WHAT IS GLOBAL HISTORY?

Sebastian Conrad
## Contents

1 Introduction 1

2 A short history of thinking globally 17

3 Competing approaches 37

4 Global history as a distinct approach 62

5 Global history and forms of integration 90

6 Space in global history 115

7 Time in global history 141

8 Positionality and centered approaches 162

9 World-making and the concepts of global history 185

10 Global history for whom? The politics of global history 205

*Acknowledgments* 237

*Notes* 239

*Index* 283
CHAPTER 4

Global history as a distinct approach

The recent trend towards global perspectives is a broad movement. As we have seen in the last chapter, a whole range of approaches contribute, each in its own way, to our understanding of a past viewed outside the framework of the nation-state. Beyond this multiplicity, however, and building on these other variant modes of engaging the world, a more distinct global history approach has begun to emerge. In this chapter, I will introduce a number of characteristic traits that many recent forays into the field share. Taken together, they form the methodological core of what global history signifies as an approach. Special emphasis will be given to the notion of global integration, or structured transformations on a global level.

We can best understand the features of global history when pitting them against an ideal type—an admittedly oversimplified portrayal—of the older tradition of world history. We should keep in mind, however, that this juxtaposition of world and global history is a heuristic move. It suggests a clear delineation between an older approach and a sophisticated modern approach, while in practice many historians use the two terms interchangeably.

The concept of world history has a history that reaches back several centuries. Today, it remains the name of a school subject in many countries, generally designating a narrative that encompasses the entire world or that looks comparatively at large geographical regions. World histories thus usually follow a macro agenda, typically striving for a full picture of the planet’s past—or, as is characteristic in many non-Western countries, they deal with “the rest of the world,” with everything that happened outside one’s own nation. There are also world histories of specific topics: world histories of empire, of state-formation, of courtly encounters, and world histories of sugar, of tea, and of cotton. In most cases, they trace these institutions and goods not only across the planet, but through time as well, sometimes taking the story all the way from antiquity to the present.1

As their points of departure, macro-perspectives of this sort operate with large-scale comparisons of societies or, more typically, whole civilizations. In most older world histories, interactions and exchange between these enormous building blocks were not ignored, but the main focus was on the different trajectories of the civilizations, whose dynamics were primarily depicted as generated from within. These parallel histories were then linked by increasing diffusion from centers of power to the periphery. In the modern period, this diffusion typically assumed the form of a transfer from the West to “the rest.” A Eurocentric bias has thus been a rather common feature of world histories for a long time, as the title of William McNeill’s influential book, The Rise of the West, made no attempt to conceal.2

Features of global history

The older world histories typically employed a methodology that combined comparisons of separate civilizations with a
CHAPTER 4

search for links between them, the latter explained by processes of diffusion. The thinking behind these histories crossed theoretical and ideological divides—ranging from modernization theory to Marxism and to narratives of civilization—but the mix of comparison and diffusion was remarkably constant. By contrast, the keyword most immediately associated with the term “global” has been “connections.” A whole cascade of related terms—“exchange” and “intercourse,” “links” and “entanglements,” “networks” and “flows”—are mustered to convey the fluidity and volatility with which interactions take place across borders. In lieu of a rather stubborn reliance on macro-comparisons, global histories have elevated mobility to the throne.

This is why most shorthand definitions of global history have confined themselves to the happy marriage of comparisons and connections, taking the best of what traditional world history had to offer and combining it with a sensitivity for the more flexible and fluid dimensions of historical change. “Global connections and comparisons” greet us from the cover page of C. A. Bayly’s seminal Birth of the Modern World, and the shibboleth that connections cum comparison are “the stock-in-trade of global history” is reiterated in virtually all attempts to define what is specific about the approach.3

And indeed, a focus on transfers and interactions is a crucial ingredient of all recent attempts to understand the global past. The mobility of goods, the migration and travel of people, the transfer of ideas and institutions: all these processes are the stuff that has helped produce the globalized world in which we live, and they are the privileged objects of study of many global historians. As we will see below, however, connections alone are not sufficient to explain the originality of the approach; connections need to be embedded in processes of structural transformation, and this on a global scale. Before we come to this point, I will first sketch a set of methodological choices that are recurrent features of current global history, beyond its emphasis on connections. They will be only briefly outlined here, as most of the issues are taken up at greater length in subsequent chapters.

