Hunger, Mysteries, and Pan

Novels

Knut Hamsun's

The Roots of Modernist Narrative

Martin Humpel
PREFACE

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INTRODUCTION

The present work argues that Hamsun’s novels *Hunger* (*Sult*, 1890), *Mysteries* (*Mysterier*, 1892), and *Pan* (1894) are examples of early modernism. Although Hamsun’s works were not considered modernist in his lifetime, recent criticism increasingly sees them in a modernist perspective. Modernism, as I see it and define it in chapter 1, is an aesthetic aimed at disrupting the traditional cultural codes of modernity. For this reason, modernism not only focuses on new themes, but also presents them in new forms — formal innovation lies at the core of modernist poetics. The attempt to classify Hamsun’s works as modernist must therefore involve a comparison with modernist works both in themes and forms. Critics have already made important thematic comparisons, but the formal argument is still missing. Therefore the primary aim of the present analysis is to provide such an argument, while maintaining that the formal criterion must be seen in conjunction with the theme-content criterion. If the latter sometimes seems to be in the background of my analysis, it is not because the formal criterion is more important for assessing Hamsun as modernist. Rather, the purpose is to highlight the formal aspect of Hamsun’s modernism which has not yet received sufficient attention.

Analyzing the formal aspects of modernism requires an adequate formal theory. Since I focus specifically on prose-works, I use as my principal instrument theories of narrative. The goal of my narrative analyses is two-fold: first, to show that Hamsun’s formal innovation arises from thematic concerns and a view of literature’s function that he shares with modernist writers; second, to show how his use of narrative techniques differs from earlier narrative aesthetics and how it corresponds to that of other modernist prose-works. My method thus could be called “historical narrative poetics.” It is narrative poetics because it compares various forms of narrative representation. It is historical because it indicates how these forms differ historically according to the differing goals of modernist and pre-modernist writers.

This method ultimately determines the choice of narrative theories I use. The major inspiration has been the studies of Dorrit Cohn,
Franz K. Stanzel, and Monika Fludernik. Cohn and Stanzel are particularly helpful in assessing the historical significance of narrative forms because they historicize narratology. Their insights help us avoid both the reduction of the differences between modernism and earlier period styles to differences in content on the one hand, and the exaggerated formalist claims of modernist radical invention on the other. Their theories allow us to see modernist narrative as a complex of new uses and new constellations of earlier techniques in conjunction with new themes, rather than as the invention of brand new techniques. When I therefore sometimes speak of modernist “new forms,” “formal innovation,” and “modernist narrative techniques,” I normally mean these new uses and constellations.

All three theorists, and most consistently Fludernik, also offer alternatives to some of the theoretical drawbacks of mainstream narratology that prevent critics from rethinking the issues of modernist narrative representation. Specifically, two major theoretical biases have generated some of the problematic assumptions about modernist narrative. One is the anthropomorphic view of every narrator as a single enunciator of the entire narrative. The underlying assumption is that the narrator is a figure resembling a real-life oral storyteller. The alternative to this view is considering the narrator principally as a textual function which can take various shapes. Accordingly, we should speak of the narrator as a person with a certain psychology only if the textual signals evoke him/her as such. This alternative makes possible a better approach to those modernist works in the third-person that openly contradict the idea of a single enunciator. The situation is somewhat different in first-person fiction whose basic construction normally does presuppose a single enunciator. Yet even here the narrator does not always manifest his/her present voice or thoughts; therefore the consideration of narrator as a textual function enables a more precise description of narrative representation in first-person fiction, as well.

The idea that every narrative is enunciated by a single coherent narrator-personality causes a second widespread bias, namely the discussion of modernist narrative under the distinction “showing” (direct presentation) vs. “telling” (indirect representation), where the former is often said to be more modernist. While I agree that the emphasis on immediate presentation or expression rather than mediated representation is a generally valid distinguishing mark of modernist narrative, I argue that this distinction should not be reduced to a strictly linguistically defined one between direct and indirect discourse (both for speech and thought). Yet this is precisely what terms such as “showing” and “telling,” or “mimesis” and “diegesis,” mean both in mainstream criticism and among many narratologists. To see direct discourse as typically modernist is, besides being historically problematic, theoretically incorrect, for it assumes that direct discourse always enables the most direct presentation of fictional reality to the reader. Fludernik argues persuasively that the effects of direct, indirect, and free indirect discourses depend on the contexts in which they occur. Indirect and free indirect discourses can sometimes provide a greater illusion of mimetic directness than the direct. To see these dimensions of narrative representation and appreciate their significance for our definitions of period styles such as realism and modernism, we must not reduce our discussions of fictional narrative to theories of oral utterance. The alternative is to approach written narrative as a textual simulation of fictional reality, including the processes of narration. Such an approach enables us to find out that while a particular narrative technique may not be direct “in terms of mimetic viewpoint,” it can still be direct “in terms of mimetic effect” on the reader (Fludernik 327).

Each of the three analyses I undertake in chapters 2, 3, and 4 differs considerably from the others in theoretical focus and in specific arguments. It is because, from the formal perspective, each of the three narratives is modernist for slightly different reasons. While there are many similarities in the themes these novels convey, the presentation of these themes differs notably. Each novel exemplifies a slightly different type or constellation of modernist narrative features.
CHAPTER 1

HAMSUN AND MODERNIST NARRATIVE

Now, if some bold novelist, tearing aside the cleverly woven curtain of our conventional ego, shows us under this appearance of logic a fundamental absurdity, under this juxtaposition of simple statics an infinite permutation of a thousand different impressions which have already ceased to exist the instant they are named, we commend him for having known us better than we knew ourselves.

(Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will)

1.1. Hamsun as a Modernist: An Unfinished Project

Knut Hamsun "is today the only Norwegian writer besides Ibsen and Undset who belongs to world literature. He is also the best known Scandinavian novelist..." (Næss, Knut Hamsun 158). One of the major sources of Hamsun's renown is his place in the development of literary modernism. His manic-depressive heroes, his elision, his emphasis on the unconscious life of the mind, his stream of consciousness techniques—make him at the same time a disciple of Dostoevski and Nietzsche, and a precursor of Kafka and Joyce. (Næss, Knut Hamsun 158-59)

Many today consider Hamsun to be an early modernist almost as a matter of course. Hamsun's undeniable influence on most of the major European writers has prompted I. B. Singer to claim that "[t]he whole modern school of fiction in the twentieth century stems from Hamsun" (8). Peter Kirkegaard even sees Hamsun's works as "centrale udtryk for den europæiske modernisme" (39).

Yet serious scholarly attempts to provide arguments in this regard have been few and rather recent. This should come as no surprise. Until quite recently, the term "modernism" served, more often than not, to denote a rather narrow canon of iconic authors who wrote in major world languages and considerably later than Hamsun: Eliot, Pound, Joyce, Woolf, Kafka, Proust. Despite the often repeated claim that modernism was a cosmopolitan phenomenon, literatures in minor languages were mostly disregarded. In the last few decades critics began to broaden the concept of modernism both spatially (toward minor literatures) and temporally (back into the nineteenth century, until at least the 1890s). The widely read anthology, Modernism 1890-1930, edited by Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, is an important milestone in this revision. It is therefore no accident that the latter editor is also the author of the first article on Hamsun's works of the 1890s as modernist.

McFarlane's essay "The Whisper of the Blood" (1956) laid the foundation for all later attempts to consider Hamsun as a modernist writer. An important feature of this article is McFarlane's selection of novels: he discusses Hunger (1890), Mysteries (1892), Pan (1894), and marginally Victoria (1898). He argues that Hamsun's twentieth-century work retreats from the modernist position to a more traditional realist idiom (594), a distinction that has rarely been disputed.2 Concentrating on Hamsun's three most groundbreaking novels, McFarlane gives a well-balanced reading of Hamsun's position in the context of the turn-of-the-century culture, and delineates the relationship between Hamsun's early works and the works of canonical modernists such as Joyce, Kafka, Proust, and Woolf as a prospective field of research. While pointing out clear affinities between the latter writers and the early Hamsun, McFarlane indicates that a revolutionary aspect of Hamsun's early works is his narrative techniques. Like later modernists, Hamsun employs innovative techniques to foreground the perspective of individual consciousness rather than present a broad social analysis:

We look with the hero equally when he examines the secret areas within himself and when he looks at the world about him, a world in which the things of greatest significance are precisely those other secret mental lives of his fellows. It is this arrangement above all else that has given the richness to Hamsun's early work; and to realize this is to shift the search for the cause of its strange and arresting quality away from questions of character analysis and on to the more technical problems of narrative perspective. (571)

The last sentence contains an important programmatic statement: a certain shift in Hamsun research from what to how. McFarlane is aware of the fact that standard definitions of modernist fiction involve the concept of formal aesthetic innovation or, more precisely, innovation in narrative techniques: truly modernist works present modernist themes in modernist forms. McFarlane himself discusses Hamsun's early works more or less in terms of modernist themes (psychology of the unconscious, individualistic subjectivity), and leaves the shift from what to how to future scholars. His essay concludes that, in order to classify Hamsun's early works as modernist, one has to explore not...
null
sun’s narrative if we are to call it modernist. (I explain the reasons in the next section in which I define my view of modernism.) This is also where McFarlane differs from Kittang—in the emphasis on form. While both critics speak of aesthetic innovation in Hamsun’s texts, McFarlane has a more formal conception of narrative than Kittang does. The former scholar seems to be interested in how the formal properties of Hamsun’s texts represent the fictional world and the character’s speech and consciousness. Kittang, in a post-structuralist fashion, sees “narrative,” “text,” and “writing” mostly in terms of organization of themes, motifs, and symbols. This difference explains, first, why McFarlane refuses to see Hamsun’s twentieth-century works as modernist, whereas Kittang does not limit his conception of modernism to Hamsun’s early work. Second, it explains why Kittang, unlike McFarlane, downplays the importance of Hamsun’s narrative techniques as a criterion for classifying him as modernist: “Hamsun er vår fremste tidleg-modernistiske romanforfattar ikkje så mykje på grunn av sin skriveteknikk og sitt ‘psykologiske’ program, som på grunn av den særeigne måten romankunsten blir til sjølvrefleksjon på i bokene hans” (27-8).

Of the two formal-aesthetic conceptions of Hamsun’s modernism, I follow McFarlane’s, rather than Kittang’s. Like the former critic, I am also less willing to see Hamsun’s twentieth-century production as modernist, although the scope of the present work does not allow space for an extensive argument in this regard. This does not mean, however, that my own analyses of Hamsun’s early novels are at odds with Kittang’s. On the contrary, they complement each other quite well. I will argue that Hamsun’s early books Hunger, Mysterier, and Pan are modernist precisely because in them narrative techniques highlight the modernist themes of existential void, inauthenticity, and the tension between illusion and disillusion which Kittang describes. But first I must explain why formal innovation is an important criterion in theories of modernism.

