Economies of Abandonment
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Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism

Elizabeth A. Povinelli

Anarcho Liberalism
Civilizational Securitization

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To Nuki Bilbil
May she rest in peace
Even if she is not
Where I wish she were
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This book is a meditation on alternative worlds in the shadow of contemporary transformations of late liberalism, a phrase I will explain more fully in the introduction, but which can here be understood as the governance of social difference in the wake of the anticolonial movements and the emergence of new social movements. It looks at shattered lives and exhausting struggles, at discourses that deflect ethical and social responsibility for crushing if at times imperceptible harms, and at scholarly attachments to miracles of
enduring difference. Ethnographic material is culled from a variety of personal and professional relationships I have had in the United States and Australia and culminates as one moves through the chapters. This material is situated in a variety of discursive fields including political theory and philosophy, anthropology, and cultural and legal studies, and also through academic and activist thought and writing. One reader of this text described it as “austere ethnography,” a description meant to indicate a move away from a now longstanding commitment in anthropology to thick description. I myself like a term that James Clifford used, during a dissertation hearing, “sociography,” to describe a way of writing the social from the point of view of social projects.

But this way of writing ethnographically—or sociographically—also presupposes an entire corpus of previous and projected writerly projects. Although certainly able to stand on its own, this book is the second in a series of books I am writing under the broad rubric of “Dwelling in Late Liberalism.” *The Empire of Love* was the first volume in this series and a subsequent volume will focus on an augmented reality project that this book mentions, if only glancingly.

*Economies of Abandonment* is conceptualized as an argument that builds across chapters, rather than as a set of thematically related essays. Material elaborated in an initial chapter is referred to in subsequent chapters. Material acting to support a point in one chapter is elaborated and made the center of a subsequent chapter. I have tried to make each chapter as self-contained as possible, which means that there is some repetition of information. And I have tried to allow for innovative readings, say, starting with chapter 3 on ethical substance and moving back to chapter 2 on recognition, camouflage, and espionage. Nevertheless, this is a book written to unravel an argument step by step. Two works of fiction frame this book: Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas” and Charles Burnett’s 1977 film, *The Killer of Sheep*, the one written loosely within the genre of science fiction, the other, a quasi-documentary of the Watts neighborhood, the scene of the infamous 1968 black uprising. Le Guin’s story sets the framework for the introduction and first two chapters, Burnett’s film for the last three. Two other divisions mirror this one. First, while gesturing to the critical importance of eventfulness and ethical substance chapters 1 and 2 focus more heavily of the use of tense in
late liberalism, chapters 3 and 4 on ethical substance and eventfulness; chapter 5 draws these divisions together through a discussion of sacrificial love. Second, the first chapters focus more centrally on the governmental aspects of late liberalism and neoliberalism, the later ones on the nature of life within these governmental orders.

The introduction moves from Le Guin's short story, “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas,” and discusses the specific social worlds and projects that interest this book; why I am interested in these kinds of worlds and projects; what this has to do with tense, eventfulness, and ethical substance. I then describe how the general space and time in which this book was written has made understanding these kinds of concerns unavoidable and make sensible why I use the chronotope of late liberalism rather than other available chronotropes such as liberalism, neoliberalism, postcolonial liberalism, or diasporic liberalism. Alongside “late liberalism” are other terms and phrases I will use in this book as a counterweight to “late liberal”: “tense,” “eventfulness,” and “ethical substance.” I will present what I mean by some of these and how the following chapters slowly unpack late liberal techniques of power that might make them useful framing devices.
This book emerged from the generosity of conversation and life. I would like first to thank members of the Karrabing Indigenous Corporation, in particular Linda Yarrowin, Rex Sing, Rex Edmunds, Cecilia Lewis, Trevor Bianamu, and Robyn Lane. Also essential were colleagues at the School for Social and Policy Research at Charles Darwin University, especially conversations with Tess Lea and David Lamb; the Institute for Public Knowledge at New York University, especially Akhil Bilgrami, Craig Calhoun, Francis Ferguson,
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Not least, I’d like to thank my oldest conversationalist and most rigorous editor, Susan Edmunds. Michael Warner kept insisting I let him be a good colleague. And he is, and has been, whether or not he read a stitch of this manuscript. Ditto Dilip Gaonkar. Stacey D’Erasmo suggested that I read Le Guin’s “The Ones Who Walked Away from Omelas,” which became a central framework for this book, which seems fitting, and right.

I received invaluable feedback on this manuscript from a variety of people. I am sure I am forgetting some essential voices, but let me single out the members of “Liberalism’s Others” and the “Borders and Boundaries” projects at the Columbia Center for the Critical Analysis of Social Difference, especially Nadia Abu El Haj, Lila Abu Lughod, Liz Emens, Katherine Franke, Murat Guney, Claudio Lomnitz, Alondra Nelson, Mae Ngai, Anupama Rao, Audra Simpson, and Neferti Tadiar. I would like to thank Austin Sarat and Adam Sitze, who organized two separate workshops through the Department of Law, Jurisprudence, and Legal Studies at Amherst College; one on killing states and another on the work of Roberto Esposito were early versions of some of these chapters were presented and worked over. And not least, Liza Johnson and Michele Spano, who read various chapters and more generally were generous in their conversation; and my student Carolijn Trewindt for sharing her thoughts and research on radical ecological movements in the United States.

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Anarcho Liberalism
Civilizational Securitization

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Liberal Gov't abolishes Aboriginal & Torres Islanders Commission, '04
Liberal Gov't declares Emergency Intervention in Aboriginal Sexual Child Abuse, '07
Labour Gov't apologizes for the Stolen Generation. Announces continuation of “Intervention,” '08
Liberal Gov't refuses to apologize for past harms to Indigenous Australians, '99
Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas” tells the tale of a city, Omelas, where the happiness and well-being of its inhabitants depend on a small child’s being confined to and humiliated in a small, putrid broom closet. It is critical to Le Guin’s fiction-based ethical wager that Omelas’s happiness is not ideological in Louis Althusser’s sense, nor naive. It is experientially unmediated, materially substantive, and morally desirable. This happiness is what every average Joe and moral philosopher might wish
Introduction

...But it is, nevertheless, dependent on a child’s being naked and con-...
say. This truth might only become available with the point of view of the last man. But this last man is supposedly simply standing where we are standing, seeing what is front of our eyes but outside our field of vision.

Regardless of her agreement or disagreement with James, Le Guin’s account of temporality, eventfulness, and ethics opens a productive avenue for critically engaging the affective attachments and practical relationship of subjects to the unequal distribution of life and death, of hope and harm, and of endurance and exhaustion in late liberalism, a phrase I will elaborate below. One reading of Le Guin would alter three ways in which liberal subjects normally understand and experience the social tense, eventfulness, and ethical substance of thriving, suffering, and lethality. First, as opposed to those who would read ethics from the perspective of future ends, this reading of Le Guin would insist that there is no horizon in which a changed material version of this child could be incorporated into the material and emotional good of the city without that good being compromised. The ethical nature of the relationship between the residents of Omelas and the child in the broom closet cannot, therefore, be deferred to some future anterior perspective—what will have been the positive outcome of this suffering from the perspective of a future interpreter we cannot as of yet know. In late liberalism, as opposed to Omelas, the future anterior is sometimes marked by the perfective, sometimes the imperfective. But in both cases the ethical nature of present action is interpreted from the point of view of a reflexive future horizon and its cognate discourses, such as that of sacrificial love.5 The child’s suffering disappears when seen from the perspective of what it will have been—or been for. Because Le Guin refuses to grant to Omelas the truth of this ethical point of view, the ethical relationship that links the citizens of Omelas to the child in the broom closet cannot be removed from the durative present of her suffering. Hers is not so much a sacrifice in the city as an organ of the city. To be sure, whether the political life of the city should be based on an alternative ethical tense—the durative present—and whether the question of politics should bear any relation to the question of ethics are important, if separate, questions that I explore later.

Second, the nature of the suffering that interests Le Guin is ordinary, chronic, and cruddy rather than catastrophic, crisis-laden, and sublime.
Granted the child in the broom closet is covered in sores and, every so often, is given a kick. But for the most part her misery is a quieter form of abjection, despair, impoverishment, and boredom. She is not a part of a system of disposability because she cannot be disposed with. In the oscillation between this state of neither great crisis nor final redemption there is nothing spectacular to report. Indeed, nothing happens that rises to the level of an event let alone a crisis. The small child’s life-as-suffering will drift across a series of quasi-events into a form of death that can be certified as due to the vagary of “natural causes.” As a result any ethical impulse dependent on a certain kind of event and eventfulness—a crisis—flounders in this closet. How does one construct an ethics in relation to this kind of dispersed suffering?

Finally, any goods generated from the kind of misery found in this broom closet must be seen as socially cosubstantial as well as temporally nontransferable. The happiness of citizens of Omelas is substantially within the small child’s unhappiness; their well-being is part of a larger mode of corporeal embodiment in which her carnal misery is a vital organ; the usefulness of the child is inseparable from the distension of her body through the bodies of the citizens of Omelas. And these are not metaphors. She and they are not like a shared body; they are a shared body. Or, as I have put it previously, they share a mutual, if distributed, form of enfleshment. The solidarity the citizens of Omelas share with each other must, as of necessity, loop through her. As a result, the ethical imperative is not to put oneself in the child’s place, nor is it to experience the anxiety of potentially being put in her place. Le Guin’s fiction rejects this ethics of liberal empathy. Instead, the ethical imperative is to know that your own good life is already in her broom closet, and as a result, either you must create a new organization of enfleshment by compromising on the goods to which you have grown accustomed (and grown accustomed to thinking of as “yours” including the health of your body) or admit that the current organization of enfleshment is more important to you than her suffering.

That Le Guin allows some people to walk away from Omelas rather than stay and fight its injustice may seem a cop-out. That Le Guin is unable to describe the place they go seems even more of one. How to come to grips with Le Guin’s refusal, or inability, to provide a substantive alter-
native to her devastating paradox of the good life—and après Derrida, a philosophy of ends more generally—is the last point that this book will address. Other issues about Le Guin’s short story and her opus more generally will be raised through a set of encounters with a number of alternative social worlds and their social projects. Of particular emphasis will be the contrast between Le Guin’s interest in the emergence of “the liberatory novum, of individual initiative, of understanding and communication,” which correspond to the “classical utopian aspirations of Western philosophy” and, say, the science fiction writer Samuel Delany’s interest in “the dominance of dispersion, of compelling convention, of statistical typicality, of delusion and a systematic distortion of communication,” which emerged from his encounter with Michel Foucault’s notion of the heterotopic. My reading of “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas” and Le Guin’s ethical reflections on civic responsibility merely provides a convenient narrative starting point for the concerns of this book: How do specific arrangements of tense, eventfulness, and ethical substance make affectively and cognitively sensible and practical, late liberal distributions of life and death, of hope and harm, and of endurance and exhaustion across social difference? Given these arrangements, what are the conditions in which new forms of social life emerge? And, if we believe that all potential social life is material, that it is embodied, then how does the materiality of the social otherwise matter to critical theory?

This is especially pertinent since outside of Omelas no one is simply happy. Citizens in actually existing states do not live in the perfect grace that prevails in Omelas. Nor is the difference between those who have and those who have not as precisely defined and located.

Obviously this is a large and unwieldy set of concerns. And the meanings of the terms I have already used—“projects,” “social projects,” and “alternative social worlds”; “events” and “quasi-events”; “tense,” “eventfulness,” “ethical substance”; “sacrificial love”; “late liberalism”—demand some initial specification. So let me begin by describing the specific social worlds and projects that interest me; why I am interested in these kinds of worlds and projects; and what of this has to do with tense, eventfulness, and ethical substance. I will then describe how the general space and time in which this book was written has made understanding these kinds of concerns unavoidable and explain why I use the chronotope of
late liberalism rather than other available chronotropes such as liberalism, neoliberalism, postcolonial liberalism, or diasporic liberalism. And finally I will describe how the following chapters slowly unpack late liberal techniques of power and the concepts I use to understand them.

Spaces of Otherwise

My analysis of the social worlds and projects that provide the sociographic core of this book emerges from very longstanding friendships—for instance a twenty-six-year relationship with friends in north Australia—and much shorter ones—I have been in deep conversation with members of alternative queer projects for only six years. Throughout this book I discuss how my friends in Australia have been working on an augmented reality project as a way of maintaining within late liberalism an ethical relationship to themselves and their country. My discussions of alternative projects of embodied sociality have a more diffused focus. But what interests this book about these social worlds is fourfold. First, I am interested in them as projects, a term that is loosely modeled on the meaning that the moral philosopher Bernard Williams gave to the concepts of moral projects and actions. Responding to utilitarian understandings of the good, Williams argues that moral projects cannot be measured, as many utilitarian approaches would have it, by assessing happiness or pleasure, or any action for that matter, from the point of view of a systemized impartial perspective. Happiness, goodness, and justice are never judged by a set of impartial decisions or from the perspective of “the view from nowhere.”10 And this is because happiness depends on a person “being taken up or involved in any of a vast range of projects” and commitments.11 “To be taken up” and “to be involved” has a much stronger meaning for Williams than to be merely interested in something. Projects are the thick subjective background effects of a life as it has been lived; and these thick subjectivities provide the context of moral and political calculation. All judgments and views always occur within thick and particular life projects—a point most anthropologists would take as axiomatic. But it is also a point that foregrounds the fact that in any given social world, multiple moral and political calculations proliferate because no one ever lives the exact same project—in Omelas, for instance, the good life would be the
contested space between the child in the broom closet and each and every citizen’s project, including those who decide to remain in the city and those who walk away from it.

Whereas Williams is interested in projects from the point of view of individual moral agents, I am interested in them from the point of view of the social worlds in which these projects are situated, and not all of these equally. I am interested in those social projects that attempt to capacitate an alternative set of human and posthuman worlds. (The “view from nowhere” is from this perspective a social project that has as its background assumption that background assumptions can be emptied out.) When I say I am interested in social projects I am gesturing to specific arrangements (agencements) that extend beyond simple human sociality or human beings. As will become clear, a social project is dependent on a host of interlocking concepts, materials, and forces that include human and nonhuman agencies and organisms. Focusing primarily on the human dimension of these social projects, critical social theory has used many phrases to describe these worlds. Michael Warner has used the term “counterpublics,” Charles Taylor “new social imaginaries,” and Nancy Frazer “subaltern counterpublics.” I have used the phrase “radical worlds.” When I say I am interested in social projects I am gesturing to specific arrangements (agencements) that extend beyond simple human sociality or human beings. As will become clear, a social project is dependent on a host of interlocking concepts, materials, and forces that include human and nonhuman agencies and organisms. Focusing primarily on the human dimension of these social projects, critical social theory has used many phrases to describe these worlds. Michael Warner has used the term “counterpublics,” Charles Taylor “new social imaginaries,” and Nancy Frazer “subaltern counterpublics.” I have used the phrase “radical worlds.” Much earlier, Foucault coined the term “heterotopia” to refer to a set of countersites (sortes de contre-emplacements) that are real localized sites in the world and yet contested inversions of the world (“je suis là-bas, là où je ne suis pas”). Some of these worlds may, from one perspective, seem more voluntarist than others. Alternative spiritual publics that I discuss in subsequent chapters might seem to be this sort of voluntarist counterpublic. It may appear that members of these social projects choose to place themselves within this or that alternative world. Others may seem to be structurally located within normative worlds in such a way that their everyday actions are heterotopic whether they intend them to be or not. My Indigenous friends in Australia would seem good candidates for this less voluntary form of the otherwise. But I hope the following chapters give lie to such simple divisions of the will—and put serious pressure on the quasi-mystical concept of “the will” itself—but there is nevertheless a discursive power of the fantasy of the will and its volitions that needs to be noted.

In any case, we have social worlds, social projects, and individuated
projects, each of which conveys a slightly different aspect of human life as this life unfolds in equally complexly organized material compositions. Social worlds are the most encompassing. But specifying even the location and composition of contemporary social worlds is quite difficult. What composes a human social world may be anything but proximate to it, let alone human. The dissemination of various forms of sociality and meaning vis-à-vis various emergent communicative and market linkages creates anonymous and yet intimate linkages and supports across social worlds. Moreover, no social world is simply organized or unorganized, coherent or incoherent, unified or fractured. Instead, social worlds are multiply partially organized and thus always multiply partially disorganized. Social projects disaggregate aspects of the social worlds and aggregate individual projects into a more or less whole—a definable and describable thing. But social projects are not fixed things. Indeed, they are not “things” so much as aggregating practices, incessantly fixing phenomena and cosubstantiating practices.

This book is particularly interested in a certain moment, or condition, in the life of alternative social projects—those moments, or those conditions in which a social project is neither something nor nothing. This indeterminate oscillation—the virtual space that opens up between the potentiality and actuality of an alternative social project—has attracted the attention of a range of immanent critical theorists even as Foucault presented his lecture on heterotopia in 1967.14 Since the mid-1960s, immanent critique has sought to conceptualize the source and space of “new possibilities of life” independent of philosophical notions of transcendent consciousness.15 In his Vincennes lectures on Spinoza, Gilles Deleuze, for instance, slowly differentiated between a mode of thought defined by its representational character (ideas) and a mode of thought that is not defined representationally (affects).16 Deleuze concedes that affects can have an ideational form (“there is an idea of the loved thing, to be sure, there is an idea of something hoped for”) and that ideas have a chronological and logical primacy in relation to the affects (“In order to will it’s necessary to have an idea, however confused or indeterminate it may be, of what is willed”). But he insisted that affects like hope and love “represent nothing, strictly nothing.”17 Affects may be ultimately determined by the given system of ideas that one has, but they are not “reducible to the
ideas one has,” whether one considers these ideas in their objective extrinsic reality or in their formal intrinsic reality. Ideas and affects are “two kinds of modes of thought” that differ “in nature.” An idea represents something while an affect does not. An affect is not nothing, but it is also not something in the same way as an extrinsic or intrinsic idea. An affect is a force of existing (vis existendi) that is neither the realized thing (an idea), nor the accomplishment of a thing (an act, potentia agendi). This perspective on the force of existing is clearly engaging Spinoza’s claim that things, finite and determinate kinds of existence, strive (conatus) to persevere in their being. For Deleuze, the perpetual variation between vis existendi and potentia agendi—between striving to persevere and any actual idea or action that emerges from this striving—provides a space of potentiality where new forms of life can emerge. But it is exactly in this ontotheoretical spacing that a different, sociological question emerges: How do new forms of social life maintain the force of existing in specific social spacings of life? How do they endure the effort it takes to strive to persevere? And how in answering these questions do new, if not onto-theoretical, then political and ethical concerns emerge?

The question of how new possibilities of life are able to maintain their force of existence in specific organizations of social space becomes especially acute in the wake of Giorgio Agamben’s reflections on Deleuze’s immanent philosophy and his own work on the biopolitical. In his reflections on Deleuze’s “Immanence: A Life,” Agamben calls for the development of a coherent ontology of potentiality (dynamis) that would upend the primacy of actuality (energeia). For Agamben potentiality has a dual nature: while the actual can only be, the potential can be or not be. And it is exactly within this ontological duality of the potential that new possibilities of life are sheltered. But for Agamben, not all potentialities have the same potential when it comes to the kinds and degrees of difference necessary to disturb current biopolitical formations. In the difficult last few sections of Homo Sacer, Agamben turns to a series of “uncertain and nameless terrains” where life and death enter “zones of indistinction.” The American comatose patient Karen Quinlan exemplifies such spaces: “Karen Quinlan’s body—which wavers between life and death according to the progress of medicine and the changes in legal decisions—is a legal being as much as it is a biological being. A law that seeks to decide on life
is embodied in a life that coincides with death.”22 Death and life, “far from having become more exact, now [oscillate] from one pole to other with the greatest indeterminacy.”23 Failing to be actual, death and life become pure potential. They can be or not be. And it is in these maximally intensified zones of oscillation and indeterminacy that new forms of life and worlds will emerge and the “ways and the forms of a new politics must be thought.”24 But rather than answering our question of how new forms of social life can survive the perpetual variation of being, Agamben’s examples intensify it. How can new forms of life, let alone the political thought they might foster, persevere in such spaces? How can new social worlds endure the “wavering of death” that defines these spaces?25 Indeed, so unlikely are the possibilities of new life surviving in these spaces that, cribbing off Brian Massumi, we might describe instances of survival as moments of “miraculization.”26

The social projects that interest this book may not have the force to act in the sense of making anything like a definitive event occur in the world (becoming a counterpublic is an achievement), but they exist, nevertheless, in the Spinozan sense of persisting in their being. And insofar as they do, these alternative worlds maintain the otherwise that stares back at us without perhaps being able to speak to us.

But if the point is not to discover the eternal or the universal, but to find the singular conditions under which something new is produced, then two specific aspects of social life need to be emphasized. This is of special concern to those trying to write an anthropology of the otherwise. On the one hand, attempting to address the question of the endurance, let alone the survival, of alternative forms of life in the gale force of curtailing social winds opens a set of new ethical and political questions. If the possibilities of new forms of life dwell and are sheltered within the variation between the force of existing and the power of acting within these intensified zones of being and not being, then what does immanent critique demand of those who live in these zones? This problem becomes particularly clear if we think of potentiality as the ethical substance of immanent critique. If, as Michel Foucault defined it, ethical substance is the prime material (matière principale) of moral reflection, conduct, and evaluation, then the ethical substance of immanent critique would be intensified potentiality, insofar as intensified potentiality is the ma-
terial on which ethical work (travail éthique) is carried out. But this ethical work is distributed across different social groups. Thus it is important to note, again following Foucault’s reading of the use of pleasure among the Greeks and the practice of critique more generally, that pleasure and critique are generally available materials and practices, irrespective of the fact that only some people make use of them. But the general availability of intensified potential doesn’t seem to be equally available in the same way. Certainly all subjects exist in the variation between vis existendi and potentia agendi and between modes of being and not being. But the intensity of this variation and its zoning are neither uniform nor uniformly distributed. As a result a gap seems to open between those who reflect on and evaluate ethical substance and those who are this ethical substance. Thus, on the other hand, we need to understand, first, that late liberalism is a social project—it is a metadiscourse that aggregates aspects of the social world—and we need to understand, second, how this aggregation occurs through and across other social projects and their material supports.

This book argues that a key means by which late liberalism aggregates social worlds is through figurations of tense, eventfulness, and ethical substance. So let me say a few things about how I understand the tense, eventfulness, and ethical substance in late liberalism, beginning with tense.

Tense, Eventfulness, Ethical Substance

The aspect of tense that interests me is broadly social rather than strictly linguistic. I am interested in the social divisions of tense that help shape how social belonging, abandonment, and endurance are enunciated and experienced within late liberalism. From a grammatical perspective, tense and event are themselves difficult to disambiguate. Metapragmatic approaches to discourse, for instance, understand tense and event to emerge from the intersection between what is being narrated and the act of narrating it—the time during or over which the state or action denoted by a verb occurs. In the grammatical past, for instance, the event being narrated is marked as prior to the act of narrating, while in the grammatical present tense the event being narrated coincides with the act of narrating it. Languages demonstrate a wide variety of ways of configuring
the temporal relationship between what is being narrated and the act of narrating it. French marks this relationship in a different way than does English; English in a different way than the Australian Indigenous language Emiyenggal. Emile Benveniste noted long ago, “In one way or another a language always makes a distinction of tense.” Sometimes, as in French and English, “a past and future” is “separated by a ‘present’”; sometimes, as “in various Amerindian languages,” the “preterite-present” is “opposed to a future or a present future” or “distinguished from a past.” But for Benveniste what is shared across these differences is a “line of separation” whose reference is the “present,” a time that Benveniste puts in scare quotes to emphasize its performative nature. Thus, how various narratives of belonging, abandonment, and endurance are socially enunciated and experienced depends in part on the ways that the relationship between the time of narration and the event narrated, or, put in another way, the event of narration and the narrated event, is grammatically marked. What Le Guin is doing, for instance, is arguing that the event of the child’s misery cannot be narrated as if it were in the past perfect or the future anterior. The grammar of the child’s misery must be written in the durative present.

What interests me is how these strictly grammatical figurations are absorbed into other discourses, affective attachments, and practices of late liberalism. Take, for instance, teleological and eschatological discourses. Grammars might differently mark the temporal relationship between what is being narrated and the act of narrating it, constituting in the process the linguistic event, but in late liberalism this linguistic variation is inflected by a shared teleological discourse that apprehends events “as [the] realization of an already given end or telos” and a shared eschatological discourse that waits for “‘extreme’ or ‘ultimate’ moments and events which immediately precede or accompany the end of history” and “its reversal into eternity.” In other words, the differences in narrative tense are metadiscursively refigured through teleological and eschatological discourses such as sacrifice and sacrificial love. As chapter 5 unpacks in more detail, discussions of sacrificial love can figure death, whether an individual’s death in war or a generation’s loss in structural readjustment, as best understood from the perspective of the redemptive end from which this death gains its meaning.
Teleological and eschatological are not the only tense-laden discourses of late liberalism. Take, for instance, liberal constitutional events. Constitutions can be said to presuppose and project into social space a division of tense, that is, the before and after the event of the constitution. Constituency divides national time between the liberal state of exception (the foundational violence of the constitutional event) and liberal exceptionalism (the exclusion of further foundational violence that the constitution guarantees). Likewise, in previous writings, I have tried to suggest how the intimate event is similarly laden with this performative tense, but in the case of the intimate event this performative tense projects into global space a temporally inflected civilizational division (the autological subject and genealogical society). In this book the autological subject and genealogical society, the brackets of recognition, the governance of the prior, and sacrificial love are all examined as techniques of social tense that are at hand when accounts of ongoing structural social harm are explained from a neoliberal or late liberal perspective. I will discuss this projection in more detail below; for now it is important merely to note that these complex, interrelated figurations of tense transform everyday liberal life into problems of threshold, scale, and performative realization. They continually deflect moral sense and practical reason from the durative present to an absolute difference between presence and absence or the critical difference between the future anterior and the past perfect.

While time and the event have an internal relation vis-à-vis tense, there is another aspect of the event and eventfulness that concerns this book. Like Le Guin, I am interested in forms of suffering and dying, enduring and expiring, that are ordinary, chronic, and cruddy rather than catastrophic, crisis-laden, and sublime. In other words, this book is interested in the quasi-events that saturate potential worlds and their social projects. If events are things that we can say happened such that they have a certain objective being, then quasi-events never quite achieve the status of having occurred or taken place. They neither happen nor not happen. I am not interested in these quasi-events in some abstract sense, but in the concrete ways that they are, or are not, aggregated and thus apprehended, evaluated, and grasped as ethical and political demands in specific late liberal markets, publics, and states, as opposed to crises and catastrophes that seem to necessitate ethical reflection and political and civic engage-
ment. Crises and catastrophes are kinds of events that seem to demand, as if authored from outside human agency, an ethical response. Not surprisingly then, these kinds of events become what inform the social science of suffering and thriving, the politics of assembly and dispersal, and the socially constituted senses of the extraordinary and everyday, as the work of Veena Das and João Biehl have helped make clear. What techniques, such as statistics, allow nonperceptual quasi-events to be transformed into perceptual events, even catastrophes? What are the temporal and epistemological presuppositions that foreclose an anthropology of ordinary suffering and thus an anthropological understanding of the dynamic by which extraordinary events of violence are folded into everyday routines—and visa versa? How and why do things move from potentiality to eventfulness to availability for various social projects? How might we turn from an ontology of potentiality to a sociology of potentiality in which potentiality is always embodied in specific social worlds? How can we grasp some of the qualities of a material object that is nevertheless a discursive object? How can we talk about subject-effects and object-effects without making materiality disappear or making its different manifestations irrelevant to the unequal organization of social life? And finally, how can we simultaneously recognize that discourse makes objects appear, that it does so under different material conditions, and that the matter that matters forth from discourse is not identical to discourse?

These questions become especially pertinent when we turn to the problem of ethical substance in late liberalism. If we take seriously Le Guin’s narrative of the cosubstantiality of bodies in Omelas, then how should we understand the relationship between ethical substance and critical theory? Attempting to address the question of the endurance, let alone the survival, of alternative forms of life in the gale force of curtailting social winds opens a set of new ethical and political questions. As noted above, if the possibilities of new forms of life dwell and are sheltered within the variation between the force of existing and the power of acting within these intensified zones of being and not being, then what does immanent critique demand of those who live in these zones? This problem becomes particularly clear if we think of potentiality as the ethical substance of immanent critique.

When I use the phrase “ethical substance,” I am clearly thinking here of
Michel Foucault’s understanding of ethical substance as he enunciated it in *The Uses of Pleasure*. And here I return to the issues, raised above, about the sociology of potentiality in immanent critique. In *Pleasure*, Foucault argued that in the Greek episteme ethical substance was bodily pleasure insofar as it was the prime material (*matière*) of moral reflection, conduct, and evaluation. The ethical work (*travail éthique*) of the self was to establish proper conduct in relation to this ethical substance—a substance that was material (*matière*)—so as to bring into being the self that was the object of one’s behavior. As is also well known, Foucault’s colleague at the Collège de France, the classicist Pierre Hadot, deeply influenced Foucault’s thinking about *askesis* (exercise; self-mastery) and about freedom as a kind of heterotopic spacing of the otherwise. As Foucault began reconceptualizing his second two volumes of *The History of Sexuality*, Hadot engaged Foucault in conversation about various forms of post-Socratic askesis: the Platonic renunciation of the pleasures of the flesh under a specific dietary regime; Pyrrhonian indifference; the Cynic endurance of hunger, cold, and insults; Epicurean limitation. Hadot believed that understanding practices of life within these post-Socratic schools would help dislodge the hermeneutic bias of contemporary philosophical practice by demonstrating the classical emphasis on philosophy as self-transformation. These discussions with Hadot were central to how Foucault would come to think about critique as a type of virtue organized around the question of governance (how not to be governed *like that*, rather than how not to be governed *at all*). Central to these virtues of critique was an examination of forms of “eventualization” (*événementialisation*) — the relay between mechanisms of coercion and contents of knowledge likely to induce behaviors and discourses, affective attachments and analytic tendencies.

And yet, as I noted above, in relation to the variation between *vis existendi* and *potentia agendi*, and between modes of being and not being, while all subjects are subject to forms of eventualization, not all forms of eventualization are the same—nor are their powers of coercion and incitement and intensities of variation and zoning equally distributed. As a result, once again we see a gap open between those who reflect on and evaluate ethical substance and those who are this ethical substance. What I will suggest throughout this book, but especially in the last three
chapters, is that the ethical substance of immanent critical theory is embodied potentiality insofar as embodied potentiality is the prime material of moral reflection and evaluation. In some ways the gap between those who reflect on and evaluate ethical substance and those who are ethical substance mirrors a much older gap in critical theory. We can think here of the ways that Louis Althusser struggled to specify how intellectuals and the proletariat were differently situated in and represented class struggle. But rather than dwell on the question of critical theory’s proper stance toward the subject that it posits as the engine of history, in this introduction I want to examine a slightly different set of concerns. First, I should note that I am myself aligned with the general project of immanent critique to find a source of a social otherwise outside a gesture of transcendental consciousness. My alignment with immanent critique is no doubt due to a certain aesthetic and theoretical predisposition to this framework. But it also emerges out of a longstanding commitment to a set of local Indigenous Australian understandings of the immanent geological (the being of geology) source of life and its possibilities. Second, given these commitments I want to turn from an ontology of potentiality to a sociology of potentiality. Rather than the question of the variation of being and not being or affects and ideas in general, I want to understand this variation in specific historical contexts. But I am making a general claim; namely, that potentiality and its perpetual variations never occur in a general way, but always, as Delueze himself noted, in specific agencements—arrangements of connecting concepts, materials, and forces that make a common compositional unity.

Before elaborating what an alternative glossary might consist of, let me turn to what I mean by neoliberalism and by way of this explain why I use the chronotope of late liberalism rather than other available chronotropes such as liberalism, neoliberalism, postcolonial liberalism, or diasporic liberalism. It is critical to this discussion that even as I describe how I am using these terms I do not think that they are referring to some given state of affairs. Liberalism, late liberalism, and neoliberalism do not exist as things in the ordinary sense of the term but rather as actions like a sighting or a citing. They exist insofar as they are evoked to conjure, shape, aggregate, and evaluate a variety of social worlds, and each of these conjurings, shapings, aggregations, and evaluations disperse liberalism as a global terrain.
Neoliberalism

First to what I mean by neoliberalism. The term “neoliberalism,” as used by writers as diverse as Immanuel Wallerstein, David Harvey, and Michel Foucault, marks the transformation of state politics and market relations between the postwar Bretton Woods agreement (loosely the Keynesian period) to its collapse in the 1970s and marks two different philosophies about the proper relationship among markets, state, and civil society. In general Keynesians believed—and still believe—that because capitalism is subject to periodic unemployment crises, it should be regulated by state and international monetary and fiscal policy, one pillar of which is the redistributive compromise among state, corporation, and labor. With the collapse of Bretton Woods, neoliberals argued for the privatization and deregulation of state assets, the territorial dispersion of production through subcontracting, and a shift in tax policies that favored the rich. Central to neoliberal thinking is the idea that the market naturally pays people what they are worth—and that bargaining power organized through extant institutional arrangements should have nothing to do with income distribution. Indeed, so the argument goes, “intervening” in the market through group bargaining distorts fair distribution based on the ultimate rationality of the market to pay people what they are worth.

But whatever neoliberalism is, what it refers to is not an event, but a set of uneven social struggles within the liberal diaspora. Ronald Reagan’s assault on the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization in 1981 and Margaret Thatcher’s confrontation with the National Union of Mineworkers in 1984–85 occurred more than a decade before the Australian prime minister John Howard confronted the waterfront unions in 1997. Likewise, a formal relationship among state, corporations, and labor came much earlier in Europe than Australia. In Australia, this formal compromise came with the 1983 Prices and Incomes Accord (colloquially known as “The Accord”) even as both the Hawke and Keating governments instituted key pillars of neoliberalism—privatization of state corporations, floating the currency, and dropping trade barriers. Conceptualizing neoliberalism as a series of struggles across an uneven social terrain allows us to see how these heterogeneous spaces provide the conditions for new forms of sociality and for new kinds of markets and market instruments (or “products”). The derivative trade is perhaps
exemplary of new markets and instruments. Prior to 1970 “no organized financial-derivative exchange existed anywhere in the world.” By the end of 2006, “exchange-traded derivatives totaling 84.4 trillion dollars” were globally outstanding. And by 2010, the United States was attempting to reregulate this vast network of capital speculation.

Begun in 2003, the writing of this book stretched across the global boom and bust of the first half of the twenty-first century, the height of the neoliberal ascendency. At the turn of the century, debates focused on the shape of the neoliberal relationship among state, market, and empire. For instance, Giovanni Arrighi proposed that “the concentration of power in the hands of particular blocs of governmental and business agencies has been as essential to the recurrent material expansions of the capitalist world-economy as the competition among ‘approximately equal’ political structures.” That is, capital expansion and empire were intimately linked whether or not empire took the form of older multinational states such as the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires or the form of the Westphalian nation-state. From this perspective, Arrighi claimed that we were witnessing the last stages of the material and financial expansion of the U.S. empire, the heir of the British Empire, and the first stages of an Asian century. Although less sanguine about the imminent demise of the American empire, David Harvey, writing in the wake of the Bush war on terror, argues that, whether of a British, American or Chinese shape, all imperial undergarments of capitalist expansion have a similar cut, namely, accumulation by dispossession. As in previous centuries, what we were witnessing in neoliberal capital was the “displacement of peasant populations and the formation of a landless proletariat.” What has changed, Harvey argues, is the location of accumulation by dispossession, not the process. In the last three decades the displacement of peasant populations has been occurring in “countries such as Mexico and India” where “many formerly common property resources, such as water, have been privatized (often at World Bank insistence) and brought within the capitalist logic of accumulation.” The political theorist Glen Coulthard has extended and refashioned Harvey’s argument by focusing on the foundational and ongoing events of Indigenous dispossession.

The internal spoils of this new organization of neoliberal governmentality did not lead to a general rise in the life-worlds of all people. Rather
than the doors of various broom closets being swung open, the occupants of these closets were shuffled around while new justifications for belonging and abandonment emerged. Some continental disparities continued. Africa remained mired in what Achille Mbembe calls a necropolitics—the spatial demarcation of Africa as a society of spectacular killing and death. Other continents emerged as major economic and social forces. China and India of course—but also South America—emerged as major centers for a renewed revolutionary Left fueled by such means as petrol pesos (Venezuela) and production centers (Brazil) even while the material benefits of the revolution remains unclear. (If Harvey is right, the rise in the capital power of these states corresponds with the formation of a new landless proletariat.) In other, long-developed contexts, wealth was reorganized. Andreas Cornia and Julius Court have shown that from the 1960s to the 1990s, inequality of wealth has increased in the vast majority of developed and developing countries and has decreased only in France and Norway. In the United States, countless economists on the right and left have noted a dramatic concentration of wealth in the top one percent of the population. If middle- and working-class Americans didn’t feel the shift in wealth, this was largely due to consumption practices that depended on the acquisition of a huge middle-class debt through easy credit.

What new political opportunities are made available by these old wineskins is unclear. Some think that the new globally striated nature of accumulation by dispossession will provide the possibility for new supranational grassroots political alliances, such as alliances between residents of small American towns in Maine fighting the company Poland Springs for control of municipal waters and residents of the Indian city of Varanasi protesting Coca-Cola Company’s access to scarce water supplies. Others propose that class struggle might be giving way more generally to the “multitude” or to a loosely organized anarchist Left. What does seem clear is that neoliberalism is not a thing but a pragmatic concept—a tool—in a field of multiple maneuvers among those who support and benefit from it, those who support it and suffer from it, and those who oppose it and benefit from it nevertheless—each action changing if only slightly the field of maneuver itself. Again, from a certain logical point of view, this field of maneuver is available to anyone, but in the actual worlds
of neoliberalism, the generally available is always distributed in specific ways.

What seemed clear when I began this book was that, with the United States mired in a disastrous war in Iraq and the emergence of potential market counterhegemons in China, India, and Russia, whose political forms resist or outright reject the typical conjunction of capitalism and democracy, liberalism as a broader formation was in crisis. Key pillars of liberalism as a general theory of political governance—that there is a self-evident relationship between a political form (democracy) and economic form (capital market)—no longer seemed so self-evident to key global players. Socialism with Chinese characteristics seemed to be providing a major engine for an unparalleled rate of world growth and, consequentially the capital to expand into and transform long-stagnant zones in Africa and elsewhere. This rise of counterhegemons subsequently opened new potential for South-South relations, unmediated by the G8, even as it challenged liberal democracy as the horizon of a world political economy. In other words, the G8 faced increasing competition not merely for economic authority but also for political legitimacy from the G20. The liberal–neoliberal G8 was not late in the sense of near to the end of its life, but late in the sense of being belated—that fundamental assumptions about the inevitable relationship between capitalism and liberal democracy were being decentered and provincialized. Thus the problem was not simply, as Wallerstein noted, that neoliberal capital expansion in the first world was financed by the “fantastic expansion of borrowing (indebtedness) via the sale of U.S. treasury bonds to the controllers of world energy supplies and low-cost production facilities.” The problem was that the major holder of this escalating debt (China) was not a liberal democracy, nor did it seem to need to be to be a driving market force. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was exactly during this period that a form of neo conservatism reemerged in the United States, proposing that the United States use its economic, political, and military strength and influence to impose liberalism, market capitalism, and democracy on other countries even as it claimed that this triumvirate was the natural destiny of all civilizations.

But neoliberalism is not merely a set of arrangements among the markets, labor, and state, nor is it merely an older form of laissez-faire capi-
talism. By the time Foucault was giving his 1978–79 lectures, *The Birth of Biopolitics* (*Naissance de la Biopolitique*), he had become interested in what he called “today’s liberal . . . or neoliberal program” (“la programmation libérale ou, comme on dit, neolibérale à notre époque”). Of decisive import for Foucault was the noncorrespondence between laissez-faire liberalism and neoliberalism. Neoliberals did not merely wish to free the economy from the Keynesian regulatory state; they wished to free the truth games of capitalism from the market itself—the market should be the general measure of all social activities and values. In a recent *New York Times Book Review* essay, Tony Judt asked how and why liberal democracies like the United States, Britain, and Australia stopped assessing social programs and actions on the basis of political philosophy and instead restricted themselves to issues of profit and loss, and languages of
efficiency, productivity, and benefit to gross domestic profit. As Wendy Brown has noted, in neoliberalism the market is no longer seen as a self-perpetuating machine but as a normative achievement that is the result of aggressive social policies. Thus the ascendency of neoliberals in Germany and the United States was not the resurgence of old forms of liberal economic ideology formulated in the eighteenth and nineteenth century but a new form of governmentality, namely, a new way in which power over and through life and death was being organized and expressed.

What Foucault did not discuss was that neoliberalism transformed an older liberal governance of life and death. Neoliberalism has not merely mimicked the move from faire mourir ou laisser vivre to “faire” vivre et “laisser” mourir. It has resuscitated faire mourir into its topology of faire vivre and laisser mourir, even as the more dominant powers of making live and letting die have changed the techniques of state killing. Any form of life that could not produce values according to market logic would not merely be allowed to die, but, in situations in which the security of the market (and since the market was now the raison d’être of the state, the state) seemed at stake, ferreted out and strangled. This way of killing is not commensurate with an older sovereign power Foucault so viscerally described in the opening of Discipline and Punish. There are not public spectacles of drawn and quartered bodies—or lynched bodies. Secret agreements are made to remove the body to be tortured far away from public sight and scrutiny. Moreover these new semipublic and secret ways of making die have their counterpart in market disciplines. Any form of life that is not organized on the basis of market values is characterized as a potential security risk. If a social welfare program, for instance, can be shown to lengthen life and increase health, but cannot at the same time be shown to produce a market value, this lengthened life and increased health is not a value to be capacitated. Indeed, it is a value to be actively attacked and rooted out of the state and national psyche. Once we understand that neoliberalism is neither laissez-faire liberalism nor Keynesianism—neither a social formation in which the state allows the market to proceed on the basis of one set of principles and the market allows the state to proceed on another set of principles, nor a well planned form of state and market regulation—but something much more aggressive, then we can understand why we get nowhere within neoliberalism argu-
The Child in the Broom Closet

ing whether this or that person did or didn’t care about the vulnerable or that this or that social welfare program was or was not a failure. Instead we need to start asking what are the measures of failure, the arts of failure, such that people believe and experience cultural recognition and social welfare as failures. After all, as I hope subsequent chapters will make clear, failure is not an ideal form floating outside social space. Failure is instead a socially mediated term for assessing the social world. When chapter 4 asks why social welfare in Australia suddenly seemed to stop working at the turn of the century, it doesn’t try to first define what failure is or isn’t. Instead it demonstrates how within a neoliberal framework any social investment that does not have a clear end in market value—a projectable moment when state input values (money, services, care) can be replaced by market output value (workers compensated and supported by nothing except the market)—fails economically and morally. And a social investment is an economic and moral failure, whether or not the investment is life-enhancing.

By 2003, in Australia where I have focused most of my quarter-century or so of research, the neoliberal reorientation of global economic hegemony seemed well under way as well as the accumulations by dispossession it sparked. The global commodity boom fueled by the production boom in China and Southeast Asia raised the Australian dollar to near parity with the American dollar (by 2011 it had achieved parity). The Australian mining industry led the way in producing a twenty-two billion dollar federal surplus in 2008. (Other primary exporting states were seeing similar surplus booms.) In this economic environment, Australia seemed sheltered by the double-digit expansion of the Chinese economy and vigorously courted new trade agreements with it. But rather than expanding social welfare to its Indigenous citizens, the conservative federal government reversed a longstanding commitment to cultural recognition and reconciliation. I discuss this at length in the next chapter, but here is just a taste. In July 2007, the government announced an “intervention” in Aboriginal affairs in the Northern Territory. The government pegged its declaration of emergency to the release of the Little Children Are Sacred report that claimed that some Aboriginal children were being sexually abused because of the fetid nature of Indigenous communities. The government called for a move “beyond” the politics of recognition
and reconciliation to a free market approach to Indigenous affairs. Everyone agreed that Indigenous life would initially be much worse. But, in a move readers should now be able to anticipate, from the perspective of the future good that market integration would bring, this present suffering, we were told, should be bracketed. Focus on the future.