First, global historians are not concerned with macro-perspectives alone. Many seek to situate concrete historical issues and phenomena within broader, potentially global contexts. The emergence of the notion of “culture” in 1880s Bengal is, accordingly, as legitimate a subject of global history inquiry as the full planetary history of the entire nineteenth century.4 Second, global histories experiment with alternative notions of space. They typically do not take political or cultural units—nation-states, empires, civilizations—as their points of departure. Instead, they pose analytical questions and go wherever their questioning leads them—across the Bay of Bengal, to nodal points in a network, to religious and ethnic diasporas, and so forth.

This implies, third, that global histories are inherently relational. This means that a historical unit—a civilization, a nation, a family—does not develop in isolation, but can only be understood through its interactions with others. In fact, many groups only jelled into seemingly fixed units as a response to exchange and circulation. Attention to the relationality of the past also challenges long-accepted interpretations of the history of the world as the “rise of the West” and the “European miracle.” Many older world history texts locate the driving force of world history in Europe and chronicle the spread of European achievements to the rest of the world: world history as a one-way street. By contrast, recent studies stress the constitutive role played by interactions between regions and
nations, as well as between Europe and the non-European world, in the development of modern societies. Development in Europe and the West cannot be explained from within, as an autonomous process, but must be seen, at least in part, as the product of various processes of exchange.

Fourth, as a discipline within the humanities, global history forms part of the larger "spatial turn." One consequence is that the relations of constellations in space to other locations—become more important. Global historians pay particular attention to the way individuals and societies interact with others—and less on endogenous change. As a result, spatial metaphors—such as territoriality, geopolitics, circulation, and networks—tend to replace an older temporal vocabulary of development, time lag, and backwardness. This also implies a rejection of the teleologies of modernization theory; i.e., a criticism of the notion that societies are transformed, as it were, from within, and that the direction of social change—from tradition to modernity, for example—is predetermined.

A direct outcome of this is emphasis on the synchronicity of historical events. This is the fifth point. To be sure, global historians by no means ignore the issue of continuities or path dependencies. As C. A. Bayly and others have argued, globalization in the modern age built on trajectories influenced by earlier patterns of entanglement. However, by dissociating from the long-term perspectives typical of the history of civilizations and by not privileging conventional notions of continuity, many global historians suggest that greater precedence be given to simultaneity. As is immediately clear from the examples of the Arab Spring revolts, synchronous constellations and external forces are often as important drivers of social change as long prehistories and traditions.

Sixth, and crucially, many global histories are self-reflective on the issue of Eurocentrism. This is one of the defining features that set this approach apart from most older variants of world history writing. We will take up this issue in more detail below (chapter 8). In practical terms, it generally means that greater emphasis is placed on area-studies expertise in history departments than was typical in the past. It also implies, seventh, that the positionality of thinking about the global past is explicitly recognized. Historians may write about the entire planet, but they do so from a particular place, and their narratives will partly be colored by the dynamics of that location. Looking back, it is obvious that a world history written in late sixteenth-century Mexico City would be wildly different from one written in Istanbul. But even today, the "world" may appear very different when viewed from Accra, Quito, or Harvard Yard.

Integration and structured transformation

The final point, to which we now turn, concerns the notion of integration. This is a crucial aspect, so we will dwell on it at some length. To focus on global integration is a methodological choice that distinguishes global history from other approaches that operate on large scales. There are two important aspects to this choice: global history perspectives go beyond mere studies of connectedness by examining large-scale structured integration; and global historians pursue the problem of causation up to the global level.

To begin with the first point: Many world/global historians content themselves with studying interactions and connections.
“Connectedness is part of the human condition, at least as far back as we can trace human activity,” John Darwin has recently reminded us, only to conclude: “The particular concern of the global historian is, or should be, with the history of ‘connectedness’—and especially with those forms of connectedness that are oceanic and trans- or intercontinental.” Others have chimed in, maintaining that “the world has never been the site of discrete, unconnected communities, that crosscultural interactions and exchanges have taken place since the earliest days of human existence on planet Earth.”

But a focus on connections alone is not enough to make good global history. For, while exchanges of goods, persons, and ideas and interactions between groups and societies, even across long distances, have been a feature of human life on the planet from the beginning, some of the links within this global “human web” were crucial to the social makeup of a society, while others remained accidental and ephemeral. The magnitude of their impact depended not least on the degree to which the world was, at the time, integrated—materially, culturally, and politically.