1.2. Modernism against Modernity

Modernism is an aesthetic usually seen in opposition to the cultural-historical phenomenon of bourgeois modernity which has “produced the notion of ‘realism’” (Calinescu 90). The term “modernity” itself is probably best defined as “the process through which rationalism is channeled into empiricism, which in turn provides the theoretical foundation for the Enlightenment, whose outlooks, goals, and predispositions characterize the ‘modern’ world” (Berman viii). This process is closely linked to the rise of the middle classes as the driving force behind the development of capitalism, industrialization and sci-entific positivism. Therefore the term “bourgeois modernity,” as used for example by Calinescu (41-42) and Nicholls (7), appropriately indicates that the bourgeois has traditionally been the bearer and executor of the idea of modernity.

The bourgeois idea of modernity, according to one of its more concise summaries, involves

[[The doctrine of progress, the confidence in the beneficial possibilities of science and technology, the concern with time (a measurable time, a time that can be bought and sold and therefore has, like any other commodity, a calculable equivalent in money), the cult of reason, and the ideal of freedom defined within the framework of an abstract humanism, but also the orientation toward pragmatism and the cult of action and success... (Calinescu 41)

Against this background, modernism can be defined as “the negative other of capitalist-bourgeois ideology and of the ideological space of social harmony demarcated for the bourgeois subject” (Eysteinsson 37). This negation of bourgeois modernity has been discussed and conceptualized “in terms of thematic, ethical, sociological, psychological, philosophical, and ideological issues” (38). But such conceptualization is clearly not sufficient:

Surely we can imagine a traditional realist text that fulfills the thematic requirements of such a negation. It seems, therefore, that in order for us to begin finding the edges of modernism, we have to relate the above issues to modes of presentation, to language and formal mediation, wind our way back to the question of “modernist form.” (38)

Eysteinsson here indicates a basic premise of standard theories of modernism: that modernism involves, among other things, an aesthetic, formal disruption or “interruption” (Eysteinsson 6; 240) of bourgeois modernity. While the works of authors such as Balzac, Dickens, Zola, George Eliot, and Galsworthy engage in the “analysis of modern life” (Berman 27), and may even share many themes, concerns, and ideologies with modernists, they are normally not associated with them. What distinguishes modernist from non-modernist works is not only the what, that is, the themes they portray, but also the how, the way these themes are presented. In this respect, the following conception of modernism is typical:

To qualify as modernism, the consideration of aesthetic form must take precedence over content... [F]orm and content must be understood to be indistinguishable. Worldview is not simply placed inside form; worldview is equivalent to form. Not only is the content of the work the content of the psyche, but the form of the work is also the form of the psyche. Creativity at its best requires formal innovation. (Berman 28)
This definition can serve us as a starting point, but only if we slightly rephrase its somewhat rigid formulation as follows: the formal element must be present in the work in such a way that the narrative expresses modernist themes in their own idiom; in this sense, the work is "self-generated," rather than adopting pre-established aesthetic rules.

This basic definition of modernism has to be taken seriously if Hamsun's works are to be included in the modernist canon. Otherwise Hamsun will always remain a writer intimately concerned with modernity, but not modernist in the above sense. The present work therefore intends to answer the question whether Hamsun's narrative aesthetic allows critics to place his early novels alongside modernist works. I do not suggest that the formal consideration should be the exclusive criterion of modernism. Many exaggerated ahistorical claims have been made in formalist theories of modernism. The formal criterion must be seen in conjunction with thematic, historical, and ideological issues. It cannot, however, be absent, and section 1.2.1. explains why.

1.2.1. Modernism and the Question of Literary Representation
The basic purpose of modernist form is to oppose the rules of conventional representation: modernism "resists reality-fabrications that are recuperable as 'stories' or as situations that can readily be reformulated in sociopragmatic terms" (Eysteinsson 187). This tendency toward what is sometimes called "non-/anti-mimeticism" or "non-/anti-representationalism" reflects a basic modernist ideology which has several historical aspects.

1.2.1.1. Social Mimesis: The Public and the Private
The need for aesthetic subversion of conventional literary language in the nineteenth century arose as a reaction against the pressures of what one might call "social mimesis." According to Nicholls, authors from Baudelaire onward

were increasingly aware of a mimetic principle at work in bourgeois modernity, in its fondness for representational art, in its parasitic dependence on 'tradition', and in the psychology of emulation underpinning a culture in which moral continuities were ensured by institutionalized habits of imitation. Bourgeois culture thus seemed to ground itself in the awkward paradox that we become truly ourselves only by copying others. (13)

This social mimesis is predicated upon rationality as a guarantee of modernity's progress. The essentially human is rational and finds its true expression in public interaction. Individuals are supposed to mature through education and critical public discussion, recognize their place within society, and comply with its rational organization.

This compliance needs to take on public forms to be recognized. Accordingly, bourgeois society determines that the proper forms of individuality and subjectivity are those oriented toward the public: those that contribute to modern society's "natural" progression. While individuality becomes confused with a social role played in front of other people, the genuinely private experience (including irrational impulses, body functions, sexual fantasies) is repressed by the public.

Thus a split occurs in many individuals between the public role of private individual they play and the genuinely private experience which often conflicts with it. This conflict becomes internalized in the individual's mind as one between what I call the public and private worlds.7 For the individual, the public world is a psychological configuration representing the forces of bourgeois modernity; being aware that s/he is supposed to play a social role, the individual perceives his/her existence in the public world as inauthentic. The individual's essentially private experience, or the private world, involves anxieties, dreams, and fantasies that are normally not revealed in front of other people; while authentic existence seems impossible without such forms of subjectivity, the public world suppresses them as inappropriate. Yet this genuinely private is precisely what most modernists perceive as the essentially human.8

If the ideology of bourgeois modernity defines individuality in terms of rational, social compliance, modernists see individuality as "won through an assertion of difference" (Nicholls 15). Against the dehumanizing pressure that the passive imitation of bourgeois-capitalist modernity involves, modernists postulate the essentially human as the genuinely individual, which is synonymous with the genuinely private. The works of several turn-of-the-century thinkers point in the same direction. Bergson finds life's real dimension and the source of its vitality in private psychological time, while criticizing institutionalized public time as a manifestation of rationalist analysis which society promotes at the expense of private intuition. Nietzsche stresses the necessity of individualist vitalism as a defense against the passivity of mass psychology. Freud sees the origin of neuroses in the intrusion of public institutions upon the private life of individuals. These thinkers indicate that "consciousness is not fully transparent to itself" (Schwartz 4) and can therefore never be reduced to public language. Similarly, modernists locate the area of private difference in the non-public areas of the mind, including the unconscious, because these cannot be entirely translated into public constructs.

Modernism thus sets out to liberate the individual subject's private world from the power of public constructs and assert it as truly private. This historical development has often been discussed as the mod-
In order to comprehend the character's fabric, it's essential to understand the complex interplay of the character's background, motivations, and their relationship with the story's setting. Modernist techniques, such as stream of consciousness, fragmented narratives, and non-linear storytelling, are essential tools in achieving this. These techniques allow the author to explore the character's innermost thoughts and feelings, revealing the layers of meaning and purpose that drive their actions. By examining these aspects, we gain a deeper appreciation of the character's role in the story and the story's themes.
tutes. Such claims, however, are often based on serious misrepresentations of both the scope and the history of narrative theory.

The most common case of such misrepresentation is the equation of all narrative theory with only one of its early branches, the French structuralist narratology of the 1960s and early 1970s. Both individual works of criticism and general introductions to literary theory, as well as various dictionaries of literary criticism, misleadingly limit narrative theory to scholars such as Bremond, Greimas, Barthes, Todorov, and Genette. To identify all narrative theory with these names provides a distorted, one-sided image of the discipline, and creates a false impression that narrative theory has ended with Genette.

French narratologists before Genette drew inspiration mostly from Vladimir Propp and the Russian Formalists. They did indeed typically disregard the issues of interpretation, history, and ideology, as they searched for some general structures of narrativity literature employs. Their attempts to create a science of narrative “grammars” often led to abstract typologies describing the story world in terms of “narrative syntax,” that is, a static organization of story elements, plot, or action. Today many of these models and efforts to create a comprehensive universal grammar of narrative are rightly seen as a kind of formal neo-positivism whose usefulness for literary studies is marginal.

Genette’s Narrative Discourse (orig. 1972) was a first step out of the cul-de-sac formalism of his fellow Frenchmen. The latter were interested predominantly in the organization of the story, or the distinction made by the Russian Formalists between fabula (story world) and sujet (narrative organization of the story world). Genette broadened the field of narratology by beginning to pay attention to a third dimension of the narrative text, the act or process of narration (Genette’s “narrative enunciating”; Stanzel’s “mediacy”), that is, narrative representation, or the way in which narrative mediates the narrated information to the reader. The discussion of the communicative aspects of narrative implicitly drew on Jakobson’s famous “communication model” between the sender and receiver of an utterance. This interest in the dynamics of narration and narrative representation became the major focus of narrative studies after Genette, and distinguishes them from the narratology of the 1960s. Yet while Genette’s book is undoubtedly a cornerstone of these new efforts, it does not go much beyond enumerating abstract categories. Genette’s discussion of narrative enunciation is still limited to establishing static categories based on short examples with little attempt to show how they interact in a longer narrative text. Genette does not avoid interpretation (his essay is partly an interpretation of Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past), but he underestimates the role that context plays in affecting the reader’s perception of the techniques discussed. He also makes almost no connec-

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sometimes they even conflate "narrative" with its interpretation. It is therefore not necessarily "one of the insights of recent literary theory" that "narrative is really not so much a literary form or structure as an epistemological category" (Sarup 141). This is not an "insight" invalidating the narratology definitions of narrative, but only one of many possible uses of the word "narrative" that the English language permits. The post-structuralist critique of narratology is thus often an unnecessary pseudo-critique, because its object of inquiry simply lies elsewhere. Both the more empirical and the more phenomenological definitions of "narrative," "text," "story," etc., can exist side by side without having to exclude each other, precisely because they refer to different areas of inquiry.

Undoubtedly, narrative theory in the tradition of Genette, Chatman, etc., is at its core a formal approach to the literary text: it concerns itself with the formal aspects of narrative mediation. Yet there is no reason why it could not be linked to social reality, history, and even ideology to go beyond the traditional tenets of French structuralism, if narratologists stop insisting on the idea of objective narratology as a science of pure forms. Narrative theories which are dialectically linked to reader-reception and history, have actually existed for quite some time, but mainstream criticism often ignores them or classifies them as structuralist narratology.

