
“Hercules, the Hydra, and the 1801 Constitution of Toussaint Louverture”

By Philip Kaisary*

**Abstract:**

This article considers the 1801 Constitution of Saint-Domingue, which was promulgated on July 7, 1801, by the celebrated leader of the Haitian Revolution, Toussaint Louverture. It argues that this complex and contradictory constitution, which codified the universal right to freedom from enslavement but maintained the plantation system, should be regarded as a paradigmatic document of both the Age of Revolutions and the Black Atlantic.

In particular, it is argued that the 1801 Constitution of Saint-Domingue can be productively considered in the light of Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker’s now canonical work of Atlantic history from below, *The Many-Headed Hydra*. The application of Linebaugh and Rediker’s analytical frame of ‘Hercules’ and the ‘Hydra’ to Toussaint’s Constitution reveals the presence of both radical emancipatory and antidemocratic currents within the Haitian Revolution.

The historical context is described and this reveals the 1801 Constitution to be a product of acutely oppositional influences at a particular juncture of the Haitian Revolution. While the 1801 Constitution bears the influence of the ‘proletarian hydra’ – its unequivocal abolition of slavery codified in law the revolutionary

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masses’ key demand – it also bears the interests of colonial Atlantic World capital. A critical reading of the Constitution’s contradictory nature thus suggests that it is a text that should be read circumstantially within the context of the political economy of the early nineteenth century Atlantic World but also as a text that reminds us of the existence of a grassroots ideological radicalism in the Haitian Revolution. Finally, it is argued that the 1801 Constitution casts light on two profoundly different conceptions of freedom: a conservative conception emerging from ‘practical politics,’ and the other, a more radical vision borne of the highly contingent experience of the African slave trade and the plantation system in the Americas.

Keywords: 1801 Constitution of Saint-Domingue; Toussaint Louverture; Haitian Revolution; Freedom; Slavery; Atlantic history

Introduction

Scholarly and popular interest in the Haitian Revolution, the only successful slave revolt in modern history, has of late been resurgent. However, still too frequently lost amid accounts and analyses of the French colonial ‘pearl of the Antilles,’ its extraordinary revolution, and its post-independence decline, is the recognition that Haiti’s early constitutions stand as key documents of the Atlantic World’s age of revolutions. Yet the centrality of constitutionalism in Haitian – and, of course, Atlantic – history is remarkable: including the 1801 Constitution of Saint-Domingue, some twenty-three
constitutions have been promulgated in Haitian history, the most recent being the progressive and anti-Duvalierist Constitution of 1987. This article considers the very first constitution in that sequence: the 1801 Constitution of Saint-Domingue, which was promulgated on July 7, 1801 by the political architect of the Haitian Revolution, Toussaint Louverture. I will argue that this complex and contradictory constitution, which codified the universal right to freedom from enslavement but maintained the plantation system, should be regarded as a paradigmatic document of the Age of Revolutions and the Black Atlantic. Further, I will argue that the 1801 Constitution speaks directly to the question that would challenge and haunt political leaders throughout the nineteenth century Atlantic world: How do you get from slavery to freedom? As Laurent Dubois has recently noted, this question, which entails both abstract political theory and matters of statecraft, first arose in all its complexity in the French Caribbean colony of Saint-Domingue during the course of events that we now refer to as the Haitian Revolution. Moreover, more specifically, the 1801 Constitution directly addresses the question of how does a state or territory, formerly premised on the monoculture of the plantation system, maintain its autonomy after abolishing the labour regime that system depended upon? This article thus contends that the 1801 Constitution of Saint-Domingue is a key document that offers insights into radically different conceptions of freedom that were in circulation in the early nineteenth century Atlantic World and that the actions of the former slaves of Saint-Domingue reveal a vision of freedom that should be located within the intellectual and cultural traditions of the Black Atlantic, rather than within the tradition of Western political liberal thought. Such an endeavor necessarily impinges on the debates about “freedom” and “rights” and what
each of these would have meant to different constituencies of actors during the Haitian Revolution, as well as how we conceive of them today.

In particular, I want to suggest that we can productively consider the 1801 Constitution, most commonly known as ‘Toussaint’s Constitution,’ in the light of Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker’s now canonical, if still controversial in some circles, work of Atlantic history from below, *The Many-Headed Hydra.* There, Linebaugh and Rediker ingeniously revealed the history of a multiethnic proletarian resistance to the origins and the rise of Atlantic capitalism in the period c. 1600–1835. As the authors themselves have made clear, it is a story in which the chief protagonists are “sailors, slaves, indentured servants, women workers, peasants, and those dependent on common rights,” who should be given their rightful place by historians as agents of revolutionary action and transformation. The book’s title takes the classical mythological symbols of Hercules and the Hydra to metaphorically frame this dramatic contest between labour and capital: while Hercules represents capitalist economic development, the establishment, and the repression of incessant revolt, the proletarian Hydra is “an antithetical symbol of disorder and resistance.” However, the Hercules–Hydra myth is not merely a poetic and analytic device for the exploration of the history of the revolutionary Atlantic from below: Linebaugh and Rediker contend that the many-headed hydra was in fact the defining reality for the many “classically educated architects of the Atlantic economy” who repeatedly sought to understand, define and pursue their project in the terms of the hydra myth.

