

**BREVE TRATTATO
DELLE CAUSE,
CHE POSSONO FAR ABBONDARE**


Li Regni d'oro, & argento.

DOVE NON SONO MINIERE

Con applicazione al Regno di Napoli.

**DEL DOTTOR ANTONIO SERRA,
della Città di Cofenza.**

DIVISIONE TRE PARTE.



INNAPOLI,

**Appretto Lazzaro Scoriggio. M.DC.XIII.
CON LICENZA DE' SUPERIORI.**

The cover of the original edition of Serra's Breve Trattato, reproduced with permission of the Reinert Family Collection.

**Antonio Serra and the
Economics of Good
Government**

Edited by

Rosario Patalano


*Professor of the History of Economic Thought,
University of Naples "Federico II", Italy*

and

Sophus A. Reinert

*Assistant Professor of Business Administration,
Harvard Business School, USA*

**palgrave
macmillan**



Introduction, selection and editorial content © Rosario Patalano and Sophus A. Reinert 2016
Individual chapters © Contributors 2016

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published 2016 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN: 978–1–137–53995–3

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Patalano, Rosario, editor. | Reinert, Sophus A., editor.

Title: Antonio Serra and the economics of good government / edited by Rosario Patalano, Professor of the History of Economic Thought, University of Naples, Federico II, Italy and Sophus Reinert, Assistant Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School, USA.

Description: New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. | Series: Palgrave studies in the history of finance | Includes index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2015040557 | ISBN 9781137539953 (hardback)

Subjects: LCSH: Serra, Antonio, active 1613 – Political and social views. | Economics – Italy – History. | Finance – History. | BISAC: BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economic History. | BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Finance. | HISTORY / Europe / Italy.

Classification: LCC HB109A2 .A58 2016 | DDC 330.945—dc23

LC record available at <http://lccn.loc.gov/2015040557>

Contents

Acknowledgements

vii

List of Contributors

viii

Introduction: Antonio Serra and the Economics of

Good Government

1

Rosario Patalano and Sophus A. Reinert

1 The Place of Naples in the 17th-Century Spanish Empire

12

Gabriel Paquette

2 The Vicaria Prison of Naples in the Time of Antonio Serra

23

Francesca De Rosa

3 The Cost of Empires: Antonio Serra and the Debate on the

Causes and Solutions of Economic Crises in the

Viceroyalty of Naples in the 17th Century

38

Giovanni Zanaldi

4 Serra's *Brief Treatise* in a *World-System* Perspective: The

Dutch Miracle and Italian Decline in the Early 17th Century

63

Rosario Patalano

5 The Influence of Portuguese Economic Thought on the

Breve trattato: Antonio Serra and Miguel Vaaz in

Spanish Naples

89

Gaetano Sabatini

6 Authority and Expertise at the Origins of Macro-economics

112

Sophus A. Reinert

7 The Republic of Wealth and Liberty: The Politics of

Antonio Serra

143

Luca Addante

8 External Imbalances and the Money Supply: Two

Controversies in the English “Realme” and in the

Kingdom of Naples

166

Lilja Costabile

1

The Place of Naples in the
17th-Century Spanish Empire

Gabriel Paquette

The monarchy's heterogeneity was striking, embracing a panoply of languages and ethnicities. It absorbed numerous formerly independent kingdoms, each of which boasted its own long-established customs, economies, and, crucially, juridical traditions. The Spanish monarchy was far from a static entity. Its borders were in constant flux. Military triumphs and defeats routinely necessitated their reconfiguration, whether geographic, fiscal, or legal. Bringing this morass of distinctive cultures, economies, and politics under the sway of a single sovereign and making these disparate, far-flung pieces function in relative harmony posed, therefore, a challenge on a scale with few parallels in early modern European history.

Where did Naples fit in this broader political panorama? Naples was but one of several constituent kingdoms of the Spanish Atlantic monarchy. While not a federation, it was a composite polity that sheltered many smaller entities under a single sovereign. Portugal, the Basque provinces, Catalonia, the Netherlands, Navarre, Sicily, Aragon, Valencia, and Naples had been attached to the Spanish monarchy's Castilian nucleus in varying contexts. The circumstances of entry were important. Each kingdom retained a hotchpotch of fiscal exemptions, spheres of autonomy, and unique privileges – all negotiated, formally and informally, upon integration. Even after their union, they continued to be treated as distinct entities, each maintaining its unique identity and status.⁵ The Spanish monarchy, as a result of this situation, was a legal mosaic, though ultimately under the sovereignty of the Spanish king. Such heterogeneity complicated the formulation of a common policy applicable to all of its component states. As in other composite monarchies, there was an inherent tension between “centripetal impulses toward centralization and centrifugal tendencies toward localism.”⁶ In Spain, the severity of this tension was exposed starkly in the 17th century, especially during its middle decades, which were marked by incessant war on multiple fronts.