This form of neoliberal governance was itself shaken at the end of my writing of this book. By the fall of 2008 the crisis of capitalism and liberalism wasn’t merely formal in sense of what kinds of state forms could not only be compatible with capitalism but were necessary to its current formation. It was now linked to a very different set of circumstances. A global financial credit crisis arose in large part from the collapse of a host of new financial instruments intended to manipulate the assets of long-term market investments for enormous short-term profit. The collapse of the credit market led to the collapse of consumption in the United States, production in China, commodity exports in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and Australia, and currencies in Eastern Europe. China did not immediately emerge as an independent engine of growth as widely hoped, although it continued to grow and, by this growth, buffer the effects of the recession in commodity export centers such as Australia. But Russia, Venezuela, and Dubai were caught banking too heavily and exclusively on high oil revenues. By March of 2009, the World Bank predicted that worldwide gross domestic product would shrink for the first time since the Second World War. The Brussels Forum followed suit, with the president of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, stating that 2009 would be a “dangerous year,” with issues going “beyond the economic to political and social instability.” In the midst of these events many proposals were advanced to fix global capitalism or to bring it finally to its knees. To those arguing that we were witnessing the end of neoliberalism and, subsequently, the end of capitalism, Amartya Sen reminded the readers of the New York Review of Books that even Adam Smith envisioned a world of diverse economic formations (free markets and government-controlled social domains such as education) within capitalism. Smith never thought that capitalism, with its signature characteristics of market transactions, profit motivation, and individually based private property, was sufficient. That Sen was incited to defend capitalism by differentiating it from neoliberalism suggests something late about liberalism, not
in the sense that we are seeing its last hurrah, but that it has entered a new stage of reflexivity. With the calming of the markets, the loosening of credit, and the tentative return to consumption, some of this reflexivity may yet wane. And how this globally systemic crisis is resolved in liberal democracies, if it is resolved, is as of yet unclear. We see some contours of a post-post–Bretton Woods world emerging—the return of a more robust regulatory environment, the partial nationalization of industry and banks, and the call for a global currency independent of the U.S. dollar.\textsuperscript{63}

If this book seeks to understand how social projects that lie on the cusp of being endure, then it turns not to an ontotheoretical answer, but to a sociographic which roots analysis in the actual conditions of neoliberalism—and late liberalism.

**Late Liberalism**

So why do I use the phrase “late liberalism”? By “late liberalism,” as distinct from these varieties and specificities of capitalism and state, I mean the shape that liberal governmentality has taken as it responds to a series of legitimacy crises in the wake of anticolonial, new social movements, and new Islamic movements. But in a broader sense late liberalism is a belated response to the challenge of social difference and the alternative social worlds and projects potentially sheltered there. From the 1950s onward, and culminating in the dramatic world events of 1968, anticolonial and new social movements transfigured the prior way in which liberalism governed alternative forms of life by putting extreme pressure on its legitimating frameworks—imperial arts of paternalist and civilizational governance. Anticolonial and new social movements refigured these paternalistic arts of civilizational care into acts of colonial domination and dispossession. Activists and their theorists, such as W. E. B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon, claimed that Western arts of caring for the colonized and subaltern were not rectifying human inequalities but creating and entrenching them. But this legitimacy crisis was, over time, turned into a crisis of culture for the governed as state after state instituted formal or informal policies of cultural recognition (or cognate policies such as multiculturalism) as a strategy for addressing the challenge of internal and external difference that they faced. The political theorists
Wendy Brown and Patchen Markell have described this as the culturalization of politics. In the wake of the liberal state’s recognition of past harm, the crisis would no longer be a crisis of liberal legitimacy but a crisis of how to allow cultures a space within liberalism without rupturing the core frameworks of liberal justice. In short, in late liberalism to care for difference is to make a space for culture to care for difference without disturbing key ways of figuring experience—ordinary habitual truths. And thus to assess care in late liberalism is to assess the capacity of culture as an agent of care.

No matter how superficially they might seem the same thing, the culturalization of politics was not the same as the colonial critique of liberalism. As the first two chapters elaborate in more detail, late liberal cultural recognition incorporated and disciplined the challenge that anticolonial and new social movements posed to liberal forms of government by shifting the locale of the crisis and creating a definitive, though undefined, limit on the formative legal and social power of cultural difference. For this shift to become practical, culture had to become pliant to legal and social science analysis and political and social incorporation. In the first instance, culture had to become equivalent to an artifact—something that could be said to have specific qualities that could then be measured and evaluated. Anthropologists of a certain structural and structural-functionalism ilk were helpful here. They truly believe(d) that culture is a set of rules—rules of descent and kinship or ritual and symbolic orders—that people do or do not follow as one follows a recipe. The soufflé rises or fails to—and its success depends upon what the rules are for making it and whether one follows them. In the second instance, this version of culture had to come out of the mouths of others. But even here, only a specific kind of other will do—the general other, the other that complies with the rules.

Not only was culture made into an object that one could possess or insufficiently create, the actions of different cultures were assigned different tenses—not merely different times, as Johannes Fabian so nicely demonstrated, but different tenses. And this is what I tried to suggest in The Empire of Love by way of the division between the autological subject and the genealogical society. In brief the autological subject refers to multiple discourses and practices that invoke the autonomous and self-
determining subject, and which are therefore linked to, but not exhausted in, liberalism’s emphasis on “freedom,” more narrowly conceived as a political philosophy. The genealogical society, on the other hand, refers to discourses that stress social constraint and determination in processes of subject constitution and construe the subject as bound by various kinds of inheritances. But these discourses of freedom and constraint are themselves animated by an imaginary of national and civilizational tense. Foucault noted as much in his Collège de France lectures, *Society Must Be Defended*, where he argued that Europe witnessed “an inversion of the temporal axis of the [political] demand.” Reading the work of Abbé de Sieyes in the broad context of new-regime France, Foucault argued that the political demand would no longer be made “in the name of a past right that was established by either a consensus, a victory, or an invasion.” Instead the demand would be “articulated in terms of a potentiality, a future, a future that is immediate, which is already present in the present because it concerns a certain function of Statist universality that is already fulfilled by ‘a’ nation within the social body, and which is therefore demanding that its status as a single nation must be effectively recognized, and recognized in the juridical form of the State.”

But the temporal inversion Foucault diagnosed was not merely a transformation of Europe in relation to itself. The “inversion of the temporal axis of the demand” had a dual address. It constituted a division of tense within Europe (what it had been and what it was now becoming) and a division between Europe and non-Europe (what Europeans were becoming and what non-Europeans were). This doubly situated inversion of tense connects the two major if fitful developments (the consolidation of *demos* and *colons*) that marked the long European *durée* from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century and was consolidated in the eighteenth to the nineteenth. It locates this durée in a topological knot in which Europe (demos) is in the body of the colonies (colons) as surely as the citizens of Omelas are in the body of the child in the broom closet. As democracy fitfully expanded across Europe and European conquest across the globe the truth of some would be increasingly judged in terms of a past perfect being—their already having been or, their potential to stop being what they are still in essence—while the truth of others would be judged from their potentiality. The futures of some, or the hopes that
they have for their future, can never be a future. They can only drag others into the past (“Osama bin Laden [Radical Islam ← going backward] coordinated the bombings”). And for others, no matter what harms they do, the truth of these harms is deferred into the future. What is happening isn’t happening because it is what it will have been when the last man has his say. The society of potentiality (demos) seemed to demand societies of fixity (colons), as if the future anterior of freedom demanded the clawing determination of the customary to make its difference visible and palpable. Indeed, so fundamentally is this history internal to modern Europe’s language of itself that its foundational terms of critical reference are saturated by this temporal inversion. Even the seemingly neutral social scientific term, “the social” cannot escape these same historical conditions, on the contrary: the historicity of the autological subject and genealogical society is internal to the historicity of the sign, “the social,” and consequently to the divisions of social belonging, social worlds, and social projects that I am examining.67 That we can say, “the social as opposed to the individual,” and that we can compare different (individual) “social worlds” presupposes the division between the autological subject and genealogical society.68

Late liberalism is not an epochal form that emerged in the wake of national, anticolonial, and new social movements, and subsequently ceased to adapt to new conditions. Late liberalism is no more a unified thing then is neoliberalism: they are both uneven terrains of social maneuver. This has become exceedingly clear in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Though not born at this moment, a reactionary position to cultural difference, especially Anglo-American forms of multiculturalism, has taken on new force since the attacks. The rise of this reactionary movement is perhaps exemplified by the influence of Samuel P. Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations* in neoconservative circles, but no matter whether we use this text or another as a marker, we have witnessed over the last decade a new and intensive shift in the governance of social difference. As the next two chapters make clear, culture is once again being inflected by a civilizational rhetoric. And this civilizational rhetoric has been articulated to national and international security. British, French, and German politicians such as David Cameron, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Angela Merkel have declared state multiculturalism a failure and called for a robust defense of western liberal principles.69 As chapter 3 argues, however, this seeming
shift from cultural recognition to liberal defensiveness is drawing on two modes already within state multiculturalism, namely, cultural espionage and camouflage.

Although I make a distinction between late liberalism and neoliberalism, I do not conceptualize these two as external to each other, for two main reasons. First, state forms of late liberalism arose within the struggle between Keynesian liberals and neoliberals. The culmination of key anticolonial and new social movements occurred in the same decades as the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement and the election of pro-neoliberals such as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. The apparent conflict between neoconservatives and neoliberals to multiculturalism (and other robust forms of cultural recognition) clouds the fact that both emerged as powerful social forces in the same few decades. Second, late liberal ways of framing social difference through specific configurations of tense, eventfulness, and ethical substance are utilized by laissez-faire liberals, Keynesian liberals, and neoliberals to legitimate differential belonging. These configurations are ready to hand across these ideological positions because they lie in the deep integrated background of late liberal life, making sense of pockets of abandonment and differential belonging. They allow the killing of all social projects that do not produce market forms of life to be justified on the basis of a distinction between societies of freedom and those of constraint, and the security risk of allowing the latter to gain a footing in the former. They make these forms of killing and letting die seem right, reasonable, and good. They figure the relationship between dominant forms, justifications, and experiences of social belonging, abandonment, and endurance and changing economic forms such as the recent dramatic cycle between capital accumulation and concentration and capital contraction and realignment.

Again, if a social otherwise is to emerge from the potentialities of this ordering of governance, then it must find a way of persisting and enduring in these late liberal ways of making live, making die, and letting die.

An Alternative Glossary for Late Liberalism

Economies of Abandonment not only looks at how late liberal figurations of tense, eventfulness, and ethical substance distract the eye from potential social worlds and their social projects but also offers an alternative
vocabulary for understanding these spaces as lived worlds. My argument is that specific, if mobile, figurations of tense, eventfulness, and ethical substance aggregate harm in such a way that its ethical and political demand is dispersed and dissipated. But this book is also interested in how alternative social projects are able to open a space in these assumptions as they endure this dissipation—and more, to become more than merely persistence. As a result, I make use of an alternative glossary that seeks to illuminate ways that alternative social projects aggregate life diagonal to hegemonic ways of life.

Espionage and Camouflage. I begin by returning to Johannes Fabian’s classic text, *Time and the Other*, placing it in recent debates in Australia and the United States on social difference in order to show how the tense of the other is available—is at hand—whenever the problem of cultural recognition arises. I spend time elaborating this point in order to show not merely that the tense of the other is always at hand when confronting the problem of cultural recognition—the major feature of modern late liberalism—but that recognition itself should be understood as simply one modality of a larger triadic dynamic of recognition-espionage-camouflage. By “espionage” I mean actual practices of spying and being spied on, as well as a much broader and diverse set of assumptions that someone is trying to penetrate a socially sealed space. In espionage, value circulates in such a way that both those circulating it and those trying to impede its circulation avoid the initial confrontation underlying the imaginary of recognition. By “camouflage” I mean the art of hiding within a given environment via embodied disguise. These actual practices of cloaking are part of a much broader and diverse set of discourses about modes of concealment that allow otherwise visible organisms or objects to remain indiscernible from the surrounding environment. Obviously camouflage, as I am using it, has a genealogical relationship to mimicry and colonialism, say the work of Fanon, Bhabha, and Serres, and equally obviously perhaps, they are not merely spectral qualities but involve the entire sensory apparatus.

Many scholars, including myself, have for some time now argued that, rather than adjudicating between antagonistic worlds, liberal forms of cultural recognition project an internal incommensurability within lib-
eralism onto the subject of recognition. Liberal exceptionalism pivots on the commonsense truth of two competing, or at least incommensurate, political and social discourses and their affective entailments—that in cases of cultural conflict the problem of difference is solved through public reason and in these same cases moral reason must draw red lines across which difference cannot proceed, or a bracket must be put around the difference so that it can be removed from public debate until that time its challenge can be managed. In moments when these two impulses collide, liberal cultural recognition shifts the burden and responsibility for maintaining liberalism’s exceptionalism from dominant to subaltern and minority members of society. The subjects of recognition are called to present difference in a form that feels like difference but does not permit any real difference to confront a normative world. In these moments, recognition cannot be separated from its modal twins, espionage and camouflage, and thus the precarious potentiality of each is continually oscillating across all three states. They are the modes of recognition that become visible when, as a result of some threat to late liberal security, the tense of the other is written as a bracket. In these redlined and bracketed moments, difference is given a tense and mood—say, the past perfect and subjunctive—and recognition is transformed into the modality of espionage and camouflage.

*Endurance and the Endurant.* Because the types of social projects that interest me exist in the precarious zone of being and not being and between vis existendi and potentia agendi, this book is interested in three modes of their life: social belonging, abandonment, and endurance. Each of these aspects of existence presents a different angle on the issue of tense, eventfulness, and ethical substance. Approaching ethical substance from the perspective of belonging and abandonment can—tends to—figure substance as a secondary condition. On the one hand, we have the social logics of belonging and abandonment and, on the other hand, the how or to what material condition one belongs or is abandoned; for example, the child is abandoned and the material conditions of this abandonment are such and such. These second-order questions are often not sufficiently probed, leading to some questionable confections of various states of so-called bare life. The question of endurance—and its social
antonym, exhaustion—refuses to consider the substance of being as a secondary quality. Internal to the concept of endurance (and exhaustion) is the problem of substance: its strength, hardiness, callousness; its continuity through space; its ability to suffer and yet persist. We get a glimpse of what is at stake here in ordinary English exchanges. If we hear someone has been abandoned, we might ask how she is doing. But if we are told that someone is enduring a tragedy, we do not usually ask how she is doing but how we might help. Moreover, endurance encloses itself around the durative—the temporality of continuance, a denotation of continuous action without any reference to its beginning or end and outside the dialectic of presence and absence. Enduring isn’t a singularity. As will become clear, especially in chapter 4, endurance is not a homogenous space. Every scene of endurance, and certainly the scenes that concern this book, is shot through with multiple and incommensurate configurations of tense, eventfulness, and ethical substance and aggregations of life. The alternative social projects that lie within these stretched and striated spaces must survive eventfulness that is below the threshold of the catastrophic and ethical substance as sacrifice.

*Immanent Obligation, the Dwelling Sciences, and the Demand to Capacitate.* The kind of immanent critical theory that this book supports and worries constantly confronts the problems of adjudication, ethical commitment, and political action. How, among the variety of alternative worlds struggling for dominance, does one assess which should live on? Habermas insisted that any critical project must have recourse to norms on which evaluative judgments about specific social projects, goals, and values can be made. Nancy Fraser, among others, took up Habermas’s argument and criticized Foucault for a dual failure. She argued that because his work lacked a normative commitment it could not, on the one hand, adjudicate among a variety of antagonistic alternative worlds nor, on the other hand, provide prescriptive solutions to empirical reason. While disagreeing with how Habermas and Fraser ground adjudication, I think they are right that the way that immanent critique adjudicates among antagonistic worlds cannot emerge from a normative commitment. If we believe that life is cosubstantial, then whatever forms of adjudication we have must be equally cosubstantial within the space we are adjudicating.
The kinds of cosubstantial potentiality and its adjudication I propose are simple and I am sure unsatisfactory. First, immanent critique will have to abandon any gesture to the difference of the will when answering why some people persist in striving to be and others do not, or why certain potentialities achieve the miraculous state of counterpublics and others do not. The will has long been an alibi of late liberal and neoliberalism. The will becomes a way of holding those who suffer accountable: “Look, this one had the will to lift herself up by her own bootstraps”; and “If she could, why can’t you?” And those who are able to be the miracle aggregate the hope of the Right and Left, leaving in the analytical shadows the far greater number of those who could or did not. Here we might remember Spinoza’s view of the concept of human free will as a result of men being “conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined.” Thus rather than will, I press heavily on the notion of immanent obligation as a no-man’s-land between choice and determination. By “immanent obligation” I am referring to a form of relationality that one finds oneself drawn to and finds oneself nurturing, or caring for in the midst of critical reflexivity. This being “drawn to” or “repelled” is often initially a very fragile connection, a sense of an immanent connectivity. Choices are then made to enrich and intensify these connections. But even these choices need to be understood as retrospective—the subject choosing is herself continually deferred by the choice. In other words, she is and is beginning to be different in the vicinity of this choice; she is belated to herself, arriving too late to be any use to adjudication. I might be able to describe why I am drawn to a particular space and I may try to nurture this obligation or to break away from it, but still I have very little that can be described as “choice” in the original orientation.

This leads to my second point, equally simple, if unsatisfactory. Assessment—adjudication—will always emerge in the queasy space of dwelling within these potential worlds, a dwelling within that is reshaping the subject who will then assess these worlds. Judith Butler makes a similar argument when she claims that Foucault’s contribution to normative theory lies in the poiesis of desubjugation and self-making. Adjudication arises not via some transcendental gesture, no matter how fragile, but from a continual reflexively practiced dwelling within the worlds to be adjudicated. Thus adjudication is not merely internally tethered to ethi-
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Cal commitment and desubjugating obligation but also to the capacitating of potential life in late liberalism. This demand to capacitate foregrounds without sidestepping the queasy and uncertain terrain between epistemology and deontology and the constant uncertainty of capacitating life at the threshold of being and not being.

Governance of the Prior. If this book was written in a particular moment, it was also written from a particular point of view—indigenous politics and socialities within the settler colony. The chapters that follow do not draw exclusively on ethnographic research in Indigenous Australia, though they do concentrate their thought on two settler nations, Australia and the United States. Other materials include contemporary struggles within the radical ecological movement, religious jurisprudence, and state tactics in the shadow of the war on terror. But, in the first instance, I think it is important to note my vantage on these issues has been deeply influenced by twenty-five years spent working closely with Indigenous Australians. From this point of view of the issues I discuss seem unavoidable. As a fact of daily life, Indigenous subjects face the disciplinary nature of late liberal tense, eventfulness, and ethical substance through a specific mode of governance I am calling the governance of the prior—the priority of the prior across political, market, and social relations. The governance of the prior is, however, striated with other social divisions of tense such as the division of the autological subject and genealogical society. And throughout this book I will argue that although originating in settler nationalism and concentrated there, the governance of the prior provides an essential formation of tense and event to the governance of difference in late liberalism.73

Others have discussed the relationship between settler nationalism and prior occupancy. The political scientist Jeremy Waldron has discussed whether the general duty of a government to do justice to all citizens within its territorial jurisdiction is trumped by any special duty to Indigenous people based on the claims of first and prior occupancy.74 Waldron argues against the triumph of indigeneity by first differentiating two foundations of Indigenous claims—first occupancy and the claim of prior occupancy—both of which he believes fail to pass a basic test of Rawlsian justice. Indigenous claims made on the foundation of first occupancy face
two problems, according to Waldron. The first is evidentiary (first occupancy is nearly impossible to prove because its truth stretches into prerecorded history); the second is the hierarchies of justice (the fact of being first, even if it could be proved, is only one of a set of values that must be assessed when deciding issues of justice). According to Waldron, Indigenous claims made on the basis of prior occupancy gain moral force from “the human interest in stability, security, certainty, and peace, and for the sake of those values it prohibits overturning existing arrangements irrespective of how they were arrived at.” But they also suffer from an ever-decreasing moral weight as the event of dispossession recedes into historical time.

In a brilliant critique of Waldron, Robert Nichols slowly unpacks the assumptions built into his model and analysis. Nichols notes that in order to divide Indigenous claims into the categories of first and prior occupancy, Waldron must assume that contract theory, the principles of personhood it presupposes, and the ontological categories of being it projects are also indigenous categories—that is, universal, general epistemological and ontological categories. Numerous Indigenous studies scholars, from Vine Deloria to Dale Turner in the United States, and Deborah Bird Rose to Irene Watson in Australia, have decisively demonstrated this not to be the case. Moreover, scholars such as Glen Coulthard and J. Kēhaulani Kauanui have shown dispossession is not a historical event but an ongoing process.

When I speak of the governance of prior, I am specifically interested in the social genealogies of these kinds of political theoretical abstractions. There is not enough space here to discuss at length the conditions that gave rise to the governance of the prior in the modern settler nation-state, the nation-state system more generally, or the Indigenous as a specific and general formation within the history of colonial settlement, let alone the variations and complexities of these interlocking relations of the governance of the prior with the divisions of the autological subject and genealogical society. This much I can say, if all too briefly. The conditions of the governance of the prior were in place before the emergence of the modern liberal nation-state. And this is true whether we believe that the modern nation-state emerged in the eighteenth-century Americas, as does Benedict Anderson, or only after the Second World War, as
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do John Kelly and Martha Kaplan.\footnote{79} What matters is how nationalisms emerged. And what Anderson emphasizes is that “one of the justifications, sooner or later” for the new nationalism was their creole nature: “their distinctive history, and especially their demographic blending of settler and indigenous peoples, to say nothing of local traditions, geographies, climates, and so forth.”\footnote{80} This manner of strategically claiming that inhabitation in a continent took priority over a foreign colonial homeland became the modular form of the modern national imaginary. Projecting themselves against the metropolitan state, non-Native Americans could claim and experience themselves as the prior occupants of the Americas.

But in acceding to the logic of the priority of the prior as the legitimate foundation of governance, the settler state projected those who already inhabited the land before the settlers’ arrival as spatially, socially, and temporally before it in the double sense of “before”—before it in a temporal sequence and before it as a fact to be faced. Susan Scheckel examined this dynamic in the American literary nationalisms of the early nineteenth century. Anxious that the Revolutionary War would lead not to a new and lasting peace but to an endless series of subsequent revolutions, “many literary nationalists of the early nineteenth century suggested that the history and myths of American Indians could provide the new nation with a sense of ‘primitive’ origins.”\footnote{81} But while solving one problem, literary creolization created another, namely the governance of the prior as a temporal sequence and event: “Who had the right to own and govern the land originally possessed by Indians and inherited through the Revolution?”\footnote{82} Thus we see another source of the deep belatedness of late liberalism.

This division of tense within the social fabric of emerging settler nationalism bifurcated the sources and grounds of social belonging in such a way that the relationship between settler and Native/Indigenous was transformed from a mutual implication in the problem of prior occupation to a hierarchical relationship between two modes of prior occupation, one oriented to the future, the other to the past. As the governance of the prior crossed the truth-value of the future anterior and past perfect, the priority of the human as ultimate signature of liberal democratic sovereignty was detached from the priority of the descent of persons even as the priority of certain persons, colonizers, was safeguarded against the priority of others, the colonized. And this division became available to be applied to other grounds within the nation and against the nation.
To see what is at stake here let us return to Anderson’s argument in *Imagined Communities* that nationalism emerged as a new political imaginary in settler societies and that the political community it imagined reorganized previous forms of state sovereignty. According to Anderson, the emergence of the print media broke previous socialities organized around face-to-face relations, vertically oriented to kingly authority, and without clear territorial borders. It installed a new horizontally oriented, homogeneous peoplehood whose internal integrity was defined in relation to the border. This homogeneous space-time written against state borders, institutionalized in market, public sphere, and state function, displaced the older imaginary of radial monarchical sovereignty. Numerous refinements and critiques of Anderson have been written since the publication of *Imagined Communities*, many of them quite incisive. But Anderson’s basic point remains quite important: the diffuse imaginaries of stranger sociability, value abstraction, and social objectification that emerged in settler nations came to provide a metaframework within which the discussion of sovereignty persists. The problem with Anderson’s account of the imagined political community of nationalism is not that it locates the origin of the nation-state at the wrong moment or in the wrong place. Rather, the problem is that Anderson doesn’t account for a division that emerged internal to the otherwise homogeneous space-time of nationalism. When we look at these differential narrative structures we find that although all people may belong to nationalism, not all people occupy the same tense of nationalism.
Because I assume that settler colonialism as much as liberalism is a diasporic object, I am as interested in the dispersion of the governance of the prior as much as its unity. A full discussion of the governance of the prior would include the different ways that Spanish and English colonialism invoked the customary. Even across the major British settler colonies—North America, Australia, and New Zealand—the governance of the prior did not have a uniform application, even though wherever the British went, they carried the governance of the prior with them. In the British Americas, for example, the priority of the prior was acknowledged and then annulled through treaty, land seizure, and passive and active genocide. The newly constituted United States of America levered its subsequent legitimacy on a similar toolbox of acknowledgment and annulment in its relations with Native Americans. But the ever-expanding United States also incorporated the logic of the governance of the prior into its own sovereign identity. In the United States, this creole logic coiled around the Jacksonian concept of manifest destiny in such a way that foreign invaders (settlers) were transformed into autochthonous domestics (nationals), the former inhabitants (an empty set created by the foreclosures of settlement) into domestic dependent sovereignties (natives). But the logic of creole nationalism did not merely allow the creole state to claim a form of priorness in relation to the newly foreign metropole and foreign domestics (natives). It also allowed the creole state to make numerous other internal and external sovereign distinctions. For instance, the so-called Marshall Trilogy that established the notion of domestic dependent nationalism was as much about the relationship between federal and state governments as the federal government and tribes—Native Americans provided a convenient setting for negotiating the competing powers of federal government. These decisions about the status of the natives were then extended into other jurisdictions, as with the U.S. seizure of Puerto Rico.

Like other settler colonies, Australia articulated a creole form of nationalism that stretched from early celebrations of the bushman to more recent characterizations of the Dreaming during the Sydney Olympics in 2002. But the Australian settler colony had a different strategy for addressing the claims of the prior. By 1788 the British found it more convenient to bracket the presence of prior inhabitants through the doctrine of
terra nullius than to negotiate treaties with the variety of inhabitants they confronted. More generally, according to Kathleen Wilson, the projection of Englishness was increasingly authoritarian and paternalist by the time it reached Australia.86 The 1901 Federal Constitution, which established Australia as an independent Commonwealth, for the most part continued to treat the “aboriginal native” population as a spectral presence, referring to the Indigenous population in just two of its sections. Section 51(xxvi) gave the federal parliament the power to make “laws for the peace, order, and good government . . . with respect to people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws.” Section 127 prohibited the parliament from counting “aboriginal natives” in the consensus. To be sure, the frontier was rife with organized and disorganized violence, seizures, resistances, and informal land agreements.87 Which is merely to say that in Australia the problem of the priority of the prior was confronted through a variety of tactics—warfare, genocide, and illegal property transfers. Unlike in the United States, all of these huddled under the cover of the doctrine of terra nullius. But like in the United States, in Australia specific tactics for maneuvering around the governance of the prior were not merely about Indigenous-state relations but about federal dynamics. Sections 51(xxvi) and 127 were less about the state in relation to Indigenous people than about struggles between Commonwealth and state powers. Internal power within the federal government was also at stake in the 1967 referendum that provided the federal government with the power to make laws with respect to “people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws,” giving rise to the modern land rights regime.

And yet, even given these diverse histories, what the governance of prior shows is that from a critical point of view, the Indigenous does not confront the state, nor does the state confront the Indigenous. Both are caught in strategic maneuvers around a shared problematic; the nation-state and the Indigenous cite a shared discourse originating in a history that predates both of their emergence. A formation of power articulated as tense and event—the governance of the prior—is foundational to the imaginary of sovereign power to both settler and Indigenous as such and to late liberalism more generally.
While it seems clear to me that the social tense, events, and ethical substance are unavoidable from the point of view of settler nationalism, I think it is legitimate to ask what relevance the above discussion has for other forms of historical and contemporary social difference. For instance, how does this discussion help us understand the unequal distribution of life and death, of hope and harm, and of exhaustion and endurance when the social referent of these distributions seems to be based on sexuality and race? There are several ways of answering the question of how the interests of this book relate to problems of social belonging, abandonment, and endurance outside the Indigenous context.

The first would point out isomorphisms cutting across Indigenous and non-Indigenous contexts. In Israel, for instance, tactics of disenfranchisement of Palestinians operate as if they were culled from a condensed settler manual. An initial Israeli creole nationalism, organized around the image of the sabre, indicates how many Israeli Jews attempted to ground their territorial claims in the past perfect of indigeneity—literally writing these claims as facts on the ground. Israel, however, also presents its difference from Palestine as a difference of social tense, rooting its general being in the autological destiny of Europe as opposed to the customary past of a socially primitive Palestinian population. These temporal discourses have spatial entailments. In East Jerusalem, Palestinians must show an unbroken residency to their homes and lands in order to maintain their right over their homes. Persons leaving for school or work abroad are claimed to have severed their traditional attachment and thus annulled their rights of place. This method of disenfranchisement is isomorphic to the way in which the Australian Native Title Act (1993) recognizes Indigenous native title. Indigenous claimants must prove an unbroken physical and cultural connection to their traditional lands even if previous governments forcibly removed them. In France, too, we hear similar strains of civilizational tense. Although interested in the viability of racial analysis to discourses of laïcité, in Da la question sociale à la question raciale?, Eric and Didier Fassin demonstrate, in a painful irony, how the homosexual has become a figure of the autological subject wielded against the backward-looking Muslim migrant. And in Turkey, Dicle Koğacıoğlu has shown how the “tradition effect” (the genealogical society) continues to frame so-called honor killings in contemporary Tur-
key. Transformations of local modes of belonging through discourses of tense, such as the governance of the prior, are clearly seen in various regions of the African continent. As numerous scholars have shown, many African groups had complex understandings of the dynamic relationship between, not the Indigenous and settler, but the autochthon (first comer) and allochthon (new comer). David Lan, Mathieu Hilgers, Michel Izard, and Peter Geshiere have shown how this dynamic relation between autochthon and allochthon allowed a constant negotiation between new comers and first comers. But they have also shown how these dynamics were disrupted by the rigid categories of the governance of the prior that sharpened and froze the distinction between first comers and new comers, transforming these categories into the Indigenous and settler.

This is all very different from the second way of answering the question of how an understanding of the social tense, eventfulness, and ethical substance of late liberalism helps us critically understand the distribution of life and death in late liberalism outside an Indigenous context. This answer provincializes in one way or another alternative forms of social belonging, abandonment and endurance. Take, for example, one of the struggles that define critical indigenous theory in the United States today: its relationship to critical race theory. Is critical indigenous theory a modality of critical race theory? Is it a subset? What would critical race theory look like if it were a subset of critical indigenous theory? Why does the scholarly public within the United States often find it hard to conceive of the centrality of the Indigenous-settler division, so palpable and unavoidable in Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, outside theories of race as race has been defined by the histories of African enslavement in the United States? Surely part of the answer is that the specific history of race internal to U.S. nationalism has become universal because American cultural hegemony has made it so. Already scholars are thinking, if not through critical indigenous theory, then about the techniques by which, as Nancy Bentley recently argued, modern race was the dekinning of African Americans.

But what these debates are actually asking, it seems to me, is, what are the various relationships informing social imaginaries and concepts? Race, indigeneity, the divisions of the autological subject and genealogical society, collective power and individual freedom, the governance of
the prior: these are not abstract theoretical truths but socially invested aggregating tools that transform the variegated space of liberalism with its multitudinous collection of ways of immanent life in order to make them conform to a set of expectations and accountings that do work in the actual world. This is why I try to describe the two broad conditions in which this book was conceived and written. It is not to argue that the social division of tense and its relation to eventfulness and ethical substance exist at all modes and levels of analysis of late liberalism. But that they are available across all modes and levels of practicing late liberalism, of justifying its exclusions and inclusions, of making good of its goods and good of its harms.

Chapter by Chapter

This introduction can be thought of as a robust presentation of the thematics and concepts that organize this book. Chapters should be read together and in sequence. One can read them separately. Although all these thematics and concepts are always in the scene, each chapter takes a different aspect on the tense, eventfulness, and ethical substance of late liberalism. If a reader is mostly interested in the dynamics of recognition in late liberalism, she could read the first two chapters. If a reader is interested in the problem of embodiment and endurance in late liberalism she could start with chapters 3 and 4. However, because later chapters assume material discussed in previous chapters, the argument makes the most sense if read consecutively.

The first two chapters examine the contemporary politics of recognition—in the contemporary moment often voiced as an opposition to the politics of cultural recognition—as a central technique of late liberalism. Chapter 1, “The Part That Has No Part,” examines two unrelated cases of social difference in two different national settings with two seemingly different outcomes. I examine the recent national emergency in Aboriginal affairs in Australia prompted by a report on sexual abuse in Aboriginal communities and the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding a preliminary injunction exempting the religious group, União do Vegetal, from the Controlled Substances Act. I pick these two examples for their contrasts: they are situated in different national traditions (Australia and
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The United States); they touch on different kinds of social panics (sexual panics and drug panics); and they involve different aspects of the state apparatus (parliament and judiciary). They also come to opposite conclusions: the Australian Intervention argues against protecting traditional customs; Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal decides to offer protection to religious expression. But I chose these two cases because they demonstrate how the tense of the other is available whenever the problem of cultural recognition arises and how this tense is inflected by the question of security. This availability means that the divisions of social tense provide a unified, if mobile, discursive field that makes maneuvers within it appear as if they were antagonistic to it. The support of or assault on the genealogical society seems opposed to the support of or assault on the autological subject, rather than merely a movement in a dead division. And this movement within a given order allows us to ask what is and is not a moment of the political — what part has no part in the social divisions of tense and what political potential might this part have.

Chapter 2, “The Brackets of Recognition,” continues my examination of the late liberal politics of recognition and my interest in the potentiality of “the part that has no part” within this mode of governance. Chapter 1 examined how various forms of social tense (the divisions of autological subject and genealogical society; the governance of the prior) manage the line between policing and politics in order to make difference intelligible in late liberalism. The second chapter puts more pressure on recognition itself. It asks what form, or mode, recognition takes when the moment of intelligibility is deferred, bracketed, or denied and recognition is not able to overcome liberal intolerance. I argue that when viewed from the brackets of recognition, recognition as such is only one of three modalities of how late liberalism governs difference, the others being camouflage and espionage.

Chapters 3 and 4 examine how the part that has no part in the given orders of the sayable and visible endures in these kinds of social spacings. Chapter 3, “Road Kill,” asks what the conditions are of life lived within these brackets from the point of view of an ethics of substance. Moving across an ethnography of the radical green movement and an Indigenous Australian mixed-media project, I pivot the discussion on the relationship between ethical substance and biopolitics, especially as these intersect
around the problems of excess, exhaustion, and endurance in late liberalism. If *ethics* is the realm in which we reflect and act at the intersection of right conduct and the good life, then our ethical relation to life within these differential zones of abandonment and vulnerability is fraught, to say the least. The life worth living is not necessarily found within these zones because the zones create such reduced conditions of life that the political desire for them to spawn or foster alternative worlds can seem naive at best and sadistic at worst. What would happen if, on the one hand, we allowed for a wider field of substantiality into our critique of biopolitics and substance, and on the one hand, we dwelled more fully in the conditions of excess, exhaustion, and endurance that characterize the spaces and zones of late liberal exposure and abandonment?

Chapter 4, “Events of Abandonment,” returns to Indigenous Australia. In this chapter, I examine modes of eventfulness and discourses of lethality in contemporary Australia, focusing first on the contemporary carnal conditions of Indigenous life and second on recent state security measures said to be a reaction to the post-9/11 world. I do so in order to understand the dynamic conditions that qualify one kind of lethality as “state killing” and another as a more amorphous condition of “letting die.” I do so in order to understand how present-tense modes of living and dying are transformed into future anterior modes of the proper life.

Chapter 5, “After Good and Evil, Whither Sacrificial Love?,” continues this discussion but turns it to eschatological discourses of sacrifice and sacrificial love, the imaginary of a form of killing as a mode of life giving, in late liberalism. The question whether this or that sacrifice is worth it opens the events of suffering and dying, if not to the problematic of being and time, then to the problematic of being and tense—the narrative relation among social, economic, and political values and subjective finitudes and how, where, and whether subjective finitudes are seen to occur and lead. I embed arguments between the Bush administration and its critics about the competing rhetorics of good and evil and sacrifice and sacrificial love in contemporary critical theory’s romance with Christian modes of sacrificial love. It concludes by asking what lies beyond good and evil, if sacrifice and sacrificial love provides a means of memorialized denial of human suffering.

The conclusion, “Negative Critique, Positive Sociographies,” returns
to Le Guin’s decision to let some members of Omelas leave without specifying where they are going. In the long shadow of negative critique I discuss the role of positive sociography to a form of critical theory that is oriented to progressive life and yet refuses to be lulled by the promises of miraculous endurance or sacrificial love.
Chapter One

The Part That Has No Part

Traditions of Dysfunction

In the southern winter of 2009, a debate raged across reviews, blogs, emails, and scholarly essays in the wake of the publication of *The Politics of Suffering: Indigenous Australia and the End of the Liberal Consensus.*¹ The book was written by Peter Sutton, an anthropologist, and promoted by conservative pundits such as Christopher Pearson of *The Australian,* a newspaper owned by Rupert Murdoch.² Sutton argued that policy makers and academics should focus on Indigenous social traditions as the primary source of Indigenous social
dysfunction. Forget problems of structural racism and state neglect, the central cause of Indigenous impoverishment, ill-health, and educational stagnation was Indigenous people’s “ancient need to pursue family loyalties over essentially foreign ideologies such as the doctrine of the common good” and “traditional medical beliefs and practices” that blocked “certain preventative and curative health measures.” Indigenous Australians, he implies, must walk out of their communities, leaving their ancient ways behind. Sutton seems sure where they are going: modernity, where common goods prevail rather than sexual abuse, family loyalties, and strange beliefs about bodies. In a review of the book, the economist Jon Altman notes its deep vitriol, surface bitterness, and bizarre accusations. Among its strange assertions and beliefs about knowledge and embodiment is this one: “Many of the academics who I knew who reacted negatively to the intervention as a whole . . . but failed to give primacy to the fate of so many children, were also childless.”

The questionable dichotomies and sexual economies that appear to organize The Politics of Suffering should not be quickly dismissed, however. They are symptomatic of a broader conservative agenda in contemporary Australia that sought to, and has been quite effective at, hegemonizing the political and social field by using images of primitive sexuality to figure an absolute difference and hierarchy between the modern and ancient, personal freedom and customary constraint, depersonalized common truths and identity-based prejudices. Sutton himself hoped that The Politics of Suffering would provide positive support to the controversial 2007 Australian federal Intervention in Indigenous affairs in the Northern Territory. The “Intervention” is shorthand for a set of policies that the then Liberal-Conservative prime minister, John Howard, put in place in 2007 in the wake of the Little Children Are Sacred report of the Northern Territory Board of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse. In the name of a national emergency in Indigenous child sexual abuse, Howard’s government assumed broad and unprecedented powers over Indigenous affairs in the Northern Territory, including Indigenous welfare, education, land tenure, and health. The era of cultural recognition and reconciliation was over, Howard declared. The governance of the prior, and the sexual dysfunction at its center, would no longer extend to Australia’s Indigenous inhabitants, and the sooner the inhabitants of
Australia accepted this the sooner the harms of the past could be extin-
guished. The federal government would, forcibly if necessary, puncture
the sovereignty of Indigenous communities and liberate countless In-
digenous children who were languishing in their broom closets—worse,
being raped in these sealed-off spaces, their abuse aided and abetted by
childless advocates kowtowing to the sanctity of traditional law.

What would the anthropologist Johannes Fabian make of *The Politics
of Suffering*? In *Time and the Other*, Fabian characterized the relation be-
tween anthropology and its object as a “political cosmology,” at the center
of which lay a constitutive contradiction. On the one hand, “anthropology
has its empirical foundation in ethnographic research, inquiries which
even hard-nosed practitioners carry out as communicative interactions”
and, on the other hand, “when these same ethnographers represent their
knowledge in teaching and writing they do this in terms of a discourse that
consistently places those who are talked about in a time other than that of
the one who talks.” Demonstrating how the event of ethnographic nar-
ration was misaligned to the narrated event that provided its foundation
allowed Fabian to align the writing practices of modern anthropology to
the historical desires of a “modern Hegelianism,” in which the function
of the non-Western other is to entail a Western unfolding? The problem
with modern anthropology, according to Fabian, was that the contem-
porary ethnographic subject, often a single individual, was continually
transfigured into a mass subject living in the past tense. People’s contem-
porary lives were reduced to a set of ancient needs: the durative unfolding
present was narratively transfigured into a frozen past perfect. Sutton’s
text would seem an exemplary if belated case in point.

Fabian insisted that the people anthropologists speak with—or more
broadly interact with—are not in a different time from the interactional
encounter itself. And his point was to demonstrate how locating them
in another time (the past perfect of the genealogical society) aligns the
anthropological narrative with the most conservative of Western civiliza-
tional philosophies and agendas. Sutton’s reverses this argument. Be-
cause contemporary Australian anthropologists refuse to speak “honest-
ly” about the harms of traditional Indigenous culture, they are unable
to understand that the time of traditional custom is out of joint with mod-
er society. It is this temporal dissonance that is causing the present social
dysfunction in Indigenous communities. This ancient past has no place in a nation defined by the promise of freedom’s future. Thus, from Sutton’s point of view, anthropologists aren’t producing the past perfect of Indigenous society; Indigenous people are doing that. Anthropologists are simply refusing to accept its irrelevance in contemporary, freedom-embracing societies.

We should be wary, however, of wallowing too long in a self-lacerating version of anthropological exceptionalism. After all, narrative maneuvers of time and the other—or what should be more precisely called tense and the other—within the political cosmology of anthropology are located within the broader social tenses of late liberalism. These social tenses are heard not only in Australian anthropology or in Australia even if they have a particular narrative form and force there. It is this broader system of late liberal tense and governance that interests me. In this chapter and the next, I examine this system of tense and governance through the shifting terrain of late liberal recognition in the wake of the consolidation of neoliberal rhetorics and institutions and the elaboration of new concerns about state security in the shadow of 9/11. As the dominant technique of the governance of difference in late liberalism, cultural recognition manages the difference between policing and politics in Jacques Rancière’s sense; namely, policing as the management of a given distribution of social places and roles, ways of being and saying such that some activities are visible and sayable (are located in the order of logos) while other activities appear to be nothing more than noise (are located in the realm of phonos); and politics as the transformation of phonos into logos and a subsequent emergence of new distributions of visibility and sayability.8 In Disagreement, Rancière draws examples from classical Greece and contemporary labor and new social movements. For instance, he points to the plebian uprising of ancient Greece and to black, female, and homosexual claims on public rationality. His purpose is to demonstrate the difference between political acts that transform the background assumptions of logos and policing practices that merely rearrange elements while leaving the background assumptions intact. How does the politics of recognition in late liberalism manage the difference between police and politics, the actual world and the potentiality embedded in the noise this actual world faces and helps to create? I examine these issues in this and the
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next chapter in order to make a space for subsequent discussions in chapters 3 and 4 about the maneuvers of social worlds and projects who are addressed by, exist in, or are a result of these tactics of recognition and social belonging.

In this chapter I discuss in some detail two seemingly unrelated cases: the politics of the Australian Intervention and the jurisprudence of spiritually based drug consumption in the United States pivoting on the case *Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal* (2006). As I noted in the introduction, these two examples cut across state and national borders (Australia and the United States), involve different kinds of social panics (sexual panics and drug panics), and focus attention on different aspects of the state apparatus (parliament and judiciary). Moreover, the two social worlds and projects differ significantly in relationship to the governance of the prior in late liberalism and in relationship to the entanglements of power and the will. In the case of Indigenous Australians we seem to be witnessing a structural relationship between the state and Indigenous people that is independent of any particular person’s will to be different. Members of the União do Vegetal congregation would seem a more stereotypically volitional form of association. Additionally, the two cases seem to relate very differently to the governance of the prior—the Indigenous Australians are a clear and forceful case of the governance of the prior, the União do Vegetal congregation is not. And finally, the Australian state and U.S. judiciary seem to come to opposite conclusions: proponents of the Australian federal Intervention in Indigenous life argue against protecting traditional customs, while the Supreme Court in *Gonzales v. UDV* offers constitutional protection to religious expression. But I am not aiming to produce a comparative sociography of late liberalism, at least not comparative in the sense of comparing two distinct entities in order to produce a higher order unity.

Instead this chapter first discusses each case as it reveals how late liberal governance makes use of an array of social tenses to legitimate its powers over life and death. Second, I discuss how this mobilization of social tense manages the potential eruption of noise (*phonos*) such that the fundamental ordering of social roles is not disturbed. And finally, I examine how this management of noise faces and creates new social projects and worlds. I focus on these three aspects for several reasons.
First, I want to demonstrate how the tense of the other is available—
is at hand—whenever the problem of cultural recognition arises. As my
introductory reference to Fabian’s ground-breaking work meant to sug-
gest, noting that the other is continually interpreted vis-à-vis a temporal
inflection is hardly a new insight. I spend the time elaborating this point
in order to show that the tense of the other is not only always at hand
when confronting the problem of cultural recognition, it is also a demand
placed on others to give an account of themselves in terms of the social
divisions of tense. But I am also interested in how the tense of the other
is entangled in the recent permutations of the late liberal governance of
difference under the shadow of state security. How in paying attention
to the local textures and potentialities of late liberal recognition can we
begin to map the contemporary securitization of alternative worlds?

Understanding social tense as a demanding environment internal to
late liberal recognition allows me to make my second point—that the
divisions of social tense are a part of a unified, if mobile, discursive field
that makes maneuvers within it appear as if they were antagonistic to it.
As I hope to make clear, the support of Indigenous tradition and the sub-
sequent assault on the same unsettle a certain level of political organiza-
tion even as it conserves another. Ditto with the União Do Vegetal case.
But the purpose of my discussion is not to adjudicate what actions are in-
stances of policing and what are instances of politics in Rancière’s sense.

