and the independence of sociology seems to be thereby secured. Nonetheless, there is no difference between Tarde and Simmel as to the point that the forms of reciprocal activities here under consideration are the forms of connection between atomic individuals.³ This assumes that society consists only in setting up relationships but not in compelling them, and therefore no negative relationships between society and individuals are recognized.

According to Simmel, "society consists of many individuals engaged in reciprocal activities." This is an image of society that "shuns a conflict of definitions as much as possible."⁴ In the light of this conception of society, it is evident in Simmel that individuals exist prior to reciprocal activities. In conformity with such impulses as love, faith, social intercourse, and so forth and with such purposeful activities as impulse, defense, offense, play and interest, and so on, individuals join together, behave well to each other, and thereby build relationships.

That is to say, out of many individuals there results one "unity," that is, "society," through reciprocal activity. Therefore, for Simmel, society is social connection (*Vergesellschaftung*). By abstracting the substantial nuclei from social connection, which are referred to as an individual's impulses, interests, purposes, tendencies, and psychological states, he tries to consider only the forms of social connection. They are the forms that bring an isolated existence of atomic individuals to their communal and reciprocal being. By virtue of these forms an actual society comes to be what it is. An actual society is related to the forms, in the same way that a wooden ball is related to the geometrical form of a sphere.

However, in what way are atomic individuals brought together to form communal being? Simmel points out that social connections take various shapes in accordance with the manner and extent of their reciprocal activities. These social connections are distinguished by degree, ranging from the connections one might happen to have with others while taking a walk, up to the various familial connections, or from a temporal social connection such as when we put up at a hotel, to the more intimate connections such as occurred in guilds during the Middle Ages.

Incidentally, I would like to ask whether the manner of connection of reciprocal activities limits individuals' acts to a definite, specified sort. In the connections that occur, when we walk together, for example, we are advised not to behave in too friendly a way to each other; that is, we ought not to assume the same attitude toward mere walking companions as to our friends. Instead, we must confine our mutual participation to the limited realm of the present. Were this confinement shattered, then we could not take a walk together. This is much more the case in intimate connections such as those within a family or a guild, where manners are subject to stricter limitations. However this may be, Simmel speaks of reciprocal activities apart from such limitations and compulsions. Are these reciprocal activities capable of bringing into unity individuals whose impulses are significantly different from each other?

This question concerned Simmel, not as an issue of sociology but rather of social philosophy. The business of sociology is to discover the forms of relationship prevalent in an established society. The question, "how is society possible?" belongs to the theory of knowledge as applied to society, just as Kant's question, "how is nature possible?" has to do with the theory of knowledge.⁵ Just as Kant pursued those a priori conditions through which nature is established, so Simmel looked for

the a priori conditions that make it possible for society to arise. The forms of subjectivity such as the forms of intuition and the concepts of understanding in Kant correspond to the forms of reciprocal activities in Simmel, which are what render one individual capable of relating with another. The difference between these two philosophers lies in this: whereas for Kant, substantial contents consist of sense data; in Simmel, they consist of individual elements. Hence, the forms Kant identifies abide not in substantial contents but rather in subjectivity itself. On the other hand, the forms Simmel identifies abide within an individual's mind, which is regarded as something substantial. Those mental processes that exist a priori within an individual are the conditions that render society possible.

If Simmel's argument is tenable, then it follows that each individual possesses within herself such social forms as are to be realized in reciprocal activities; that is, the forms of communalization and unification. Yet, how can it be claimed that these individuals exist in an isolated fashion? Only on the condition that we negate the forms of communalization that we have a priori within us can we assume that individuals exist in an isolated fashion. Consequently, for Simmel, the isolated existence of individuals is a presupposition to be acknowledged from the start. He says that "everyone possesses within herself a deep-rooted point of individuality, and is seemingly unable to learn from others whose point of individuality is qualitatively differing from hers."⁶ According to Simmel, the forms of communalization are based on this point of individuality, and the various social forms are responsible for achieving the universalization of individuals. The reason why an individual, with its unfathomable and unknowable point of individuality, can nevertheless enter into relationships with others, lies in our comprehending its individual mind by universalizing it. We obtain a glimpse of a person not in her individuality but as a universalized type. Thanks to this universalization, other persons are recognized as friends, fellows, or comrades; that is, as dwelling together in the same association.

