LEADERS AND REBELS:
JOHN WRAWE’S ROLE IN THE SUFFOLK RISING OF 1381

by JOE CHICK

ON 12 JUNE 1381 a group of rebels assembled in Liston, an Essex village close to the county’s border with Suffolk. Crossing the border, they travelled to Cavendish and Melford Green, helping themselves to goods, before proceeding to the monastic town of Bury St Edmunds. In the following days these rebels, along with many Bury townsmen, engaged in acts of rebellion in the town and the surrounding area. On 14 June, money was extorted from the townsmen of Thetford and Sir John Cavendish, chief justice of the King’s Bench, was murdered in Lakenheath. On 15 June, two abbey officials were murdered and the heads of rebel victims were paraded in the town. On 16 June, the Bury rebels demanded a new town charter and a new abbot. It was not until 23 June that William de Ufford, earl of Suffolk, arrived to suppress the rebellion. He headed a group of royal justices who heard indictments against rebels into late July. All the recorded cases resulted in a sentence of ‘beheaded’ [decollatus].

To those who have studied the 1381 rising, often called the Peasants’ Revolt, these events will be recognisable as the ‘story’ of what happened in Suffolk. The involvement in these actions of John Wrawe, a chaplain from Sudbury, would be equally familiar. This understanding has largely been formed by the 1896 work of Edgar Powell, the first history of the rising in East Anglia specifically. According to Powell, the rising in East Anglia was the ‘result of a comprehensive plan’ in which Wrawe received orders from Wat Tyler in person. The Sudbury chaplain himself is presented as a powerful figure, who used subordinates to control events not only in Suffolk but also in three locations in Norfolk (Yarmouth, East Dereham and Wickmere) and one in Cambridgeshire (Ely).

The idea that rebellion across the country was centrally organised has been widely challenged. Rodney Hilton accepts the existence of a county framework, but suggests that the revolt began in village communities and that a degree of coordination emerged through local political structures being used to organise broader bands of rebels. R.B. Dobson criticises the centralised model further by describing the East Anglian rising as ‘highly local in character’. Despite this, the depiction of Wrawe as a regional leader has endured. Charles Oman writes of Wrawe’s authority in western and northern Suffolk. Hilton describes subordinate figures across Suffolk operating under Wrawe’s leadership. John Ridgard adopts the grand term ‘The Great Society’ for Wrawe’s company, taken from the indictments against the rebels. Herbert Eiden, writing in 2008, continues to describe Wrawe as the ‘principal leader’ and describes his coordination of events across the county. Christopher Dyer hinted at an alternative model in a 1988 article by referring to several leading rebels in Suffolk, but did not expand on this point. Having Wrawe as a regional leader is a useful narrative tool for many historians and, for Hilton, his leadership provides a degree of cohesion that supports the depiction of 1381 as a class conflict.

Two recent articles raise some questions over Wrawe’s prominence. Miriam Müller’s study of a rebel group which met in Brandon, on the Suffolk–Norfolk border, reveals prominent rebel leaders who, unlike Wrawe, go unmentioned in the chronicles. In a recent article examining the Bury St Edmunds rising in 1381, I argue that the town’s rising was characterised by local grievances and organised through the leadership of prominent Bury townsmen. These two articles only challenge Wrawe’s prominence indirectly. Müller’s article gives an insight into the
composition and organisation of the Brandon rebel group but does not go into the question of how the group fitted into a wider leadership model. Equally, my article on Bury, rather than challenging Wrawe’s leadership of the whole county, leaves the possibility that the town’s rising was separate from that of Suffolk generally. Indeed, Hilton presents the urban revolts of 1381 as, to some extent, separate from the wider revolt, being instead opportunistic attempts to pursue local agendas.  

This article will examine the leadership of the Suffolk rising directly. Following a summary of the sources, it will explore a number of questions regarding the Suffolk rising. Firstly, it will outline Wrawe’s background in comparison with other rebel leaders. Secondly, it will explore the actions of Wrawe’s company and assess the nature of his leadership in executing them. Thirdly, it will investigate his relationship with the rebels elsewhere in Suffolk. It will question whether he controlled subordinates, as Powell suggests, and it will assess the extent of Wrawe’s sphere of influence. Fourthly, it will look at separate rebel groups and consider how they organised themselves and the extent of their independence from Wrawe. Fifthly, it will look into the way in which rebel groups interacted with one another. Sixthly, it will discuss the aims of the rebel groups and consider whether they were localised or part of a wider agenda. Seventhly, and finally, the article explores the judicial proceedings following the rebellion, in particular the importance of a rebel’s social status and the differences in the fate of rebels from the towns and the country. Throughout, comparisons will be made with local studies of the rising elsewhere in England to consider Suffolk’s place in the wider rebellion.

SOURCES

The secondary literature for Suffolk tends to rely heavily on the *Chronica Maiora* by the St Albans monk Thomas Walsingham. Powell’s influential work claims to use legal records as its main source. In reality, its narrative for Suffolk closely follows that of Walsingham, with other sources being used to fill gaps in Walsingham’s version rather than to contest it. Although he gives an exceptional level of detail of its rebellion, Walsingham had no personal connection with the county. He most likely gained his information from a contact at the abbey of St Edmund in Bury. A lack of first-hand knowledge is implied by his inaccuracies, attributing an incorrect start date to the rising, an incorrect location to the murder of Cavendish and describing a meeting between Tyler and Wrawe which could not possibly have happened. Another detailed account of the events in Bury and Mildenhall is the record of the Bury almoner John Gosford, who was most likely an eyewitness of at least some events. It portrays the rising very differently from Walsingham’s chronicle, describing the actions of rebel groups rather than of leaders. Gosford’s account has been underused in comparison to Walsingham’s, perhaps for the very reason that it lacks a colourful leader character, but this article will draw on the ideas of both accounts.

Another source is the testimony of John Wrawe, in which he gave evidence against other individuals to the King’s Bench in May 1382. Due to Wrawe’s efforts to avoid execution, historians have tended to have been dismissive of his testimony. His attitude is certainly very different from that of John Ball, who confessed to all the charges put to him and was executed soon after the revolt. The difference in attitude reflects Wrawe’s less idealistic form of leadership, a theme which will emerge across this article. Dobson describes Wrawe’s testimony as ‘somewhat suspect’ and Prescott says that ‘some of Wraw’s [sic] allegations… are doubtful’. Due to these reservations, his testimony tends to be used only to add details regarding the movements of his company. Dobson and Prescott’s reservations, however, are ones which historians should have for all written sources. In using Walsingham, it must be remembered that he was a monk writing about a rebellious chaplain during an era of religious radicalism.
and that the church itself was criticised by the rebels.\textsuperscript{21} Other rebels on trial, it will be argued, sought to use Wrawe as a scapegoat. Furthermore, Wrawe’s testimony, like other legal documents, does not give the verbatim words of the accused. The summary of the case was written by a royal clerk who had little reason to be sympathetic, so at least two voices are expressed in the account.