The immediate goal of this chapter is to demonstrate the common polic-
ing function operating in social and political debates in Australian and the
United States. From what perspective are the disruptive debates about In-
digenous traditions and the alternative religious practices political events?
What kind of political events they are? And, in light of these questions,
what would it be to engage politically in late liberalism? I will begin with
the Australian invention and then move to Gonzales v. União do Vegetal. I
conclude with a discussion of the part that has no part in these debates.

Sweeping out the Broom Closet

On June 21, 2007, the then prime minister of Australia, John Howard, de-
clared a “national emergency in relation to the abuse of children in In-
digenous communities in the Northern Territory.” Howard’s declaration
came in the wake of the Little Children Are Sacred report of the Northern Territory Board of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse. As I noted above, in the name of this national emergency, Howard’s government assumed broad and unprecedented powers over Indigenous affairs in the Northern Territory, including Indigenous welfare, education, land tenure, and health. Howard’s announcement came with carrot and stick. As a carrot Howard promised millions of dollars for Indigenous health, education, and employment training. As a stick the federal government assumed control over seventy-three Indigenous townships through the forcible acquisition of five-year leases over townships on Indigenous-owned land, community living areas, and other designated Indigenous areas and sent, under the cover of military police, medical personnel to conduct compulsory sexual health exams for all children under the age of sixteen. “Business managers” with powers to control and direct all Indigenous programs and their assets, including the monitoring of all community communication and video equipment, were also sent to take control of all Commonwealth programs in Indigenous town camps and rural communities.

One of the first actions of these business managers was to shift Indigenous workers from the Community Development Employment Programme (CDEP, a work and training program within a social welfare framework, loosely called “work for the dole”) to welfare. Publically proclaiming its neoliberal (“enterprise culture”) commitments, the federal government nevertheless began the Intervention by shifting as many Indigenous people from the CDEP to welfare as possible. This shift from work to welfare was necessary if the federal government wished to control the wealth and spending of Indigenous people in remote communities and town camps. For legal reasons, persons on the CDEP couldn’t have their wages managed. Once all Indigenous people were placed on welfare, payments could be tied to school attendance and other behavioural indices; furthermore, fifty percent of payments could be given in the form of debit cards that restricted purchasing choices of Indigenous men and women to selected stores for selected items while prohibiting other purchases such as alcohol and pornography. But shifting Indigenous men and women from CDEP to welfare came with a dramatic lowering of incomes in a population already suffering general and sustained poverty. Speaking
to Leon Compton on Darwin ABC radio on July 23, 2007, Mal Brough made the link between welfare and social control explicit:

**Compton:** Are you saying that money from CDEP is the problem in child sexual abuse and alcoholism and violence?

**Brough:** Absolutely, there is no doubt that there is a contributing factor beyond the CDEP payments and because for all intents and purposes they are a welfare payment—it is the cash that is being used to buy the drugs and alcohol that have caused so many . . . so much of the pain for these children. There is just no doubt about that.11

Although Howard pegged his declaration of emergency to the release of the *Little Children Are Sacred* report, he did not restrict himself to its recommendations. Instead he endorsed the longstanding call of the minister for families, community services and Indigenous affairs, Mal Brough, for a move beyond the politics of recognition (“self-determination”) and reconciliation with Indigenous people to a neoliberal approach to Indigenous affairs. Indigenous people needed to stop worrying about their culture, move out of rural regions, and accept whatever jobs they could get in the cities. If they wouldn’t move on their own accord, the federal government would starve them out by reducing their income.

By September, the Howard government, which controlled the federal parliament, passed the Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act (2007). The act gave the federal government sweeping powers over Indigenous land tenure, welfare, alcohol consumption, and education.12 Throughout the Northern Territory large bright blue or yellow signs were erected at the entrance of Indigenous communities announcing that pornography and alcohol were banned and in the process publicly branding Indigenous communities as spaces of perversion and decay. (An unexpected consequence, from an Indigenous point of view, was that some areas previously understandable as public or private lands were suddenly and publically visible as Indigenous land.) Because many of the provisions of the proposed emergency legislation were racially discriminatory, the federal government added an amendment that suspended the application of the Racial Discrimination Act to the legislation. Two years later, in 2009, one of the authors of the *Children Are Sacred* report, Patricia Ander-
son, questioned the relationship between the report’s recommendations and the emergency powers claimed by the government.13

On November 26, 2007, the Howard government was soundly defeated in federal elections. In addition to losing the elections, Howard lost his parliamentary seat, as did Mal Brough. The new Labour minister for Indigenous affairs, Jenny Macklin, refused, however, to condemn the Howard Intervention. Instead she decided to investigate how the Intervention could be “humanized,” expanded to the other Australian states, and made compatible with the Racial Discrimination Act.14 On April 30, 2008, Macklin announced that the new Rudd government would neither immediately close nor permanently restore the CDEP, a key target of the Howard government. And, in public presentations leading up to the Rudd government’s first budget speech, the government announced that it would introduce a new national welfare debit card if it proved successful in an experimental deployment “in selected Indigenous communities.” The card would control payments to “negligent parents” by ensuring that “half of the cardholders’ welfare payments are spent on approved goods and services, such as food and clothing for their children, rather than wasted on alcohol and drugs.”15

On February 13, 2008, Kevin Rudd made a national apology to Indigenous people, who represented, he said, one of the “oldest continuous cultures in human history.” The apology, one the previous Howard government had steadfastly refused to make, was said to be for past government mistreatment of Indigenous people, in particular the “Stolen Generation,” the generations of Indigenous children taken from their families under assimilation policies that were in place between 1869 and 1969. Rudd claimed that “righting the wrongs of the past” would allow Australia to move “forward with confidence to the future.” And, in almost the same breath, Rudd promised a renewed commitment to the policies and rhetoric of the Intervention described as “new solutions to enduring problems.”16 A similar two-step dance was seen six months later in Canada, where on June 11, 2008, the Conservative prime minister, Stephen Harper, apologized for the sexual abuse of First Nation children in Indian residential schools, not by traditional members of the Indigenous communities, but by non-Indigenous people caring for them, calling it a “sad chapter” in Canadian history. But at nearly the exact same moment, Harper re-
fused to rethink his rejection of the Kelowna Accord, one of his first acts of government in 2006, which was meant to put $5 billion into Indigenous employment, housing, and social programs.\(^{17}\)

The support of the Intervention by the Labour Rudd government suggests how the Intervention seemed to dramatically upset previous alignments between the Left and Right and thus signal a radical new political epoch in Australia. That the arts of care announced and practiced in the Intervention have rattled the political order is undisputable from a certain perspective. At the beginning of June 2008 Dr. Alyssa Vass, spokesperson for the Darwin Aboriginal Rights Coalition, told an inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on Regional and Remote Indigenous Communities: “The punitive discriminatory approach taken by the intervention has made life more difficult for families, has been disempowering to the extreme and perpetuated destructive negative stereotypes.”\(^{18}\) But by the end of June 2008 the West Australian Children’s Court magistrate, Dr. Sue Gordon, and Major General Dave Chalmers issued a report calling for increased spending on housing and police, fully funded clinics, a choice-based welfare debit system, and community-based alcohol management rather than an alcohol ban. But they also advocated for the elimination of “unviable” settlements. Divisions also emerged between Indigenous scholars and politicians, played out in regional and national settings.\(^{19}\) In a searing critique of Howard’s policies, a Northern Territory Labour parliamentary member, Marion Scrymgour, referred to the Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act as “the black kids’ Tampa.” (In August 2001, the Howard government refuse to let a Norwegian freighter, the *MV Tampa*, enter Australian waters after it rescued 438 mainly Afghan asylum seekers; many people believed that this violation of international law was an election year stunt.) Scrymgour was the first Indigenous minister in any Australian government—at the time the minister for family and community services, and environment and heritage in the Northern Territory government.\(^{20}\) In a previous moment her words would have carried a certain irreplaceable weight. But Brough immediately called for Scrymgour to resign. She initially refused. But after two years of controversy, Scrymgour left the Northern Territory Labour Party, which immediately elevated another Indigenous woman, Alison Anderson, to her portfolio. Soon after, it emerged that only three hundred houses would be
built from the AUD$672 million Strategic Indigenous Housing and Infrastructure Program—the bulk of the money going to administrative costs and the builders. Facing a stalled and underfunded housing initiative, the refusal of health care workers and teachers to move into Indigenous communities, and large amounts of dedicated funds going to non-Indigenous administrators, Anderson threatened to quit. And quit she did, on August 4, 2009.21

And Anderson was right: it is uncertain how much of the $587 million actually allocated for the first twelve months of the Intervention has been spent, nor is it clear on what it has been spent. Preliminary analysis suggests, rather unsurprisingly, that a large percentage has been allocated to the employment of non-Indigenous bureaucrats, bureaucratic agencies, police, and researchers. Part of the problem of tracking the actual distribution of wealth is the bureaucratic practice of proliferating and changing program names; redirecting previous unspent or promised budgetary allowances; and closing programs without a subsequent account of where their allocated but unused funds have gone. Even if we could clarify the deceptive bookkeeping, it would remain unclear how to assess the social value of the Intervention. What will be the individuated and thus quantifiable units to be measured? The creation of new houses, play yards, and schools? The quieting of communities? Will any studies be undertaken to show where the “trouble makers” have gone? And if so, will the money spent to show where they have gone be deducted from funds allocated for the building of Indigenous housing? Will these facts be factored into the assessment of the Intervention? We already know that many people have shifted to the cities, living in the long grass, struggling to meet basic rental, food, and clothing needs on their new government-enforced budget.

But no one advocating for the Intervention pretended that life would be easier for Indigenous citizens in the present. In fact they emphasized that life would be harder during the transition from a welfare-based politics of “self-determination” to a neoliberal “enterprise culture” and that Indigenous people would need to endure this difficult period as best they could. The Howard government acknowledged this—that life in the present would be worse for many Indigenous men and women. The Labour government has agreed, saying it would remain unclear for some time how the Intervention would impact Indigenous lives—whether it
will have made any positive difference in basic service delivery, housing, health, or education.\textsuperscript{22} By July 2009 the Productivity Commission was reporting that the key indicators of Indigenous disadvantage were far worse than anyone had thought—the gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians was either unchanged or widening across eighty percent of social statistics, including education, life expectancy, jobs and income, preventable diseases, overcrowding, incarceration, and community violence.\textsuperscript{23} According to the Productivity Commission the only programs that seemed to be closing this gap were cooperative approaches between Indigenous people and government, nonprofit and private sectors, conceived from the bottom up rather than top down. And it is exactly in these ordinary bureaucratic statements that we witness how the time of harm is always belated—something that happened when no one was looking; always something to come and then coming too late.

In light of statements that Indigenous lives already difficult to endure would be made more difficult, what makes the Intervention seem like a sensible good, a form of life enhancement rather than, say, state killing or neoliberal modes of making die? What discourses of social belonging and abandonment, caring and disregard made the emergency Intervention seem necessary, and by making it seem necessary, allowed the Howard and the subsequent Labour governments to create a narrative form that conjured away the social harms of the durative present? What does care consist of such that when a form of creating harm for others is thought of and experienced as a form of caring for others? To begin to answer these questions we must begin with what supposedly started this social drama, the \textit{Little Children Are Sacred} report.

The report, commissioned by the Northern Territory Labour government, written by Rex Wild and Patricia Anderson, and publicly released on June 15, 2007, begins dramatically, noting “a breakdown of Aboriginal culture” caused by a number of underlying conditions of Indigenous life. “Excessive consumption of alcohol is variously described as the cause or result of poverty, unemployment, lack of education, boredom and overcrowded and inadequate housing. The use of other drugs and petrol sniffing can be added to these. Together, they lead to excessive violence. In the worst case scenario it leads to sexual abuse of children.”\textsuperscript{24} The \textit{Little Children Are Sacred} report was careful to dispel five myths about Indige-
nous sexual abuse: that Aboriginal men are the only offenders; Aboriginal law is the reason for high levels of sexual abuse; Aboriginal law is used as an excuse to justify abuse; Aboriginal culture is the reason for under-reporting; and Aboriginal men do not have an important role to play in preventing child sexual abuse. And yet, it was in terms of these myths that federal government spokespersons and the national media made sense of the abuse. When the report circulated in the national press, the point that received the most attention was not the supposed breakdown of Indigenous culture but the abuse of children by men acting according to traditional marriage laws. Again and again the media reported older “traditional” men raping young girls and boys and justifying this sexual abuse in terms of traditional marriage practices. Film clips of young people running amok in Aboriginal communities and townships supplemented these stories. Conservative commentators rushed to claim their pyrrhic victory, indicting supporters of multiculturalism for their naive understanding of Indigenous customs even as they loudly proclaimed the collapse of the Indigenous social order. And the ubiquitous billboards proclaimed at the entrance of every Indigenous community its scarlet letter of shame.

Throughout, the national media promoted the promarket and pro-modernization visions of particular Indigenous men and women who had close ties to the Howard government, such as Noel Pearson, or academics, such as Peter Sutton, who castigated progressive white Australians for wishing to lock Indigenous people into national museums. What Indigenous people wanted, according to these Indigenous men and women and their non-Indigenous allies, was to be free-enterprise subjects—to have real jobs, to live in the real world of contemporary Western society, where horizons were oriented to the future not the past. Even after the Rudd Labour government came into power, newspapers and other public media continued to foreground the link between child sexual abuse, traditional law, and the governance of the prior trumping the governance of freedom. Take, for instance, an article in *The Australian*, “Secrets in the Shadows,” published in June 2008. The story begins dramatically with a teenage boy, “who dropped dead after a foofy match” near Papunya in central Australia. Although “nobody’s fault,” his death set off a round of vicious violence in “a world where payback, retribution, spearings and mob violence are ever-present.” Dismissing the “moaning of critics that
the intervention was a land grab and not about child sexual abuse,” the article foregrounds the moaning of children through hearsay about rampant sex abuse, and asserts that the cause of the abuse is the traditional law of elder men and kowtowing white enablers.25 “Community workers, terrified that the 12-year-old boy would rape again, took to sleeping in the boy’s house at night. When FACS [Department of Family and Community Services] finally came to take the child into care, after a delay of many weeks, the boy’s family whisked the child into cultural business. Police refused to transgress on ceremonial ground and FACS workers retreated.”

The use of a sex panic to intervene in racial politics is hardly new. A similar disruption occurred in the United States in 1965 after the release of the Report on the Negro Family: The Case for National Action, popularly known as the Moynihan Report. Daniel Moynihan was a sociologist and assistant secretary of labor under President John F. Kennedy. The Moynihan Report correlated black female-headed households to a “tangle of pathology . . . capable of perpetuating itself without assistance from the white world.” As William Graebner notes, the report “appeared just as the civil rights movement was negotiating the turn to “black power,” a moment Moynihan understood as crucial to whether the black movement would radicalize. As Sutton did with Indigenous Australians, so Moynihan did with African Americans, blaming the radical inequality between whites and blacks on internal pathologies rather than contemporary institutional arrangements (although, in Moynihan’s case, this pathology was said to have emerged from the institution of slavery, “three centuries of injustice,” rather than a traditional precolonial practice that could somehow be abstracted from contemporary actions). The Right seized on the report. Nothing was wrong with America or American law or American capitalism. What was wrong was black culture. A direct political line leads from the Moynihan Report to the Reagan demonization of the racialized figure of the “welfare queen” to the Clinton administration’s dismantling of the welfare system.26 The legislation that emerged is particularly interesting to the recent Australian case, given how, as Anna Marie Smith has shown, a series of programs under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children, intertwined sexual regulation and welfare reform.27 For example, to receive support the woman must provide the state with
the name of the biological father. The state then pursues a “child support” action that, if successful, forces the father to pay the state, not the mother, for the benefits she receives.

Moreover, as among African-Americans in the United States, in Australia, most Indigenous men and women living in the rural north are used to being the locus of social experimentation, and the nodal point of a national anxiety organized around free and collective agency projected onto their ways of life. They are used to hearing government officials—who themselves continually change as governments replace governments—announce rivers of money and infrastructure that subsequently turn into a dirty trickle by the time it reaches them. They are used to hearing that the harms in their present lives should be bracketed. They are used to being aggressively abandoned within a temporal horizon of a future perspective: a future from whose perspective their present suffering has already been mourned and buried. And they are used to the two poles of social belonging, autology and genealogy, being used as the means through which new programs are justified. After all, the reliance on the specter of genealogical determination was as vital an organ of social control under the previous regime of self-determination through cultural recognition as it is now a vital organ in the Intervention. In the previous regime of recognition—which, I should note here, continues alongside the current attack on recognition—the evidence determining whether an Indigenous difference was truly Indigenous referred to the same specter of customary law. Native title, land rights, and cultural heritage and property laws demanded of Indigenous people a genealogical reckoning, not within their own language of obligation and belonging, caring and being cared for, but with a liberal imaginary of individual determination. What a surprise that Sutton could so easily invert the values of Indigenous culture: he had spent the previous decade vigorously arguing that Indigenous people should be divided between “traditional owners” and “historical people” based on various individuals’ adherence to past social forms and practices. If you think that any people can be split into groups based on the siphoning of complex contemporary practices into premodern and modern action, then you can flip the values of these actions back and forth—negative, positive; positive, negative.
Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal

Gonzales v. UDV takes us far from the Northern Territory of Australia and its current accounts of the sexual dysfunction of its Indigenous citizens. Instead we enter the somewhat rarified realm of judicial reflection about matters of state powers, religious expression, and international security. But it is exactly the difference in social location, situation, and genre that allows us to begin to see the ways in which social tense is available and dispersed in late liberalism and thus the multiple ways the powers of making live and making die reappear there.

The bare facts of the case are well known and undisputed. Gonzales v. UDV addressed the concerns of a demographically insignificant group in the United States, members of the União do Vegetal community. According to its official history, the União do Vegetal is a Christian religion established in Brazil on July 21, 1961, in Porto Velho, Rondônia, Brazil, by the rubber-tapper José Gabriel da Costa. The vegetable of spiritual benefit is ayahuasca, a hallucinogenic black tea brewed from Banisteriopsis caapi vine and Psychotria viridis plant. I have never imbibed ayahuasca, but others report its physiological and spiritual effects by word of mouth, in YouTube testimonies, online blogs, underground zines, and alternative spirituality magazines. These also provide information on where one can go to access this form of spiritual enlightenment. Venues differ significantly in terms of crass comfort. Friends of mine describe the settings they have drunk ayahuasca as ranging from ratty dens where couches are stained with vomit to smart new age venues with tasteful vomitoriums. The União do Vegetal is not the only formal and informal group to celebrate the spiritual powers of the ayahuasca plant. Other spiritual groups that use this plant include Santo Daime, PaDeva Church, and Irmandade Beneficente Natureza Divina. These churches trace their religious practices to the period prior to the Spanish conquest of the Americas, but embed their contemporary beliefs in various spiritual discourses including Christianity, Wicca, shamanism, and neopaganism. The membership of these churches is relatively small. The União do Vegetal claims about ten thousand members. Only a couple hundred are resident in the United States.

Prior to Gonzales v. UDV, one large roadblock stood in the way of those persons in the United States who wished to explore the spiritual offerings
of these churches. In Brazil the possession and use of ayahuasca was legalized in 1992. But in the United States the key hallucinogenic component of ayahuasca, dimethyltryptamine, or DMT, is defined as a Schedule 1 class drug under the Controlled Substances Act. Schedule 1 drugs are drugs classified as having a high abuse risk and no safe, accepted medical use in the United States. Other Schedule 1 drugs include heroin, marijuana, LSD, PCP, and crack cocaine. Trafficking in these drugs is a federal crime. First offenses carry a penalty of up to twenty years in prison if no death or serious injury occurs and not less than twenty years if they do, in addition to a $1 million fine for individuals and $5 million fine for groups. The second offense carries a penalty of up to thirty years in prison if no death or serious injury occurs and not less than twenty years if they do, in addition to a $2 million fine for individuals and $10 million fine for groups.

It was exactly the issue of drug trafficking that wounded the União do Vegetal in the U.S. Supreme Court. On May 21, 1999, the U.S. Customs Service seized a shipment of ayahuasca tea heading from church headquarters in Brasilia, Brazil, to John Bronfman and the União do Vegetal headquarters in New Mexico. A subsequent search of Bronfman’s house turned up thirty gallons of ayahuasca. The federal government did not file criminal charges against any member of the União do Vegetal, but threatened to do so. In a preemptive strike on November 2000, mestres (leaders) of the church filed suit against the Customs Service. They claimed that the Customs Service had violated their First Amendment rights (free exercise of religion), the Fourth Amendment (search and seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process), and Fourteenth Amendment (due process, equal protection) rights, as well as their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and various international treaties and obligations. The União do Vegetal asked the court to prohibit the government from prosecuting them, to return the seized tea, the holding of which they considered sacrilegious, and to declare legal the ceremonial use of ayahuasca, which they claimed was a “necessary and essential” part of their religious practice. The U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Boulder, Colorado, agreed to execute a preliminary injunction exempting the União do Vegetal from the Controlled Substances Act. This exemption would allow the União do Vegetal to import, distribute, and use a Schedule 1–controlled substance for religious purposes. The federal gov-
ernment appealed the case to the Supreme Court. In December of the same year, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the preliminary injunction against prosecution in an unanimous decision—the first decision of the new John Roberts Court.

The Supreme Court heard the oral arguments in *Gonzales v. União do Vegetal* under the shadow of the war of terror. The oral arguments of *Gonzales v. UDV* were heard on November 1, 2005, the same session that heard *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*, the case that found that the military commissions established by the Bush administration to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay violated the Uniform Code of Military Conduct and the Geneva Convention. Ten months later the U.S. Congress passed the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, an amended version of the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, which Bush signed into law on November 27, 2006. The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act penalized the use of force, violence, or threats to animal enterprises including the incitement for others to use force. This definition opened the door for the prosecution of radical green websites.

From a legal point of view, *Gonzales v. UDV* did not address these legal findings in the ever-growing jurisprudence of terror. It commented on an ongoing dispute between the U.S. Congress and the Supreme Court about the burdens that religions should bear in relation to neutral laws of general applicability (laws that do not appear to be based on animus or hostility to the free exercise of religion) that nevertheless impact the religious free expression clause of the U.S. Constitution. And, more narrowly, it concerned the question of whether the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals was right to issue a preliminary injunction exempting the União do Vegetal from the Controlled Substances Act. The federal government, represented by the deputy solicitor general, Edward S. Kneedler, vigorously disagreed with the 10th Circuit Court. A central question in the dispute was the competing controlling powers of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 and American Indian Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1994 in the wake of *City of Boerne v. Flores* (1997); the Controlled Substances Act; and all three of these acts in relation to the 1971 United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances, of which the United States became a signatory in 1980.

The dispute about religious free expression intensified after the
Supreme Court decision in *Employment Division v. Smith* (1990), in which two Native American members of the Native American Church were denied unemployment benefits on the basis of having lost their jobs at a drug rehabilitation center after testing positive for the Schedule 1 drug peyote, which they had ingested during a Native American Church ceremony. At stake in *Employment Division v. Smith* was whether a neutral law of general applicability (denying unemployment benefits to persons fired for certain forms of criminal conduct) should be held to the principle of “strict scrutiny,” namely whether a law or government action that was religiously neutral could survive constitutional scrutiny only if the government interest was “compelling” (the most demanding test to constitutional challenge)? Or could the court decide that, if there was a law of general application that did not specifically refer to religion but nevertheless burdened religious practice, then the government need only show a rational interest for the law to be upheld? Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Scalia argued that the Supreme Court would no longer hold the government to the standard of compelling state interest if a law only accidentally affected a religious practice. Acknowledging that in most cases minority religions would bear the brunt of so-called neutral laws, Scalia argued that the threat of anarchy must at times expose democracy to the prejudice of the majority and that this prejudice had a political not juridical address. (That neutral laws are never neutral from the point of view of a social world must be accepted.) “The Court today suggests that the disfavoring of minority religions is an ‘unavoidable consequence’ under our system of government and that accommodation of such religions must be left to the political process.”

Supported by a broad and unlikely coalition, including marijuana legalization advocates, conservative Catholics, evangelical Christians, and the ACLU, Congress accepted Scalia’s challenge and passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 which restored the compelling interest criterion to cases involving religious expression, and amended the American Indian Religion Freedom Restoration Act of 1994 to exempt the use of peyote by Native Americans in the American Indian Church from the Controlled Substances Act. But four years later, in *City of Boerne v. Flores and RFRA* (1997), the Supreme Court ruled that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act had exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority.
Boerne v. Flores did not involve the ingestion of Schedule 1 drugs, nor did it involve a minority religion. It concerned a zoning ordinance and a church façade. The archbishop of San Antonio, Texas, sued local zoning authorities for violating his rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act by denying him a permit to expand a church as he saw fit. The Boerne zoning authority argued that local preservation ordinances forbid the construction and the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act was an unconstitutional infringement on local government rights and prerogatives. The Supreme Court agreed, ruling that Congress had exceeded its constitutional powers by intruding onto local and state prerogatives to regulate the health and welfare of its citizens and by predetermining what laws were or were not constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, a power reserved to the Supreme Court.

While Boerne severely restricted the application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, most jurists believed the compelling interest criterion it wrote into law remained in force in federal cases. But this opinion had not been tested. And so, the questions before the Roberts Court included: What legal force remained in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act after Boerne? Did the compelling interest test apply to federal law and international treaty? Was the securing of health, borders, and international relations a significant enough governmental interest to trump the free expression of a minority religion? What about the United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971? In wake of 9/11, was there a new compelling interest in state security that overrode all minority concerns? And what, if anything, did the special rights of Native Americans as enshrined in the amended American Indian Religious Freedom Restoration Act have to do with the rights of the União do Vegetal?

It may seem surprising that the American Indian Religious Freedom Restoration Act was raised at all in Gonzales v. UDV. After all, the União do Vegetal is a self-declared Christian religion not an Indigenous religion, and as such seems to be differently situated within the governance of the prior. União do Vegetal originated in Brazil, and thus has a migratory relationship to the territorial integrity of the United States. Moreover, the União do Vegetal claimed that its rights were violated in relation to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act not the American Indian Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Nevertheless, the União do Vegetal, the federal
attorney general’s office, and the Roberts Court all argued whether the União do Vegetal were “similarly situated” as Native Americans to religious expression. In other words the technical legal question—whether neutral law of general applicability touched the free expression jurisprudence, whether the distinction between religious belief and action mattered, and whether these issues affected questions of the compelling state interest test—pivoted on broader understandings of the relevance of the governance of the prior to the general governance of difference in late liberalism. Who belonged within the exemptions of the governance of difference and how did these exemptions relate to the governance of the prior? Who were abandoned to make their own way? The answers were disputed. Let’s start with the federal attorney general’s office.

According to the attorney general’s office, Native Americans are an exception within the chattering crowds of religious minorities because, as the political theorist Will Kymlicka puts it, they are a national minority with unique if qualified claims of sovereignty based on a set of genealogical principles that linked them to the event of settler conquest. In other words, they seem differently situated in the governance of the prior than do the congregants of the uDV. The federal government’s position was simple. The União do Vegetal did not, according to the government, fall within these principles of the governance of the prior. Its religious beliefs were extraterritorial and its principles of inclusion were based on Christian proselytizing rather than genealogical descent. And yet the attorney general also argued that the members of União do Vegetal should be treated as if they were Native Americans when it came to what piece of legislation was relevant to them (the American Indian Religious Freedom Restoration Act rather than the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).

The federal government’s interest in protecting the unique status of Native Americans by grounding their difference in the governance of prior was not, however, motivated simply by high regard for the worth of Indigenous difference. It was also motivated by an understanding of how the governance of the prior helps discipline the proliferation of alternative social projects and their practical reach. The constitutional event allows the state to sort populations into pre- and postconstitutional entities even as the territorial distortions of the constitutional event (the fact that the coverage of the constitutional event changed over time as new
Chapter One

territories were incorporated and quasi-territories such as Puerto Rico and American Samoa remain within it) provide endless interpretive maneuverability. We see how it allows this sorting by returning to the different discursive work that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, American Indian Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and Scalia’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith do. Remember, the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was prompted by Scalia’s majority opinion in Smith. But on the face of the statute, the aim of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is the reinstallation of the compelling interest criterion in cases of neutral general laws, not the rights of Native Americans to ingest peyote in religious ceremonies. The Act states that a government cannot “substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless it could prove “that is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”37 As Boerne makes clear, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act can have as much to do with capital and property rights as the spiritual ingestion of drugs.

The amended American Indian Religious Freedom Restoration Act addressed a different issue: the right of Native American members of the Native American Church to ingest peyote, a Schedule 1 drug, in their religious services. In other words, as opposed to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the amended American Indian Religious Freedom Restoration Act was controlled by the imaginary of the governance of the prior, and this mode of governance was grounded in the divisions of the autological subject and genealogical society. In the American Indian Religious Freedom Restoration Act the terms “Indian,” “Indian Tribe,” and “Indian Religion” were defined according to the descent of blood, kinship, and culture, and mutatis mutandis those members of the Native American Church who are not “Indian” in this way or any other way remained subject to criminal law and its demand that they make their difference legible under the Religious Freedom Reformation Act.38 It is important to note that the Native American Church does not abide by the genealogical imaginary of the federal government. Prior to its amendment, all members of the Native American Church were exempted from the Controlled Substances Act. The American Indian Religious Freedom
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Restoration Act specifies that only Native Americans are except from the Schedule 1 prohibition of the ingestion of peyote. And the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency is slowing changing its regulatory practices to conform to this restricted social referent. But the Native American Church itself con-
tinues to be open to all irrespective of their racial or ethnic profile. Thus perhaps more than protecting the rights of religion, the American Indian Religious Freedom Restoration Act restricts which members of a reli-
gion can be exempted from prosecution under the law. In other words, the American Indian Religious Freedom Religious Act seemed to close a gap between membership in a religion and membership in a racial de-
scent group. The potential racial discrimination embedded in this legisla-
tion is preempted by the discourse of the governance of the prior, namely the special trust relation the federal government has to Native American tribes.

The gap between membership in a religious community and member-
ship in a descent group—a difference written into the discursive separa-
tion of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the American Indian Religious Freedom Reformation Act—threatened to reopen in the State of Utah v. Mooney (2004). In Utah v. Mooney, James and Linda Mooney, along with their church, the Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church (collectively, the “Mooneys”) were charged by the State of Utah with multiple felony counts of “engag[ing] in a continuing criminal enterprise” and of engaging in a “pattern of unlawful activity” by possessing and distributing peyote, a controlled substance, to members and visitors in their religious services.39 The State of Utah claimed that the Mooneys and other members of the Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church were not exempt from prosecution under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act because they were not members of a federally recognized tribe. They read the definition of the term “Indian” (“any tribe, band, na-
tion, pueblo, or other organized group or community of Indians . . . which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians”) in the American Indian Religious Freedom Restoration Act as exempting only federally recognized tribal members. The Utah supreme court disagreed with this narrow reading, finding the Mooneys “Indians” under the law. Thus while the Utah supreme court loosened who may be recognized as
a legal Indian, it reaffirmed that one has to be recognized as a legal Indian. In other words, the relationship between the governance of the prior and the divisions of the autological subject and genealogical society remained intact. The Mooneys were exempted as a class of people rather than as members of a descent-neutral religious community.

From a federal point of view, the União do Vegetal case seemed to erode even further the means by which the governance of the prior helps to discipline the proliferation and practical reach of alternative social projects. The União do Vegetal had no genealogical principles to restrict membership. Indeed, in their submissions to the court, the União do Vegetal foreground the volitional nature of their congregation. They were not “a closed group that has gone through screening” but a religious sect, and therefore believed that it is “important to invite everyone to the table.” This proselytizing mission, the federal attorney general’s office argued, provided the compelling interest for refusing the injunction—the health of the group’s members, the impossibility of determining membership based on descent, true belief, and thus the possibility of drug diversion. To exempt ayahuasca from the regulation of the Controlled Substances Act and United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances would not merely interfere with the government’s role in protecting the health of its citizens; it would also jeopardize the security of its external and internal borders. To support this last point, they pointed to the furtive means by which the União de Vegetal tried to smuggle the seized ayahuasca across the border.

The União do Vegetal, the 10th U.S. Federal District Circuit Court, and the Roberts Court rejected these arguments. They argued that the relevant statute to consider when providing a preliminary injunction exempting the União do Vegetal from the Controlled Substance Act was the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, not the American Indian Religious Freedom Restoration Act. If the American Indian Religious Freedom Restoration Act was relevant at all, its relevance was to demonstrate that, on the one hand, the “unique relationship” between the United States and Indian tribes did not justify their differential health treatment and, on the other hand, no serious health, social, or diversionary consequences would result from allowing this specific exemption. As Roberts wrote, if “hundreds of thousands of Native Americans” practice their faith with-
out serious health or diversion harms despite peyote being banned as a dangerous substance with a high potential for abuse, then “it is difficult to see how” an exemption cannot be granted to the “130 or so American members of the U.D.V. who want to practice theirs.”

Policing the Political

The decision of the Roberts Court to uphold the preliminary injunction against the prosecution of the União do Vegetal under the Controlled Substances Act seems to travel in the opposite direction from the Howard and Rudd administrations’ decisions to initiate and then uphold the Intervention. The difference between these two cases doesn’t appear merely at the surface—the Roberts Court refusal to demonize the alternative bodily practices (illegal drug ingestion) of a minority religion occurred at nearly the same moment that the Howard government declared a national emergency based on the specter of Indigenous bodily practices (illegal sexual practices). Not only do we seem to be seeing a different judgment but we also seem to be witnessing a different mood and stance toward the minority social projects and worlds that crisscross the nation. *Gonzales v. UDV* is soothing and practical, allowing and monitoring difference. In the case of the Intervention in Australia, the mood and stance was hysterical and confrontational. As the first decision of the Roberts Court, *Gonzales v. UDV* was hailed as signaling a potential softening of judicial ideological positions, especially important after the controversial intervention of the Supreme Court in *Bush v. Gore*, which effectively decided the 2000 election by halting the Florida ballot recount. The Intervention, meanwhile, was widely considered to have roiled the social and political field, hardened ideological positions, broken longstanding alliances and friendships, and shattered a longstanding consensus on the importance of multiculturalism to the making of the Australian nation.

But were either of these cases instances of a political event—or indices of a broader political shift in recognition in late liberalism? Let’s take the Australian case. The sex panic did alter one level of the political order. But, as much as something like a political event seems to have occurred, the question remains how to relate this level of political disruption to another level of political conservation. Did the Intervention actu-
ally disturb anything from the point of view of a common politics if we take “common politics” to mean the normal distribution of roles, places, and occupations within a given political order? Has the common, in this sense, been disrupted? Have late liberal strategies of transforming a crisis of colonial legitimacy into a crisis of culture been affected as the state has shifted from cultural recognition (“self-determination”) to social intervention? The answer seems to be no; the Intervention is not a political action in Rancière’s sense, but merely—and only partially, because other laws demanding the traditional subject remain in force—an inversion of the relationship between culture as the agency of care and as the cause of crisis. If the Intervention was not an instance of political action, was *Gonzales v. UDV*? Here again the given distribution of social places and roles—the given spacing of the governance of the prior and the distinction between the autological subject and the genealogical society—remains firmly in place even as who is thought to occupy which space is shuffled around. Native Americans will remain situated within the social tense of the settler state. They alone will be disciplined by the specter of the governance of the prior.

It is vital however to remember that although it can police the potential eruptions of political events, the politics of cultural recognition in late liberalism cannot saturate social worlds in such a way that no potentiality remains within the actual world. This is in part because, in relation to social projects and worlds, recognition only faces one aspect, or plane, of these projects and worlds, and because trying to manage this plane creates new potentials for these projects and worlds. As well as demonstrating the success of containing a potential political event, the Intervention and *Gonzales v. UDV* demonstrate the inability of recognition to saturate any given social field.

In the case of the *Gonzales v. UDV*, the plaintiffs had social and cultural characteristics that straddle and cross the divisions of the autological subject and genealogical society. The origins of their religious practice of ingesting ayahuasca are continually projected into the period before the conquest of the Americas. A Mayan backdrop indigenizes its religious practice. But its proper name, and the official representation of the group, continually situates members within the framework of the free subject of Christian conversion. We might go so far as claim that it was this very indeterminacy that made the União do Vegetal available for judicial re-
flection and debate. The same can be said about the União do Vegetal’s relationship to the governance of the prior. Are the União do Vegetal the same or different from other Indigenous groups? The União do Vegetal leadership argues that there is no difference between what their church does and what the Native American Church does. And who decides which of these will be the truth of this group: the extraterritorial nature of the União do Vegetal (and then what about the Comanche empire, which straddled the current divisions between Mexico and the United States)\textsuperscript{42} or the Christian rewriting of pre-Christian practices (and what about the Native American Church with its complex dialogical relation to Christian notions of communion)?

In the Australian case, similar problems of indeterminacy arise. Sutton might be able to differentiate between traditional and modern, customary and historical peoples, but this differentiation cannot survive an encounter with the material conditions of actual Indigenous social worlds. What Indigenous man or woman cannot be addressed from the perspective of either the autological subject or the genealogical society? Some have job skills in education, construction, and power and water management; some keep outstations where their deceased relatives inhabited the landscape. Some make their way through the competing Christian ideologies that aggressively address them, casting their deceased relatives as devils if they appear to them. Most of their modes of kinship and association have had to address competing discourses of race, friendship, and stranger intimacy as they do nothing more than go to school, buy a can of Coke, visit a doctor, or fill out their unemployment forms. These modes of association are the unintelligible knots (nods) in the social divisions of tense defining late liberalism—the part that has no part in the distribution of social roles and places. But even as they are caught in the divisions of social belonging, the members of the União do Vegetal and contemporary Indigenous Australians in the Northern Territory resist this division insofar as they remain and endure. As neither this nor that they stand as a constant refusal of the techniques of recognition and their inversion in late liberalism.\textsuperscript{43} They are the part that has no part—the noise of the unsayable—found neither on one side nor on the other of the temporal division of social space, but in the space that cannot be contained by this division.
The Brackets of Recognition

This chapter continues my examination of the late liberal politics of recognition and my interest in the potentiality of the part that has no part within this mode of governance. Chapter 1 examined how various forms of social tense (the divisions of autological subject and genealogical society; the governance of the prior) manage the line between policing and politics in order to make difference intelligible in late liberalism. Even as it continues to explore how tense functions as a technology of power, this chapter puts more pressure on recog-
nition itself, arguing that recognition is not a single entity but is instead one of three modes, or forms, of apprehending alternative social projects and worlds in late liberalism. If the previous chapter was interested in the way recognition prevents the eruption of a political event in the vicinity of the part that has no part, this chapter asks what form, or mode, recognition takes when this moment of intelligibility is deferred, bracketed, or denied and recognition is not able to overcome liberal intolerance.

After all, as even Le Guin’s short story “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas” makes clear, the fictional citizens of Omelas have several different ethical responses to the abused child in their midst. They reconcile. They refuse to reconcile. They stay. They leave. The public, political, and juridical discourses surrounding the Intervention in Australia and the U.S. Supreme Court case Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal demonstrate the variety of responses that a set of nonfictional subjects, embedded in governmental and legal institutions, take to the injustices done to alternative social, religious, and cultural projects and worlds in their midst—including whether or not they experience a disciplinary action taken against them as an injustice. The responses of these actual persons vary as surely as do those of their fictional counterparts. They refuse recognition. They grant the favors of recognition. They decide that recognition should be granted carte blanche or on a case-by-case basis. And these responses meet a variety of other responses outside the strict confines of parliament, Congress, and law, such as when liberal academics and pundits say such uncontroversial things as: We need to denounce the social projects of the other (Sutton); We need to be able to live with the impasses of justice (Scalia); And we need to proceed in a case-by-case manner (Roberts).

The statement that we must proceed case by case, or cognate statements such as that we need to begin with what we can agree upon suggest the complex temporal and spatial nature of recognition. Until a specific political struggle for recognition is resolved, alternative social projects must hide in plain or not so plain sight, and states must be ready to discipline them. Moreover, no one assumes that the social projects and worlds denied recognition evaporate when a verdict is announced. In short, the dynamics of recognition depend on a temporal suspension of judgment that manifests as a social spacing—a bracketing of the other in a no-man’s
land of having been neither recognized nor denied recognition. Insofar as these brackets of difference are ordinary responses within the politics of recognition in late liberalism, they suggest the vast social worlds and projects that are neither inside nor outside recognition, whose worth and value has neither been nor not been decided, that remain pure potentiality in the actual divisions of the social order, a virtual queue in the seams of late liberalism. Statements such as these, exemplified in Roberts’s majority opinion in *Gonzales v. UDV*, suspend, or bracket, social differences that cannot as yet enter into the communicative rationality and moral sense of the late liberal public sphere. Whatever the objective conditions of the world are “really” out there, such statements insist that the relationship of justice and ethics to these bracketed spaces must be suspended for the moment. But what if we opened these brackets? What conditions of life would we find in these suspended zones? What are the modes of comportment of the parts that have no part but are nevertheless living among us?

To understand what is at stake here the first thing we need to remember is that the call for people to begin with the agreeable and become comfortable with impasses does not mean that those people who are disagreeable and the supposed source of the impasse disappear from the face of the earth. People may be bracketed by liberal procedures for proceeding in the face of alternative social projects and worlds, but these brackets do not vaporize them. Those within these brackets hear the same call for patience as those without. They are just differently positioned to this call. Large groups of people may be, as Dipesh Chakrabarty put it in another context, consigned to the “imaginary waiting room of history.” But they are *living* within these waiting rooms. Whether one wishes they would or not, statements such as “We should begin with the practical and the agreeable” do not place the lives of the impractical and disagreeable in the past perfect or future anterior tense — a problem that society has dealt with or will have dealt with from the perspective of the last man. Such statements might configure these social worlds in such a way that they effectively disappear from public discussion, sentiment, and ethics. But it would be mistaken to think that the people themselves are sitting quietly in their broom closets, or clamoring outside the gates of the Emerald City waiting for the wizard to appear, or hanging out with the doorkeeper
of law waiting for permission to enter. The social worlds of the impractical and disagreeable remain in durative time. They persist. But they do not persist in the abstract. From the perspective of dominant worlds, the condition in which they endure has the temporal structure of limbo—an edge of life located somewhere between given and new social positions and roles, and between the conditions of the past and the promise of the future. Nicolas Rothwell of The Australian noted this suspension of being a year after the beginning of the Intervention: “Aboriginal societies of the Centre and Top End are now in a disquieting limbo, at the mercy of their bureaucratic masters and administrators in distant Canberra. Everything is transition, reform, new initiatives both economic and social. The revolution promised a year ago is not over, or even well advanced. Indeed, it has scarcely begun.” But from the perspective of the bracketed, the problem is how to endure the material conditions that compose their limbo.

Not only are the parts that have no part in the given orders of the sayable and visible continuing to live as they wait in their waiting rooms, when we open the brackets of recognition and examine the clamorous, sprawling social worlds living within, against, on top of these brackets, we find that the broom closet might not be the best metaphor for the spatial distribution of this form of social abandonment. And we find that “recognition” might not be the most useful way of conceptualizing the dynamics at play. And thus the second thing we need to remember is that recognition is simply one of several forms that the apprehension of alternative social projects and worlds take in late liberalism. When the security of the state, its specific organizational integration with the market, and its enmeshment within dominating discourses of ethics and rights are threatened, recognition appears in a different modality. When we look into and around the waiting rooms of history, what we see is not recognition but recognition in another state, or another state of apprehension; namely, espionage and camouflage. By these terms, I mean to refer to actual practices of cloaking as well as a much broader and diverse set of discourses about modes of concealment that allow otherwise visible organisms or objects to remain indiscernible from the surrounding environment. Espionage and camouflage are, in other words, the modes of recognition that become visible when, as a result of some threat to late liberal security or some bracketing of the politics of recognition, the tense of the other is written as a suspension of the present and the future. In
this way of conceiving things, recognition is not negated by espionage or camouflage. Recognition is simply one mode of apprehending the other in late liberalism alongside espionage and camouflage. These latter two modes might be most apparent when recognition is bracketed, but they are always potentially present in successful bids for recognition. In other words, because recognition, espionage, and camouflage are modal relations—in the strict sense that they relate to each other as internal possibilities—recognition is as much a response to threats to late liberal security as espionage and camouflage. Or this is my argument: recognition is never simply about the worth of the other; it is also always about the arts of disguise, perimeter busting, and uncloaking necessary for recognition in the more limited sense to make a discernment. And because it is, recognition and its other modalities provide an especially dense site for understanding the contemporary entanglements of late liberal and neoliberal governance—the governance of alternative social projects and worlds in the wake of the legitimacy crisis of the postcolonial world and a new post-9/11 crisis.

The answer to the question of how the part that has no part in the given orders of the sayable and visible endures in these kinds of social spacings will stretch across the next two chapters. In chapter 3 I focus on ethical substance, endurance, and materiality of being a social potential in the actual worlds of late liberalism and neoliberalism. In chapter 4, I examine the form of eventfulness that characterizes suffering and surviving in these spacings. In this chapter I examine two different issues: first, I discuss accounts of the cause and meaning of moments when late liberal recognition is not able or is unwilling to overcome its intolerance of alternative social projects, moments that include the suspension of judgment about the other or the suspension of others when a negative judgment is made about their life and worlds. I then discuss espionage and camouflage as modalities of recognition that emerge at these moments of intolerance.
account of the underlying causes of intolerance and, on the other hand, a justification for withholding or suspending recognition. What causes liberal recognition to tremble and turn away from its supposed commitment to valuing the diversity of the other? What causes liberals to draw clear red lines beyond which they refuse to extend recognition and tolerance? For some time, scholars of recognition have been interested in two aspects of these red lines and the brackets of recognition they create: their cause and justification. On the one hand, they have asked what causes the trembling of recognition—the liquefactions of the liberal self and her social commitments in relation to an alternative social project and world—so that we can better understand, shape, and direct the resultant transformations of law, economy, and politics that these liquefactions provoke. Broadly speaking, two competing causes of this trembling have been discussed in the critical literature.

