CONCLUSION

THE AFTERLIVES OF THE *INDIO BÁRBARO*

On May 2, 2011, U.S. Navy Seal Team 6 killed Osama bin Laden during a raid on his family compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The Seal Team leader informed President Obama about the success of the mission with the phrase "For God and Country, Geronimo, Geronimo, Geronimo." After a moment's pause, he clarified "Geronimo EKIA," meaning "Geronimo, Enemy Killed in Action." Despite military claims to the contrary, it remains unclear whether "Geronimo" was shorthand for the mission (official code name "Operation Neptune Spear"), for bin Laden (official codename "Jackpot"), or for the act of killing bin Laden. What remains clear is that the name linked Osama bin Laden's evasion of the U.S. military and intelligence communities for ten years at the beginning of the twenty-first century with the Apache leader's evasion of the U.S. and Mexican militaries for ten years at the end of the nineteenth. Though separated by more than a century of U.S. global warfare, Geronimo and bin Laden were linked as terrorists in this communication, which also linked the Christian God and the nation. Bin Laden and Geronimo were savvy and resourceful, perhaps even brave, but ultimately they were beaten (and conjoined) as "terrorists" in the nation's military memory and popular imagination.

One week later, on May 9, 2011, tens of thousands of demonstrators filled Mexico City's Zócalo to welcome the "March for Peace with Justice and Dignity," arriving after a five-day journey on foot from Cuernavaca, Morelos. Those marching were the families and friends of the victims claimed by Mexico's drug war. The demonstrators demanded an end to impunity and justice for their dead, but their chief demand was for then President Felipe Calderón to end his misbegotten policy of war against the drug cartels and instead

enter into peace negotiations with their leaders as the only viable means of reestablishing national security. Calderón responded by insisting that while he was happy to dialogue with the good people of the peace movement, he would never enter into negotiations with "esos bárbaros en el norte." Though separated by more than a century, the twenty-first-century narco and the nineteenth-century Apache and Comanche were linked in Calderón's speech, again through historical allusion to the equestrian peoples, the original "bárbaros del norte."

The march from Cuernavaca to Mexico City was led by Javier Sicilia, a poet and a journalist whose twenty-four-year-old son Juan Francisco was killed, along with six friends, by a group of *sicarios*, or hit men, on March 28 of the same year. These young men were killed because they had unwittingly gotten into a bar fight with the nephews of a sicario who worked for the Pacifico Sur cartel. The sicario was an ex-military officer, allegedly drummed out of the military for drug-related corruption, who turned into a private security worker for the cartel. The nephews appealed to their uncle for revenge and he obliged. The torture and murder of these upper-crust university students and businessmen—one of whom was the son of the renowned poet Sicilia—brought into cruel relief the truth about Calderón's declared war on the drug cartels. Of the tens of thousands dead as a consequence of the war, a significant number, if not the majority, were innocent bystanders caught in the crossfire or swept up in the escalating violence of its perpetrators.[1] Five years into his presidential term, Calderón's administration had repeatedly portrayed all those killed as members of the cartels or as delinquents whose choice of lifestyle had inevitably led to their drug-related deaths. The participants in the March for Peace, carrying placards of their dead, made it all too evident that this was not the case. Instead of hardened drug dealers or strung-out junkies, the marchers told of students killed on the way to school, working-class women and men killed on the way to their jobs, and indigenous peasants killed for protecting their fields.

The speech acts of the Navy Seal to Obama and of Calderón to the national media remind us as well of the transnational complicity between the two nations, foregrounding the histories of war against the Apache and the Comanche that link U.S. and Mexican statecraft. They reiterate the colonial and national representations of the indio bárbaro that form the subject of *Indian Given.* These speech acts triangulate the globe, a triangulation through the Middle East enabled by the racial geographies of the borderland that are at once historically and cartographically specific yet heuristically and discursively diffuse, disentailed from the actual Mexico–U.S. border through the

explanatory power of the heterotemporal and multispatial indio bárbaro. In this narrow sense, I suggest both of these wars are again *Indian given*. The indio bárbaro, a key figure in establishing the imperial boundaries of the United States and Mexico, now animates both of these contemporary wars and carries on with its racializing mission by demarcating in religious terms the boundary between the "good people" of a nation worth defending and the barbarous inhumanity of those who must be excluded, excised, eliminated at all costs.

The invocation of the indio bárbaro in the name of Geronimo and in the allusion to "pueblos bárbaros" signals the transposition of the racial geographies of the border onto other places and other times. In this coda I consider the afterlives of the indio bárbaro in the twenty-first-century drug war against the "pueblos bárbaros del norte" and in the global war on terror. As a metaphorical concept for a paradoxically *indigenous* foreign agent threatening "God and country," it has traveled far afield from its original home to present-day Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, central Mexico, Honduras, and beyond, signaling again and again a threat to the very form of the nation-state and presaging a need for ever-greater militarization and joint actions across the globe. Specifically, these speech acts conjoin the Muslim terrorist and the narco terrorist in the national imaginations of both countries as dangers that once again require the joint action of the U.S. and Mexican militaries to keep the borders of these nations "safe" from both. These wars are spatial practices in their own right, of course, reiterating the racial coordinates of the border but also materially remaking these specific geographies in the process.

As *Indian Given* demonstrates, the figure of the indio bárbaro is not representative of any historical actors. He does not reflect the fabled Chichimecas of the Aztec Empire nor the mobile traders of New Spain's northern frontier; he does not reference the equestrian peoples of the Great Plains nor even the Apache or Comanche warriors who militarily staved off British and Spanish colonialism and fought wars of expansion against the United States and Mexico. Rather it is precisely the catachrestic nature of the indio bárbaro that accounts for its long afterlives. Untethered from *any* historical referent yet encompassing all of these, the indio bárbaro floats across time and space, conditioning our repetitive futures. I am not suggesting a *causal* relationship between the indio bárbaro discussed in chapters 2 and 3 and the Muslim or narco terrorist of the present. Instead, repressed but always present in the manner suggested in chapters 4 and 5, the indio bárbaro conditions national responses to contemporary phenomena, functioning as an unconscious racial hermeneutic in the business of statecraft for Mexico and the United States. Thus free trade and the drug trade together produce the latest iteration of the

indio bárbaro in the undocumented immigrant and the *narco-killer-terrorist*, threatening the borderlands, providing anxious national populations with facile explanations for the profound restructuring of the U.S. and Mexican economies over the last twenty years under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Meanwhile beheadings and scalpings in Mexico and in the Middle East reiterate the violence of nineteenth-century liberal statecraft as practiced by the United States and Mexico against the equestrian nations. This is a reiteration with a difference, of course, as this contemporary violence-as-statecraft is expressive of an alternative sovereignty to that of the centralized nation-state, one that combines feudal territoriality with extra-economic compulsion in capitalist production for a global and integrated market. Taken as proof-positive of the barbarity of the drug cartels and of Mexico as ungovernable, instead these spectacular forms of violence are a new mode of governmentality that must be theorized rather than dismissed as merely the latest expression of brazen Mexican savagery. The figure of the indio bárbaro haunting the scenes of beheading performs two functions at once. It naturalizes the violence for national audiences that insist on reading scalping and beheading as anachronistic acts of indigenous barbarity, necessarily foreign to the modern practice of statecraft. The indio bárbaro at the same time functions as a psychic derivative enabling citizens of both countries to repress their own liberal complicity in such practices.

