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Liberating sex, knowing desire: scientia sexualis and epistemic turning points in the history of sexuality

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Abstract
This study considers the role of epistemic turning points in the historiography of sexuality. Disentangling the historical complexity of scientia sexualis, I argue that the late 19th century and the mid-20th century constitute two critical epistemic junctures in the genealogy of sexual liberation, as the notion of free love slowly gave way to the idea of sexual freedom in modern western society. I also explore the value of the Foucauldian approach for the study of the history of sexuality in non-western contexts. Drawing on examples from Republican China (1912–49), I propose that the Foucauldian insight concerning the emergence of a ‘homosexual identity’ in the West can serve as a useful guide for thinking about similar issues in the history of sexuality and the historical epistemology of sexology in modern East Asia.

Keywords
China, Michel Foucault, homosexuality, scientia sexualis, sexology, turning points

This article aims to achieve two modest goals. First, it aims to assess how historians of Europe and North America have periodized sex, gender and sexuality as conceptual rather than analytical categories. Second, it aims to inspire discussions about the value of such periodization for the increasingly popular endeavor to study the history of sexuality in a comparative/global context, especially by taking into consideration non-
western frames of analysis. My point of entry will be two classic contributions to the
historiography of sexuality: Thomas Laqueur’s *Making Sex* (1990) and the first volume
of Michel Foucault’s *The History of Sexuality* (1990[1976]). Given that scholars have
rarely put these two books in substantial conversations, my discussion begins by high-
lighting the contradictory nature in their conclusions about turning points in the history
of sexuality.

In *Making Sex*, Laqueur explores the shifting conceptualization of sex in western civi-
lization from the one-sex model, in which men and women were thought to be two ver-
sions of a single-sexed body, to the two-sex model, which treated men and women as
opposite counterparts. According to Laqueur, this dramatic switch took place during the
18th century. In the one-sex model, male and female differed in degrees based on a
single-sexed body and were not separated into two distinct kinds of species. Medical
experts showed that male and female reproductive anatomies highly resembled one
another, and they attributed the different versions of the single-sexed body to at least two
genders, men and women. After the Enlightenment ‘intervention’ in the 18th century,
however, people ceased to perceive the female organ as a lesser form of the male’s;
in the two-sex model, men and women no longer implied different variations of the
single-sexed body, but two distinct types of species that occupied different realms of
social life, performed unique social and cultural duties, and behaved with separate sets
of manners. Simply put, gender, as it was conceived after the Enlightenment, changed
from being the *definition* of sex to the *socialization* of sex.

In the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault is well known for pointing
out that the concept of homosexuality was first consolidated in the literature of sexual
science – what he calls *scientia sexualis* – in the second half of the 19th century. Through
scientific classification and the making of a sexual nosology, the term ‘homosexuality’
first appeared in 1869, and, for Foucault, it was precisely through the coinage of the con-
cept that individuals who experienced same-sex attraction or who engaged in same-sex
behavior came to constitute a distinct social group in the West. The ‘incorporation of
perversions’ and the ‘specification of individuals’, Foucault argues, denoted the central
aim of the collaborative effort between medical doctors and sexual scientists in the late
19th century (Foucault, 1990[1976]: 42–3). On a deeper epistemological level, the Fou-
cauldian *scientia sexualis* refers to that new regime of truth in the 19th century that
shifted the discursive technology of the sexual self from the domain of pastoral confes-
sion to the discourse of science and medicine.

So how do we reconcile the two different turning points in the history of sexuality –
one in the 18th century and the other in the late 19th – proposed by Laqueur and Foucault
respectively? Whereas *The History of Sexuality* has historicized *scientia sexualis*, in this
article I wish to go inside it, hoping to gain a better appreciation of the covert tensions
and complexities of its historical trajectory. In doing so, I emphasize the importance of
the Foucauldian epistemic turning point notably missing from the Laqueurian narrative.
Taking homosexuality as a concurrent focal point, I will first show that the excavation of
a new episteme of sexuality in the late 19th century has played a more significant role in
the modern genealogy of sexual liberation. One of the main themes that Laqueur’s study
fails to highlight is the emergence of a psychological style of reasoning about gender and
sexuality in the late 19th century.
I then turn to the ways in which the liberating impulse of sexual science rose in a crescendo around the mid-20th century. The Kinsey reports – the epitome of American sexology – fundamentally reoriented the way many mental health experts conceptualized sexual normality in the United States. Therefore, the tension between sexual medicine and sexual science was significantly altered when, for instance, the American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from its official list of mental disorders in 1973. The late 19th century and the middle of the 20th century thus constitute two critical epistemological junctures in the history of sexuality, as the notion of free love slowly gave way to the idea of sexual freedom in modern western society. This article concludes with a critical evaluation of the applicability of the Foucauldian approach to the study of the history of sexuality in non-western contexts. Drawing on examples from Republican China, I propose that the Foucauldian insight concerning the emergence of a ‘homosexual identity’ in the West can serve as a useful guide for thinking about similar issues in the history of sexuality and the historical epistemology of sexology in modern East Asia.

The First Turning Point: Liberating Sex beyond the Flesh

The concrete influence of medicine and science in the cultural normalization of the two-sex model first culminated in early sexological investigations of same-sex desire. Around the turn of the 20th century, European sex scientists produced an unprecedented scope of literature on the subject. Although the term ‘homosexuality’ had already been coined publicly by Karoly Maria Benkert (pseudonym Kertbeny) in 1869 in Germany, at its inception, the early sexological discourse more frequently referred to ‘sexual inversion’ for describing the same condition. Under the general rubric of ‘sexual inversion’, the politics of knowledge about homoeroticism and same-sex desire was richly layered and multifaceted.

Before the intervention of the sexologists, according to historians such as Carroll Smith-Rosenberg (1975), Anthony Rotundo (1992: 75–91) and Lillian Faderman (1981), romantic friendships between same-sex individuals flourished in Victorian society among middle-class women and men. Although the sexual nature of these intimate bonds can never be perfectly discerned, historians have generally reached the consensus that these relationships provided an opportunity in which same-sex love and desire could be expressed. In fact, these same-sex intimate ties were often viewed as compatible with heterosexual love and marriage, challenging the ‘repressed’ view of Victorian sexuality that was adopted as a kind of orthodoxy among an earlier generation of historians. According to Faderman (1978a, 1978b, 1981, 1991), the major contribution of the sexologists, such as Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Havelock Ellis and Sigmund Freud, was the morbidification of same-sex desire and the ending of same-sex romantic friendships.