One group, exemplified by Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*, argues that a trembling of recognition results when the semantically ordered, practically based, moral foundations of distinct civilizations collide. The borders between peoples, civilizations, and their semantico-moral formations are metaphorized as tectonic plates. When they touch, or shift from their established positions, they release massive forces that form and deform the borders of social worlds. Consider, for instance, an editorial in the *Sunday Times* (London), September 16, 2007, in which Nick Clegg, then the home affairs secretary of the Liberal Democratic Party, presented to the public his party’s official stance on the appropriateness of recognition in the current moment of the war on terror: “Our aim must be to refute the medievalism of Al-Qaeda’s perverted worldview, while ensuring that members of our mainstream Muslim communities feel that our liberal values of tolerance and diversity are their values too. We must combine critical engagement with the many grievances held among mainstream Muslims, without necessarily accepting them, drawing a clear red line beyond which liberal respect for other views does not extend.” Clegg acknowledges that people tremble—he might even be said to be insisting that a tremble occur whether it has or has not. Medievalism, culturally based abuse, terror: not only should these categories prompt the red lines of late liberal recognition, they should also abrogate the communicative procedures through which late liberal judgment
emerges in social time. We are told that recognition has its proper limits; that liberals always seek to overstep those limits because of their deep commitment to tolerance; and that, as a result, liberals must be careful to discipline their good impulses especially at the divide between the modern autological subject and medieval genealogical society. But Clegg also insists that the proper comportment to this trembling should be understood through a temporal spacing. In other words, he finds at hand a temporal framework on which the red line of intolerance can be drawn. The confrontation, Clegg tells his readers, is not merely between people, but across time. Denying them recognition is not denying recognition to the people who are among you, but people who are in your past. The child in the broom closet is — and the Muslim next door and the Indigenous man down the road might be — in a different geological sediment.

Though hardly aligned with and strikingly more complex than Huntington’s political project, some philosophers of language have likewise presented the problem of recognition in terms of incommensurate semantic fields. They ask how and why radically incompatible ethical and epistemological horizons are aligned or not; how people interpret and decide between them; and how they characterize these interpretations and the practical worlds that result within or alongside them. Scholars such as Gadamer, de Man, and Derrida have vigorously argued about the degree, source, and condition of distortion in translations (and interpretations) across incommensurate semantic fields; about the risk of assigning and acting on these translations in ordinary life; and about the social productivity of foregrounding indeterminacy and undecidability as a progressive social ideal.5

The ability to commensurate two textual (or social) fields without distortion or the ability to decide between two translations or interpretations on the basis of truth and accuracy puts more than metaphysics at risk (though as Derrida has noted, it also puts metaphysics at risk).6 The stakes of these distortions seem high, given, as Jim Hopkins has argued, that the ability to “spontaneously, continually, and with remarkable precision and accuracy” interpret one another “seems fundamental to our co-operative and cognitive lives.”7 The American philosopher Donald Davidson located the purest form of the philosophical problem of truth and incommensurability in colonial history insofar as his notion of “radi-
cal interpretation” finds its starkest expression there. Davidson uses the phrase “radical interpretation” to indicate the semantic dynamics that are operating when people interpret an utterance in the context of radical linguistic (and social) alterity. How could the Hawaiians have understood James Cook, or Cook the Hawaiians, without producing serious distortions? As he puts it, “Hesitation over whether to translate a saying of another by one or another of various non-synonymous sentences of mine does not necessarily reflect a lack of information: it is just that beyond a point there is no deciding, even in principle, between the view that the Other has used words as we do but has more or less weird beliefs, and the view that we have translated him wrong. Torn between the need to make sense of a speaker’s words and the need to make sense of his patterns of belief, the best we can do is choose a theory of translation that maximizes agreement.”

Davidson props the possibility of radical interpretation on the “principle of charity,” namely, that speakers and listeners assume that the other is acting according to a set of rational linguistic conventions like their own. This convention allows speakers and hearers constantly to readjust their “passing theories” about the meaning of words as they realize that others are not using them as the listener would. As a result, if our aim is to understand the speaker as she or he wishes to be understood, then we modify our own language assumptions in the direction of a speaker’s own as, in the course of conversation, we realize that the two are divergent—that the semantic way the other uses “hippopotamus” is the way we use “orange,” for example. In short, we negotiate charitably. And like liberal respect, charity begins and ends at home. According to Davidson, “If we cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other behaviors of a creature as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and true by our own standards, we have no reason to count that creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying anything.” That creature becomes noise—becomes a creature as it becomes noise.

At the basis of all of these theories of translation, the political theorist Mahmood Mamdani has argued, is a more or less sophisticated version of “culture talk”: the idea that there are “cultures” and that each culture can be defined by some internal essence or arrangement of sense and value. For Mamdani and other political theorists, like Patchen Markell,
culture talk is a second-order discourse. It registers the facticity of a moment of embodied social dissonance and it characterizes this dissonance as the effect of a kind of thing ("culture"). This social dissonance might be a fleeting feeling at the edge of an encounter or a pronounced and well-defined event. The occasion of a dissonance that threatens to turn into intolerance may be publicly discussed or silently reflected upon. It can involve human or nonhuman animals, organic or inorganic life. What is at stake is how these exemplary moments of reasoned public debate, animated by the trembling of recognition, sit side by side with quieter—even silent—moments of trembling and the reflections they produce. In other words, the social terrain of late liberal recognition is not reducible to a single kind of event—the same kind of seismic shock that levels all houses equally or in the same way.

Take the claim made by some of my Indigenous friends in Australia, whom I have known and lived closely with since I was twenty-two, that animals should be allowed to die in their own way. This is not indifference on their part, but an ethics they themselves learned as a way of life prior to their developing an explicit, propositionally based way of justifying it to themselves and others. But when this dying presents, from my point of view, unnecessary pain to an animal, my response to the competing claims of the animal’s pain and my friends’ moral stance prompts a response that certainly has cognitive aspects, but also involves an embodied interpretation, a set of affective and energetic interpretations. I turn my head away as my body becomes upset, even as I think about the difference between what I think and what they think. Even if I take to heart Donna Haraway’s call to take seriously the idea that human nature is an interspecies relationship—that within the child in the broom closet are all sorts of living beings—I do not know how to square this hermeneutic circle. And I would say that in these moments I tremble and my trembling is not in the past tense. I tremble in a durative sense. I continue to feel the shores of liquefaction lapping at my breast each time I am confronted by these competing claims; the terror and liquefaction doesn’t kill me, nor do they lead to a simple distribution of master and slave.

And yet, for a variety of reasons, I keep the content of these reflections close to my chest. I have not presented or debated them in public—or at least not until here and now. At various moments, I talk with my friends
about these competing claims. At other moments, I sit, watch, experience
my reactions, and think about the consequences of “taking a stand” in the
contexts of local and regional representations of “the traditional Aborigi-
nal” and the concrete politics of cultural recognition, self-determination,
and Intervention that I discussed in chapter 1. At all times I know that I
am acting, whether I am doing or not doing something concrete. At all
times I find that this trembling of recognition is about the degrees of dif-
ference and indifference I am cultivating to various things in the scene—
myself, my friends, the nonhuman animal—and about the uneven con-
sequences of removing or being removed from belonging to any one of
these cultivated obligations. And at all times I understand that there are
different psychic, social, and physical consequences to the various social
persons in the scene—what good will be available to which people based
on what “decision” I make. But to call any of these reflections and de-
cisions volitional—choices of the will—would radically mischaracterize
the time and nature of these reflections and decisions. I can say that I can
leave our little Omelas. I can say that I can decide “enough is enough,”
that losing my friends is less important than continuing to inhabit this
impasse. So they can also say. But every decision and subsequent action
is the result of a set of obligations already in the scene. That is, we are not
within different “cultures,” rather we are all implicated in a set of shared
and divergent forces that bring us together and move us apart.

Other moments of potential intolerance are less noticeable, even less
of an event than mine, more like a quasi-event, more like a passing shiver,
quickly felt and then swallowed up by ongoing life.

The force of dissonance need not be discussed in such classic anthro-
pological terms. The mixed and heterogeneous subject is within liberal
spaces classically conceived. The utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer, for
instance, provoked widespread public debate with his provocation that if
we are to make a distinction between persons and nonpersons, then all
nonpersons—those who are world-poor, in the calculus of who and what
kinds of entities are world-making or world-poor—should be treated
equivalently, and most controversially, should be liable to be put to death
by persons. Into the class of the world-poor Singer casts animals, fetuses,
and severely disabled newborns. Outraged responses to Singer’s pro-
posal came side by side with coolly reasoned ones. Philosophers such as
The Brackets of Recognition

Bernard Williams and disability activists such as the late Harriet McBryde Johnson responded publicly in the genre of dispassionate argument. Johnson’s widely reported decision to debate Singer in public was meant to defeat the substance of Singer’s argument by reason and address—the content of her argument and the fact of who was authoring these words, a woman born severely disabled and thus, within Singer’s framework, a nonperson at the time of her birth. Singer’s response and the various replies to him are not at stake here.

What is at stake is how these kinds of exchanges are characterized, valued, and evaluated in late liberalism. In late liberal democratic contexts, these kinds of exchanges—the content of their argument and the pragmatics of how they argue—are typically understood as exemplary acts of deliberative communication safely protected under the genre of constitutionally protected and celebrated liberal public reason. But this typical characterization masks the fact that Singer’s propositions and Johnson’s counterpropositions are not merely one kind of thing—a token of a type of thing that is stable across all social contexts—among other kinds of things. What they were doing as they debated at Princeton University is open to multiple metadiscursive characterizations. Habermas, for instance, might celebrate their engagement insofar as he can use it as an instance of the procedural basis of a (re)integrated public sphere. For Habermas, debates such as theirs enhance democratic society by modeling how justice is achieved and the good life made material in late liberalism.

But others do not agree. Many European countries would consider Singer’s position as falling within the parameters of prohibited “hate speech.” The redline of tolerance is drawn in front of his argument no matter how persuasive it might be—indeed, precisely because it might have persuasive power a red line of tolerance might be needed. And Singer is not the only person barred from proceeding. Having himself suffered the accusation of engaging in hate speech, Singer defended in an article in The Guardian the rights of the radical animal rights group PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) to post posters headlined “To Animals, All People are Nazis.” As Singer noted, PETA adapted this line from the Polish-born Jewish writer Isaac Bashevis Singer. “In the same week that Germany and the World Jewish Congress rejected the idea that defa-
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imation of religion is an affront to human dignity,” moving against a U.N. Human Rights Council declaration condemning “defamation of religion,” Germany’s highest court “ruled against the right of the United States–based animal rights group People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals to exhibit posters that juxtapose photographs of victims of the Holocaust with photographs of animals in factory farms and at slaughterhouses. . . . According to the court, Germany’s laws on freedom of speech did not protect PETA’s campaign, because to make ‘the fate of the victims of the Holocaust appear banal and trivial’ was an offense against human dignity.”19 And there is nothing particularly unique about this case. Were the anti-Islamic cartoons in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten or the Maclean’s magazine article, “Why the Future Belongs to Islam,” or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s denial of the Jewish Holocaust instances of deliberative debate, free expression, or hate speech? According to whom? In other words, like culture talk, talk about deliberative reason is an interpretive intervention in a field of interpretive forces.

This way of thinking about culture talk has led a second group of critics to argue that recognition trembles, not when experiencing the collisions of semantic fields, cultural borders, or civilizational boundaries, but when experiencing internally incommensurate social, political, and economic logics, practices, and affects, and the competing fields of power in which they are embedded. From this point of view, the problem is not the mismanagement of colliding civilizational borders. The problem is that a dissonance internal to late liberal society is projected outward as a problem between liberal, illiberal, or nonliberal societies. This internal dissonance can be exacerbated when liberal institutions are placed in the vicinity of an illiberal or nonliberal cultural or social other, but the dissonance exists independent of any such encounter. And two broad kinds of dissonance are central to the trembling of recognition.

One form of internal dissonance emerges from the incommensurability and undecidability of truth as it stretches across late liberal deliberative sense and moral sense.20 When “deliberative sense” is cited in the liberal public sphere, the meaning of “sense” tends to gravitates toward aspects of semantic or pragmatic signification and its possibility for truth production. When “moral sense” is cited in the liberal public sphere the meaning of “sense” tends to gravitate toward the faculties and fields of
sensation, often organically grounded. This sensate ground is the field of the final intelligibility of moral sense—and as a form of understanding and interpretation is often explicitly contrasted to deliberative reason. The infamous statement of the U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart that, although he believed hard-core pornography was impossible to define, he would know it when he saw it, should be rephrased as “I feel it when I feel it.” We also see this sense of moral sense in my visceral reaction to the pain of dying animals in the context of the claim of my friends. But whether public or private, large or small, these moments of dissonance and the trembling of recognition that occurs in their vicinity are not meaningful in and of themselves.

They are, to be sure, in the sense that they occur, if not exactly exist. But what they mean, or how we understand them—how we interpret them discursively so that these tremors can be made sensible as a kind of thing—will not be found within the tremor, the trembling, itself. To be sure, the tremor is a moment of interpretation. As Charles Sanders Peirce argued, interpretation can be logically understood to have at least three different grounds, the affective (emotional), energetic, or logical-symbolic-linguistic. These three grounds interact with each other dynamically even as they remain analytically distinct. And all of them are rhetorical in the sense that they figure a relationship between two other signs (or a sign and its object, in Peirce’s terminology). The feeling of rage a subject might experience in the vicinity of neoconservative politics would, for Peirce, be an example of an affective interpretant, and my trembling in the face of the competing claims about the proper response to the suffering of animals would be an example of an energetic interpretant. Rage is an affective sign that interprets—in the sense of figures—the subject relative to a political field. This subject might reflect on this rage with a variety of propositionally based accounts of its “meaning,” thumbing through and variously interdigitating the various political registers and genres available to her. She may, through this discursively mediated reflection, produce new affective interpretants such as finding herself becoming proud, or scared, of her rage—or new energetic interpretants such as finding oneself paralyzed by the discovery that one’s self-understanding as a committed pacifist is out of joint with one’s feelings. One might as a result decide to abandon formal politics altogether even though one doesn’t know
what one’s next step will be. In any case, from a Peircean perspective, this entire spiraling matrix of interpretation is internal to political semiosis.

It is no surprise then that Pierre Bourdieu and Paul de Man read Peirce and Heidegger as engaged in a similar project of precognitive understanding and rhetoric as building—or that earlier, John Wild read William James from the perspective of an existential phenomenology.23 Heidegger’s early philosophical project rested on elaborating the hermeneutic conditions of Dasein.24 Within this early philosophy, interpretation—understanding as interpretation—is not originally within propositionally based language games. As Mark Wrathall has argued, Heidegger understood propositionally based language games as presupposing a prior mode of interpretation (a “primary meaning”) in which a “thing or activity . . . refers to or relates to other activities or entities” in such a way that the disclosure of meaning is “not dependent on our possessing a system of signs.”25 Understanding as interpretation is within the practical comportment of everyday life—a comportment rooted in practical understanding and grounded in a variety of interpretants, the total effect of which produces what Bourdieu referred to as habitus.26 This does not mean that understanding as interpretation is outside language and consciousness, or linguistic consciousness, or that it is within the individual subject. Understanding is instead a complex topology that interdigitates the internal and external, subject and object, affect and reason; a topological spacing that Lacan called “extimacy.”27

For thinkers like Peirce, Bourdieu, and de Man what moments of trembling mean, in the sense of their semantic and propositional sense, cannot be found in the trembling itself, nor can the trembling be reduced to semantic or propositional sense. The meaning of the trembling of recognition is only secured through a second-order interpretive act—the various available ways of saying how these trembles should be socially understood, absorbed, and distributed and the demanding environments that impose repressive and productive consequences of using one or another of these ways of understanding and evaluating them. These second-order interpretative acts “say” what kind of thing the tremble is and thus what proper stance (actions, relations, and feelings) one should take toward it. But a gap, a difference, remains between these first- and second-order modes of interpretation because they are differently grounded. Not only
can the meanings of the trembling of recognition not be solely located in cognitive reflexivity but all recognition is an immanent proposition, a potential social direction, because moments of recognition and its trembling emerge at the intersection of the dynamic relation to these grounds of interpretation.

But if these moments of recognition ricochet across these various interpretive grounds, the distinctiveness of these grounds is not without a history. The phrases “deliberative sense” and “moral sense” are often used to refer to these three kinds of grounds. Over time, the procedure of deliberative reason came to be considered a critical domain of truth production as distinct from moral reason, even as both “senses” of sense, sensate and cognitive, moral and deliberative, became available for generating truths in late liberalism—and thus of assessing the legitimacy of the other. From such mundane examples as my friends and my responses to the suffering of animals to such portentous examples as the U.S. Supreme Court decision on pornography, these distinctions are elaborated and put to use through a typical series of questions, such as: Should I allow my “gut” to decide to tolerate or not tolerate this or that alternative social project and world? Where is my gut? Is it being camouflaged by my mind? Is my mind merely a mask taking power over but not negating the affective forces registering through me? In other words, truth was not consolidated in one or the other of these “senses.” It was dispersed across them, creating spaces of undecidability with respect to which of the senses should have the upper hand in any given context of social and cultural politics. In short, the historically constituted difference between deliberative and moral sense constituted a zone of undecidability within late liberal truth, even as it ordered that truth.

Another form of internal dissonance arises from the incommensurate ways in which institutions designate what will and will not be an instance of an alternative social world. Here we shift from looking at the internal incommensurate and undecidable grounds of understanding, interpretation, and evaluation to the incommensurate and undecidable grounds of various bureaucratic orders, institutional purposes, and evidential demands. Singer was pointing to this disorder in liberal bureaucratic orders, institutional purposes, and evidential demands when he criticized the contradictory stances the European Union has taken on hate speech.
We can also return to a case discussed in chapter 1. In the wake of the *Little Children Are Sacred* report, the Australian federal government loudly announced the end of the previous regime of cultural recognition. But this announcement did not wipe the legislative or juridical slate clean. It was not a sovereign act in this sense: for the most part, the existing legislation, a maze of incommensurate laws pertaining to land usage in Indigenous country, remained on the books. We can take even a very few of the major bureaucratic entities and their legislative regimes affecting land usage in the Northern Territory of Australia: Aboriginal Land Trusts set up under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act in 1976; land councils established under the same act; the Aboriginal Areas and Protection Authority set up under the revised Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act in 1989; the Native Title Act passed in 1993 but then subsequently amended; the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act, 1976; and the Local Government Act, 1978. These pieces of legislation and their implementation place demands on (recognize) Indigenous subjects and groups in slightly to significantly different ways. The Aboriginal Land Rights Act and the Native Title Act pivot on a model of human descent from clan-based estates. The Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act allows for economic associations independent of these clan-based groups. The Local Government Act is based on residential principles that do not assume descent or market associations. And the Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority can use any of these criteria—descent, economic, residential, ritual—for making a judgment about what aspects of the country should be registered as a sacred site—and who has authority to register them. And groups organized on the basis of all of these acts might be operating on the same piece of land with different intentions and outcomes.

These few legal regimes do not begin to saturate the density of property relations in the region where the Intervention was located. Other property forms would include, at the very least, forms of title such as freehold, leasehold, life estates, ground leases, and pastoral lease and rights regimes based on common law, international law, and statutory law. Through these various bureaucratic entities and their regulatory regimes pass numerous kinds of goods and services, including housing, land development, land management and protection, employment schemes such as the Community Development Employment Program (CDEP), and more
recently, shared responsibility agreements. These legislative regimes derive their meaning, often explicitly, from their surrounding legislative and discursive contexts, without these surrounding contexts fully determining that meaning or its ultimate direction. And yet, considered as a field, these reappear as a set of incommensurate, though often mutually referring, state regimes that are themselves constantly under revision.

For example, leading up to and following the federal emergency intervention in Indigenous affairs, some of this legislation changed. Aboriginal Councils and Associations have become the Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations, and the local governments are currently being consolidated into the twenty–twenty concept: twenty central town hubs by 2020. But these changes do not occur instantly, nor leave a pristinely commensurated field in their wake. These competing, at times incommensurate, legislative regimes exist simultaneously even where they are not explicitly referred to or mobilized.

It is within these dissonant, often incommensurate legislative and bureaucratic terrains that Indigenous people must make their way. And because they exist as incommensurate fields, they provide a potential field of maneuver for Indigenous and non-Indigenous subjects supporting and opposing these policies. In short, dissonance itself may be a means of conserving power as much as a source of interference to power. In the above cases, the dissonances within these legislative fields provide different degrees of maneuverability or blockage to various actors within them.

It is not necessary to choose between these two broad and competing causes—the seismic shocks that occur when two semantic-civilizational orders collide, and the internal incommensurability within late liberalism. The trembling of recognition is no doubt produced by any of a number of factors internal and external to late liberalism—it has plural conditions as well as plural states. It can be caused by various social orders confronting each other, especially when a given or emergent mode of social life challenges one or the other side of late liberal deliberative and moral sense, or both sides at the same time. It can also be caused by struggles within any given late liberal order, especially when moral sense and deliberative sense are metathematized as religious sense and rational sense. And it can be located within any given social order or within any given social subject. So a subject might find herself trembling, liquefying, be-
cause, for example, she might think she should love across radical difference but in fact is physically and affectively repulsed by some aspect of a concrete other—they insist that I let this small animal bloat and die, and believe that to summon the courage to kill it is to enter the domain of abominable cruelty because each and every entity must be allowed to encounter its own death—and because she cannot be sure if her repulsion has a theological or (merely) cultural origin, and cannot be sure if it matters whether her repulsion has a cultural, physical, reasoned, or spiritual ground. But she might not notice, remember, or self-consciously consider other quasi-events of trembling. Maybe these will resurface in her dreams, intensified or dispersed across a number of phantasmagorical figures.

What is necessary to understand is that these moments of trembling produce a variety of reactions, the intelligibility of which are socially external to the trembling even as the reactions are an internal expression (interpretation) of the force of this dissonance in a scene. And it is necessary to understand that this intelligibility is embedded in a variety of demanding environments that passively and actively enforce one mode of intelligibility and justification over another. In other words, scholarly and political interest in the causes of the trembling of recognition and their interest in the problem of justice and justification when red lines of intolerance and incarceration are drawn is due in no small part to the fact that this trembling leads to acts of state and public enhancement of life for some at the expense of others. After all, when recognition encounters, or manufactures, an unrepentant alterity, it does not simply tremble. Nor does the liberal state merely transfer these public tremors to the realm of private beliefs (no matter how many times the transformation of public religion into private belief is held up as the exemplary transformation of secularism). Where the security of the state is challenged, the state of recognition publicly denounces the redlined public, enacts repressive laws to eliminate it, and hunts down its recalcitrant members.

When recognition is formally withheld or granted as a suspended judgment, issues of justification come to the foreground. Political theorists and political philosophers have attempted to discover some overarching principles on which to ground justice and justification in these moments of overt oppression. We might even say that the dominant strain of theo-
retical thought has focused on social justice in the moments that states decide an alternative social project cannot be accepted as a member of the national or international community. What norms can be imagined against which judgment can be judged? To be sure, the juridical history of constitutional democracies is littered with cases in which jurists have noted that a prior cultural or social judgment was not based on reason but on “mere prejudice” (a culturally grounded gut reaction). In other words, when the projected future became the actual present, those who decide who will be designated as the part who has no part come to view their past decisions in a negative light. And yet the conservation of the narrative configuration of tense in the new judgment insulates that new judgment from reflexive memory—juridical judgment from reflexive judgment. After all, we might think that when jurists consider how many times past judicial judgments of the worth of the other have been revised, they would, in the face of a new decision, liquefy in terror that their judgment too will, from the perspective of the future, be revealed to have been merely a culturally inflected gut reaction. We might expect them to understand, alongside Derrida, that Justice is annulled at the very moment of the verdict. But they do not in general do so. As a result, brackets continue to proliferate without acquiring any special supernatural powers to transubstantiate immediately or fully the life-worlds so bracketed. And thus, for longer or shorter, and more or less effectively, these life-worlds must develop a mode of living within the brackets of recognition. What happens to the people who are the part that has no part in late liberalism? What happens to recognition?

Espionage, Camouflage, Recognition

When brackets are thrown around recognition, either as a suspension of judgment or as a red line of toleration, the full modal possibilities of recognition become visible. They are not absent in instances when recognition succeeds; they are simple in potentia in these moments. Often these redlined publics are part of the formal political order. In November 2008, for instance, the Sarkozy government arrested around twenty people in connection to the deliberate short-circuiting of the transportation system throughout France. The minister of justice, Rachida Dati, accused the ar-
rested of being members of the “mouvance anarcho-autonome,” a part of the “extreme Left.” In other words, the productive forces of state discipline are supplemented by its repressive forces, and, when they are, governmental interests in life give way to spectacular acts of killing or barely perceptible acts of letting die.

The struggle to define the difference between human and nonhuman animals in the United States and Europe presents us with an exemplary case of these redlined publics, the differential of institutional power in which they are situated, and the productive and repressive forces available to enforce one mode of intelligibility and justification with respect to their alternative way of life. In the United States, for instance, the 1990s witnessed the rise of a new wave of animal rights and welfare legislation backed by powerful industry groups. The Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA) was passed in 1992, backed by the National Association for Biomedical Research, creating new criminal and sentencing guidelines for attacks on businesses whose business or research involves nonhuman animals. The lack of criminal prosecution under the AEPA, and increasing violent and nonviolent protests against businesses using animals as commodities, led many within industry and research to call for a new, tougher law. Edward J. Walsh, a member of the Board for the National Animal Interest Alliance, published a widely circulated essay in Lab Animal calling for the toughening of the AEPA. In it, he condemned the lack of sentencing power in the AEPA, pointing to the emergence of the Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front as serious threats to business and science. And he went a step further. He insisted that because the Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front are terrorist groups and because “terrorism is a special form of criminal activity,” the assault on these groups “requires special legal consideration.” And not just the people in these groups who act violently on their beliefs: Walsh argued that “the real battle” is being waged in the “not-so-savage-acts” and the “silly crimes” of street activism. “In response to their theatrics and petty criminal acts, we must deliver the solid, unambiguous message that their disrespect for the law will not be tolerated.” According to the Source Watch, the National Animal Interest Alliance is a front group for industries involved in animal commerce and agribusiness. They promote substituting “animal welfare” for “animal rights” and tough laws against
ecological activists. The National Animal Interest Alliance and the American Legislative Exchange Council, which provide model legislation that can be downloaded off their websites, were among the powerful lobby interests that pushed the amendment of the AEPA, transforming it into the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act of 2006, which did as Walsh suggested, criminalizing not merely violent acts but any act that is experienced as a threat by those against whom the act is aimed and any act that supports and promotes these acts. The Internet was being divided — on the one hand were websites that could openly oppose the politics of the radical ecological movement because their view of violence to nonhuman animals could be understood as a site for public debate; on the other hand were websites that would open their managers to criminal prosecution because these had been effectively characterized as on the other side of the red line of tolerance.

All of these examples presuppose a volitional agent on the other side of the red line. The “mouvance anarcho-autonome,” the Earth Liberation Front, and Earth First! are imagined to be composed of individuals who choose to separate themselves from dominant neoliberal orders in the creases that these orders make available and to hide themselves within these same orders. As volitional actors they are more available to neoliberal techniques of “making die,” as opposed to others who might simply find themselves in a structural space no longer valued by the market and its cultural forces. For these people, the softer forms of letting die will do. They will be allowed to continue to persist in the seams of neoliberalism and late liberalism until they exhaust themselves. But in both cases, the techniques of persistence that these alternative social projects devise must be covered in various kinds of camouflage lest too much public attention merit state attention.

Take, for instance, documents from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the 10th District Court’s preliminary injunction that allowed the União do Vegetal exemption from prosecution under the Controlled Substance Act. During the presentation of the case, a debate emerged about how to understand the covert means by which the União do Vegetal moved ayahuasca across the border. The 10th Circuit Federal District Court acknowledged that the União do Vegetal president, Jeffrey Bronfman, misled customs brokers about the substance he was importing from
Brazil. The custom forms described the ayahuasca as an “herbal extract” that would be used by União do Vegetal members as a “health supplement.” Emails that Bronfman drafted emphasized the need “for confidentiality regarding uDV’s ‘sessions involving hoasca.’” He wrote: “Some people do not yet realize what confidentiality is and how careful we need to be. People should not be talking publicly anywhere about our sessions, where we have them and who attends them.” Moreover, when the União do Vegetal attempted to grow the two plants used in the ayahuasca ceremonies in the United States, members themselves used the term “clandestine” to describe their activities, requiring all members to sign confidentiality agreements to keep their plans secret. The 10th District Court acknowledged that “all of these actions by uDV demonstrate a recognition that its importation and consumption of hoasca [sic] violated the CSA” and that “although uDV eventually sought a preliminary injunction after the seizure of the hoasca, at all times leading up to that event the record reveals that the status quo was the enforcement of the CSA.” Nevertheless, the District and Supreme Courts rejected these acts of camouflage as deleterious to the União do Vegetal’s case, arguing that because the Controlled Substances Act does not list “hoasca” as a Schedule 1 drug, but only the DMT derivable from it, the seized plants were in fact unregulated herbal supplements. Roberts’s practical suggestion for solving this problem of camouflage was for the state to keep an eye on the size of the União do Vegetal as a means of assessing the possible diversion of ayahuasca.

At one and the same time, the Court upheld the injunction against denying the União do Vegetal the legal right to import and consume a Schedule 1 drug, placed this act of recognition under surveillance, and deferred the possibility of claims by analogous groups to a case-by-case review. In practical rulings such as Roberts’s, the other is placed within a bracket that is as much a narrative configuration of time as it is of space. These deferred and partial judgments are not issued in the durative tense but as a catachresis of the past perfect, in which the undecidable practice will have been apprehensible, and the future anterior, in which the undecidable practice will have been resolved. At the intersection of these two tenses, the harms done within these brackets narratively disappear, and social worlds are abandoned to their own means of making their way—their own means of making the world work.
But Roberts's practical reason did more than make these worlds disappear. His practical reason also discursively and functionally integrated the União do Vegetal into the same bureaucratic order that monitors the rest of the United States through secret, though warranted, or warrantless wiretaps. Not surprisingly, many people would view Roberts's practical reason to be the result of a new dynamic of recognition that predates or postdates the 9/11 attacks. Many people have argued, in contexts more broad than this decision, that the emergence of tactics such as camouflage and espionage postdates the attacks—and indeed, that continuing to discuss the politics of recognition now demonstrates a naive failure to understand the fundamental transformation the liberal democratic state has undergone. For them the recognition of cultural difference has been absorbed by state security, something the courts adjudicate (such as in *Hamdan v. Gonzales*, heard in the same session as *Gonzales v. UDV*) but do not abrogate—and something that has long been under way such as is seen in the passage of legislation such as the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act.

These new technologies of surveillance have already been absorbed into new ways of conceptualizing the global market. Bruce Mehlman, the assistant secretary for technology policy, United States Department of Commerce, delivered a talk on February 14, 2002, at a Biometrics Consortium Conference, in which he articulated global terrorism, national security, and economic dominance through the concept of espionage. According to Mehlman, biometrics would allow Americans to defend themselves in all these domains from the perimeter-busting practices of others, even as it would provide a means of unclicking those camouflaged within their borders. The problematic at play is not tolerance and worth but (bio-)informatics and population management: how to make the camouflaged stand out, to be perceived surreptitiously, to be tracked in order to manage its threat. Perhaps ironically, even as the Australian state was implementing the Intervention, China was threatening to prosecute members of the Australian-British mining group Rio Tinto for domestic espionage. But, if we turn the angle of this gaze, if we are looking from the perspective of the camouflaged, the problem is not the agony of worth but the agony of action: getting in without being seen and clandestinely navigating internal and external perimeters in order to change the existing order. The problem is not about being deemed worthy or
having worth for who one is in one’s most robust social skin, but what one could potentially do, how one could potentially transform the world as it is given, or dominantly given, and make it into the world that it is not. But however much their hierarchical relationship may have changed, or intensified, since 9/11, the modal relations of recognition, espionage, and camouflage preexisted the new security state, their origins found in and tied to the emergence of late liberalism as a response to anticolonial struggle and new social movements. Espionage and camouflage are not new states of recognition, nor are they the end of recognition. Rather, they assume a different relationship as late liberalism becomes entangled in a post-9/11 neoliberalism, and produce different forms of “making die.”

At first blush, it seems significant to the survival of an alternative social project that recognition can be explicitly granted, withheld, or deferred. And for specific alternative social projects this is no doubt the case. After all, recognition brings with it a host of material and immaterial infrastructures that help shape and capacitate life. But, as we know, every act of recognition creates new zones of potential life that is as yet neither prohibited nor allowed. Thus, what matters from the point of view of a specific alternative social project seems to matter less from the point of view of the dynamics of recognition.

If the distinction between explicit and deferred refusals of recognition doesn’t capture the immanent social field that make these refusals intelligible and justifiable, then it does capture a critical tactic by which late liberalism secures the positivity of recognition. Moments of explicit recognition of the worth of the other, or moments in which this worth is refused, create the illusion that espionage and camouflage are external to recognition. And this sequencing of recognition, camouflage, and espionage is an important tactic for evacuating the durative lives of those living in the brackets of recognition. A typical way of understanding the relationship among recognition, espionage, and camouflage, is to see recognition as the first moment, followed by espionage and camouflage. Or to see espionage and camouflage as the first moments, followed by recognition. In both cases, recognition, espionage, and camouflage are seen as distinct moments, each external to the other. But when we view recognition from inside its brackets we begin to understand recognition’s multiple modalities and better appreciate the clamorous, sprawling social worlds living
within, against, on top of these brackets and the multiple, uncoordinated strategies that those living there deploy to maintain their lives. And these sprawling social worlds are particularly interesting because they upend the comfortable view of recognition as an encounter *entre nous* absolutely distinct from acts of espionage and camouflage.

Indeed, life-worlds that are accustomed to falling within the brackets of recognition are especially attuned to how legal debates and decisions may demand new social maneuvers, many of which lie within the gray zones of legality. For this reason, I am ultimately less interested in finding or disputing who is bracketed or the justice or justification of moments of bracketing. Rather, I am interested in the modes of comportment that emerge from brackets that address them, telling them, for instance, that they will have to live with less now in order to live with more in the future, or that their present deaths are actually a future redemption. If we are not to be left thinking that these counterworlds are picturesque scenes of glorious resistance and wells of creative discovery, then we need to be clear about the conditions of life within populations that must engage recognition where it trembles and then expresses itself as espionage and camouflage. There exhaustion rules the roost. And why wouldn’t it, when such significant forces are lined up against a target—when they must bear the tension of inhabiting the tense of the other? Hegel might be right that in the end it is the position of the slave that moves history. But most slaves die. They are worn to death. They have no energy left to make a revolution. And so their tactics of world making within the waiting rooms of history often never appear. I am hardly the first to make this point. If Foucault was interested in why, given the emergent forms of life that proliferate in the contemporary world (caused as much by these zones of abandonment as any encouragement of market or state to be otherwise), so few forms persist and become dominant, then one answer is, as I have noted, the exhaustion of life when a group is the part that has no part. A variety of world-making tactics swarms around all of us. We are all in the waiting rooms of history. But some of these tactics do not appear to all of us. Some wear sheep’s clothing. Some names are changed not to protect the innocent, but to protect those named from the necessity of being innocent—of proving to some court of law that what they are doing should be recognized as legitimate. Various emergent or persistent forms
of life circulate, or are prohibited from circulating, across various communicative media.

Moreover, as I hope the previous chapter’s discussion of the Australian Intervention made clear, when the dynamics of recognition are operating within the metadynamics of the autological subject and genealogical society, governments and publics can rapidly shuttle between calls for the recognition of social difference and calls to refuse not merely social difference but to reduce life to such a degree that that social difference cannot survive. In these displaced zones of recognition people sometimes put their energies into the reelaboration of the self rather than the identification of the self for certain others. In these social fields, the point may well be to reshape habitudes ahead of recognition, to test something out rather than translate it, not to produce meanings that can be translated, or embodiments that can be recognized. This is especially true when we are discussing subaltern publics that violate moral and deliberative sense. By the time normative law and publics deliberate, commensurate and decide their horizons of moral sense, the bodies before them have changed, as have (hopefully) the conditions of embodied reason itself. But to engage in these practices of self-elaboration or self-maintenance a social group may spy on those who join them, assume that they are being spied on, and camouflage themselves in the cloak of authorized identities.
Chapter Three

Road Kill

Ethical Substance, Exhaustion, Endurance

Hospices of Late Liberalism

If late liberalism, as distinct from laissez-faire liberalism and neoliberalism, refers to the effects of anti- and postcolonial and new social movements on how difference is treated in liberal worlds, the 1970s saw a robust set of alternative languages of difference emerging in these movements’ wake. In 1977, three years after Ursula Le Guin received the Hugo Award for Best Short Story for “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas,” Charles Burnett submitted his master of fine arts thesis, the film *Killer of Sheep*, to the School of Film, Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles. *Killer of Sheep* is a quasi-narrative film cast with nonprofessional actors, friends of the filmmaker and residents of Watts, the setting of the movie. Across a multitude of loosely coordinated neorealist vignettes and plots we enter Stan’s life: Stan works in a slaughterhouse; the slaughterhouse is Fordist in its mode of production, racist in its stratification of skills. If I wanted to push the allegorical through-line of this book, I would draw the reader’s attention to a particularly poignant scene in which Stan’s daughter is shown playing with a white female doll, singing Earth, Wind, and Fire’s hit “Reasons” in a cramped broom closet, clothes littering the floor, walls falling apart, wiring exposed, a washing machine in disrepair.

But as I move in this and the next chapter to examine how the parts that have no part in late liberalism endure, I am interested in another plot of the film, which follows Stan and his friend’s attempt to buy an engine for a car that Stan has been slowly renovating. The engine is not merely a sign of Stan’s potential upward mobility. It is the material condition of this mobility and material evidence of a history of racial discrimination carved into the landscape. As Celeste Langan has noted, “A steady stream of seemingly innocuous funding and operational decisions . . . have, since 1964, quietly but effectively restricted the mobility of poor African-Americans and other disfavored minorities who do not own cars.” Thus the car Stan hopes to make is not merely a mode of transportation; it is the material condition for the transformation of his body, the production of a body less exhausted, alienated, and numb. The availability of cars does not merely allow access to mainstream economies. It can also capacitate alternative socialities. Jon Altman and Melinda Hinkson have described how the availability of trucks in rural Indigenous Australia allows for the emergence of new Indigenous territorial publics. But they, like Stan, must first procure a vehicle.

As *Killer of Sheep* progresses, viewers witness the various ways, legal and otherwise, in which Stan and one of his friends raise money to purchase the engine. What becomes painfully clear is that, for members of the Watts neighborhood, nothing is ready to hand in the Heideggerian sense. Nothing in Stan’s world simply works. Everything must become a “theory” in the sense of a self-conscious encounter with the world. In slow neorealist time, we watch as Stan and his friend are absorbed into and resist
the chaos of local gray economies. They finally purchase a used engine for fifteen dollars from a local purveyor of such items, lug it down a precarious set of stairs, nearly but not quite dropping it along the way, and then heave it onto the back of a borrowed truck. But by the time that they have reached this final platform of their desire, they experience themselves as having no energy left. And this is not a metaphor. It is a fact of muscle, bone, and will, whatever we mean by this last term. The motor sits on the edge of the truck bed. They do not move it any further. Their bodies exhausted, as well as their minds, they convince each other the motor is secure. They start the truck, move a few feet, and the engine falls off. That’s it. The engine is busted. The motor won’t run now if it ever would have.

No matter that Burnett ends this meditation on race, poverty, and hope with Stan in the same position in the same slaughterhouse pushing a group of sheep down a metal corridor to their slaughter, he claims his film was meant to be hopeful. What is hopeful about Stan is his perseverance—he “has decided to persevere and fight on despite society’s place for him.” Stan remains a “thing” in Spinoza’s sense, a particular modification of the possible if unknowable attributes of life, insofar as he continues to strive (conatus) to persevere in his being. We might say that Stan stares in the face the question of how to endure as he strives to persevere. But it is important for us to note that Stan himself would like to change the conditions in which he strives—he is striving to change the conditions in which this perseverance occurs. The harrowing nature of the film is the vertiginous precipice of Stan’s being and becoming as the viewer comes to understand that the only thing separating Stan from the sheep is his will to persevere.

Insofar as Burnett sees these kinds of spaces as hopeful, as sites where a potential alternative social project exists in the actual world, he shares this optimism with a strain of critical theory—the immanent critical theory of scholars, such as Gilles Delueze, who were also developing a theory of potentiality in the 1970s. Burnett filmed Killer of Sheep during the transition from Keynesian liberalism to neoliberalism and during the emergence of late liberalism as a strategy for governing the challenge of postcolonial and new social movements. Thus whether intending to or not, Burnett was a part of a much broader discourse of potentiality and
endurance, of hospitality and livability. In 1979, Commonwealth delegates signed the Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice at the fifth Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka, Zambia. The Lusaka Declaration stated the commitment of signatory states to legal equality “without any distinction or exclusion based on race, colour, sex, descent, or national or ethnic origin.” The declaration focused on three main groups—those suffering under apartheid in South Africa, economic immigrants, and Indigenous minorities. In relation to Indigenous minorities, the Lusaka Declaration noted that the legacies of colonialism and racism in the past “may make desirable special provisions for the social and economic enhancement of indigenous populations.” In doing so it acknowledged that Indigeneity was not a form of life that was finding it easy to flourish within the settler-state. In Canada, Australia, and the United States, the life expectancy, educational levels, and disease profiles of Indigenous people better fit the third world than the first world in which they were situated. The Australian state’s commitment in the 1970s to the politics of the cultural recognition (“self-determination”) of Indigenous people through land rights legislation should be seen in this broader light.

At issue were not merely the inhabitants of the earth, but also the earth itself. In 1979, James Lovelock, a chemist and National Aeronautics and Space Administration consultant, published *Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth*. In it he proposed that the earth was a supraorganism of which humans were mere part rather than center. The Gaia theory helped spawn the deep ecology movement, whose scope was a biospheric perspective on all living and nonliving parts of the earth—and critiqued the distinction between living and nonliving as being nothing more than the deforming nature of the human perspective. Although castigated by the likes of Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Dawkins as more high priests of a neopagan new age religion than natural scientists, Lovelock and his collaborators have continued to seek science-based evidence for their theory. Their aim is not merely to test a hypothesis but to influence human governance over—or within—a form of life that is not, by many natural science definitions, life. For most natural scientists, life is that which can replicate itself. Gaia cannot. It can only provide the conditions of hospitality within which the life proper to it can flourish. Thus, if Gaia is life, then it
is a life whose function is not to replicate itself, but others. peta, Earth First!, the Animal Liberation Front, the Earth Liberation Front: these are the names of only a few of the best known ecology groups pushing every member of the human race to assume some relationship between his or her present personal happiness and the present suffering of other species on the earth and the earth itself. The citizens of Omelas must think outside the closet.

But the earth has its competitors. In 1979, Margaret Thatcher became prime minister of Great Britain. During her tenure she set into motion what were then radical principles of limited government through the dismantling of key elements of social welfare; expanded market freedom through the crushing of trade unionism and the privatization of state-run enterprises in schooling, education, and health; and taxation “reform” in which taxes on the wealthy were significantly lowered and indirect taxes significantly increased, thereby redistributing the burden of state finance from the rich to the middle class and poor. All state-based regulatory regimes, including environmental protection, were portrayed as hostile to the flourishing of capital (an argument that reemerges in debates about the human contribution to global climate change). Ronald Reagan would become president of the United States a year later, after pushing through a similar policy agenda in California during his terms as governor from 1967 to 1975. Thatcher and Reagan would become the heroes of the Atlantic neoliberal movement. Key to their governing strategy was dismantling social alliances within the Labour and Democratic parties of their respective countries through the demonization of racial and sexual minorities and alternative publics. If the conservative state was to replicate itself, it needed to deny the conditions of hospitality within which progressive life forms flourished.

Meanwhile, throughout 1979, Foucault was presenting his Collège de France lectures on the birth of biopolitics. The course was the third of a series focusing on the arts of governance and formations of power (the first two were Society Must Be Defended and Security, Territory, Population). In the course, Foucault proposed a series of shifts — or reorganizations — that marked the advent of biopolitics, including a shift from law to truth; from the rights of man to the efficiencies of markets; and from revolutions against the state to management by the state. These reflections on
biopolitics occurred during the same period that Foucault was working on his histories of sexuality and beginning to reflect on *askesis* and “ethical substance.” In *The Use of Pleasure*, for instance, Foucault argued that in the Greek episteme the ethical substance was bodily pleasure insofar as it was the “material” of moral reflection, conduct, and evaluation.7 The ethical work (*travail éthique*) of the self was to establish proper conduct in relation to this ethical substance— the prime material of a person’s moral conduct— so as to bring into being the self that was the object of one’s behavior.8 But how does one endure the conditions of neoliberalism and late liberalism long enough—or in a sturdy enough fashion—to accomplish this performative trick?