However, while Linebaugh and Rediker’s account does not include a detailed consideration of the Haitian Revolution, it is instructive to see how they fit the
Revolution within their analytic frame. For them the Haitian Revolution is to be regarded as “the first successful worker’s revolt in modern history” – a characterization which I wish to suggest underplays the role of race in the revolution – and thus unequivocally as one of the hydra’s heads. Further, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the revolutionary leader who led Haiti to independence on the battlefield at Vertières in 1803 and who later became Haiti’s first Head of State before his assassination in 1806, is characterized as a victim of the capitalist “executioner” Hercules. This they ascribe to Dessalines’s attempt to widen the ownership of land in post-revolutionary Haiti. However, without wishing to endorse Philippe Girard’s recent rejection of the Revolution’s ideological and material radicalism, glossing the Haitian Revolution as a binary history of one of former-slave proletarians struggling against the Herculean might of colonial and capitalist France, is nevertheless insufficiently nuanced. Though, as Nick Nesbitt has convincingly argued, “[t]he Haitian Revolution was emphatically the destruction of a normative world-system […] that legitimized the enslavement, debasement, and torture of millions of Africans in New World slavery,” it was also, as John Patrick Walsh has written, a profoundly complex – and contradictory – working out of “the meanings of universal freedom for a country of former slaves.” This article proposes that nowhere are those complex and contradictory tensions more clearly visible than in the 1801 Constitution – a profoundly dichotomous document that reveals the presence of both radical emancipatory and antidemocratic currents within the Haitian Revolution. Further, this article argues that the conundrum of the 1801 Constitution’s contradictory tendencies is explicable in two ways. First, it can be understood as being the product of extraordinarily diverse and opposing influences at a particular juncture of the Haitian Revolution. While the 1801
Constitution bears the influence of one of the heads of the ‘proletarian hydra’ – its unequivocal abolition of slavery codified in law the revolutionary masses’ key demand – it also bears the interests of colonial Atlantic World capital. That is to say, although the 1801 Constitution was promulgated by Toussaint Louverture under circumstances brought about by the revolutionary actions of the former slaves of Saint-Domingue, it was drafted by members of the Atlantic World’s elite – the former planter class and slave owners – who were committed, for both ideological and practical reasons, to the continuation of the plantation mode of production in Saint-Domingue. The position of the drafters of the constitution was thus one of hostility and skepticism with regard to the revolution’s most radical agenda, but also one of concern for Saint-Domingue’s infrastructure, defence, and economic autonomy as it sought to instantiate a society without slavery. And second, the constitution reveals two profoundly different conceptions of freedom: a conservative conception emerging from ‘practical politics’ and the context of the discourse of rights and freedoms as ‘transactional’ or ‘reciprocal,’ and the other, a more radical vision borne of the highly contingent experience of the African slave trade and the plantation system in the Americas. Given the confluence of these interlinked factors, the 1801 Constitution’s deeply conflicted character should come as little surprise. ‘Toussaint’s Constitution’ thus becomes a fascinating analytical prism through which to perceive both ideology and realpolitik, and these, in turn, reveal revolutionary Saint-Domingue to have been an extraordinary site of multiplicity, movement, connection, and contradiction within the Atlantic World system.

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The Haitian Revolution and the 1801 Constitution of Saint-Domingue

In his classic account of the Haitian Revolution, *The Black Jacobins*, CLR James dismissed the significance of the 1801 Constitution in the events of 1791–1804, writing that “too much importance has been attached to [it]” and that it was, simply, a “despotism” that was unpopular with both the ‘mulatto’ and black population.\(^\text{16}\) However, while both the text’s despotic character and its unpopularity with the masses cannot be disputed, the recent and growing scholarship on the 1801 Constitution has come to regard it as a text that, as Lorelle Semley has written, “sheds light on the general upheaval of the times.”\(^\text{17}\) And writing with reference to Haitian constitutions spanning the years 1801 to 1807, Sibylle Fischer has argued that, “no documents dating back to the early days of independence in Haiti speak more eloquently to the extraordinary nature of the events that had just come to a conclusion than the early constitutions.”\(^\text{18}\) The analysis that follows seeks to augment these recent studies of the 1801 Constitution by arguing that its contradictory nature should be read circumstantially within the context of the political economy of the early nineteenth century Atlantic World but also as a text that reminds us of the existence of a grassroots ideological radicalism in the Haitian Revolution.\(^\text{19}\)

However, in order to ground the analysis that follows, a brief summary of the events of 1791–1804 is required, although so concise a summary as presented here cannot hope to elucidate fully the Revolution’s deeply complex narrative. The Haitian Revolution broke out on the night of August 22, 1791, when black slaves rose up and attacked plantations in the colony’s richest sugar-growing district in the colony’s
northern plains. Though slave regimes everywhere in the Americas were notoriously inhumane, the conditions on the Caribbean sugar plantations were especially harsh, and nowhere more so than in colonial Saint-Domingue where the life expectancy for newly imported African slaves was a mere seven to ten years and the colony’s natural annual population growth rate was minus 5 percent. The slave system in Saint-Domingue was thus intensely harsh and generated enormous wealth for the colony’s planter class: indeed before the outbreak of the Revolution in 1791, Saint-Domingue was the most profitable colony in the Atlantic economy, supplying “half of the entire world’s sugar and coffee, as well as valuable crops of cotton and indigo.” The conflict thus caused a tremendous shock to the Atlantic economy and its rising consumer culture as exports from Saint-Domingue collapsed in the Revolution’s early stages. Slavery in Saint-Domingue included all of the worst abuses of slavery – myriad forms of torture, elaborately ritualized punishments, and sexual abuse. Thus, when they rose up, the slaves attacked the institution of slavery in the most direct way possible: breaking plantation equipment, destroying plantation houses, burning crops, and attacking their masters. And despite the Revolution’s many complex twists and turns, the masses rejection of slavery never wavered.