What does that mean? Take the example of the introduction of Western clocks to Japan. When European clocks, high-tech products of their time, were first brought to Tokugawa Japan in the seventeenth century, they were seen primarily as exotic gadgets. Their import had no effect on the social regime of time. Quite the contrary. While European clockmakers took pride in the fact that their watches ran evenly, irrespective of the cycles of the sun, in Japan the same clocks had to be converted to accommodate the traditional order of time, for the length of Japanese hours depended on daylight and consequently varied throughout the year. The mechanical clocks had to be readjusted twice a day, and seasonal dials were installed to undo, as it were, the new clocks’ independence from the cycles of nature. In the seventeenth century, then, this technological transfer remained essentially ornamental.

The situation changed dramatically after 1850, when East Asia was incorporated into the political and economic orbit of the West. Now, Western temporality was seen as a central ingredient of all reform projects, and attempts were made to introduce “new times” to Meiji Japan. New technology such as trains, new factories with their novel ways of organizing production, and new forms of social organization, including schools and the army, all required a new time regime. Western watches and clock towers emerged as the symbol of the modern; punctuality and notions of progress translated Western time into everyday practices, and the introduction of the Gregorian calendar in 1873 abolished the traditional methods of time reckoning and prepared Japan for global synchronicity. If we compare these two transfer processes, it becomes clear that the difference between them lies less in the transfers themselves than in the larger geopolitical conditions in which they were embedded. The sparse trade contacts of the seventeenth century, conducted by the Dutch and carefully controlled by the Japanese, had been replaced in the nineteenth century by an imperialist world order under British hegemony. In this changed context, cultural imports were no longer incorporated into local cosmologies, but assumed the force to fundamentally transform everyday practices.

Connections in and of themselves are only a starting point. Their significance can vary greatly, so that, depending on a whole range of circumstances, the same clock can take on very different levels of importance. Global historians need to remember that global connections are preceded by conditions and that it is essential to thoroughly understand these conditions before
they can hope to understand the connections themselves. Exchange, in other words, may be a surface phenomenon that gives evidence of the basic structural transformations that made the exchange possible in the first place. Effective global history needs to remain aware of the systemic dimension of the past, and of the structured character of social change.

Lest this sound too abstract, let us look briefly at another example. When critical intellectuals in Vietnam, Japan, or China began to read Marx, this was, rather logically, seen as evidence of the transcultural circulation of ideas. Accordingly, traditional histories charted the translation process, studied the reception of Marxist ideas, and looked for the impact of Marx’s texts on reformist thinking in Asia. While these were important facets of the problem, the more important causal links, it turned out, lay elsewhere. In this case, connectedness proved to be itself the result of social changes that had created the conditions under which reading Marx in Vietnam began to make political sense. In the last instance, the influence of Marx could not be reduced to the power of his arguments alone. Rather, aspiring young intellectuals were shaped by the forces and concerns that dominated the times, and the way in which they translated, cited, and highjacked Marx’s texts was structured by these conditions. Connections—reading Marx—were thus primarily an effect of prior social, political, and cultural transformations (and not the source of these transformations).

The original mistake in this example involved, but was not limited to, a failure to take the influence of power into consideration. If issues of hierarchy and of exploitation are sidelined, a preoccupation with connections may blur and indeed hinder an accurate understanding of the contours of the global past.

Failure to note power structures confers agency on everyone who is involved in exchange and interactions, and by celebrating mobility runs the danger of ignoring the structures that control it. Cross-border movements were able to bridge differences between societies, but they may also exacerbate conflicts. European aristocrats on the Grand Tour and African slaves on the Middle Passage all crossed political and cultural boundaries, but it does not take much imagination to realize that subsuming them both under “connections” is highly ideological. Frequently the people who wielded real market power stayed put and benefited from being able to ship the huddled masses of their poor across the Atlantic and the Pacific.