This was not Foucault’s focus at the time. A number of more recent critical theorists have, however, taken up the broad problem of how to understand the intersection of biopolitics and ethical substance in the light of broader transformations of liberal markets and powers. Judith Butler, Rosi Braidotti, Elizabeth Grosz, and Brian Massumi, among others, have attempted to formulate a critical theory of vulnerability, bodily materiality, and embodied potentiality that would have as its ground something other than a metaphysics of substance. These and other scholars rejected the understanding of substance as embedded in a hierarchy of being in which being has a primary sense (substance) and a secondary sense (qualities, quantities, relations, and modalities of substances). In other words, they rejected the idea that substances are kinds of beings that are self-identical, while quality, quantity, and so on can only predicate, modify, and find a dwelling in substances. The problem critical theorists faced was how to address substance, materiality, and embodiment without treating substance as a singular, stable, independent, and ultimate referent of an immovable and unmoving being against which social and culture forces brace, qualify, quantify, or relate?9 The difficulty of finding a space between the metaphysics of substance and some other ordering of substance has led to accusations that critical theory simply evacuated substance—or, “the body”—or made everything “socially constructed,” docile, and perfectly malleable to language games. Butler’s work is often presented as an exemplary case of how the critique of the metaphysics of substance, intended to radically destabilize normative governance, has unintentionally led to a radical desubstantialization of the body and world.
In response to this reception, many critical theorists have tried to specify further what they were seeking to do when they crossed the governance of life with the ethics of substance. Since *Gender Trouble*, Butler has been quite careful to specify what she meant by the metaphysics of substance and to what aspect of life she was applying her critique. Her aim was not to evacuate substance per se. She sought to critique the ontology of self-identical, self-enclosing being and the mobilization of this ontology in the governance of persons. How, she asked, was the deployment of a metaphysics of immovable and original substance used to support the politics of gender and sexuality? Critiquing the metaphysics of substance mattered because of the ways in which this metaphysics propped up the liberal humanist concept of the (sexed) person, and the humanist governance of populations through a notion of the proper life of substantial anatomy. To resist biopolitical governance we had to decenter the self-identical substance in which it covertly dwelled. The decentering that was needed had to go beyond the usual operations of subjects and their predicates, substances, and the attributes. The critique of the metaphysics of substance needed not merely to take an ethical stance against the determination of gender identity by a self-identical anatomical substance (the sexist stance); nor merely to take an ethical stance against the multiple qualifications of self-identical anatomical substance by gender (the culturalist stance). It had to fundamentally resist the biopolitics operating through these ontologies, and epistemologies, of self-abiding substance. Power did not merely make attributes stick to substances. Power produced cartilage and skin—and life itself—in such a way that attributes emerged as natural to them and thus was, in critical ways, cosubstantial with them.

And yet there remains a deep confusion about the grounds and aims of critique when critique is influenced by a concept of biopolitics and aimed at substance and its ethical reflection. Or, put another way, critical confusion arises when the governance of life intersects with life, the body-without-organs with the body-with-organs. As a result, a funny thing happened on the way to decentering substance, interrogating the conditions of its formations, and formulating a politics of hospitable dwelling organized around ethical substance (reflecting ethically on the techniques of the self). Everything took on an almost infinite plasticity or such an extreme potentiality that any acknowledgment of the actuality and consequences
of various kinds of events seemed to signal a reactionary moment in the movement of thought. I think this is so because, ever since we noticed the socially pernicious nature of the metaphysics of substance, wherever else we might fall, the fall into the mistake of seeing self-abiding substance outside the field of social power has seemed the most precipitous fall of all.

I don’t think making everything absolutely elastic was what was, or should have been, the right way of critiquing the metaphysics of substance or engaging the biopolitical, especially as this critique intersected with critical reflections on the arts of life contained in scenes such as those that interested Burnett and, for that matter, Le Guin. And I think that the worst excesses of a wild desubstantiation are past us. In their wake have emerged four general positions on substance and biopolitics. First, critical theorists take great care not to separate an order of immovable and unmoving substance from the ordering, coordinating, and distributing of biopolitical substantialization, even as they do not reduce materiality/substance to this mode of substantialization. Often, and Braudotti is a good example of this, critical theorists avoid this ontological reduction by distinguishing between materiality and substance. Likewise, Brian Massumi describes “flesh” as “the condition of possibility of the qualities of the world, but it is never contained within or defined by those qualities.” I have distinguished carnality and corporeality as an order of substance (carnality) that is excreted from the organization of substance (corporeality) but not equivalent to it.

To put this as clearly as possible: to argue that there is not an immovable and unmoving substance which social and cultural discourses merely qualify is not to say that there is a strict correspondence between the forms of governance and the materialities they excrete and extrude. The discursive construction of materiality—what I am here calling corporeality—shapes, carves, and assembles a given formation of the material world. But it never does so without producing a specific remainder. For instance, if he had been able to get the engine home, Stan would have used a spanner to secure it to the chassis of his car. Which spanner he would have used—one that perfectly fit the nuts he would use to secure the engine, or one that was a little too large or small for the job—would have determined whether the nuts were stripped in the process. And the nuts would be
stripped more or less easily depending on what they were made of. Their material composition would influence their functionality and whether it would be exhausted as the nuts were rounded. In other words, the shaping, carving, and assembling of materiality encounters the material being shaped, carved, and assembled. In this way, the forms of equipment that compose the discursive construction of materiality are constantly producing embodied life and unintegrated life at the same time. There is always a shaping and an errantness. The unintegrated, errant aspect of materiality is what I am calling carnality. This dynamic between corporeality and carnality is not merely a function of equipment in a narrow sense, but an entire arrangement of the condition in which someone builds a world — in the case of Stan, not merely that the nuts he uses can be made of a harder or softer, more or less pliant steel, but also that he only has so much money to spend renovating his car, and so must purchase the cheaper, softer versions that are more liable to being stripped. The errant nature of carnality is not, however, merely negative. It is — carnality is always within corporeal formations. But the difference between corporeality (the arts of material formation) and carnality (the mattering forth of the worth vis-à-vis these arts of formation) can, as this chapter will show, become the positive occasion for alternative forms of life.

All of these ways of specifying aspects of embodied being are efforts to answer the charge of the evacuation of the materiality of being in the critique of the organization of matter. Second, critical theorists emphasize that the biopolitical is not a space of life but a spacing of life; not a living difference but a differential within the living. Unfortunately, much of this discussion has focused on genealogies of Greek and Roman antiquities internal to European governmentalities, rather than the emergence of critical cleavages within biopolitics at the intersections of neoliberalism and late liberalism. I will come back to this. Third, critical theorists focus on the conditions of emergence of the otherwise rather than the origin of the other. As Deleuze put it, sounding much like the genealogical Foucault, the point is “not to discover the eternal or the universal, but to find the condition under which something new is produced.”¹⁴ And fourth, critical theorists consider these differentially distributed zones of vulnerability and abandonment as spaces in which, at least potentially, a new ethics of life and sociability could emerge. These four points are critically
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connected. The potentiality of living otherwise ethically emerges from the differential capture and distribution of embodied and exposed life and from the zones of indistinction they create.

Thus, rather than forgetting the body or assigning it to some nether realm, contemporary critical theorists have attempted to specify carefully what aspects of body and matter are implicated at different levels of social, political, and cultural analysis. What this work has made clear, however, is that at various moments a division opened within ethical work (travail éthique) between those who reflect on and evaluate ethical substance and those who conduct their lives in relationship to it—or perhaps are it: are the prime material of ethical substance. Should theory and practice celebrate these spaces as fostering (or, more minimally, providing the conditions of) practices of freedom in Foucault’s sense? Should they celebrate these spaces as potentials for creating robust alternatives to late liberal normativity and its publics? Should we bracket those spaces where life is denuded and focus on the miraculous moments when, from within the bowels of the unlivable, new life appears because these moments give us hope that something might change?

To put this in a slightly different way, if the potentiality of living otherwise emerges from the differential capture and distribution of embodied and exposed life in late liberalism (in the difference between corporeality and carnality), then what qualities of embodied living are we as critical theorists hoping to impose on others in the concrete spaces of neoliberalism and late liberalism? And how do we explain why some people keep on getting on while others do not? Why, in Killer of Sheep, does Stan persist beyond the point of exhaustion for other people in his neighborhood? Muscle and will, effort and endurance: what do we imagine are the social origins of these practical concepts? How are they a part of the technology of power and the ethics of substance that should interest us?

The following addresses these questions by tracking the problem of endurance faced by alternative social projects that have grown up in the shadow of the 1970s. Rather than blackbox the problem of endurance and will, I foreground their material conditions. I begin with friends and colleagues of mine in Australia, whom I have mentioned in the previous chapters. I focus on a project we are working on collaboratively to develop in their country: an augmented-reality project based on the global
positioning system. Although my friends do not use the term “ethics,” they constantly discuss the proper way of living within their world when what they believe to be proper action is not supported by the power of action as this action is embedded in everyday life and bureaucratic orders. I then turn to an alternative food movement in the United States in the context of the post-9/11 security state.

Virtual Realities

In 2008, in the middle of Anson Bay, at the mouth of the Daly River in the Northern Territory of Australia, I was crashing about in a ten-foot tin dinghy with friends of mine, and some kids in our care. They are Indigenous and Australian. I am neither. The adults and I are all roughly the same age, though I am the oldest. We had known each other for twenty-four years at that point. We were out on the boat that day doing preliminary work on what we were calling “the mobile phone project,” a digital project that seeks to use mixed-reality technology to embed traditional, historical, and contemporary knowledge back into the landscape. Imagine a tourist, or one of our great-great-grandchildren in the same area. They open our website, which shows where a GPS-activated mixed-reality story is located, and then download this information into their smartphone. Now imagine this same person floating off the shore of a pristine beach in Anson Bay. She activates her GPS and video camera and holds up her smartphone. As she moves the phone around she see various hyper-texts and video options available to her. Suddenly the land is speaking its history and culture without any long-term material impact on the landscape. And the person can only hear this story in the place from which it came.

On that particular day we were trying to get to Banagula, where many of the stories would be located. Banagula is a beach on the southern shore of the vast and semi-remote estuarine Daly River. It was the dry season, when the tides forcefully rush into and out of the Daly River. As they did, our dinghy reared up and slammed down in the open sea. To move the boat anywhere but straight into the waves would capsize the boat. To continue straight into them was giving us head concussions and hypothermia. The motor we had bought, cobb...
social resources, was not powerful enough either to lift the dinghy above
the waves or to navigate them with firm intent. This was the only boat
available to us, and it had a hole in it. There was no paddle. No one had life
vests. We worried about the fuel we were expending, having had only so
much money to fill up the few plastic containers onboard. The one worry
we didn’t have was food. We were skilled hunters and we had collected
a bounty of road kill along the way, some of which was on board. In our
immediate surround, other boats, powered by enormous motors, cruised
past us, smoothly lifting well-groomed white bodies across the water.

Why were we doing this? A simple answer would be that we thought
our mobile phone project might help reanimate—rather than repro-
duce—a local understanding of the relationship among place, people,
and knowledge that is oriented to the production of mutual obligation
rather than detached truth, even while it might provide the basis for a
new media tourist enterprise. For my Indigenous colleagues to know is
to practice an embodied commitment to place that over time becomes an
embodied obligation. To know is an exercise, an askesis, whose goal is to
produce embodied obligation between places and its peoples. But as in
Stan’s case in Killer of Sheep, these exercises of the self must be supported
materially. Thus, we all hoped that this form of knowing might produce
a dual form of value—epistemological and capital. In the meantime, like
Stan, my Indigenous colleagues must find a way of enduring—of capaci-
tating the will to endure—until these material supports are in place. Their
bodies must be able to endure the transition. The equipment in which
their bodies are embedded must be able to endure the transition.

Like Stan, my friends live in a world that is hardly ready to hand. If
ethical substance is the material of one’s reflexive actions, the material of
their reflexive action exists within a given organization of power that con-
tinually throws them in the vertiginous gap of being and becoming and
failing to become. The major federal legislative accomplishment effecting
Indigenous people in the Northern Territory, the Aboriginal Land Rights
Act of 1976, only obliquely addressed the conditions of their lives. They
grew up in a small Indigenous settlement during the heyday of cultural
recognition (“self determination”). But while they practiced the rituals
and knew the traditional narratives that composed the surrounding lands,
they failed to meet the narrow legal definition of the local descent group.
And the men and women in this boat are hardly atypical. While national publics celebrated the redemptive powers of self-determination, the local condition of Indigenous life hardly improved. If you are Indigenous in Australia it is statistically probable that your life is and will be very much worse than that of other Australians in terms of health, education, wealth, life expectancy, and mental outlook. Take Linda Yarrowin, who was thirty-five at the time we made this trip. By then she had lost five of her nine siblings (to septicemia, tuberculosis, pneumonia, collision with car, throat cancer). Her father and his brothers had died from aneurisms and kidney failure when they were in their mid-fifties, near to the average life expectancy of Indigenous men. In 2007, Linda and the others on the boat had abandoned their natal community because of a wave of horrific violence there, even though in leaving they lost a rare thing for Indigenous young adults, permanent jobs in education and infrastructure. The riot that led them to make the decision to leave was so notorious that the local government promised them homes in the area where we were working on the cell phone project.

Thus, when I refer to those of us on the boat, the “we” that I conjure is both a joint and divided being. Whereas in *Killer of Sheep*, Burnett rarely shifts focus from the shared experience of African American members of the Watts ghetto, for those of us on the boat, not all members share an equivalent relationship to a variety of resources, nor are we the outcome of equal kinds of social investments and the futures. We are engaged in a joint social project and yet each of our projects is slightly askance the other. We are a unified social group from the perspective of this social project and yet the “we” is divided, and this division is not merely between them and me. Each of them has a different individual project, as will become clear over the next two chapters, because of larger or smaller differences in upbringing, ability, and aspiration. But apropos to the discussion at hand, they and I are starkly divided according to a broad set of social statistics. And these statistics are not outside the boat. The boat is the artifact of our various potentials. My friends know where to find used and exhausted objects we can recycle into living materials; I can funnel salary and research funds and bureaucratic connections. But none of this is enough; and none of it could ever support more than what we have. Our affective attachments and anxieties are also different.
Profiles of the surviving and deceased relatives of those Indigenous Australians involved in the Anson Bay Mobile Phone Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>CONDITION*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surviving</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 renal disease</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>15 not known</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Deceased</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3 infant mortality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average age at death</strong></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1 vehicular</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 tuberculosis</td>
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<td>1 septicemia</td>
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<td>1 murder</td>
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<td><strong>Their Parents</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Surviving</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
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<td><strong>Deceased</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Average age at death</strong></td>
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<td>67</td>
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</tr>
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<td><strong>The Parents’ Siblings</strong></td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deceased</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average age at death</strong></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* “Condition” refers to existing condition among those surviving, and condition at death among those deceased. Of the 27 surviving siblings, 15 were either healthy or had conditions that were not evident at the time of the survey.
though we had then known each other for twenty-four years. When I leave this boat and then Australia I enter a very different set of localities and demanding environments than they do. All of this is made harder by the 2007 Intervention, when state funds were radically curtailed for projects such as ours. And then, by the fall of 2008, the market mechanism was in total shambles. Every capital enterprise we approached to help finance the training and infrastructure of our project wanted reassurances that an immediate market product could be produced. And the state refused to fund any projects that could not demonstrate a market outcome.

We eventually made it to Banagula. On other days we don’t make it back or do so barely. But we keep meeting and trying to raise resources to support the project. We are neither defeated, nor are we successful. We persevere. But if the most general purpose of this project is to coconstitute human bodies and geontological place by using the multimedia capacities of the Internet to reinforce local protocols about land use, knowledge acquisition, and embodied obligation, then the actual lives supporting this ethical practice hardly seem sufficient to achieve its goals. We are a miniscule group if one takes even the smallest step backward from this scene. The context of these people’s lives may be typical, but their will to persevere is not. I could give you a variety of statistics about the percentage that this small group of people represents from any of a variety of social perspectives. Behind us are enormous crowds of people who cannot, could not, or did not survive the initial exclusions of recognition built into the politics of recognition that subtended “self-determination” and the subsequent abandonments of the federal Intervention. So small is this percentage that their existence as a group of people persevering in the sea is indeed miraculous.17

It is true that doing something keeps everyone from sliding into nothing; a point I will return to in the next chapter. But getting anywhere in this context involves a variety of illegal and quasi-legal actions—which again differentially affect us. I can lose my visa privileges. They can be incarcerated, as little infractions become a criminal record. For instance, the same vehicles that Altman and Hinkson describe as creating the conditions for a new type of Indigenous territoriality are often unroadworthy and unregistered.18 Driving infractions slowly accumulate, often leading
to jail sentences. And as they continually get nowhere, they continually lose kids to prison, bodies to addictions, and toes, feet, and then kidneys to diabetes, reducing the number of people on the boat. Money decisions must be made about plane tickets, food, petrol, alcohol and cigarettes, or car registration. Today, someone has found a training program in conservation management. Today, grants I have submitted creep forward. Why does a certain strand of critical theory put such hope in potentiality? Does it matter whether they can endure this precipice? And which form of endurance will they find themselves inhabiting, the kind that makes them hardened, calloused, and indifferent to life or strengthens their attachment to life?

It is exactly here that social analysis faces a blackbox. We know that certain people strive (conatus) to persevere either individually or in relation to certain social projects. And we know that sometimes this striving results in robust counterpublics, and that these counterpublics sometimes become hegemonic forms of life. But can social analysis account for why?

**Potential Realities**

Rather than these questions of endurance, resistance, and will, critical theory has by and large focused on two other problems that arise in the vicinity of alternative social projects. On the one hand, it asks what are the conditions in which new forms of life emerge, and, on the other hand, it asks how one judges (evaluates, assesses) one form of life over another. Much of the most heated debate in contemporary critical theory has revolved around these two questions as they are differently addressed by normative and immanent social theory. I have already mentioned Deleuze’s argument that the perpetual variation between vis existendi and potentia agendi provides a space where new forms of life can emerge. Michel Serres, the philosopher of science whose work helped found the new science studies of Bruno Latour, provides a more materialist account of the same in his romping account of the parasite. Serres plays on the dual meaning of parasite in French, as an organism that lives on or in another organism and as static or noise. For Serres, static, or noise, is the indwelling outcome of every space of building. His understanding of
building is broad. A discursive formation, an architectural structure, and a geological foundation are all instances of a building. The institutionalized discourse of self-determination that my colleagues grew up within is a building in Serres’s sense. And because it was a building, it immediately created static insofar as some clearly fit its hallways of recognition, some clearly did not, and others partially did and partially did not.

My colleagues in the boat, for instance, were the ideal objects of the discourse of both cultural recognition and self-determination that was dominant from the late-1970s through the turn of the century. They were taught the stories and rituals relevant to the land that surrounded the Indigenous community in which they were born. And they believed that they should teach their own children these traditional knowledges and practices in turn. They should “pass it down through the generations” is how they put it to myriad lawyers who arrived in their community during a contentious land claim that stretched from 1976 to 2010. But knowledge, practice, and belief were not sufficient under the legislative regime in which land claims were heard. The Aboriginal Land Rights Act of 1976 also demanded that they be members of a specific kind of descent group with a specific kind of historical relationship to the land under claim. While a small number of community members passed, my colleagues on the boat failed this genealogical reckoning. And the riots that drove them out of their community were, in part, fueled by these divisions of the law as practiced in the community, creating more static.

But the boat they are now sailing in is also a building, and one already decomposing from the static built into it by the time they could afford it. And they, and I, are buildings insofar as our carnality is the static produced by the disciplines of corporeality we differentially face. When we combine these two buildings—the boat and our bodies—the result of this history of differential building becomes clearer. They and the boat are cosubstantially decomposing in the world as it is given to them. Like the engine that Stan bought, this boat would not be available to my friends—they could not afford it—unless and until it was like them, an item no one else wanted. The boats we use and the cars we drive for the mobile phone project, for instance, are composed of copper wires, corroded from the salt environments to which they are exposed, the broken nature of their protective shields, the lack of money to replace wire or shield, the habitu-
iated relationship to a partially working world, and the low level of camouflage and espionage that using and being in sublegal equipment entail. This way of life is recycled back and forth across forms of materiality. Their “paths of thought and existence are traced” through and in these assemblages of materiality.\textsuperscript{24} Those copper wires and the boat and engine that can’t lift above the waves are a part of my friends’ bodies as certainly as their cartilage and blood pressure. The entire contraption of it-and-us slams into our differently cared-for tendons, exhausting all, but some more seriously than others. Then tendons become one more thing that must be repaired without the proper resources to do so. In short, materiality (carnality)—flesh and machine—emerges out of as much as it is the late liberal and neoliberal regime (corporeality) that addresses us all but all of us differently.

No one is going to kill us or lock us up for trying to succeed, though many of this group will be locked up for using illegal resources; they are just going to let us exhaust ourselves. They are making a wager that few people will be able to be like Stan or the group on our boat, so few that the otherwise we represent will never be able to sustain itself, let alone extend, thicken, and become dominant. Late liberalism knits together internationally a careful weave of sovereign killing (capital punishment and assassinations), criminalization of life staples such as certain food, drugs, and forms of protective gear, and self-righteous neglect. All three tactics, insofar as they presume universal access to legal forms of self-subsistence, are legal forms of bad faith.

In other words, those of us on the boat trying to cross Anson Bay are not being killed by the state in any way that would be recognizable as state killing. As Foucault observed, the state only rarely exercises its right to kill. Instead it directs life, letting those who wish to swim against the tide to do so until they cross a line or exhaust themselves. And, as Serres noted, the struggle for recognition rarely commences before the outcome is certain: “There is no war. Or there is only war when the result is certain. There is murder but not war. There is no equality. There is no face-to-face.”\textsuperscript{25} Most opposition to alternative social projects happens in a different way. An authorless wager is made that very few people will be able to continue to preserve in the face of prevailing material obstacles. They will not be able to sustain their perseverance. So the wager is made
to wait until an alternative social project exhausts itself, produces marketable values, or becomes a serious threat to late liberalism.

Let’s say a coast guard catches us without life jackets on an unsound boat—we might be fined. This fine wouldn’t be calibrated according to our incomes. Something like this happened. In July 2009, this same group of friends and I were in Darwin looking for material to fix a car when a fisheries and water official came to the door of one of the houses we keep in Darwin. The official wanted to discuss a fine he was, perhaps, obligated to give one of my friends, the named owner of the boat we use. A few months before, the boat had stalled again, this time drifting off to sea. After some time, realizing that the seas would not run in their favor this time, they set off a boat alarm that signals an emergency. They were rescued. But no one told them that, because the boat was not equipped with the necessary safety equipment and was overloaded with people, they would be heavily fined. My friends were lucky that day. The official used his discretion to lower the fine significantly. Even so, if my friends were forced to pay the fine they would have to decide whether to skimp on fuel for the boat, food for the month, or shoes for their children; to take a job that might pay better but would never give them the temporal and material resources to make this trip across the bay. Because it appears to be their choice, no one seems to be killing their will to be otherwise.

But static is neither abstractly positive nor negative. Serres notes, “Noise is a joker necessary to the system. It can take on any value, and is thus unpredictable so that the system is never stable.”26 Take, for instance, another boat ride for the same project in 2008. At a place called Bamayak, four of us got off the boat to look inland for a water hole. The rest motored off to go fishing. When, near sunset, we returned to the beach where we’d gotten off, our boat was nowhere in sight. There we were, stuck in a region without human population or infrastructure. We had found swamp water deep in the hinterland, and there were shellfish in the mangrove swamps, so we weren’t going to starve or die from thirst anytime soon. But no one wanted to spend the night warding off the plague of mosquitoes sure to come at sunset. After a while, we spotted a small dinghy on the horizon coming slowly toward us. On board were three white people. We recognized them as part of an exclusive, expensive tourist fishing outfit that
operates just off Indigenous lands. When we asked if they could spare a bottle or two of water they told us they didn’t have much. It was clear that we were stranded in the middle of nowhere. And we could see their huge “mother ship” anchored offshore, no doubt keeping the beer chilled for their return.

Oh well, all’s well that ends well. Just before the dusk raised the whir of mosquitoes, we saw our boat on the horizon, heading toward our shore. They also had been stranded. The motor had refused to start. Why it stopped working and why it started working again soon became the topic of a heated conversation. We traded possibilities, which soon sorted themselves into three: engine failure, say, a faulty spark plug or salt-corroded wiring; punishment from maroi, “old people” who lived in the landscape, who were punishing us for never visiting them; the Christian God, who looks after everyone if they believe in his son Jesus Christ. We mulled these possibilities over. People took various positions and various combinations of positions in the argument on the boat. But it wasn’t clear whether we could hold these three possibilities simultaneously, nor what the goods and futures offered by each would do in the worlds we variously inhabited. It was 2008, after all. Every day we heard on the television and radio, and read in the paper, about “a national emergency in relation to the abuse of children in Indigenous communities in the Northern Territory.” The state’s obligation to self-determination was being thrown out the window. Did being in a world of maroi do anything, explain anything, lock anything together in such a way that it made other statements and practices practical or impractical, self-evidently true or absurd, coherent or incoherent, sane or mad? But in this incoherence and madness, we are obliged to feel this problem, we find ourselves responsible for it, even if in the negative formation.

It may be exactly this experience of obligation and responsibility that makes our adventure an ethical act, and the geontological an ethical substance in Foucault’s sense. But we are not trying to become something different. We are instead trying to extend something over space and time that has no viable language outside this iteration of its persistence. We are trying to be within a social imaginary in which the substance of human life is cosubstantial with geological/geographic life. We believe, to various degrees of conviction, that the essence of their ancestors, whose route
we are following, is at places like Bamayak and Banagula. And we believe, with more or less conviction, we are in fact “inside” these ancestors as we trace their movements across the sea. We cannot repeat their movements. To trace is not to repeat. But we nevertheless recycle the experience of the flesh into our resolution to continue to move. We say to each other we will never forget. We repeat, as if it were a trauma, how cold we were, how broken our backs and brains were, how certain we were that the boat would tip, how our experience must have been like the experience of their ancestors. We transform the noise of the boat into a difference between white people (or other white people) and us, and it becomes the embodied source of the seriousness of our exercise of belief. But we are not trying to become otherwise, we are trying to be the same, and this is enough for us. Until, that is, we have exhausted our resources and the resources of others—an event never that far off our horizon.

While the dynamic between corporeality and carnality is a general condition of human social life—along with the peregrinations of endurance, resistance, and will this dynamic produces—what aspect of this dynamic is put to work depends on the alternative social project. To demonstrate this, let me turn to another alternative social project focused on engines, energy, and endurance.

**Project X**

If you look up the name “Project X” on the internet, you will find that it refers to a movie, a place, a building, and an idea about the radical ecological movement. The movie *Project X*, starring the young Matthew Broderick, critiques animal experimentation through a sentimental story about an air force pilot and a chimpanzee who has been taught sign language. Project X is also a social project located in a small intentional radical faerie community in central Tennessee. In 2006, one member of Project X, Sandor Katz, published *The Revolution Will Not Be Microwaved*, a book on the radical food movement. Some of the movements he discusses in the book include feral foraging, dumpster diving, food gleaning, and road kill collection. Like many books written for the progressive Left, *The Revolution Will Not Be Microwaved* is written in a mixed genre: a “to do” and “how to do” book. Like *The Monkey Wrench Gang*, Edward Abbey’s lightly fictional
account of environmental sabotage in the Southwest, it urges people to change their lives and tells them how to do so. Among its many helpful suggestions, *Microwave* provides readers ways of distinguishing between edible and inedible road kill. Rigor mortis, for instance, is not an indication of inedibility.

In the early 2000s, Katz began a recycling project. His idea was to convert locally obtained used deep-fry oil into motor fuel for his community. The waste products of capitalism would become the energy of an alternative community. The idea was to turn a commodity into an anticommodity and thus, in the long run, turn an exhausted object of capital into a viral form that reworks the logics and socialities of the “mainstream” from which it had come. From his home on the mountain, Katz carefully experimented with the various waste oils used in surrounding commercial outlets—dumpster diving local donut shops, Chinese restaurants, and hamburger joints. Everything he hauled back to the community had been heading to local landfills or illegal dumps. When he had refined the conversion process, he approached various local restaurant owners and explained the project to them. He asked if he could bring by special containers into which they could pour their used oil. Some owners refused because they thought his project was weird—or that he was, or his community was. Others refused because they said it added an extra burden to their job. Katz explained that it actually simplified their waste disposal practices. Others said yes. But over time, chatter arose about charging for the oil. If Katz wanted the waste oil, what seemed like the waste product of commodity production must be a commodity. It could be objectified, quantified, and priced in a market. Katz didn’t give up. Diverted and frustrated, he nevertheless continues, if not on this specific radical food project, then on another. His endurance is notable, and noted in many online and local articles about him in the green press.

*Project X* is the product of the long and contested legacy of the radical ecological movement with intellectual and strategic tentacles in anarchist, Marxist, labor, and radical democracy movements. Organic intellectuals provide local and online communities with trenchant critiques of capital markets, humanist discourse, and liberal social relations. Katz is part of this loose network and thus sees the material he seeks—used cooking oil—as an effect of a specific set of social relations and their
existence within a specific social imaginary. Waste oil is only “waste” and “oil”—it has the qualities and modalities of waste and oil—from within the social machinery of capital. Oil, and specific oils, is the corporeal effect of a specific construction of materiality, a manufacturing process, and its technical and social relations of production. Waste is a term—and a set of attitudes—used to refer to the errant, unintegrated remainder of this construction process.

But if Marx understood nature to be the historical residue of human activity, Katz’s deep-ecological point of view roots material unfolding in a posthuman perspective. In an online interview Katz foregrounds the interpenetration of beings: “In every breath that you ever take without going to the grocery store, there are untold numbers of different microorganisms, including not only bacteria, but fungi, and who knows what else.”28 These breaths and these substances are produced and dwell in industrial forms of agrocapital but are not reducible to these forms.

Insofar as they are not, they are capable of creating new forms and aggregations of life and exemplify the distinction between the orders of carnality and corporeality. Oil is burned or cannot be burned under certain technological conditions, but in being burned it produces something else. It produces a material remainder within the organization of neoliberalism and late liberalism that then provides the material conditions in which new social projects can be built. This material dynamic between corporeality and carnality sweeps into itself an assemblage of interlocking concepts, materials, and forces that include human and nonhuman agencies and organisms. The flesh that Katz is working with is not humanist flesh. Nor is there any easy separation between flesh and nonflesh. For Katz and supporters of the deep ecology movement, the separation of the flesh from nonflesh, human flesh from bacteria and fungus, entails not only the act of separation but also a claim about sovereignty—what carnal forms, and in what configurations, have the right to exist, survive, be killed? What can be exhausted because this exhaustion is necessary for the endurance of something else? Deep ecology, posthumanism, and biopolitics would seem to converge around a central problem even as the issue of exhaustion raises, like a worm curled in the heart, the problem of endurance, of what endures and what can explain the fact of endurance.

Thus only in the most severely restricted and artificial sense does capi-
tal saturate the material conditions of the world. It may produce and commodify a kind of industrial substance (oil) in order to be a commodity (have exchange value) that can produce another kind of commodity (a deep-fried food with certain qualities); and make a commodity chain that divides the world into commodities and wasteful excess. Capital makes oil and waste simultaneously. But, for Katz, it also makes a different kind of excess, a difference beyond capital, outside the containment or definition of capital. This excess has at least two dimensions. It has the dimension of substance: forms of being that emerge from new biotic habitats. And it has the dimension of relationality: forms of relationality that can emerge from the striated possibilities of these new substances and habitats. Katz seeks to intervene in this process by recycling capital waste production into an anticapitalist social movement and a set of new social relations that will underpin them.

But even as Katz and others engage in a practice of life whose ethical substance is biospheric, their project is liable to absorption by capital whose economic horizon is global. Not long after Katz began his biofuel project, biofuels emerged as a significant sector of the consumer market and commodity speculation. Biofuel was, of course, just one sector within a more generally frenzied market in commodity speculation. Each nation made use of different kinds of materials—in Australia it was ores and minerals; in the United States, biofuel; in Africa, precious metals and stones; and in OPEC nations, oil. At the height of the commodity boom, the Australian dollar came close to parity with the U.S. dollar, further suppressing the financial underpinning of the mobile phone project I discussed in the last section. As U.S. corporate agriculture shifted from the food to biofuel market, the price of basic food products such as rice, flour, and corn rose significantly. This led in turn to a new or intensified exhaustion of people in places such as Egypt, Central Africa, and Indonesia, where government-subsidized staples and rocketing prices created a crisis of government. In a draft report, “A Note on Rising Fuel Prices,” not intended for circulation but widely available on the Internet, Donald Mitchell notes that the “World Bank’s index of food prices increased 140 percent from January 2002 to February 2008.” He attributes this precipitous increase to a number of factors but singles out the “large increase in biofuels production in the US and EU.” Practices cultivated by people
like Katz in one zone of social abandonment were absorbed into regulated and unregulated liberal and neoliberal capital that in turn led to the creation or intensification of new zones of social abandonment. What we witness in all these alternative social projects seeking to develop a new ethical substance, such as Katz is trying to do—or to sustain one such as we were doing in our boat—is an entwinement of endurance and exhaustion. We can think of the exhaustion of both flesh and material from two perspectives: the exhaustions produced by and then reabsorbed into the system, such as waste oil, and the exhaustions produced when trying to create alternative ethical substances. In encouraging these new substances and relations, which actually dwell in the world even though they have no proper dwelling there, Katz and others produce themselves as a form of excess—things that can be exhausted, killed, placed in suspended animation, or redeployed in a market. As Katz notes, many of the practices he describes violate statutory laws and social norms, to say nothing of placing the practitioner under the general cloud of opprobrium that settles over a radical environmental activist.

In the United States, a series of federal acts has labeled radical environmentalists as the number one domestic terrorist threat. The most notorious of these federal acts are the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act of 2006, which amended and renamed the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, and the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007. The amendments codified in the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act are significant in two ways: first, they define violence from the perspective of the offended party; second, the promotion, circulation, or support of violent acts include reporting on them in online forums. Another thing that was new was the focus that the Federal Bureau of Investigations placed on enforcing the most extreme readings of the law. Managers of these online forums could be, and were, prosecuted. The first examples of this new zeal were the so-called SHAC-7 (the corporation, Stop Huntington Animal Cruelty, and six activists associated with it) and the Sacramento prosecutions of Earth Liberation Front members and the emergence of a cross-agency strategy called Operation Backfire targeting radical ecological movements. The SHAC-7 were not prosecuted for engaging in violent acts but for taking a political position in relation to them in an online forum. The federal prosecution presented
numerous witnesses who testified to having been incited to commit violent acts after reading the forum and to having experienced the forum and other street activisms as violent threats.

As proposed in 2007, the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act, amended to the Homeland Security Act, would receive an estimated budget of $22 million over four years. In it, “violent radicalization” would be defined as an extremist belief system for facilitating ideologically based violence to advance political, religious, or social change, while homegrown terrorism would be defined as the use, planned use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual born, raised, or based and operating primarily within the United States or any possession of the United States to intimidate or coerce the United States government, the civilian population of the United States, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. “Ideologically based violence” would be defined as the use, planned use, or threatened use of force or violence by a group or individual to promote the group or individual’s political, religious, or social beliefs. The act would establish a National Commission on the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism to examine and report on facts and causes of violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence in the United States. The commission would have a restricted lifespan; it would be terminated thirty days after its final report. But, following the termination of the commission, the secretary of homeland security would establish or designate a university-based Center of Excellence for the Study of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism in the United States to assist federal, state, local, and tribal homeland security officials, through training, education, and research, in preventing violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism in the United States. It would require the secretary to conduct a survey of methodologies implemented by foreign nations to prevent violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism; and to report to Congress on lessons learned from survey results. The bill also would support efforts by the Department of Homeland Security to prevent ideologically based violence and homegrown terrorism that violates the constitutional and civil rights or civil liberties of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. The bill passed the U.S. House on an overwhelming vote of 404–6 but then stalled in the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
All of these major and minor legislative changes also triggered innovations in the prison system. Green activists were placed in newly created “Communication Management Units” along with other so-called terrorists. Communication Management Units, colloquially known as CMUs, were created in 2008, outside the congressional review process, in order to “house inmates who, due to their current offense of conviction, offence conduct, or other verified information, require increased monitoring of communication between inmates and persons in the community in order to protect the safety, security, and orderly operation” of Federal Bureau of Prisons “facilities and protect the public.” The rationale for moving members of the radical ecological movement into CMUs is the same rationale for prosecuting them—that their communicative function within the movement provides the movement with its ability to act covertly and anonymously.\(^3\) To date, there are two known CMUs, one located in Terre Haute, Indiana, and the other in Marion, Indiana. These new prison spaces and new prison populations provide employment opportunities for local populations, a point not lost on the governor of Michigan, who offered to use his prison system to house Guantanamo Bay detainees.\(^3\)

In short, working excess, Katz and others risk becoming excess. And this excess simultaneously provides the conditions of new postcapitalist forms of sociality and new, commodifiable, forms of repressive violence. Katz is well aware of this risk even though his activities are not allied with the violent-action wing of the green movement. The threat of exhaustion haunts his surrounds. In his vicinity are others who felt the force of federal prosecution, in their case for tree spiking, and have shifted the mode of their politics to antiviolent, local fostering of alternative communities.\(^3\) Some still believe that only violence will force a change—by moving the center further to the radical Left. But they are no longer fit enough, or can no longer imagine the internal resources for living on the run.

The issue of exhaustion—of getting “burned out”—is thus, not surprisingly, a substantial matter in the radical ecological movement. In writings and interviews Katz and his interlocutors continually contrast the vigor of his body and spirit with the status of his body as HIV positive. What can account for his endurance in the context of internal and external predators? Or his nonexhaustion in the face of the zones of state abandonment in which he lives and attempts to convert the excesses of capital
into the enduring fuel of a counterlife? We can think here of the exhaustion of flesh and material. In celebrating Katz’s amazing endurance, and finding ourselves less interested in those who lack it, we see the point I made above. Critical theory and progressive activism invest in the endurance of life in spaces of state and social abandonment because they consider these spaces capable of providing a potential for cultivating a new ethics of life and sociality.

But if ethics is a realm in which we not merely reflect on but act at the intersection of right conduct and the good life, then critical theory’s ethical relation to life within these extreme zones of potentiality is fraught, to say the least. The life worth living is not necessarily found within these zones of maximal potential because the zones create such reduced conditions of life that the political desire for them to spawn or foster alternative worlds can seem naive at best and sadistic at worst. But once we view potentiality as socially constituted and materially distributed, then we find ourselves in the morally viscous realm of excess, exhaustion, and endurance, a realm that includes affective, physical, and social conditions that can depress the brain and immune system, rupture organs as well as bonds with families and friends, and orient violence inward. If we must persist in potentiality, we must endure it as a space, a materiality, and a temporality. As we all know, materiality-as-potentiality is never itself outside given organizations of power. Stan and those of us in the boat, for instance, strive to persevere within a neoliberal form of biopower. Thus the potentiality for living otherwise emerges from the differential capture and distribution of embodied and unintegrated life in neoliberalism and from the striated zones of indistinction and abandonment they create. When looked at in this way, the ethics of substance has a quite complex topological relation to the biopolitical management of life.

As much as Stan, Katz, Linda—my colleague on the mobile phone project—and her family share certain exhausting conditions of neoliberalism and late liberalism, to understand the different modalities of this sharing, we must remember that the biopolitical is a spacing rather than a space. As we move from the intentional communities of central Tennessee to Indigenous northern Australia, we see some of the contours of this biopolitical spacing. Unlike Katz, my Indigenous colleagues are not trying to overthrow capital but to live otherwise within its seams. They do not
“choose” to drop out. They were born at the far end of liberal capitalism’s exhaust system. As a result they engage as a matter of course in the exact activities that Katz promotes—feral foraging, dumpster diving, gleaning, and road kill collecting. And, as a result, their practices of “recycling” can be formally described as stealing or unlicensed food production and consumption from the perspective of law. They move around within the gray economy of substance—unregistered and unregisterable cars and boats, unlicensed guns—that can lead to the bright lights of legal detention that further mark their bodies in such a way that they are driven deeper into social zones of abandonment and excess. Moreover in the Australian case the biopolitical is marked by the division of the autological subject and genealogical society.38 The embrace of the “customary” by the politics of recognition was demonized by the politics of the neoliberalism as if the customary were a quality of the Indigenous rather than the internal limit of Western capital, colonialism, and democracy.39

Enduring Immanent Critical Theory

And so where are we left? If it is true that to be in these spaces of abandonment, exhaustion, and excess radically reduces being and true also that it is being in these spaces that provides the possibility of being otherwise, then what should an ethically informed politics be? Should a political movement work to make these spaces less lethal and enervating? But what if it is exactly this enervating lethality that is the condition of this particular kind of world-making activity? And what about the fact that, no more than Stan, my colleagues may not want to be potentiality, or mere potentiality, or potentiality like this? They want to strive to persist in the being they find proper to the world, but in another mode. To return to some transcendental fixed point, or a set of normative, even if revisable, horizons is, in the light of these lived worlds, a means of avoiding the nature of the given world exactly at the moment when the given world is what needs to be “theorized.” It is true that norms provide a feeling of safety insofar as they provide an experience of possible judgment and assessment and, retroactively, a place of certainty. But these norms hardly make these spaces disappear for those who inhabit them.

Critical theorists can cut into the accumulation—abandonment—
regulated—unregulated chain (A—A . . . R—U) at various points. In this case Habermas, for instance, focuses on the rejuvenating moment when unregulated publics are absorbed into the stultified being of regulated publics, rather than on the conditions of existence in so-called unregulated publics. Other critics likewise move quickly past the stakes of the well-known fact that the “physical, the symbolic and the material social conditions” that shape embodied materiality also deform it toward the transitions and thresholds of becoming that these deformations provide. To what are we committing ourselves if we commit to a freedom that is the undefined and undefinable trajectory of a radical otherwise in our world’s scenes of abandonment? This otherwise may lie in shattering the life-world in which a person finds herself situated, but it also might mean maintaining a life-world under constant threat of being saturated by the rhythms and meanings of another. The conditions of excess always sit side by side with conditions of exhaustion and endurance that put into question the neat capture of substance by capital and other biopolitical projects and complicates the simple ethical investment in the thresholds and transitions of becoming within biopolitics. In these situations, to be the same, to be durative, may be as emancipatory as to be transitive. To live the present as if it were this future demands that a social world learn how to maneuver illegally. Those who do must hide out within this environment, appearing to be in a time they are not even as they must go on heightened alert because the time they are in is a time no one wants to recognize.

Where one intervenes in this chain is a matter of obligation and implication rather than detached impartial adjudication. And so critical theorists take responsibility for the variety of positive political positions they take to these spaces, including severe systematic oppression and ordinary callous disregard. What we read in them, whether we pause the play button as Stan and Bracey stand before the broken engine or pause it on the day that my friends and I survive another trip to Anson Bay, is a rhetorical choice with ethical substance. Will we stand so narrowly on the side of potentiality that the engine stays on the truck, the road kill never rots, and the head doesn’t concuss as our boat slams into the next wave.
Chapter Four

Events of Abandonment

Chapter 3 began with a scene from Charles Burnett’s 1977 film *Killer of Sheep*. The scene slowly follows the film’s protagonist, Stan, and his friend as they lug a used car engine down a winding set of stairs and heave the engine onto the back of a borrowed truck, only to have it fall off and crack as they begin to drive away. In chapter 3, the interest was the dilemma of ethical substance when read from the perspective of the materiality of becoming otherwise—of embodied potentiality and endurance for the part that has no part.
in late liberalism. But one could easily turn the scene in a slightly different direction so that it highlights a different aspect of the problem of embodied potentiality and endurance in late liberalism. From this angle we would remain standing in the domain of ethical substance, but we would be looking at how the nature of social events contributed to the ways that life and death, endurance and exhaustion, and hope and harm are distributed in late liberalism—and how this distribution is made ethically and politically sensible and compelling. After all, from one vantage point the loss of the engine is not a big deal. It cost the protagonists fifteen dollars in 1977, which, taking inflation into account, would be about fifty-five dollars today. Indeed, *Killer of Sheep* seems especially interested in exploring the modes of exhaustion and endurance that are ordinary, chronic, and cruddy rather than catastrophic, crisis-laden, and sublime. There are many scenes that tease at viewer anxiety organized around the dramatic and spectacular: a group of neighborhood kids try to move an empty freight train carriage along the tracks as one of them lies in front of its wheels, his head hanging across the rail; a small girl is left alone in an old truck on an inclined street after we’ve seen that the brakes of the truck are not that reliable. But these scenes never culminate in the kind of violent event that a generic modern viewer might anticipate. Indeed, the film is remarkably devoid of blood or violence except for that which occurs in the slaughterhouse. No one is killed if we exempt the sheep, not something we should casually do. Nevertheless, no humans are tortured. No police grace the film, though their specter is constantly invoked.