From the beginning, the revolutionaries, their rivals, and their opponents were divided into competing factions that we cannot simply distinguish by race and class, since, as Laurent Dubois has observed, “[i]nterpretations of individual and collective action during the revolution that are based primarily on racial or class categories often fail to provide a complete or coherent picture of how and why people acted as they did.” However, by 1794 the former slaves had begun to unite under the leadership of
the black general Toussaint Louverture, a former slave who had been granted his freedom in 1776. The rise of Toussaint marks the eve of a five-year period in the Revolution that the historian Jeremy Popkin has dubbed the period of “republican emancipation.” During the five years from 1793 to 1798, the violence that had characterized the outbreak and early stages of the Revolution slowly diminished and a new society – one without slavery – began to develop.24

The origins of this period of “republican emancipation” are complex and, as was the case throughout the Revolution, had to do with a confluence of both local and global events. Locally, the colony’s newly installed French Civil Commissioners, Étienne Polverel and Léger-Félicité Sonthonax, were in 1793 confronted with both a black insurrection and the threat of a white counter-revolution. Meanwhile, globally, Britain and Spain had joined the war against revolutionary France in February 1793, leaving Saint-Domingue exposed to attacks from British Jamaica and Spanish Santo Domingo. The Commissioners thus found themselves backed into a corner and fighting political and military battles on multiple fronts – the need to reach out to the rebellious slave population was urgent. Thus it was that in June 1793 Sonthonax promised the black insurgents partial emancipation in exchange for military service in the army of the French Republic.25 The black insurgents however rejected this offer leaving Sonthonax with little choice other than to announce the general abolition of slavery in Saint-Domingue. On August 29, 1793, Sonthonax announced the applicability of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man in Saint-Domingue. Then, in mid-1794 Sonthonax’s emancipation decree was backed-up with news received from Paris – on February 4, 1794 the French Convention had abolished slavery in the colonies making former slaves throughout the
French Empire citizens of France. Toussaint, who had until then been fighting with the Spanish against the French, then performed a celebrated \textit{volte-face} – in May 1794 he aligned himself with Republican France.\textsuperscript{26}

Soon after switching to the side of Republican France, Toussaint was promoted to the rank of general in the French army. Then, after defeating the British in 1796, Toussaint’s rise to power was nearly complete. He took the final step to becoming the colony’s most powerful figure when he outmaneuvered the French General Laveaux and the commissioner Sonthonax, ousting them to Paris by means that demonstrated his considerable political acumen.\textsuperscript{27} By 1798, Toussaint had risen to the top of the new Saint-Domingue and until his demise in 1802 he appeared to have a unique and remarkable opportunity to build a state without slavery in the very centre of the Atlantic World slave system, on the territory that until 1791 had been the most profitable slave colony the world had ever known. This ‘state’ was technically still a French colony but in reality it was functioning autonomously under Toussaint’s governance.

However, though steadfastly committed to the abolition of slavery, Toussaint’s conception of freedom “was very different from that of the French revolutionaries who had declared in 1789 that ‘liberty consists in being able to do anything that does not harm another person.’”\textsuperscript{28} As Laurent Dubois has observed, from as far back as 1794, “Louverture had consistently enforced limits on the freedom of ex-slaves, arguing that such limits were necessary to consolidate and protect emancipation.”\textsuperscript{29} Throughout the Revolution, Toussaint consistently adopted two measures intended to restore the plantations to their former profitability without using slave labour. First, from early in the Revolution through to the end of his governance of Saint-Domingue, Toussaint sought to
return plantations and plantation property to returning planters. And second, Toussaint instituted obligatory wage-labour to replace the labour that had previously been carried out by slaves. In Toussaint’s Saint-Domingue, work and liberty were inseparable, as Toussaint himself remarked in a 1795 letter to General Laveaux and as his notorious Proclamation on Labour of October 1800 made clear.\textsuperscript{30} Such a perspective helps us to understand why whites in the slaveholding American South were willing to see in Toussaint a figure of unflinching authoritarianism who “thought like a white man” even though the revolution he led struck terror into them. As Alfred Hunt has written:

“No, not slavery, but a harsh labour regime was resisted by many former slaves whose vision of freedom did not correspond to an enforced return to the plantations as wage-labourers. The most notable flashpoint of resistance came from Toussaint’s radical and charismatic adoptive nephew, Moïse, who organized an uprising and agitated for land and labour reforms – activism for which Toussaint had him arrested and executed in November 1801 after a hasty trial – an episode memorably recounted by CLR James thus: “It was almost as if Lenin had had Trotsky shot for taking the side of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie.”\textsuperscript{32} This was the background to Toussaint’s convoking of a Constitutional Assembly in March 1801: slavery had been abolished, but the security of that abolition was terribly precarious – the return of slavery was only a French or British invasion away. Thus, securing emancipation was dependent on two things: the maintenance of a sufficiently large and well-trained army to repel any
forthcoming invasion and economic prosperity to maintain such an army. The terrible irony of Toussaint’s situation was thus: since Saint-Domingue could not survive without importing essential foodstuffs, goods, and materials, he concluded that emancipation depended on plantation labour to produce sugar and coffee for the export markets. Black freedom, it seemed, could only be secured with plantation agriculture. Toussaint was thus confronted by the contradiction between political sovereignty and economic dependence, a contradiction that would plague the project of postcolonial state building in a hostile neocolonial order well into the twentieth century. But, as Laurent Dubois has noted, Toussaint did perhaps have a radical alternative that he failed to consider seriously. The French abolitionist Nicolas de Condorcet had proposed the development of new modes of production in Saint-Domingue to replace the slave system. Condorcet envisioned that the large plantations could be parcelled up and small plots assigned to former slaves who would raise sugar cane which would then be processed and exported by newly established state-managed factories. Though Dubois has speculated that this alternative “involved both costs and risks that perhaps seemed to much to bear,” if Linebaugh and Rediker are correct in their dubbing of the Haitian Revolution as a “workers’ revolt,” it becomes hard indeed to conceive of Toussaint as its leader.33

The need for a Constitution for Saint-Domingue in 1801 was both strategic and logical: by then the French government was under the control of Napoleon Bonaparte and the first cracks in the empire-wide French abolition of slavery had begun to appear. Napoleon’s constitution of 1799 decreed that because of differences in the “nature of things and the climate,” differences in “habits, customs, [and] interests,” and the “diversity” of agricultural production throughout the colonies, the metropolitan
government would henceforth decree “special laws” as appropriate for France’s various colonies in the Americas, Asia, and Africa. As Dubois has noted, this constitutional provision was a means of reneging on the general abolition of 1795 and of preparing the ground “for the acceptance of slavery in some parts of the empire.”