This leads us to the second point that merits attention here. Unlike other perspectives on past connections, global history addresses the question of causation up to the global level. In many older world history texts, the analytical status of links and interactions was less than explicit. In some works of transnational history, too, they ultimately remain external to the core argument, and thus ornamental. However, as the world grew increasingly integrated, social development could no longer be understood without some notion of interdependence, or structured difference. “Britain and India came to have very different histories in the nineteenth century,” David Washbrook reminds us, “but this was a result of the very closeness of their relationship, not their distance—social, cultural—from each other. They existed as two sides of the same coin, but each with a very different face.” A global history that aspires to be more than an ecumenical and welcoming repository of happy stories of cross-border encounters, then, needs to engage systematically with the issue of structured global transformations and their impact on social change.
Our use of the term “global” here should not be misconstrued as necessarily implying a planetary reach. For each issue under study, a separate determination must be made as to how far exactly large-scale processes and structures extend. In much existing work, historians have prematurely confined their inquiries to fixed containers and geographical constraints. It would be equally fallacious to go to the opposite extreme and presuppose globality in every instance. What “global” suggests, therefore, is an openness to pursuing links and the question of causality beyond conventional containers and spatial units; it denotes “simply the methodological concern with experimenting beyond familiar geographical boundaries.”

If “comparisons and connections” serves as the conventional shorthand for global history, then we must add a third “c”: causality, pursued up to a global scale. The decision to focus on large forms of structured transformation and integration is a choice that sets global history apart from other approaches, such as comparative and transnational history. The emphasis on global integration will almost certainly raise a host of questions. Does this choice make it impossible to write global history about eras before integration, and before modernity? Will this choice narrow the range of possible topics by insisting on an identifiably global causality? Does it compel global historians to study this global level explicitly? I will take up these issues in the following chapter.

Beyond connectivity: competing narratives

In order to better understand the significance of a non-internalist approach, and of the analytical role of global integration, it may be helpful to briefly compare the perspective of global history with three influential but contrasting ways in which historians have hitherto understood and interpreted transformations on a planetary scale. Somewhat schematically, we can label them as Western exceptionalism, cultural imperialism, and the paradigm of independent origins. I will briefly sketch these three narratives and point out their shortcomings when compared to a global history approach.

The first metanarrative, still firmly entrenched in many textbooks and general overview works, assumes a general process of modernization that originated in Europe and was then gradually disseminated around the globe. The defining features of this notion of modernity are familiar: the functional differentiation of social spheres, such as the economy, politics, the social, and culture; and a gradual rationalization of all these spheres, giving birth to a capitalist and industrialized economy, the nation-state, and meritocratic bureaucracies; the replacement of hereditary estates by a class society and the modern individual; and the overcoming of traditional and religious cosmologies through what Max Weber called the “disenchantment of the world.”

In principle, these were seen as universal developments, but in actual practice they emerged in Europe first and were then conveyed to the rest of the world. Such a diffusional reading—epitomized by William McNeill’s The Rise of the West—lay at the heart of many older world histories, especially when guided by modernization theory, but also in many of the Marxist variants of world histories. “For the last thousand years,” as David Landes has summarized this narrative, “Europe (the West) has been the prime mover of development and modernity.” Such triumphalist formulations have become much less common, so that most accounts now replace the unabashed Eurocentrism of earlier days with a recognition
of the various forms of negotiation and adaptation that attended the process. At its core, however, the basic assumptions of this narrative are still in place: Europe/the West is seen as the locus of innovation, and world history is essentially understood as a history of the diffusion of European progress.\textsuperscript{16}

Against this formerly dominant view, a second interpretation emerged that was based on a radically critical reading of the dissemination of Western modernity. This view is associated with postcolonial, subaltern, and some Marxist perspectives. In it, modernity remains essentially European and is still equated with the march of universal reason. But the spread of modernity is seen not as emancipatory but as a process of deprivation.

There are two different, but related arguments involved. The first is the hypothesis that it was Enlightenment universalism that lay at the root of the West’s expansionist urge. It was only a small step, the critique runs, from positing universal standards to deciding to intervene and to implement these standards, by force, under the auspices of a paternalistic civilizing mission. The second argument is related. The spread of Western modernity is understood as a form of cultural imperialism with the potential to eradicate alternative worldviews. Critical scholars have interpreted the spread of Enlightenment tenets in the nineteenth century as a process of coerced and often brutal diffusion, made possible and driven by highly asymmetrical relations of power.\textsuperscript{17}