Indeed, many medical sexologists at the time contended that homosexuality was a pathological condition. With the publication of his famous Psychopathia Sexualis in 1886, forensic psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing (1892[1886]) saw sexual inversion as a form of neurotic degeneracy, an urban disease that relegated humans to a lower evolutionary trait of sexual hermaphroditism away from the more ideal sexual dimorphism that characterized higher-level living species. Sigmund Freud (2000[1905]), though later distancing himself from sexology, offered contradictory views of homosexuality,
describing it as a problematic psychological outcome of inadequate early childhood experiences, while suggesting that everyone was born with a ‘polymorphously perverse disposition’. American psychoanalysts later appropriated a decidedly conservative interpretation of Freud, and, by the 1930s and 1940s, psychiatrists in general adopted various methods of ‘curing’ and treating homosexuality, including psychotherapy and other more invasive psychosomatic interventions such as electroshock or other forms of aversion therapy. In his influential work *The Sexual Question*, the Swiss neurologist August Forel discussed lesbianism in a way that resonated with his contemporaries: the ‘women inverts . . . satisfy their pathological appetite by degenerate practices’, and the ‘normal’ woman when ‘systematically seduced by an invert, may become madly in love with her and commit sexual excesses with her for years, becoming herself essentially pathological’ (Forel, 1935[1905]: 251, 253).

Other sexologists upheld the contrary view that same-sex eroticism was simply a benign human variation. Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, a German jurist without formal training in science or medicine, was the first to devise a scientific theory of homosexuality in 1864. His major contribution to sexology was the idea of the third sex, which gave rise to the notion of sexual inversion. In his view, ‘Urnings’, his term for homosexuals, constituted a third distinct group of human species that was neither fully male nor fully female (Ulrichs, 1994[1863–74]: 36). British romantic writer Edward Carpenter, the first president of the British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology, popularized Ulrichs’s view in his two widely read books, *Love’s Coming of Age* (1912[1896]) and *The Intermediate Sex* (912[1908]), by replacing ‘third sex’ with ‘intermediate sex’. Drawing on historical examples such as from ancient Greece, Carpenter even suggested that same-sex eroticism, as experienced by the intermediate sexes, was more desirable and respectable than heterosexual eroticism (1912[1908]: 20). The prominent English sexologist Havelock Ellis, in his encyclopedic *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, especially in his volume dedicated to the study of sexual inversion (Ellis, 1906[1901]), also shared the view that sexual inversion was a relatively harmless phenomenon. He collaborated closely with Carpenter, disagreed with the legal prosecution of homosexuals and believed that sexual inversion was a congenial predisposition. This naturalist interpretation of homosexuality was further elaborated in the works of the German physician Magnus Hirschfeld (1935, 1940, 2000[1914]), who organized the Scientific-Humanitarian Committee in 1897, continuing Ulrichs’s agenda of decriminalizing homosexual behavior in Germany, and later established the Institute for Sexual Science, the first of its kind, in 1919.9

The politics of knowledge about same-sex desire was multifaceted because writings on the subject were filtered through various constituencies that included: (1) prominent scientific and medical authorities like Krafft-Ebing, Freud and their followers who clinically pathologized the condition of sexual inversion; (2) their patients and other readers who expressed in letters disagreement and dissatisfactions with their theories (Oosterhuis, 2000); (3) some feminists of the time who problematized the sexologists’ link between female sexual inversion and the women’s rights movement (Bauer, 2009: 82–111); (4) self-identified homosexuals within the circle of expertise such as Ulrichs and Hirschfeld; and (5) influential ‘allies’ among the founders of sexology like Ellis who supported greater tolerance of homossexualty. Around the turn of the 20th
century, then, the sexologists’ intervention on the topic of same-sex desire did not remain a neat, collective discourse that unitarily pathologized homosexuality as many historians, including Faderman (1978a, 1978b, 1981, 1991) and Foucault (1990[1976]), have depicted it to be. Instead, it was a multi-layered discourse of interaction between medicine and science, full of contradictions and contestations among the experts themselves who theorized homosexuality with a range of intention from pathologization to normalization to glorification.

Above all, the turn-of-the-century sexological discourse achieved two major outcomes. The first outcome was the emergence of a psychological understanding of gender through which homosexuality was theorized as a specific manifestation of gender ‘inversion’ – or, to use the term the sexologists favored, ‘sexual inversion’. When discussing homosexuality in the context of sexual development, Krafft-Ebing, for instance, stressed the importance of a psychic dimension: ‘With the inception of anatomical and functional development of the generative organs, and the differentiation of form belonging to each sex . . . rudiments of a mental feeling corresponding with the sex are developed’ (Krafft-Ebing, 1892[1886]: 185–6). Similarly, the Berlin psychiatrist Albert Moll, the author of the first medical monograph devoted exclusively to the topic of sexual inversion, viewed male same-sex desire as the ‘feminine’ mentality of a person with normal male biological sex – ‘sexual sensations of a feminine nature among men whose genital organs are normally formed’ (Moll, 1931[1891]: 17). Other sexologists who promoted greater tolerance of homosexuality also portrayed homosexuals’ inner sense of self as merely an inverted sex. Ulrichs, for instance, wrote: ‘Nature developed the physical male germ in us, yet mentally, the feminine one’ (Ulrichs, 1994[1863–74]: 58). Even though they held diverging opinions about the clinical status of homosexuality, all of these early sexologists described people with same-sex desire as having a mentality of the opposite sex. Gender was no longer determined only through reference to anatomical biology, which Thomas Laqueur’s analysis tends to privilege: a psychological basis in congruence with an individual’s inner sense of self came to play a decisive role in the cultural definition of gender by the early 20th century.10

The second outcome was the reinforcement of the two-sex model in which the nature of sexual desire was expansively theorized by adhering to a binary oppositional system for both sex and gender. For those sexologists who pathologized homosexuality, normal sexuality was defined as the status of having a biological sex and a psychological gender that were aligned properly so that sexual desire would be channeled toward the opposite sex. In depicting homosexuals as individuals whose inner psychological sex (gender) was the opposite of their physical sex, even those sexologists who did not pathologize homosexuality constantly relied on the idea of two incommensurable sexes (the two-sex model). Without the two-sex conceptual framework, countless debates around the topic of people’s erotic drive toward members of the same or opposite sex would not have taken place both inside and outside the medical scientific community. As the 19th and the 20th centuries unfolded, these debates never came to an end, and people continued to understand their sexual tendencies along the axis of object choice between two distinct, opposite sexes. The idea of a psychological version of sex, first articulated in the early discourse of sexology, expanded the conceptual possibility for thinking about the relationship between sex and gender beyond the strict terms of biology versus culture.
With the rise of this psychological model of gender between 1880 and 1920, the conceptual space of sexual freedom emerged from two stages of historical development: first, the psychiatric implantation of sexual psychopathology around the 1880s and 1890s that gave sexuality for the first time in history both a psychological and a pathological character under the name of medicine; and second, the subsequent sexological enterprise around the 1900s and 1910s to deploy the existing vocabularies of perverse sexuality in a system of normalizing and liberalizing scholarly endeavors under the name of science (Chiang, 2008c). In the final two decades of the 19th century, hoping to gain a better understanding of sexual deviance specifically and diseases of the mind more generally, psychiatric experts shifted from an emphasis on bodily causes to psychogenic accounts; brain localizations of mental defects slowly lost their appeal and psychical considerations came to the fore. A popular, and perhaps somewhat valid, tendency is to attribute the root of this transition to Freud; however, it is worth noting that by turning their attention to sexual perversion, psychiatrists had also created a new platform of professional discourse that played a catalytic role in the transformation of their therapeutic emphasis, while sexuality was for the first time in history interpreted as psycho-pathological in nature. This new psychiatric discourse, originally intended for the medical surveillance, regulation and control of sexuality, offered a new ground for the emergence of the modern notion of sexual freedom.