The problem of linking the centre of the Spanish monarchy with its peripheral kingdoms, whether in Europe or in America, produced several potential solutions. Ultimately, a new administrative structure was developed in the 16th century, though it borrowed heavily on practices and techniques of the late medieval Aragonese-Catalan Mediterranean Empire.⁷ Councils were formed, composed of spokesmen for each kingdom. These met at court and consulted with the king, both directly and through his advisers. The importance of the Councils should not be discounted. As a Polish visitor to Spain noted in 1611, “what is surprising about Spain is that, though their government is absolute, their kings

Karl Marx contended that the Spanish monarchy should be grouped “in a class with Asiatic forms of government”, considering it nothing more than the “agglomeration of mismanaged republics with nominal sovereignty at their head”. But while denouncing it as “despotic”, he noted that Spanish sovereignty “did not prevent the provinces from subsisting with different laws and customs, military banners of different colors, and with their respective systems of taxation”.¹ Marx partly subscribed to a “black legend” concerning Spanish rapacity and incompetence, an image whose origins date from the Dutch revolt against Spanish rule in the waning decades of the 16th century and which subsequently gathered force in England and other Protestant countries threatened by Spain’s purported aspirations to universal monarchy.² This disparaging image would be disseminated across Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, finding special resonance in Naples, the efforts of the Spanish crown to contest it notwithstanding.³ Yet Marx, as a careful historian, could not help but recognize the legal and customary pluralism that flourished in the lands under Spain’s dominion. Marx explained this phenomenon away as a strategy typical of “oriental despotism”, which is more than satisfied “to allow these institutions to continue so long as they take off its shoulders the duty of doing something and spare it the trouble of regular administration”.⁴ Marx thus reproduced two opposing and recurrent images of the Spanish empire: on the one hand, an entity whose weakness and sprawl necessitated its decentralization; on the other hand, a robust state with incorrigible centralizing tendencies.

In 1613, the year in which Antonio Serra published his *Breve tratado*, the Spanish monarchy stretched from Naples to the Philippines. Its boundaries encompassed an astonishingly vast amount of non-contiguous territory, separated by oceans, seas, and mountain ranges.

do nothing without the Councils".⁸ The Councils received information from, and sent orders to, a viceroy who had been assigned to one of the peripheral kingdoms.⁹

In each peripheral kingdom, whether Naples or New Spain, the most powerful figure was the viceroy, the highest magistrate sent from Spain and, in most cases, a Castilian by birth. In *Política Indiana* (1647), Juan de Solórzano Pereira rationalized the institution of the viceroy. He explained that it was created "so that vassals who live and reside in remote provinces need not go seek their king, who is so far away, having his vicar nearby to ask for and get all those things they could expect and get from their king".¹⁰ The viceroy was considered to "be the monarch's image and *alter ego* and held to be in possession of all the majesty, power and authority of the king".¹¹

But the viceroy was not all powerful. He was compelled to work in conjunction with the aforementioned Councils in the Iberian Peninsula. These councillors were usually natives of the respective territory who responded vigorously to any perceived threat to their homeland (and, it must be said, their interests and those of their allies and retainers). The Councils, as John H. Elliott argued in his *Imperial Spain* (1963), were

much more than mere administrative organs in that they also fulfilled some of the functions of representative bodies (...) a body of representative native councillors attendant on the person of the king could at least help to restrict the deleterious consequences of royal absenteeism.¹²

Though outfitted with all of the pomp of royalty, empowered to issue decrees and execute justice, the viceroy in Naples was forbidden to infringe on local laws.¹³ Elsewhere viceregal autonomy was further circumscribed by leaving local privileges unmolested. In Milan, for example, the municipal council's authority remained robust. Furthermore, a local senate was installed there after the advent of Spanish rule to deter viceregal ambition.¹⁴