Thus, when in February 1801 Toussaint Louverture convoked a Constitutional Assembly to draft a constitution for the colony of Saint-Domingue it was a logical response to the changes Napoleon’s Constitution had instituted – and the changes that it threatened. If “special laws” were to be required it was logical that they should be specified. The 1801 Constitution of Saint-Domingue was thus not only an opportunity for Toussaint to codify his various labour regulations and to consolidate his control of the colony, but it was also a necessary strategic measure to entrench the abolition of slavery in Saint-Domingue, and to thereby preempt any “special laws” from France that might threaten emancipation.

However, developments in Saint-Domingue and Santo Domingo also contributed to the need for a new constitution: in January 1801 Toussaint’s forces, under the command of Moïse seized control of the former Spanish territory of Santo Domingo in the eastern half of the island after meeting little resistance. Toussaint’s objectives in Santo Domingo were idealistic, economic, and strategic. Exporting the revolution offered Toussaint the opportunity to not only end slavery in a neighboring territory but also to put an end to the practice of the kidnapping of men, women, and children in Saint-Domingue who, Toussaint alleged, were subsequently sold into slavery in Santo Domingo. But Toussaint’s eastward expansion was also about tapping the considerable economic potential of Santo Domingo’s land, which had not experienced the intensified plantation
regime that had occurred in Saint-Domingue. Moreover, Toussaint needed to exert control over the territory of Santo Domingo since its eastern shores were ideal landing grounds for the armies of Europe. With Toussaint’s control now extending across the entirety of Hispaniola a new constitution was in order.\textsuperscript{36}

Thus, in March 1801, representatives from each of Saint-Domingue’s departments were elected to Toussaint’s Constitutional Assembly in regional elections. In addition, five Spanish representatives from Santo Domingo were included in the delegation.\textsuperscript{37} The elitist composition of the assembly is striking – not a single former slave would be included. Indeed, though Moïse had been selected he boycotted the entire constitutional process, which he condemned.\textsuperscript{38} The Assembly tasked with drafting the constitution was thus comprised of Saint-Domingue’s and Santo Domingo’s old elite: Frenchmen, Spaniards, and mulattoes, many of them former slave and plantation owners.\textsuperscript{39} Hence, the Constitution was made possible by the long years of suffering and resistance by Saint-Domingue’s enslaved masses but was to be drafted entirely without their input. In Linebaugh and Rediker’s terms, this assembly was anything but one of the hydra’s heads. Moreover, and testifying to Saint-Domingue as a crucial site of connection, Alexander Hamilton, “America’s most elusive founding father,” found himself giving advice to Toussaint’s constitutional assembly.\textsuperscript{40} Having been invited to comment on an appropriate system of government for Saint-Domingue, Hamilton suggested a number of authoritarian measures that would ultimately be incorporated in the final text. Hamilton wrote that “no regular system of liberty [would] at present suit Saint-Domingue.”\textsuperscript{41} Instead, Hamilton, well aware of the fragility of Saint-Domingue’s autonomy, proposed a
military government with a single executive to hold office for life, compulsory military duty for all males, and a concentration of power in the executive.\footnote{42}

The Constitutional Assembly completed its work by May 1801 and Toussaint signed and promulgated the resulting constitution in July, a sequence of events that Nick Nesbitt has argued, “constitutes the founding moment in the history of postcolonialism.”\footnote{43} The document that the Assembly produced made the universal freedom from slavery its radical foundation;\footnote{44} article 3 reads as follows:

“There cannot exist slaves on this territory, servitude is therein forever abolished.

All men are born, live and die free and French.”\footnote{45}

The essence of Article 3 would be repeated in the Haitian Constitutions of 1805, 1806, and 1807: the 1805 Constitution promulgated by Jean-Jacques Dessalines declared that: “Slavery is forever abolished”; the 1806 Constitution promulgated by Alexandre Petion declared that: “Slaves cannot exist on the territory of the Republic: slavery is forever abolished”; and Henri Christophe’s 1807 Constitution declared that: “Every resident person in the territory of Haiti is free in full right.”\footnote{46} With the exception of the 1805 article, each of these declarations of the right to freedom from enslavement is explicitly founded on the notion of Saint-Domingue or Haiti as ‘free soil’ territory. As the critic Ada Ferrer has obsevered,

“by explicitly specifying the location where freedom would be made real […] the Haitian Constitutional texts made it clear that the freedom envisioned was not an abstract proposition, but freedom from real, existing slavery.”\footnote{47}

Returning to the 1801 Constitution, Sibylle Fischer has argued that the radicalism of the provision banning slavery is best perceived by reading the 1801 Constitution “against the
backdrop of comparable provisions in French constitutions between 1791 and 1799.” \(^{48}\) Neither the French Constitution of 1791 nor the Jacobin Constitution of 1793 abolished slavery, while the 1799 Constitution actually paved the way for the reintroduction of slavery in the French colonies in 1802. In fact, as indicated above, the only French Revolutionary Constitution that contained a provision abolishing slavery was the otherwise conservative post-Thermidorian constitution of 1795. \(^{49}\) This reminder that, ultimately, the French Revolution failed to abolish slavery, serves to demonstrate just what a radical – and ironic – political move Toussaint was making in conjoining universal freedom from slavery with an ideal of French republican citizenship in his Constitution. Further, the radicalism of article 3 in the 1801 Constitution becomes even clearer when considered in the light of scholarship on the US Constitution and slavery. Paul Finkelman’s work, for example, has made the deeply persuasive case that the drafting and ratification of the American Constitution was conditional on the safeguarding of slavery. \(^{50}\)