By a modern notion of sexual freedom, I simply mean the ability to conceive of, articulate and enact a sense of sexual self-definition and self-agency without subsuming sexual desire under heterosexual obligations (such as marriage and procreation). In creating an unprecedented type of discourse about sexual perversion towards the end of the 19th century, psychiatrists entered a fresh realm of medical knowledge in which they claimed for themselves exclusive expertise. But if we take seriously Foucault’s contention that ‘where there is power, there is resistance’, this new technique of medical surveillance facilitated the possibility for later sexologists to appropriate the language of sexual perversion in a ‘reverse discourse’ that would then displace its initial pathological meanings by making new claims for its normalcy (Foucault, 1990[1976]: 95, 101).

In the 1900s and 1910s, ‘sexual inversion’, ‘homosexuality’, ‘sadism’, ‘masochism’ and ‘fetishism’ were concepts now to be studied intensively, extensively and not just medically but, more importantly, scientifically. A second wave of sex scientists, including Iwan Bloch, Havelock Ellis and Magnus Hirschfeld, represented a group of individuals in the opening decades of the 20th century who published monographs, edited disciplinary journals, founded learned societies and organized conferences, all devoted to the goal of establishing a comprehensive scientific discipline of human sexuality that incorporated a variety of research methodologies. In this process, they often advocated more liberal attitudes toward both the medical and legal aspects of sexual behavior, directly reflecting their conviction that social reform could be achieved through sexual science. Implicit in this transition from the mere ‘psychiatrization of sex’ to a more general ‘scientification of sex’, however, was a fundamental reconfiguration of the ‘conceptual space’ that ‘determines what statements can and cannot be made with the concepts’ of sex and sexuality (Davidson, 2001: 136). Or, to borrow Foucault’s insight, ‘what has changed is the silent configuration in which language finds support: the relation of situation and attitude to what is speaking and what is spoken about’ (Foucault,
1994[1963]: xi). Simply put, the psychiatric system of sexual knowledge that emerged in the latter part of the 19th century had completely transformed the possible terms under which people understood this aspect of themselves.

A crucial component of this psychiatric discourse was the categorization and pathologization of people’s erotic inclinations, which allowed for a possible conception of personhood rooted in the psychological condition of one’s sexual desire – a sense of sexual self. The homosexual now inhabited a sense of sexual self distinct from the fetishist based on the difference in their respective bodily involvements and mental characters of sexual pleasure; and the sadist now had a sense of sexual selfhood distinct from the masochist according to the same logic. Even though these different sexual personas may converge in a given individual, the point is that after the medical experts had created different sexual labels corresponding to specific types of erotic psychology, the ways that individuals appropriated, resisted and negotiated these labels would always function within an epistemological framework in which a complete separation of one’s sexual desire from one’s sense of self would no longer be tenable. Despite their tendency to pathologize deviant subjectivities, the early medical sexologists seem to have contributed to what Jennifer Terry calls ‘the conditions whereby marginal subjects apprehend possibilities for expression and self-representation’ (Terry, 1991: 56).

The effort of the second generation of sexual scientists, such as Ellis and Hirschfeld, did not reverse this process of epistemic change but significantly relied upon it. The kind of ‘liberating impulse’ captured in what they had accomplished both reflected and constructed the possibility for science – in addition to medicine, religion and law – to speak about sexuality, which was now no longer defined around a medical conception of psychic condition exclusively, no longer understood in terms of a cause or an effect of behavioral outcome, and most certainly no longer perceived as a behavioral morphology in and of itself: sexuality came to be conceived as the conjuncture of all of the above (Halperin, 2001). As a complex system of interaction between mental states and physiological expressions, and as a turn-of-the-20th-century product orchestrated through the exercise of the scientific power of sexology at the expense of exclusive psychiatric knowledge, sexuality was now something through which a sense of self-ownership, self-definition and self-determination could be articulated. Only within a new regime of sexual scientific knowledge, through a new sense of sexual self and under a new set of epistemic conditions, was it possible for an individual at the beginning of the 20th century to experience a distinctly modern notion of sexual freedom that both decoupled sexual desire from the institution of marriage and procreation and intrinsically linked it to new modes of political struggle.

I want to conclude this section by showing that the dissociation of sexual desire from heterosexual obligations represents an archeologically unique mode of conceptualization, without which the feminist position for legalizing birth control would not have consolidated in the opening decades of the 20th century. When New Women like Margaret Sanger fought for birth control in the early 20th century, they were also fighting for women’s right to demand sexual pleasure. But this latter aspiration, be it implicit or explicit, would not have been a possible candidate of feminist thinking prior to the psychiatric discourse of sexual pathology and the subsequent reworking of the psychiatric model by a second group of liberal sex reformers. Medical authorities like
Krafft-Ebing first psychiatrized sex to give it both a psychical and a pathological dimension, with the result being that women’s sexual interest appeared for the first time in history as a possible free-standing condition outside the heteronormative confinement of marriage practice. Sexual scientists such as Ellis then challenged the pathologizing model of sex in their campaign for sexual liberalism – which involved consensual limits, mutual love and affection, and even reciprocal sexual satisfaction, but not procreation (such as demonstrated in their tolerant attitude towards homosexuality). As such, when the second generation of sexologists appropriated and modified the pathologizing model of sexuality articulated by the first-wave psychiatrists, the epistemological consequences amounted to an entirely new system of discursive knowledge about the sexual self.

This new system of discursive knowledge about sexual selfhood emerged precisely at the juncture in time where historians of gender and sexuality have located a shift in women’s intimate experience. As mentioned earlier, prior to the 20th century, same-sex romantic friendships between middle-class women were surprisingly tolerated in American society. These intimate bonds between women existed within a larger social structure that encouraged women to enter the institution of heterosexual marriage. By the 1900s, however, the desire to form intimate bonds with persons of the same sex, sexually or not, became a focus of intense medical surveillance. In this ‘attack on “romantic friendship”’, to quote Faderman, ‘even romantic friendship that clearly had no sexual manifestations was now coming to be classified as homosexual. Medical writers began to comment on “numerous phases of inversion where men are passionately attached to men, and women to women, without the slightest desire for sexual intercourse”’ (Faderman, 1991: 49; original emphases). The first-wave psychiatrists and their followers, therefore, did not merely clinically pathologize same-sex intimate relationships; more importantly, they sexualized such interpersonal relations. This turning point in the history of female same-sex relationship resembled a larger cultural shift in the conceptualization of the nature of female intimate experience: such a reconceptualization secured the concurrent births of the New Woman and the modern lesbian, and the possibility of female sexual freedom.