These interlocking local constraints were matched by massive impediments to viceregal volition at the apex of the imperial system. The Spanish monarch remained the sole arbiter of most facets of government in each kingdom. Just as importantly, the vast complex of local states were linked in a personal union with the king alone.¹⁵ In this way, there were few horizontal links among the kingdoms but a great number of separate vertical ties between each kingdom and the Spanish monarchy. In each component state, the king's capacity for patronage

was formidable. The grant of ecclesiastical benefices, the sale of offices, the appointment of officials, and the approval over the sale and transfer of feudal properties emanated directly from the crown.¹⁶ The strategic distribution of these much-coveted plums guaranteed direct communication between the crown and the beneficiaries of its largesse, not to mention unmediated loyalty and service obligations.

Within well-defined limits, however, the viceroy maintained a degree of autonomy in setting the direction of the kingdom to which he was assigned. His military authority was undivided.¹⁷ He was not compelled to enforce passively the laws emanating from the Councils at Court. On the contrary, it was a firmly established and fully recognized principle that viceroys (and other crown officials) judged whether local conditions were propitious for the imposition of any given law. Castro de Bobadilla noted in his widely read manual *Política para Corregidores* (1616) that royal provisions and decrees that were "contrary to justice and in prejudice" to the crown's ultimate interests could be "obeyed but not executed".¹⁸

By invoking this curious formula, "obedecco pero no cumpro" (in Spanish), the viceroy reaffirmed his loyalty and subordination to the monarch while simultaneously indicating that the best expression of his obedience was the non-enforcement of a particular act until circumstances, which were unknowable except by those "men-on-the-spot", favoured its execution. In this way, the overlapping administrative structures of the Spanish monarchy were neither a byzantine aggregation caused by the meshing of disparate, not entirely compatible systems of governance nor the enablers of a lusty, arbitrary Leviathan. Instead, blurring lines of authority and the creation of a dazzling mosaic of checks and balances mitigated the obstacles intrinsic to rule at a great distance. It betrayed the crown's deep-seated distrust of its agents posted beyond Castile's borders. It also reflected a keen appreciation of the hazards latent in imposing laws that failed to account for, in Philip II's words, "the diversity and difference of lands and peoples". Spanish administration in its non-peninsular kingdoms, to borrow the historian John Phelan's memorable phrase, was a "dynamic balance between the principles of authority and flexibility".¹⁹

Many of the same institutions existed, in one form or another, across the monarchy. There were viceroys both in Spain's European provinces and its ultramarine territories. But the prevalence of the same office did not necessarily mean that it worked in the identical fashion in each constituent kingdom. In European kingdoms, many of the signature institutions of the Spanish monarchy were modified to fit the existing

institutional framework. The Americas, or the Indies (*Indias*), as they were known, were considered part of the crown of Castile. The laws and institutions of the New World were modelled on those of Castile. Philip II summarized the relationship in an address to the Council of the Indies in 1571: "because the kingdoms of Castile and the Indies belong to one crown, their laws and manner of government ought to be as alike as possible".²⁰

This legal status influenced the scope of the viceroy's authority in the New World. The vast wealth, great distance from Europe, and the distasteful memory of disruptive recalcitrance of several conquistadors in the 16th century impelled the Spanish crown to devise institutions to carefully monitor and check the viceroy's activities. Various legal restrictions and overlapping authority conspired to limit his authority. Of course, as the Spanish monarchs and their ministers fully realized, America could not be micro-managed from Madrid. The difficulties of transatlantic communication forced some patronage to be left under the viceroy's control, particularly the authority to dispense minor governmental appointments and judicial offices. Although subject to a greater degree of oversight, the colonial treasury remained under the viceroy's purview. He could issue proclamations [*bandos*] and measures [*ordenanzas*], but not laws in the strict sense. Although American viceroys shared some of the responsibilities of their European counterparts (e.g. defence of the realm from external attack and the maintenance of domestic tranquility), others were peculiar to the New World. These included the expansion of Catholicism through the promotion of evangelization and conversion, the negotiation of treaties with Amerindians, and responsibility for rewarding the descendants of the conquistadores and first settlers.