NAFTA and Narcos

Narcos and Muslim jihadists are brought together most often by U.S. government officials to justify defense budgets on the basis of their joint threat, but it is the figure of the indio bárbaro that ultimately enables this threat to cohere. State Department and Pentagon officials testify before Congress that drug trafficking threatens U.S. national security because profits could potentially fund jihadi terrorist organizations.[2] This facile connection would strike some observers as improbable given that Latin American drug lords are often explicit in their Christian devotion and notorious for their neoconservative politics. Cocaine profits have been siphoned off by leftist guerrilla movements and right-wing paramilitary forces in countries like Peru and Colombia, but the armed protagonists in these long-standing civil wars over economic inequity and political repression are not jihadists targeting the United States. The deadly irony of the Iran-Contra cocaine scandal uncovered by journalists like Gary Webb and Robert Parry in the 1980s bears remembering whenever U.S.

government officials insist on connecting Latin American drug smuggling with terrorist activity. The Reagan administration falsely and often accused the Sandinista government of funding its "terrorist" regime in Nicaragua by smuggling cocaine into the United States and poisoning urban youth. Instead, his CIA was all the while assisting the counterrevolutionaries (the Contra) with the shipment of cocaine from Colombia via Panama to the streets of Los Angeles in order to fund their criminal activities to overthrow the legitimately elected Sandinista government.[3] As this example illustrates, the U.S. government's arguments joining Latin American drug smuggling, terrorist activities, and the dangers to U.S. youth for political advantage predates 9/11. Indeed, both the Reagan and Clinton administrations signed executive orders that strengthened joint antidrug and antiterrorist enforcement. After 9/11, however, the terrorist in this equation took on a decidedly jihadist profile.

The United States has spent over $1 trillion in taxpayers' money persecuting its "war on drugs" in Latin America since the 1970s.[4] Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has spent over $12.5 billion on Plan Colombia alone "to stop drugs at the 'source'" (Isacson et al. 2013, 2).[5] Colombia remains the top recipient of U.S. military and police aid to fight the drug war; however Mexico is a close second, as Plan Merida (2008–present) is modeled on Plan Colombia. In 2010 military and police aid to Latin America peaked at a total of $1.6 billion in a single year. Mexico was the top recipient that year, capturing over $500 million—or one third—of the total dispensed (Isacson et al. 2013, al. 20). While military and police aid to Latin America has declined under the Obama administration due to budget cuts and sequestration, this does not necessarily signal a decrease in U.S. involvement with Latin American military and police. Rather, Obama's military strategy in Latin America mimics his "leaner and meaner" strategy in the Middle East, entailing the increased use of Special Operations teams; of cybersecurity and increased CIA surveillance; of drone and robotic targeting of suspected "terrorists"; and the training of armies by proxy (Isacson et al. 2013, 21–23).[6] As these tasks are dispersed across a greater number of U.S. government departments, militarized agencies and offices proliferate, as do budget allocations. Moreover, by collapsing antidrug and antiterrorist activities, the shift in strategy renders many of the budget allocations "classified" in the interest of national security and difficult if not impossible to trace.[7]

As a consequence of this mission creep, today Latin America receives more yearly military and police aid to combat drugs than it received in any given year during the Cold War to combat communism. As military security expert Adam Isacson compellingly argues in "The U.S. Military in the War on

Drugs," the militarization of the drug war under Reagan and Bush (1989–93) was a strategic response to the end of the Cold War by State Department and the Pentagon officials:

> The collapse of the Soviet block left few compelling missions or pretexts to justify either the large militaries in the region or large military aid programs in Washington. The U.S. government, which had spent the better part of a century cultivating close and costly military-to-military relationships, was faced with a stark choice: Southcom, and other U.S. bureaucracies responsible for security in Latin America, would have to adapt by finding new justifications for current budget levels—or undergo a deep reduction in size and influence. (2005, 22)

The appearance of crack in U.S. cities provided the Reagan administration with an easy alibi for pursuing the first option by reviving the "war on drugs" rhetoric of Nixon to great effect for military and police budgets. The "radical mission switch quickly acquired a firm legal basis" as Congress shifted central authority for drug interdiction and eradication from the Treasury Department to the Department of Defense and the Pentagon in the late 1980s (Isacson 2005, 28). Today we maintain more than four thousand U.S. military personnel on the ground in Latin America at all times, as well as additional agents from ten other law enforcement agencies. The U.S. Navy and Air Force maintain constant surveillance of Latin America's sea and sky.[8]

Arguing for escalating budgets in order to protect the United States from "terrorists" who might mix themselves among the immigrants (documented and undocumented) crossing U.S. borders, especially the southern border, Homeland Security has gotten into the game since its creation in the aftermath of 9/11.[9] For this reason Homeland Security absorbed the Border Patrol Agency, militarizing it in the process. Homeland Security has more than doubled the number of border patrol agents along the southern border with Mexico, from 9,100 in 2001 to more than 18,500 today.[10] Moreover, Homeland Security has also militarized the border with advanced weaponry and surveillance technology. This increase in technological sophistication in weaponry and surveillance is in part due to the U.S. war in the Middle East, as surplus military equipment, developed for surveillance and intelligence gathering in Iraq and Afghanistan, finds its way to the U.S.–Mexico border. An "Unmanned Aircraft System" (drones), for example, now patrols the entire two-thousand-mile southern U.S. border at all times.[11] By way of contrast, the Border Patrol has only 2,200 agents patrolling the more than 5,500 miles of Canadian border, and drones survey less than a thousand of those miles,

although this is the border that 9/11 terrorists used to cross into the United States.[12] The Border Patrol has yet to capture a single alleged Islamic terrorist crossing into the United States from Mexico, though agents have killed several Mexican citizens since 2010—in the double digits—including some who were clearly on the Mexican side of the border with no intention of crossing it.[13]

Night-vision goggles, drones, and M16s are all trained on undocumented Mexican immigrants crossing the border in search of work, and it is the figure of the indio bárbaro that enables this racialized distribution of military force and reterritorializes our "defense of the nation" along the Mexican border rather than the Canadian one. Indeed a comparison of the distribution of force along the two borders underscores how this racialized hermeneutic conditions the nation's response to the perceived violation of U.S. sovereignty by Mexican drugs and immigrants. While accounting for only 2 percent of U.S. marijuana seizures at the borders, Canada nevertheless supplies the U.S. market with over 1 million pounds of marijuana per year.[14] Canada is the leading foreign supplier of ecstasy, often laced with highly addictive methamphetamines, a drug of choice among high school and college-age students.[15] On the other hand, El Paso, Texas, just across the bridge from Ciudad Juárez, is consistently ranked the safest city in the United States. Yet there is a 3.7:1 ratio per border mile in the distribution of border patrol agents along the Mexican and Canadian borders. The racial hermeneutic of the indio bárbaro may also help to explain why U.S. drug interdiction and eradication policies are myopically focused on the "unholy trinity" of marijuana, cocaine, and heroin produced in Latin America when cocaine and heroin are not among the top-five drugs used by underage youth in junior high or high school. Indeed, they are last on the list of top-ten drugs used by U.S. citizens. In order, the drugs most used are alcohol, cigarettes, marijuana, ecstasy, tranquilizers, prescription drugs, methamphetamines, inhalants, cocaine, and heroin (Mares 2006, 40). The majority of these drugs are legally manufactured in the United States and Canada by powerful industries (pharmaceutical, tobacco, alcohol) that benefit handsomely from the illicit use of their inebriants. And yet, the southern hemisphere and the Mexico–U.S. border continue to draw the military heat because of the myopic focus on marijuana, heroin, and cocaine.