The theorists I have in mind are, first of all, Franz K. Stanzel and Dorrit Cohn. They draw marginally on French narratology, but rather extensively on German literary scholarship, traditionally both very historical, but also reception-oriented and attentive to the questions of narrative form. Thus what distinguishes these two theorists from the narratologists I mentioned above is a much greater interest in interpretation, reader-reception, and history. Rather than freezing their object of study in synchronic structural typologies, they examine the diachronic development of narrative forms, showing how they function in various historical contexts. Rather than isolating a static general theory from the dynamics of concrete criticism, they let the first one dialectically interact with the other. Because of their interest in reader-reception, they examine the dynamics of narrative representation, demonstrating how narrative techniques transmit social reality to the reader and how they can affect the reader's perception of the larger units of texts, including entire books (whereas French structuralism was all too often content with a few short sentences). For Cohn and Stanzel, in short, theory is never an end in itself, but serves our understanding of literary history and reader-reception.

Stanzel's disciple Monika Fludernik is less historically oriented, but otherwise she extends many arguments of Stanzel and Cohn. Her magisterial work *The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction: The Linguistic Representation of Speech and Consciousness* constitutes a turning point in the most recent narrative theory. In this book she most convincingly undermines two cornerstones of classic narrative theories, the Jakobsonian "communication model" of narrative based on oral communication, and, consequently, the rigidity of the distinction between direct representation ("showing," "quotation," "mimesis") and indirect report ("telling," "narration," "diegesis").

The Genettean narratologists assume that everything in the narrative is either reported or quoted by an always already present narrator; this narrator may be covert in certain parts of the text, but is nonetheless postulated as the ultimate "enunciator" of the entire narrative. In contrast, Fludernik's basic premise is that this classic postulate often contradicts empirical evidence. The postulate is based on the uncritical application of the model of oral communication (which always has some empirical speaker) to the narrative text. A fictional narrator, Fludernik argues, is not an empirical entity, but a language construction. All narrative representation is textual simulation (of the world, of consciousness, of the act of narration, etc.). Fictional narrative, in principle, is not the utterance of a narrator, but the textual simulation of "narrative utterance," "diegesis," "mimesis," "narrator," "voice," "consciousness," "speech," etc., by means of various expressive linguistic signals. The narrative text sometimes does present fictional reality through the voice of a narrator, but it also often simulates fictional reality directly, without its being either "reported" or "quoted" by the narrator. Thus fictional narration sometimes does not resemble oral narration at all. The reader's perception of the narrator as more or less personalized or depersonalized, reliable or unreliable, is only the effect of the author's use of narrative discourse. Some narrators resemble real people more than others because they are "closer" to their authors, but because their authors use narrative techniques that create greater mimetic effects. As a textual construct, a narrator can be an ambiguous mixture of incompatible narrative voices that defies mimetic resemblance to real people, and must then be treated as a mere "narrative function."

If the postulate that every narrative originates in a coherent, anthropomorphic narrator-personality is wrong, the cherished narratological axiom of direct quotation ("showing," "mimesis") vs. indirect report ("telling," "diegesis") can no longer be an absolute distinction. In order to prove this, Fludernik makes the central theme of her theory the boundaries between direct discourse, indirect discourse, and free indirect discourse, the latter technique usually being defined by the classic linguistic-based narratology as a hybrid between the former two categories. Fludernik notes that theorists have either avoided or failed to successfully conceptualize and define the trouble-
some phenomenon of free indirect discourse (FID), because the boundaries between direct, indirect, and FID are much more fluid than previously thought and sometimes impossible to distinguish. By demonstrating that narrative mimesis and diegesis are only textual simulations whose origins often cannot be determined, Fludernik undermines the validity of classic narratological categories such as "voice," "perspective," or "focalization," which have always been defined in relation to an assumed anthropomorphic narrative agent. It is no wonder that the treatment of thought-representation—crucial for the discussion of modernism—in Genettean narratology is profoundly unsatisfactory, since it ultimately reduces all narrative representation to the narrator's "speech": "mimesis in words can only be mimesis of words" (Genette, Narrative Discourse 164).17

Fludernik wants to challenge precisely the uncritical, automatic equation of the linguistically direct discourse with direct literary representation. Due to this equation, the classic structuralist narratologists have failed to handle ambiguous representational forms such as FID (and figural narration, as we will see later), because they have not given sufficient thought to the differences between FID for presenting thought on the one hand, and FID for presenting speech on the other; and because they have classified the representational functions (the effects on the reader) of direct, indirect, and free indirect discourses as if they were immune to the context in which they occur.

The Genettean postulates of "pure" mimesis, "pure" diegesis, and the "dual-voiced" FID cannot be successfully isolated as pure categories outside a particular context. These categories are only approximations; their functions, that is, effects on the reader, can never be fully systematized, because they are not essential properties of these categories, but context-dependent textual configurations.18 The effects of a particular narrative technique can vary considerably in the actual text. In order to see this, one must analyze individual techniques not only through isolated abstract categories, but one must also pay attention to the particular narrative context in which the technique occurs, and the way this context influences reader-reception.

To summarize, the present work intentionally avoids the French-structuralism-based narratology, including Genette, and relies on the German/Austrian (in Cohn's case, German/Austrian-inspired) scholarship for three major reasons. First, Genettean narratology lacks a socio-historical dimension. Cohn and Stanzel, on the other hand, show how the various changes and developments of narrative forms are related to socio-historical issues: what effects writers in certain periods (want to) achieve, whether a text imposes certain ideologies blatantly or with an ironic detachment, or what role the reader's expectation in a particular era plays for his/her perception of the literary text. Second, the Genettean narrative theory sustains the idea of a narrative text as the utterance of a single enunciator and thus postulates too rigid a distinction between direct quotation and indirect report. Cohn, Stanzel, and especially Fludernik show persuasively that such a distinction is much more fluid, and includes important phenomena that have been neglected (e.g., "figural narration") or misunderstood (e.g., "FID"). Third, the Genettean analytic effort to isolate formal narrative categories lead him to disregard how these categories interact in a broader context and how this context affects the reader. Cohn, Stanzel and Fludernik, on the other hand, stress that one has to examine how narrative techniques intertwine in a concrete text, and discuss their ultimate effects on the reader in larger textual units. This contextual orientation links Cohn's, Stanzel's, and Fludernik's work to Suzanne Fleischman's impressive theory of tense in narrative. Fleischman's work improves upon the earlier narratological discussions of tense and time for two major reasons: it shows how the spatial functions of tenses and their effects on the reader vary in different contexts; and it indicates that the treatment of tense and temporality is often imprecise because critics do not discuss tense in connection with the closely related grammatical category of aspect.

All these theorists offer useful correctives to some concrete problematic approaches to modernist narrative; these correctives can also help us understand Hamsun's significance in the development of modernist narrative. First, the critics who discuss every narrator as a single "person" often fail to appreciate certain third-person texts that defy such a conception of narrator—e.g., Joyce's Ulysses or Hamsun's Mysteries. In contrast, approaching narrator as a variable textual function enables a better understanding of these texts and their purposes.

The main principle of this approach, which postulates that one should speak of narrator in anthropomorphic terms only to the degree in which the narrative reveals the explicit signs of a narrator-personality, also makes possible a more precise description of first-person narratives. Critics sometimes exaggerate the quasi-autobiographical, retrospective dimension of Hunger because they try to approach the narrative as if through the narrator's present perspective. Yet such a perspective is largely missing or, more precisely, is neutral, since the narrator reveals almost no explicit signs of his present view of the past. Instead, Hunger presents the immediate experience of the narrator's past self with minimum signs of narratorial mediation.

Second, many critics reduce the broadly conceived distinction between the modernist preference for presentation and the realist inclination toward representation (as I define them above) to the nar-
In conclusion, modernist works are characterized by certain distinctive features, which include:

1. A focus on the subjective, personal, and individual experience of the artist.
2. A rejection of conventional narrative and storytelling techniques.
3. An emphasis on form, style, and technique over content.
4. A disregard for traditional values and norms.
5. An exploration of the subconscious and the irrational.

These features are evident in works such as "The Waste Land" by T.S. Eliot, "The Sound and the Fury" by William Faulkner, and "Ulysses" by James Joyce. Modernist works often challenge the reader's expectations and force them to reevaluate their understanding of the world and human experience.
Once the audience is engaged, the presenter's posture and body language can be directly observed. This is known as micro-expression, which is the subtle and unconscious body movements that can reveal the presenter's true feelings. For instance, a presenter who is lying might tense their body, avoid eye contact, or fidget with their hands. These micro-expressions can be easily noticed by the audience, and they can help convey the presenter's true emotions.

The audience's attention is crucial to the effectiveness of a presentation. If the presenter maintains eye contact and engages with the audience, they are more likely to stay attentive and interested. Conversely, if the presenter rolls their eyes, looks away, or fidgets, the audience may become distracted and lose interest.

In summary, the presenter's posture and body language can significantly affect the audience's perception of their message. By being aware of these non-verbal cues, the presenter can effectively convey their message and engage the audience.
The perception of nature is an integral part of human experience, often influencing our understanding of the world. In the context of ecological psychology, the perception of nature is considered as a fundamental aspect of human cognition and behavior. The presence of natural elements in our environment can significantly impact our mood, physical health, and overall well-being. Studies have shown that exposure to natural environments can reduce stress levels, improve cognitive function, and enhance mental health. Furthermore, the conservation of natural habitats and the promotion of nature-based activities are crucial for the preservation of biodiversity and the sustainability of our planet. In conclusion, the perception and appreciation of nature play a vital role in shaping our perceptions and actions towards the environment.
to free aesthetic creativity from the constraints of mimetic verisimilitude.

I do not mean to imply that all these phenomena have to figure together in the same text; neither do I claim that other techniques do not occur in modernist texts. The above strategies are, nonetheless, typical major tendencies in modernist fiction. The high occurrence of at least some of them in modernist texts is not accidental, but determined by the themes they express. Particular texts are thus not modernist only because they employ the above techniques, but because these techniques express modernist themes. This is true of canonical modernists, as well as Hamsun.

1.5. Hamsun's Modernism and His Narrative Poetics

In this scheme, Hamsun's *Hunger, Mysteries, and Pan* undoubtedly represent an aesthetic disruption of bourgeois modernity. These works eschew the idea of literature as furthering social progress through participation in critical public dialogue and emancipate the individual's private world from such a framework. This approach has both its thematic and narrative aspects; while most Hamsun studies have described the former, I will show that Hamsun's narrative techniques, too, play an essential part in this effort.

The 1870s and 1880s in Scandinavia were a period of realism and naturalism called the Modern Breakthrough, advocated most notably by the famous Danish critic Georg Brandes. In Norway particularly, the idea of socially engaged, critical realism found especially fertile soil, due to the delayed economic development and the relatively late appearance of constitutional parliamentarism. The period 1875—1885 represents the struggle for liberalism and the heyday of belief in the possibility of progressive social reforms. During this time Norwegian writers enjoyed a similar social status as politicians. The works of Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, Henrik Ibsen, Alexander Kielland, and Jonas Lie "took problems up for debate," in Brandes's famous words. Literature was to advance social progress by furthering rational and critical discussion, to educate citizens about social issues and to promote a liberal political agenda. The underlying premise of this literature was that humans are rational beings, capable of mastering their uncertainties and confusions, and thus responsible for their actions. This belief, central to the development of modernity since the Enlightenment, also promoted objectivity in rendering facts in accordance with the recent development of scientific positivism.