The way many women had begun thinking about and experiencing a sense of self that demanded sexual enjoyment and its related political interests reveals the process of epistemic change – underscoring the shifting relations between systems of knowledge and forms of experience – that I have considered. This is why even though some historians have convincingly challenged Nancy Cott’s study of Victorian female ‘passionlessness’ (Cott, 1978) by showing that certain 19th-century female free lovers themselves had outwardly refuted such doctrine, the same historians often fail to offer a parallel interpretation of the fact that women in the 19th century, free lovers or not, lived in a historically specific social apparatus, in which the idea of sexual desire was exclusively framed in relation to the institution of marriage and female sexuality was exclusively understood in relation to maternal interest. My analysis, then, suggests that the period between 1880 and 1920 marked a substantive transformation in the historical-epistemological status of sexuality from 19th-century free love to 20th-century sexual freedom. To impose the modern concept of sexual freedom backward in time and apply it to historical contexts before the late 19th century is to exercise an ‘application of concepts, as though concepts have no temporality, that allows, and often requires, us to draw misleading
analogies and inferences that derive from a historically inappropriate and conceptually untenable perspective’ (Davidson, 2001: 41). It was not until the transition from the psychiatrization of sex to a more general scientification of sex around the turn of the 20th century that women, for instance, gradually adopt and participate in the making of a modern notion of sexual freedom that demarcated sexual desire from marriage and child-bearing. This new psycho-political sense of sexual self would remain central to the idea of sexual freedom throughout the rest of the 20th century.

The Second Turning Point: Knowing Desire in Terms of Normality

By the mid-20th century, two concurrent developments in sexual science fundamentally changed the way people thought about issues of gender and sexuality. First, ‘gender’ got defined officially as a separate concept from ‘sex’ by a medical psychologist at Johns Hopkins University, John Money. In an article published in 1955, Money used the phrase ‘gender role’ for ‘all those things that a person says or does to disclose himself or herself as having the status of boy or man, girl or woman’, and ‘gender’ to refer to ‘outlook, demeanor, and orientation’ (Money, 1955: 254, 258). In 1964, building on Money’s vocabulary, the psychoanalyst Robert Stoller, working with his colleague Ralph Greenson at the UCLA Medical School, coined the concept of ‘gender identity’ to indicate more directly one’s core sense of self as ‘being a member of a particular sex’ (Greenson, 1964: 217). If by ‘gender role’ Money referred to socially prescribed behavior patterns, Stoller and Greenson adopted the term ‘gender identity’ to identify another layer of gender that is strictly psychological. In fact, they further differentiated gender identity from ‘sexual identity’, which encompasses one’s sexual desire and erotic drive, and thus distinguished sexuality from gender accordingly (Stoller, 1964). Whereas both concepts were indistinguishable in the turn-of-the-century discourse of sexual inversion – the sexual invert had both an inverted gender identity and an abnormal sexual identity – the language of psychoanalysis now provided medical and scientific authorities, as well as the lay public, with sufficient working definitions for setting them apart.16

Another significant development in sexology around the mid-20th century was the publication of the two Kinsey reports on male and female sexual behavior.17 With respect to the discussion of homosexuality in particular, historians have generally depicted the American mental health profession prior to the mid-1960s as a monolithic field that pathologized homosexual behavior. Indeed, a majority of psychiatrists, particularly those who were psychoanalytically inclined, rigidly viewed homosexuality as a psychological disturbance that combined an inner masochistic tendency with a psycho-adaptational fear of the opposite sex.18 In 1952, when the American Psychiatric Association published its first official listing of mental disorders, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM I), homosexuality was officially classified as a psychopathology in the United States. As mental health professionals gained increasing cultural authority in the postwar era, they worked closely with legal and political officials to associate male homosexuality with the concept of ‘sexual psychopath’ and portrayed homosexuality with an image of ‘menace’ that threatened national security (Chiang, 2010b; D’Emilio, 1989; Freedman, 1989).
It was within this conservative socio-political context of cold war America that Alfred Kinsey and his collaborators published their *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (1948) and *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female* (1953). In both volumes, by providing statistical findings of the prevalence of homosexual behavior in American society, Kinsey explicitly challenged the mental health profession’s description of homosexuality as a psychological illness. Given the context, many historians have correctly documented that among the critics of Kinsey’s work, the most vociferous ones were the psychiatrists, especially those with a clinical orientation in psychoanalysis. In addition to the failure to take into consideration the unconscious and dynamic nature of sexual experience, psychiatrists and psychoanalysts dismissed Kinsey’s attempt to normalize homosexuality by arguing that statistical findings of the prevalence of a specific sexual behavior could not constitute sufficient grounds for establishing its normality. Based on their clinical experience, many psychotherapists insisted that homosexuality was neither normal nor desirable and could be cured even though it might be somewhat prevalent according to Kinsey’s findings.

More pertinent to my argument, however, is the disagreement on the most appropriate approach to conceptualizing sexual normality between Kinsey’s sociological method and psychiatric experts’ psychoanalytic perspective. In fact, historical evidence suggests that Kinsey’s notion of sexual normality defined around the measure of statistical occurrence had already begun to alter many mental health professionals’ view of homosexuality since the late 1940s. For example, at the 38th annual meeting of the American Psychopathological Association held in 1948, psychiatrist Dr David Levy remarked:

Kinsey’s findings are naturally disturbing to an analyst when he finds a discrepancy between his assumed norms and the supposedly true norms. True, the finding that a certain item of behavior is more frequent than you supposed does not mean that it is not a neurotic symptom in any particular individual. Nevertheless, the possibility that some of your subjectively social values may be illusory calls for a critical reevaluation. It may mean recasting a number of other ideas you have worked with on the basis that they are generally accepted social values. You begin to wonder about the particular segment of the population represented by yourself and your patients, out of which your world of social values, your clinical norms of values and behavior have been derived. It is a jolt, but it is also an important corrective of those ‘norms’ that may represent arbitrary and dogmatic standards. (Levy, 1949: 205)

This comment shows that Dr Levy found Kinsey’s findings and argument compelling, and, with that, he warned his medical colleagues about their own clinical definitions of (sexual) normality.