The reason why social forms are capable of bringing individuals into unity lies in their power of universalization. Within an individual this capability of universalization is a priori. Hence, without negating and restricting individuality, an individual can enter into reciprocal activity by putting into effect this power of universalization. What Simmel conceives of in terms of the "manner" of reciprocal activities is not a "manner" through which acts are specified, but the sorts of reciprocal

activities that differ from each other in accordance with the degrees of universalization. These specific differences of universalization are recognized a priori. Moreover, he considers the degrees of universalization in connection with the point of individuality. The point of individuality is not a definite secret realm within an individual being but something that refuses to be universalized as reciprocal activities; that is, it is something that exists outside of society. For this reason, an individual who engages in love or friendship can decrease her point of individuality (i.e., those elements that exist outside of society) almost to zero and universalize almost the entire realm of her being. This is the case with reciprocal activity in which universalization is enlarged to its greatest extent. On the contrary, an economically oriented person, who has been produced by the monetary economic civilization prevalent in the modern world, is likely to be universalized only as a mere cog in the wheel of the economic system and place the other sides of her life outside of society. This is the case with reciprocal activity in which there is minimum universalization. In this way, the degree of universalization determines the manner of reciprocal activity.

Thus, Simmel emphasized the possibility of society, without paying heed to its compulsory characteristics. Is it possible, however, to think of such things as the decrease of the point of individuality and the increase of universalization without also attending to elements of compulsion? The reason why beings involved in love and friendship are communalizable without residue is because the manner of acts inherent in them is strictly determined. Community does not arise where acts that betray trust are performed as one pleases. Because love affairs demand exclusive possession, the point of individuality is decreased. This demand of exclusive possession restricts individuals through strong coercive power. Therefore, the increase of universalization and the strengthening of coercion cannot be separated from one another. What is more, coercion's strength increases the individual's possibility of revolting against such restriction. One hates treachery vehemently because the danger of treachery is all the more increased. If this is true, then an increase in universalization is rendered possible only by one's constant endeavor to destroy the point of individuality. Rather, universalization itself must materialize through this endeavor. We cannot speak of universalization (and hence, of social forms) without having recourse to the negation of the individual.

Tarde and Simmel kept their eyes on society only as unifying, communalizing, and universalizing human beings, without thereby paying heed to the negation, restriction, coercion, and so forth society

exercises over individuals. Vierkandt, who advanced Simmel's standpoint a step further, and Wiese, who substituted the concept of relations for that of forms, are basically without difference. It is interesting that Vierkandt opened the way toward the utilization of the idea of wholeness and regarded society as consisting of not only the mere forms of reciprocal activities but also as an agent carrying on these reciprocal activities.⁷ But Vierkandt's position results in an individual thereby becoming a mere means through which society manifests itself, and the coercion of society against individuals thereby loses its hold to a considerable extent.

It is worth noting that Wiese described the themes of sociology as "the relationship between one human being and another one" (*der Mensch-Mensch-Zusammenhang*) and as "the sphere of betweenness which pierces a human life."⁸ In addition, he attempted to comprehend the concept of "social process"; that is, "the acts that connect people with, or separate them from one another." In particular, he argued that attention should be paid to the process; that is, the flux characteristic of human acts. Wiese referred to the temporal state in which human beings are connected or separated through acts by means of social relations and described the building up of social configurations (*das soziale Gebilde*) beyond these social relations as social process. Therefore, social configurations such as the church, the state, the economy, and class possess flowing social relationships as their composite elements and are never something substantial. Hence, individuals are involved in nets of reciprocal relationships and suffer constant change. Moreover, it is not the case that society, which determines individuals in this way, is an unmoved whole. As is the case with individuals, society also "is becoming and becomes in being" (*ist im Werden, wird im Sein*). In this sense, neither an individual nor society is something fixed. Instead, they determine each other, while undergoing transformation.