With the disappointing performance of liberals in the parliament after 1884, the major event being their scandalous participation in the 1885 refusal to award Alexander Kielland a state-funded writer's stipend, the writers' critical optimism subsides. The new cultural-political situation produces a more deterministic naturalism on the one hand, and the interest in symbolism and the individual psyche on the other. The latter orientation becomes the major trend of Norwegian literature in the 1890s, a period traditionally called Neo-Romanticism, which focuses on the mysteries of the psyche and the senses, intuition and imagination.

Hamsun is the most important of the Norwegian writers of the 1890s to reject the idea of literature based on utilitarian reason and scientific objectivity. In his controversial public lectures he maintains that literature should not serve any social, educational, and political purposes, but be good and interesting per se. The quality of contemporary Norwegian literature, according to Hamsun, is poor, because it serves other purposes than purely literary ones: it propagates social reforms and serves to enlighten the broad population, "farmers," "people," "masses" and "bourgeois," all of which Hamsun consistently derides. Due to its democratic and didactic emphasis, literature presents life as less complicated than it actually is, and in a less poetic way: "[V]or Literatur... er en Poesi om Samfundet for Folket,... vis Digtning af Hensyn til det demokratiske Princip lægges niveausisk tilrette for de mindre udviklede Mennesker, og..." *Paa Torné 26*. Writers offer only pre-fabricated objective facts that anyone can easily understand, focusing on the most ordinary and typical people so that even the "less developed people" could "kontrollere Objektiviteten" of their depiction (49).

Two basic axioms govern Hamsun's critique of contemporary literature and determine his own early works. First, the human being is primarily an individual mind, and only secondarily a social creature: "Livet yttrer sig ikke bare som Samfund, og Menneskene oprøder ikke bare som Karakterer" (*Paa Torné* 41). Second, the human mind is an inexplicable mystery governed by the irrational forces of the unconscious. Consequently, Hamsun in his lectures calls for literature that would focus on the complexities of the individual psyche; and he ridicules the aspects of bourgeois modernity and realist objectivity ("reason," "understanding," "morality," "truth," "science"), celebrating rather their opposites.

The early Hamsun's major concern is thus the illumination of the individual's mind and portrayal of humans as complex, even inexplicable, individuals. The realist idiom is, however, inadequate for conveying this concern, because it depicts humans in a broad social context which reduces man to an abstract social function. Contemporary writers and dramatists use the individual's psychology to express the social context that frames it: "[N]ær somhelst Ibsen behandler indi-
sun, objectivity is reductionist representation, whereas subjectivity in his psychological literature is to be non-reductionist presentation.

Objectivity in literary representation is nothing but a fabricated idea ("Paafund"), one that originates in the educational goals society promotes and in the related effort to model literature on science (Paa Tørnø 49). Objectivity is unity and simplification, and therefore life in the abstract; it reduces life to crude "facts": "[H]vor Kendsgerningerne er overfladiskel...[E] Faktum tager blot et Par grove Faktorer i Betragtning, men jeg aner og fornemmer, at der er et tusind finere bag dem" (51). Realism cannot "paavise Fenomenerne, uden i deres faste, haarde Resultater" (68); its psychology is therefore superficial: it creates only "Typer" (26), "Karakterer" (30), "Sjæle i Kontur" (32), "Apparater, som har staaret frem og repræsenteret Begreber og Ideer" (35), but not real people.

Subjectivity, on the other hand, is multiplicity and complexity, and therefore real, concrete, individual life. In the new age of "Elektriciteten" and "[d]en almindelige Nervøsitet" (46), humans have become more complex and sensitive, and literature should reflect this: "[E]r Menneskene blevne mer komplicerede, skulde ogsaa Litteraturen blive det" (46). Instead of superficial "Sjæle i Kontur," Hamsun calls for "Sjelemaleri" (64) that will reach deep into the human psyche ("[d]en dybe sjælelige Ransagelse" 83) and will do so thoroughly ("en Sjæl belyst og forhørt" 66). The human being is plurality, a multiplicity of concrete details ("hundrede Smaating, fine Bagateller" 67), all of which make the individual unique, and all of which must therefore be depicted.

Hamsun's preference for presenting experience in its concreteness and immediacy is shared by most modernist novelists, as well as by the major turn-of-the-century thinkers who influence modernism. Philosophers such as William James, Henri Bergson, Friedrich Nietzsche believe that reality is an immediate flux (James's "stream of consciousness," Bergson's "duration," Nietzsche's "chaos of sensations") irreducible to our ordinary conceptualization and language representation (Schwartz 19-20). Therefore they draw a sharp line between conceptual abstraction and immediate experience (5). The idea that real experience eludes representation in ordinary language supports modernists in their abandonment of traditional literary forms and in their search for new forms that might present or express immediate experience in its own idiom, and hence more authentically.

In Hunger, Mysteries, and Pan Hamsun emancipates immediate and concrete subjectivity in several ways. First, he closely focuses on the individual psyches of highly individualistic social outsiders. Their extreme individualism, heightened sensitivity to beauty and emotions, as well as their sense of their own uniqueness alienate them from the
bourgeois public world: they are not willing to compromise their individuality by giving in to the leveling pressures of ordinary bourgeois existence.

Second, Hamsun tends to present the fundamental conflict between the individual and society in such a way that the reader does not see it from an overarching public perspective, but rather as internalized within the character's mind. Therefore I prefer to speak about the conflict between private world and public world: I do not mean by these terms simply individuality and society in a broad sociological sense, but configurations of the character's psyche. The protagonist experiences a split between two desires: a desire for authentic living in the public world from which the character cannot entirely tear himself away; and a desire for an authentic self-enclosure in the privacy of one's dreams, sensations and emotions. The character is unable to achieve either. The former requires an unacceptable identification with a pre-determined social role. The latter is predicated upon the elimination of communal life and an impossible unity of the self, impossible because his self is shaped by the unconscious forces which he cannot control. Thus the early Hamsun's protagonist never attains authentic identity. The character is unable to fully understand either himself or the world, and remains a split prisoner of the mind. Nevertheless, his search for identity seems to generate a positive energy which manifests itself predominantly as artistic creativity. The psyche in early Hamsun is thus an ambiguous phenomenon: it is both an obstacle to happiness and a source of positive vitality.32

In order to eliminate the public metalanguage characteristic of the realist novel and to present the above modernist themes from an immediate and concrete private perspective, Hamsun uses all three modernist methods identified above: 1) The suppression or elimination of the figure of the narrator and the explicitly narratorial discourse; 2) The extensive use of techniques for rendering the character's private world in its unmediated concreteness: stream of consciousness or interior monologue in the first person and the present tense; FID for presenting consciousness; and figural narration. 3) The perspectivization of narrative.

Hamsun does not use all these three techniques with the same intensity in each of the three novels. Undoubtedly, these novels present similar modernist characters and share the same themes of the inauthentic self governed by the unconscious, and the split between the public and the private. Still, these works do differ in individual thematic concerns, and they are therefore narrated in three quite different ways: Hunger and Pan are both first-person narratives, but whereas the former concentrates exclusively on the character's immediate experience (the narrator's past self), the latter novel foregrounds the narrator's remaking of his past experience; Mysteries is a third-person narrative and also introduces an outside view of the protagonist.

It is my thesis that, in regard to the narrative presentation of particular themes, each of the three texts is modernist for a slightly different reason. Therefore, each of the following chapters is devoted to one of the novels and concentrates on somewhat different issues. I show that the differences in narrative presentation are closely bound up with the differences in thematic focus of each novel. My analysis of Mysteries and Pan shows that the misunderstandings of the narrative workings of these texts is related to some of their interpretive misunderstandings. Chapters 3 and 4 therefore contribute to the thematic understanding of Mysteries and Pan. In chapter 2 on Hunger, though, I do not focus on thematic analysis because, in my view, critics have discussed Hunger as a modernist novel rather successfully in terms of its themes and composition. Since I mostly agree with the earlier thematic interpretations and my narrative analysis does not contradict them, the purpose of chapter 2 is not to bring a new interpretation, but to place Hunger in the context of the history of narrative poetics and to explain why the narrative is modernist from the formal-historical perspective.

In Hunger, the thematic tensions between the public and the private are channeled through the immediate experience of the isolated protagonist who refuses to enter the paradigms of bourgeois life. I will show that Hamsun eliminates the narrator's voice for the sake of figural narrative and free indirect discourse which both simulate the character's immediate experience. The traditional Hamsun criticism has failed to see Hunger as a novel with a distinctly modernist presentation of consciousness because of two traditional critical biases. First, critics assume that the first-person narrative, by definition, cannot present the character's immediate experience convincingly enough, because such a narrative is enunciated by a narrator-personality who cannot but see his past self from the outside and from a temporal distance. The presentation of consciousness is thus said not to be "direct" enough for Hunger to qualify as a modernist "stream-of-consciousness novel." I show that in the case of Hunger, such claims are not based on textual evidence, given the elimination of the narrator and the use of figural narrative. Second, Hamsun critics failed to consider free indirect discourse—which thoroughly permeates the narrative of Hunger—as a criterion of modernist presentation of consciousness, because they see FID as a technique not direct enough, containing traces of narratorial voice. This view, as I have already indicated, is wrong both theoretically and historically. Theoretically, it is based solely on the strictly linguistic definition of FID which disregards the questions of narrative context and reader-reception. Historically, the view
is based on an exaggerated assumption that a truly modernist presentation of consciousness must be a direct stream of consciousness in the first person and the present tense.