The absence of explosive and intensified violence is notable, given the setting of the film. Burnett was filming in Watts twelve years after the 1965 uprising. But the absence of cinematic violence allows Burnett to conjure another form of violence: the violence of enervation, the weakening of the will rather than the killing of life. Stan’s wife remarks on his bottomless exhaustion, and viewers see him in a constant state of somnolence. Something and yet nothing has happened to cause Stan to be so exhausted—it is hard to point to anything as the event in relation to which his exhaustion is the effect. Instead his hope and despair are conjured through the endurance of the exhaustion of numerous small quasi-events. Little things pile up. But these “little things” don’t recursively enclose or intensify in such a way that a *thisness* is easily formed. It is hard
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to pull a *thisness* out of the ongoing flow of the everyday because so much decomposition happens below the threshold of awareness and theorization. The event is a pile of clothes in the washroom, a roll of linoleum in the kitchen. Sometimes these quasi-events are the result of a purposeful aggregation of energy, of a *project*, such as Stan’s attempt to buy the engine or put down a new kitchen floor. But whether aggregated into a project or remaining in the diffused background of everyday life, these quasi-events rarely appear to be catastrophic in the ordinary sense of the word. They are not, for instance, the kind of event that riveted the United States in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The engine is not the ceiling of the New Orleans Superdome. It is not a modernist wonder—the largest fixed-dome stadium in the world—whose fragility in the face of a natural event transformed a catastrophe into a sublime event and intensified an ethical demand that even a president couldn’t simply fly over.

The imperceptible relationship between quasi-events and ordinary life poses a set of problems to the usual way we think about ethical and political demand. After all, life is, or might seem to many people within late liberalism to be, what happens around, between, or in spite of the periodic rupture of the ordinary. But the ordinary does not exist. The ordinary is a statistical projection of a variety of socially distributed ordinaries—what the texture of the ordinary is for some is not for others. As a consequence any discussion of the relationship among ordinary exhaustion, quasi-events, and endurance in the late liberal governance of difference must be situated within the various ways that eventfulness is distributed in late liberalism, such that people experience the kinds of events that make up their lives not only as ordinary but generalizable. We can think of the ordinary as the local spacing of eventfulness. This complex spacing makes it difficult to answer such questions as “Who, if anyone, is killing Stan?” and “What are the conditions that make the claim that Stan is being killed so nonsensical and impractical?” Broad claims made in the wake of Agamben’s work on the camp become unhelpful.¹ That Watts is a concentration camp and that Stan has been reduced to bare life, or that we are all in a camp and all of our lives have been stripped bare, do not help us understand how various forms of eventfulness distribute the texture of enervation and endurance in late liberalism.

With Stan in the background I want to focus this chapter on modes
of lethal events and thresholds of ethical and political claims. As should become clear, this chapter engages Judith Butler’s work on vulnerability even as it makes an intentional turn into the sociality of materiality and more specifically into the social topology of quasi-events and spectacular events, small breakages and catastrophic ruptures. I do so to suggest how the complexity of these spacings makes sensible the relationship between kinds of events and an ethics of harm in late liberalism. Much of the best thinking in the critical theory of life and death has focused our attention on large-scale killings. In *Society Must Be Defended*, for example, Michel Foucault outlined the complex entanglements of sovereign, disciplinary, and biopolitical forms of power at play in the machinery of Nazi genocide. Achille Mbembe situated this industrialized European savagery in a history of African colonization, where colonists experimented with spectacles of irrational, excessive killing. And yet, what we are now witnessing in late liberalism conforms to neither of these histories and formations of killing. In most places, late liberal power does not exercise itself through the spectacular display of drawn and quartered bodies, nor through the biological racism of German National Socialism. Neoliberalism works by colonizing the field of value—reducing all social values to one market value—exhausting alternative social projects by denying them sustenance. When the state does kill it often does so through secret detention centers outside the reach of habeas corpus.

In short, if chapter 3 examined ethical substance from the point of view of the endurance and exhaustion of the material assemblage of alternative social projects, this chapter examines how late liberal modes of making die, letting die, and making live are organized within and through a specific imaginary of the event and eventfulness. Who and what are made accountable for various kinds of events? What kinds of affects, such as grief, are appropriate to various kinds of harmful events? What forms of condemnation or approbation are appropriate to the people held responsible for them? How do these various modalities of the event rivet scholarly or political attention, or rivet their attention only if transformed through statistical practices into a catastrophic event? How is eventfulness utilized—put to work—by market and state actors to make sensible the social distribution of life and death?
Late liberal societies hardly lack the neighborhoods and dingy broom closets that so interested Burnett and Le Guin. No less than the citizens of Omelas, members of these societies are fully aware of the existence of these spaces in their polis and make decisions about the relation between the suffering that occurs in them and their own well-being. And these neighborhoods, flavelas, residential towers, and rural ghettos are witness to the full range of quasi-events that interested Burnett and Le Guin. These run down, often fetid spaces are periodically the occasion for public hand-wringing, outrage, and scandal. In Australia, for instance, Indigenous rural and urban communities are open broom closets of poverty, disease, and despair. But if you walked through them you would not necessarily see the decomposition that composes them. Take for instance Indigenous housing in the far north of Australia.

To be sure, Indigenous housing in rural ghettos and town camps can rapidly unsettle an unsuspecting visitor. A year before the sea voyage I described in the last chapter, a schoolteacher visited a sixty-six-year-old woman who was dying of oral cancer in an Indigenous community—the birthplace of those on the voyage. Inside the cinder block house where the dying woman lived were a series of rooms, unfurnished except for old stained mattresses on the floor, where dogs with scabies sometimes slept, a single steel-framed bed in the front room (what most Australians would call the den), and a wobbly table on which stood a broken television set. In the kitchen were carcasses of various animals and fish, opened jams, loaves of bread, sugar, tea, bowls and pans with days-old remainders of cooked food, and running through them all various sizes of cockroaches. The inside toilet had been backed up for weeks. There was no hot water. When we bathed this dying woman we boiled water on the stove in old flour drums. Sewn through all of this were the syringes, empty pill bottles, new and used bandages used to care for this woman, and beer cans, wine coolers, and other addictive substances her relatives were using as they stayed there. Many people on the porch were drunk, stoned, or hung over. Not far distant, a fight had broken out between the two sides of the community, part of the longstanding “war” that would eventually drive my friends off the community. Following the discussion from the last chapter,
we might say that the house was in an extreme condition of noise. When
the schoolteacher entered the house she too entered a heightened condi-
tion of static. She found herself unable to cross the doorframe, and then
found herself blushing, hot, with what she later described as “embarrass-
ment.” The scene she witnessed, the broken nature of the dying woman’s
home, the ruined infrastructure, the infestations of insects and vermin,
the garbage and medical waste strewn about paralyzed her. Who she was
before she crossed the doorframe was different from who she was after-
wards. What or who was to blame?

For this schoolteacher the doorway was a threshold that marked out
an event, experienced as a rupture in her ordinary life and its taken-for-
granted conditions and rhythms. The immediate and long-term ethical
and political implications of this rupture are difficult to know. From con-
versations that I had with her, I got a sense that she suddenly experi-
enced herself as a deeply habituated being rather than simply herself and
as someone who had taken certain basic material conditions of life for
granted. But for how long and to what end this experience lasted I do
not know. Perhaps she changed the party she voted for in subsequent
elections. Perhaps she looked at people differently on the street. Perhaps
she blamed non-Indigenous people. Perhaps she blamed “Indigenous
people.” Perhaps she blamed “the state.” Perhaps she blamed “traditional
Indigenous culture.” All of these possibilities were available to her. Con-
servative critics were at that very moment blaming Indigenous people
for refusing to care for the all-but-free housing they received from the
government. Some anthropologists were arguing that Indigenous uses of
housing reflected the persistence of traditional culture in modern life. So
this narrative went, because Indigenous people are traditionally oriented
to disposable housing they treat their houses like bush camps. According
to these anthropologists the solution is to educate Indigenous families
about the nature of the modern home. Not surprisingly, some advocates
of the federal Intervention leaned on this anthropological reasoning to
support a shift in the way Indigenous housing is financed and managed.
Privatizing Indigenous housing would, they argue, inculcate an ethos of
modern material responsibility.

But the specific experience of the schoolteacher is not a general experi-
ence. Experiential events are not existents in the sense that many people
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take rocks to be existents. Experiential events emerge from the rhythms in which human and nonhuman material composition and decomposition are ordinarily encountered. While Serres may be right that in all systems noise and building coexist, in some systems, like Indigenous housing, all buildings threaten to become all noise. And this noise can become what life sounds like, more like a hum than an explosion, the sound of the ambient background. A number of scholars have tried to dishabituate this sound by amplifying it. Take for instance the work of Tess Lea and Paul Pholeros.

Pholeros, along with Paul Torzillo and Stephan Rainow, is a founding member of Healthabitat, a consortium of architects and doctors who promote a functional intersection of environment, health, and design. Lea was, at the time, the director of the School of Social and Policy Research in Charles Darwin University. Faced with the pervasive public discourse about irresponsible Indigenous people Lea and Pholeros proposed a new functionalist approach to housing. They adopted the basic principles of Healthabitat for assessing the relationship between housing and health. Is a house capable of providing the means of washing people; washing their clothes and bedding; removing waste water effectively; reducing the impact of overcrowding, improving nutrition through the ability to store, prepare, and cook food; reducing the negative effects of animals, insects, and vermin; reducing the health impact of dust; controlling the temperature of the living environment; and reducing hazards that cause injury? If not, the structure might look like a house, but it is not a house. With these basic principles in hand, Lea and Pholeros documented how Australian government demands that Indigenous housing be built within a restricted budget produce homes with toilet pipes that dead-end beneath the house, floors without supports, stoves whose copper plating will wear off within months of intensive use. If “the material house is an illusion when no system of institutionalized expectation is in place to connect the physical structure (house) and the range of functions it is assumed to be able to provide to the resident,” then the house is not a house, they argue, no matter what it appears to be from the outside.

But these pseudo-houses don’t explode. They and the things that inhabit them slowly decompose according to a rhythm that feels natural. This decomposition occurs in a system of concepts, materials, and
forces that locks together human and nonhuman agencies and organisms. For example, on July 10, 2009, I was driving in the Northern Territory of Australia along a back highway that connects the Darwin suburbs to the Palmerston suburbs, a distance of about twenty-five kilometers. In the small rented truck with me were several Indigenous friends and colleagues of mine, some of whom I have known since they were teens: Gigi Lewis, then thirty-five, her partner, Rex Edmunds, then forty-six, and three young teenage boys in their care. We were moving some household items, including a washing machine tied down in the back of the truck, from Gigi’s mother’s house in Darwin to Gigi and Rex’s new house in Palmerston, and in the process moving Gigi’s family from a state of quasi-homelessness into government housing. As we paused for a red traffic light, Gigi showed me two large staph infections growing on her leg under her skin and I show her the staph infections I had on my forehead. Rex was drinking in the backseat, relaxing after a long week of laying a water pipe in a small rural community, Bulgul, located about three hundred kilometers south of Darwin. The water pipe was part of the infrastructure of an augmented-reality project that we and another set of families had been working on for the previous two years, in collaboration with various Northern Territory government agencies and libraries and the local university.

However, between the idea of the project and the effects we hoped the project would produce and the actual project lay a material and discursive world. And although it should be common sense at this point it is still necessary to note that, while the actual world stood between all of us in that truck and the idea we had of the project, the actual world does not address all of us in the same way. We are and are not the same thing in the sense that we may be an aggregation vis-à-vis our intentions to build this augmented-reality project, but we are constantly disaggregated by the world around us. Take for instance our efforts to lay the pipeline. To accomplish this task we decided to rent a small trench-digging machine, which meant driving into Darwin to rent it, dig the ditch the same day, and then drive it back. Our other option was to dig the hundred-meter trench by hand through sun-baked, hardened soil with crowbars and pickaxes. But to rent the trench digger we needed a credit card and the ability to pay. Of the ten Indigenous adults working on the project,
and their extended family, no one had a credit card or the ability to pay, so we used mine. On the long drive down to Bulgul, on one of the many dirt roads, several attachments on the trench-digger flew off, which meant several of us had to drive back along the road to find them. When we finally got the trench-digger off the truck, Rex learned to use it by using it. Relatives in the region with access to sympathetic construction firms donated the piping. We collaboratively consulted on how to attach various parts of the piping and how to bury it as we attached the parts and buried the pipe. After finishing there was a little leakage at the tap. More than we’d like to have seen, but not so much that we were willing to dig up the entire pipeline after an exhausting day.

What is at stake here then is the materiality of our idea as it encounters different *agencements*. These arrangements shape and direct actions such as our decision to move large household appliances a day after returning from Bulgul, no matter that we were all exhausted, because my truck was still available (I was leaving in a couple days for the United States). But these arrangements also continually and slowly decompose that unity. When we reached our destination, we were chagrined to discover that the lid of the washing machine had flown off. Or, maybe, we hoped, we had never put it on the truck and so we would find it at Gigi’s mother’s house. But when we drove back to Darwin, carefully following our tracks, there it was on the side of the road, crumpled and flattened from having been repeatedly run over in rush hour traffic. The lid could not endure the conditions of my friends’ lives any more than our bodies seem able to fully cope as a constant feeding ground for bacteria. The next morning I left the apartment at the university where I stayed when in town, and drove to their house, where they were still lamenting the lid. Without it the machine would not run and wash the clothes that housed the bacteria that gave us staph sores. How would they afford a new washing machine? Why hadn’t someone tied down the washing machine more carefully and securely? “Don’t blame me,” I said, guilty because I had been among those securing the washing machine to the back of the truck. “I am blaming Rex,” Gigi said, “He was drunk.” “Not really,” said Rex, and besides, “We are getting somewhere.” One of Gigi’s daughters laughed, and asked, “Where’s that?” “We’re still alive,” Rex said. “We’re still trying,” Gigi agreed conciliatorily.
Gigi and Rex’s claim that their family was getting somewhere on the basis of little more than the fact that they are still alive and trying condenses a set of tacit references to a shared background. For nearly two years prior to moving into their new home in Palmerston, they and the other Indigenous members of the augmented-reality project had been homeless. Prior to that they had spent their lives, as had their parents and grandparents, in a small rural Indigenous community across the Darwin harbor—the community where the schoolteacher visited the woman dying of cancer. They had grown up in the shadow of the land rights movement and the celebration of Indigenous cultural difference more generally. Land rights and cultural recognition in Australia was exemplary of the logic of care in late liberalism. By making a space for traditional Indigenous culture, the state argued it was making a space for this traditional culture to care for Indigenous people. But land rights legislation, and public discourse on Indigenous culture more generally, differentiated among Indigenous people on the basis of the tradition effect—the assessment of different Indigenous people on the basis of their correspondence to a modernist anthropological understanding of the clan and its territory. In caring for Indigenous people in this way, land rights placed a division into Indigenous social worlds that then internally divided Indigenous communities.

However imperfect, this way of life started to unravel in 2007. As reported in the local Darwin newspaper, on March 15, 2007, Gigi and her family and five other families were threatened with chainsaws and pipes, watched their cars and houses being torched, and their dogs beaten to death. Four families lost rare, well-paying jobs in education, housing, and water works. Why they were driven out—what caused this explosion of violence—cannot be answered, except in the most narrow sense (so-and-so hit so-and-so and then their friends got involved), without immediately being drawn into discourses of care and harm in late liberalism and neoliberalism. For instance, the newspaper did not report that Gigi’s grandparents, and most of the senior and now deceased members of the community, had continually petitioned the government to recognize all community members as traditional owners irrespective of their clan affiliations in order to avoid creating internal divisions and the violence they feared would flow from them. Instead follow-up news stories insinuated that traditional land struggles were to blame for the riot, that the
violence was caused by ancient clan conflicts rather than by the modern creation of clans as a way of managing difference in late liberalism. Public meetings were held, attended by the leaders of Department of Family, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs in the Northern Territory Labor government, in which the displaced people were held up as examples of the failures of land rights policies to protect Indigenous people living in communities outside their traditional country. The families driven out were promised new housing, schooling, and jobs at Bulgul, a site closer to their traditional countries. Fifty people promptly moved to Bulgul and set up a tent settlement.

But then, on June 21, 2007, the then prime minister of Australia, John Howard, declared a “national emergency in relation to the abuse of children in Indigenous communities in the Northern Territory.” Indigenous people living in remote communities, or those like my friends who were promised housing in or nearer to their traditional country, were told to move closer to the cities where infrastructural and service delivery costs were lower, even if doing so would endanger their lives. The people who made the promises to the displaced persons confronted the budgetary consequences of these promises and suddenly became difficult to reach. In the year that followed, the income of two of the six families driven off went from roughly $AUD28,000 to $AUD12,000 per year after they lost their permanent jobs and were moved onto the Community Development Employment Program (CDEP, a work and training program within a social welfare framework, loosely called “work for the dole”).

We continue to push the project, no matter hostile relatives in the region, government agencies’ refusal to help erect a shed paid for by private contributions, the biggest financial collapse since the Great Depression, and the everyday obstacles of their poverty and others’ racism. But since being run out of their community their income has been slashed in half. And so the used cars they can afford break down at a faster rate than they can afford to fix them. Their secondhand boats are stranded offshore without petrol. Neighbors call the police for quality-of-life infractions. And other relatives with nowhere to spend the night sleep in makeshift tents on nearby beaches or in overcrowded flats. And still other relatives, involved in assaults and petty thefts, must be bailed out of jail. My friends quickly moved from being a big event that demanded address to being
just another nondescript moment in the chronic condition of Indigenous life in the Northern Territory.

Nevertheless, it was exactly within this play of historically specific forces that our augmented-reality project emerged, supporting immanent critique’s claim that such spaces of indeterminacy provide the conditions for new forms of life. Before the riot and the Intervention, I had been working with these same families and others on a digital archive whose initial content would come from material I had accumulated over the previous twenty-five years working with the parents and grandparents of project members. The digital archive was going to be part of the Northern Territory Library’s innovative Library Knowledge Centers. The Northern Territory Library had already established ten Library Knowledge Centers in remote communities; we were petitioning to become the eleventh. These digital archives were anchored to a “bricks-and-mortar” model of the library, meaning that they were located on a dedicated computer in a building on a community. But after March 2007, this computer, this building, and this community were suddenly not available to the project members. After November 2007, it was becoming clear that no other building would be built at Bulgul. Rather than emptying the space for alternative social projects, however, these new formations of neoliberalism and late liberalism opened up the possibility of designing something that more tightly connected the digital archive with a local epistemology in which knowledge’s end was not truth, though truth was a critical anchor of knowledge, but embodied obligation.

But will their bodies and the material that supports and eats through them endure long enough to embody this obligation? The last chapter tried to answer this question by focusing on the materiality of endurance. But another part of the answer rests on whether anyone will notice the decomposition occurring. As my reference to my friend Gigi and my exchange about staph infections at the red light suggests, bodies also occasion this kinds of quasi-events. Since 1969, one year after the federal government was given the power to legislate on behalf of Indigenous Australians, the commonwealth government listed health as one of four domains for Indigenous development. In 1976, the commonwealth government commissioned the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs to conduct a review of Aboriginal health. It
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released its report in 1979, the contents of which were so scandalous that the federal government started a $50 million five-year Aboriginal Public Health Improvement Program in response. The program, administered by the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, focused in particular on inadequate water, sewage, and power systems in rural Aboriginal communities. Unfortunately, the crisis in Indigenous health has continued to make front-page headlines, periodically prompting the organization of special inquests and parliamentary committees at the federal and state levels and the reorganization of government agencies responsible for Indigenous health, education, and welfare. Although the Australian Bureau of Statistics reports that “after adjusting for age differences between the populations, Indigenous Australians were twice as likely to report their health as fair or poor as non-Indigenous Australians,” the bureau also notes that the statistics it compiled are “likely to be underestimates of the true rates of illness in the Indigenous population because of the under-identification of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in these data collections.” This longstanding and appalling state of Indigenous health periodically prompts the question of what or who is to blame and, consequentially, what is to be done.

It is a somewhat arbitrary decision to begin the history of the lethal conditions of Indigenous worlds in 1969. Since colonization, British administrators, the Australian state, and a variety of domestic and international publics have asked and answered the questions of what and who is to blame for the fetid state of Indigenous life. Prior to the federal government’s listing of health as one of four critical domains in Indigenous affairs, not merely the poor health of the Indigenous but also their high death rates were discussed, explained, and managed in terms of a series of historically fluctuating accounts of the causes and cures of social pathology. In the early years of Australian federation, the lethal conditions of Indigenous life were justified in social Darwinian terms. “Full-blooded” Indigenous subjects would be allowed to live a somewhat traditional life as they faded into human evolutionary history, while “mixed bloods” would be slowly interbred with the white population until all traces of cultural and genetic difference disappeared. From the perspective of a future world in which Indigenous people would be museum pieces, the immediate suffering of living people will have made ethical sense.
Contemporary statistics mapping Indigenous health and welfare are dramatic, but the diseases they refer to are not. The typical illnesses that afflict Indigenous people are chronic and endemic, infectious and cumulative, not spectacular and catastrophic. They are the illnesses of the poor, typically staphylococcal and streptococcal infections, parasites such as scabies and giardia, circulatory diseases, diabetes, respiratory diseases, musculoskeletal conditions, kidney disease, eye and ear problems, and mental and behavioral disorders. It can be hard to see these illnesses in their normal physical state. Their effects on mortality are usually slow and corrosive. One thing leads to another. For instance, the chronic nature of group A streptococcal infections contributes to diseases of the circulatory system for Indigenous men and women, leading to hospitalization rates two to three times those of non-Indigenous men and women. The risk of septicemia from chronic staphylococcal infections—which are common and for the most part untreated—in rural communities is constant.

The problem is that pointing to the quasi-events that lead to these catastrophes can quickly trivialize the problem. Quasi-events are a general condition of human social life. (My shoestrings snap all the time.) They are widespread (quasi-events occur across every actual and conceivable organization of social life); they confound response (their slightness often occurs below the level of accountability); and they resist cause-effect characterization (it is hard to say when they occurred let alone what caused them). But these general characteristics of the quasi-event mask the fact that they always occur within a socially differentiated world. For instance, the force of will on which my friends rely to continue to try to create the mobile phone project meets the rhythm of these decomposing worlds. So much is jerry-rigged. So much exists in the gray zone between the legal and illegal. There are very few places in which something like ease of coping can be seen. And all of this everywhere and everything is never anything huge. It’s always a lid. A telephone call missed. A maybe this or maybe that—a neither, neither. Spinoza may have thought that an entity that does not strive to remain in being isn’t an entity, but this might not matter so much to the folks who give up and hit the bottle. The weakness of the will is coextensive with the wobbly order of the everyday.

Speaking about the way that mass media reduces eventfulness, rather than the problem of eventfulness per se, Brian Massumi discusses how an
event’s specific content is short-circuited into an endless series of “like”
events: “Retroactive analysis is replaced by a shudder and a shrug, memory quickly elided by expectation.” To trivialize Massumi’s point, our flying lid was just the latest in a series of flying objects—for instance, just a week before, a second-hand esky (cooler) lid flew off, making the esky unusable as an esky but functional as a bush bathtub. So why don’t we tie things down? Or tie them down better? Give it a little more effort? Who is to blame for not having done so? Where is the failure of our project? And when did it happen? Has it happened already?

This Is Something

If we are to keep the esky lid from sailing off into the ever-expanding air of “like events” that slowly wears away the will to sustain alternative social projects, the case to take the lid seriously, to care for and about it, must be made in the contemporary spacings of harm and eventfulness in neoliberalism and late liberalism. I would be surprised if most Australian citizens would confuse their mode of happiness with the mode of happiness of the fictional citizens of Omelas. Although they share some of the same characteristics, the broom closets perforating Australia do not work the same magic on Australians as they do on the citizens of Omelas. Things are not that good. The middle class is periodically squeezed between rich and poor. There are mortgages to worry about. There are new individual labor contracts to negotiate. In Le Guin’s imaginary society, nothing but a robust happiness acts as a comparative backdrop to the everyday abuse of the small child. Not so in Oz. True, like the fetid space of the broom closet in Omelas, Indigenous communities are often cruddy, corrosive, and uneventful. An agentless slow death characterizes their mode of lethality. Quiet deaths. Slow deaths. Rotting worlds. The everyday drifts toward death: one more drink, one more sore; a bad cold, bad food; a small pain in the chest. Any claim that these forms of decay matter can be referred back to the general condition of human life—everyone is slowly dying! But unlike Omelas, these kinds of deaths only periodically fix the gaze of national and international publics. When they do, they don’t do so in a way that unambiguously concretizes their ultimate, or immediate, cause, agent, and effect. Who is killing these people? What is killing them?
Answers must yield to the complexity of an entire system. One can see why a subject within late liberal society dreams of something decisive, clear, sublime.

Late liberal subjects do not have to be awoken from sleep to see death-scape with much clearer borders, agencies, and intensities. In contrast to cruddy, cumulative, and chronic lethality are special forms of enemy and spectacular forms of death that capture and rivet the imagination of late liberal societies and act as an alibi for the concentration and consolidation of state executive power. Certain kinds of enemies, events, and history are seen as having a spectacular, even sublime, quality: they cut time in two; they present decisive ideological struggles; and they demand that exceptional measures be taken. Those within late liberal societies seeking to increase state surveillance powers cite these decisive kinds of enemy and devastating images of airplanes, nightclubs, and towers exploding and vomiting forth singed and dismembered bodies. The lethal state of Indigenous life hardly competes with the society of the terrorist spectacle: bodies in hoods, in naked piles, attached to real or fake electrodes. Bodies disappear only to reappear with drill marks. These forms of violence seem to oppose and stand outside of the everyday uneventful forms of misery and dying that characterize Indigenous life. These new terrorist forms of death are spectacular in outward form. In appearing to be spectacular, they seem to create the ontological necessity to respond ethically—a demand that we take sides. And citizens and their governments do.

Take for instance, the Australian government’s response to the Bali nightclubs bombings. Those spectacular killings were continually cited alongside an omnipresent, invisible domestic and international terrorist threat when the conservative government of John Howard sought to modify the Crimes Act of 1914. Passed in 2005, amendments to the Crimes Act gives the Australian Security Intelligence Organization the power to detain any person for up to seven days without charge if he or she is suspected on “reasonable grounds” of being involved in any terrorist activity. During this time, detainees are prohibited from exercising their right to have a lawyer present; to silence; and to protect themselves against self-incrimination. While Australia does not have a declaration of rights that enshrines freedom of speech in general, the High Court of Australia found a specific implied right of freedom of political speech in Australian
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Capital Television v. Commonwealth (1992). It is exactly this more circumscribed right that the amendments to the Crimes Act restricted. What has especially worried free speech advocates is the definition of terrorist activity under the “advocacy” clause. There, a terrorist is defined as anyone who “advocates the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur),” including praising “the doing of a terrorist act in circumstances where there is a risk that such praise might have the effect of leading a person” to commit “a terrorist act.”

These carceral forms of state power, premised on actual and potential spectacularly catastrophic mass deaths, incited mass protests and engaged public and private consciences. In November 2005, in major cities throughout Australia, thousands of people marched against the new crime amendments. The news media highlighted, and in some instances violated, the far-reaching scope of the new terrorist laws. Beyond the specific crime amendments, these protests were aimed at what many left or progressive people saw as an uncritical alliance forged by the Howard government with the Bush administration that compromised fundamental Australian principles of social and personal justice. For example, while Australia has a long history of strongly opposing the death penalty domestically and internationally, since the Bali bombings of October 2002 there has been a significant silence about the death penalty for “terrorists.” And while no troops are stationed in Indigenous communities to shoot at armed and unarmed people resisting the lethal state of Indigenous life, police have faced a number of Indigenous riots in places such as Red Hook, Palm Island, and, most recently, Aurukun, after alleged police abuse and murder. The Howard government has stationed Australian troops in foreign nation-states, ostensibly as part of humanitarian efforts. For instance, troops entered East Timor to “stop the carnage” that erupted as Indonesia withdrew from the region. However, critics argued that the government, after decades of refusing to intervene against Indonesian atrocities in the region, was merely attempting to gain strategic control over the Sunrise Oil Field. Likewise, critics saw the Australian intervention in the Solomon Islands as compromised by the government’s refusal to publicly renounce a first-strike policy in the Asian Pacific and its continual references to the Islamic fundamentalist infiltration of the Pacific via Southeast Asia.
There is serious debate about why Howard, whose government pre-dated by four years the U.S. Supreme Court appointment of George W. Bush to the presidency in 2000, made such a firm commitment to the international unilateralism of the U.S. neoconservative movement. Some have argued that Howard is a “true believer” whose political thinking ultimately derives from Milton Friedman’s school of laissez-faire capitalism, developed at the University of Chicago while Leo Strauss taught there. As a result, so this story goes, Howard’s foreign policy could be easily adapted to the Straussian neoconservativism of the current Bush administration with its deep, resonant ties to Carl Schmitt’s theories of political theology. Others have insisted that Howard is an extraordinarily skilled modern prince, astutely morphing his party’s message to fit shifting public anxieties about the location of economic, social, and political threats and never letting belief get too much in the way of securing and holding power. Whether believing or not, Howard’s allegiance to the liberal democratic parliamentary system seems shaky, if not outright hostile, to some of his critics. For instance, Ian Duncanson argued that the Howard government reflected a “kind of Peronism” in which the separation of powers, foundational to liberal democracies, was replaced by elections in which “victories become empty mandates to pursue previously undisclosed or hitherto non-existent policies” and by “opportunistic opinion polls” in which majority opinions “act as plebiscites on single issues.” Indeed, Howard’s refusal in the mid- to late 1990s to countenance even a hint of contemporary national responsibility for past historical wrongs carried out against the Indigenous population foreshadowed rather than reflected the U.S. neoconservative disdain for guilt-saturated liberalism.

But for whatever reason, this strong state rhetoric continually foregrounds and creates spectacular scenes of killing. Two other examples suffice. One occurred in late August 2001 as the United Nations World Conference against Racism in Durban, South Africa, was under way. The Norwegian vessel *Tampa* picked up some 433 asylum seekers who found themselves trapped on a sinking ship as they traveled from Indonesia to Australia. The asylum seekers were mainly Afghani people fleeing the Taliban. The *Tampa* sought to drop off its unintended passengers on Christmas Island. On August 27, Howard declared that the asylum seekers would not be allowed into Australia or Australian territory, in-
including Christmas Island. Instead, Howard pushed ahead with the so-called Pacific solution, the use of economic incentives to entice the near-bankrupt state of Nauru to establish a detention center for asylum seekers attempting to enter Australia. As many have noted, Nauru agreed to set up these detention camps in exchange for Australian foreign aid after its material resources had been exhausted by a history of British and Australian extractive capital. Still more shocking was Howard’s stance on the “children overboard” controversy. It was alleged that some families threw their children overboard in order to force the government’s hand. Howard figured this decision as a sign of the barbarous cunning of these asylum seekers.16 Prior to the establishment of the security state in Guantánamo Bay (which, as we know, swept up the Australian David Hicks), Howard was testing how far the international community was willing to go to stop what he and his government readily admitted were potentially permanent detention camps. These camps were just, argued Howard, because they were good for Australian nationalism. Very quickly international human rights groups at the Durban conference, as well as members of the United Nations, denounced Howard’s “Pacific solution” as a violation of the U.N. refugee convention.17 How could they not, if for no other reason than that this “solution,” like the post-9/11 U.S. mantra that the government must protect “the homeland,”18 had shocking resonances with fascist rhetorics of the Second World War?

This new expression of sovereignty does not show itself in public spectacles of drawn and quartered bodies or inflamed racist rhetoric. It is tucked away in distant detention centers. It is important to note that mandatory detention has been part of the migration policy of Australia since 1992 and that it was a Labour government that removed the 273-day limit on mandatory detention. In other words, it is not simply the neoconservative movement that is responsible for the fetid conditions in detention camps on Nauru and Manus Island and on Australian soil, such as at the Woomera Immigration Reception and Processing Centre. As early as 1998, Amnesty International cited the mandatory detention of adults and children as a violation of human rights, noting the U.N. Human Rights Committee had found Australia in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In the eight years that followed, various U.N. committees and commissions have investigated
the conditions of detention camps in Australia. In July 2002, a delegation from the office of the U.N. high commissioner for human rights stated that the camps were “offensive to human dignity.” Later that same year, the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention characterized this detention regime as bordering on the extrajudicial because of its “automatic and indiscriminate character, its potentially indefinite duration and the absence of juridical control of the legality of detention.”

The Howard government steadfastly refused the recommendations of Amnesty International, the U.N. Human Rights Council, the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and other human rights advocates, arguing that the detention policies were lawful because they had been written into law under the Migration Act since 1992. No humanitarian exemption applies if the government lawfully states the exemption of certain humans from humanitarian conditions. The Australian High Court has agreed, finding in favor of the government in two cases decided in 2004. In *Behrooz and Ors v. Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs*, the High Court found that the inhumane conditions of the detention camps did not annul their legality. In *Al-Kateb v. Godwin*, the High Court found that unsuccessful asylum seekers could be held indefinitely in these same fetid camps if they could not be returned to another country. Hunger strikes, mouths sewn shut, the absence of physical and mental health facilities: the law easily survives the inhuman conditions it creates, fosters, and inhabits. It was only after the 2006 discovery of two seriously mentally ill Australian citizens mistakenly confined in these camps—one of whom claimed, as part of a psychotic delusion, that she was German—that the Howard government reversed state policy. Mandatory detention was abolished. Asylum seekers can now challenge their confinement.

A second example of the kinds and modes of eventfulness characterizing the strong state and riveting public response occurred in July 2006, as Israel began a sustained attack on Lebanon. The devastation in southern Lebanon and Beirut was massive, as was the humanitarian crisis. The Australian news media showed extensive footage of refugees streaming down roads as Israeli jets bombed nearby, refusing to guarantee civilians safe passage. Various states organized the evacuation of their national citizens from Lebanon, hiring cruise liners and freighters and making room
on military vessels. But the Australian government’s effort to hire a vessel to evacuate its citizens was continually stymied. Members of the large Lebanese community in Australia accused the government of abandoning its citizens and, according to some, doing so because of its support of the Israeli offensive. Strongly protesting any suggestion that it was in any way slow to respond, the federal government insisted that the real cause of the crisis was the weak Lebanese state. As the crisis dragged on amid images of bodily and material carnage, members of the conservative public added another culprit to the weak Lebanese state: they openly questioned how much public finance should be spent on evacuating people who were dual citizens and spent most of their time in Lebanon. Were these “real” Australians? Didn’t they choose to put themselves in harm’s way? The federal government vigorously denied that these kinds of questions affected their actions. The problem was purely logistical. Other state and public events leading up to the war, however, provided a fertile discursive ground for suspicions of a new, virile form of racial discrimination in Australia: the government passage of new security laws in 2005 said to address domestic and international Islamic terrorism; the public race riots in Cronulla in 2005; and the ongoing public debate about the loyalty of Muslim clerics and immigrants, especially Sheikh Feiz Mohammad, who now resides in his ancestral village in north Lebanon. On July 22, 2006, twenty thousand people marched in Sydney against the Israeli attack of Lebanon and the government’s attack on Muslim civil rights.

Any attempt to understand the social imaginaries characterizing lethal conditions within late liberal societies must take into account these two very different forms, modes, and qualities of killing found there: strong and weak state killing, and the modes and forms of agency, causality, and eventfulness on which they rely: late liberalism and neoliberalism. Thus the Australian government could blame the weak condition of the Lebanese state—its inability to disarm Hezbollah—for the war itself and for the humanitarian crisis it triggered. Yet, from another angle, the biopolitical regime of an increasingly weak post-Fordist state continues to spread its practical ideology of agency and value deeper into the tissues of everyday life. New organizations of production, circulation, and consumption produced in the wake of the Keynesian state continue to dismantle any “collective structures which may impede the pure market logic.”23 Even
Australia, with its strong history of social equity (as opposed to the more vapid value of social equality), is slowly installing neoliberal markets and cultivating the neoliberal subjects who will occupy them.

It is at the intersection of these state and market forms and forces and the shifting governance of difference that the lethal conditions of late liberal societies must be understood. And these lethal conditions need to be understood not merely in terms of the facts on the ground but also in terms of our scholarly attachments to certain modes of time, eventfulness, and ethics. The security state’s ability to capture countervailing energies and imaginaries is not restricted to those who march, protest, and organize against the security state, but also includes those who think critically inside and outside the universities.

If we are interested in how the assignment of responsibility and the demand for an ethical and political response are embedded in the discourse and experience of the event, then we need to understand, on the one hand, how difficult it is to experience the ethical call of events that do not strike us as catastrophic or sublime and, on the other hand, how the divisions of late liberalism, especially the division between the free-subject (autological subject) and the customarily constrained subject (genealogical society), is always at hand to interpret the ultimate cause and purpose of these events. In other words, any attempt to understand the social imaginaries characterizing lethal conditions within late liberal societies must take into account the topological relationship between forms, modes, and qualities of killing (strong and weak state killing); the modes and forms of agency, causality, and eventfulness on which they rely (event, quasi-event); and the divisions of difference at hand to account for them.

But how do we critically reflect on the conditions and ethical demands of lethality in late liberal societies when life and its imaginaries are located at the catachresis of strong and weak states and catastrophic and quasi-events, late liberalism and neoliberalism? It seems to me that two avenues need to be followed. Along the first, we would examine violence and lethality from a perspective that does not assume the qualities, vitalities, and borders of the catastrophic itself. Several scholars have been pursuing this project. In *Life and Words*, Veena Das notes the anthropological attachment to the kind of violence that characterizes the catastrophe.
Concentrating on social being in the wake of two catastrophic events—the gendered violence during the partition of India and Pakistan and the massacre of Sikhs in the wake of the assassination of Indira Gandhi—Das argues that it is not only the events themselves that are world-annihilating but the slow rhythms of death in their wake. Likewise, in a recent essay, Lauren Berlant juxtaposes forms of biopower within the current regime of capitalism to the forms of sovereign power accumulated by the terror state. Her case study is obesity. Her aim is to make visible endemic forms of death that are experienced as the attenuated background conditions of ordinary life and are resistant to typical accounts of causality, subjectivity, and life-making. How do scholars find the right distance or right scale from which to sketch the “slow rhythms” of this lethal violence? How do we focus attention on the broom closets that pock late liberalism in the context of the spectacular machine of the killing state and its equally vicious adversaries?

A second tactic is to make visible and compelling the nature of this kind of lethality by relying on the science of statistics. By design, statistics transfigure one kind and mode of eventfulness into another. They transform the borders, qualities, scale, and agency of quasi-events into self-evident eventfulness—if we can even use the term “event” in the domain of the chronic, slow, but as of yet unrealized form of lethality found in Indigenous worlds. Indeed, as Foucault and others, such as Ian Hacking, have shown, the statistical imaginary allowed the state to conjure knowledge of its population, and the population as such, in terms of its health and mortality, vitalism and malaise. Yet the deployment of a statistical imaginary to awaken a slumbering critical public and reason faces a central paradox. By transforming the invisible, dispersed, and uneventful into the visible, compact, and eventful, statistics obliterate the very nature of this kind of death. Rather than understand this kind of lethality within its own terms (its dailiness, ordinariness, livedness), we demand that it conform to the spectacular event and its ethical dictates of empathic identification. As a result, nothing new happens. No alternative ethical formations are initiated. It is not even very clear how these statistics puncture the inured nature of suffering in local communities. Many Indigenous friends of mine do not see the deaths in their communities as a form of state killing unless an agent of the state—such as a police constable—
literally kills them. The cruddy, cumulative, and corrosive aspects of life have spread so deep into the everyday that, as Ludwig Wittgenstein says, there is nothing more I can say other than that is what is.27

Sinking In

If we need to examine epistemological techniques that transform quasi-events into catastrophic events, then we also need to understand how the very nature of the quasi-event makes it an effective means for shifting accountability away from neoliberalism onto those who suffer in neoliberalism. And, we need to understand how these quasi-events are where the struggle to maintain an alternative social world is at its deepest if also its most tenuous and subtle. In other words, the politics of the otherwise occurs at moments that themselves have the nature of the quasi-event. Take, for instance, an interaction between a young Indigenous man in his late thirties and his family. The young Indigenous man’s social profile is typical of most people of his age living in his community. Despite the horrific nature of the following account, if you met him, you would often see him in good spirits. This young man characterizes himself as an alcoholic. Like everyone in his family, he has had “sores” (staphylococcal and streptococcal infections) on and off since he was a child, bearing the scars on his body. He has high blood pressure but does not take his medication regularly. He was hospitalized for congestive heart failure, just as his mother was in her last stages of oral cancer. His father died of a stroke when he was in his teens. His mother’s youngest brother died years earlier of kidney failure associated with septicemia. His younger brother has a congenital heart condition. Three weeks after he was released from the hospital, his eldest sister was taken to the hospital with septicemia. Her treatment resulted in massive congestive heart failure. Although told by doctors and family to stop drinking, this young man started drinking again within a week of his release from the hospital. Further, what would perhaps be more surprising to the sensibilities of many Australians, he demanded that his family members drive him to a local shop to buy alcohol with the money he had saved during his hospitalization. When family members refused, he angrily told them he could do what he wanted with his body. He knew the risks; they were his to take; how he gambled with
Events of Abandonment

his life was his business. These were his words, “risk,” “gamble,” “my body.” Only the future could say whether he won or lost his gamble, was right or wrong in his approach to this world of misery.

Forty years his senior, his aunt vehemently disagreed not only with his account of the location of his risk but also with the underlying logic of his social imaginary. To his statement that his body was his alone, she replied, “No, that is not your body; that is my body. When you die, my body will suffer and die.” When she referred to her physical risk, this woman was not simply referring to a generalizable empathic form of grief. She was not saying, “I will mourn you as an individual.” Her brother was this young man’s father. Thus, she and he share “one body”: They are both murru-murru (long yam), an ancestral being from which they both substantively descend as surely as an average non-Indigenous Australian believes that he or she shares the genetic substance of his or her mother and father. In other words, the woman was attempting to mobilize a discourse of socially cosubstantial corporeality against her nephew’s social imaginary of individuated bodies engaged in private wagers. His language of privatized loss, and its incumbent discourse of individual risk, was not met by the risk of another private loss but by an appeal to a cosubstantial distribution of life, health, and social being—a position much closer to Le Guin’s than to the young man’s.

As a second instance we could return to my friends and me, who were driving around Darwin and Palmerston with the washing machine strapped onto the back of my rented truck. If the washing machine is built to survive some determined amount of uses, every time it is used it is suffused, my friends think, with the formative effects of human sweat on things and places. Sweat (minthene) is a person’s essential substance layered with the essential substances from which it was formed, including human and nonhuman beings and the organic and inorganic nature of specific places. It passes down from ancestors and passes into places out of which it passes again into people. The ordinary and extraordinary examples are multiple. Hunting implements smell their users. Uncles press their sweat on nephews in ritual, as do aunts their nieces. Landscapes react both in a general way, and according to the specific ancestral beings who inhabit them, to different people’s “stink.” And as people live in these landscapes, shit and piss in them, burn and bury their clothes and other
things in ritual, the land itself begins to be change substantially. And, in
this mutual coming-to-be, substantially interpenetrated human and land-
scapes acquire new obligations with regard to each other. When does this
happen? What is the event that signals this turn? It is hard to say. It is a
matter of argument and persuasion within and across various Indigenous
and non-Indigenous publics. Potentiality in being that may never achieve
an actuality and yet is discussed and assessed endlessly as a potential.

But as for the washing machine we were carting from Darwin to Palm-
erston, my friends said that it was already on the fritz because too many
people were using it. But when they said that too many people were using
it, they were not merely referring to a numerical calculation but a sub-
stantial condition. Washing machines, after all, slush sweat through them.
Based on this understanding of sweat, they shouldn’t be used by every-
one and anyone. But what if there is only one machine for hundreds of
people, then what? Does reference to sweat—to the intersubstantial na-
ture of organic and inorganic entities—become “nothing but an excuse”;
“they just don’t want anyone to touch their washing machine.” Some of their
relatives think so. Others worry out loud that this discussion of animat-
ing sweat and living landscapes is devil worship. They pray to a Christian
god who tells them to reject all practices and accounts of the world that
do not place the superordinate power of Jesus Christ front and center. In
other words, is this belief in sweat and its geontological effects functional
in Wittgenstein’s sense: does it work in the world as that world is orga-
nized? Or does it only partially work, with much in reserve?

The state and businesses do not greet these social imaginaries of le-
thality, individuality, and responsibility in the same way. After more than a
decade of conservative leadership under Howard, Australia has witnessed
a distinct shift from a strong social welfare state to a form of neoliberalism
and its concomitant economic and dominant discourses of privatization
and the individualization of wealth, value, and destiny. During his gov-
ernment, Howard pushed through the privatization of state holdings, in-
cluding airlines, telecommunications, and health care; rolled back social
welfare; assaulted the trade union movement; and shifted the source of
public care from the state to the private individual and family. In the
course of these changes the causes, meanings, and practices of health have
taken up several strains of a neoliberal logic.
Thus by the time that the nephew and aunt fought, state and business were amplifying and channeling the nephew’s rather than the aunt’s social imaginary into agencies of social life in such a way that the one is sensible, practical, and productive, while the other is insensible, impractical, and sterile. They divide the complex histories and intersubjectivities of the aunt and her nephew into stereotypes of the battle of ancient law and modernity. The aunt is hardly some pristine adherent of an ancient order. And by the time the aunt makes her argument, the language game of individual risk has already organized social, economic, and political life increasingly around the neoliberal view of her nephew—that bodies and values are poker chips in individual games of chance and that the social is an impediment to the production of value. This view has social ramifications that are especially hard on the poor. As Craig Calhoun concisely puts it, privatizing risk makes “individuals bear the brunt of hardships that are predictable in the statistical aggregate without effective mechanisms to share the burden, let alone reduce the risk.” Privatizing risk creates and fosters a language game in which the social is practiced as nothing more than an aggregate of individuated risk calculators working according to mathematically predictable econometric models. I am not in you. You are not in me. We are merely playing the same game of chance whose truth lies not here and now between us but there and then in who wins and who loses. No one is killing me. I am killing myself. Maybe . . . we’ll see . . . the future will tell.