In both Walsingham’s chronicle and Wrawe’s testimony, the involvement of the Sudbury chaplain, or lack of, is the central focus. This article will contrast these with a source in which Wrawe is not the central focus: the indictments of the Suffolk commission. After the revolt, commissions were sent out to each county to restore peace and to hear the cases against the rebels, headed in Suffolk by William de Ufford, earl of Suffolk.\textsuperscript{22} Andrew Prescott’s PhD thesis analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the indictment evidence in detail.\textsuperscript{23} In western Suffolk they have never been treated as a major source due to one major weakness: the records have been lost.\textsuperscript{24} Due to their relevance to other cases being heard by the royal justices, however, six indictments were recorded in the King’s Bench rolls.\textsuperscript{25} Despite the small sample, a detailed examination tells us much more about the Suffolk rising than the existing literature has assumed. They are far from a random sample of indictments and the implications of this will be discussed in this article.

WHO WAS JOHN WRAWE?

In the 1381 rising, a number of members of the clergy played a leading role.\textsuperscript{26} The most famous of these was John Ball, a priest who mobilised rebels with his radical ideology. Already notorious for years of radical preaching, he contributed to the 1381 revolt through distributing letters across a wide geographical area and delivering a sermon on Blackheath.\textsuperscript{27} The contents of the letters and sermon were recorded in the chronicles of Walsingham, Knighton and Froissart.\textsuperscript{28} Ball used these media to deliver a message challenging the social inequality of England. The letters make reference to Piers Plowman, a poem which presents an idealised image of rural life and the traditional estates theory of social order. Through his letters and sermon, Ball provided a form of leadership based on spreading a radical ideology intended to encourage people to rise.

Like Ball, Wrawe was a member of the clergy. In his testimony from May 1382, he states that he was from Sudbury in the south of Suffolk.\textsuperscript{29} A parliament roll, which contains a list for each county of key individuals to be excluded from the general pardon, states that he was a chaplain.\textsuperscript{30} Sudbury had two medieval parishes, All Saints and St Gregory, and a chapel of St Peter.\textsuperscript{31} One rebel with whom Wrawe cooperated, called Geoffrey Parfay, was the vicar of All Saints’ church,\textsuperscript{32} so it is possible that the two rebels were already associates in the same parish church before the rebellion began.

Other than his profession as a chaplain, nothing is known of Wrawe’s background. To add further confusion, two individuals called John Wrawe, both holding clerical positions, appear on the list of Suffolk rebels.\textsuperscript{33} Could this be a duplication by the scribe? This seems highly unlikely. One is listed as a chaplain in Sudbury, the other as a parson in Ringsfield, two locations at opposite ends of the county. Furthermore, the testimony of the Sudbury Wrawe makes no mention of the actions carried out by the ‘other’ Wrawe, which occurred in a very confined area in the east of Suffolk.\textsuperscript{34} Historians have variously assumed the existence of one or two John Wrawes. The only historians to mention the problem directly are Herbert Eiden and Juliet Barker.\textsuperscript{35} The former concludes that this is a scribal error, the latter that there were, indeed, two John Wrawes. Two leaders sharing the same name may not be as coincidental as first appears. Barker was unable to find a John Wrawe in the records of the parsons of Ringsfield, raising the possibility that this was not his actual name. Acting several days after the Sudbury
Wrawe, it is possible that the Ringsfield leader deliberately mimicked the name. This must be a tentative argument but, if it were the case, it would show a high degree of notoriety for the Sudbury Wrawe if his name had been heard at the opposite end of the county.

The existence of two John Wrawes has led to some misunderstandings in accounts of the Suffolk rising. Powell, although not discussing the issue like Barker, assumes the actions of the Ringsfield Wrawe to be separate from those of the Sudbury chaplain. Other historians, however, assume there to have only been one individual with no mention of the possibility of two. Hilton attempts to explore the background of John Wrawe before describing his journey from Sudbury. He does this, unfortunately, by exploring the Ringsfield parish of the ‘other’ John Wrawe. Prescott also combines their actions, but his uncertainty about the feasibility of Wrawe’s movements further supports this article’s insistence on the existence of two individuals. He notes that ‘it is difficult to see how Wraw could have found time’ to rebel in Beccles in the north-east of Suffolk on 18 June yet also be in Sudbury in the south-east to be arrested shortly afterwards.

THE ACTIONS OF WRAWE’S COMPANY

According to his testimony, Wrawe’s involvement began on 12 June when he joined a rebel company assembling at a place called Liston, near the Suffolk border with Essex. He does not talk in terms of arriving there as a leader. In fact, he admits that he could have left if he wished. This version differs significantly from the secondary literature’s depiction of the commencement of the Suffolk revolt. Powell claims that Wrawe had met with Tyler in London the day before and arrived as a leader acting under central commands. This Tyler–Wrawe meeting is only mentioned in Walsingham’s chronicle and Prescott has shown it to be implausible, as Tyler was not yet in London on the date claimed. The subsequent movements of the company, on which there is a consensus between Wrawe and the secondary literature, are plotted on Fig. 81, together with the date on which revolt commenced in the locality. According to Wrawe, on 12 June they destroyed the manor of Overhall in Liston, belonging to the merchant and former privy councillor Richard Lyons. On 13 June he describes how his company moved to Cavendish, where they entered the church and stole the possessions of Sir John Cavendish, which had been locked in the church tower for safety. They then travelled to Melford Green, where they drank the wine they had stolen in Cavendish and left the other stolen goods with a taverner called Enewene.

More interesting than the movements and actions themselves, is the way in which Wrawe describes certain features of them. One important aspect is how he depicts his own role in the early days of rebellion. There is one specific action that he pins on another individual, claiming that a man called Ralph Somerton, a dyer from Sudbury, stole the church keys in Cavendish and led the rebels to the church tower where they found the goods they stole. Otherwise he describes himself as fully involved in all these actions. Mostly he does not attribute a leadership role to himself, but neither does he rule out such a role by attributing it to others. There is one action, however, in which he does indicate his importance as a community leader and his ability to command respect from his parishioners. He admits that on 12 June he sent a messenger to Sudbury ‘summoning all the men of that town’ to join them in Liston.