*Mysteries* is the most misunderstood book of the three, often by its defenders as well as detractors. The core of the misunderstanding is the purpose of the very elaborate, yet ultimately totally confusing narrative. While Hamsun's detractors see the book as a failure, some of Hamsun's defenders have tried to make it more understandable and organically unified than it actually is. In my opinion, *Mysteries* is essentially an anti-novel that follows scrupulously one character, yet at the same time frustrates all attempts at our final understanding of him. The purpose of such a puzzling narrative is to present the character as having no identity. The narrative parodically deconstructs the representational pretensions of realist/naturalist narrative: the protagonist Nagel cannot be explained in terms of cause and effect; and the quasi-positivistic heaping up of detailed information about him turns out to be of no help, just as the narrative presentation of Nagel from various angles gives no overarching perspective. Hamsun in this novel uses not only figural narration and FID to present the character's experience in its immediacy as in *Hunger*, but partly also the authorial narrator to indicate the way society sees Nagel. However, Hamsun uses the authorial narrator only parodically to deconstruct him: this narrator is only one voice among many and has no cognitive authority, not to speak of omniscience. Hamsun combines many different narrative techniques in such a way that they illuminate the protagonist from various angles, but none of them becomes a superior public metalanguage and none of them helps to explain Nagel. This modernist perspective of narrative deconstructs the cognitive privilege of a particular perspective and the possibility of an objective portrait of a personality, suggesting rather that no one can ultimately gain objective insight into another person, because the human being is a complicated and self-contradictory mystery. What makes the narrative form of *Mysteries* specifically modernist is that the combination of various narrative functions and voices in narrative perspectivization defies realistic mimeticism: the expression or presentation of the main theme takes precedence over verisimilitude. Concretely, this anti-mimetic feature of *Mysteries* consists in an unlikely combination of narratorial omniscience and ignorance: the narrative as a whole defies being seen as an "utterance" of a coherent narrator-personality with one voice, and must rather be understood as a non-mimetic blend of narrative functions, presenting the character in a radically fragmented way. I show that the absence of a superior perspective and the presence of the non-mimetic multiplicity of conflicting perspectives also characterize modernist painting.

Pan is the story of a person who has fled the public life for a solitary life in nature, but seems to be unable to live outside society. Lieutenant Glahn's retrospective narrative reveals a split in his mind between nature and society. Because of the back-to-nature theme and other romantic motifs, critics have traditionally labeled the novel as romantic or neo-romantic. I argue that the consideration of how the narrative presents the thematic discrepancy between the private and the public allows for a modernist reading of this novel. The mechanisms of Glahn's narrative reveal themselves as the projection of his psyche and betray all the images of nature and romanticism as inauthentic. The avoidance of reflection on the part of the narrator's present self and his attempts to freeze the past in the perpetual present of an artistic image, as well as the conspicuously different narrative presentation of his public and private worlds reveal that Glahn's romanticism is a half-conscious aesthetic self-deception. The psyche becomes the very form of the narrative in a typically modernist fashion.

The three narratives thus illuminate the experience of the modern psyche in three different ways, and suggest three somewhat different answers to the question why they are modernist. In the case of *Hunger*, the central issue is the definition of modernist presentation of consciousness and the question whether this definition should include the use of techniques such as figural narration and FID whose importance for defining modernist form is usually underestimated. These questions also figure in my discussion of *Mysteries*; but the modernist argument in regard to this novel also involves the parodic subversion of the realist narrative idiom and the question of narrative perspectivization which in *Mysteries* frees aesthetic creativity while undermining the rules of realistic verisimilitude. In the case of *Pan*, the question is whether the narrative renders Glahn's turn to nature as a romantic search for authenticity, as is usually assumed, or whether the narrative defies romantic reading by revealing its status as the product of the psychological self-deception of a mind split between private desires and the public pressures of turn-of-the-century bourgeois society.
CHAPTER 2

HUNGER: STREAMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

What, then, may finally be said about Joyce’s stream-of-consciousness technique? First of all, it certainly does not provide an “exact reproduction” of thought or “the total contents of thought” as some critics have claimed; it simulates the psychological stream of consciousness.

(Alwin R. Steinberg, The Stream of Consciousness and Beyond in Ulysses)

This chapter provides historical and theoretical arguments for my claim that the suppression of explicit narratorial voice and retrospection, together with the extensive use of figural narration and free indirect discourse for presenting consciousness in its own subjective idiom, make Hunger formally a modernist narrative. The first part of the chapter (2.1.) discusses Hamsun’s use of figural narration in the first-person form. The second part (2.2.) provides arguments as to why the extensive presentation of consciousness in FID is typical of modernist texts. My arguments support suggestions that Hunger is a “stream-of-consciousness novel,” but redefine the way mainstream criticism usually conceives this phenomenon. At the same time, the chapter argues against those critics who overestimate the thematic significance of the narrator’s retrospective stance in Hunger.

More often than Mysteries and Pan, Hunger has been called a modernist novel. Particularly critics such Eggen, Kirkegaard, and Kittang have provided important arguments in this regard, including the themes of existential emptiness and anxiety, personality split and alienation, the centered subject, and the uprootedness of the artist in a depersonalized modern city. While such themes do make Hunger a modernist novel, they do not do so alone, but in conjunction with narrative presentation. The discussion of the latter has so far been limited to observations of how the composition and the structure of motifs reflect the chaotic and unpredictable movements of the starving writer’s psyche.¹

McFarlane has suggested properly that to inquire into the modernist form of Hamsun’s early novels, one should consider them in the context of the development of stream-of-consciousness techniques (“Whisper” 592). Yet McFarlane himself has not elaborated upon his suggestion, and later attempts to apply labels such as “stream-of-consciousness” or “interior monologue” to Hunger have not advanced beyond brief statements about thought associations and “limited” point of view. Egggen simply claims that Hunger is “en indre monolog” (55) without explaining in what sense. Nettum, in contrast, seems to doubt whether McFarlane’s suggestion is actually worth pursuing. While mental associations certainly play an important part in Hunger, Nettum claims, one cannot yet speak of stream-of-consciousness technique in pure form (“i renform” 61). He only sees a tendency that approaches it (“tillop” 61):

Hos metodens mestre, James Joyce og Virginia Woolf, er formålet å gi leseren illusionen av at fortelleren eller forfatterpersonligheten er totalt fraværende; i stedet er det brukt en slags "registreringsmaskin". I SULT er det en forteller og kommentator som betrakter bevisshetsstrømmen utenfra. Men det er noe riktig i påstanden [at Hunger anticipates the stream-of-consciousness technique] forslått som det bærende prinsipp i fremstillingen er skildringen av en strøm av psykiske fenomener. (61)

My chapter will argue against Nettum’s view, showing that it is based on several common misperceptions of the modernist presentation of consciousness which are prevalent in mainstream criticism. First, I will argue that textual evidence does not support the claim that the narrator makes retrospective comments on the stream of consciousness from the outside. Such a view seems to stem from the problematic assumption that every first-person narrator is explicitly retrospective by definition (cf. Nettum 59-61). In this view Nettum is joined by Hugan who believes that the key to the understanding of the novel lies in the narrator’s retrospection (38-9), but does not explain why; and to some degree also by Musarra-Schrøder who calls Hunger “erindringsroman” ("Tankeengangsvelsen“ 146, 156), overemphasizing the role of narratorial recollection in the novel (see below).

Second, Nettum’s view unfortunately reduces the question of the modernist presentation of the mind to the presence/absence of certain problematically defined narrative features of “stream of consciousness.” While “stream of consciousness” has hardly ever been defined properly as a narrative technique, the critical discussions of it have produced several broadly accepted misunderstandings about the nature of modernist prose. Many consider certain features attributed to stream-of-consciousness techniques to be the distinctive signs of modernist narrative. I identify three of these biased criteria of modernism as fragmentariness (radical narrative disorder and fragmentation of the text on the printed page) as typically modernist ways of
representing human consciousness); **linguistically defined directness** (modernist narrative characteristically presents the workings of the character's mind in the first person and the present tense); and **autonomy** (the modernist presentation of consciousness is radically independent of the narrator's discourse, i.e., it typically appears in long, separate blocks of the text, uninterrupted by the narrator's voice). These narrative features are, indeed, often found in modernist fiction. Yet their importance as indicators of modernism is often exaggerated, while other narrative features are disregarded. As I will show, the uncritical acceptance of these criteria has prevented critics such as Nettum from recognizing the presentation of consciousness in *Hunger* as modernist.

McFarlane’s above suggestion significantly indicates that the central question concerning modernism in the narrative of *Hunger* may be the presentation of consciousness. I believe my further discussion will make clear why it is important not to reduce this broad question to some rigid definition of “stream-of-consciousness technique.” In contrast to Nettum, I will argue that there exists no “pure form” of the stream-of-consciousness technique. Rather, we must be able to recognize that modernism uses a variety of techniques for simulating consciousness.

### 2.1. *Hunger* as a Modernist First-Person Narrative

#### 2.1.1. The First-Person Novel before Modernism

First-person narration is characterized by an existential continuity between a fictional person's identities as character and as narrator. Therefore the most common critical device for the description of a first-person narrative text is the technical distinction between the “experiencing self” and the “narrating self.” The term “experiencing self” refers to the narrator’s past self as a character; the term “narrating self” denotes the narrator’s present role as a narrator. The distance between the narrator’s two selves imitates the real human being’s separation from its past self—“temporally, spatially and psychologically”; the distance is thus “one of the most important points of departure for the interpretation of [first-person narratives]” (Stanzel 213). Theoretically, the distance ranges between two poles: either the narrating self comes to the fore so forcefully that it entirely suppresses the experiencing self, or the other way around. In other words, the variety of first-person narratives “extends from identification to complete estrangement between the narrating and the experiencing self” (Stanzel 213). Practically, however, traditional first-person fiction is characterized by a certain balance between the two selves, corresponding roughly to the balance between indirect report and direct scenic presentation. Indeed, Stanzel identifies in the recurrent shifts between the two selves a characteristic structural feature of first-person fiction in general (72, 225). The classical, autobiographical first-person novel, such as *David Copperfield*, corresponds to this model (210).

The reason some balance is always achieved in the traditional first-person fiction lies in the continuous presence of the narrating self and the authoritative role it plays in the classical novel. The first-person novel had traditionally been modeled on the genre of memoir or autobiography: the reader expected the narrating self to be verisimilar to a real autobiographer who would provide some retrospective illumination of the past. This role of the narrating self was reinforced by an even more general narrative convention: the classical narrator—both its first-person and authorial variants—was assumed to have the cognitive privilege over the characters’ lives. This convention conformed to the Enlightenment view of humans as rational beings capable of understanding and mastering the confusions of their former, immature selves. Thus even if the experiencing self manifests itself more forcefully than the narrating self in a particular classical first-person text, it is still subordinated to the authority of the narrating self. The narrating self is the ultimate referent for the meaning and objectivity of the narrative. No matter how confused or subversive the past self may be, “the field of tension between the two selves is always resolved” (Stanzel 210), in that the narrating self has the final cognitive privilege.

It should then come as no surprise that some modernists and twentieth-century writers, in their effort to demonstrate relativism and perspectivism, avoid first-person narration altogether. If they do use it, they usually either place the cognitive authority of the narrating self in a new, relativistic framework, or they turn away from the traditional first-person model. Hamsun’s was the latter way.

#### 2.1.2. *Hunger*, a “Rare Specimen” of the First-Person Novel

Hamsun’s *Hunger* represents a radical rejection of the classical model of first-person fiction in that it dispenses with the narrating self almost in its entirety. Only a very few past tense passages in *Hunger* that summarize stretches of time, come close to offering a narrating self. The narrating self, in general, cannot overtly summarize time-periods in passages that strictly concentrate on the experiencing self; similarly, the experiencing self can summarize time only for another fictional character (speech) or for himself in self-communion (thought), but not as a narrator for the reader. The experiencing self, as a fictional character, is part of the narrating self’s discourse, and cannot therefore normally “speak” to the reader as a narrator. Therefore past tense passages that overtly summarize time-periods are, indeed, “intended”
the experimental sections.