Significantly, Toussaint’s 1801 Constitution did not ban slavery as a matter of individual or social rights. The constitution did not codify freedom from slavery as a right to liberty, or for that matter any other kind of right – the 1801 Constitution does not contain anything resembling a ‘Bill of Rights’ or any declaration of the democratic credentials of the state. \(^{51}\) Instead, freedom – or more specifically the impossibility of slavery – is woven into the fabric of the territory’s existence and identity. Fischer has argued that this was in fact a further means of safeguarding the ban on slavery in Saint-Domingue: the French Revolution had clearly demonstrated that individual and social rights were always open to challenge and potential repeal. So, Toussaint’s 1801
Constitution sought to circumvent the fragility of legal discourses of individual liberty by boldly asserting the unassailable fact of freedom in Saint-Domingue – “There cannot exist slaves on this territory, servitude is forever abolished. All men are born, live and die free and French.” This fact of freedom, rather than a right to freedom, recognizes the immanent inalienability of human freedom and makes that recognition indigenous to the political settlement of the new Saint-Domingue. Furthermore, Nick Nesbitt has alerted to a further radical nuance embedded within the constitutional establishment of the fact of human freedom in Saint-Domingue:

“[I]t is the first modern constitution to address the conflict between the defence of property rights and human rights: if all humans possess a fundamental and inalienable freedom, property rights must logically be explicitly qualified not to include humans. Aside from Robespierre’s never-adopted 1793 proposal for just such a constitutional limitation, this constitution was the first in Western modernity explicitly to base itself on the unlimited, universal right to freedom from enslavement.”

Though uncompromising in its anti-slavery stance and radical for codifying a programme of universal emancipation, in other respects the 1801 Constitution of Saint-Domingue is utterly undemocratic, paternalistic, and authoritarian. Though James was certainly right to insist that, “France could have no quarrel with Toussaint over this Constitution on the score of despotism” – it was after all the kind of constitution that Napoleon could only dream of – the 1801 Constitution’s reactionary elements need to be addressed. While it constitutionalized universal emancipation with one hand, with the other it instituted repressive labour control, including enforced plantation labour and restrictions on
mobility, in the name of commerce and economic necessity. Not only did it maintain the plantation system (articles 14–18); it treated the relationship between plantation owners and plantation workers as akin to the relationship between a father and his children (articles 15 and 16). Moreover, the Constitution named Toussaint as ruler of Saint-Domingue for life and it banned vodou, the religion of the masses, making Catholicism the state religion in its stead (article 6). The banning of vodou, which had been both a key organizational tool and a means of communicating a spirit of revolutionary insurrection, must be regarded as an especially ironic provision. In addition, the Constitution prohibited divorce (article 9); and it gave Toussaint as Governor unlimited powers to propose and institute laws (article 36). I will now propose that we can deepen our understanding of the contradictions of the 1801 Constitution by delving deeper into different conceptions of freedom in circulation in the revolutionary and Black Atlantic at the time.

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Contrary conceptions of freedom in Toussaint Louverture’s Saint-Domingue

As we have seen, freedom under Toussaint’s Constitution was a strictly circumscribed negative freedom from slavery under despotic rule. Freedom was bent before economic necessity and paternal authoritarianism. The situation in Saint-Domingue in 1801 makes abundantly clear the fact that far from being an ecumenical and trans-historical ideal, ideas of freedom are inevitably conditioned by the circumstances from which they are envisioned. As Nick Nesbitt has argued, Toussaint’s Constitution of 1801 was an instrument in a state-building project in which the construction of “novel modes of
production [and] political forms of organization, beyond the mere ideology of universal anti-slavery and the negative imperative to resist its return to the island” were strictly off the agenda. However, to return to Linebaugh and Rediker’s metaphor, the proletarian hydra in Saint-Dominigue had rather different, and much more radical, ideas about what constituted freedom. And though these ideas were entirely absent from the 1801 Constitution I argue that their actions illuminate the Haitian Revolution’s boldest aspirations. The argument here thus parallels Linebaugh and Rediker’s observations about the revolutionary actions of “the motley crew” in the American Revolution. Linebaugh and Rediker’s radical “motely crew” was comprised of various groupings of organized gangs of workers and sailors in eighteenth century Atlantic world port towns. And, Linebaugh and Rediker, argue the motley crew’s rebellious and audacious actions sparked a proletarian revolutionary consciousness while the reactions against it “help to illuminate the clashing, ambiguous nature of the American Revolution – its militant origins, radical momentum, and conservative political conclusion.”