Judd Marmor, a psychiatrist at the University of California, Los Angeles, who played an instrumental role in the removal of homosexuality from the *DSM*, explicitly acknowledged Kinsey’s influence on his own evolving perception of homosexuality. ‘In the 1940s and early 1950s’, Marmor later recalled, ‘I was impressed by the publication of the Kinsey group’s historic studies of male and female sexuality which seemed to me to be praiseworthy efforts to study the problems of human sexuality more objectively and scientifically’ (Drescher and Merlino, 2007: 84). By 2003, Marmor would completely
endorse the famous Kinsey scale and describe human sexuality using the languages both of biochemistry and of sociological sexology. He explains that he preferred the phrase ‘sexual orientation’ over Freud’s ‘sexual object choice’, because

... we now know that to a great extent, variations in sexual orientation are determined by the degree of androgenization of the fetal midbrain at a critical period of intrauterine development. We now also know that approximately 5 percent of all males, in all societies and all cultures, have a variation in the degree of prenatal androgenization that results in more or less exclusive homosexuality. Another 15 percent, approximately, have lesser degrees of androgenization that put them as partial homosexuals, from 1 to 5 on the Kinsey scale, and that is why we find a greater number of people who have tendencies toward homosexuality. However, there are people who are 0 (totally heterosexual) and 6 (totally homosexual) on the Kinsey scale, depending on the degree of prenatal androgenization. (Drescher and Merlino, 2007: 87–8; original emphasis)

Historians have tended to interpret the historical significance of Kinsey’s statistics merely as a piece of scientific evidence, around which gay people could demand that the mental health profession recognize their sexuality as ‘normal’ while forging a collective identity and consolidating a political group consciousness (Bayer, 1981: 65). However, such a general understanding of the relationship between gay social actors, the Kinsey reports and the mental health profession’s changing view of homosexuality is incomplete when one realizes how some of the experts themselves, such as Levy and Marmor, had already begun to modify their clinical understanding of homosexuality by relying on Kinsey’s work.

Unfortunately, even this more nuanced historical perspective often pitches the ‘progressive’ psychiatrists (e.g. Marmor) against a ‘less scientific’ group of conservative psychoanalysts. For instance, the lesbian activist Barbara Gittings has recently remarked that the psychoanalytic pathologization of homosexuality ‘was uncritically accepted at the time. I’m not aware of a single review or comment in the contemporary psychiatric literature that pointed out that the Bieber authors failed to follow science’ (Drescher and Merlino, 2007: xvi). Even Marmor himself would similarly claim that the eventual de-pathologization of homosexuality was based on ‘scientific correctness’ (ibid.: 86). In following Foucault’s emphasis on epistemic shifts, I believe the juxtaposition of liberal-minded psychiatrists against conservative psychoanalysts on the ground of a single epistemic frame of ‘science’ is grossly insufficient. Historian John Forrester (1996) has convincingly argued that psychoanalysis differs from other branches of evidence-based medicine and human sciences because statistical evidence does not constitute the leading conceptual architecture of its mode of argumentation. Similarly, the normalizing arguments about homosexuality advocated by Kinsey’s research group were constructed within a statistical metric of normalcy that sharply contrasted with a clinical metric of normalcy that underpinned physicians’ long-standing practice of the case-studies methodology. So the progressive psychiatrists were not necessarily ‘more scientific’ than the psychoanalysts per se, but their conceptualization of sexual normality simply belonged to a different conceptual scheme with its own set of theoretical and methodological preoccupations that gradually challenged the old. With respect to psychiatrists’ evolving
view of homosexuality, what we witness over time is thus a historical shift in the norms of clinical ‘truth’ – from one that found the case-studies method sufficient for distinguishing the pathological from the normal to one that became increasingly grounded in the statistical notion of normalcy and socio-populational approaches.

Culminating in the American Psychiatric Association’s 1973 decision to remove homosexuality from its list of mental disorders, the politics of knowledge surrounding the clinical status of homosexuality thus adds the mid-20th century as a second critical epistemic turning point to the history of sexuality. Under the political force and the increasing visibility of second-wave feminists and other gay and lesbian activists, the 1970s witnessed the immediate popularization of the idea of sexual freedom. But, as I hope to have demonstrated thus far, its epistemological basis and arrangements have existed within a historical structure and context that goes much further back than the 1970s. Looking at the various genealogical forces behind the shifting modalities of sexual liberation – from 19th-century ‘free love’ to 20th-century ‘sexual freedom’, and even to what some queer theorists have identified as the emergence of ‘queer liberalism’ at the beginning of the 21st century – we can see how the articulation of human knowledge constantly shapes and is shaped by varying forms of human experience.22 Similarly, the recognition of the expression of desire is fundamentally conditioned by the existing available knowledge paradigms and their epistemic vocabularies. This is why acknowledging the rise of a modern sexual episteme during the late 19th century that Foucault stresses in The History of Sexuality is so important: ever since scientia sexualis made sexuality an essential project of modern science and medicine, the reciprocal interaction between sexual knowledge and sexual experience has gradually liberated sex beyond the flesh, an ensuing legacy of the psychologization (in both its cultural and especially its scientific dimensions) of the erotic that continues today.

**Toward a Foucauldian History of Sexuality beyond the West: the View from China**

Thus far, my analysis has focused on the relevance of Foucault’s approach to the study of the history of sexuality in the West, especially in the western European and North American contexts. For if we take homosexuality and sexual liberation as concurrent prisms of historical analysis, we see that the modern epistemic foundations of gender and sexuality are rooted in an order of knowledge that emerged in the second half of the 19th century and continue to define our conceptual space. Within this knowledge structure, science maintains an authoritative role in determining the kinds of statements – such as claims of truth or falsehood – that could or could not be made about gender and sexuality; that is, the discursive apparatus of our epistemological preoccupations.

At the same time, as I hope to have demonstrated, this notion of medical surveillance and governmentality highlighted in Foucault’s work also helps illuminate the inherent subversive effect of medico-scientific discourses, in that the articulation of any psychopathological descriptions of sexuality simultaneously generated room for potential knowledge-claims that would modify these initial descriptions through the ‘liberating’ effect of science. My historicization of the notion of sexual freedom shows that between 1880 and 1920 sex got ‘liberated’, so to speak, through the sexologists’ effort in
transforming the discipline of sexual science by replacing an exclusively medical tradition with a more inclusive scholarly endeavor under the broad banner of ‘scientific’. As another example, the medico-pathological paradigm of homosexuality in the United States gradually lost its persuasion as mental health experts, under the influence of Kinsey’s studies, became increasingly aware of how problematic the notion of sexual normality was for the clinical practice of psychoanalysis.

But is the usefulness of the Foucauldian approach to the historical study of sexuality restricted to the western context? Here, I would like to suggest that Foucault’s understanding of power and knowledge, and their relation to discourse in the historical analysis of sexuality, is as useful when applied to non-western contexts as it is to the western context. Let me conclude by returning to one of the most contentious tasks that has pre-occupied historians of western sexuality for decades, arguably even to this date – situating the emergence of a homosexual identity in its proper historical and technical context. But this time, let us put aside the historiographical debate as frequently framed around the West, and reflect on the global dynamics of sexual knowledge by shifting our focus to China.