Both approaches discussed so far—emancipatory modernization and cultural imperialism—are essentially diffusionist and take the European origins of modernity for granted. What is more, they rest on the supposed absence of substantial cultural and social development elsewhere as one of their axiomatic tenets. In recent years, however, the European claim to originality, to exclusive authorship of modernity, has been called into question. Historians have begun to look for parallels and analogies to the European “march of civilization,” for autochthonous processes of rationalization that did not depend on, but led to similar results as, developments in Europe. This is the third paradigm sketched here, and it forms part of a larger scholarly debate on the origins of modernity. It was born out of a desire to challenge diffusionist notions of modernization, and to acknowledge the social dynamics that prevailed in many societies before their encounter with the West. The aim was to replace older notions of traditional societies and “people without history” with a broader understanding of multiple modernities. But in the end, this approach posits an identical telos—a modern, capitalist society—even if this goal is not achieved via transformations inspired by contact with the West, but rather builds on indigenous cultural resources: a teleology of universal disenchantment, realized in each society internally, but across the globe.

All three approaches converge in their methodological bias for national and civilizational frames. Their many differences notwithstanding, all rely on internalist logics in their attempt to explain what must be understood as a global phenomenon. If we are going to take the challenge of global history seriously, we need to move beyond these three approaches and focus on the connectivities and processes of integration that have shaped and reconfigured societies globally. Sanjay Subrahmanyam has argued that modernity is “historically a global and conjunctural phenomenon, not a virus that spreads from one place to another. It is located in a series of historical processes that brought hitherto relatively isolated societies
CHAPTER 4

into contact, and we must seek its roots in a set of diverse phenomena. From such a vantage point, it is less instructive to search for alleged origins—European or otherwise—than to focus on the global conditions and interactions through which the modern world emerged. This is why notions of global integration and system-like dependencies are crucial: changes in one location within the integrated world ripple through the system to affect other parts as well.

It is clear that the four approaches discussed above—world history, postcolonialism, multiple modernities, and global history—cannot be neatly separated, but overlap in many respects. They are, in other words, ideal types. For heuristic purposes, however, it is helpful to keep them apart analytically. Let us very briefly look at a few issues and see how these different paradigms may lead to very different results (indeed: to different questions)—before then using the case of nationalism to illustrate in greater detail the analytical surplus that is characteristic of a global history approach vis-à-vis the three other paradigms.

A first example is the case of human rights, on which a substantial historiography has recently emerged. A standard world history perspective would hold that the rights of man have a European genealogy that reaches back to humanism, and even a bit earlier, before coalescing into a program with global reach during the French Revolution. These rights with their universal claims then traveled beyond their place of origin and gradually gained acceptance around the world. A postcolonial reading would instead emphasize the parochial and culturally specific notion of human rights and the indiscriminate way in which it was used to marginalize, and indeed efface, alternative concepts of entitlement and equality that were less dependent on the concepts of nation and the individual. A third approach, that of multiple modernities, insists on indigenous cultural and political resources that allowed multiple notions of human rights to emerge in many different places, largely independent of each other. Building on these three approaches, recent forays into a global history of human rights focus instead on the emergence of human rights as a truly global discourse. Historians have thoroughly explored the global scope of human rights discourse by placing the emphasis less on the French Revolution and more on the appropriation and universalization of a language of rights in Haiti a few years later. In the twentieth century, the 1970s appear as a pivotal moment, when the decline of socialism and nationalism as political ideologies paved the way for the rise of human rights claims to the status of a hoped for “Last Utopia.” The intellectual origins of human rights, in this reading, are of less importance than the synchronous global conditions of their overall acceptance, and of their fusion with local genealogies in very diverse locations.

A similar case can be made in the field of international law. For a long time, historians have seen the Law of Nations, as it emerged in the wake of Hugo Grotius, as well as the subsequent development of international law, as a rationalization of international relations. Against this belief in the benevolent spread of a European accomplishment, critical scholars have pointed out the close connection between the Law of Nations and European imperialism, and have judged ostensibly universal claims to be no more than a thin veil concealing colonial ambitions. Third, in their quest to identify independent origins for international law in today’s global order, scholars have begun to mine the cultural and legal history of
various societies to show that parts of what is currently held to be common sense are contributions from alternative non-Western traditions. A global perspective would want to address more specifically why international law emerged when it did, why it was appropriated by different actors around the world, and in what ways it can be understood as a response to a global challenge. A preoccupation with the inventors and intellectual patent-holders, in other words, would lose its primacy, while the actual practice of international law moved to center stage.  