Toussaint’s conception of freedom, which included enforced wage-labour, is best understood not only circumstantially, but also in the context of a discourse that had been circulating around the Atlantic World since at least as early as 1791 – a discourse under which rights and freedoms could be treated as ‘transactional’ or ‘reciprocal.’ Then, seeking to augment Anthony Bogues recent argument that the Haitian Revolution constituted a project of freedom that involved not only the overthrow of racial slavery, but also the dismantling of all forms of human domination (including wage-labour), I will argue that the former slaves’ reaction to Toussaint’s 1801 Constitution reveals a far more
more radical vision of freedom that developed in direct response to atrocities of the African slave trade and the plantation system in the Americas.\textsuperscript{56}

**Freedom as ‘transactional’ or ‘reciprocal’**

One way of looking at the 1801 Constitution’s codification of the universal right to freedom from slavery in exchange for obligatory wage-labour is to see it within the context of the discourse of the transactional or reciprocal nature of rights and duties. Under this formula, duties went both ways between a state and its citizens. Thus, if freedom from slavery was a right guaranteed by the state, in return citizens owed a reciprocal a duty to the state – and in the case of Saint–Domingue that duty was one’s labour. This idea, as Charles Walton has recently demonstrated, was at the heart of debates over citizenship and duties during the French Revolution.\textsuperscript{57} It was also an idea that Thomas Paine addressed in *Rights of Man* in a comment on the debates that took place in the Parisian National Assembly in 1789:

> “While the Declaration of Rights was before the National Assembly, some of its members remarked, that if a Declaration of Rights was published, it should be accompanied by a Declaration of Duties. The observation discovered a mind that reflected, and it only erred by not reflecting far enough. A Declaration of Rights is, by reciprocity, a Declaration of Duties also. Whatever is my right as a man, is also the right of another; and it becomes my duty to guarantee, as well as to possess.”\textsuperscript{58}

Thus, for Paine rights and freedoms were founded in the moral commensurability of human beings and a new conception of social bonds in which reciprocity arose from
human solidarity. Though Paine expands the notion to encompass multiple reciprocal
duties between citizens rather than a straightforward two-way relationship between
citizens and their state, it remains an illuminating point of contrast for the situation in
1801 Saint-Domingue. This because despite the fact that when Toussaint sought to
retrospectively justify his Constitution to Napoleon he argued for the correctness of a
didactic paternalism rather than a discourse of reciprocity between citizens and state,⁵⁹ it
is possible to see in the Constitution the intention of fostering solidarity amongst a
community of former slaves who individually and collectively owed a duty to the state to
safeguard their emancipation. Thus, while it might be tempting to regard the 1801
Constitution as a barbarous despotism, by contextualizing it within the debates on rights
and duties circulating throughout the Atlantic World at the time, we can come to
understand the 1801 Constitution’s limits on freedom as measures that were consistent
with an ideology of freedom that included reciprocal rights and duties. Moreover, it is a
point of interest to contrast the concept of “reciprocal freedom” that emerged in
revolutionary France and Saint-Domingue with the thesis of freedom as a “horrible gift”
as articulated by Frantz Fanon and more recently by Marcus Wood. Wood argues that
Fanon searched “deeply into the appalling aporia lying within the myth that freedom can
ever be given by any master to any slave” since freedom is “beyond the power of any
human, and most especially a politician, to endow another human with.” Moreover, in his
reading of both Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks and The Wretched of the Earth, Wood
argues that wherever slavery was abolished by colonial legislation, the black experience
of freedom would be forever tainted by and “intimately bound to [the] original moment
of controlled white domination.” I wish to suggest here that we might expand Fanon’s
and Wood’s thesis, since the 1801 Constitution of Saint-Domnigue highlights that even when freedom is offered as a reciprocal bargain by a black revolutionary turned statesman, such as Toussaint, rather than as a gift from white colonists, it still falls short. The true liberty that the former slaves of Saint-Domningue were seeking will now be explored in more detail.\textsuperscript{60}

\textbf{Radical practices and conceptions of freedom}

The former slaves of Saint-Domningue, like “the motley crew,” envisioned a more radical form of freedom than the one on offer in the 1801 Constitution: they wanted the freedom to spend their time how they pleased. However, it is important not to confuse this desire with an idle wish for a pure, non-existent freedom. On the contrary, from the outset of the Revolution the actions of the former slaves expressed an understanding that freedom from slavery could not be bought, could not be traded for, and could not logically require any reciprocal duty on their part since the right to freedom from enslavement was immanent in all human beings.\textsuperscript{61}

At this juncture it is necessary to elaborate the pragmatic and substantive meanings of liberty and equality for the mass of former slaves in Saint-Domningue. Carolyn Fick has explicitly addressed this question, arguing that, for the mass of former slaves, tangible freedom could only be realized with a right to land and the freedom to labour for oneself:

“Work and labour for the profit of another or for the production of export crops on which the colony’s existence depended was profoundly antithetical to their own vision of things.”\textsuperscript{62}
Fick finds a variety of reactions to emancipation in post-1793 Saint-Domingue, but the most significant and manifest reaction was the attempt on the part of the former slaves “to transform themselves into free smallholding peasants” producing goods for local markets or growing subsistence crops. In addition, the former slaves persistently advocated the limitation of their working week to five days, female ex-slaves demanded the right to equal pay for equal work, and, crucially I would suggest, vagrancy and ‘wandering’ became widespread. The phenomenon of vagrancy and/or wandering was common throughout post-slave societies in the Americas and the wandering of former slaves in the post-Civil War United States is particularly well-documented, the explosion of movement memorably analogized by one writer as being akin to releasing birds that had been long in a cage.