Previous studies have tended to stress the eugenics agenda behind the transmission of western sexology into China during the Republican period (1912–49). This interpretation had led a number of scholars to conclude that the emergence of the concept of tongxing lian’ai (‘same-sex love/desire’) immediately after the fall of empire did not produce the same kind of social effect that Foucauldians have identified for the history of sexuality in the western world. In his groundbreaking but brief overview of sex and medical science in early Republican China, Frank Dikötter (1995) argues:

Where a multiplication of ‘sexualities’ occurred in European sexology, particularly in the work of Freud and his followers, modernizing élites in China on the contrary reduced all sexual practices to the expression of one ‘natural’ desire for heterogenitality. Instead of attributing social prejudice and official hostility towards homosexuals in twentieth-century China to an ‘importation of Western intolerance’ – a simplistic and naïve interpretation put forward by Bret Hinsch – the strong conceptual link between sex and reproduction was precisely what impeded the recognition that ‘homosexuality’ was more than a nonproductive act. (Dikötter, 1995: 145)

For Dikötter, it was precisely because Chinese modernizing élites could never dissociate sex from procreation that ‘most of the literature in Republican China remained entirely independent from the sexological inquiries into “perversions” which became widespread in European medical circles’, and homosexuality ‘was represented as a socially acquired vice which discipline should overcome for the sake of the self, the married couple and the nation’ (Dikötter, 1995: 143, 141).

In her more nuanced study of the changing social meaning and cultural significance of female same-sex relations in modern China, Tze-Ian D. Sang criticizes Dikötter for ‘overlook[ing] the intellectual debate over same-sex relations that occurred during the May Fourth era (1915–27)’ (Sang, 2003: 99–100). But in some ways, Sang’s analysis of Chinese intellectuals’ translation of western sexological texts seems to support Dikötter’s claim that no similar tendency to ‘individualize’ homosexuality took place.
in Republican China. In the context of the May Fourth era, ‘tongxing ai [‘same-sex love’]’, writes Sang, ‘is primarily signified as a modality of love or an intersubjective rapport rather than as a category of personhood, that is, an identity’ (ibid.: 118). This effect, according to Sang, exemplifies a powerful system ‘deploying sexuality . . . as social control in modernizing China’ (ibid.: 7).

Most recently, in his refreshing study of Chinese male same-sex relations in the first half of the 20th century, Wenqing Kang (2009) draws a similar conclusion:

Chinese intellectuals, influenced by social Darwinist evolutionary thinking, were concerned with the possibility of Chinese people becoming extinct. They introduced western sexological understandings of male same-sex relations in order to reform society and strengthen the nation. Whereas in the West, sexological knowledge pathologized homosexuality as socially deviant, thus reducing it to an individual psychological problem, in China sexology as a form of modern knowledge was used more to diagnose social and national problems. No medical institution was founded to treat homosexuals during this period, and sexological knowledge remained in the domain of public opinion and scholarly investigation. As Chinese writers and thinkers introduced Western sexology to China, male same-sex relations were stigmatized more as a disruptive social deviance than a personal medical condition. (Kang, 2009: 42–3)

Through the eugenics lens, Dikötter, Sang and Kang all agree that the introduction of sexological knowledge to Republican China did not result in a medicalized and individualized notion of ‘homosexual identity’, which many historians have described as the increasingly dominant paradigm for conceptualizing same-sex desire across Europe and North America since the late 19th century. Instead, for Dikötter, Sang and Kang, homosexuality in early 20th-century China was conceived more in terms of a social problem, one that modernizing elites thought could be ‘fixed’ with the technology of eugenics. But I think we would get a picture that is rather different, if not more interesting, by going beyond the eugenics perspective (a perspective that most of the secondary literature has adopted by giving the famous Chinese eugenicist Pan Guangdan the spotlight of analysis).24 Positioning ways of knowing instead of processes of nation-state making as the most immediate historiographic backdrop, we could better appreciate the epistemic foundations of non-western sexuality by actually going inside and probing the heterogeneity of scientia sexualis in 20th-century China.

Indeed, I would disagree with Dikötter’s, Sang’s and Kang’s interpretation of the social consequences of the appropriation of sexological knowledge in Republican China. Iconoclastic Republican intellectuals, including not only Pan but also China’s own ‘Dr Sex’, Zhang Jingsheng, the writer Lu Xun’s youngest brother, Zhou Jianren, and the embryologist who was later appointed as the director of the Experimental Biological Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Zhu Xi, all advocated and promoted the scientific study of sexuality in China like never before.25 In the process of building and legitimating a scientific discourse of sex, these public intellectuals, almost all of whom earned their advanced degrees abroad (in Europe, North America, or Japan), adopted different ways of explaining human sexuality that originated from western science and medicine, such as biology, psychoanalysis and endocrinology. Many readers, most of whom presumably resided in
urban areas where the writings of these May Fourth thinkers were most readily accessible, wrote to them, argued with them in public forums, provided them with valuable information on personal sexual experience and supported/criticized their effort in establishing sex education on a more ‘scientific’ ground.

This historical trend is evident not only in the enormous quantity of articles on issues of sexuality found in prominent Republican journals, such as the *Eastern Quarterly* and *New Woman*, but also in the establishment and circulation of specific periodicals dedicated to the topic such as *Sex Science* and *Sex Magazine* in the 1930s. These publications enjoyed such popularity among the Chinese educated populace at the time because they provided an open intellectual venue for debating issues of social change in a rapidly evolving political climate. Even though many of the articles published in *Sex Science* were translations of foreign texts, the mere existence of the journal reflects the seriousness of those Republican Chinese researchers who tried to organize and consolidate a discipline of sexual science.

In fact, the editors of *Sex Science* even devoted special issues to particular themes such as ‘sex endocrinology’, ‘homosexual love’, or ‘sex techniques’ (*Xing kexue*, 1936a, 1936b, 1937). In the special issue on ‘homosexual love’, questions concerning whether homosexuality could be acquired from, cured by, prevented by, or arise from intimate relations with same-sex classmates were all discussed in remarkable detail (Jian, 1936; Kong, 1936; Mo, 1936; Ping, 1936). The editors even included an article that featured an extended discussion of female homosexuality (Hong, 1936). Therefore, far from being confined to pure intellectual debates about broader social and national problems, as suggested by Sang and Kang, homosexuality in Republican China was in and of itself treated as a serious topic of empirical investigation by those who claimed for themselves expertise in the scientific study of sexuality. Dikötter’s interpretation of how Chinese medical experts failed to grasp the western idea of homosexuality is apparently also inadequate. Most importantly, commentators repeatedly used the label *tongxing aizhe* (‘persons of same-sex love’) for both men and women, and some even associated these individuals with neuropathic disorders. Like its western counterparts such as the *Journal of Sexual Science* in Germany and *Sexology* in the United States, *Sex Science* functioned as a textual archive reinforcing the specialized authority of sexology across culture. In a word, the discourse of *scientia sexualis* in early 20th-century China bears striking similarities to that of late 19th-century Europe.