A further interesting aspect of Wrawe’s account is the nature of the actions he recounts. There are five paragraphs describing the events of 12 and 13 June. One relates to inciting rebellion, but all of the other four relate to the destruction of property and looting. Historians should use the term ‘looting’ with care. Wrawe’s testimony, like other legal documents, is written in the words of the clerk rather than the accused. An alternative perspective could be that the company were requisitioning goods, in the manner of an army, to sustain themselves during the rebellion. In the case of Wrawe’s company, however, looting seems a more fitting description. Stealing and drinking wine was hardly an unavoidable necessity of rebellion. Furthermore,
Wrawe mentions leaving stolen goods with Enewene in Melford Green, then collecting them again shortly before his capture and taking them to his room in Sudbury. These were not provisions but, rather, the spoils of war. In stark contrast to fellow clergyman Ball, Wrawe’s form of leadership did not promote idealism.

A turning point in the rebellion came on 13 June when Wrawe arrived in Bury. By his own account, he raised the hue and cry and threatened anyone who did not join him with execution. Contrary to Oman’s assertion that Wrawe was ‘in full possession of Bury and its neighbourhood for eight days’, this period saw him play an increasingly minor role in the leadership of the town rising. Even the incitement of rebellion was not carried out by Wrawe alone, with at least one other individual, George Donnesby, also executed for his part. It is the acts of murder, however, that give the strongest indication of new leadership.

Over the following three days, four individuals were murdered in Bury and the surrounding

area: Sir John Cavendish (the chief justice of the King’s Bench); John Cambridge (the abbey prior); John Lakenheath (a monk); and a man simply described as ‘a worthy person of the neighbourhood’ [valentem de patria]. In a previous article, I made the case that these actions, the most significant of the Bury rising, were led by other individuals. There were three key points to my argument. Firstly, murder was out of character with the looting that characterised Wrawe’s company. Secondly, there was a clearer motive for Halesworth, Denham and Westbrom to murder the prior, as Wrawe later claimed. The townsmen had a long history of fighting the abbey for self-government and these individuals and the prior had been prominent members of opposing sides in a recent episode. Thirdly, Wrawe’s testimony does not give an alternative version of the murders of Cavendish nor the ‘worthy person’, suggesting he had faced no such accusations.

It appears that Wrawe was a prominent leader in the early days of revolt. His form of leadership involved directing acts of looting, drawing a stark contrast with fellow clergyman John Ball. When the Bury rising began, Wrawe’s leadership became less significant and, with townsmen now leading the revolt, the dominant form of action changed from looting to politically motivated murder. Is this a sign that the Bury rising was an exceptional situation, as Hilton suggests, or was the Suffolk rising as a whole a localised rather than centrally organised event? This article will now consider Wrawe’s control of actions in Bury. Firstly, it will evaluate Powell’s belief that his subordinates acted across the whole of East Anglia. Secondly, it will examine the significance of the actions of entirely separate rebel groups.

THE SCOPE OF WRAWE’S SUBORDINATES

There are two items in Wrawe’s testimony which imply that individuals carried out actions on his behalf at a distance. Both occurred on 14 June and involved money being extorted. Neither case shows any sign of an overarching strategy linking them to the other actions of Wrawe’s company. In one, the burgesses of Thetford were threatened with an attack by Wrawe’s company. According to Wrawe, he was not present himself but was given a share of the proceeds later. He claims the incident was carried out by Geoffrey Parfay (a vicar), one Thomas (Parfay’s chaplain), Adam Bray (a tanner) and Thomas Munchensy (a squire). All of these individuals were from Sudbury or, in Munchensy’s case, the manor of Edwardeston only six miles away, suggesting they had been part of the group Wrawe had summoned from his home town. A separate indictment by Ufford’s commission accuses Parfay, Bray and Wrawe of leading a number of incidents, including the Thetford episode, but does not make clear whether they were all present in person. Most likely Wrawe was not present in Thetford, having the alibi that he was leading a robbery of Cavendish’s house thirteen miles away in Bury on the same day. These individuals can be regarded as subordinate rebel leaders, but the incident is not a strong indicator of Wrawe’s ability to coordinate actions across a vast geographical area. Most likely this group had been part of Wrawe’s Sudbury rebels and split away once they reached Bury. There is no indication that Wrawe organised any further actions by them.

This interpretation raises the question as to why these individuals separated from Wrawe’s company in order to target Thetford. With Thetford manor being part of the Duchy of Lancaster, it is tempting to link their action with the London rebels’ targeting of John of Gaunt. The Suffolk group’s action, however, was directed at the assets of the town’s burgesses rather than those of the duke of Lancaster. With no manorial lord to protect these burgesses, the rebels may simply have acted opportunistically for their own profit. Alternatively, local circumstances may have created a grievance not fully apparent in the sources, perhaps related to the position of Thetford and Brandon as rival trading centres about six miles apart. While there is no positive evidence linking the two groups, a company of Brandon residents began to rebel on the same day as this act of extortion.
Wrawe’s testimony describes a second incident, which occurred on the same day in Stanningfield near Bury. It took the form of a knight called Sir Thomas Cornuerde extorting eight marks from the Suffolk escheator John Rookwood, threatening that Wrawe would kill him if he did not pay.\textsuperscript{55} Cornuerde is supposed to have shared five marks with the Sudbury chaplain. Cornuerde is unlikely to have been acting under Wrawe’s orders. He knew his target personally, having been involved in numerous transactions together, so this was probably an opportunistic act of his own.\textsuperscript{56} Some historians have questioned the event altogether, firstly because Cornuerde was later acquitted, and secondly because eight marks is a small sum for a knight to demand.\textsuperscript{57} More unlikely, though, is the notion that Wrawe would have pinned an entirely fabricated story on a member of the social elite when he could have had an easier time directing an accusation at a lower-status scapegoat. One possibility is that Wrawe misrepresented the sums involved. Another is that the eight marks related to a specific sum Rookwood owed to Cornuerde, as there is no reason to think the knight sought to extort the escheator for everything he could get. More mysterious is why Cornuerde, who appears to have had no other interaction with Wrawe, chose to share the money. Even if he used the chaplain’s name as a threat, it seems unlikely that he would feel indebted to him. More plausible would be that Wrawe claimed to act at a distance in an effort to minimise his involvement but that, in fact, his company had been present to put pressure on Rookwood. Rather than commanding Cornuerde in this matter, it is more likely that Wrawe hired out the services of his company for a share of the knight’s takings. If the link was Wrawe’s presence in person, it would raise questions over his ability to control rebel actions at a distance. Powell claims that Wrawe controlled actions as far away as Norfolk. This view rests upon a number of claims made by other rebels when indicted for their own actions. Norfolk rebels in East Dereham and Wickmere claimed to have acted on Wrawe’s orders, whilst those in Yarmouth claimed to have sent a torn-up town charter to various individuals including Wrawe.\textsuperscript{58} The fact that his name was known across such a vast area demonstrates Wrawe’s notoriety, but is Powell justified in attributing these actions to Wrawe’s leadership? If these localities had subordinates receiving orders from the Sudbury chaplain, we would have expected their actions to be consistent with those of Wrawe’s own company, yet this is not the case. The incidents in these places involved demanding a new town charter and actions that Powell describes as showing a ‘desire to destroy court rolls and kindred documents’.\textsuperscript{59} This is very different from the looting that characterised the actions most firmly linked to Wrawe’s own company. Furthermore, if the authorities had taken these claims seriously, one would expect Wrawe to have used his testimony to minimise his involvement as he did regarding the Thetford and Cornuerde incidents. Another possible interpretation of the allegations is that a number of those indicted used Wrawe as a scapegoat to minimise their own involvement. Wrawe himself is accused of acting in such a manner by historians, yet it has not been considered that he himself may also have suffered from others behaving in this way.