Vagrancy and wandering in Saint-Domingue took on a myriad of forms: some ex-slaves skipped from one plantation to another in search of more appealing working conditions. Others moved to join friends, family, or relatives elsewhere. Others simply absconded from their assigned plantation preferring to “hide out and not work at all.” These actions of such ex-slaves came under attack in Toussaint’s 1800 “Proclamation on Labour” which was constitutionalized in 1801. There, Toussaint declared in serpentine prose and logic, that the result of a lack of enthusiasm for plantation agriculture labour among the masses co-existed with their mistaken belief that they were free to “spend their days running about aimlessly, thus setting a very bad example for the other farmers.” However, Toussaint could not perceive anything positive in the actions of these ‘vagrants.’ And though the former slaves were not seeking permanent, unfettered movement – eventually they would settle and form distinct social and political structures
including the egalitarian structure of expanded family compounds known as *lakous* – the practices of vagrancy and wandering in Saint-Domingue from 1793 onwards, reveal that in the short-term at least, for many ex-slaves the quintessence of freedom was the freedom of unfettered movement.68

I am therefore here reminded of Frederick Douglass’s quite brilliant contribution to this radical ideology of freedom in the first of his autobiographies, *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass*, published in 1845, some forty-one years after the achievement of Haitian independence in 1804. Douglass, a former slave who would later become the American Ambassador to Haiti, and who would also later acclaim the Haitian Revolution as a victory not only for Haitians but for blacks everywhere, described how for him, as a young man held in slavery, the idea of freedom was conjured most perfectly, but painfully, on viewing the beautiful transatlantic sailing ships loosed from their moorings on the Chesapeake Bay. Douglass movingly described these ships as “freedom’s swift-winged angels, that fly round the world,” thereby evoking mobility as the quintessence of freedom, which he contrasted with the slave’s confinement “in bands of iron.”69

Douglass’s idealization of mobility as freedom is poetic and rhetorically stunning, but it is also bitingly bitter: at the time Douglass was writing, transatlantic sailing ships had of course been exporting Africans to the Americas to be sold into slavery for more than three hundred years. Yet Douglass’s symbolic vision gestures towards a project of freedom in which true liberation is both as yet unrealizable, but indispensible to human progress. And Douglass’s conception of freedom certainly accords to a greater extent with the practices of the former slaves of Saint-Domingue than it does with Toussaint’s
Constitution, preoccupied as it was with matters of state and protecting the emancipation that had been so hard won.70

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Conclusion

The draftsmen of the Saint-Domingue Constitution of 1801 crafted the first constitution in Western modernity to affirm the universal human right to freedom from enslavement, bestowing republican citizenship on a population of former slaves. But the document’s deeply riven contradictions complicate our understanding of Haiti’s place in the Age of Revolutions. The Haitian Revolution’s radical drive towards freedom and equality was certainly one of the hydra’s heads, but the meaning of freedom was never stable and agreed upon in the course of the Revolution.

However, I do not wish to suggest anything contrary to the fact that of the three great revolutions that reshaped western political thinking at the end of the eighteenth century – the American, French, and Haitian – the Haitian case was the most radical. Nor do I wish to understate the remarkable fact that while each of those Atlantic world upheavals was animated by the rhetoric and ideals of liberty and freedom, only in Haiti were the implications of those ideals pursued unconditionally “in direct opposition to the social order and economic logic of the day.”71 The economic logic of the day, after all, pointed to the maintenance of the Atlantic slave-system. And yet, ironically, the 1801 Constitution of Saint-Domingue is the perfect document to buttress David Geggus recent condemnation of the Haitian Revolution as an Atlantic world revolution that only construed the pursuit of freedom in “the profound but narrow sense of freedom from
slavery rather than as political rights.” Yet, the existence of grass roots resistance to Toussaint’s Constitution demonstrates that Geggus’s assessment is not sufficiently sympathetic.

Nor would I go as far as Laurent Dubois, who has claimed that the 1801 Constitution was, in effect, “a charter for a new colonial order.” Instead, I would argue that the authoritarian, anti-democratic society that the 1801 Constitution ushered in was one that was also created by the need to maintain a strong army to defend emancipation in a hostile imperial world as well as the dependency on the plantation economy as the only means by which to preserve emancipation. Victor Bulmer-Thomas’ work on Haiti’s economic history makes this point stunningly clear: Haiti’s army and navy “absorbed around 50 per cent of public revenue in the first decades of independence,” a vast expenditure that was a direct consequence of Haiti’s foreign relations with the core imperial nations. Thus, if, as Nesbitt argues, 1801 was the world’s foundational postcolonial moment, Toussaint Louverture, his 1801 Constitution, and the former slaves of Saint-Dominique were its first neocolonial victims. As Fick has written, “the only possible outcome” in response to Toussaint’s 1801 Constitution was either defeat and re-enslavement under French rule or victory and complete independence. But the tragedy of independence was that when it did come, and when the plantation system was eventually destroyed in the 1820s and 1830s, the result, as Carolyn Fick has observed, was that Haiti, as the territory of Saint-Domingue became known on January 1, 1804, “was no longer a player of any significance in the Atlantic economy.” The eventual triumph of revolution from below “meant individual freedom in poverty.” The reawakening of the hydra in Haiti is much overdue.


The article thus seeks to augment Anthony Bogues’ recent article, “The Dual Haitian Revolution,” which focuses particularly on the 1805 Constitution of Haiti, the first constitution of independent Haiti.

Linebaugh and Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra*. Since its first publication in 2001, Linebaugh and Rediker’s book has had a sizeable impact: awarded the International Labor History Award Prize in 2001, the book has become has become a touchstone for a
constituency of Atlantic World scholars, general readers, and activists. For an insight into
the controversy surrounding the book’s reception, see: Linebaugh and Rediker, “The
*Many-Headed Hydra*: An Exchange, reply by David Brion Davis,” *New York Review of
Books*.