Therefore, Wiese dissolved society into the flux of human acts and tried to regard society as the "represented total contents" of these reciprocal relationships between individuals and society, when these contents are regarded as one "conceptual unity." However, when he conceives of human acts in this way, he fails to pay attention to the fact that they are confined to specific forms. The reason why social process brings forth a specific social configuration lies in this, that the acts of connection and separation are determined and controlled in a specified direction. Without keeping this point in mind, he expounds the reciprocal determination of individuals and society. Therefore, the

individuals with whom he deals, are individuals spotlighted only by their dissolution in society. He writes, "the personal ego (*das persönliche Ich*) is not what we pursue in our sociology as an authentic object of research. Instead, we deal with the social ego (*das soziale Ich*), which interpenetrates various human relationships and owes its character as ego to social configurations. The human products of these configurations are intimately connected with the personal. But the task is not to clarify this totality of a human being (*die Totalität des Menschen*), but to take pains to analyze the social aspects of this mixture."⁹ That is to say, Wiese's task was to consider the notion of society by excluding those aspects in which there were elements of coercion. But by doing so, we must ask whether it is possible to understand "the practical communal life of human beings."¹⁰

Durkheim strongly emphasized the element of "coercion," in contradistinction to the aforesaid one-sidedness. According to him, the viewpoint that tries to deal with society as reciprocal mental activities or as mental relationships tends to conceive of individual consciousness as dissolved in society. On the other hand, Durkheim emphasized that society stands as the other to individual consciousness. This is what his fundamental proposition of urging us to deal with social facts as "things" (*Règle fondamentale: Traiter les faits sociaux comme des choses*) must signify. Moreover, as the other, society coerces individuals to perform specific sorts of actions. Apart from this, the significance of society cannot be adequately comprehended.

Durkheim discovered this position in the existing characterization of social facts.¹¹ Just at the place where Tarde found the relation of imitation, Durkheim found that of coercion. According to the former, a youngster imitates an adult's speaking, thinking, and behaving. To the contrary, for Durkheim, adults coerce a youngster into definite ways of seeing, feeling, and behaving. This coercion is already in place, even before a youngster begins to imitate. As soon as a child is born, adults coerce her into sucking milk, falling asleep, and awaking at specified hours of the day. Soon after that, they coerce her to use words, to behave in accordance with specific patterns, and to acquire knowledge. All customs and inner tendencies arise from such coercion. Because of this, a child suffers under the pressures of the social environment from the outset and is thereby situated within the various social roles available. As representatives and mediators of the environment, parents and teachers coerce youngsters into definite sorts of consciousness and actions, instead of merely transmitting the radiation of imitation.

Social facts are, as was said before, the specific forms of behavior, thinking, and feeling, which exist outside of individuals and yet coerce them. Just as words are taught to children from external sources, so the words I now use to express my thoughts exist independently, irrespective of whether I use them or not. If I perform some obligation, I am not actually obedient to an obligation that I myself set forth but to the social order I have inherited from being taught, and such order is thought to be objectively grounded in law and morality. Similarly, religious rites and doctrines, economic institutions, customs, and so forth exist independent of individual consciousness. Furthermore, all of them possess commanding power. Unless individuals obey these specific ways of behaving, they are punished in some way. This is the case even with manners and customs that appear trivial, to say nothing of actions ordered by law and morality. If we dress ourselves by closing our eyes to current fashion, we are surely treated as abnormal persons. She who does not use her native language in speaking to her compatriots is also regarded as an abnormal or disagreeable person. So far, then, it seems that even clothes and words possess compelling power.

If social facts are characterized by "coercion from outside," then we cannot label society universal. Such things as mental processes, which exist within every individual a priori, are not by themselves social facts. Society is not something universal existing within individuals but exists outside of them. Of course, it manifests itself within individuals, but it is able to depart from them as well. For example, customs and morality do not exist as something immanent in the acts thereby prescribed. As expressed through forms independent of these acts, they pass from mouth to mouth, are transmitted to later generations through education, and are preserved by means of words. Judicial or moral orders, maxims prevalent among folk, religious or political doctrines, rules of artistic taste, and so forth are in the same category. It is not that these norms are perfectly and necessarily manifested within individuals. They can exist by themselves, even though individuals may never actually instantiate them.

If this is so, then is it possible for society to subsist in separation from individuals? Can we speak of something as a group phenomenon, without its also being communal (hence, universal), that is, applicable to all of the members or to a great majority of them? Of course, not. Society must be a community that exists in accordance with and among its members. But it is not communal because of its being universal. Conversely, it is universal because of its being

communal. The state of a group becomes a phenomenon common to individuals, because it coerces individuals as that which commands. Coercion plays a role in universalization.