The next sections are the ones that conclude our first set of the narrative.

In the experimental section of this book (195-196) our conclusions draw a picture of the relationship
between the studies of the experimental section, the narrative section, and the conclusions.

In some cases, the experimental section, the narrative section, and the conclusions
are connected to other sections of the book. However, in this section, we focus
on the experimental section, the narrative section, and the conclusions.

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ing the narrating self. This enabled him to present the life of the experiencing self in its immediacy.

2.1.3. The Absence of Explicit Narratorial Irony
The assessment of Hunger as a novel in which the narrating self is largely effaced must be defended against the persistent misconception of the narrator of Hunger as ironist, shared for example by Nettum:

[At]standen mellom det fortellende jeg og det opplevende jeg kan skape et dobbeltperpektiv som nærmer seg ironi. Fortelleren ser ironisk på seg selv slik han "dengang" oppførte seg. ... [H]an dømmer, kritiserer, reserverer seg. ... (Nettum 59)

Nettum's assessment directly contradicts the claim he makes on the very same page, that the narrating and the experiencing selves in Hunger "er identiske." Nettum mentions (59-60) several words that are supposed to signal narratorial irony, such as "idiotisk," "fjollet," "sentimentalt." Also Merch sees such expressions as the signs of the narrator's irony:

[In Hunger,] the 1-narrator exposes a slightly ironic attitude towards the 1-character by means of his language. This is sometimes very obvious, as for instance when the narrator says: "Jeg sat og fabel med disse fornemmelsker en lang stund, kanske en hel time." The Norwegian verb "fable" contains an implicit comment to the event narrated. By using this verb, Hamsun's 1-narrator shows that the character's thoughts at that moment were irrational, outlandish. (38)

There is no doubt that Hunger abounds with irony virtually on every page. Yet to speak of irony in this novel does not necessarily mean to attribute it to the narrating self. Irony in a narrative text can have many sources, notably situational, verbal and intertextual contradictions, all of which can certainly be attributed to the author, but not necessarily to the narrator. It is therefore important to distinguish between implicit irony and explicit irony, that is, rhetorical ironizing. It is true that in a first-person text, which is constructed as a single person's enunciation, the narrator can often be held responsible for much of implicit irony by virtue of being the fictional creator of the narrative. Determining the narrator as ironist in this case depends heavily on the interpretation of a particular work, since mere implicit irony "leaves the narrator's stylistic neutrality intact" (Fludernik 355). Therefore it makes more sense to speak of narratorial irony proper only if the reader can discern an explicit distancing on the narrator's part. Nettum and Mørch equate irony in Hunger with this distancing.

In contrast, I will argue that such an irony is absent from Hunger; the expressions the two critics mention are the signs of irony which arises in the sphere of the experiencing self.

In the article "Fra det ubevistede Sjælevi," Hamsun stresses that there is a fine line between consciousness and the unconscious. He illustrates this idea in Hunger by creating a hypersensitive character of poor psychic integrity who is uniquely aware of the split in his personality between a rational, reflective ego and an irrational, instinctual ego. He frequently acts out dialogues, or otherwise communicates, with his other self, the need for self-observation and self-communication is of strong existential importance to him. He often becomes aware of the existence of his irrational other and of its forces that operate alongside his rational self: "Jeg lå med åpne øyne i en tilstand av fraværenhet fra mig selv, jeg følte mig dejlig borte" (44); "Jeg hørte mig selv tale dette vås, men opfattet hvert ord jeg sa som om de kom fra en anden person" (81). At times, Hamsun exaggerates this paradoxical self-awareness to the point of improbability. The novel abounds with sentences indicating explicitly that the character is well aware of behaving in an irrational way; indeed, he is often conscious of the unconscious, so to speak:

Jeg hørte selv at jeg fantasierte, hørte det endnu mens jeg talte. Men galtak var et delirium af svakhet og umattelse, men jeg var ikke sanesels. ... Jeg ... bar mig ad som en gal. Og jeg var mig også i dette sistevis bevisst hvad jeg gjorde. (52)

Jeg var mig stadig bevisst at jeg talte usammenhængende og jeg sa ikke et ord uten at jeg hørte og forstod det. ... Det var som å ligge våken og tale i søvn. (54)

This interpenetration of rationality and irrationality, awareness and unawareness, provides a counterargument to Nettum and Mørch. In my view, the expressions "idiotisk," "fjollet," "sentimentalt," and "jeg fabelt" do not mark overt narratorial irony. They are descriptions of how the experiencing self's rational ego felt—simultaneously, or immediately afterwards—about the behavior of his unconscious, instinctual half. This is obvious in the following passages, in which such expressions (see emphasis) occur in the context of the character's self-reflection:

Jeg var mig i sletten af fuldt bevisst at jeg begik gale strekere, uden at jeg kunde gøre noget ved det. ... Det nyttel ikke hvor meget jeg sa til mig selv at jeg bar mig idiotisk ad, jeg gjorde de dummeste grimmer bak damens ryg [emphasis added]. ... (13-14)
The article discusses the impact of emotions on the perception and understanding of expressions. It highlights the role of cognitive factors in the interpretation of facial expressions. The text is difficult to read due to handwriting and formatting issues, making it challenging to extract coherent information.
Some critics would presumably call this passage the narrator's retrospection. Yet the passage differs substantially, in terms of its effect on the reader, from commentary-filled, retrospective reflection. The passage clearly evokes for the reader the experiencing self's field of vision and perception, and must therefore be distinguished from explicit retrospection.

Some theorists have contended that all narrative is always narrative of the past. However, this problematic tenet may apply only in a limited sense to written fictional narratives; it seems to be derived more from the model of oral narration than from textual evidence. Fiction always simulates, rather than narrates, particular fictional worlds and discourse; it aims, more often than not, at evoking the present image of fictional reality before the reader (more on this in 2.2.2.). To say that narration is always narration about the past reduces all narration to retrospection: indeed, some theorists support this view by pointing out that the standard narrative tense, at least in the western narrative tradition, is the preterit.

Yet in fiction, the preterit is standard to such a degree that it often does not evoke any quality of "pastness" for the reader. This holds true, Stanzel and Fludernik note, especially for figural narratives in which no retrospection is foregrounded thematically. The narrating self effaced, the text offers the reader only a reflector-character who "thinks, feels and perceives, but does not speak to the reader like a narrator" (Stanzel 5). In figural narratives, therefore, the preterit is "no longer opposed to the present of a narrator," and therefore "becomes an unmarked index of simultaneity within a general past tense frame" (Fludernik 199).

Consequently, the evocation of "presentness" in figural narratives is often equally effective in both the past and in the present tenses. Since the reader's attention is strictly oriented toward the reflector's perceptual horizon, switching from the narrative past into the narrative present and back is often inconspicuous, quite unlike in overtly retrospective novels in which shifting tenses can be very marked. That is why Hamsun can switch tenses freely throughout Hunger with little or no change in the semantics or the expressivity of the text. The entire passage above could easily be narrated in the present tense, in which it, incidentally, begins (see the first sentence); indeed, many passages in Hunger similar to the one above are narrated in the present tense:

- Jeg går ind gjennem porten, kommer ind i en bagdag som jeg går værs over, støter mot en dør som jeg åpner og går ind gjennem, og jeg befinder mig i en gang, et slags forvevelse med to vinduer. Der står to kufferter, den ene ovenpå den andre, i den ene krok, og på langvægren en gammel umalt sofabænk som det ligger et tæppe i. Tilhøre, i næste værelse hører jeg røster og barneskrig og ovenover mig, i anden etage, lyden af en jærgplade som det hæmres på. (93)

Although a shift to the present tense in Hunger sometimes does enhance a sudden change (often indicated lexically by expressions such as "pludselig"), or an extraordinarily feverish action, the tense Hamsun uses normally makes little or no difference. Both tenses accommodate equally well expressive signals that can evoke the present quality of the character's vision/perception and that can simulate his consciousness. It is therefore more appropriate to consider the above passages to be, rather than narrative retrospection, examples of what Fludernik calls "narrated perception" (305-09).

The fact that the narrative past tense in figural narratives does not evoke any thematic "pastness" for the reader, is important in the historical perspective. Figural narration arose in the nineteenth century as a way of more radical narrative presentation of the character's subjectivity. It helped emancipate the character's subjectivity from the hold of the classical narrator. As such, the technique came to its full fruition in the works of modernist novelists.

In the classical realist novel, the explicit presence of a narrator and/or the overt retrospective narration reinforce the "presentness" of the narrator's sphere and the "pastness" of the character's sphere. Figural narratives, on the other hand, succeed better in evoking for the reader the present moment of the character, and thus also his/her immediate subjectivity: figural narration is better suited for expressing time as a constant flux, and for presenting human psychology as an ever-changing whirl of perspectives. This explains why modernist novelists, in their effort to portray relativism and perspectivism, typically make use of the figural mode. Novels such as A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, The Trial, or The Castle, are exemplary in this respect.

2.1.5. Conclusion: Hunger as a Modernist Figural Narrative

The narrator in Hunger is only an abstract narrative function: he does not manifest himself as a vociferous, autobiographical narrator-personality. Hunger does not conform to the mimetic requirement of creating a believable narrating self. In a real autobiography, a narrator-
personality naturally takes some stand toward its earlier self; so does the narrator in the first-person realist novel. In Hunger, on the other hand, the question of what stand the narrating self adopts toward its past self does not at all arise as a theme. The relationship between the narrating self and the experiencing self is neither negative nor positive; it is neutral(ized): it exists in the text of Hunger only as a technical feature of narration (the source of the information about the protagonist), not as a thematic issue. The question of “consonance” and “dissonance” between the two selves cannot be answered.19

For this reason, critics’ attempts to apply the psychological criteria of identification vs. non-identification to the relationship between the two selves in Hunger, has obscured the historical novelty of this text. By eliminating the narrating self as the ultimate cognitive horizon, verisimilar to a real-autobiographer-personality, Hamsun abandoned the classical form of the first-person novel, and broke away from the realistic tradition of novel writing of his time. Hamsun freed narration in Hunger from the constraint of realistic verisimilitude: the full concentration on the experiencing self creates no obligation for the author to fabricate a reasonable mimetic link—such as identification, criticism, explicit irony—to the narrating self. Hunger can be called an “autobiographical, retrospective narrative” only in a very limited, implicit sense, regarding only its most superficial, basic genre orientation as a first-person discourse. Such a label can, however, be quite misleading, because the novel lacks explicit retrospection. Rather, the narrative of Hunger presents the workings of the character’s consciousness as if in its present manifestation: the protagonist moves constantly before the reader as an ever-changing entity.20

It is precisely this emancipation of the character’s psychology from the autobiographical mimetism of the realist first-person novel which makes the narrative of Hunger modernist. The character’s experience is free of any cognitive authority and mediating framework that the narrating self had traditionally provided. The narrative can now simulate convincingly the presentness of the immediate manifestations of the character’s private world. The figural narrative situation enables the introduction of phenomena critics have labeled as “interior monologue,” or “stream of consciousness,” which will be the subject of section 2.2.