The evidence Powell uses to link Wrawe to actions in Cambridgeshire is even more indirect. His main evidence revolves around an individual called John Michel who acted as a leader in the rising in Ely. In Michel’s indictment he is also accused of involvement in a number of incidents in Bury before returning to Ely, which leads Powell to conclude that he had gone to Ely under Wrawe’s orders.\textsuperscript{60} There is no actual mention of any such instruction. Even more tenuous is the link Powell draws between a certain Robert Tavell and John Wrawe. Simply due to his presence both in Bury and Ely, Powell concludes that ‘there can also be little doubt that Tavell... was dispatched hither by that leader’s [Wrawe’s] orders’.\textsuperscript{61} His evidence certainly leaves some doubt in the mind of the reader.

By questioning Wrawe’s role in Bury and across East Anglia, this article greatly limits his sphere of influence. Fig. 81 plots the actions in which Wrawe was involved, including the murders
at which he was present but not in a leading role. It is apparent that his sphere of influence does not cover west Suffolk, let alone the whole county. Questioning Wrawe’s links with distant rebel actions also draws a contrast between the nature of his leadership and that of Tyler, who coordinated the actions of multiple groups of rebels. Not only has the geographical scope of Wrawe’s influence been greatly overstated, but the limited temporal scope has been overlooked. His first actions took place on 12 June and he cannot be firmly linked to any episodes after 15 June. Yet other indictments reveal that revolt continued in Suffolk for at least three more days.62 We cannot be certain of Wrawe’s movements in these final days, but it is quite possible that he had fled home. Certainly, his testimony describes money and goods being found in his room in Sudbury at the time of his capture.63 Viewing Suffolk’s organisational structure in this light, Wrawe should be considered a highly significant figure, but not a county leader.

SEPARATE REBEL GROUPS

References to Wrawe as a county leader overlook the known existence of actions by entirely separate rebel groups. One high profile action unrelated to Wrawe’s company was the murder of Cavendish on 14 June. The episode took place in Lakenheath (see Fig. 81) and his head was taken sixteen miles south to the pillory in Bury.64 With Wrawe’s company already present in the town, this murder has often been misleadingly recounted alongside the Sudbury chaplain’s actions.65 Both Walsingham and the Anonimalle Chronicle suggest the act was carried out by Wrawe’s company, but their vague account of this event is contradicted by two sources of legal evidence.66 Another man, John Poter, was beheaded for the murder, and his indictment, unlike those of other individuals, makes no mention of acting on Wrawe’s orders.67 In his testimony, Wrawe does not give a ‘reworked’ version of Cavendish’s murder as he does with those of Cambridge and Lakenheath.68 It is unthinkable that he would not have attempted to distance himself from such a serious action, suggesting the authorities had not accused him of involvement. The fact that the first murder was led by another leader further weakens the link between Wrawe’s company and the violent targeting of individuals in the Suffolk rising.

Not only did this one, highly significant action take place under another leader, but entire rebel groups acted independently of Wrawe. The tendency of historians to focus on the events covered in Walsingham’s chronicle means the actions of such groups often go unmentioned. Müller’s article on the rebel group which gathered in Brandon, a village on Suffolk’s border with Norfolk, is useful in this respect.69 In her article she argues that this group acted within the context of a background of manorial tensions over serfdom which had been exacerbated by the Black Death.70 This conclusion is problematic because the Brandon rebel group did not act against their manorial lord, but travelled some distance into Norfolk. Despite the issue with this point, the article provides an enlightening insight, through its use of King’s Bench indictments and manorial documents, into the organisation of a rebel group unmentioned in all of the chronicles of the revolt. After leaving Brandon, the group carried out a number of acts of theft, extortion and the destruction of manorial documents in Norfolk between 14 and 19 June. The sources enable Müller to identify two rebel leaders called John Geldere and William Metefeld junior.71 The lack of any mentions of these leaders and their actions in the chronicle accounts raises further doubt over whether any of the chroniclers had an in-depth knowledge of the events across Suffolk as a whole. Despite the detail of Müller’s study, at no point does she indicate that they received orders from Wrawe or from Geoffrey Lister, the man Hilton describes as a county leader in Norfolk.

The fact that these Suffolk rebels took many of their actions in Norfolk, where commission indictments have survived in far greater numbers, enabled Müller to track the movements of the Brandon group. Her article raises the question of whether the loss of so many Suffolk
indictments has hidden the existence of other independent rebel groups. The six that have survived indicate that the county did have a number of independent leaders. Wrawe’s accusation that several other Sudbury townsmen extorted burgesses in Thetford was raised earlier. The idea that Wrawe was not the only Sudbury townsman taking a leading role is supported by the indictment evidence. Three other townsmen, Nicholas Roper, William Pickard and Adam Bray, were indicted collectively and it was alleged that they were:

principales ductores et fecerunt diversos homines surgere de comitatu predicta contra dominum Regem et quod predicti Nicholus, Willelmus et Adam fuerunt principalis fractores… domorum et communes depredatores per totam libertatem sancti Edmundi.

Beyond Sudbury, John Wright of Bury is described as:

the chief insurgent and the leader of many different people, against the lord King and his allegiance, through the whole Liberty of St Edmund and made proclamations in various towns in the aforesaid county in order to incite and encourage people to rise against the lord King.

capitalis surector et ductor multorum diversorum hominum contra dominum Regem et ligeanciam suam per totam libertatem Sancti Edmundi et fecit proclamationes in diversis villis comitatu predicta ad exitandum et confortandum populum contra dominum Regem surgere.

These extracts are clear in their description of those indicted as leaders. The geographical scope of the accusations is also noteworthy. The ‘Liberty of St Edmund’ referred to the extensive area in which the abbey of St Edmund had special judicial privileges. The word *ductor*, meaning leader, also appears in further indictments. John atte Cross of Shellow, a settlement eleven miles east of Bury, is described as ‘one of the principal leaders’ and accused of inciting people to rise. The indictment of a bailiff known as Adam Rogges of Aldham says ‘he led a large company’ in the robbery of the residence of William Berard, the escheator for Norfolk and Suffolk.