Social facts are forms of action (*manieres de faire*). But other forms of being (*manieres d'être*) must be taken into consideration as well: the number of elements constituting society, the principle of ordering them, the intensity of their connection, the geographical distribution of populations, kinds of transportation, forms of architecture, and so forth. At first sight, although they seem outside the realm of action's forms, they are nothing more than the settled forms of action. The political structure of society consists in the ways in which various classes of society traditionally live their lives. The types of architecture are representative of traditional ways of building houses constructed in response to the environment and in keeping with that of the preceding generations. Similarly, traffic routes are people's fixed habits of passage. Therefore, forms of being place no fewer restraints on individuals than do forms of action.

By giving due consideration to these factors, Durkheim defined social facts in the following way. "Social facts are sorts of action, more or less fixed, that are likely to coerce individuals from the outside. They make their appearance universally within a given realm of society and have their own being independent of their individual expressions."¹²

Durkheim came to think that society, as coercive from outside, stands over against individuals. Society cannot be derived from mere individual consciousness. This position is exactly opposite to that which takes imitation or reciprocal activities as constituting society. We can say that Durkheim's position afforded a penetrating insight into one aspect of the relationship between society and individuals. If society exists through coercion, as Durkheim argued, then society and individuals are unified just at the place where they stand opposed to and separately revolt against each other. Unless individuals are able to revolt against society, there is no possibility of coercion. On the other hand, coercion cannot arise unless to make individuals obey society. Therefore, the more individuals revolt against society, the more strongly society, as coercive, manifests itself and, hence, so much the more must individuals obey society's commands. Thus unity in revolt (between society and individuals) is coercion and the reason why Durkheim tried to clarify what is meant by *society* by having recourse to such antisocial phenomena as "suicide" and "crime." The phenomenon of crime shows in an enlarged manner the possibility of individuals revolting

against society. What is more, apart from these revolting individuals, there can be no society (hence, no coercion).

In the aforesaid unity in revolt between society and individuals, however, does not society, as that which exists outside individuals, include within itself individuals? Of course it does. Even Durkheim does not deny that society is constituted by individuals. His point is to insist that the whole has a specific reality different from the sum of its parts. Just as an organism is not the mere sum total of molecules, which turn out through their unification to have a life quite different from them, so society turns out to be different from the individuals that constitute it through the association of them with one another. A group feels, thinks, and behaves in a way entirely different from that in which its members think, feel, and behave when they are separated from society. In Durkheim's opinion, the fact of association itself makes the group differ from individuals and is most coercive and obligatory to individuals, as the source of all other obligations. What does Durkheim mean here? How is it possible for association to be the coercion of individuals? What is this association of individuals like?

In an attempt to find the ground of social processes within the structure of inner social environment (*le milieu social interne*),¹³ Durkheim describes a living power that sets the material of society in motion as a human environment and investigates it from two perspectives: the volume and the mechanical intensity of society. Mechanical intensity indicates the degree of moral relationship that holds between individuals, of an inner connection in communal life, and hence the degree of fusion among individuals. Therefore, we can say that the inner social environment, when seen from the perspective of its human elements, connects people and allows them to participate in one group-oriented being. Durkheim often thinks of "the nation" in this way,¹⁴ as that which signifies the coercion of individuals. Additionally, society as coercive includes this inner connection in its structure; that is, the relationship that constitutes the fusion of individuals. We can conclude that what he described as the association among individuals has something to do with the relation of fusion but not of coercion. Nevertheless, it must be maintained as well that, when individuals are associated in this relationship of fusion, this association coerces individual members. This relationship of fusion was dealt with earlier through the issues of imitation and reciprocal activities. For this reason, the contention that association among individuals terminates in coercion against them cannot be understood if we stand on the position of regarding society

as coercive alone. If there were only the moment of coercion but not of fusion, association would not arise and, hence, an agency that coerces individuals would also not exist. In this way, Durkheim's insight is also one-sided.

By giving heed to society as an objective fact, we can discern that these two aspects (i.e., coercion and fusion) are respectively emphasized in a one-sided way. Insofar as each of these aspects reflects an aspect of society, then these arguments cannot be said to be in error. But both of them err in their endeavor to explain society by appealing to only one aspect. Society must originally be understood to have these two aspects. That is to say, the communalizing and interfusing aspect of association among individuals at once indicates the existence of coercion as well. In light of this structure of society as objective fact, we will understand more clearly the structure of subjective betweenness also expressed therein.