Perhaps the best way to illustrate the historical significance of the rise of an East Asian *scientia sexualis* is to identify the changing styles of argumentation about same-sex desire that it facilitated in China. The prevalence of homoeroticism in late imperial China has been a topic of intense scholarly discussion and debate (Hinsch, 1990; Vitiello, 2000; Volpp, 2001; Xiaomingxiong, 1984). But when we turn to the actual historical record, we are confronted with two opposed epistemological characterizations of same-sex desire in China’s transition from an empire to a nation: from what I call the culturalistic style of argumentation to a nationalistic style of argumentation (Chiang, 2009a). In the essayist Zhang Dai’s reflections on the relationship between his friend Qi Zhixiang and a boy named Abao, written in the 17th century, we see that same-sex desire was described as a symbol of cultural refinement:
If someone does not have an obsession, they cannot make a good companion for they have no deep passions; if a person does not show some flaw, they also cannot make a good companion since they have no genuine spirit. My friend Qi Zhixiang has obsessions with calligraphy and painting, football, drums and cymbals, ghost plays, and opera. In 1642, when I arrived in the southern capital, Zhixiang brought Abao out to show me. . . . Zhixiang was a master of music and prosody, fastidious in his composition of melodies and lyrics, and personally instructing [his boy-actors] phrase by phrase. Those of Abao’s ilk were able to realize what he had in mind. . . . In the year of 1646, he followed the imperial guards to camp at Taizhou. A lawless rabble plundered the camp, and Zhixiang lost all his valuables. Abao charmed his master by singing on the road. After they returned, within half a month, Qi again took a journey with Abao. Leaving his wife and children was for Zhixiang as easy as removing a shoe, but a young brat was as dear to him as his own life. This sums up his obsession. (Zhang, 1982: 35–6)

This passage also sums up what a man’s interest in young males meant in the late imperial context remarkably well: it was perceived as just one of the many different types of ‘obsessions’ that a male literatus could have – a sign of his cultural elitism. For Zhang, a man’s taste in male lovers was as important as his ‘obsessions’ in other arenas of life, without which this person ‘cannot make a good companion’.

Replacing this culturalistic style of argumentation is the nationalistic style of argumentation that gained epistemological grounding only in the 20th century. As Matthew Sommer’s work on Chinese legal history has shown, sodomy appeared in formal legislation in China only by the late imperial period. This Qing innovation, according to Sommer (2000), fundamentally reoriented the organizing principle for the regulation of sexuality in China: a universal order of ‘appropriate’ gender roles and attributes was granted some foundational value over the previous status-oriented paradigm, in which different status groups were expected to hold unique standards of familial and sexual morality. But whether or not someone who engaged in same-sex behavior was criminalized due to his disruption of a social order organized around status or gender performance, the world of imperial China never viewed the experience of homosexuality as a separate problem. The question was never homosexuality per se, but whether one’s sexual behavior would potentially reverse the dominant script of social order. If we want to isolate the problem of homosexuality in China, we must jump to the first half of the 20th century to find it (Chiang, 2010a).

Here is where we can broaden our appreciation of the effort among certain Chinese modernizing intellectuals to build a western-derived science of sexuality starting in the early 20th century. When they explained same-sex desire by making the writings of European sexologists such as Havelock Ellis familiar to a popular audience, what they brought to comprehensibility was not merely the category of ‘homosexuality’ itself, but a whole new style of reasoning descending from western psychiatric thought about sexual perversion and psychopathology. This psychiatric style of reasoning ‘transferred’ from the West was, in turn, transformed into a nationalistic style of argumentation in the politically volatile context of Chinese national modernity: such as when the dan actors of Peking opera and other cultural expressions of homoeroticism (e.g. male prostitution) came to be regarded as signs of national backwardness even among the Chinese themselves.
especially by the late Qing and the early Republic (Kang, 2009; Wu and Stevenson, 2006). Put differently, a distinct problem in modern Chinese historiography has been the question of why, starting in the Republican period, Chinese modernizers began to view previous cultural expressions of same-sex eroticism as domestic indicators of mental deficiency. And what I am suggesting here is that, much like how the gradual acceptance of an intrinsically pathological view of China helped the reception of western-style anatomy in 19th-century medicine (Heinrich, 2008), the epistemic alignment of pre-nationalistic homoeroticism with the foreign notion of homosexuality precisely undergirded the appropriation of a science of western sexology in 20th-century China.

To assess the transformation in the epistemology of same-sex desire in China from an internal historical perspective, then, we can begin to reconstruct some of the polarized concepts that constitute two opposed styles of argumentation. We are presented, for instance, with the polarities between literati taste and sick perversion, refined obsession and pathological behavior, cultural superiority and psychological abnormality, markers of elite status and signs of national backwardness. The first of each of these pairs of concepts partially makes up what I call the culturalistic style of argumentation about same-sex desire, while the second of each of these pairs helps to constitute the nationalistic style of argumentation. These polarities therefore characterize two distinct conceptual modes of representation, two contrasting conceptual spaces, two different kinds of deep epistemological structure.

Such a critical analysis on the register of historical epistemology enables us to reassess the broader significance of the new regime of truth conditioned by the rise of a *scientia sexualis* in China. Whereas Dennis Altman (2001: ch. 6), Lisa Rofel (2007: ch. 3) and Judith Farquhar (2002: ch. 5) have respectively claimed that ‘gay identity’ and *scientia sexualis* first appeared on the China scene only by the post-socialist era, my historicization suggests that the emergence of both can be traced to an earlier epistemic turning point – in the Republican period.27 And according to Gregory Pflugfelder’s classic study of the history of Japanese male same-sex sexuality (2000), the first half of the 20th century was characterized by what he calls the ‘medico-scientific’ or ‘sexological’ paradigm of male–male sexuality, which replaced the ‘disciplinary’ paradigm of the Edo period (1600–1868) and the ‘civilized’ paradigm of the Meiji period (1868–1912). In terms of periodization, then, my insistence on paying greater attention to the historical-epistemological dimensions of *scientia sexualis* in Republican China complements Pflugfelder’s study rather well.

Yet, precisely because a thorough discussion of the timing of the emergence of a modern homosexual identity in Japan is distinctively absent from Pflugfelder’s analysis, I am compelled here to make and provisionally defend an even bolder claim: that what had already happened in the western world before the dawn of the 20th century – namely, the emergence of a homosexual identity through a ‘reverse discourse’ of medical sexology – took on a particular significance in the East Asian context only a few decades later. Though it is possible to suggest that a more nuanced approach would account for Chinese local formations of same-sex affect that cannot be overridden by the western-derived paradigm of homosexuality, it is equally important to acknowledge that this same approach risks essentializing Chineseness by assuming that the genealogical status of those local formations is somehow hermeneutically sealed from the historical apparatus
of westernization. Now that studies in the history of non-western sexualities have begun to mature (e.g. Kang, 2009; Ko, 2005; Najmabadi, 2005; Sang, 2003; Ze’evi, 2006), historians should be even more cautious of any attempt to view broader historical processes of epistemic homogenization as less important than forms of local (oriental) resistance. The two parallel epistemic turning points – one around the late 19th century for the European context and another around the early 20th century for the East Asian context – that this article highlights should at least be a valuable point of departure for thinking about the comparative histories of sexuality and the global life of its epistemic circulation.