Working from a small sample of surviving indictments, the repeated use of the word *ductor* is significant. It could indicate one of two possibilities. Firstly, that the phrase was a rhetorical tool for magnifying the charges against rebels and justifying severe punishment. Secondly, that the justices genuinely perceived the county’s revolt to have been led by a number of separate rebel groups under independent leaders. Other features of the language indicate the latter to be more plausible. Firstly, all three cases pose much vaguer accusations than most indictments. This makes them of little use to a historian aiming to recount events, but suggests that it was the leadership role rather than the specific actions of these individuals that caused the greatest concern for the justices. Secondly, none of those indicted claim to have acted on Wrawe’s orders, as was the case for some individuals indicted for more specific felonies. Thirdly, two of the three indictments raise accusations of acting throughout the Liberty of St Edmund, again suggesting a prominent leadership role rather than an overly liberal use of the word *ductor*. Finally, cases heard by Ufford’s commission were only added to the King’s Bench rolls if they were relevant to the royal justices hearing the most serious cases, so the very fact of their appearance suggests these individuals were considered key to the county’s rising. Suffolk may lack the detailed indictments of Norfolk, but those that remain indicate that it also had a number of rebel groups acting independently of its supposed county leader.
With the evidence suggesting Suffolk had multiple independent rebel groups, it raises the question of how they organised their actions. In late medieval and early modern risings, rebels would often make use of existing civic, manorial and parish structures to organise revolt in their locality. The social status of the Suffolk leaders in 1381 suggests a similar pattern. Wrawe’s summoning of the men of Sudbury, raised earlier, suggests that the parish structure was central to the basis of his authority. The indictment evidence informs us that Rogges was a bailiff. This meant that, although of peasant status, he held a position of authority in the daily routines of his lord’s manor, with responsibility for administrative and judicial duties. Through its use of peasant officers, the manorial structure had the scope to be utilised in acts of resistance in the same way that Wrawe used his authority within his parish. Likewise, Müller’s study also found a tendency for manorial officials to play a leading role in the Brandon rebel company. It seems that in 1381, as in the Pilgrimage of Grace in 1536, both manorial and parochial structures were utilised for organising rebellion.

INTERACTION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN REBEL GROUPS

The absence of central leadership did not prevent the rebel groups from interacting and cooperating. In her study of the Brandon rebels, Müller observes how separate rebel groups would join together for particular actions, before going their separate ways again. An attack on a property at Langford on 16 June saw cooperation between two rebel groups, comprised of people from sixteen different settlements, before they separated into two groups again the following day. Suffolk lacks the detailed sources available to Müller, but a similar dynamic would appear to have been in play. After murdering Cavendish, Poter’s rebel group brought his head to the pillory in Bury and the townsmen who murdered the prior in Mildenhall also brought this head to place alongside that of Cavendish. These acts were carried out in different settlements under different leaders, but they coordinated their ensuing act of humiliation. This interaction between groups probably explains how Cavendish’s murder came to be mistakenly attributed to Wrawe’s company despite a clear indictment to the contrary.

There are indications that this fluid form of interaction and cooperation stretched beyond Bury. Despite the limited legal sources for Suffolk, this article has mentioned the appearance of Adam Bray of Sudbury in two separate indictments: one linking him to the act of extortion in Thetford; and the other accusing him of leading and inciting rebels throughout the liberty. The Thetford episode suggests Bray acted together with Wrawe’s company, being charged alongside Wrawe himself and Parfay, who was implicated in a number of Wrawe’s acts. The other indictment, however, suggests he acted with separate rebel groups. Here he is charged alongside Nicholas Roper and William Pickard, two men who, although from Sudbury, are not anywhere mentioned in connection with Wrawe. This again indicates rebel groups joining forces for certain acts, then going their separate ways. It is clear that Bray cooperated with Wrawe at times, but the reference to him acting throughout the liberty suggests his rebels took the rebellion beyond the Sudbury chaplain’s geographical sphere of influence.

On the one hand, this article argues for the absence of central leadership, on the other it presents a model in which numerous rebel groups interacted and cooperated. Without central leadership, what formed the basis of this cooperation? Müller addresses this point in relation to the Brandon group, which accumulated rebels across a twelve- to fourteen-mile radius. She notes that the common link is their origin from villages that had trade, travel or migration links to Brandon. This suggests cooperation was formed by the everyday contacts of manorial officials rather than through county leadership. It is likely that the rebellion elsewhere in Suffolk took a similar form, although the limited Suffolk legal sources prevent further investigation. Extensive lists of rebels from the Norfolk indictments formed Müller’s analysis, but
unfortunately equivalent lists do not exist for Suffolk. What is known is that a number of the rebel leaders named across this article originated from Sudbury. This suggests that social links may have been the basis of cooperation across Suffolk just as it was for the Brandon rebels.

The organisation of the revolt varied between counties. It would appear that in Suffolk and Norfolk it took a similar form. Both had numerous significant leaders of rebel groups who were prepared to cooperate, but both also lacked central leadership coordinating the efforts. Local studies of Kent and Essex, however, have found a very different organisational structure. Here, there is evidence of mounted messengers being used to coordinate rebel movements and to attack multiple targets simultaneously. The popular name ‘The Peasants’ Revolt’, implies an inaccurate degree of uniformity in the rebellion. Not only did counties rise at different times, with Norwich not rising until two days after Wat Tyler’s death, but the nature of their actions varied greatly. So too did their aims, the theme which this article will now explore.

THE AIMS OF REBEL GROUPS

Traditionally, the enforcement of the poll tax of 1380–81 has been presented as the immediate trigger of the 1381 rising, but with post-Black Death social conditions as the wider cause. The waves of plague in England left labour in short supply, potentially providing the peasantry with a basis to negotiate terms. The feudal relationship between peasants and landlords did not, however, have formal mechanisms for negotiation, so after the Black Death many tenants turned to informal methods of resistance to force better conditions, such as refusing to perform labour service, sometimes collectively, or fleeing estates to work elsewhere. The traditional portrait argues that the 1370s saw a seigneurial reaction in which landlords, supported by royal government, enforced traditional feudal relations, fostering tensions among their tenants. Mark Bailey questions the level of emphasis placed on this reaction, noting that the traditional social structure of villeinage had already become weakened when the Peasants’ Revolt occurred and that some lords were open to adapting social relations.

Too much emphasis on a seigneurial reaction implies a uniformity of rebel aims which is not apparent from their actions during the rising. This variation is most evident between the regions of the country, reflected in the dramatically different leadership styles of Tyler and Wrawe. Looting was the defining characteristic of the actions of Wrawe’s company, but it was actively discouraged by Tyler. The latter’s rebels attacked a number of unpopular government figures, most famously through murdering the chancellor, Archbishop Simon Sudbury, and the treasurer, Sir Robert Hales. The rebels targeted these individuals in person rather than their property. An exception to this rule was the destruction of the Savoy, owned by John of Gaunt. Gaunt, however, was at Berwick on the Scottish border, most likely the reason why he was not also murdered. In fact, the Savoy incident, more than any other, demonstrates the rebels’ concerted effort to avoid looting. Six separate chroniclers describe how the London rebels destroyed valuables in the Savoy rather than stealing them. In view of their eagerness to discredit the rebels, there is little reason to question the chroniclers’ consensus on this point.