Fundamentally, association and coercion illustrate contradictory states of affairs. From the subjective standpoint, "association" consists of subjects, which as the many, collectively terminate in the one. To cite a familiar example, people who engage in a communal rope pull with sincerity combine to become one subject. It is not that I pull and that you also pull but that "one power" somehow pulls. On the contrary, "coercion" consists of forcing separated individual subjects to subordinate themselves to the whole. It cannot occur except at a place where a subject stands opposed to the whole as its other. This kind of opposition arises when she who pulls the rope takes leave of it, tiring of this activity, or finding herself interested in some other play to which she moves. She who has taken leave of the rope is in revolt against a communal activity, and she stands thereby outside of the power of the rope pull. If the power of the communal activity of the rope pull suppresses this revolt or exerts control over laziness so that the participant returns once more to the rope and the collective pulling of it, then coercion is evident. In this sense, coercion is the power of bringing separated agents back to oneness. Yet, in what manner does association signify such coercion?

Association, in spite of its division into an infinite variety of sorts and degrees, consists in the fact that subjects who were previously separated as the many, come back to the one. Hence, the individuality of individual subjects is discarded in accordance with their respective circumstances, and they become communal instead. In other words, subjective individuals are "emptied" in various ways, and they turn out to be constituents of the subjective whole. However this may be, where

did these emptied individuals come from? Individuals are empty in themselves: only the negation of their respective community establishes them. If so, then we can say that before the individuality of the subject is discarded in the associative collectivity, this individuality was already established through the negation of community. Therefore, association is "the discarding of individuality that appears in the form of the discarding of community." This is double negation.

The same is true of what is conceived of as direct association, as is the case of the union of love. The primordial element in the union of love, as Hegel also points out, lies in the self and the other discarding the independence of the ego, but this discarding is performed on the ground of the separation of self and other. Because of this, in love the fear is that oneself and the other will be separated. Hence, a solemn pledge that negates the possibility of this separation must be given in advance. Even in maternal and filial affection, this fear takes the form of a mother's affectionate concern. A perfect union in which there is no danger of the separation of oneself from the other or a unity that becomes as one body, and in which individual members are never conscious of their independence, can never be found within the finite existence of human beings. Even if we bring forward examples of totemistic society with which ethnologists are often concerned, the expression of the whole through the totem already reveals an endeavor to restrain the members from separating from it. In this way, even in what are regarded as direct associations, a double negation is already involved, to say nothing of the particularly conscious interest-oriented association in which separation is already anticipated at the time of establishment and measures preventing it are stipulated at the outset. This shows that the independence those in the association have agreed to discard from the start indicates the recognition that it already consists of the discarding of community.

It should be obvious that the association between oneself and another is already a negation of their separation. Hence, the subjective whole that has emptied subjective individuals appears at the same time under the guise of coercion against the revolt of these individuals. The union of love consists of merely the fact that the self and the other become unified. Its power constantly forces self and other, who try to separate from each other, to continue or resume their relationship. For instance, in the relationship of *I* and *Thou*, the *Thou*, as the agent who accuses and is angered by the betrayal of *I*, retains the authority to end the betrayal from the outset. Truthfully, what is at stake here is not the *Thou* itself, but the "connection" that operates through *Thou*. *Thou* can

accuse *I* only through the authority of this connection. Therefore, at a place where there is an *I/Thou* relationship, there is at work the power that obliges *I* and *Thou*, the power that determines *I* and *Thou* to act in specific ways. The same is true of totemistic society. The totem expressing this primitive connection obligates its individual members through the authority of this connection and thereby determines them to an extremely strict manner of action. Restrictions of the relationships between the sexes are more complicated than in civilized societies, and they also bear more severe significance. Nonetheless, in no society, however primitive it may be, is there no sense of obligation and control over its individual members.

In this way, association is, at the same time, also coercion. If this is true, then we will be able to acquire a more adequate comprehension of the structure of association from an understanding of coercion. The primordial element that coercion indicates lies in this, that an individual revolts against society and is opposed to it as something other than herself. This element signifies the discarding of community. There is no association that does not involve the discarding of community, insofar as coercion and obligation are recognized. Communities, whatever they may be, consist in what empties subjective individuals in their respective ways. To discard the community and revolt against society means to further negate the negation that has already been realized among its individual subjects. Nevertheless, the secondary element that coercion indicates is that society, as standing in external opposition to individuals, nonetheless obliges them to obey in spite of this opposition and thereby negates the independence of subjective individuals. Individuals must empty themselves in various ways, submerging themselves in their respective subjective wholes. Negativity must be instantiated among individual subjects. This is equivalent to discarding individuality, which, in its turn, is discarding community. By keeping our eye on these two elements that coercion implies, we can see that coercion exhibits, in a structure that serves to subordinate those individuals to society who attempt to revolt against it, two directions; that is, the negation of negativity, on the one hand, and its materialization, on the other.