It is not just an irrational U.S. drug policy or even the generic fear of a brown planet that leads to the militarization of the southern border, but the specific if unconscious fear of the Mexican as the indio bárbaro, of the indio bárbaro as indigenous foreign terrorist. Behind every Mexican immigrant is not just a violator of borders, a usurper of jobs, or a pusher of drugs but also the uncomfortable reminder of an indigenous people who refused to cede

ground to U.S. nationalism, who refused to willingly disappear into a narrative of the vanishing Indian, a reminder that must be repressed behind the figure of the indio bárbaro. The indigenous faces of Mexican migrants recall the terrorizing truth of a racial geography made through violent dispossession and repression: the Indians did not die, they did not willingly cede their sovereignty to more capable white sovereignty. They remain in the presence of Mexican mestizos and indigenas who refuse to acknowledge the fastidiousness of nation-state borders. It is in this sense that Mexicans, like the indios bárbaros, are indigenous people made foreign: like the indios bárbaros they must be alienated from the "American" landscape in order to preserve the myth of a U.S. racial geography founded on legal principles by scrupulous settlers who purchased the territory from sovereign if foolish Indians. The undocumented immigrants remind U.S. citizens of their own original undocumentation. They also recall the living Native Americans who continue to assert their own territorial sovereignty within a white settler nation-state. Thus, in addition to filling the coffers of the military industrial complex, the militarization of the border protects the racial unconscious of a U.S. citizenry: it protects their mythic origin story by naturalizing all Mexicans as barbarous, lawless people.

The irony is that many of the Mexicans crossing the border do so because they have lost their own jobs as a consequence of NAFTA or are fleeing the violence of an ever-intensifying drug war waged by the U.S. and Mexican militaries against the cartels. 2014 marked the twentieth anniversary of NAFTA, a trilateral agreement that required the elimination of all subsidies to small Mexican farmers, the privatization of Mexican communal lands, and the elimination of Mexican tariffs on imported U.S. and Canadian basic grains.[16] An estimated 2 million Mexican farmers have been displaced from their lands since the passage of NAFTA.[17] Of course, when a Mexican farmer abandons his farm it has a multiplying effect as a farm owned by the head of the household invariably employs family labor and seasonal itinerant labor.

Thus it should have come as no great surprise when by 2004, within the first ten years of NAFTA, a conservatively estimated 8 million Mexicans had migrated to the United States in search of work, many of them indigenous farmers and laborers displaced off their communal farms because they could not compete with foodstuffs produced by U.S. agroindustry. By the year 2000, 96.2 percent of Mexican municipalities had experienced international outmigration (Delgado Wise and Cypher 2007, 37).[18] Thus farms in New York's Hudson valley today employ increasing numbers of indigenous Mexican farmers, including entire villages of indigenous peoples who have abandoned the Mexican countryside (Grey 2007, 38, 41–51). But peasants are not alone in

their migration to the United States. Mexicans are also abandoning the urban centers because Mexico is deindustrializing as an effect of NAFTA.

NAFTA has created more than half a million jobs in the *maquiladora* industry (Polaski 2004, 15).[19] Mexican exports to the United States have grown accordingly. The value of trade between Mexico and the United States has more than tripled. Exports from the United States to Mexico increased from $41 billion in 1993 to $226 billion in 2013, an increase of 444 percent (Villarreal and Fergusson 2011, 14).[20] Mexican exports to the United States, meanwhile, increased from $40 billion in 1993 to $280 billion in 2013, an increase of more than 600 percent (Villarreal and Ferguson 2011, 14). Consequently, the United States is currently running an import-export deficit with Mexico, causing U.S. labor unions quite a bit of stress in the process (Villarreal and Ferguson 2011, 10).[21] This trade deficit should bode well for Mexico, but when one looks more carefully at these statistics a different picture emerges. While it is true that Mexico is exporting more value-added goods to the United States in 2014 than in 1993, this does not imply an intensification or extension of industrial manufacture in Mexico. Rather it is disarticulating the Mexican economy with profoundly negative effects on employment by transferring "Mexico's economic surplus away from its potential domestic usage" (Delgado Wise and Cypher 2007, 121).

Maquiladoras are a highly parasitical form of industrial manufacture. The trade agreement relaxed environmental and labor regulations for maquiladoras, but it also eliminated tariffs on imports needed in export production within the *maquila* sector, as it is popularly called. Transnationally owned factories located along the border assemble goods that are then exported, primarily to the United States, for consumption. However, the majority of the inputs used in the assembly of these consumer goods—and the technology embodied in those inputs—are imported into Mexico.[22] In 2013, 75 percent of Mexican exports were composed of imported inputs, representing an *increase* of 2 percent over the twenty years of NAFTA, as imported inputs made up 73 percent of Mexican exports in 1994 (Castañeda 2014, 138).[23] Even though export production has exploded over the last twenty years, the percentage of imported inputs in Mexico's export manufacture has remained stubbornly the same, leading Mexico's foreign minister Jorge Castañeda (2000–2003) to conclude that as a result "employment in the manufacturing sector has stayed unchanged, and so have salaries" (138). Paradoxically, most of the value added in Mexico's exports is not added within the country of Mexico, in other words. As the final step in the production process, assembling inputs produced in other countries into the final product to be consumed in other countries,

Mexican maquilas add but a tiny percentage of the value added to the commodity in the form of cheap labor rather than technically skilled labor.

This macroeconomic structure in maquiladora manufacturing, coupled with the increase in imported consumer durables and goods for the Mexican market, has created a downward pressure on wages. Consequently, "real incomes in the manufacturing sector and the rest of the formal economy have remained stagnant, even if the fall in the price of some goods [due to imports] has softened the blow for workers" (Castañeda 2014, 138). Nevertheless, the maquila sector acts as an important tax shield for transnational corporations whose tax load is reduced as inputs enter the country and as exports exit the country. Thus the figures accounting for Mexico's increase in value-added exports disguise the fact that the majority of the overall value added to exports is accrued outside of Mexico and leaves very little profits or taxes in the country. Furthermore, as corporations relocated factories to Mexico to take advantage of cheaper labor costs and exemptions from tariffs on inputs, their profit margins have dramatically increased, as the repatriation of profits without taxation is another benefit of the trade agreement (Ruiz Durán 2013, 55–56). Thus the export deficit that the United States is currently running with Mexico does not indicate a negative impact on profits under NAFTA but its reverse. The costs of these relocations and trade deficit are instead born by workers on both sides of the border.