We can extend the heuristic differentiation of these four approaches to virtually all fields of historical inquiry. Was the concept of race a European invention, a tool of empire, a notion that grew from various indigenous roots—or a response to global challenges? Was the Enlightenment the accomplishment of European salon culture, a Western imposition, the product of many indigenous cultures of rationalization—or rather a way in which social elites around the world came to terms with new global realities? Or think of attempts to historicize the global history of fascism. World historians have tried to define the term by drawing up a laundry list of necessary features: a charismatic leader, mass mobilization, an ideology of ultra-nationalism, and so on. All of these features, however, were derived from the European experience. Other instances of fascism, in Japan or Argentina, for example, would seem to fall short of the requirements; in fact, even German National Socialism did not live up to the model set by Italian Fascism, and vice versa. By using global history as a corrective lens for this slightly myopic analysis, historians have paid more attention to transfers and direct contacts and have thus been able to reveal to what extent Italy and Germany served as models and inspiration in many places around the world.

Moving beyond comparison and transfer history, finally, a more systematic focus on global integration would begin with the shared global situation of the interwar years, and the quest, by many societies, for a "third way" between classical liberalism and communism, a quest that led many governments to experiment with new forms of social organization and mobilization. From such a perspective, the absence of this or that item on the laundry list—Was there a mass party challenging the establishment, or only mobilization "from above"? for example—is of less importance than understanding different cases as related, but differentiated ways of coping with structural transformations and a changing international order.

Case Study: Nations and Nationalism in Global History

In this final section, let us look in greater depth at the historiography of nationalism, as it is here that we can observe most clearly how new global perspectives have been able to complement and modify earlier ways of situating the nation within world history. In some respects, the nation is an unlikely candidate for such an endeavor. Not too long ago, in the 1990s, when "globalization" became the "in" word, some pundits were quick to predict the end of the nation-state altogether. In the realm of scholarship, its future prospects were equally bleak. Transnational and global histories were written with the explicit purpose of moving beyond the nation-state. But this moment of crisis—or was it one of euphoria?—soon abated, and gave way to the recognition that nation-states had staying power and would continue to be relevant, albeit in an altered setting. It has also become clear that global history is
not about consigning the nation/nation-state to the dustbin of history, but rather about reassessing its historical role and better explaining its emergence and significance.

How do these more recent approaches compare with earlier attempts to place the nation in the world? To a certain extent, it is no exaggeration to say that the theory of nationalism operated on a global scale from its very beginnings. Thus, the explanatory approaches inspired by early modernization theory—most notably by Ernest Gellner—were universal in scope. They posited the formation of nations as an effect of the ongoing transition from traditional to modern societies. While nationalist activists typically emphasized the distinctive character of a given nation, Gellner discarded all claims to uniqueness by postulating a universal law of development: industrial manufacturing destroyed the hierarchies of agricultural society in order to guarantee the mobility of labor and thus continuous growth. Nationalist self-legitimation may have stressed a shared history, a common language, and common cultural patterns, but for Gellner, nationalism was “the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society [...] in place of a previous complex structure of local groups [...]. That is what really happens.”

In this view, all nationalisms were, despite their superficial variations, essentially the same, and nationalism everywhere was an effect of socioeconomic modernization that could be explained in entirely endogenous terms. That being the case, there was no obstacle to comparing the experiences of far-flung locales with one another. By contrast, more recent approaches have instead highlighted connections and transfers. They have concluded that the worldwide prevalence of nationalism in the nineteenth century cannot be ascribed to internal factors alone, but must be understood as a result of diffusion as well.

Although Benedict Anderson has received attention chiefly as a proponent of a constructivist approach to nationalism, his most important methodological contribution has been his description of the modular character of the nation. By this he meant that after its initial creation, the form of the nation could, in principle, be transferred to other settings as a kind of template. This form developed first in the Creole societies of the Americas, and then in Europe in the mid-nineteenth century. Concepts and models of nationalism were generated there and subsequently became available globally as a kind of toolkit. From this point onward, all emerging nationalisms were shaped and influenced by this same paradigm.

Compared to earlier models inspired by modernization theory, Anderson’s approach marked an important step forward, since the global spread of nationalism could no longer be regarded as something akin to a clockwork result of the laws of social development. The concrete mechanisms by which the national form spread, however, remained little examined. Anderson’s interest was in the development of nationalism in Europe and the complex conditions under which this became possible. When it came to the rest of the world, he focused on how the form was used and modified. He essentially took its transferability as a given. But how can we understand the dynamics of transfers if we limit our attention to the origins of the form that travelled and to the nature of that form, but do not explore the conditions of possibility that made its transfer attractive to its recipients?