I think that here is where the genuine structure of human association is to be found. If it is argued that association, insofar as it is the connection of individuals, presupposes individuals who discard the community and that these individuals, insofar as they discard the community, already presuppose association, then this is mere circular reasoning. Individuals, no matter what association they may revolt against,

turn out to "revolt against," in the sense of negating the negativity as materialized in the association. And this negativity is, fundamentally speaking, absolute negativity; that is, emptiness. Therefore, it can be said that an individual revolts against "emptiness" itself through the medium of her revolting against an association, whatever it may be. In coming to grips with the notion of the individual, we are already brought to "emptiness" as its real feature. An individual becomes an individual by negating emptiness (i.e., authentic emptiness) as her own fundamental source. This is the self-negation of absolute negativity. In addition to that, an individual must be subordinate to society through emptying herself, regardless of how this emptying is performed. This means that emptiness is materialized in various associations to varying degrees. Therefore, an individual returns to "emptiness" itself, through engaging in association of whatever sort. In our attempt to comprehend wholeness itself, its essential feature was also revealed to be emptiness. Absolute wholeness is absolute negativity. Seen in this light, human association, inclusive of coercion, is understood to be the movement of the negation of negation in which absolute negativity returns to itself through its own self-negation. Therefore, for the individual, coercion, even though being coercion from the outside, nonetheless, is self-coercion arising out of the individual's fundamental source.

In this way, the negative structure of a betweenness-oriented being is clarified in terms of the self-returning movement of absolute negativity through its own negation. This is a human being's fundamental structure, which makes its kaleidoscopic appearance in every nook and cranny of a human being. To conceive of the standpoint of a mere individual or of society by itself, while giving no heed to this structure, results in an abstraction that brings to light only one aspect of a human being. Indeed, there are three moments that are dynamically unified as the movement of negation: fundamental emptiness, then individual existence, and social existence as its negative development. These three are interactive with one another in practical reality and cannot be separated. They are at work constantly in the practical interconnection of acts and can in no way be stabilized fixedly at any place. For instance, when a specific association is constructed, it does not subsist statically as a fixed product. The essential feature characteristic of human association is its constantly putting into effect the movement of the negation of negation. When this movement comes to a standstill in one way or another, the association itself collapses. Thus, if an individual, as the negation of

emptiness, sticks to this negation in such a way as to refuse to allow the negation of negation to occur as well, then that association disintegrates on the spot. Likewise, if an individual submerges herself in the whole and refuses to become an individual again, then the whole perishes at the same time. Taking a totemistic society as our illustration, this is the extinction of the meaning of the totem. We can conclude that the movement of the negation of absolute negativity is, at the same time, the continuous creation of human beings.

7 the fundamental law of a human being (the basic principle of ethics)

The negative structure of a human being is, as was said previously, the fundamental law that renders a human being capable of continuously forming itself. Were we to deviate from this law, we would cease to exist. Therefore, this law is the basis of a human being. At the outset, we prescribed the ground of human community, namely, the law of a human being, as ethics. Therefore, we can assert that this fundamental law is basic ethics. Basic ethics is the basic principle of ethics. We can describe the basic principle of ethics in terms of "the movement in which absolute negativity returns back to itself through negation."

Objection may be raised that this principle serves as the principle of all philosophy, as with Hegel, and does not serve as the principle of ethics alone. But the principle of ethics is the fundamental law of human beings. Such things as the historical world, the natural world, and logic are all to be found in human beings. A human being, as a part of the natural world, is human existence regarded as a natural object. It exists in an objective way and yet has nothing to do with subjective human existence of the sort that we are concerned with here. Rather, the subjective human being is the basis on which all other objective beings are themselves established. If so, then it is natural that the historical world, the natural world, and so forth, all take the fundamental law of human beings as their fundamental principle in their respective and specific ways. The same may be said of logic as the laws of thinking. These laws are not laws that exist in and by themselves prior to human