Rebel aims not only varied between counties but also within them. Eiden attempts to reconcile the actions of Suffolk and Norfolk rebels into a single ideology, but his conclusions sit uneasily with the evidence. He argues that the rebels’ burning of documents points to ‘the constraints imposed upon them by seigneurial authority’ as a central grievance, yet his own evidence notes that this practice was far from universal. Eiden also describes the judicial and religious establishment as the principal target throughout Suffolk and Norfolk. This group, however, is far too broad to be indicative of a common rebel ideology.

The actions of Suffolk’s rebel groups have significant differences. Firstly, all the politically motivated murders in Suffolk, apart from that of Cavendish, were led by the Bury townsmen,
highlighting a difference in approach between their rebel group and many others. This suggests their group had a more political agenda than Wrawe’s company, whose actions were characterised by looting. Secondly, the attitude to legal documents differed between rebel groups. The major chronicles report how the London rebels destroyed legal records at Lambeth and the New Temple. Historians sometimes comment on widespread destruction of manorial documents, in particular of court rolls, as if this were a uniform practice by rebels. The lack of indictment evidence for Suffolk prevents a detailed mapping of this practice, but it is evident that it was not pursued uniformly across all of the county’s centres of rebellion. Destruction is known to have taken place in a number of Suffolk parishes, yet it is significant that, despite the wide range of accusations against him, Wrawe does not answer to any charges of document destruction in his testimony. A lack of destruction is also implied by the survival of pre-1381 legal documents in the community Wrawe initially targeted, in the form of a manorial court roll for Overhall in Liston. Walsingham also makes no mention of legal documents in the early stages of the Suffolk rising, only in terms of the Bury townsmen’s demand for their town charters.

The Suffolk rebels were not united behind a common agenda against lordship. Indeed, many rebels, including those from Lakenheath, Sudbury and Brandon, did not target their manorial lords. For many rebel groups, there is little evidence to indicate the circumstances behind their actions, but the case of Lakenheath suggests a pursuit of local grievances rather than a common ideology. In the 1360s and 1370s, tenants at Lakenheath engaged in acts of disobedience such as rent strikes against Ely Abbey, their manorial lord. There are not, however, any signs of a seigneurial reaction during this period and the Lakenheath rebels targeted Cavendish rather than their manorial lord in 1381. His murder was the result of a local grievance over the enforcement of tax collection and the interference of royal justice. In 1371 parliament agreed to a new form of subsidy on a parish basis to raise money for the war. It proved effective at raising money but some communities saw their tax burden increase, with Suffolk’s total contribution doubling. In Lakenheath, there was a revolt against the royal officials sent to collect this subsidy and Cavendish had been one of four commissioners sent to handle this rising. When the chief justice returned to Lakenheath in 1381, it was his final journey. The pursuit of local agendas has parallels in Cambridgeshire, where rebels also acted upon long-standing political grievances rather than anger over serfdom.

Discontent with central government policy is another grievance that could potentially have united rebels across the realm. While the Suffolk rebels targeted a number of royal officials in the form of Lyons, Cavendish and Rookwood, interpreting this as an attack on government policy stretches the evidence too far. Only in Cavendish’s case did the county’s rebels attack the individual in person and this incident centred on a local grievance. Furthermore, these individuals were not closely associated with any one aspect of government policy, so it would be difficult to attribute a clear political agenda to the rebels. Rookwood’s role as an escheator involved managing the estates of those who died without heirs, so involved him little in government policy. Lyons had held a variety of financial posts in government, but had ceased to be active following his impeachment for corruption in 1376. Cavendish’s judicial role in government contributed to the formation of the motives for his murder but it does not present a common link with Rookwood and Lyons.

The consensus that the enforcement of the poll tax triggered the revolt also deserves re-examination. It was clear from the disappointing initial yields of the tax that levels of evasion had been high. To rectify this, royal commissioners were sent into communities to investigate. It was during this unpopular process that Brentwood in Essex, considered the first community to rebel, took action by targeting the tax evasion commissioner John Bampton. The case for this being the trigger of the revolt draws heavily on evidence from Essex and Kent communities.
such as Brentwood.\textsuperscript{107}

In this article’s examination of Suffolk, however, no direct link with the tax evasion commissions has emerged. None of the known rebel targets in Suffolk were poll tax commissioners. Cavendish’s judicial office had implicated him in the enforcement of a parish tax in Lakenheath a decade earlier, thereby creating the motive for his murder, but he was not involved in the poll tax. The fact that some counties did not rebel until a month after Essex and Kent indicates an entirely different trigger for revolt. It was the instability of the country itself which triggered most local communities into pursuing their own localised aims. The timing of the Bury rebellion did not coincide with the tax evasion commissions, but with the arrival of Wrawe’s company. The instability following his arrival triggered the Bury townsmen into continuing their long-standing dispute. Although it is difficult to ascertain the local context for all of Suffolk’s rural communities, the late timing of the county’s risings suggests that they, like Bury, were triggered into pursuing local grievances by the country’s instability. This suggests ‘groups of smaller spontaneous uprisings’, as Yves-Marie Bercé depicts the rebellions of south-west France, rather than a single rebellion under a county leader.\textsuperscript{108}

\textbf{JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SUFFOLK LEADERS}

Once the revolt had been crushed in London, Richard II set up a number of commissions to hear the cases in each county. The existing secondary literature describes the way in which the justice varied in its level of brutality depending on those hearing the cases. Sir Robert Tresilian’s treatment of the St Albans rebels has been characterised as exceptionally brutal in the context of the peaceful methods of resistance employed in the town.\textsuperscript{109} Most of the surviving Suffolk indictments resulted in a beheading but, as has been argued, the six cases enrolled in the King’s Bench roll probably related to leading rebels of greater interest to the royal justices. What is known is that the commission headed by Ufford was prepared to try individuals without a formal jury indictment.\textsuperscript{110} Many of the individuals mentioned in this article were accused of acting treasonably: John Poter, George Donnesby, Geoffrey Parfay, John atte Cross, Adam Rogges, Nicholas Roper, William Pickard and Adam Bray.\textsuperscript{111} This distinguishes Suffolk from some other counties, in which individuals were not accused of treason, due to it being a relatively new concept with justices uncertain of exactly what it entailed.\textsuperscript{112}