Anderson’s approach met with criticism from postcolonial historians, who for their part placed greater emphasis on the concrete imperial conditions under which nationalist movements developed in the colonized world. In his much-cited book *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*, Partha
Chatterjee argued that nationalism in the colonial world must inevitably remain a phenomenon derived from Europe, a “derivative discourse.” While it was true that nationalist movements were directed against foreign rule, on an ontological level—Chatterjee claimed—they continued to be indebted to the parameters of the dominant, which is to say imperial, discourse.  

In addition to this, the book contains a second argument. In substance, Chatterjee claims, anticolonial nationalism is fed by opposition to the West, which often takes the form of an emphatic stress on the national spirituality of the non-Western in contrast to Western materialism. And indeed, the dichotomy of a spiritual East versus a material West was a standard ingredient of political discourse in Asia in the late nineteenth century. Chatterjee goes on to expound this argument further in *The Nation and Its Fragments*, which is to some extent a revision of his first book. Here, Chatterjee divides nationalism into a material, external sphere and an inner, spiritual one. On this spiritual level, “its true and essential domain,” he sees the nation as already sovereign, long before it achieves political sovereignty. This inner domain appears as the realm of the true cultural expression of a nation. In other words, even if the “national form” (Etienne Balibar) is transferable and the national discourse remains derivative on the formal level, the substance of nationalism nevertheless is geographically and culturally specific and cannot be derived from the European imperial model.  

To what degree, we may now ask, is this particularity of the content of nationalism itself the product of global constellations? It is a valid question for, to a certain extent, Chatterjee’s approach remains indebted to the endogenous model: while he acknowledges the transfer of the nation as a form within the context of imperial power, the specific nature of the substance of colonial nationalism is explained with reference to local cultural resources, and in particular to older, precolonial traditions. Chatterjee has been accused of idealizing and reifying these precolonial cultural resources. From a global history perspective, however, two further criticisms are of greater importance. First, Chatterjee’s analysis remains entirely focused on the binary relationship between the colonized nation and the colonizers. This is a limitation that his account shares with the general thrust of the postcolonial paradigm. The dynamics of Indian, Chinese, or Thai nationalism were part of a global constellation. The paradigm of a local “reaction” to stimuli from Europe and the United States, important though it is, remains narrow in scope, just as the privileging of references back to autochthonous cultural traditions fails to tell the whole story. By cleaving to a postcolonial narrative, Chatterjee risks disregarding the larger global context, and overlooking the way in which historical actors in many regions from the late nineteenth century onward increasingly made reference to a global totality. Nationalism and thinking in national categories developed within this context of global integration.

And, second, he excludes as a factor the degree to which the substance of nationalism, too, not only referred back to endogenous traditions, but was also a product of the global constellation. Rather than making an analytical distinction between a (universal, transferable) “nation-form” and the culturally specific manifestation of its content, then, the aim must be to reconstruct both levels, each in its global context. After all, the larger geopolitical reality often was a crucial factor in determining which of numerous local traditions were mobilized for national projects.
of “culture” was employed in response to global challenges. “The history of the culture concept in Bengal,” he insists, “can be treated neither as a local deviation from nor as a late reiteration of an essentially Western intellectual form, but will rather be investigated as a spatially and temporally specific moment in the global history of the culture concept.”

The turn to culture can be read as a turn away from an earlier version of liberalism characterized by rational individualism and economic self-interest. Against this liberal gospel, the notion of culture was embraced by social groups that formulated a nationalist critique of British rule and economic hegemony. In Sartori’s reading, the global structures to which these eminent intellectuals responded were primarily economic. In the wake of the financial crisis of the 1840s, trade and industry were increasingly monopolized by British merchants, while native capital was invested only in property and real estate, thus disconnecting Bengali society from the dynamics of commerce. In this situation, the notion of culture became part of a quasi-Romantic discourse among Hindu elites as they sought to affirm their organic connection to the land and to the agrarian workforce.