2.2. Modernist Presentation of Consciousness in Hunger

The terms “stream of consciousness” and “interior monologue” have always been the trademarks of modernist fiction. Critics usually use them rather loosely to cover various phenomena, both psychological and narrative. Although some critics have tried to define these terms as narrative techniques,21 it is clear that both of them imply, first of all, a psychological reality represented, rather than a particular technique. Techniques for representing stream of consciousness or interior monologue are many. I will therefore use the two terms as synonyms to denote any extended stretch of represented consciousness.

One of the most common stream-of-consciousness techniques is free indirect discourse. Yet while this fact is well-known to narrative theorists,22 not a few critics still have a relatively vague notion of the phenomenon of FID and its functioning, not to speak of its historical significance. As I indicated at the beginning, the myth still exists that stream of consciousness proper is “direct” (in the first person and the present tense), “autonomous” (cut off from the narrator’s discourse) and “fragmentary” in its graphical form on the printed page. This well-rooted “ideal” overshadows other types of stream-of-consciousness techniques, notably those in free indirect discourse. Moreover, some critics have elevated the above features to one-sided norms of what modernist narrative is. I will show how this bias, combined with inattention to FID, has prevented critics from recognizing modernist aspects in the narrative presentation of consciousness in Hunger.23

A close reading of Hunger reveals that there are almost no pages in the novel where free indirect discourse does not occur. One may almost claim that Hunger is characteristically written in this mode. My thesis is that FID is the most significant narrative technique in Hunger in that a) it is the most important device by which the narrative is focused on the private world of the experiencing self, and b) it is a technique that repeatedly presents the protagonist’s inner world as a stream of consciousness, or interior monologue.

2.2.1. Free Indirect Discourse and Modernist Narrative: A Historical Perspective

Free indirect discourse has traditionally been discussed as a linguistic-stylistic device that can present both speech and thought/consciousness, as in the following examples, respectively:

Jeg henvendte mig straks til en konstabel og bad ham indstændig om at følge med og lukke mig ind hvis han kunde.

_Hija hvis han kunde, ja! Men han kunde ikke, han havde ingen nøkkel. Politiet nølter var ikke her, de var i detektivskaudelingen._

_Hva played jeg da gjøre?_  
_Hjulp meg gå til et hotel og læg mig_[emphases added]. (47-8)

_Jeg reiste mig og stilte mig midt på gulvet. Alt ved øverrest kom modtan Gundersens opsigelse temmelig beærlig. Dette var egentlig ikke noget værelse for mig; her var nogle simple grønne gardiner for vinduerne, og så synede mange spiker i væggene til at hænge sin garderobe på var her heller ikke. ... Kortsagt, værelset var_
Grammatical-stylistic descriptions usually point out that FID is a hybrid between the narrator's and the character's "voices": it preserves the narrative past tense and third-person reference (unless referring to the narrator-character in first-person fiction), but it espouses the expressive and emotional signs of the character's subjectivity. Today's theorists realize more and more that this strictly linguistic-stylistic description of FID is too simplified, as well as inadequate to explain the various effects FID can have on the reader (more on this later). In my discussion of *Hunger*, I will only concern myself with FID-pas-

sages that present thought/consciousness; those presenting speech are far fewer in *Hunger* and, more importantly, not directly related to my topic, the modernist presentation of consciousness.

Modern narrative theory constantly returns to FID, for at least two major reasons: FID belongs to narrative phenomena that are most difficult to conceptualize, and because it is indissolubly linked to larger—not strictly linguistic-stylistic—theoretical issues such as language representation, point of view, intertextuality and literariness (McHale 249).

Unfortunately, studies of the phenomenon in a socio-historical perspective have been scarce, despite the theorists' awareness of the importance of such an enterprise. Nonetheless, a general agreement reigns among critics: FID was not employed widely until the nineteenth century (and especially the second half), and it assumed central importance with the rise of the modernist narrative. I will trace this development in the following pages.

Historically, FID must be considered as part of the repertoire of narrative techniques for presenting the character's personality as if from within its own mental and perceptual horizon. In this respect, the rise of FID closely parallels that of figural narration (see 2.1.4., n17), of which FID is the most characteristic element; in fact, sometimes the line between FID and figural narration becomes blurred.

Pavel's is so far the most ambitious attempt at providing a historical context for the emergence and increase in significance of FID. As a technique whose potential for presenting individuality in its own subjective idiom was recognized from very early on, FID is one of the sympt-

oms of the "rise of modern subjectivity" (Pavel 29). From the Enlighten-

ment era until approximately the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the subject in literature spoke mostly in the language of the community; even when irony, self-deception, and other signs of subjectivity were involved, the narrator—whether third-person or first-person—was assumed to be generally reliable, due to his/her apparent allegiance to

the shared construct of community values (Pavel 22). The self was understood as the "locus of strategic and moral debates closely related to action and held in a language shared by an entire community." Due to an unwritten contract between the author and the audience, "inner thoughts were taken to be as clearly articulated as public ones . . ." (25). Thus the difference between the character's inner thoughts on the one hand, and his/her outer speech and action on the other, was relatively insignificant. Fiction, like historical or legal discourse,

focused on human action and its motivation, and, as such, [was] . . . preoccu-
pied with the links between visible deeds and inner deliberation based on moral and strategic reasoning. Seen from outside, the "I" appeared thus analogous to a deliberation chamber, rather than to an absolute origin of soli-
ditary discourse. (29)

As doubt about the Enlightenment view of the individual as a rational being, capable of moral choices and thus responsible for his/her actions increased, the links between thought and action weakened:

These weak links are manifested, at the level of narrative construction, by the birth of the modern antihero, who cannot control nor understand him-

self . . ., and by the rise of chance, as opposed to reasoned strategy, as the main plot device of the modern novel. Discursively, this weakened connec-
tion is responsible for self-deceptive or unreliable autobiography, free indi-
rect discourse, and the growing fragmentation of represented inner speech.

(25)

In this scenario, FID assumes a new position, consonant with "a new distribution of the roles within the 'I'" (26). As areas of subjectivity other than thought and action begin to be explored, the self ceases to be a well-articulated "deliberation chamber," and begins also to accommodate "sensations, memories, and diffuse desires over which the 'I' has no effective linguistic command" (26). Writers begin to employ FID for presenting these new psychological themes, a task for which earlier techniques were less suitable.

Pavel's historical assessment concurs with Pascal's book-length study of the functioning of FID in the nineteenth-century novel. Pascal argues that while the use of FID enriched the nineteenth-century nar-
rative in that it enabled writers to present characters as if from "within their own worlds of perception and understanding," it did not mean "a radical subjectivisation of the fictional world" (137). FID as a con-
voyor of the character's psychology is still tied closely to the narrator who guarantees meaning and objectivity, as well as the moral design of the story (137). The narrator's grip on FID loosens only with the advent of modernism which brings the "release of the subjectivism inherent in this form" (137-38).
Indeed, modernists and some of their forerunners put FID to their own use. Stevenson argues that FID, while certainly not being a modernist invention, "does help distinguish the work of the modernists from the 'relatively stabilised' fiction of their predecessors" (34–5). The difference in use of FID is both quantitative and qualitative: Stevenson speaks of "new frequency and extent of its employment," as well as of "the particularity of its use as a register for unspoken thoughts, rather than as just another way of recording dialogue" (35)—indeed, in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, FID was used much more for rendering speech than for presenting consciousness.²⁸ In the same sense, Cohn speaks of FID as a "stylistic bridge that led from nineteenth- to twentieth-century fiction" (115). Modernists used the technique in a new way as one of their instruments of enhancing relativism and perspectivism: in modernist narrative, FID characteristically presents the subjective experience of the human mind in its immediacy, while the narratorial presence, deprived of its traditional mimetic roles, no longer exercises authority over it.

Hamsun’s novel Hunger constitutes an important milestone precisely because in it the nineteenth-century technique was put to a modernist use: FID depicts extensively the private inner world of the protagonist, while no narratorial control takes place. In this respect, the historical significance of Hunger is entirely unacknowledged.

2.2.2. Free Indirect Discourse in First-Person Narratives: A Theoretical Perspective

Traditional accounts of FID were limited to third-person narratives, since the technique occurs much less frequently in first-person fiction. Some critics have even concluded that FID simply does not exist in first-person narratives. Theorists such as Cohn and Stanzel have persuasively argued against such a misconception. FID does occur in first-person texts, but its features in this environment differ in several aspects from those in the third-person realm. Some of the constraints first-person narration places upon the use of FID explain its lower frequency.

As noted above, the linguistic-stylistic descriptions take FID to be a hybrid between the narrator’s and the character’s voices. Purely theoretically, this assessment holds for third-person narratives, as well as for first-person texts in which the issue of "dual voice" also arises, namely between the narrating and the experiencing selves. However, this elementary description is simplified and often inadequate, primarily because FID frequently consists of sentences in which the elementary grammatical signs (the past tense and third person) of "dual voice" are either not present, or are not sufficient signals of FID.³⁹ More importantly, the dual-voice hypothesis is frequently at odds with the reader’s perception of FID passages: the theory obscures important differences between representing speech and thought (see n.25), and between first- and third-person narratives. Stanzel has offered the reason FID occurs less often in first-person narratives: the duality of "voice" within represented thoughts in first-person texts "does not result in a true doubling of the perspective because the narrating self ultimately retains an existential link with his earlier, experiencing self" (221). This difference has some important consequences for the presentation of consciousness.

a) FID occurs relatively scarcely in first-person narratives as an instrument for rendering consciousness. One reason is that the first-person narrator can only use FID to render his own past inner world, since s/he does not have access to other characters’ minds.⁶⁰ Longer passages of FID that render consciousness presuppose a character who is extremely introverted, egocentric, or otherwise focused strictly on his internal life. This fact posed no problem for Hamsun, since the protagonist of Hunger is precisely of this sort; but the technique may be limiting for other authors, whose literary intentions either do not allow for the first-person FID, or may require third-person techniques instead.