Many of the members of Ufford’s commission, who oversaw the justice in Suffolk, had personally suffered at the hands of the rebels. Three of the commission’s eight members had been direct targets. According to Walsingham, Lister’s rebels in Norfolk initially planned to compel Ufford to join them. Receiving word, the earl fled in disguise to the king.\textsuperscript{113} Ufford also owned Mettingham Castle in eastern Suffolk which was plundered by a rebel group.\textsuperscript{114} A second justice, Roger Scales, was forced to march with the Norfolk rebels in 1381.\textsuperscript{115} A third, John Holkham, had to flee the rebels.\textsuperscript{116} A further three justices had social links to rebel targets. In 1380 John Holkham was involved in a transaction of a castle and two manors with John Methwold, a target of the Brandon rebel group.\textsuperscript{117} Thomas Morieux was the son-in-law of John of Gaunt, a target of the London rebels. William Elmham also had close links with Gaunt through his involvement in the military campaigns in France.\textsuperscript{118}

In light of these episodes, it would be tempting to conclude that there was a clear social gulf between the justices and the rebels. This is certainly implied in many works of secondary literature which argue that the growing resentment at judicial corruption in the decades leading up to the revolt led to justices becoming key targets in 1381.\textsuperscript{119} In reality, the boundaries between justices and rebels were blurred. Not all decisions were made by Ufford’s commission, with charges also heard by local juries who could refer cases to the commission. Under pressure to restore order to the country, the judicial proceedings in East Anglia saw some death sentences
carried out without adhering to the full legal processes. Such a climate would have given local juries a fair degree of influence over the final decisions of the commission. Certainly, there was scope for a jury to ensure an individual avoided execution, such as by minimising the value of stolen goods or by judging an individual to have joined the rebellion out of compulsion. This influence is highly significant given that the local jurors, unlike the members of the commission, were from the same social circles as some of the participants. A notable example of this is Halesworth who sat on one of the Bury juries himself, despite being accused by Wrawe of the murder of the prior. His life after the revolt demonstrates a different social gulf in the justice of the rebellion: the ability of members of the social elite to avoid punishment.

Halesworth was a townsman of high status, having held the post of alderman (the head of the guild) in 1379. Although he did not hear his own case, it is perhaps not surprising that the Lackford jury who heard it did not find a fellow juryman and former alderman guilty, but instead Wrawe. In a rebellion that had been led by members of the town elite, an outsider who had gained notoriety, such as Wrawe, would have been a useful scapegoat. Despite this verdict over the prior’s murder, Halesworth was not fully cleared of involvement in the town’s rising. In 1386 he appears in a patent roll receiving a pardon. It was the later pardons of individuals like Halesworth that made Prescott doubtful of their earlier appearance on parliament’s exclusion list. It should be noted, however, that Halesworth was ultimately pardoned rather than declared ‘not guilty’ of any involvement. In view of the rapid justice delivered to many rebels, it is highly unlikely that it took five years to reach a decision on Halesworth’s guilt. His treatment appears more as a suspended sentence than a proclamation of innocence. The earlier decision of the local jury would have placed the burden of proof on Wrawe and perhaps kept Halesworth out of the spotlight sufficiently for him to secure this pardon. In the long term, involvement in the rebellion did not hinder the Halesworth family, with another Thomas Halesworth, most likely a descendant, holding the post of alderman in 1408. This example provides a stark contrast to the traditional harsh characterisation of justice towards the 1381 rebels.

Outside of Bury it also appears that high-status individuals were able to continue their careers unhindered. Sir Thomas Cornuerde was acquitted of the act of extortion of which Wrawe accused him. Thomas Munchensy was the highest-status leader of the extortion in Thetford, being married to the daughter of a knight, Sir Edmund Vauncy. Two years after the rebellion, Munchensy was involved in a grant of seisin with John Rookwood and Sir Thomas Morieux, a transaction involving a rebel, a rebel target and a justice from the Suffolk commission. Unhindered by his involvement in the rebellion, he went on to inherit his father’s estates in 1389 and to be knighted himself in 1391. It is only from Wrawe’s testimony that we know of Munchensy’s involvement, so the entire accusation could be dismissed as unfounded. This, however, faces the same problem as the accusation against Cornuerde. If Wrawe hoped to escape death, it seems doubtful that he would have chosen a member of the social elite as the target of an unfounded accusation.

This pattern of acquittal and pardon ends with the lower-status leaders. It appears from the indictments by Ufford’s commission that leading Suffolk rebels were beheaded. It is not always possible to ascertain their social status, but it seems they tended to be of modest social status compared with those who received the pardons. Adam Bray was a tanner from Sudbury. In the 1380 poll tax, John atte Cross and his wife were assessed at 2s 4d, a common rate for couples from his manor suggesting no great status. Adam Rogges was from the upper end of the peasant class, but was far from being socially elite. He held the office of bailiff of Aldham, a manor owned by the earl of Oxford, but was a serf nonetheless. His father, John Rogges, held substantial holdings for a villein which he left to his wife Matilda when he died in 1359. Whether Adam benefited from this personally is unclear: it is known that he was not on good terms with his mother, appearing in court for raising the hue and cry against her in 1360.
The Bury rebels were punished differently from their rural counterparts. In addition to producing the list of individuals, which included a number of Bury townsmen, parliament named six towns to be excluded from the pardon, one of which was Bury. The list was reiterated later in 1381, but this time Bury was the only town excluded from the pardon. The following year, the government imposed a fine of two thousand marks upon the residents of the town.

Bury’s singling out can, in some senses, be viewed as particularly harsh treatment. Compared with the executions of many of the lower-status rural leaders, though, this fine would surely have been a more favourable option. The settlement required the guild, controlled by individuals such as Halesworth, to levy and collect the fine and their effort to shift the burden on to the lower social orders caused upset. This form of punishment may well have been chosen for this very purpose, as a way of turning townsmen’s attentions towards internal tensions rather than their grievances with the abbey.

There are signs that judicial proceedings elsewhere in the country followed a similar pattern. Helmut Hinck has explored the rebellion in Winchester, a town rarely mentioned in histories of the revolt, in which members of the urban elite also lead actions. Just as in Suffolk, the Hampshire commission handed out a significant number of executions very soon after the rebellion. Yet Hinck notes that at least three high-status individuals who had led Winchester’s revolt went on to pursue successful careers unhindered. William Wygge, Henry Clerk and Gilbert Forster all represented Winchester in parliament after the revolt. Both Wygge and Forster held the position of mayor on a number of occasions. Clerk held the positions of alderman and bailiff. This is not unlike the Halesworth family in Bury. Likewise, in Cambridge Edmund Lister, a former mayor of the town, and Robert Bluntsham, a former royal bailiff, were both successful in receiving pardons despite their leading roles in the county’s rebellion.