More generally, and much more abstractly, Sartori links the debate on liberalism versus culture to the expansion of capitalism. He argues that culturalism emerged around the world as a reaction to the particular kinds of alienation and subjectivity that labor relations and forms of production under capitalism generated in particular areas. The specific notion of culture was, to be sure, suffused with local particularity, but the alleged traditions were not only thoroughly worked over by capitalism but also pressed into the service of social practices in a capitalist regime. Thus, culturalism cannot be fully accounted for as the effect of intellectual transfer; rather, it
must be understood as a series of unique responses to the same global problematic.

The second example is Rebecca Karl's *Staging the World*, a study of nationalism in late Qing China. For Karl also, the notion of China as a nation could only take hold at a specific historical moment, at the moment when China discovered the new “world” for itself. This moment did not consist merely in China’s perception of regions outside the Sino-sphere, outside China’s area of influence, but rather in an awareness of the world as a structured whole, increasingly made up of sovereign (nation-)states and dependent colonial countries. This new understanding of the “world” as a totality of units connected through globe-spanning forces like imperialism and capitalism then replaced the millennia-old mental dichotomy between the Middle Kingdom and barbarism.

What does this mean in concrete terms? Rebecca Karl is particularly interested in the way in which events that once appeared marginal from a Chinese perspective—the annexation of Hawaii by the United States, the partitions of Poland in the eighteenth century, the American conquest of the Philippines, British rule in Egypt, and so forth—became objects of intense debate in China around 1900. Within the traditional cosmology of the Qing court, these locations were indeed peripheral, at the fringes (and sometimes squarely outside of the reach) of Chinese “civilization.” At the turn of the century, however, Chinese reformers began to realize that the political and economic threat that China faced was not so different from the plight afflicting these smaller nations. While Hawaii may have been remote in cultural terms, the modern logic of geopolitics placed it in a situation very like that of the Qing Empire. The colonization process was no longer simply a concern of distant and exotic peoples, but now threatened even China in similar ways. As a result of globally effective structures, commonalities were no longer culturally, but rather geopolitically determined. They were now the result of the colonial threat and of China’s peripheral position in the capitalist world economy.34

The central thesis of Karl’s book is that the perception of China as one nation among others and as a part of “Asia”—understood here primarily in terms of a shared marginalization within the hegemonic imperial order, and less in terms of cultural or ethnic commonalities—only became possible within the context of global integration. “China only became both specifically national (and not an empire) and regionally Asian at the same time as, and only when, China became worldly.”35 The establishment of the nation was thus equally a diachronic projection and a response to China’s incorporation into the world. As the title of the book suggests, it wasn’t diachronic stages of development that were responsible for the emergence of dynamics of nationalism, but a synchronic “staging of the world”—a performance on a global stage.

Both Sartori’s and Karl’s books are written by scholars whose contributions to global history are largely resident in their particular areas of expertise, modern India and modern China. While other global historians focus on networks of nationalists, compare nationalist movements in different locations, or aim at a planetary synthesis, these studies focus on a particular location that they then analyze through its global entanglements.

More important, both books are examples of a broader historical movement that attempts to understand global structures not only as the necessary context, but also as the necessary precondition for the emergence of particular forms of
nationalism. Both authors focus predominantly on political economy, and they posit a sometimes highly abstract notion of capitalism as the driving force of history. Equating a global totality with capitalism will appear too rigid to some, and critics have taken both authors to task for what they see as dogmatic reliance on overly abstract notions of capitalist expansion. But the possible shortcomings of our two examples do not diminish their value as illustrations of just how integral a nuanced understanding of the global can be. As we have seen above, we can conceive of and explain global integration in a variety of ways. In the context of this chapter, Sartori and Karl are relevant because they see the global not as an external, and additional, context—but rather as constitutive, shaping the objects of study while being shaped by them.

Taken together, the set of methodological preferences outlined in this chapter and the emphasis on the concept of integration, constitute a rejection of explanations that slight or even completely disregard external influences and factors. This is the methodological core of global history understood as a distinct approach. Conventional social theories generally operate within what can be called an internalist paradigm. In past grand narratives of modernization, historical phenomena were explained endogenously, from within, and typically analyzed within the boundaries of a society. This focus on internal change has been the hallmark of virtually all social theories to date. Whether inspired by Marxism, Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, or the work of Michel Foucault, social theories essentially treated societies as self-generating and assumed that social change was always of a society’s own making.

Global history, by contrast, steps outside this internalist or genealogical framework. It pays particular attention to interactions and entanglements across borders. And it recognizes