To see how these new approaches to risk work their way through state agencies, take, for instance, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), a bureaucratic arm of the federal government. When the AIHW released its report on Indigenous health and welfare in 2006, it reported a “relationship” between “socio-economic status and health . . . with people at the lowest socio-economic levels experiencing the highest rates of illness and death.” The AIHW seemed to be saying that the agents of harm may be pathogenic, but the vector of harm is socioeconomic — structural racism is killing these people. The answer to the question of what, or who, is to blame for the stubborn persistence of Indigenous ill health depends on what is considered a social vector, as opposed to an individual choice.

This wasn’t exactly what the AIHW was claiming. It immediately quali-
fied its claim by stating, “Socio-economic status does not alone explain the variations in health status that exist between groups in society.” According to the AHW, to understand health status one must look beyond socioeconomic status to individual risk and “behavioral” practices. Indeed, from a neoliberal point of view, the social is the aggregation of these individual behaviors. The sentence “poverty is a risk to your health” is quickly denuded of force within a neoliberal language game that reduces risk to individual choice. The behaviors that put one at risk, according to the AHW, are associated with individual choice (immunization, smoking, diet and exercise, and high blood pressure) rather than racial discrimination.

Thus, what wonder that the conservative Howard government was able to respond to the question of what, or who, is to be held accountable for the lethal conditions in Indigenous communities by pointing, at one and the same time, to the individual and her “culture,” but never at the sociopolitical conditions in which these emerge. Cultural and social logics of exactly the sort articulated by the aunt are, according to Howard, an impediment to the maintenance of a unified social fabric and to the fostering of an entrepreneurial spirit among Indigenous people. Indeed, they are said to be the cause of poverty along with longstanding federal and state commitments to Indigenous social welfare. When Indigenous people stop seeing their social worlds from the perspective of local cultural sense or from state-backed social welfare, then they will emerge from poverty and with this emergence gain the health that all other Australians have. But the nephew is also to blame by choosing to harm himself through alcohol consumption.

Then, then, then. . . . Local men and women are quite familiar with the temporal ethics of this future anterior. Needless to say, it is the aunt who is sober, the nephew who is not; the aunt is outside the logic of life as a set of privatized risks, the nephew is not. Nevertheless, as an “incentive” to Indigenous people to take up the nephew’s position, Howard committed his government to withdrawing federal economic support from rural Indigenous communities as part of the “mainstreaming” of Indigenous people and policy. Is this withdrawal, seen throughout late liberal worlds, a form of state killing? Howard would say, clearly not. In his corner are many Indigenous men and women. Noel Pearson, an Aboriginal
activist, has famously and forcefully argued that state welfare, when applied to Indigenous peoples, is a technique of numbing Indigenous and non-Indigenous people to the radical state of dysfunction in Aboriginal communities.33 For Pearson, Indigenous subjects are so destroyed and so used to their destitution that only liberating them from a failed social welfare net and local social imaginaries will save them. In the future, according to Howard, Pearson, and others, the young man’s stultifying life will be shown to have been the vigorous beginning of a new day for Indigenous welfare. The evidence will not be in for quite some time, of course.

Was self-determination and its manifestation through the social welfare system a failure? What if we do not accept that the social welfare net and local social imaginaries are not working in some general way but only in a specific way? Why aren’t they seen to be working? What isn’t working? Much of the public debate focused on true feeling—whether Mal Brough really cared about Aboriginal children, whether John Howard didn’t really care, or whether neither of them cared and both of them were simply engaged in a land grab or seeking a poll boost.34 For instance, whatever we call the Community Development Employment Program—work for the dole, dole top-up, community development scheme—the best statistics show that the program raised the personal income and employment of rural Indigenous men and women.35 Assessing the relationship between employment, physical and mental health, and vague sets of life qualities is much harder, and not merely because it confronts an exceedingly difficult statistical task. Assessing the relationship between employment and other social indices is difficult because first one has to agree what a social ill is, or an instance of social care. This said, if the CDEP doesn’t lead to so-called normal employment, and normal employment is considered the ultimate social good because of how it helps the efficiency of the market and corporate profit, then the CDEP has failed, no matter that it preserved and enhanced local lives. In neoliberalism to care for others is to refuse to preserve life if it lies outside a market value. Thus Howard and Kevin Rudd can say that life will get much harder for Indigenous people but that this harm is a good.

But no matter how we transform, or don’t, quasi-events into catastrophes, the contemporary assessment of responsibility for these quasi-events and catastrophes emerges within the tensions among social wel-
fare, laissez-faire, and neoliberalism and between these and late liberalism. To ask and answer the question of who is to blame for the slow catastrophe in spaces such as African American neighborhoods and Indigenous ghettos is to take a stance within liberalism as it organizes markets and difference. Likewise, to care for others is to make a claim; it is to make a small theoretical gesture. To care is to embody an argument about what a good life is and how such a good life comes into being. Thus the arts of caring for others always emerge from and are a reflection on broader historical material conditions and institutional arrangements. The point is not, therefore, to argue that someone really cares or doesn’t really care. In the first instance, the question is, what do we believe care to consist of, such that when we experience a form of relating to one another socially, we experience that form of relating as a form of caring for others?

What we believe care to consist of is directly related to where we believe failure resides or what we believe failure consists of. Perhaps the arts of care should be oriented to the potentiality within the actual, to removing the actual hindrances that impede groups’ striving—whether they are striving to change their world through a social project or to remain as they are within a world changing around them. The arts of care would then focus on the differential distribution of the “ease of coping.” Caring would sink into the recesses of the everyday, the ordinary, and the mundane. What it would discover there is that everything is jerry-rigged. Rather than menacing terrorists, they would find people trying to make a small, frail shelter.

These issues do not need to be addressed if we are dreaming of future worlds in which no one has these sores or these life expectancies, even as others are never impeded in their quest to accumulate as much wealth as possible. But the actual cost-benefit analysis occurring is not the balance between the risk of untreated staphylococci or streptococci versus the risk of developing a drug-resistant form, but the risk of untreated staphylococci or streptococci within certain populations and the cost of investing in poverty-stricken communities for the short or long term. The presupposition underlying the treatment of infections in indigenous communities is that the communities themselves will remain fetid. Within a neoliberal state, any social investment that does not have a clear end—a projected moment when input value (money, services, care) can be re-
Health problems by percentage of population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Indigenous</th>
<th>Non-Indigenous</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Circulatory</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Injury</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancer</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diabetes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renal disease</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infectious &amp; parasites</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Distribution of each dollar of income by population

- Indigenous: 38 cents per dollar
- Non-Indigenous: 62 cents per dollar

Average life expectancy by population

placed by output value—is not merely economically suspect but morally suspect, no matter the life-enhancing nature of the investment.

We should not be surprised by this way of assessing failed forms of state welfare. After all, the neoliberal weak state and strong market do not produce and distribute life, its qualities, vitalities, and borders, evenly or equitably. Nor do all forms of lethality produce the same qualities, visibilities, and intensities as others. Lethality is apprehended and perceived and is discussed, explained, and managed in terms of historically fluctuating accounts of agency, eventfulness, sociality, and normality. Even tsunamis, earthquakes, and hurricanes that generate terrific waves of empathy and generate moral capital for those who demonstrate outrage leave in their wake a nonplussed public. When the waters recede and the ground stops shaking, empathy also evaporates as ethical sense settles back into doxic accounts of poverty, its causes and consequences. Cost reemerges as a central issue for how to calculate who can or should be protected, re-located, cared for, as was the case for my colleagues, discussed in the previous chapter, who were driven out of the community where the nephew and aunt lived. Here we see how prescient Le Guin’s suspicion of the ethics of empathy is. Empathy asks us to put ourselves in someone else’s shoes. What would it be like to be them? To be in this tidal wave, that fetid broom closet, that cultural condition? And yet, this very act—this ethical gesture—initiates a separation between you and me. I am not substantially the result of your tsunami or your staphylococci. As a result, to give to you can end up seeming like a taking away from me because mine seems to be mine. Never has Le Guin’s basic point that all goods are generated in a system of distributed misery seemed so hard to fathom, so impractical, and yet so close to late liberal reality.
Chapter Five

After Good and Evil, Whither Sacrificial Love?

Christ is alive! Let Christians sing.
The cross stands empty to the sky.
Let streets and homes with praises ring.
Love, drowned in death, shall never die.

BRIAN WREN, 1969

The Good and the Evil

Late in his second term George W. Bush told a reporter why he had given up playing golf: “I feel I owe it to the families to be in solidarity as best as I can with them. And I think playing golf during a war just sends the wrong signal.” Unsurprisingly, Bush was excoriated and lampooned for equating the sacrifices of war and the game of golf. But in making this awkward equivalence Bush seemed to signal a deeper division between an administration prone to understand its actions in a millennialism of good and evil and critics of
the administration who advocate a broader approach to the collective responsibilities of wartime sacrifice and the possibilities of wartime sacrificial love. If the nation is at war, then why are sacrifices asked only of the military and their families and not of the citizenry more generally? And how does waging a war premised on an absolute division between “those who stand with us” and all others square with another message preached in Christian pulpits every Easter season: the message of a sacrificial love offered not merely to friends but, more profoundly, to enemies?

As much as many might wish to hold the Bush administration responsible for every last bit of the mischief of our times, this we cannot nail to its coffin: Bush’s is not the first U.S. administration to promote a Christian-inflected millennial governance. His administration has certainly pressed the cause. We are only now beginning to appreciate the organizational ties connecting specific Christian groups and the various arms of the state apparatus. Scholars and activists have been particularly worried about the ties between the U.S. military and specific evangelical groups and about religio-political litmus tests used for appointments to the Justice Department and the Environmental Protection Agency. But equally worrisome are the complex entanglements of conservative Christian movements in neoliberal state functions—not merely the state’s public embrace of religious groups for the outsourcing of federal social service funding, but also the state’s covert ties to conservative Christian agendas, such as the personal and business connections among the Bush administration, the Family Research Council, and Blackwater Worldwide. But the second Bush was not the first.

Twenty years prior to the George W. Bush administration, Ronald Reagan’s belief that he was living in the end-time helped shape his foreign policy. I would not be the first to note that the Evil Empire provided a discursive footprint for the Axis of Evil. And long before Bush and Reagan, the concept of manifest destiny, as Ernest Tuveson wrote in 1968, expressed a specific U.S. Christian millennial utopianism in which America was understood to have been chosen by God to arbitrate a global war between good and evil. Therefore, what may be more disturbing than yet another U.S. administration articulating yet another millennial fantasy is how this fantasy seems to have drifted across the Atlantic and Pacific, encompassing the Blair ministry in Great Britain and less publicly
the Howard ministry in Australia. And, equally unnerving, is how the notion of millennial good-and-evil civilizations may have been in play in debates about whether the European Union (EU) constitution should make reference to Christianity or a Christian culture. This debate is especially unnerving insofar as it occurred in a context in which the civilizational struggle between good and evil is often figured as a battle between good and bad Muslims. Thus German chancellor Angela Merkel told reporters at the 2007 European Commission meeting that, while she did not hold out “any hope” for the inclusion of a reference to the Christian god in the EU constitution, she could not close her eyes to the lack of religious freedom in Turkey for Christian denominations. While, therefore, the sociologist of religion José Casanova is certainly right that the United States is as much an exception to European secularism as a bunkmate of it, it is also true that we are witnessing a host of possible convergences between the United States and Europe as the politics of recognition mutates from a social struggle over the worth of the other to a faith-based certainty about the evil of the other.

But as the golfing fiasco suggests, beyond good and evil, or coiled within their heart like a worm, is another rhetoric of governance that surely preceded the smoldering landscapes of New York, Afghanistan, Iraq, London, and Madrid but just as surely has intensified in their heat: namely, the complex crossings of the figures of sacrifice and sacrificial love in late liberalism’s governance of alternative social worlds and projects. It is how this crossing helps reveal the mutations of late liberalism in the wake of the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent emergence of a security state that concerns this chapter. And more important for the purpose of this book, these complex rhetorical crossings provide a dense knot where late liberal figurations of tense, eventfulness, and ethical substance aggregate harm and suffering in such a way that every ethical and political claim of an alternative social worlds can be deferred. Thus while I obviously tread on a terrain occupied by contemporary debates in secularism, my interests are not in secularism but in how discourses of sacrifice and sacrificial love shelter late liberalism from critique.

Although emerging from similar gospels, these two rhetorical figures—good and evil and sacrifice/sacrificial love—seem to index and express competing political and social visions and allegiances. On the
political and social Right, foreign policy is figured not as sacrifice or sacrificial love but as a millennial struggle between good and evil. And, according to Bush, “God is not neutral” in this struggle.⁹ From the point of view of progressive Christians such as James McGinnis, founder of the Institute for Peace and Justice, the Christian concept of sacrificial love offers an alternative to these conservative Knights of Faith.¹⁰ Tacking between the concept of sacrifice and the concept of sacrificial love, such progressive critiques castigate the Bush administration for its refusal to stress the collective sacrifice a nation is normally called on to make in times of war. If the United States is at war, then all Americans should be asked to make the necessary social and economic sacrifices of war—not merely to give up golf. Perhaps if Americans had been encouraged to think of themselves as at war, then the orgy of spending encouraged by the housing bubble would have been replaced by a more circumspect sacrificial logic. The exorbitant margins of profit demanded of corporate executives as the price of Wall Street investment might have been tempered. But “We the People” was, instead, rewritten as “He and I the Competitors,” the first person and the nonperson who need not even be specified lexically.¹¹ McGinnis, for instance, argues that Christian sacrifice teaches us to share burdens felt by individuals of a community among the community and that Christian sacrificial love teaches us to turn our cheeks to our enemies. Beyond good and evil lies another message, the cultivation of modes of sacrifice for the other that defines sacrificial love.

Here we see that where the Bush administration in its critiques has focused on good and evil, to the exclusion of sacrifice and sacrificial love, a space has opened for a broader discussion about a certain deficit in late liberal thought. For all the administration’s early emphasis on compassion, critics argue, it has discouraged the kind of neighborliness that is collective in its imaginary, public in its burdens, and sacrificial in the face of the need of the other. For all the rhetorical emphasis on faith, religion emerges in administration policies only as a site for state outsourcing and the social production of individualized risk. Compassion means little more than sympathy for others unable to leverage the kinds of capital necessary to make huge profit at the center or margins of the market.

Under considerable pressure Bush did begin to acknowledge the suffering and sacrifice consequent to his war policies. In a prime-time ad-
dress delivered on June 28, 2005, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Bush stated: “Every picture [from the war] is horrifying, and the suffering is real. Amid all this violence, I know Americans ask the question: Is the sacrifice worth it? It is worth it, and it is vital to the future security of our country.”12 Is the sacrifice worth it? Answering this question actually presupposes two prior discussions. The first is the discussion of modalities of expenditure and abandonment in our times, from expenditures and abandonments whose social weight is barely noticeable to those whose social weight begins to unravel the social order, from the soft deaths of pastoral care to the hard deaths of sovereign killing, from making live to making die. In other words, deciding that this or that sacrifice is worth it depends on how we narrate forms of killing and making die, making live and letting suffer, in the various domains of social life—politics, market, and civil society. And this discussion presupposes a second.

The question whether this or that sacrifice is worth it opens the events of suffering and dying, if not to the problematic of being and time, then to the problematic of being and tense—the narrative relation among social, economic, and political values and subjective finitudes and how, where, and whether subjective finitudes are seen to occur and lead. We can begin to see what is at stake here if we rephrase what Bush said in this way: “Is the sacrifice worth it? It is if we establish a specific relationship between violence and redemption that will define the social imaginary of suffering and dying.” If we can do so, killing and dying will be understood and experienced as a mode of birth, as a way of bringing new being into existence. For instance, insofar as killing can be narrated in the future perfect, it can become a way of giving; violent death becomes sacrifice and ceases to be scandalous.13 Indeed, by denying the present perfect of suffering and death, we can make suffering and death something to strive for, celebrate, and memorialize.

Given its penchant for memorialized denial, the very narrative of sacrifice and sacrificial love presents a set of dilemmas for progressive critics when they mobilize these narratives against the millennial imaginary of good and evil. And this is what interests me here. How do discourses of sacrificial love coordinate violence and redemption in such a way that suffering and dying—the mortifications of the flesh of others—are continually read from the perspective of the future perfect, the redeemed end of
Sacrificial love constructs a complex self-reflexive totalization in which the present becomes a mode of pastness by being projected into a perfected future. This future perfect swallows up the possibility of a more complex mode of dwelling in the fractured present. In the background of my argument is Carl Schmitt’s notorious claim that “under no circumstances can anyone demand that a member of an economically determined society . . . sacrifice his life in the interests of [its] rational operations.”14 Equally relevant is Benedict Anderson’s question as to how an imaginary political formation can lead so many millions of people into “colossal sacrifices.”15 But rather than from the perspective of the state or the nation, I want to think about these issues from the perspective of the diffused discourses of liberal secular sacrificial love. What are the dilemmas of posing sacrificial love as an antidote to the millenialism of good and evil?

The Knights of Faith

One of these dilemmas comes from the increasingly explicit religious overtones of sacrificial love. Critical theorists were accustomed to the challenging rhythms of late liberal governance and the harms it causes others—the sacrifices that must be made or withheld, the love that must be given or denied—when these rhythms were understood as occurring within a secular framework. Yet a new difference has emerged within liberalism to disrupt these arrangements, signaled but not contained by discussions of good and evil and sacrifice and sacrificial love. The Christian Knight of Faith is suddenly let loose in secular democracies, basing its allegiances on scripturally backed faith. Many critics thought that this Knight of Faith had been safely contained in private consciousness and church service. Then, just like that, he rides into the center of secular politics, constitutional democracy, and the political theory that has supported them, disrupting the ongoing feast, disturbing the given time of political difference. Some see him as the end of the liberal secular era. Others see him as the answer to the metaphysical malaise of the multicultural moment. But many on the political and social Left and Right think that there is something about the way he loves sacrifice and sacrificially loves that provides critical insight on the ethical shape and future of liberal gover-
After Good and Evil

nance—something internal to the logic of sacrifice and sacrificial love that emerged from the Judeo-Christian tradition and that can renew the democratic order.

It would be hard to underestimate the critical commotion that political faith has caused in critical theory. One of the doyens of political theory, Jürgen Habermas, warns that “religious traditions and communities of faith” have gained an unexpected political importance not merely in the Islamic-dominated societies of the Middle East and Southeast Asia but within the “heart of Western civilization.” Christian faiths are no longer content to restrict their religious fervor and conviction to the inner sanctum of individual conscience or church. In the United States, politicians court voters by making explicit professions of faith. In Europe, questions of religious identity and political inclusion—the inclusion of Turkey in the EU and of Christianity in the EU constitution—prompt heated debates about the relationship between Christian faith and European civilization. For those, like Habermas, who understand secularism as a precondition of constitutional democracy—and of liberalism more generally as a broad and diverse governmental doctrine and practice of liberty and equality—the appearance of Christian faith in the heart of Western political society raises troubling questions. How does the man of religious convictions fit within the procedural routines of pragmatic public reason without doing violence to them? How can religious conviction be incorporated into secular public reason when the routines of truth production and verification are not merely different but often confrontational?

Habermas may have only recently awakened to the figurative force of Christianity in the shaping of constitutional democracies. But more than 150 years ago Karl Marx argued, in “On the Jewish Question,” that the perfected Christian state emerged only when the state gave up Christianity as a state religion. The liberal democratic state and economy could become Christian only when Christianity became a private matter. Or, put another way, democratic sufferings and death would become a true theodicy of sacrifice once states became theologically neutral. Of course there are many complex readings of “On the Jewish Question.” One understands liberal forms of secularism—including the dynamics of the public sphere, the market, and the citizen-state that have interested Habermas since the
publication of *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*—to presuppose certain behaviors, knowledges, and sensibilities genealogically related to Christianity and its various disciplines of truth. Thus when we refer to the secular West, liberal society, or constitutional democracies, we are referring to a set of multiplex transpositions that mutually reorganized, and made sense of a divide between, “the religious” and “the secular.”¹⁹ Contra Marx, the state did not become Christian when it gave up Christianity as a state religion; it became so when the practices of the self, internal to Christianity and the modern democratic society, were reorganized. In short, secularism and Christianity, and the political and religious more generally, were mutually reconstituted in complex historical encounters within and outside of Europe. If the secular West is Christian, so this argument goes, it is not because Christians are a majority within the North Atlantic or because people of religious conviction have hijacked the state but because secularism and its governmentalities (including the seemingly contrastive French and Anglo-American models of national inclusion) and Christianity and its practices of the self came to presuppose compatible modes of social, communicative, and corporeal comportment and their relation to truth production. As a result, studies of religion should not define religion and then extract social truths or ethical principles from this definition. Studies of religion should instead focus on how people, in coordinating the political, economic, and religious dimensions of social life, make sense of accumulation, expenditure, and abandonment.

These practices of social coordination are not what have riveted recent critical theory, although I will come back to them shortly. Instead of examining how people coordinate political, economic, and religious principles and practices and how these practices of coordination, among other things, organize, account for, and maneuver around the paradoxes, contradictions, and problems within actually existing liberal democracies, many critical theorists seek to distill from Christian doctrine an essential Christian form that can serve as a basis for providing constitutional democracies a universal and/or transcendental foundation in a postmetaphysical world. And it is to sacrificial love, more specifically, that critical theorists have turned, with surprising frequency, as that which offers a revolutionary ethical foundation for democratic governance.
Take, for example, Slavoj Žižek’s recent writings on what he calls “the most deplorable aspects of the postmodern era” and the revolutionary insights of the Christian legacy (postmodern politics, liberal democracy, and Christian sacrificial love). To understand what is at stake in his writings, we need to begin with his opposition to what he calls multicultural globalization. Žižek believes that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of neoliberal capitalism left the progressive Left without grounds for making convincing claims about social conscience, democratic justice, or human rights. Against those who would reestablish democratic justice on a multicultural foundation, Žižek argues that multiculturalism is an impediment rather than a solution to the problem of judgment and justice. For him, multiculturalism collapses justice, ethics, and subjectivity to the iterative sameness of the market, evacuating any possibility of establishing a transcendental ground on which antagonistic claims about conscience, justice, or human rights can be made or adjudicated. Where there is no antagonism, so the argument goes, there can be no meaningful difference, and, contrastingly, where there is antagonism without transcendental ground, there can be no means for adjudicating meaningful difference peacefully. Because the postmodern Left occupies both of these contradictory positions at the same time, it cannot oppose the vicious extremes of capitalism, the emergence of religious fundamentalism, or the xenophobias of the racist Right. All must be loved equally, and all should have equal opportunity for thriving; conversely, all must be equally despised and destroyed.

As much as Žižek skewers—and misconstrues—the so-called postmodern Left, he is also aware of the varieties of radical evil that have accompanied a specific social group’s claim over the content of the Universal: colonialism, anti-Semitism, slavery, homophobia. For Žižek, only Christian sacrificial love—the relationship of absolute love to the radical other that Christ established on Golgotha—offers a revolutionary means of avoiding the radical evils associated with projects that specify the content of the Universal and projects that empty out the possibility of Absolute Judgment. The Christian model of sacrificial love, the phantasm of the Crucifixion, is a “fragile absolute” in which we are commanded to love not merely our friend and neighbor but, more radically, our enemy. This command “unplugs” Christian subjects from the specificities of their so-
cial roles and, insofar as it does so, unplugs their political decisions from their social and ethical boundaries, providing a Universal foundation to constitutional democracies currently adrift in a postmetaphysical world. In the shadow of the happy event of the Crucifixion, Christians can die in relation to the given world while catching “a glimpse of Another Space.” Unplugging is an act, a temporal event, that changes eternity itself by redefining the possibility of the world. And here we see Žižek’s memorialization of suffering and death by an absolute denial of the present perfect nature of subjective finitude—that there is a form of killing and dying that does not need to be experienced, because it can be experienced as a form of radical birth. Death can remain a joyous denial. So can killing. Someone or something is killed, extinguished. Someone did the killing. But Žižek, Habermas, and Joseph Ratzinger can reassure one another that this is a minor issue in the context of the major event of the Good News.

Žižek is not alone in his march to Golgotha in search of an ethical foundation for liberal governance. Nor am I alone in noting the return to religion beyond religion in recent critical theory. John Roberts has discussed this ethicoreligious turn in the work of Jacques Derrida, Alain Badiou, Antonio Negri, Žižek, and Roy Bhaskar, differentiating among “a weak Messianic tradition” as exemplified in Derrida’s writing, “a strong Messianic tradition” in Badiou’s and Žižek’s writings, and “an ecumenical libertarianism” in Bhaskar’s and Negri’s writings. Roberts argues that these diverse thinkers situate an ethics of conviction as a passionate act and this passionate act as the ground of responsibility: “Ethics becomes a site of the passionate political judgment and decision.” Passionate political judgment finds its apotheosis in sacrificial love, and the paradoxical nature of this passion finds its apotheosis in the work of Derrida.

Derrida began addressing the political potential and paradox of Judeo-Christian discourses of sacrificial love and the political responsibility and ethical obligations of Europe to the other (“what has been promised under the name of Europe”) in a series of essays stretching back to the mid-1990s. These mediations are, of course, deconstructive in nature, seeking not to resolve the impasse of reason witnessed at Calvary but instead to locate the obligation of the North Atlantic to the radical other in this impasse—the mysterium tremendum, the awefulness—of the Christian gift of death. The gift of death cannot be rationalized by any proce-
ture of liberalism. Nothing could have justified the sacrifice of Isaac or can justify that of Christ—not ethics, not custom, not hatred, not crude gestures to glimpsed absolutes. Thus the decision to (be the) sacrifice is a radically singular event, a moment of absolute aloneness, of being without community in order to be with a god who at that exact moment is absolutely alien. At the moment of decision, Abraham and Christ are left decisively and devastatingly isolated (the obfuscation of Abraham in response to Isaac’s queries; the cry of Christ, “Lord, why hast thou forsaken me?”). They face the bar of the absolute on one side and the bar of community censure on the other. Worse, as Derrida notes, unqualified love—the affective subjectification of truth—is necessary for the paradox to function qua paradox. Yahweh would not have demanded the sacrifice of Isaac if Abraham had not had an “absolute, unique, and incommensurable love for his son.”

Absolute relation to the absolute: This law of sacrificial love would be awful enough if I were only under the ethical command to love my neighbor to such an extent that I would make the ultimate sacrifice for him or her. This new law, the legacy of Europe as the name of a promise for a future world, demands of me not merely a determination of how close a person and his or her ethnos must be to me for the person to qualify as my neighbor, a determination made especially difficult by the contemporary global economy of communication and intercourse. Given the complex socioeconomic matrixes—those globalized and globalizing forms of state, market, and media—through which I am connected to so many people, entire continents are my neighbors even though they are perfect strangers. Globalization has punctured the older nature of the neighbor. Entire populations, ethnicities, tribal areas, and regions may be toiling away to produce the conditions of the good life in Europe and the United States without most Europeans and Americans knowing their names or where they live, let alone on what grounds they should be judging them as friend, neighbor, or enemy.

But these problems of discernment are as nothing when put in the context of the new law of love. This new law also demands of me that I sacrifice myself for friend, neighbor, and enemy alike. I must sacrifice what I love most dearly, what is irreplaceable—my Isaac, my future, my self—to another who makes no sense to me and might want to annihilate
me. Derrida insists that the totality of the annihilation of this law of sacrificial love cannot be underestimated. If I were merely commanded to love my neighbor as much as I love myself, or in the same way that I love myself, then when I died, I could believe that some part of me would live on. This is especially true if I imagine that I am the product of a cultural or civilizational horizon. I can then imagine that my neighbor would carry me forward in my absence. Not so with my enemy. The new law, the fulfillment of Abraham’s interrupted sacrifice of Isaac, ruptures the security of this continuity in community and the communitarian illusion on which it is based. In killing myself for my enemy—the Absolute Other—I am extinguished in my particularity and my generality. My self, my ethnos, my entire aspirational horizon will be consumed by this terrifying demand. Yet, to the fascination of Derrida’s ethical reflections, this is exactly what Yahweh asks of Abraham. And in making this demand on Abraham, Derrida argues, God not only asks him to commit this abominable sacrifice for the other but also becomes an absolute stranger to him. No known or knowable system of justice can justify it. There is only an absolute otherness that demands absolute obedience beyond common, ethnic, or ethical sense. Maybe this is why the holy hide away in desert caves: lest a stranger appear on the horizon, demanding this ultimate sacrifice. Yet this is the dowry that Europe carries, what is internal to the call for recognition of the Christian legacy of Europe in the EU constitution. For it was exactly in the shadow of an increasingly virulent, religiously and racially inflected, European stance against immigrants that Derrida wrote, and wrote against Schmitt’s too-easy distinction between the private enemy (inimicos) and the public enemy (hostes).26

What obligation, Derrida asks, does this impasse of love, justice, and obligation impose on the North Atlantic?27 How can this law claim a moral imperative over anyone when it cannot ground itself in any sensible order of ethics, justice, or sociality? Should a stranger appear to a penitent, coming from the South or East or within the West, or flying toward her across a brilliant morning sky, how does the penitent know whether this stranger is bound? Is this law transitive? Must she do unto me as I would do unto her? As I watch her approach, I cannot assume that she knows this directive or, if she knows it, feels obligated by it. This stranger may never have heard these words before or may have heard of them only as a report from an alien, perhaps unholy, place. Indeed, a for-
eign state might severely regulate or ban outright certain Christian sects, their broadcast channels, and their emissaries to keep its citizenry from being exposed to these unholy words. Other states might react by passing resolutions supporting freedom of religion through trade sanctions. But maybe the stranger is closer to home, one of us. Perhaps she is a practicing sociobiologist who espouses a theory of the selfish gene, thinking that altruistic love is biologically absurd. For her, this directive does not command the status of a general moral imperative. It is (merely) a local code or custom, spoken at a specific place, a specific time, open to anthropological analysis. She would not agree that any general political theory should be animated by these words. What do I do with her? Something must be preserved, but it is not clear what, or who. Can she live among us? Can I kill her to preserve the law of love? What else can I kill to preserve my law of sacrificial love?

These and other attempts to elicit an ethical dynamic from a reading of Christian doctrine have forged a new, for some frightening, alliance between conservative theologians and the critical Left. Žižek takes pride in upending the usual oppositions between the critical Left and the religious Right—and in cementing his reputation as the perpetual provocateur. Yet to be persuaded by these readings, we must first accept that religions, and Christianity in particular, can be defined—that doctrines and paradoxes exist in them and can be analyzed independent of their social conditions. We must already abide within a certain social imaginary of liberalism in which concepts have an abstract and objectified being and agency that can be detached from the social routines of their formation and citation. We must think that Christianity is a thing with qualities and essences before we can find it secretly working its ethical magic within the domains of the modern democratic state. But what if Christianity were not a thing but part and parcel of a set of social maneuvers within liberal democracies? What if Christian sacrificial love were not a paradox but part of the means by which the paradoxes, contradictions, and violences of actually existing liberalism were stilled if not resolved? If Christian sacrificial love were not a paradox but a means of maneuvering around extant political-economic contradictions, then the first task we would face would be to remember that the narrations from which we draw this paradox are always already within the natural history of discourse.28

Take, for example, the Abrahamic and Christian narratives from which
Chapter Five

these critical theories extract their accounts of sacrifice and sacrificial love. These narratives do not exist outside social time. They participate in the social life of referentiality and performativity insofar as they consist of both a narrative event and the event of narration—the continuously retranslated, internal referential space of the stories and constant retelling and rereading of this space. When we read of Abraham’s journey to Mount Moriah and of Christ’s Passion, culminating in his death on the cross, from the point of view of the narrative event, Abraham’s arm is always raised, and Christ crucified is always looking toward heaven. But when we examine the same sacrifices from the point of view of the act of narration—those of us who read about Abraham hearing Yahweh’s voice in the winds of Mount Moriah—these paradoxical extremes dissipate as death falls away as the ultimate reference. From the point of view of the act of narration, we know that nothing actually happened or that, in happening, a tortured death was the condition for a radically new form of redeemed life. In short, we already know that in Isaac’s case Yahweh held back Abraham’s hand. And for all the talk about his ultimate sacrifice, Christ’s death is continually referred to as the act of redemption (“Christ is alive! Let Christians sing. / The cross stands empty to the sky”). His marked body, now lily white, bears testimony to the fact that his killing was not. We enter the world of Lacanian algebra. There is at least one man who was killed but did not die. Not all killing kills. There is at least one killing that creates life. Empathy may allow us to feel the excruciating physical and psychic pain of Jesus stretched out on the cross. But because we read these texts, or listen to them, we know after the first hearing that Isaac is lifted off one stone and that God rolls back another. We cannot know otherwise.

The second task we face is to situate these narrative events in the complex relays and transpositions across the orders of social life. When we do so, the Christian logic of sacrificial love that so captivates Žižek seems to have little formative force in the contemporary secular public sphere. When we look at contemporary public discussions of friends, neighbors, and enemies in places like the United States, Western Europe, and Australia, it is easy to argue that discourses of sacrificial love have ceased to obligate citizens or states. Certainly, the so-called war on terror has helped no one cultivate unconditional love for the radical other. Sacri-
fices abound, but sacrificial love is rare. Indeed, we see an increasing confidence among liberal democrats in claiming and justifying an absolute intolerance for competing forms of religion and politics. Red lines demarcate difference, especially where difference becomes a call to arms.

The war on terror cannot be held responsible for the appearance of these red lines. Defenders of the liberal public sphere—in both deliberative and substantive varieties—have always held to some red line to absolute difference. Indeed, we would be hard pressed to find a subject within liberal democracies who believes that there is no horizon of otherness past which sacrificial love could not, at least theoretically, extend. Very few people seem willing to unplug themselves unconditionally from their social and ethical horizon. A nonsacrificial love might be easier to find—for instance, the position of some Christian evangelical churches on homosexuality: “Love the sinner, hate the sin.” But the kind of relation Žižek sees Christian sacrificial love establishing with the Absolute Other is rare, and where it might exist there are laws proscribing it. Caveats proliferate. Dilemmas abound. Legislation piles up. Should the acceptance of strangers depend on whether they seek to join us in making a joint economic, social, or political world or seek to kill us and our way of life? Are we creating strangers among us by refusing to embrace cultural difference in the public sphere and confront the persistence of class inequalities in the market? Is French republicanism causing the recurrent rioting in the suburbs of Paris, or is it a bulwark against racism? At the minimum, most liberals agree that tolerance should be extended if the other is willing to do the same, if the difference between the other and me is not so great as to annihilate me, and if the other can make this difference legible to me within the deliberative public sphere. At the maximum, consensus begins to fall apart. We argue whether there are cases in which we should even empathize with others, let alone die on their behalf. Indeed, cultural conservatives argue that encouraging our children to empathize with religious suicide bombers may lead them down a treacherous slope that ends in jihadist camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Yet for those like Habermas who see the liberal public sphere as the best foundation for political society, the factual limit of tolerance does not negate the normative orientation of liberalism to revise reflexively its most fundamental assumptions about justice and the good life. In-
sofar as liberals continue to be committed to alleviating the pain that their political and social beliefs and practices unnecessarily cause others, the fact that red lines must be drawn and that caveats will proliferate around them does not alter the orientation of the public sphere to sacrificial love—the abandonment of their cherished ideals for the sake of better, less harmful ideas. Indeed, that some liberals point to this willingness to sacrifice their beliefs in the face of the pain of the other is what distinguishes liberal democracies in the global market of governmental forms—strongman oligarchies, communist free markets, theocratic capitalism, and socialism. And liberalism can accomplish all of this by doing little more than articulating a very ordinary affect (empathy) and a very ordinary communicative procedure (deliberation) into a massive political force.

**Bad Forgeries**

It is easy to draw a genealogical relationship between the liberal dialectics of empathetic deliberation and the theological command that we lay down our life for the other. One can argue, as Charles Taylor and others have done, that insofar as liberalism seeks to base justice and the good life on the general perspective of humankind rather than on the particular borders of self, ethnos, and nation, these movements write Christ’s signature into the secular. But if we think that there is a Christian sacrificial logic, then as much as there is a Christian signature within the very dynamic of affective public reason, this signature also has all the signs of a bad forgery. A profound shift has occurred. We are no longer under the unconditioned command that we give our life for our enemy. We are under a very conditioned command that we hone our abilities to know when it makes sense for us, and them, to give a gift of death that does not really kill. Take, for instance, ubiquitous guiding statements of the practical public sphere such as “Let’s start with what we can agree about” and “We need to be able to live with impasses.” These practical statements refer to and entail the self-evident dependency of liberal justice on the horizon of unfolding time and the perspective of ends. In liberal systems of law and public reason, present-tense judgments about moral limits and the economic impoverishment of others are referred to a future horizon.
of rectified sense and bodies. In other words, the tense of public deliberation reflects and reinforces the commonsense tense of sacrificial love. It is, as Michael Dillon and Julien Reid note, the liberal way of making war—wrapping various kinds of killing within the imaginary of making life.31

So doxic are these statements that many people must struggle to remember that, as much as we might wish it did, empathetic deliberation does not provide a pause button on social practice and its unfolding. As much as we might wish it would, social time does not stop and wait for us to sort things out. As other folks are deliberating their fate—and I think that this point cannot be overemphasized—the subjects of dominant repugnance, or subjects who challenge dominant modes of life intentionally or not, continue to live. They eat. They sleep. They hope or despair. They maneuver around a world in which they are—and they know they are—a social problem. Their lives might be crushed in the meantime. But empathetic deliberation allows the liberal subject never to have to encounter the people assigned to the brackets of the disagreeable. They do not exist in the present because I bracket them in order to proceed, nor will they exist in the future because this future is imagined as a place in which they do not exist. In short, empathetic deliberation can claim a genealogy to Judeo-Christian sacrificial love because it uses this spiritual relation to assign the disagreeable and uncomfortable to the historically undead.

A similar discursive maneuver around sacrificial love occurs in contemporary sovereign politics. To be sure, as they stare into the pit that mars Manhattan, many Americans do not hear the theological command to give up their lives for those responsible. Nevertheless, many people say that their sons and daughters, their spouses, or their parents are making exactly this kind of sacrifice in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the United States consumes its way to economic prosperity, or speculates its way to economic catastrophe, these people say that their loved ones are willing to make a principled death far from suburbs and malls. And this time no god holds back the hands of the slayer. The public may be barred from doing so, but families and friends see the bodies of their beloveds returned to them wrapped in flags. The mortician repairs the torn body, but for a final internment—until, for some, the redemption of the dead. These individuals and families have made what the second President Bush and
others have described as the “selflessness” of “ultimate sacrifice.” They have given their lives for a higher good. They have laid down their lives—or returned in physical and psychic pieces—for another.

But the rhetoric of sacrifice and sacrificial love is not univocal. It unfolds over time and across other discursive spaces. Take, for example, Bush’s rhetoric of sacrifice in such national rituals as his prime-time addresses to the American people. In his initial dramatic address to the nation on September 20, 2001, Bush makes reference to the ultimate “sacrifice,” but to whom he was referring is unclear: was he referring to the attackers’ willingness to sacrifice their lives for their “radical visions,” or to the attackers’ willingness to sacrifice others? (“By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions—by abandoning every value except the will to power—they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism.”) Referential clarity seems easier to establish in Bush’s first State of the Union address, after the attacks. Again Bush deploys the imagery of sacrifice, but this time it is clearly the “terrorists” who are willing to make the ultimate sacrifice. (“And terrorist leaders who urged followers to sacrifice their lives are running for their own.”) And it is America that is catching up with this new world of sacrificial offerings. (“For too long our culture has said, ‘If it feels good, do it.’ Now America is embracing a new ethic and a new creed: ‘Let’s roll.’ In the sacrifice of soldiers, the fierce brotherhood of firefighters, and the bravery and generosity of ordinary citizens, we have glimpsed what a new culture of responsibility could look like.”) It is not until his second State of the Union, sixteen months after the attacks and shortly before the U.S. military was busy trying to cover up the abuses at Abu Ghraib, that Bush finally evokes the Christian ideal of sacrificial love. (“America is a strong nation, and honorable in the use of our strength. We exercise power without conquest, and we sacrifice for the liberty of strangers.”) By 2004 he insists that Americans never forget the sacrifices of their friends (“As we debate at home, we must never ignore the vital contributions of our international partners, or dismiss their sacrifices”); by 2005, the sacrifices of their parents (“the security purchased by our parents’ sacrifice”); and by 2006, the sacrifices of the military families (“Let us never forget the sacrifices of America’s military families. . . . Our men and women in uniform are making sacrifices—and showing a sense of duty stronger than all fear”).
War critics can say that these discursively unfolding references to the sacrifices of war do not make the deaths of men and women in Iraq and Afghanistan sacrifices. We should lament the loss of life in Iraq because those who have died did not have to die in an illegal and unnecessary war—Bush and Cheney sacrificed these men and women for power and profit. But saying this might too quickly dismiss the performative force of such rhetorical maneuvers and, more troubling, too quickly skirt past how deeply counterdiscourses are tethered to a compatible imaginary. We can agree that Bush’s sacrificial rhetoric masks the callous disregard that men who hunger for state and market power have for the lives of the U.S. troops and Iraqi citizens. And we can agree that most people in the battlefield are not agreeing to be the sacrificial lamb. Everyone, or those in their right minds, is trying desperately to remain alive and in one piece. Actuarial probability shows that someone will die—that many will die. But no one wants to be that one or to have his or her beloved be that one. And so Humvees are provided with extra plating. Military engineers try to beat improvised explosive devices by jamming radar frequencies. Families raise money—or trim it from already stretched budgets—to send reinforced body armor to their kids, siblings, or spouses in the battlefield. Meanwhile, U.S. financial speculators are selling the poor and members of the middle class mortgages that they know will bankrupt them. Are Americans living through a perverse era? Yes. Does this perversion negate the performativity of sacrifice as a national rhetoric? Yes, and no.

As horrifying as these facts are, they do not negate the rhetorical force of sacrifice and sacrificial love that Bush and others evoke. The cynical reason of the progressive Left does not puncture the rhetoric of sacrificial love, because it merely contests the particular end to which a life is given rather than the general problem of sacrifice as a life-giving process. To say that the killed and maimed have died or are dying in vain suggests that there is some horizon of redeemed life where this killing and maiming would be rectified. In other words, “sacrifice” plays the role of the empty signifier, in Ernesto Laclau’s sense, creating centering effects in the realm of the political for critics and supporters of the war. For some, the real site of sacrifice is, and should have remained, Afghanistan. For some, the real site of sacrifice is Iraq. (If we put our faith in poll numbers, in 2003 seven in ten Americans believed that Saddam Hussein “had
a role” in the 9/11 attacks. In 2006, 43 percent believed that Hussein was personally involved in the attacks, while 85 percent of the active soldiers in Iraq believed this.) For them, the war is in self-defense. For some, this horizon is the principle of freedom, making the war against Islam “the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century.” For others, the sacrifice is for the defense of Christianity itself, a Christianity that believes the End of Days depends on the rebuilding of the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem. (And if reports from military classrooms and training grounds are correct, the U.S. chain of command is increasingly evangelical, with God as its ultimate commander in chief.) For still others, an increasingly disillusioned group, the sacrifice was for Iraqis and Afghans themselves. They enlisted—or saw their deployment as helping—to lift Iraqis and Afghans out of the misery of (Islamic, dictatorial) oppression. Bush referred exactly to this redemptive form of killing when he insisted that he would not withdraw American troops from Iraq prematurely lest their ultimate sacrifice be in vain.

The centering effect of sacrifice and sacrificial love enfolds not only the many occupational forces killed in Iraq and Afghanistan but also the countless counterinsurgents and civilians killed alongside them. All are articulated within the same logic that transforms the killing of occupation forces, innocent Iraqi and Afghan civilians, and the variety of antioccupational forces into a unified form of sacrificial life. Death— theirs and ours—is given so that something can be remade into a truer, higher form of being that we might catch a glimpse of as we make the ultimate sacrifice. Not only is our death a sacrifice in this sense, but the deaths of the enemies who arrived on my doorstep unexpectedly on 9/11 in New York and Washington and 7/7 in London are “opportunities” from this perspective. Even extrajudicial killings are sacrificial in this sense. It is from this perspective that U.S. soldiers are dying for the enemy. They are dying so something will be born anew. Once again, but this time in sovereign war making, the democratic state can narratively articulate its political strategy to Judeo-Christian sacrificial love because it uses this spiritual legacy to assign massive killing to the redeemed horizon of the undead.