In the New World, the greatest limitation on viceregal authority was posed by the *Audiencia*, the highest court of Spanish America, of which thirteen had been established by 1661. The judges [*oidores*], appointed directly by the king, were empowered to correspond directly with the sovereign. The *Audiencias* also retained attorneys [*fiscales*] responsible to the king for everything that pertained to the treasury. Viceregal autonomy was further checked by the *Residencia*. At the expiration of their term of service, all officials underwent this remarkably thorough evaluation of their conduct. Perhaps the greatest brake on viceregal power in Spanish America was a relatively short tenure in office. If in the 16th century, the viceroy was appointed for an undetermined number of years, with the average length of service hovering around six years, then after 1629 viceroys were appointed for three years with the possibility of a three-

year renewal.²¹ Such a short stint ensured not only that various men of aspirations got a turn but also that each viceroy remained an "outsider", whose roots in the economy and society he administered were shallow and easily extirpated.

In contrast to the situation in Spanish America, the passage of Naples from Aragonese to Castilian rule in 1504 heralded neither major changes in the fiscal system nor significant modification to its fundamental political structure. Only under the viceregal tenure of Pedro de Toledo (1532-1553) would its comprehensive integration into the Spanish monarchy be contemplated.²² Some historians have viewed Toledo's period in Naples as less than salubrious. Giuseppe Galasso, for example, argued that Toledo's initiatives inaugurated "a process of fiscal expansion and corruption ... financial and fiscal problems [which was] to emerge as the greatest bane and the most odious aspect of the [Spanish] regime".²³

But this result did not necessarily happen against the wishes of important sectors of Neapolitan society. Spanish government in Naples, as elsewhere, would have been unthinkable without collaborators. Provincial aristocracies recognized, and scamped toward, the benefits offered by Spanish rule. As Elliott has observed, "paradoxically, the greatest strength of the Spanish monarchy lay in its very weakness. ... [H]owever many orders might issue from Madrid, viceregal administrators were incapable of carrying them out without the assistance of the local governing class".²⁴ And local elites were remarkably adept at harnessing the institutions of the state to serve their own economic and political ends.²⁵ In Naples, a delicate balance calibrated the autonomy of Neapolitans with the monarchy's goals.²⁶

But geopolitical pressure from without, at least as much as discontent from within the incorporated kingdoms, changed the terms of the relationship. Between 1618 and 1621, Spanish involvement in Germany led, ultimately, to its effort to control the military corridors which linked Vienna, Milan, and Brussels. These decisions also resulted in the resumption of hostilities with the Dutch. The expenditure necessitated by these excursions coincided with the sharp decline in remittances of American silver. Fiscal crisis was nothing new in the Spanish empire: under Philip II in the late 16th century, revenues had tripled, but public debt had quadrupled.²⁷ But the acuteness of the early 17th-century shortfall compelled the crown to identify new sources of revenue and resulted in the levying of additional taxes. Crown bureaucrats first surveyed Castile for possible sources and, subsequently, extended their reach to other parts of the monarchy, including Naples. The problem, as Elliott has

noted, was that each province "retained [its] own customary laws and representative assemblies, so that any attempt to extract larger financial and military contributions could well lead to disruptive constitutional conflict".²⁸

Nevertheless, such a conflict proved exceedingly difficult to avoid. The Spanish economic reformer and royal secretary Pedro Fernández Navarrete (1564–1632) complained that new kingdoms brought into Spanish monarchy must neither "appear to be separate nations nor [the subjects] be considered to be foreigners".²⁹ Building on these ideas, the Count-Duke of Olivares, Philip IV's chief minister, recognized that the Spanish empire's diversity must be replaced by uniformity, or at least with closer relationships between kingdoms befitting of a supranational polity. In Count-Duke Olivares's far-reaching plan for a "Union of Arms" (1625), a shift towards homogeneity entailed the expansion of royal power and the curtailment of provincial customary rights, privileges, and constitutions. Their existence hampered the Spanish monarchy's capacity to respond punctually and decisively to geopolitical threats.³⁰ The problem was dire. As Calabria has noted, the administration and collection of taxes in Naples was "chaotic, marred by overlapping and competing jurisdictions, and plagued by a bewildering variety of exemptions and loopholes".³¹ Crown and vice-regal aspirations for centralization and administrative efficiency were hindered by "concessions and compromises and essential respect for the norm of autonomy".³²