b) Another reason for the rare occurrence of FID for presenting consciousness in first-person texts, is that long or frequent FID-passages presenting the experiencing self’s inner world require that the narrating self be suppressed (Cohn 171, Stanzel 224). This necessity is related to the role the narrating self has traditionally played in the first-person genre. Long stretches of interior monologue cannot be presented in an authentic and credible manner if they are tied to the voice of the autobiographical narrating self whose major preoccupation is recollection, reflection, and retrospective self-analysis. The narrating self is, sooner or later, expected to put some order into the streams of consciousness of the experiencing self.³¹ This limitation, once more, was no problem for Hamsun: in Hunger, the narrating self is effaced so that the immediate, subjective experience of the experiencing self can freely unfurl, with no a posteriori control. In usual first-person fiction, however, authors do create at least some retrospective links to the experiencing self, being thus unable to suppress the narrating self sufficiently; the attachment to the narrating self allows them to use FID for presenting thoughts only sporadically.³²

c) The existential continuity between the experiencing and the narrating selves does not allow a true “dual voice" which can otherwise be of high importance in authorial narratives. The authorial narrator can use FID to adopt an ironic distance toward the characters: in
authorial texts, FID "very often distances the reader from the fictional characters, because this distance is already inherent in the dual perspective of narrator and fictional character." (Stanzel 224). Thus whereas FID in authorial texts can create both irony and empathy, FID in first-person narratives "promotes the reader's empathy with the experiencing self much more frequently than it ironizes or creates distance between the experiencing self and the narrating self" (224). This holds true even more for figural narratives such as Hunger: they do not allow for any ironic distance within FID because the narrating self has no explicit voice. Here the theory of "dual voice," originally created for third-person FID, turns out to be an unapplicable theoretical construct. As for the presentation of consciousness, the reader sees little or no ambiguity between the voices of the narrating and the experiencing selves: she ascribes the "voice" in FID to the experiencing self (cf. n27).33

The first-person genre is very well-suited for capturing the existential-psychological differences between a fictional person's past and present selves; even more so if this person is a reflective type. Hunger, with its effacement of the narrating self, is a different case. Both the narrative situation and the thematic make-up of the novel create an optimal environment for the extensive employment of FID for presenting consciousness. The main character of Hunger is extremely introverted: he constantly retreats into his private world from his unsuccessful interaction with the public world. Hamsun's artistic intentions were to present the protagonist's movements of the mind with no a posteriori reflection: therefore he used figural narration to an extent that was unique in 1890. Having thus met the conditions for the high employment of FID for presenting the experiencing self's thoughts (see a, b, c above), Hamsun made an extended use of this technique: Hunger is among first-person novels with the highest employment of FID for presenting consciousness. In the following sections, I will explain concretely why the extensive use of FID makes the presentation of consciousness in Hunger modernist, and why critics have failed to realize this.

2.2.3. Modernist Narrative and Techniques for Presenting Consciousness

Critics have often assumed that novels by writers such as Joyce and Woolf are the highlights of modernism because the interior monologues employed in them are fragmentary and disorderly, and because they, allegedly, "reproduce directly" the workings of the human mind. The critics' criterion was authenticity: the more "direct," disorderly, and fragmentary the representation of consciousness, the more

verisimilar the image of the mind was supposed to be. It is no accident that this critical preference arose during the period of the rise of modernism, whose characteristic preoccupation was perspectivism—both ideologically and in matters of narrative presentation. Ever since the theories of Henry James and of his admirer, the critic Percy Lubbock, the distinction between the direct "point of view" and the narrator's indirect discourse, have had a normative slant: "showing" is good, "telling" bad. Many scholars have adopted this sharp division rather uncritically to modernist narrative, and elevated certain techniques for presenting consciousness higher than others only because they were "less mediated" by the narrator. A favorite example of the "most accomplished" technique became the last chapter of Ulysses that presents Molly Bloom's stream of consciousness:

Yes because he never did a thing like that before as ask to get his breakfast in bed with a couple of eggs since the City Arms hotel when he used to be pretending to be laid up with a sick voice doing his highness to make himself interesting to that old faggot Mrs Riordan that he thought he had a great leg of and she never left us a farthing all for masses for herself and her soul greatest miser ever was actually afraid to lay out 4d for her methylated spirit. . . . (738)

The chapter is an attempt at rendering Molly's mind in its autonomy: the stream of consciousness is tied neither to any overt narrator, nor to any covert narrator's past tense.34 Moreover, Joyce presents consciousness as if in its own (dis)order: there is no punctuation, there are no paragraphs, no capital letters to indicate the beginning of sentences; the sentences themselves are incomplete, fragmentary. In this manner, the stream of consciousness is supposed to be less verbal, and more thought-like, dream-like, or image-like. Therefore some critics have claimed that such a technique reaches deep into Molly's mind, perhaps even into her unconscious. However, the typographical fragmentariness makes the image of the mind no less verbal; in fact, the verbal component is foregrounded in such a way that it almost becomes a barrier for the reader's "direct" access to Molly's mind. The question arises: is this really the most authentic representation of the human mind?

Cohn has challenged the assumption that such techniques are the "purest" ways of rendering consciousness. She argues that while psychologists do not dispute the existence of "inner speech" (also called "mentation") in the human mind, theoretical conceptions abound as to the quality of this phenomenon. Models of consciousness range from totally non-verbal to entirely verbal. The question still lingers: do we think in words, concepts, images—or something else? Consequently, there exists no ultimate norm for representing the human
mind in the arts and literature; fictional renditions of consciousness are always conventional.

Yet Cohn does make some general assumptions in this respect. Following Freud, she equates the higher mental strata with articulation, and the mind’s depths with inarticulateness. She applies this well-known postulate to narrative techniques for rendering consciousness: “Most generally, one can say that the more direct the technique, the more evidently verbal the activity of the mind, and therefore the more clearly conscious the mind that is exposed” (139). This thesis challenges the uncritical acceptance of Molly’s interior monologue as the most accomplished technique for rendering consciousness. Less direct techniques, such as FID, or even certain kinds of narration about consciousness, may in fact be better suited for representing the human mind, especially that mind’s inarticulate, hidden depths. The defenders of modernism tend to consider the narrator’s discourse about the character’s consciousness to be the most traditional and inherently “bad” technique, because it is the least direct and thus inauthentic. In contrast, Cohn argues that indirect narration has the potential to reach deeper in the human mind. The deeper the mind, the less representative it is; the unconscious is, by definition, unrepresentable, except in a symbolic or metaphorical manner, that is, in an indirect manner. Indirect narration about the character’s mental life can therefore express more appropriately the workings of the unconscious—in symbols, similes, and metaphors. Narration about the character’s psyche “reaches deeper” precisely because it creates vague images of the mind’s interior instead of reproducing the character’s verbalized thoughts.35

Cohn’s arguments imply that it may be misleading to prefer one technique for presenting consciousness to another in an a priori normative fashion. It is difficult, if not impossible, to decide which technique presents consciousness in a more authentic way, without taking the context into account. First-person reference, present tense, greater fragmentariness, and more sustained stretches of text, are not necessarily qualities that make the “autonomous” interior monologue deep-reaching, “better,” or more modernist than others. Defining modernist narrative on the basis of such criteria, with no regard to the context and the goals particular techniques serve in the individual work, is an infelicitous formalist enterprise. Unfortunately, both certain ideological preferences of critics and certain models elaborated by narrative theorists have promoted such an approach.

2.2.4. Traditional Narrative Theories and the Presentation of Consciousness

Ever since Henry James drew the line between “telling” and “showing,” twentieth-century theorists have overemphasized the divide that separates “indirect narration” (diegesis) from “direct (re)presentation” (mimesis).36 By applying a speech-communicational model (SPEAKER -> UTTERANCE -> HEAER) to the narrative text (NARRATOR -> THE NARRATED -> IMPLIED READER/NARRATEE), the structuralist theorists have, paradoxically enough, reinforced the traditional mimetic assumption that there is always a coherent narrator-personality behind every word of the text. While these theorists made an important contribution by replacing the “author” as the assumed narrative agent with a non-biographical “narrator,” they nonetheless continued to conceive of the “narrator” as if it were a real personality. The narrator was the ubiquitous ultimate “enunciator” of every word in the narrative; in case the narrator’s voice was not detectable in certain passages, the critics would still deem his/her presence to be “covert.” Fludernik succinctly summarizes this problem:

[S]ince the earlier ... tendency to identify the non-personalized narrator with the (historical) author has become untenable in the wake of the Modernist aesthetic, the responsibility for the telling has now been transferred to the (covert) narrator, or the implied author, and that even in narratological circles. The persistence of this preconceived notion that somebody (hence a human agent) must be telling the story ... derives directly from the frame conception of storytelling [i.e., real-life oral enunciation] rather than from any necessary textual evidence. (488)

This conception of narrator has had a problematic consequence: everything that exists in a narrative text must either be “narrated” (indirect discourse, diegesis) or “quoted” (direct discourse, mimesis) by the narrator; FID has the privilege of being a “mixed” form in this model. As a heuristic device for approaching the problems of the narrative text, this tripartite communicational model seems to, at a degree, indispensable. Yet it cannot provide the only adequate instrument of narrative analysis, since it has a few serious drawbacks.

First, recent theory shows that the boundaries between direct, indirect and free indirect discourse are less strict than previously thought: many examples show that the distinction is often difficult to make. The following example from Hunger illustrates how thin the line is between diegesis, mimesis, and FID: “Forresten var met navn det og det, pastor den og den” (777). In the context of the paragraph, this sentence is the character’s speech in FID. However, since the corresponding utterance in direct discourse would most likely include a real name, rather than the phrase “such and such,” a more predictable (more “standard”) form of this FID would be: “Forresten var mit navn [for example] Ibsen, pastor Henrik Ibsen.” Which of the two types of FID is more direct, more mimetic? The answer is not easy. First, we cannot really ascertain whether the protagonist used a name, or said,
The sentence "more or less "scarcity" by means of P Amit" contains a typographical error. It should read "more or less "scarcity" by means of P Amit."
Chapter 23

Conclusion

The process by which the human mind is able to experience
the subjective nature of the character's mind is through the
interaction of the character's experiences and the environment.
The character's experiences are shaped by the emotional
response to the events that occur in the story. These
emotional responses are the result of the character's
interaction with the environment. The character's experiences
are also influenced by the interactions with other characters
in the story. These interactions can be positive or negative,
and they can have a significant impact on the character's
emotional state.

The emotional states of the characters are reflected in
their actions and decisions. These actions and decisions
shape the course of the story and contribute to the overall
development of the characters. The characters' emotional
states are also influenced by the external environment,
which can include physical factors such as weather,
and social factors such as family and friends.

The emotional states of the characters are also reflected
in their interactions with each other. These interactions
are shaped by the characters' emotional states and
their experiences. The interactions can be positive or
negative, and they can have a significant impact on
the character's emotional state.

The emotional states of the characters are also reflected
in their physical actions. These actions are shaped
by the characters' emotional states and their
experiences. The actions can be positive or
negative, and they can have a significant impact
on the character's emotional state.

The emotional states of the characters are also reflected
in their decisions. These decisions are shaped by the
characters' emotional states and their experiences.
The decisions can be positive or negative, and they
can have a significant impact on the character's
emotional state.