Maquiladoras leave almost no technological footprint in the country because they do not produce any backward or forward linkages. They do not invest in the production of inputs and components; they do not invest in research and development within the country; they invest but minimally in the up-skilling of their workforce. They do not create domestic industries that would multiply economic growth through the development of technology and the production of inputs at home. While it is true that maquilas pay much more than Mexico's minimum wage, it is also true that they pay *less* than nonmaquiladora manufacturing that is subject to Mexican labor laws and unionized labor (Delgado Wise and Cypher 2007, 126; 128). Also the increase in overall wages due to the maquiladora manufacturing is offset by the decline in wages due to the closing of domestic factories that have not been able to compete with low-cost imports, or what Castañeda calls the "Walmart effect" (135).[24]

Compounding the negative effects on Mexican manufacturing is the reorientation of nonmaquiladora factories to export production, a reorientation that has come with the extension of NAFTA provisions to this sector. Nonmaquiladora and maquiladora export production together account for 85 percent of Mexican exports, with maquiladora manufacturing responsible for

55 percent. Historically, nonmaquila manufacture, such as the auto industry, has invested in the domestic production of inputs and components, in research and development, and in the training of their unionized workforce (backward linkages), as well as in the marketing and distribution of their products to Mexican consumers (forward linkages). But more nonmaquiladora industries are now taking advantage of "temporary import programs" that allow corporations to incorporate maquiladora-produced components or temporarily imported inputs into their finished manufactured export products without having to pay tariffs or taxes (Delgado Wise and Cypher 2007, 127, 125).

The dramatic increase of temporary import programs within the nonmaquiladora manufacturing sector has led Delgado Wise and Cypher to label the growing number of firms involved in these programs as a "disguised maquila sector":

> In the disguised maquila sector, nationally produced inputs/components have fallen from 32 percent in 1993 to 22.6 percent in 2004. In essence, export firms outside of the maquila sector are progressively *de-industrializing,* leaving only the value of Mexican labor as the determining component of value-added as 77 percent of the inputs into the production process are imported. Once again . . . in the final analysis for Mexico the net result of this sector is almost completely reducible to the disembodied export of the Mexican labor force as embodied in the exported products. Furthermore, when Mexican-made inputs are reduced the impact is not limited to destroying supplier firms and jobs but also the complex set of socioeconomic relationships and skills that have accumulated over decades. (2007, 129)

The export model of economic development that replaced the import substitution model instituted in the postwar period (1940–80) is dramatically deskilling Mexican labor and cheapening it in the process with devastating consequences for laborers in all three signatory countries. Thus foreign direct investment (FDI), which has skyrocketed under NAFTA, can at once increase gross manufacture (as it has done) and decrease the level of technological development of the country. This deskilling of the labor force in part explains why it is that the educational level of Mexican immigrants (documented and undocumented) in the United States is steadily rising, as these migrants cannot use their skills at home. In 2000, 27.8 percent of Mexican migrants over fifteen had a high school education or postgraduate degree, whereas by 2003, that figure had jumped to 34.9 (Delgado Wise and Cypher 2007, 37). Moreover,

while 36.2 percent of the U.S. workforce in manufacturing is made up of Mexican workers, only 27.8 percent of the Mexican workforce in Mexico is in manufacturing, all of which suggests that U.S. businesses are indirectly benefitting from this brain drain in Mexican skilled workers (Delgado Wise and Cypher 2007, 38). Mexican immigrants are but an effect of this export model of neoliberal development, yet they are read as the cause of the downward pressure on wages they represent.

NAFTA was sold to the U.S. and Mexican audiences as a vehicle for job creation in Mexico that would significantly decrease immigration to the United States. As Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gotari famously quipped during the lead-up to NAFTA: "We want to export goods, not people" (Castañeda 2014, 139). Instead, the increase in imports under NAFTA displaced millions of Mexican workers in agriculture *and* in industry and was unable to generate the jobs in export production to absorb these displaced workers, much less the new labor entrants. At the very least, NAFTA failed to create enough jobs in manufacture and industrial agriculture to absorb all those displaced by its development model. At the very worst, it has negatively affected domestic industrial manufacturing with devastating long-term consequences.

The one industry that NAFTA has indisputably helped is the drug industry, for two simple reasons. The exponential increase in trade over the Mexico–U.S. border that came with the more than tripling of exports and imports means that it is ever easier to conceal shipments of drugs into the United States and illegal arms into Mexico. For all the unmanned drones patrolling the border, a very small percentage of trucks crossing the ports of entry across the two-thousand-mile border are inspected. At some ports of entry as few as seven out of a hundred trucks crossing into the United States have their cargo inspected. To inspect a higher percentage of the cargo crossing into the United States would cause huge bottlenecks, slow down production times, and lead to spoilage, as has happened in the two instances when the United States attempted more rigorous inspections in the last fifty years (Andreas 2000, 41, 47). While the surveillance techniques get more sophisticated at the points of entry, so does the technology developed by drug smugglers to evade these techniques (Dermota 1999–2000, 17). Ironically, this is the one area of research and development in Mexico still thriving.

The second way in which free trade facilitates the drug trade is that it has also made it significantly easier to launder money. Foreign direct investment (FDI) by U.S. firms in Mexico increased from $15.2 billion in 1993 to $101 billion in 2012, an increase of 564 percent (Villarreal and Fergusson, 19). Meanwhile, Mexican FDI in the United States increased from $1.2 billion in 1993 to $14.9

billion in 2012, an increase of over 1,000 percent (Villarreal and Fergusson 19). The estimated profits from the global trafficking of the "unholy trinity"—cannabis, cocaine, and heroin—are estimated to be between $300 billion to $500 billion a year, or the equivalent of 8 to 10 percent of world trade (Gibler 2011, 34).[25] The Mexican share of that profit is considerably smaller. In 2010, the U.S. State Department estimated Mexico's share of the profit at $25 billion (Gibler 2011, 30). It is exceedingly easy for drug organizations to launder their money through the foreign direct investment traveling back and forth between the United States and Mexico, with banks in the United States and Mexico receiving mere slaps on the wrists for their key involvement in this process (Dermota 1999–2000, 21–22; Mares 2006, 104). It is also exceedingly difficult to keep drug capital and all other capital apart. Every year the Mexican banking system finds itself with an "extra" $10 billion in its coffers that "cannot be explained within the proper dynamics of the country's economic activity," according to the Mexican treasury secretary (cited in Gibler 2011, 33). Thus "legitimate" businesses in the United States and Mexico have become addicted to the money generated by the drug trade. Indeed, the global market is addicted to the drug market, as Rajeev Syal of the *Observer* suggests, "Drug money worth billions of dollars kept the financial system afloat at the height of the [2008] global crisis" (cited in Gibler 2011, 33).