It is, of course, possible that some of these members of the social elite faced spurious allegations, accounting for the outcome of their trial. However, when the chance of a favourable verdict so closely follows the lines of social status, it must be suspected that there is a trend.

CONCLUSION

The importance of Wrawe’s leadership has been overstated. He played a significant role in actions on 12 and 13 June but was eclipsed by leading Bury townsmen soon after. Outside of Bury there are also strong signs that a number of leaders, acting independently rather than as Wrawe’s subordinates, played a significant role in leading the rebel companies. Rather than a single rebellion under a county leader, a model of small, spontaneous uprisings fits the events in Suffolk better. In this respect, the risings in Suffolk and Norfolk were different from those of Essex and Kent where studies have found the presence of effective centralised coordination. The independent rebel groups of East Anglia did interact and cooperate, but through existing social links between manorial officials rather than as a result of central leadership.

Unlike fellow clergyman John Ball, Wrawe’s leadership did not provide rebels with idealism. He was an important community leader and commanded loyalty from his parishioners, but the actions in which he most clearly took a leading role revolved around looting. They were very different from the political murders of the Bury rebels or the burning of manorial documents of other Suffolk rebel groups. The varied actions of the different rebel groups indicate localised grievances. Where background information is known for a community, such as Bury and Lakenheath, the links between rebel actions in 1381 and long-standing grievances are particularly apparent. As such, the rising does not justify a distinction between urban and rural revolt. Both types of community were opportunistically pursuing their own grievances.

There was a sharp divide between the justice received by leading rebels of high and low social status, the former more likely to continue their careers unhindered. It would seem that the use
of scapegoats was central to this. Wrawe, accused among other things of murdering the prior of Bury, was executed while Halesworth, who was far more likely to have played a leading role, was eventually pardoned. The fact that the Sudbury chaplain’s name is mentioned in trials as far away as Norfolk shows he gained a great level of notoriety in the region and suggests he became a popular scapegoat. We cannot be certain of the reason why he, rather than another leader, emerged as the region’s scapegoat, but perhaps it was because his company was the first to act in East Anglia. For many centuries, it has proved convenient to emphasise his supposed leader status. For other rebel leaders he was a scapegoat; for Walsingham he was a tool for attacking heresy; and for Hilton he provided a degree of cohesion in depicting 1381 as a class conflict.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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NOTES

1 Powell 1896.
2 Powell 1896, 9 and 57.
3 Powell 1896, 32, 36–37 and 48–49.
5 Dobson 1983, 233.
6 Oman 1906, 109.
8 Ridgard 1988, 74.
9 Eiden 2008, 427–32.
11 Müller 2012a.
12 Chick 2016, 35–47.
14 For a translation of the relevant section of Walsingham’s chronicle, see Preest 2005, 142–44.
15 Powell 1896, 7.
16 Walsingham claims Wrawe’s actions began on 15 June rather than 12 June as Wrawe’s testimony suggests: Dobson 1983, 244. Walsingham claims Cavendish was murdered in Bury rather than Lakenheath, as stated in the indictment evidence: Preest 2005, 142. For the implausibility of a meeting between Tyler and Wrawe, see Prescott 1984, 127.
17 For the relevant sections of Gosford’s text, see Powell 1896, 138–43.
18 For a translation of Wrawe’s testimony, see Dobson 1983, 249–54. For an account of the judicial proceedings, see Prescott 1984, 90 and 234–35.
19 Dunn 2002, 140.
20 Dobson 1983, 248; Prescott 1984, 238.
21 Dobson 1983, 373.
22 Prescott 1984, 43.
24 Ridgard 1988, 74.
25 TNA, KB 9/166/1 fol. 43. Some of these pleas are available transcribed but untranslated in Powell 1896, 126–31. Two indictments are translated in Dobson 1983, 255–56.
27 Dobson 1983, 272.
29 Dobson 1983, 249.
30 PROME 1377–84, 111.
32 Dobson 1983, 252.
33 PROME 1377–84, 111.
34 Juliet Barker finds the indictments show the Ringsfield Wrawe acting within a 3.5 mile radius: Barker 2014, 299.
36 Powell 1896, 24.
38 Prescott 1984, 159.
39 Dobson 1983, 249.
40 Powell 1896, 9.
41 Prescott 1984, 127.
43 Dobson 1983, 251–52; Powell 1896, 11.
44 Dobson 1983, 251–52.
45 Dobson 1983, 252.
46 Dobson 1983, 249.
47 Dobson 1983, 252.
48 Dobson 1983, 250.
49 Oman 1906, 107.
50 Chick 2016, 45.
51 Dobson 1983, 252–53.
54 Bailey 2007, 166 and 265.
56 Roskell, Clark and Rawcliffe 1992, profile of ‘SWINBURNE, Sir Thomas’; CCR 1377–81, 96, 97, 114 and 385.
57 Prescott 1984, 238; Barker 2014, 305.
58 Powell 1896, 48–49.
59 Powell 1896, 32 and 36–37.
60 Powell 1896, 48–49.
61 Powell 1896, 46–49.
62 Bailey 2007, 186. For indictments describing actions in Suffolk on 16 to 18 June, see Powell 1896, 127–28 and 130.
63 Dobson 1983, 252.
64 This action with his head is described by both Gosford and Walsingham: Powell 1896, 141; Preest 2005, 142.
66 Both chronicles give only a cursory mention to the event and the Anonimalle Chronicle incorrectly states the that murder took place in Bury, suggesting a lack of first-hand knowledge.
67 Powell 1896, 126–27.
69 See Müller 2012a, 1–19.
70 Müller 2012a, 15.
71 Müller 2012a, 11–12.
72 Manuscript illegible.
73 TNA, KB 9/166/1, fol. 43.
74 TNA, KB 9/166/1, fol. 43.
75 TNA, KB 9/166/1, fol. 43.
76 TNA, KB 9/166/1, fol. 43.
77 TNA, KB 9/166/1, fol. 43.
78 For an outline of the process by which these indictments appeared on the King’s Bench rolls, see Prescott 1984, 236–37.
79 Xu 2015, 91; Wood 2007, 103–104; Bohna 2003, 564 and 575–76; Fletcher and MacCulloch 2004, 29.
For example, *Anonimalle*, Walsingham, Knighton, Froissart, the monk of Westminster and the continuator of the *Eulogium Historiarum* all say the rebels destroyed valuables in the Savoy rather than stealing them: Dobson 1983, 157, 169–70, 184, 188, 200 and 206. The monk of Westminster is more explicit in describing how the rebels who plundered would face ‘death by execution without trial of judgment’: Dobson 1983, 200.
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‘Lyons, Richard (d. 1381), merchant and financier’

‘Cavendish, Sir John (d. 1381), justice’

Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>CCR</td>
<td>Calendar of Close Rolls</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Calendar of Patent Rolls</td>
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<td>PROME</td>
<td>The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England</td>
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