Notes

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1. The literature on Victorian intimate friendships is extensive. Smith-Rosenberg’s seminal essay is inspired by Taylor and Lasch (1963). On same-sex romantic friendship, see also Benemann (2006); Bray (2003); Crain (2001); Katz (2001); Marcus (2007); Nissen (2003); O’Donnell and O’Rourke (2003); Traub (2002: 276–325); and Vicinus (2004).

2. The major earlier historians who challenged the ‘repressed’ view of Victorian sexuality include Degler (1980); Gay (1984); and Rothman (1984). See also D’Emilio and Freedman (1988); Lystra (1989). Two notable reconsiderations of Victorian sexuality are Siedman (1990) and Stearns and Stearns (1985). For more on Victorian sexuality, see Cott (1978); Faderman (1981); Horowitz (2002); Jensen (1986); Osterud (1991); J. Reed (1978); Rotundo (1992); and Smith-Rosenberg (1975).

3. For a critique of this view, see Chauncey (1989).

4. It is interesting to note that one year before his death, Krafft-Ebing wrote an article in which he reversed his lifelong defense of the degenerate nature of homosexuality, and acknowledged the possibility that homosexuality may not necessarily be a mental pathology. The most careful analysis of Krafft-Ebing’s influence on and contribution to the modern notion of sexual identity is Oosterhuis (2000).

5. For the argument that Freud himself actually viewed homosexuality with a much less pathologizing perspective than his American contemporaries and followers, see Abelove (1993). See also Davidson (2001: 66–92).


8. The first English edition of Sexual Inversion was published in 1897, the second in 1901 as part of the Studies. The manuscript was translated into German by Hans Kurella and published in Leipzig in 1896 with J. A. Symonds’s name included as the co-author: see Ellis and Symonds (1896).

9. The secondary literature on the turn-of-the-20\textsuperscript{th}-century sexologists is too vast to cite exhaustively here. For a fair overview of the sexologists’ views of homosexuality, in addition to the
works of Faderman, see Angelides (2001); Chauncey (1989); Chiang (2008d); Duggan (2000); Meyerowitz (2002); Rosario (1997, 2002); Somerville (1994); Terry (1999: esp. ch. 2); and Weeks (1981).

10. On this point, see also Mak (2005, 2006).

11. See also M. T. Reed (2001).

12. I use ‘archeology’ in the way Foucault (1972[1969]: esp. ch. 5) uses the term, the object of which I take to be discursive formations or knowledge (savoir). See also Davidson (2001: ch. 8).

13. Members of the early 20th-century birth control movement emphasized that they were advocating ‘birth control’ (or ‘contraception’) and not necessarily ‘abortion’. The existing body of literature on the history of birth control is extensive. I have primarily referenced Brodie (1994); Degler (1980); Gordon (1990[1976], 1992[1986]); Mohr (1978); J. Reed (1978); and Tone (2001). I am aware that my following discussion is mainly concerned with middle-class women as opposed to working-class women, whose history of sexual episteme, of course, deserves explication in its own right.

14. This statement supports Carroll Smith-Rosenberg’s claim that ‘To the later generations of New Women the new sexual vocabulary offered by Havelock Ellis and other liberal male sex reformers appeared as congenial – at times more congenial than the rallying cries of the older political feminists’ (1985: 284). On the relationship between the New Woman and sexuality, see also Bauer (2009); Hall (2000); Newton (1984).

15. Using Victoria Woodhull as an example, Ellen DuBois directly challenges Cott’s interpretation: ‘As for female sexuality per se, Woodhull . . . believed in the existence, desirability and healthfulness of sexual passion, in women as well as men. She wholeheartedly refuted the doctrine of passionlessness, which she called “that unnatural lie,” by this time an idea that challenged male sexuality as well as female’ (n.d.). On free love, see also Passet (2003); Sears (1977); and Stoehr (1979). Jesse F. Battan’s work on 19th-century free love focuses on the importance and power of language (1992, 2004).

16. As historian Joanne Meyerowitz has shown, American feminists and other political activists later appropriated the concept of gender from the scientific literature, and thereby reworked its disciplinary potential initially shaped by the medical lexicon in the new political climate of the 1960s and beyond (Meyerowitz, 2008: 1354–5).

17. The remainder of this section draws on the argument more fully elaborated in Chiang (2008a).

18. See, for example, Bergler (1956); Bieber (1965); Bieber et al. (1962); Caprio (1954); Socarides (1960); and Wilbur (1965). According to historian Nicholas Edsall, ‘such views not only went largely unchallenged for nearly two decades – at least among analysts – but hardened over time’ (Edsall, 2003: 245). Similarly, Kenneth Lewes observes that ‘Kinsey’s effect on this [psychoanalytic] discourse [of homosexuality] was minimal’ (Lewes, 1988: 140).

19. On the background to the Kinsey studies, see Pomeroy (1972). For secondary analyses that situate Kinsey’s work in the larger historical context of sex research in the United States, see, for example, Bullough (1990, 1994: chs 6 and 7); Chiang (2008a); Irvine (2005[1990]: ch. 1); Krich (1966); Minton (2002: ch. 7); Morantz (1977); Rosario (2002: chs 4 and 5); Terry (1999: ch. 9). For a brief historical analysis of the reciprocal influence between scientific research on homosexuality and homosexual subjectivity, see Terry (1997).

21. For the psychiatrists’ and psychoanalysts’ criticisms of Kinsey’s work, see, for example, Bergler (1948); Bergler and Kroger (1954); Brill (1954); Bychowski (1949); Lanval (1953). Specifically, for criticisms of the Kinsey reports that focused on the ‘emotional aspect’ of sex, see, for example, Mead (2001[1949]); and Kegel (1953). For related critical evaluations of the Kinsey reports, see Geddes (1954); Geddes and Curie (1948). For a secondary account of the psychoanalysts’ attack on Kinsey, see Terry (1999: ch. 9). See Morantz (1977) for a cogent analysis of the criticisms that focused on the issue of female sexuality.


23. For a more in-depth discussion of how this argument is relevant for the global historiography of sexuality, see Chiang (2009b).

24. Pan (1899–1967) is well known for his annotated translation of Havelock Ellis’s Psychology of Sex: A Manual for Students. Between 1922 and 1926, Pan earned his bachelor’s and master’s degrees in biology from Dartmouth and Columbia respectively. His educational experience in New York coincided with the peak of the American eugenics movement, the center of which was located in the upper-class resort area of Cold Spring Harbor on Long Island, where Charles Davenport had opened the Station for Experimental Evolution in 1903 with funds from the Carnegie Institute. After returning to China, Pan became an important political figure who made ‘eugenics’ a household term. See Dikötter (1989).


26. For a discussion of the transition from ‘culturalism’ to ‘nationalism’ in terms of a political transformation in modern China, see Levenson (1965).

27. For more on the significance of the Republican period for the history of sexuality in China and global queer theoretical critique, see Chiang (2008b), which challenges some of the assumptions in Rofel (2007).


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