Both the illegal drug economy and immigration from Mexico to the United States precede NAFTA; however the processes described above have considerably accelerated and intensified the trafficking in drugs and immigrants. NAFTA set millions of Mexicans in motion looking for work, from the countryside to the city, from the cities to the maquiladoras on the border, from the Mexican border to the United States. This is the new geography of NAFTA, a geography of motion that has emptied the Mexican countryside and filled up the urbanized spaces in Mexico and the United States. It is a racial geography of neoliberalism that is displacing indigenous peoples on a scale not seen since the conquest, and that is transforming the demographic makeup of the United States with the many shades of Mexican brown. NAFTA created a precarious life for the vast majority of Mexicans, and thus it should surprise no one that a portion of this vulnerable population would choose to migrate north, to take up low-wage agricultural, manufacturing, and service jobs that proliferate in the United States as an effect of NAFTA as well. Undocumented Mexican workers in the United States sort our chickens according to sex, harvest our fruits and vegetables by hand, build our condominiums, deliver our pizza, pick up our dry cleaning, console our young and our elderly. However, it should surprise us even less that a portion of this vulnerable and

young population chooses to take up lucrative careers in the drug economy that thrives in the shadow of NAFTA. After all, a great reserve of displaced Mexican labor accumulates along the Mexico–U.S. border in the hopes of some sort of employment. With weekly salaries of three to four hundred dollars for low-level street dealers in cities like Nuevo Laredo and Ciudad Juárez, employment in this industry is lucrative even by U.S. standards. Arguably, like the Apache and Comanche before them, these drug dealers facilitate trade in illicit goods sought after by a gluttonous U.S. citizenry. In the nineteenth century the Apache and Comanche raided Mexican ranches for the horses, cattle, and captives that fetched a dear price from European settlers and dislocated eastern Indians pouring into the Great Plains. Today, these *narcotraficantes* bring us cocaine, heroin, and marijuana from the factories in Colombia and the fields in Mexico that fetch a dear price from the casual users and junkies proliferating in U.S. suburbs, cities, and countryside.

Rather than being recognized as model entrepreneurs responding to the laws of supply and demand—U.S. demand to be specific—these narcos and immigrants are instead vilified using the same language and tropes that were used against the equestrian nations in the nineteenth century. Narcos and immigrants are portrayed as aberrations of humanity, engaging in improper trade with improper methods, who should be excised from the borderlands at all costs, requiring the joint efforts of the Mexican and U.S. military to do so. Narcos, the twenty-first century tribus salvajes, trade drugs made more desirable and profitable because they are outlawed. Meanwhile migrants trade themselves, smuggling their cheapened labor across the border at great cost to their personal safety to sell to the highest bidder in the United States. And, of course, every Mexican immigrant looking for work is potentially a narco looking for his or her next victim, and thus the border wall grows longer each day, at seven hundred miles it covers one-third of the highly militarized border between the United States and Mexico. And thus the old racial geography of the borderlands informs the new, with the indio bárbaro as a simplistic explanation for the economic restructuring brought on both countries by NAFTA and the drug economy it enables. But the racial geography of neoliberal reform is remaking the space of the nation-state in significant ways as well.

Heads and Scalps

If one enters "narco beheadings" into any search engine, tens of thousands of images of defiled corpses fill one's screen: beheaded corpses, scalped corpses, dismembered corpses, corpses with their eyes gouged out or with the "Z"

of the Zeta cartel carved in torsos or backs. Many of the corpses come with notes, pinned to the chest with a knife or written on the body with a marker, explaining the offense that led to such a terrible death. One might imagine that corpses are beheaded to prevent identification. One would be wrong, as the head is not removed from the scene, but rather cleverly arranged to punctuate it. In one photo, two skulls are cradled by severed forearms with hands, their corresponding scalps delicately placed above the scene on the railing of what appears to be one of the international bridges spanning the Rio Grande. To ensure identification, the accompanying sign informs us that these two are "el Chino" and "el Fantasma" and lists their crimes against the cartel. I remember that we too had a Chino and a Fantasma at our high school in Laredo, Texas. Doesn't every high school along the border have a Chino and a Fantasma?

In another photo, four heads are arranged in a row along the windshield of a car that reads, "ultima letra captura y ejecuta a asesinos debastadores" (the last letter [i.e., "Z" for the Zetas] has captured and executed devastating assassins). The hood of the car, directly in front of the skulls, reads "zzzzzz," a pun on the name of the executioners that suggest these four men, all with their eyes closed, are just sleeping. In another photograph, two corpses lean up against each other on a street corner, the heads of each completely flayed. They have been arranged to look like two drunks, sleeping it off, with cigarettes hanging from their lipless teeth and with ridiculous sombreros atop their bald skulls, the cartels parodying a parody of the lazy Mexican. Perhaps their crime was not working hard enough to secure the expected rate of return, or perhaps they used too much of the product themselves. There is no helpful caption explaining their deaths.

What is made clear by these photographs is that these executions are public events. They are not the private adjudications of crime syndicates but the public policing of a population. Indeed, in several of the photos there are crowds surrounding the scene of execution. The narcos upload real-time photographs of their crimes themselves from their cell phones, making it mercifully impossible to reproduce the images for you here in print. These staged scenes of performative violence/justice are not only directed at local communities intimidated into submission, but at the entire world that has access to the internet. They connote a spectacular and absolute form of territorial justice, established precisely because it "pursues the body beyond all possible pain" (Foucault 1979, 34). These narrative scenes set the parameters, in script, in blood, and in body parts, of what happens should you violate narco law. Thus this kind of death is not limited to cartel cadre but illustrative of a general if

unwritten code of behavior that must be followed by everyone within cartel territory. For example, in one photograph seven men are arranged in a semicircle on a main rotary in Uruapan, Michoacán. They sit on plastic chairs, their eyes covered by bandanas, their bodies showing no visible signs of torture, a merciful death. Attached to several of the corpses' chests with knifes are posters that read: "¡Advertencia! Esto les va pasar a todos los asaltantes rateros de coches, casa[,] habitacion transeúntes[,] asi como sequestadores[,] violadores y extorcionistas" (Warning! This will happen to all of those assailant petty thieves of cars, houses, and temporary housing, as well as to kidnappers, rapists and extortionists). The cartels claim exclusive power to inflict violence as punishment in their system of criminal justice, prohibiting others from the actions that are their sole purview.