7 Linebaugh and Rediker, “The *Many-Headed Hydra*: An Exchange, reply by David
Brion Davis,” paragraph 2.


remained an enigmatic and shadowy figure, the historical depictions of him tending to
emphasize only his ferocity and brutality on the battlefield. However, this picture is
beginning to change as recent scholarship has begun the task of constructing a more
sophisticated understanding of Dessalines. See, for example, four recent articles on
Dessalines in *The William and Mary Quarterly*: Laurent Dubois, “Dessalines, Toro
d’Haïti”; Philippe R. Girard, “Jean Jacques Dessalines and the Atlantic System: A
Reappraisal”; Julia Gaffield, “Haiti and Jamaica in the Remaking of the Early
Nineteenth-Century Atlantic World”; and Deborah Jenson, “Jean-Jacques Dessalines and
the African Character of the Haitian Revolution.” All in *The William and Mary Quarterly*
Vol. 69, No. 3, (July 2012). Meanwhile, the novelist and Haiti enthusiast Madison Smartt
Bell is currently working on a biography of Dessalines.
12 Girard, *The Slaves Who Defeated Napoléon*. For examples of Girard’s denials of the significance of ideologies of liberation in the Revolution, and also his de-emphasizing of the Revolution’s philosophical and practical radicalism, see, *inter alia*, 15, 16, 342.


15 This analytical move is indebted to Benita Parry’s argument on the necessity of discerning “distinctions between the programmes of bourgeois and Marxist currents within liberation movements, the first seeking to inherit an intact colonial state and appropriate it to promote their own class interests, the other aspiring to abolish the state apparatus and replace it with democratic institutions.” Parry, *Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique*, 99.

16 James, *The Black Jacobins*, 265, 266.


19 See note 2, above.


22 Popkin, *A Concise History of the Haitian Revolution*, 14–18. See also: James, *The Black Jacobins*, 12–13: “Impossible as it is to substantiate hundreds of cases, yet all the evidence shows that […] bestial practices were normal features of slave life [in Saint-Domingue].” (13)

23 Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 5.

Also, the major sources on Louverture’s emancipation are: Debien, Fouchard, and Ménier, “Toussaint Louverture avant 1789,” 67-80 and Girard and Donnadieu, “Toussaint Before Louverture,” 41–78.

25 Emancipation would thus only apply to men of military age and ability.


As it would turn out, it was a short-lived abolition: Napoleon would re-impose slavery in Guadeloupe in 1802 and in 1799 he ceased efforts to enforce the 1794 abolition decree in France’s Indian Ocean colonies, where white colonists had successfully resisted the metropolitan efforts to impose abolition.

The exact sequence of events leading up to Toussaint’s change of allegiance remains unclear however. Indeed, Jeremy Popkin has questioned the significance of the Convention’s abolition decree of February 1794 to Toussaint’s decision-making, pointing out that his decision to join the French may have been primarily motivated by his rivalry with other black leaders. See: Popkin, *Concise History of the Haitian Revolution*, 67.

Also see: Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 179-80.


29 Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 238.


31 Hunt, *Haiti’s Influence on Antebellum America*, 89, 91

33 Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 192.

34 Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 241.


37 Nessler, “A Failed Emancipation?,” 229, n.36.


40 Lang, “Hamilton and Haiti,” 241.


Also see: Lang, “Hamilton and Haiti,” 241.

Despite his authoritarian recommendations, it would nevertheless be a mistake to use Hamilton’s involvement in the drafting of the 1801 Constitution of Saint-Domingue to characterize him as the most reactionary of American Revolutionary figures, an assessment which is often made. Such an assessment would be to accept Thomas Jefferson’s view of Hamilton and would require us to gloss over the facts that, unlike Jefferson, Hamilton was steadfastly anti-slavery, and, again, unlike Jefferson, Hamilton embraced the Haitian Revolution.


44 Nesbitt, *Universal Emancipation*, 156.

Haitian Constitution of 1805, Article 2; Haitian Constitution of 1806, Article 1; Haitian Constitution of 1807, Article 1.


Drawing on the pioneering work of Sue Peabody, Ferrer notes that this concept of territorially delineated freedom belongs within a European jurisprudential tradition that predated the Atlantic Age of Revolutions and which held that “simply setting foot on a particular territory was enough to confer freedom upon a slave.” Peabody quoted in Ferrer, “Haiti, Free Soil, and Antislavery,” 47.

Fischer, Modernity Disavowed, 264.

Fischer, Modernity Disavowed, 264; Nesbitt, Universal Emancipation, 158.

Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders. The most brilliant rhetorical defence of the counter position to this view remains Frederick Douglass’s eloquent and angry oration of July 1852, “What to the Slave Is the 4th of July?” There, Douglass argues that slavery was not merely contrary to the US Constitution, but also to natural rights discourse, American Republicanism, and Christianity.

Nor should these absences surprise us: a lack of concern with matters of democracy and rights in a Constitution was the norm in 1801. Before 1801, nearly all of the world’s constitutions were American and they did not generally say much about democracy and rights. The French Constitution of 1793 is a highly unusual exception in this respect, since it provided for universal male suffrage.


James, The Black Jacobins, 264.


57 Walton, “Reciprocity and the French Revolution.”


59 L’Ouverturte, “Memoir,” 95: “If I did oblige my fellow countrymen to work, it was to teach them the true value of liberty without license; it was to prevent corruption of morals; it was for the general happiness of the island, for the interest of the Republic.”


63 Fick, “Emancipation in Haiti,” 19.


65 Litwack, *Been in the Storm So Long*, 223.


69 Douglass, *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass*, 38.

70 Considering Toussaint’s Constitution alongside Frederick Douglass’s *Narrative* is also a compelling gesture since, as Michael Drexler and Ed White have argued that Toussaint’s Constitution can be regarded as an alternative point of origin in the history of African American letters: “[F]ollowing its dissemination throughout the US in the fall of 1801, Toussaint's Constitution became the most widely read piece of literature authored
by an African American and may have remained so until the publication of Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass in 1845.” Drexler and White, “The Constitution of Toussaint,” 59.

71 Hallward, Damning the Flood, 11.

72 Geggus, “The Caribbean in the Age of Revolution,” 100.

73 Dubois, Haiti: The Aftershocks of History, 34.


75 Fick, “Emancipation in Haiti,” 23.

76 Fick, “Emancipation in Haiti,” 35.

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