The same no one who was whispering the creed of sacrificial love in the ears of those standing at Ground Zero in Manhattan is whispering in the ear of the neoliberal market. Even if a specific theological figura-
tion of self-denial provided the discursive and subject conditions for the emergence of Western capitalism (if we follow Max Weber), the resultant political economy of capitalism seems to have opened rather than closed a gap between the law of ontotheological self-sacrifice (crucifixion for the other) and the law of economic self-aggrandizement (individualized profit maximization), wherein, as I noted above, the “We the People” of the national imaginary becomes the he and I who never have to meet. Since the 1970s, market conservatives and, increasingly, labor democrats in the United States and Europe have promulgated a promarket philosophy that emphasizes privatization and individualization as the way of alleviating poverty. To right and left we have watched the slow dismantling of the neocorporatist compromise that lasted from the end of the Second World War to around 1973 and the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreements. In the wake of this collapse we are witnessing a shift in the practical business of the state as a mechanism of wealth redistributing to the practical business of the state as a source of corporate wealth and welfare through tax breaks and finance. Social, economic, and political life is increasingly organized around the neoliberal view that bodies and values are stakes in individual games of chance and that any collective agency (other than the corporation) is an impediment to the production of value. And the privatization of risk creates and fosters a language game in which the social is practiced as nothing more than an aggregate of individuated risk calculators working according to mathematically predictable econometric models. I am not in you. You are not in me. We are merely playing the same game of chance, whose truth lies not here and now between us but there and then in who wins and who loses. No one is killing me. And I am killing no one. We are each only responsible for ourselves. And every actual hardship I suffer can be referred to a future generation—often comprising one’s own children—that will do better, no matter that every generation has among it many people not making as much as others or not quite making it at all. As Hannah Arendt put it in even darker times, “The fact that with monotonous but abstract uniformity the same fate had befallen a mass of individuals did not prevent their judging themselves in terms of individual failure or the world in terms of specific injustice.”

As with the empathic public sphere and the war on terror, the mar-
ket would seem to hold little promise if we are looking for people fulfilling the command that they lay down their lives for enemies, neighbors, or friends. It is pretty brutal out there in the North Atlantic. Whether we accept David Harvey’s claim that the Iraq war signals a new American empire or Giovanni Arrighi’s that it signals the end of an American-dominated phase of capitalism, the rise of Chinese manufacturing, Brazilian enterprise, and Indian technologies has put renewed strain on the North Atlantic economies. Every day newspapers report a new viciousness in private equity in the United States. The collapse of the mortgage bubble brought on as much by predatory loans and speculative greed as by gullible or swindled homeowners occurs side by side with less publicized but equally vicious predations. On September 23, 2007, the New York Times reported on a widespread investment practice in which private equity firms acquire nursing homes, dramatically reduce costs by cutting care, and thus increase their profit margins so that they can be sold for significant gains. All of this can be satirized to great profit. But in any case, sacrificial love hardly seems the proper way of characterizing the practices of this new economy.

Once again progressive critics should be skeptical of the compassion of market neoliberals. And once again, given the sensibleness of this skepticism, we need to ask why the rhetoric of sacrificial love can have such a powerful illocutionary force nonetheless. In previous chapters I noted that social welfare is neither a success nor failure in the abstract. It is a socially mediated way of assessing the social world. If neoliberalism understands all social investments that do not have a clear end—a projectable moment when input values (money, services, care) can be replaced by output value—as failing economically and morally, then it might be hard to defend social programs which presuppose a world in which the state should care for the most vulnerable.

In a similar way, the question “Is the sacrifice worth it?” can be answered in the affirmative only if a specific relationship between violence and redemption defines the social imaginary of suffering and dying. If mortified bodies are read from the perspective of the redeemed end of individual responsibility, then the present-tense harms generating goods for some but not for others can be stretched across the horizon of time in such a way that the harms themselves become goods. Suffering and dying
can always be referred to a horizon of time where they are transformed into thriving and birthing. Compassionate conservatives are the first to admit that the kinds of changes they are demanding will be tough, even catastrophic, for some. But in the end, where, as Derrida notes, the truth of the ontotheological man lies, a new day will come, a new epoch, a rectified and cleansed body. If not the present workers’ bodies, then their children’s. Or if not them, then some person, at least one person, who is killed will not die.

So what is to be done when what lies beyond good and evil, sacrifice and sacrificial love, provides a means of memorialized denial of human suffering? To answer such a preposterously large question is beyond the scope of this chapter. I can, however, note three difficult issues that face those bold enough to wade into the question’s opening. First, the difference between a normative horizon, even a horizon whose normative structure is figured as paradoxical, and the incessant play of actual immanent tactics needs to be squarely addressed. Is there anything more to be gained by investigating the actual language games of sacrificial love as they operate across the denominated domains of late liberalism, markets, publics, and sovereignties than by remaining the critical reading of theological and philosophical texts? What exactly is this gain? After all, Žižek, and perhaps Derrida, might argue that just because the unplugging potential of sacrificial love has little formative force in contemporary social life does not mean that it couldn’t. Likewise, Žižek and Derrida might argue that just because discourses of sacrificial love are currently a bad forgery does not mean that they could not be written in the actual signature of the Fragile Absolute. Derrida, in particular, has demonstrated the horrifying stakes of an ethics of sacrificial love when read from the perspective of absolute other and then moved into the incessant activities of public and bureaucratic life. Moreover, the enormous existential energy that sacrificial love has provided those who face personal harm, of whatever sort, as the likely consequence of their resistance to a failed social order cannot be glibly dismissed. Michel Foucault may well have been right that pastoral care emerged not as an exit from power but as a new formation of power. But the example of Cesar Romero, the Catholic archbishop of San Salvador and one of the spiritual leaders of liberation theology, demonstrates the counterdiscursive potentials within this
new formation of power. What other grounds might allow for such leaps of progressive faith that renounce the body, its finitude and difference, as greater than the social good? And this leads to the last area that must be carefully investigated. Can something other than sacrificial love lie beyond the millennial governance of good and evil? Here, perhaps to the surprise of some, we find that we have a variety of options. Arendt is an obvious touchstone. For her, the concept of Greek immortality provided an ethical ground for political life far removed from the transcendental antiworldliness of Christianity.\textsuperscript{44} The willingness to suffer and die remains central in Arendt’s political philosophy—life is not, after all, the first value of Arendt, or the second or third. But the wager of death does not take the hero from the world. Among the ancient Greeks, a heroic death allowed a person to remain in the world as an immortal, and this heroic death bequeathed to those left behind the task to bear the burden of a fractured present through the narrativized remembrance. But the Greeks are not the only ones, or even the first. Buddhist meditations on the corpse meet new globalized technologies of massacre in Thailand.\textsuperscript{45} Indigenous geontologies try to refigure the economies of abandonment in Australia.\textsuperscript{46} What might be the fates of these refusals of good and evil on our fragmented presents?
At the very end of “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas,” Ursula Le Guin does something shocking for someone so clear sighted about the ethics of abandonment and the politics of social injustice. She lets some of the citizens of Omelas walk away from the searing paradox of the child in the broom closet. Worse, she does not say where these departing citizens are going. She tells us that they seem to know where they are going. But she doesn’t give us any hint of what they are thinking or what the new world they hope to bring into
existence will look like. And so she lets us watch them walk away from Omelas with little more than a suggestion that this emigration is a profoundly ethical act. But those who leave Omelas leave the child behind. Why don’t they stay and fight, or burn down Omelas if that is what it would take to liberate the child?

How more realistic does Charles Burnett’s *Killer of Sheep* seem, ending as it does with the protagonist Stan working in the same slaughterhouse as when the film began. We do not see anyone walking out of Watts. Burnett ends his meditation on race, poverty, and hope by showing Stan pushing a group of sheep down a metal corridor to their slaughter. And throughout, Burnett foregrounds the near impossibility of escaping Watts when the equipment that residents have on hand is not reliable—when Heidegger’s famous “ease of coping” has not been built with them in mind. Take, for example, one scene in the film: Burnett follows the attempt of Stan’s family and friends to spend a day at the seashore. They borrow a car that has clearly seen better days. It begins to break down almost immediately, finally falling to pieces halfway to the shore. Stan and his family and friends stand on the side of the road, stranded between Watts and the coast. But while many viewers might not see anything revolutionary in these scenes, Burnett sees otherwise. For Burnett, Stan is hopeful because he “has decided to persevere and fight on despite society’s place for him.” He remains something inspirational insofar as he continues to strive to persevere in being.

Burnett’s hopeful take on social transformation, when viewed unflinchingly from inside the material conditions of the part that has no part in late liberalism, provides an interesting rejoinder to those who demand to know the positive content of an alternative form of social life before setting off on a journey. And it provides an interesting challenge to those who would demand a normative solution to any critique of the actual world. Like Burnett, many critical theorists might seem to open the question of the social otherwise only to leave readers with nowhere to go, no description of where or what an elsewhere might consist of, and with nothing in one’s pocket but sheer persistence in the face of a set of seemingly unmovable barriers. This, many argue, is especially true of the hope that immanent critique places in spaces of radical potentiality. If this is hope, skeptics say, it is a very denuded and awkward form of hope. What
good does immanent critique do for a practical politics if, after stripping social life bare—exposing the brutality of social injustice—it provides it with no alternative clothing?

Three kinds of criticism are typically leveled at narratives that focus on moments of sheer potentiality such as we see in “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas,” *Killer of Sheep*, and this book: that they lack a normative direction around which a practical politics could be built; that they are parasitical on a given normative world; and that they reflect the precritical political positions of the author. The first argument asserts that there is something wrong with a form of knowledge that does not propose a positive, alternative shelter for the exposed body. A fundamental rule of scholarship has been broken: every critical social analysis must have a normative horizon against which progressive action can orient itself and social movements can be assessed. Immanent critique and critical theory are, instead, mere parasites of the normative. Although I have not discussed his work in this book, Theodor Adorno and his concept of negative dialectics is a favorite hobbyhorse of these kinds of criticisms. Prior to the charges against the philosophers of potentiality, there were charges against the “determinate negations” of Adorno. His understanding of negative dialectics as parasitical on the ordinary nondialectical mode of capital—his argument that the purpose of negative dialectics was to point out specific contradictions between what liberal capital claims and what it actually delivers—allowed critics to characterize negative dialectics as providing little more than an aesthetically ornate style of skepticism and aloofness. To say, “not this,” does not tell us “what then?” or “where then?” Where are all those people going, those who walk away from Omelas? And to say, as Burnett does, that the protagonist of *Killer of Sheep* is hopeful for nothing more than his continued willful striving leaves us no insight into how he is able to capacitate his will or how he will move from willful striving to positive living.

Moreover, according to critics, when theorists do provide substantive answers they are wildly naive and abstract from a policy perspective, and because these theorists are not neutral and disinterested, their conclusions are untrustworthy. Critical theory, and especially immanent critique, doesn’t seek to find the truth of the world, according to these critics, but rather attempts to shape the truth of the world to reflect its
political beliefs. This criticism has spawned second-order debates about the sources and grounds of neutral and disinterested knowledge, especially the infamous disinterested nature of the “view from nowhere.” Philosophers such as Thomas Nagel argue that the view from nowhere—the ability to view the world from a detached perspective—is a feature of cognition unique to human beings. But social literary historians such as Mary Poovey have claimed that this perspective is irreducibly associated with specific (Western) social imaginaries that were then universalized through power-saturated institutions such as capitalism and liberal democracy. And finally, still other critics find fault in this way of doing scholarship by pointing out what look like moments of overt or covert hypocrisy on the part of the critic. For instance, I have written extensively on the cunning of cultural recognition in Indigenous land claims even as I have agreed to aid Indigenous friends and colleagues by supporting their land claims. And I am currently helping imagine and find financial support for an Indigenous grassroots project on mixed reality that I will then proceed to engage critically.

How should these charges against immanent critique and critical theory be addressed? Clearly the answer cannot be that scholars agree to remain silent about people like Stan, the anonymous child in the broom closet, my Indigenous friends in Australia, and the practitioners of alternative spiritual practices in the United States, until they can give a substantive account of the sheltered place of justice awaiting them at the end of their voyage. As this book has attempted to demonstrate, this incitement to wait, to be patient, to bracket harm until the impasse has been resolved and the account given, is part and parcel of how power is organized in late liberalism—it is what begins the dialectic among recognition, espionage, and camouflage.

Given the complexities by which harm is represented and apprehended within late liberalism, it seems to me that if we are to address the above criticisms it would do us well to begin by addressing whether negative dialectics is in fact negative, and in what ways potentiality emerges from actuality. For instance, we know that negative dialectics is negative in the sense that it attempts to demonstrate how the achievement of identity and unity is built on the violent suppression of difference and diversity. Negative critique was developed to make visible the nonidentity be-
between claims of social unity and claims of social difference and diversity, and to make palpable the nonidentity between claims about normative worlds and actual worlds. Negative dialectics insists that we must rigorously demonstrate the noncorrespondence between what is claimed and what is, and the techniques of power that allow the claimed world to appear not merely as the actual world but the best of all actual worlds. One must unwork this identity—make it unworkable—transform it from the background that allows an ease of copying for some but not others. The activist and personality from New York’s Lower East Side, Valerie Solanas, made a similar point in her *SCUM* Manifesto, wherein she called for the “unworking” of capitalism. “*SCUM* will become members of the unwork force, the fuck-up force; they will get jobs of various kinds and unwork. For example, *SCUM* salesgirls will not charge for merchandise; *SCUM* telephone operators will not charge for calls; *SCUM* office and factory workers, in addition to fucking up their work, will secretly destroy equipment. *SCUM* will unwork at a job until fired, then get a new job to unwork at.”

In other words, negative critique and critical theory more generally don’t lack a relationship to normativity. They shift the focus on normativity from a horizontal to a background perspective. And it is exactly as background that normativity provides critical theory with a specific kind of positivity. What appears to be a radically empty gesture (“not this”) is revealed to be a positive act. The citizens of Omelas who say “not this” act insofar as they make a statement. Stan’s continual refusal to collapse under the weight of a thousand mute obstacles (“not that”) should be understood as a series of quasi-events that provide the preconditions in which some new social content might be nurtured. My Indigenous friends, who are trying to create an augmented reality project that would then support them socially and economically, continue to do something as long as they refuse to do nothing. All of these fictive and real characters are acting positively in a social world that is built in such a way that it is unreliable for them whether or not the statement “not this” immediately produces a “what then.” “Not this” makes a difference even if it does not immediately produce a propositional otherwise. Each of these differences is unique because of their differential distribution across the social worlds of late liberalism.
There is another way that critical theory provides positive content through the parasitical activity of stating “not this.” In this case, critical theory does not aim its understanding on those within alternative social projects but on those for whom the world seems to work just fine. Solanus is an exemplary critic in this sense. She seeks to make the world unready-at-hand for those for whom it has worked smoothly—so smoothly that there seems little difference between the world as a normative projection and the world as it is differential lived.

There is a final way that critical theory and immanent critique is a positive exercise. Insofar as the focus of a critical theorist emerges from the worlds in which she is immersed, these worlds imprint themselves on the movement of critique. This is why the content of critical theory is never capable of being neutral or disinterested. For instance, whether right or wrong, convincing or absurd, my understanding of tense, eventfulness, and ethical substance as technologies of late liberal governance is a positive imprint of the social worlds in which I have been immersed over the last long while. The imprint these social worlds have made on my work is not a pure copy of their worlds any more than the voyage my friends made to Banagula, described in chapter 3, is a pure repetition of their ancestors’ voyages. These are tracings that will then be traced. All of these tracings are the prehistory of a new positive form of life even as they are the conditions for “not this” and “not that.” All of them set the table for guests who will shout that the food is tasteless, the wine weak, the conversation stifling; or find that they finally feel full.
Introduction. The Child in the Broom Closet

2 Ibid.
3 James, “The Moral Philosopher and Moral Life,” 141.
5 See, for instance, Bernard Williams’s discussion of the critical importance of the project for the health of the subject. Bernard Williams, Moral Luck.
6 Povinelli, The Empire of Love, 6–9.
7 Or, as one critical reading of this story suggests, one must be willing to annihilate oneself. See Simon, “William James’s Lost Souls in Ursula Le Guin’s Utopia.”
8 Derrida, “The Ends of Man.”
9 See, for instance, John Fekete’s reading of Le Guin and Delany. Fekete, “The Dispossessed and Triton.”
10 Nagel, The View from Nowhere.
11 Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, 112.
12 Warner, Publics and Counterpublics; Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries; Fraser, “Rethinking Recognition”; Povinelli, “Radical Worlds.”
13 Foucault, “Des éspaces autres,” 47.
14 Foucault, “Des espaces autres.”
15 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 101.
17 Ibid.
18 The idea may have an objective (extrinsic) reality insofar as it represents a thing. It also has a formal (intrinsic) reality insofar as it is a thing independent of what it represents. See ibid.
19 Agamben, “Absolute Immanence.”
20 See ibid. and Agamben, Homo Sacer, 44.
21 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 187.
22 Ibid., 186.
23 Ibid., 162.
24 Ibid., 187.
25 Ibid., 163.
27 See Jakobson, On Language; Bakhtin, “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel.”
29 Étienne Balibar reflected on the distinctions of teleology and eschatology in a reflection on Derrida and Althusser. There teleology is said to be “the doctrine of the historical and intellectual process as realization of an already given end or telos, a process with a conscious or unconscious purpose,” while eschatology refers to the “extreme” or “ultimate” moments and events which immediately precede or accompany the end of history and “its reversal into eternity.” Balibar, “Eschatology versus Teleology,” 64.
30 In “The Performativity of Foundations,” Benjamin Lee explores the complex temporal performative dynamic of modern democratic constitutionality, including the different modes of time invested in reference to God and the people and entailed in the institutional dynamics of democratic constitutional process. See Lee, “The Performativity of Foundations.” We can also here think of Walter Benjamin’s discussion of the difference between constituted and constituting violence. See Benjamin, “Critique of Violence.”
31 See Povinelli, The Empire of Love.
32 Das, Life and Words; Biehl, Vita.
33 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 26.
34 Ibid., 27–28. See also Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself.
35 In an interview Althusser noted, “Proletarians have a ‘class instinct’ which helps them on the way to proletarian ‘class positions.’ Intellectuals, on the contrary, have a petty-bourgeois class instinct which fiercely resists this transition.” But this instinct is the “consciousness and practice which conform with the objective reality of the proletarian class struggle.” Thus the proletariat need only be educated. Not so the intellectual: “The class instinct of the petty bourgeois, and hence of intellectuals, has, on the contrary, to be revolutionized.” Althusser, “Philosophy as a Revolutionary Weapon,” 13.
36 In 1944, the leaders of Allied forces met at Bretton Woods Hotel in New Hampshire to plan for a joint postwar economic policy. For a general discussion of neoliberalism, see Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics; Wallerstein, The End of the Worlds as We Know It; Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism; Palley, “From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism.”
37 For a discussion of the effects of the arrangement on Europe, see Eichengreen, *The European Economy since 1945*.
38 Chapman, “The Accord.”
40 Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century*, 12.
41 For the debate about the relationship between global migration and the nation state form, see McKeom, *Melancholy Order*; Trouillot, *Global Transformations*.
42 Arrighi, *Adam Smith in Beijing*.
43 Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 159–205. Harvey is not the only scholar to consider the history of U.S. imperialism. Because the “claims and counter-claims are not really concerned with the actual history of empire,” Eric Hobsbawm is critical of approaches, whether on the left or right, that assert that the United States’ (or the Bush administration’s) claim of global supremacy cannot account for the specific dynamics or trajectories of the United States. Hobsbawm, *On Empire*, 61. See also de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*.
45 Ibid.
46 Coulthard, “Subjects of Empire.”
48 Mbembe, “Necropolitics.”
49 Cornia and Court, *Inequality, Growth and Poverty*.
50 See, for instance, the work of grassroots globalization networks. Appadurai, “Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination.”
51 Hardt and Negri, *The Multitude*.
52 Whatever actually happens, these moments of the “historical singularity of capital” help us understand capital as an “economic-institutional figure before which a field of possibility opens up.” Foucault, *Birth of Biopolitics*, 165.
53 See Melville and Owen, “China in Africa.”
54 The inadequacy of the G8 in the management of the current global economy is not merely an external challenge posed to it by the G20, but something acknowledged by members of the G8. See, for instance President Barack Obama’s call for an expanded G16 at the Italian-hosted G8 summit at L’Aquila in July 2009.
56 Even if we wished to differentiate between capital and the market, as does Fernand Braudel, it is increasingly unclear what forms of life are becoming explicit markets. See Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism*.
58 Brown, “American Nightmare.”
59 “In a matter of weeks, Australia’s boom has gone bust. Now economists at Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase, among others, are forecasting that Australia’s econ-
omy will shrink this quarter and next, tipping the land down under into a recession for the first time since 1991. JPMorgan sees the jobless rate—a record low 4% just 10 months ago—rising to 9% by 2010.” Wiseman, “Boom in Australia Goes Bust as Global Slowdown Hits.”


Freedman, “Zoellick Calls 2009 a ‘Dangerous Year’ as Crisis Curtails Trade.”

Sen, “Capitalism beyond the Crisis.”

In the same month, the prime minister of China, Wen Jiabao, facing a rapid slowdown of growth and the subsequent displacement of labor, chastised American unregulated capital—a form of capital that many economists believe China had aspired to.

Brown, Regulating Aversion; Markell, Bound by Recognition.

Fabian, Time and the Other.

Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 222. See also Arendt’s description of the messianic (prophetic) mode of facism in which “the Leader is always right in his actions and since these are planned for centuries to come, the ultimate test of what he does has been removed beyond the experience of his contemporaries.” Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 81.

Arendt, Foucault, and others long ago outlined some of the genealogical conditions of the social. Arendt argued that “the Social” emerged from and rearticulated the classical division between the biological processes and the realm of necessity located with the private realm and actions of freedom located in the public realm of political action. Foucault focused on the emergence of the social with the emergence of the nation as a new ground and reference of legitimate power (biopolitics) and knowing (probability). Both emphasized the increasing self-evident nature of the referent, the social, to the human worlds in which human life consisted. See Arendt, The Human Condition, 38–49; Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, esp. 213–38.

Thus I am perhaps closest to Foucault’s understanding of writing a general history as opposed to writing a total history insofar as the latter claims “a total description” that draws “all phenomena around a simple center—a principle, a meaning, a spirit, a world view, an overall shape,” whereas the former “would deploy the space of a dispersion.” See Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, 9–11.

Burns, ‘British ‘Multiculturalism’ Criticized.”

See Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks; Bhabha, “Interrogating Identity”; Fuss, Identification Papers.

Spinoza, Ethics, 168.

Butler, “What Is Critique?”

It is in fact what allows political theorists of multiculturalism, such as Will Kymlicka, to say that immigrants, indigenous people, and the unmarked settler

74 Waldron, “Indigeneity.”

75 Ibid., 55.


77 Coulthard, “Subjects of Empire”; Kauanui, *Hawaiian Blood*. That settlement is an ongoing historical struggle is a point that Waldron is aware of. His discussion of Indigenous rights is explicitly situated in the ongoing conflict between the Palestinian and Israeli states. See Waldron, “Indigeneity.”

78 For a longer discussion, see Povinelli, *The Empire of Love*.

79 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Kelly and Kaplan, *Represented Communities*.


81 Scheckel, *The Insistence of the Indian*, 16.

82 Ibid., 17.


84 The infamous notion of domestic dependent nationalism was elaborated across the so-called Marshall Trilogy, *Johnson v. MacIntosh* (1823), *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* (1831), and *Worcester v. Georgia* (1832).

85 “The justices insisted that, legally, the treatment of Indians in conquered territories did not provide a precedent for the status of Puerto Ricans, who were prior subjects of Spain. Yet the language of *Downes v. Bidwell* resonates with the landmark decision of *Cherokee Nation v. the State of Georgia* in 1831, which rendered Indians as members of ‘domestic dependent nations,’ foreign to the rights guaranteed by states and territories, but domestic for federal purposes. As ‘alien races,’ Puerto Ricans were rendered ‘foreign’ in a ‘domestic sense’ by their perceived resemblance to alien races deemed to be incapable of self-government at home.” Kaplan, *The Anarchy of Empire*, 10.

86 Wilson, *The Sense of the People*; Duncanson “Scripting Empire.” See also Ford, *Settler Sovereignty*.

87 See, for instance, Reynolds, *Dispossession*.

88 Abu El Haj, *Facts on the Ground*.

89 See, for instance, Goldberg, *The Threat of Race*.

90 Fassin, “Going Dutch”; Fassin and Fassin, *Da la question sociale à la question raciale*?

91 Koğacıoğlu, “The Tradition Effect.”


93 Bentley, “The Fourth Dimension.”
Chapter One: The Part That Has No Part

1. As part of this debate see Austin-Broos, “Making a Difference,” and Lattas and Morris, “The Politics of Suffering and the Politics of Anthropology.”

2. Pearson states that Sutton provides “hope that the debate on Indigenous policy is becoming much more forthright” and that “issues that habitually have been skirted around or alluded to only in anthropological code are being discussed with a refreshing bluntness.” Pearson, “Face Reality of Violence,” n.p.


4. Ibid, 43.

5. Not surprisingly Sutton was also part of the academic backlash against so-called postmodern anthropologists who supposedly refused to abide by the self-evident nature of these differences, let alone their hierarchical relationship. See Sutton, The Politics of Suffering.

6. Fabian, “The Other Revisited,” 143.

7. Ibid., 140.

8. For Rancière, to count as political, an act or movement must involve more than power, the power to rebel, or the power to suppress. These may be mere instances of policing, which he understands as “an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees those bodies are assigned by the name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise.” In other words, for Rancière, policing is not so much the “‘disciplining’ of bodies” as a “rule governing their appearing” and “a configuration of occupations and the properties of the spaces where these occupations are distributed.” In contrast to policing, the political is manifested when a part that has had no part—a part that has been treated and “understood” as nothing but noise—becomes visible, palpable, and articulate. Rancière, Disagreement, 29.

9. Ibid.

10. Under pressure from human rights activists, the federal government made the program voluntary.


12. Laura Beacroft and Melanie Poole, “Overview of Northern Territory Emergency Response.”


14. As of the writing of this book, the Labour government is discussing how it might reinstate the Racial Discrimination Act without suspending the Intervention.

15. The full text reads: “A national welfare card that will allow the Government...”
Notes to Chapter One

to control payments to negligent parents across the country will be unveiled in Tuesday’s budget. The debit card—to be introduced in selected Indigenous communities before being rolled out across Australia—will ensure half of the cardholders’ welfare payments are spent on approved goods and services, such as food and clothing for their children, rather than wasted on alcohol and drugs. The card will not carry a photograph but will be PIN-coded to prevent it being sold on the black market and abused by welfare-dependent parents.” Karvelas, “Welfare curbs on parents,” 3.

16 See the transcript of Rudd’s apology, “Kevin Rudd’s Sorry Speech.”

17 First Nations Summit website, www.fns.bc.ca.


21 See Cunningham, “Another Minister Quits,” n.p. See also Lea and Pholeros, “This House Is Not a House.”

22 Franklin, “Swan Cuts Deep as Revenue Sinks.” Commenting on this proposal in “Despair and Defeat Also a White Problem,” David Burchell first conjures the “bemused Aboriginal” to note the fickle romantic fantasy of white liberals: “A colleague of mine ran into a bemused Aboriginal bloke at a reconciliation meeting some years back. The young man couldn’t quite work it out. After facing hostility and suspicion for much of his life, suddenly here he found himself feted as a kind of saint, merely for being Aboriginal. Everyone wanted to know what he thought; nobody wanted to disagree with him. They all laughed at his jokes. It was intoxicating, but also unnerving. My colleague told him not to lose his head. At some point, he explained, white liberal opinion (among whom he countered himself) had fallen in love with a particular view of Aboriginality. But it wasn’t a platonic love. Sophisticated urban liberals, with their hi-tech lifestyles and their busy lives, cleaved to the idea of a traditional, spiritual Aboriginal culture so radically different from their own. It worked for them.” One of the differences was between “domestic violence, which was white and “family violence,” which was black. But now we know that “domestic violence is much the same phenomenon in black and white communities.” Thus testing out this policy on blacks might actually help whites wake up and see they are the same.


24 Little Children Are Sacred, 12.
26 Graebner, “The End of Liberalism.” Moynihan’s report was attacked by the Right, which argued that the cause of the pathology was the welfare system itself. See Murray, Losing Ground.
27 Smith, Welfare Reform and Sexual Regulation, 85.
28 See Povinelli, The Cunning of Recognition, 153–86.
30 For a full range of opinions on the legal recognition of the ritual use of ayahuasca, see the Ayahuasca–Santo Daime Online Library website, www.santodaime.it.
32 “UDV New Mexico Ayahuasca Case: Timeline and Overview of Events” (last modified March 2009), Vaults of Erowid website, www.erowid.org.
33 Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, filed in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, November 2000.
35 “To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.” Employment Div., Oregon Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
36 Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, 120–32.
38 “(1) the term ‘Indian’ means a member of an Indian tribe; (2) the term ‘Indian tribe’ means any tribe, band, nation, pueblo, or other organized group of Indians, including any Alaska Native village (as defined in, or established pursuant to, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act [43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.]), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of the status as Indians; (3) the term ‘Indian religion’ means any religion—(A) which is practiced by Indians, and (B) the origin and interpretation of which is from within a traditional Indian culture or community.” American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–344, § 3(c)1–3, 108 Stat. 3125 [H.R. 4230], (1994).
40 Greenhouse, “Sect Allowed to Import Its Hallucinogenic Tea.”
41 Rancière, Disagreement, 27–34.
Notes to Chapter Two

42 For a historical account of a prenational form of Indigenous empire, see Pekka, *The Comanche Empire*.

43 Amanda Macdonald first made me think about the politics of persistence in her presentation, “If Everybody Could Just Settle Down: Representational Insistence in Lieu of Resistance in the Pre-Postcolony New Caledonia,” delivered at the “Conditions of Settler Colonialism” symposium, Center for Contemporary Critical Theory, University of Chicago, May 25, 2008.

Chapter Two. The Brackets of Recognition


3 Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*; see also Aazmi, *From the Graveyard of Civilizations*.

4 Clegg, “Defeating Terror the British Way.”


6 Derrida, “The Ends of Man.”


8 Davidson, “Radical Interpretation.”


11 Davidson, “Communication and Convention.”


13 Davidson, “Radical Interpretation,” 137, my emphasis; for a trenchant critique, see Cutrofello, “On the Transcendental Pretensions of the Principle of Charity.”

14 Mamdani, “‘Culture’ and Human Rights.”


16 Haraway, *When Species Meet*.

17 For an exchange between Singer and Williams, see Schaler, *Peter Singer Under Fire*, 77–102.

18 The debate took place in one of Singer’s classes on March 2, 2002, at Princeton University. For Johnson’s account of their exchange, first published in the *New York Times Magazine*, see Johnson, *Too Late to Die Young*, 201–28.


20 I discussed this distinction in “Introduction: Critical Common Sense” in *The Cunning of Recognition*.

21 Silverstein, “Metapragmatic Discourse and Metapragmatic Function.”

22 Thus Paul de Man argued that Peirce was essential to a deconstructive under-


24 Of course there is some debate among philosophers about this. My own reading of Heidegger is influenced by Arendt’s student William O’Grady, and by the external realism promoted by Dreyfus and Carmen. See Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*; Carmen, *Heidegger’s Analytic*.


26 Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*.

27 See Miller, “Extimité.”

28 See, for instance, Baker and Morris, *Descartes’ Dualism*.

29 Singer, “To Defame Religion Is a Human Right.”


31 Derrida, “Force of Law.”

32 Walsh, “The Animal Enterprise Protection Act.”

33 See para. 22.

34 Ibid.

35 See, for instance, Der Derian, “Decoding the National Security Strategy of the United States of America”; Masco, “‘Survival Is Your Business.’”


Chapter Three. Road Kill

1 Langton, “Mobility Disability,” 459. Langton is quoting from Oedel, “The Legacy of Jim Crow in Macon, Georgia.”

2 Altman and Hinkson, “Mobility and Modernity in Arnhem Land.”


5 Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*.

6 Foucault’s emphasis on the critical role of the physiocrats, and of political economy more generally, in the emergence of an art of governance whose rationale and object was life has struck more than a few political theorists as closely echoing Hannah Arendt’s reflections on the emergence of the Social and through it, the stranglehold of life on modern politics. See Foucault, *Security, Population, Territory*. Like Foucault, Arendt saw the political economists, and their most vocal critic, Marx, playing a key role in this transformation of the antilife stance
of the Greek polis to the life-enhancing logic of the Social. But if Arendt was clear, if controversially so, about her stance on the relationship between life and necessity, Foucault was less clear on the relationship between his thinking about biopolitics and substance. See Arendt, *The Human Condition*.


8 Ibid., 27–28. See also Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself*.

9 Note that Rosi Braidotti uses the term “material,” or more specific “bodily materiality” rather than substance. Indeed, she explicitly refuses “the metaphysics of substance” although the concept of being is central to her work. See Braidotti, *Metamorphoses*, 65–116.

10 Butler notes, “Humanist conceptions of the subject tend to assume a substantive person who is the bearer of various essential and nonessential attributes.” Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 10.

11 See Braidotti, *Metamorphoses*. Butler’s more recent work likewise attempts to foreground the fundamental vulnerability of the exposed body as a modality of existence that is neither ontological nor desubstantial. See, for instance, Butler, *Precarious Life*.


15 Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom.”

16 See Povinelli, *The Cunning of Recognition*.


18 Altman and Hinkson, “Mobility and Modernity in Arnhem Land.”

19 See Johnson, *Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody*.

20 Made more poignant by the fact that he suffered debilitating bouts of depression, William James wrote on conditions in which conflicts of the will arise. Take for instance, he writes, freezing mornings when we know we must get out of bed, and yet “the warm couch feels too delicious, the cold outside too cruel, and resolution fains away and postpones itself again and again as it seemed on the verge of bursting the resistance and passing over into the decisive act.” For James, what causes us finally to rise is not more will but less inhibition. At some point there are “no contradictory or paralyzing suggestions,” and up we go. James, “Will,” 691. See also, Richardson, *William James*, 80.

21 For instance, Nancy Fraser and Nancy Hartsock critiqued Foucault’s concept of docile power as leaving no site for resistance and no ability to evaluate one form of resistance over another. They argue that without a fixed point, or normative horizon, against which progressive action can orient itself and social movements can be assessed, nothing can emerge and nothing can be discriminated. See, for instance, Fraser, “Foucault on Modern Power”; Hartsock, *Money, Sex, and Power*.

22 “Noise is stercoral: it makes the occupation of an expanse intolerable and thus gets it for itself.” Serres, *The Parasite*, 94.
Notes to Chapter Three

24 Massumi, *A Shock to Thought*, 82.
26 Ibid, 66.
27 See Risor, “Twenty Hanging Dolls and a Lynching.”
29 On July 3, 2008, the British newspaper the *Guardian* broke the story of a secret World Bank report showing the dramatic effect of a mandatory increase of biofuel percentage in cars in the West on prices of food oil in the rest of the world. Chakrabortty, “Secret Report.”
31 Biofuels are not the only waste products that can enter the circuit of capital. A host of scholars have begun studying startup companies specializing in “cord blood banking.” Cord blood is blood extracted from the placenta or umbilical cord that contains stem cells, which are now celebrated as having the potential to treat genetic diseases. Once treated as waste products of reproduction, the blood within the placenta and umbilical cord is now the basis for public and for-profit cord storage banks. The Australian sociologist Catherine Waldby has examined how in the process the gift economy of tissue donation has been transformed into a speculative commercial enterprise. See Waldby, “Umbilical Cord Blood.”
34 See, for instance, the case of Scott DeMuth, who was jailed for contempt of court for refusing to speak about how interviews conducted for his dissertation research on the intersection of Native American and environmental activism might shed light on an Animal Liberation Front action at the University of Iowa. See Will Potter, “FBI Harasses Sociology Professor Who Has Spoken Against Labeling His Student a ‘Terrorist’” (May 18, 2010), website of GreenIsTheNewRed.com, www.greenisthenewred.com.
36 See, for instance, Bari, *Timber Wars*.
37 As Braidotti argues, becoming a minority is not a “general principle,” as Deleuze sometimes seems to suggest. For Braidotti, the process of becoming a minority always emerges within the given differentials of life, the central distributing function being sexual difference. Indeed, her extraordinary commitment to the
unnovable axis of sexual difference has led her to demonize queer theory from a majoritarian point-of-view. See Braidotti, *Metamorphosis*, 65–116.

38 Povinelli, *The Empire of Love*.

39 See Duncan Kennedy’s classic essay “The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries.”

40 See Braidotti, *Metamorphoses*.

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**Chapter Four. Events of Abandonment**

1 See Agamben, *Homo Sacer*.

2 For Foucault, mass extermination was the exercise of sovereign power on behalf of the population, a term he sometimes uses interchangeably with “race.” See Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*. Roberto Esposito distinguishes between the biologics of the Nazi biopolitical regime and a positive biopowers; see Esposito, *Bios*.

3 Mbembe, “Necropolitics.”

4 “We cannot sit back and continue aimlessly with a welfare dominated housing model where Government drip feeds housing to Aboriginal Territorians, a model that bleeds money, doesn’t work and encourages welfare dependency.” From “Giles: Call for Royal Commission into Indigenous Housing,” news release by Adam Giles, October 5, 2009, Website of the Country Liberal Party, www.countryliberals.org.au. The privatization of public housing in Australia is part of a much larger neoliberal strategy; see, for instance, Fennel, “Project Heat.”

5 Serres, *The Parasite*.


7 The function of tradition in the governance of difference is not restricted to the Indigenous context. See Koğacıoğlu on the “tradition effect” in Turkey, in “The Tradition Effect.”


11 Australian Anti-Terrorism Act, no. 2 (Cth.) (2005).


13 Australian Anti-Terrorism Act, no. 2 (Cth.) (2005), sched. 1, sec. 9.

14 Garran, *True Believer*.

Notes to Chapter Four

17 For a general discussion of the “Tampa Affair,” the “Children Overboard” allegations, and the “Pacific Solution” see Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, and Weller, Don’t Tell the Prime Minister.
18 See Hauerwas and Lentricchia, “Note from the Editors.”
19 The press widely reported this comment, made by Pratullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati, special advisor for Asia and the Pacific and U.N. envoy to the U.N. Human Rights Commission, after his visit to the Woomera Detention Facility in 2002 and the Howard government’s immediate reaction. See, for instance, “Australia Rejects UN Criticism on Camps” (August 1, 2002), BBC website, news.bbc.co.uk.
20 For a discussion of the history of international reaction to these policies, see Crock, Saul, and Dastyari, Future Seekers II, 201–3.
24 For an overview see Vigh, “Crisis and Chronicity.”
25 Berlant, “Slow Death (Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency).”
26 Foucault, Security, Population, Territory. See also Hacking, The Taming of Chance.
28 For instance, having finally gained control of both houses of parliament in 2004, Howard radically transformed labor relations by introducing Australian Workplace Agreements. These individual agreements made between employer and employee replaced the “awards” system, in which pay packages were negotiated among the federal government, industry, and the trade union movement.
31 See Altman and Hunter, “Indigenous Poverty.”
32 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health and Welfare Unit, “Health.”
33 For a different approach to indigenous poverty, see Brock, Outback Ghettos.
34 See Scrimgeour, “How Think Tanks Are Misleading Us on Aboriginal Children’s Health.”
Chapter Five. After Good and Evil

1 The interview was announced and excerpted in “Bush Has Given Up Golf for Troops,” on Jonathan Martin’s blog, Politico, www.politico.com (May 13, 2008).

2 Much of this information is emerging only because of judicial pressure. See, e.g., Abramowitz, “Service Logs of White House Visitors Are Public Records, Judge Rules.”

3 Critics are worried by the influence of fundamentalist Christian groups like Military Ministry, a national organization and a subsidiary of the controversial fundamentalist Christian organization Campus Crusade for Christ. Military Ministry’s national website states that it targets basic training installations and has converted thousands of soldiers to evangelical Christianity. See Lepold, “Military Evangelism Deeper, Wider Than First Thought.” A top adviser to Gonzales, Monica Goodling is quoted as having judged prosecutors on the basis of whether they were “sufficiently conservative on the core issues of ‘god, guns + gays.’” Lightblau, “Report Faults Aides in Hiring at Justice Dept.” Similar problems were reported at the Environmental Protection Agency, where Vice President Dick Cheney’s office was reported to have removed statements on the health risks posed by global warming because they did not comply with the Bush administration’s political and market ideology. Revkin, “Cheney’s Office Said to Edit Draft Testimony.”

4 For the connections among the White House, Blackwater, and the Family Research Council, see Scahill, Blackwater.


7 See, e.g., the comment by the former prime minister Tony Blair that “if you have faith about these things then you realise that judgement is made by other people. If you believe in God, it’s made by God as well,” in McSmith, “Blair: ‘God Will Be My Judge on Iraq,’” n.p.

8 See, e.g., Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim.


11 Emile Benveniste famously noted that the third person should be, more precisely, thought of as the nonperson and was not always specified lexically. Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, 728–31.
Notes to Chapter Five

12 “President Addresses Nation, Discusses Iraq, War on Terror” (June 28, 2005), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov.

13 In a reading of Herman Melville’s civil war poem “Shiloh,” Michael Warner examines how violence can be made scandalous. See Warner, “What Like a Bullet Can Undeceive.”

14 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 48.

15 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 7.

16 Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere,” 1, 2.

17 See Ratzinger and Habermas, The Dialectics of Secularization.

18 Habermas attempts to answer these questions in Between Naturalism and Religion.

19 For a genealogy of the secular, see Asad, Formations of the Secular.

20 Žižek, The Fragile Absolute, 1.

21 Žižek, “A Leftist Plea for ‘Eurocentrism.’” See also Rancière, Disagreement; and Žižek, Fragile Absolute.

22 Ratzinger and Habermas, Dialectics of Secularization.


26 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 29.

27 Derrida discusses the peregrinations of obligation across The Gift of Death and The Politics of Friendship.

28 I borrow the phrase “natural history of discourse” from Michael Silverstein and Greg Urban, who use it to refer to the process by which moments of speech are moved through social institutions in such a way that they appear to be socially neutral, authoritative pronouncements about social life. See Silverstein and Urban, “The Natural History of Discourse.”

29 For a critical account of contemporary debates over race and racism in France, see Fassin and Fassin, De la question sociale à la question raciale.

30 Taylor, A Secular Age.

31 Dillon and Reid, The Liberal Way of War.


Notes to Conclusion

36 “President Bush Addresses American Legion National Convention.”
37 Weinstein and Seay, *With God on Our Side*.
41 Charles Duhigg, “At Many Homes, More Profit and Less Nursing.”
42 Derrida, *The Gift of Death*.
45 Klima, *The Funeral Casino*.
46 Povinelli, *The Empire of Love*.

**Conclusion. Negative Critique, Positive Sociographies**

2 Maybe it need not be said, but those who criticize immanent critique do not have the same positive view of parasites that Michel Serres does. See Serres, *The Parastite*.
3 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*. For the link between negative dialectics and critical theory, see O’Connor, *Adorno’s Negative Dialectic*. See also Buck-Morss’s classic, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics*. For a critique of negative dialectics, see Howard Williams, “Adorno’s Negative Dialectics.”
4 Pippin, “*Critical Inquiry* and Critical Theory.”
5 See Nagel, *The View from Nowhere*; Poovey, “The Liberal Civil Subject.” See also Taylor, *Sources of the Self*.
6 As an example, we can take the long, complex history of exchange between anthropology and the colonial world that Talal Asad described with his characteristic nuance. This complex dance between ethnographic empathy and state espionage has taken a new turn since Asad first described the handmaiden tale of anthropology in the colonies. Now some anthropologists have created businesses that work the seams between ethnography and covert state operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. See Asad, *On Suicide Bombing*; McFate, “Anthropology and Counterinsurgency”; Stannard, “Montgomery McFate’s Mission.” See also Wax, *Anthropology at the Dawn of the Cold War*.
7 Solanus, *Scum Manifesto*, 72.


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In *Economies of Abandonment*, Elizabeth A. Povinelli explores how late liberal imaginaries of tense, eventfulness, and ethical substance make the global distribution of life and death, hope and harm, and endurance and exhaustion not merely sensible but also just. She presents new ways of conceptualizing formations of power in late liberalism—the shape that liberal governmentality has taken as it has responded to a series of legitimacy crises in the wake of anticolonial and new social movements and, more recently, the “clash of civilizations” after September 11. Based on longstanding ethnographic work in Australia and the United States, as well as critical readings of legal, academic, and activist texts, Povinelli examines how alternative social worlds and projects generate new possibilities of life in the context of ordinary and extraordinary acts of neglect and surveillance. She focuses particularly on social projects that have not yet achieved a concrete existence but persist at the threshold of possible existence. By addressing the question of the endurance, let alone the survival, of alternative forms of life, Povinelli opens new ethical and political questions.

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Elizabeth A. Povinelli is Professor of Anthropology and Gender Studies at Columbia University. She is the author of *The Empire of Love: Toward a Theory of Intimacy, Genealogy, and Carnality* and *The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous Alterities and the Making of Australian Multiculturalism*, both also published by Duke University Press, as well as *Labor’s Lot: The Power, History, and Culture of Aboriginal Action*. 