Another set of photographs establishes the parameters of permissible speech within the realm. In September 2011 a group of three social media activists were killed in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, for reporting on Zeta violence in the city. With more than eighty journalists killed or disappeared in Mexico during the Calderón presidency, Nuevo Laredo journalists had understandably stopped reporting on cartel activities. Filling the void were three young bloggers including "La Nena de Laredo," María Elizabeth Macías, who informed the public on where shoot-outs were transpiring, who was targeted and why, and how to evade checkpoints. Two were strung up from a pedestrian bridge in Nuevo Laredo, one disemboweled and hogtied, the other's arm almost severed and hung from his feet. The most spectacular assassination was reserved for Macías, who was suspected of providing information to the attorney general and the Mexican military, passed on to her by her Internet fans. La Nena's decapitated body was found in Nuevo Laredo's *zócalo*, or main plaza, partially undressed to show that the skin on her back and been flayed and to suggest that she had been raped. Her head was mounted on a large spherical sculpture in the plaza. Her keyboard was arranged to hang around what would have been her neck and her mouse was in her mouth. The poster accompanying her body conveyed the following:

> Ok. Nuevo Laredo en Vivo y Redes Sociales[,] yo soy la nena de Laredo y aqui estoy por mis reportes y los suyos . . . para los que no quieren creer esto me paso Por mis acciones por *Confiar* en SEDENA [Secretaría de Defensa Nacional] y MARINA [Procudadora General]. . . . Gracias por su Atención Atte: La "nena" de Laredo . . . zzzzz. (Okay Nuevo Laredo live and on the social networks, I am the Laredo Girl and I am here because of my posts and yours . . . for those of you who did not want to

believe, this happened to me because of my actions because I trusted SEDENA [Department of National Defense] and Mariana [Attorney General] . . . thank you for your attention. Attentively yours: Laredo Girl . . . zzzz.)

María Elizabeth Macías's courageous voice was silenced when the Zetas assassinated her, as is emblemized by her mouse shoved in her mouth. Yet the Zetas usurp her speech when they write the attached note in the first person, ventriloquizing her voice to articulate their law, their punishment pursuing her body beyond the point of death, she speaks in blood and print on their behalf to silence the future political speech of others.

After seeing these images of narco violence that pursues the body beyond death, it is easy to see the perpetrators as barbarians. It is easy to say *¡Qué bárbaros!* It is even easier to avert our eyes, to turn away, to refuse to see. And yet these scenes of violence are staged in zócalos and plazas, on rotaries and bridges, demanding that bystanders look and absorb the power the scenes convey. These spectacular public displays are a modern form of statecraft reminiscent of the nineteenth century parades for returning scalping parties; they are a mode of taking possession of state sovereignty in a Foucaultian sense. The perpetrators make it clear to the Mexican public that the *capos* decide who dies and how they die, but also who lives and how they should live. These scenes are a population-management technique, setting the parameters of media representation (as in the case of the bloggers in Nuevo Laredo killed for daring to reveal too much about the narco activities in their town), of proper law enforcement (as in the case of the thieves in Uruapan, Michoacán, killed presumably to protect the citizens), or to determine the terms of trade (as in the beheaded cartel members on the bridge or on top of a car with the letter Z). These beheadings, scalpings, hangings, and other forms of torture and defilement denote a territorial control of one's market, a policing of the plaza; alternately they are deployed to gain control of someone else's market share or plaza.[26] Most important, they make it clear that the cartel's control is exclusive, as no official state police, army, or judicial system may deter them or save you. They are the law.

Just in case we are tempted to say that this kind of violence is proof positive that Mexico has become ungovernable, let us remember the event of September 26, 2014. On that day forty-three male students of the Raúl Isidro Rural Teachers College of Ayotzinapa, Guerrero, were killed because they dared to question the macroeconomics of neoliberal reform. Ayotzinapa is a teachers college reserved for the children of peasant farmers. These colleges

are iconic achievements of the Mexican Revolution, a key component in the nation-building project of educating the peasant and indigenous classes by the state. These forty-three men were training to be primary, secondary, and high school teachers who would return to teach in rural areas of agricultural production. They were on their way to Chilpancingo, Guerrero, the state capital, as part of a group of more than a hundred students to protest tuition hikes at the college. These kinds of protest have become a tradition for Mexican university students who are accustomed to free education provided by the state. The students were also demanding guaranteed posts after graduation, as budget cuts have severely cut back the number of positions available for teachers in rural schools. Given the devastation of small farming in Mexico, these teachers colleges and rural schools arguably provide one of the only remaining avenues to legal employment for the children of farmers. Federal and state police blocked the routes that led to the state capital, forcing the students to return to the municipal capital of Iguala, Guerrero, to hold their protest.

The students' new plan appeared to have been to interrupt a speech by the local head of the DIF, Mexico's office for the "Integral Development of the Family," a speech celebrating her achievements and launching her campaign for mayor of Iguala. She was the wife of the sitting mayor, and evidently the then-mayor and future-mayor did not like the fact that the students were flying in the face of neoliberal restructuring and demanding that the state provide employment and free education. Or perhaps they did not like the fact that rural colleges and schools provide an alternative avenue of employment for these capable young men, who should instead be swelling the pool of labor reserved for the drug economy from which the couple benefitted directly. Whatever the case may be, the mayor ordered the local police to stop the protests. Clashes ensued between the police and the protestors as the protestors were attempting to leave the city on buses. Several were killed on sight as the police opened fire, but most escaped unharmed. One student's corpse was found the following morning, with his eyes gouged out and his face scalped. The forty-three who did not escape were kidnapped by the police and handed over, this time by order of the police chief, to the local cartel, the Guerreros Unidos—United Warriors—a clever pun on the state's name that suggests at once a new mode of territorial control and a new form of political subjection. The leader of the Guerreros Unidos cartel then ordered the students killed, either because he mistook them for a rival gang or because he objected to their political speech, it remains unclear. I bring this case to our attention *not* to demonstrate the "lawlessness of Mexico" but rather to un-

derscore its lawfulness. The collusion of the state, the party, and the cartel in the orchestration of this mass murder *is* a form of government, a new form of law. At every stage in this horrific event, decisions were made and actions coordinated between these three entities. The drug economy not only provides new modes of economic production, but also new sovereignties of power expressed through the extra-economic forms of compulsion emblemized by torture, killing, and defilement.

It is a feudalistic system of absolute sovereign power when the local lord (the mayor) genuflects before the king (the cartel capo) to ask his favor, and where it is the king (the capo) who ultimately distributes justice and decides the fate of his unruly subjects. The cartel leader is jury, judge, and executioner, the absolute power, while the police and sicarios are but lowly knaves and knights who carry out the orders of their superiors, pursuing the bodies of their victims beyond the point of death with the mark of the sovereign—the gouged eye, the flayed skin—lest they themselves fall out of favor and suffer the same fate. The deaths of these forty-three students make evident that political power and economic power are still one in Mexico, only now the primary source of this power is the drug economy with its ritualized forms of violence that are also a form of statecraft. The arbitrariness of the violence is part of the ritual. It is a pyramidal structure of power where everyone benefits economically from the extra-economic compulsion of the threat of death, but where almost everyone might also fall victim to it as well.

My use of the term *feudal* is not meant to signal an atavistic return to a precapitalist mode of power in Mexico, much less some return to some fanciful "barbarous Mexico." Rather it signals my return to an old debate regarding the coterminous development of the capitalist mode of production in Europe and Latin America. In his essay "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America," Ernesto Laclau took issue with Andre Gunder Frank's thesis of the development of underdevelopment.[27] Frank's argument, that because Latin America had been fully integrated into the world economy since the Spanish conquest it was fully capitalist, was pitched against the stage theories of capitalist development whose architects insisted that Latin American economies were trapped in feudal modes of development and must be led/guided/forced into capitalist modes of production in order to become fully modern. While Laclau agreed with Frank that Latin American economies were never "dualist" and were always fully integrated into a capitalist economic world system, he nevertheless insisted that much of Latin America's economy had indeed been trapped in a feudal-*like* mode of production that relied on extraeconomic compulsion in its labor arrangements. Moreover, Laclau argued that

Latin America's integration into the world capitalist system intensified rather than rectified its feudalist arrangements of labor.

Laclau's groundbreaking claim was his insistence that a global capitalist mode of production not only coexists with earlier modes of production but indeed relies on their extraeconomic labor compulsion to maintain an ever-increasing rate of profit. Far from being a closed system, feudal sectors of Latin American economies were fully integrated with capitalist modes of distribution and consumption, but their forms of *production* were "precapitalist." Laclau was making a historical argument in his article to account for Latin American plantation systems that had relied on both slavery and debt-peonage well into their liberal periods, but were nonetheless producing for a capitalist world economy. Following Laclau, I suggest that sectors of Latin America are today entering into a feudalistic future. The drug industry in Mexico, for example, employs a feudal-like mode of production when cartels compel peasant farmers all over Mexico to grow illicit crops on their ejidos and private lands on penalty of torture and death. These extraeconomic forms of compulsion are of course compounded by the fact that the agricultural products they would have previously produced cannot compete on the domestic market against agroindustrial imports. The cartels also rely on extraeconomic forms of labor compulsion for the distribution of their product, as evidenced by the seventy-two immigrants from Brazil, Ecuador, and other Latin American countries who were killed in San Fernando, Tamaulipas, in 2010 because they refused an offer by the Zetas to remain in Mexico as drug dealers for four hundred dollars a week. The innumerable mass graves that have been found in Guerrero, Durango, Michoacán, Sinaloa, and Tamaulipas are a testament to these extraeconomic forms of compulsion that are not exceptional but ordinary business practices. Beyond these feudal-like modes of production and distribution, however, I suggest this model of absolutist power is pluralizing territorial sovereignty within the nation-state, as capos use feudal-like modes of discipline and punishment to maintain control of their plazas and every level of their participation in a capitalist world system. In the spirit of Laclau's essay, these modes of production, distribution, and political power are not in aberration of capitalist relations, nor are they in any way "precapitalist," rather in all the ways discussed previously they are distinctly modern and capitalist, auxiliary to the liberalization of trade and articulated with capitalist modes of production. After all, the labor force for the drug economy is drawn from the unemployed and underemployed labor reserve created by neoliberal reform, and the cartels in turn help to maintain the discipline and control of those lucky few who have attained full employ-

ment in the maquiladora and nonmaquiladora sectors through the demonstrations of the violence of their law for all residing in the territory.

That this feudal-like, or feudal-light, mode of power is anything but "premodern" is underscored by the fact that it was the republican governments of Durango, Sonora, Coahuila, and Chihuahua that established beheadings and scalping as a form of modern statecraft, a mode of statecraft similarly employed by the U.S. military in its "Indian wars." Then and now these performative methods have been integral to the establishment of modern forms of sovereignty. As discussed in chapter 3, after establishing their bounty programs, all four states set up commissions to check the scalps and heads brought to their state treasuries for payment for the distinguishing tattoos and patterns of head shavings used by the equestrian nations, although of course there was no way to ascertain whether the dead were in fact participants in raiding parties. Similarly, sicarios sometimes miss their marks, killing indiscriminately as well as deliberately, although today there are no state commissions to validate their actions, in part because it is precisely such republican state agencies whose power the cartels contest and usurp. As suggested in chapter 3 with regard to the nineteenth century, scalping and beheading determined who was to be included in the new Mexican nation, and who was to be radically excluded, exacting unity through the practice of these ritualized forms of democratic violence. Today cartels display heads and scalps and tortured bodies with the same exuberance to establish who may be included within their territories and who must die. Unlike the killings in the nineteenth century, today's beheadings and scalpings are not the democratic enactment of violence but the ultimate expression of the cartel's monopolistic power over their plaza. The massive demonstrations and social movement begun by Mexicans all over the country in the aftermath of the killing of Ayotzinapa's forty-three students is a tribute to the truly democratic nature of Mexico's civil society, a civil society determined to wrest control of state-power away from the trilogy of the party, the state, and the cartel.

It would be easy to end here, implying that Mexico's history of war against northern indigenous peoples haunts these scenes of narco violence, and this wouldn't be entirely incorrect, as the narcos clearly borrow from a familiar lexicon of national state-making in their staged and spectacular displays of the dead. However, this would be an incorrect conclusion as it would wrongly trace the source of all this violence to the ever-present if repressed figure of the indio bárbaro del norte. Instead, as in all things, if one wants to get to the heart of the matter, one should follow the money. And what better way to follow the money than to follow the peace movement.

In 2012 Javier Sicilia and the Mexican peace movement that quickly sprang up around his deeply personal but broadly representative loss embarked on a six-thousand-mile journey across the United States to bring their grief to the attention of the U.S. public as it is our government that pays for the drug war and our citizens who consume the product supplied by the drug economy. The Caravan for Peace with Justice and Dignity was made up entirely of the families of the killed and disappeared, and they stopped at significant locations for the functioning of the drug economy and the execution of the drug war. They visited all the major border cities where Mexican imports, including drugs, cross into the United States: San Diego, Nogales, El Paso, Laredo. They visited Harlem and the south side of Chicago to meet with the families of those incarcerated in the United States for drug related crimes. They destroyed guns in a Houston parking lot outside a gun shop, to underscore the devastating effect of U.S. manufactured arms that are smuggled into Mexico by U.S. citizens, as Mexico manufactures no guns itself, not a one. They met with the congressional leaders who benefit politically from taking a hard stance on the war on drugs and Mexican immigrants.

The most moving stop they made however was at Fort Benning, the new home of the former School of the Americas. The Caravaners staged a die-in in front of the school, reminding the United States that the Mexican military who today carry out the drug war are trained and armed by the U.S. military (fig. C.1). It is not simply that the Mexican military accidently kills innocent bystanders in persecuting drug lords and their underlings, although there is an inordinate amount of "collateral damage" at their hands. It is that the Mexican military, trained by the United States in the most advanced killing and counterinsurgency techniques, often switch sides in the drug war, lured by the large sums of easy money. Indeed, the most notorious drug cartel of them all, los Zetas, were originally an army battalion of Mexican Special Forces trained by the United States at the School of the Americas in counterinsurgency tactics and drug interdiction. They initially defected to work for the Gulf Cartel in the 1990s. During Calderón's drug war, in response to a power vacuum created by the successful arrest and extradition of the leaders of the Gulf Cartel, the Zetas branched out on their own and diversified their economy with human smuggling and cattle rustling among other things. They are the largest cartel in terms of territory, and they employ the most brutal tactics in killing. Allegedly, they introduced the practices of beheading and scalping as a form of terror and intimidation. As the peace activists remind us, "Los asesinos no nacen, se hacen aquí" (Assassins are not born, they are made here) (fig. C.2). The peace activists write on their own bodies, literalizing the



FIG. C.1. Caravan for Peace with Justice and Dignity stages die-in at Fort Benning, Georgia, to underscore U.S. military's role in deaths of their relatives and friends in Mexico at the hands of drug cartel members, Mexican military, and local police forces, many of whom were trained at this base, Southcom, or the School of the Americas (as in the case of the Zetas).

FIG. C.2. Caravan for Peace die-in. "Assassins are not born, they are made here." Fort Benning, Georgia, September 12, 2012.

embodiment of their grief, but also emblemizing the chain of responsibility for their grief that ends, like the proverbial buck, at the gates of Fort Benning, Georgia, with the U.S. military. Similarly, narcos were made, not born, out of the economic and political conjunction of free trade and the drug trade, out of extraeconomic forms of coercion, out of U.S. military "schools" that train them for the violent production and transportation of the drugs consumed in the United States.

Narcos are not twenty-first-century indios bárbaros beyond the pale of humanity, but the end result of an explicit form of modern statecraft, that of the U.S. government's fifty-year war on drugs in Latin America for the protection of its "national security." The Caravan members and the peace movement they represent recognize this fact when thus they demand peace negotiations to end Mexico's civil war brought on by the drug war, and with these negotiations demand the reintegration of these cartel members with justice into the Mexican nation.

I will close by considering the relationship between the nineteenth-century indio bárbaro and today's Muslim terrorist emblemized in Osama bin Laden. The U.S. government was drawing such an analogy between Al Qaeda and the Apaches by giving bin Laden the codename Geronimo. Geronimo's own lifespan coincided with the fifty-year period of profound geographical transformation in the racial geography of the borderlands that is the subject of *Indian Given*. He was born in 1829 along the Gila River in what was then greater Nuevo Mexico, but is today Arizona. By the time Geronimo turned seventeen he had participated in four raiding parties into Sonora and Chihuahua, and lead his fifth to acquire the necessary horses for his wife's bride price.

There is dispute over the origins of his name. Named Goyahkla in Apache, he claimed Geronimo was a Latinization of his name given to him by Mexicans who cried out in fear of him, "Cuidado allí viene Geronimo!" I would suggest, however, that his name speaks to Apache accommodation with Spanish colonialism, as it is just as plausible that he was baptized under the name Geronimo after the saint on one of the many mission settlements in Nuevo Mexico. In 1851, while the men of his band were trading with Apaches from other bands at one such mission settlement in Janos, Chihuahua, four hundred Mexican soldiers attacked Geronimo's base camp, killing his mother, wife, and three children. Devastated by this loss, Geronimo became one of the most notorious Mexican raiders in history, and the principal buyers of his band's raided goods were U.S. military personnel, visiting the area to determine the new border between Mexico and the United States. By 1860, with its victory over Mexico, the U.S. military had lost its use for Apache and Coman-

che warriors, and they became the target of a series of massacres executed by U.S. miners who were flooding into the area with their families in order to dispossess the Apache of their mineral-rich territory. The Apache retaliated in kind, beginning a cycle of raids on U.S. soil and against Euro-American settlers. U.S. Army generals were dispatched to deal with the Apache, and most particularly Geronimo. He and his band of the Chiricahua Apache were the most effective in their battle against the U.S. military, and in resisting reservation status. Indeed, Geronimo's war with the U.S. government outlasted all the other indigenous wars in defense of territory. By 1881 to 1886, when Geronimo led his band in the last Indian war fought on U.S. soil, all other equestrian peoples—the Kiowa, the Comanche, the Cheyenne—had been forced onto reservations. Geronimo then famously led his small band of Chiricahua into the Mexican Sierra Madre, some voluntarily, some coerced, where they evaded five thousand U.S. soldiers and three thousand Mexican soldiers for five years. For this reason Geronimo earned the title of being the last Indian leader of the last Indian war against the United States.

Thus you can see how Geronimo and Apache history is *loosely* analogous to bin Laden and Al Qaeda history. Both men and their bands are famous for having taken aid from the United States to fight a foreign (Mexican/Soviet) threat in their own lands (Apache territory/Afghanistan). The U.S. military and intelligence communities then and now perceived both as biting the hand that had fed them once their bands were abandoned by the U.S. government. Both men and their bands evaded the long arm of the U.S. law for a significant period of time, even though they were vastly outnumbered. Both men and their bands produce absolute hysteria among a U.S. public that is entirely disproportionate to the threat actually posed to U.S. security. Finally, both men are considered terrorists because they are presumed to kill without mercy.

Analogies illuminate similar traits in phenomena presumed to have evolved separately. Instead I suggest a homologous relationship between Geronimo and bin Laden that led to the naming of the mission, as these men share traits as a result of a common ancestor, the indio bárbaro of the borderlands, who roams and raids and kills without mercy in the United States's imperialist imagination and who must be excised not simply from the geographical borders of nation, but from the very boundaries of humanity. The United States so successfully drew this homology between bin Laden and the Apache as indios bárbaros that no national or international body objected to his assassination, without any access to a trial or council, in front of his family, nor to the dumping of his body at sea. He had been so successfully

dehumanized that U.S. justice pursued the body beyond all possible pain, foreclosing bin Laden's body from the most holy of practices, mourning.

There is another compelling reason for naming the mission Geronimo however. By giving the leader of Al Qaeda the code name Geronimo, the United States renders Al Qaeda as anachronistic as the Apache. Actually, the naming gesture renders *both* the Apache and Al Qaeda anachronistic, turns them both into relics of a past. And as relics of a past long fought and forgotten, this naming gesture furthermore frees the imperial U.S. citizen equally from her responsibility in the U.S. genocidal past against indigenous peoples and from her responsibility over the U.S. genocidal present in the Middle East. Naming bin Laden Geronimo clears him and Al Qaeda out of the way of the United States' imperial, triumphal march toward instituting democracy everywhere, precisely as the indio bárbaro heterotemporally haunts the theater of war in the Middle East.

Narcos appear to be the modern day indios bárbaros as well, for all the reasons discussed above. The narcos, like the Apache, are after all facilitators of trade. They transport products illicitly from their producers in Mexico to their buyers in the United States. Once again, the U.S. government is completely complicit in this trade, even as it insists that Mexico execute a drug war against the cartels that has turned the borderland into a place of incomparable violence in the Americas. You have to work very hard to be the most dangerous geography in Latin America. *Qué bárbaros.* Again it is so easy to say, it slides off the tongue. But who are the bárbaros? For as the Mexican peace movement reminds us, and as I underscore again, narcos and terrorists are not born killers, rather they are made, by economic, political, and military conjuncture along the borderlands of two imperial nations. Meanwhile, the *figure* of the indio bárbaro is deployed over and over again, consciously and unconsciously, for imperial pursuits along the border and far beyond this region. One could say U.S. imperialism initiates and extends its life under the shadow of the indio bárbaro. Because the indio bárbaro can haunt two places at once.