The Spanish crown, then, was forced to tighten the reins. In spite of the ubiquity of symbols – architectural, ceremonial, and artistic – of Spanish power, these reins had been kept extraordinarily slack. The fiscal requirements of a state engaged in war on multiple fronts necessitated a policy shift. As one contemporary historian has contended, these "heavy fiscal demands drained the productive structures of the Southern Italian economy, heightened inflation, and led to urban and rural revolt".³³ These revenue-generating efforts provoked a range of responses and analyses, not least from commentators like Antonio Serra.³⁴ They also undoubtedly played a role in the revolts and riots that broke out across the Spanish empire: Mexico City (1624), Catalonia (1640), Portugal (1640), Naples (1647), Palermo (1647), and Andalusia (1651), not to mention the disturbances in Castile itself.³⁵ The pacification of these revolts burdened Spain's already strained resources. Yet it is by no means easy to conclude that Madrid's centralizing efforts caused the revolts. After all, unrest was rife across Europe, with revolutions more widespread than they were at any other period except 1848.

England, France, and the Netherlands were convulsed by revolution and civil war. As one eminent historian argued, "the various countries of Europe seemed merely the separate theatres upon which the same great tragedy was being simultaneously, though in different languages and with local variations, played out".³⁶

With the notable exception of the independence of Portugal (and its colony Brazil), however, the Spanish monarchy surmounted the "General Crisis" of the 1640s and 1650s with its territorial integrity largely intact.³⁷ This outcome may be attributed to the fact that elites in the different constituent states of the empire realized that "they could do better for themselves within the framework of the monarchy than if they struck out on their own".³⁸ Dissatisfaction with Spanish rule did not dissipate entirely. The assassination of the Viceroy of Sardinia in 1668 is ample testament to discontent that simmered just beneath the surface. The Spanish response to such discontent was mixed. While it is true that the parliament of Naples was abolished in 1642, the parliaments of Sicily and Sardinia continued to be summoned through the period of Spanish rule, right into the 18th century.³⁹ The end of Spanish rule in Naples (and Milan, Sicily, and Flanders), it must be stressed, ultimately was achieved not through domestic rebellion, riot, or revolt but rather by the terms stipulated in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), which ended the War of Spanish Succession. Clearly, the strategies of accommodation, negotiation, and compromise, which had served the Spanish monarchy so well for so long, were not easily cast aside.

The cobbled-together Spanish monarchy did more than merely hobble along. In fact, far from being a steadily declining power, it remained surprisingly resilient until at least the first decade of the 18th century.⁴⁰ Historians need not become apologists for the Spanish empire (or defenders of its economic record in Naples in particular) to recognize, as Marx reluctantly did, the formidable administrative achievements of that great "composite monarchy". Its elaborate and relatively flexible institutional mechanisms enabled it to hold, however loosely and infelicitly, a breathtaking diversity of polities, on multiple continents, under a single crown, for two centuries.

Notes

1. Marx, K., "Revolution in Spain [I]", *New York Daily Tribune*, 9 September 1854, in Marx and F. Engels, eds, *Revolution in Spain*, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1939, p. 26.

2. For an excellent survey of the origins and impact of this "Black Legend", see García Cárcel, R., *La Leyenda Negra: Historia y Opinión*, Madrid: Alianza, 1992.
3. On Neapolitan political writers' analyses of Spanish rule, see Pagden, A., "Fede Publica and Fede Privata: Trust and Honour in Spanish Naples", in Pagden, ed., *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish-American Social and Political Theory 1513-1830*, New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 65-90; on long-standing efforts to contest disparaging depictions of the Spanish monarchy, see Kagan, R.L., *Clio and the Crown: The Politics of History in Medieval and Early Modern Spain*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.
4. Marx, 1854, in Spain, p. 26.
5. For a discussion of composite monarchies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Elliott, J.H., "A Europe of Composite Monarchies", *Past and Present* 137, 1992, pp. 48-71.
6. Greene, J.P., "State Formation, Resistance, and the Creation of Revolutionary Traditions in the Early Modern Era", in Morrison, M.A. and M.S. Zook, eds., *Revolutionary Currents: Nation-Building in the Transatlantic World*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, p. 4.
7. For these late medieval Mediterranean (and Eastern Atlantic) institutional precedents, see Fernandez-Armesto, F., *Before Columbus: Exploration and Colonization from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 1229-1492*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987, esp. part I.
8. Quoted in Thompson, I.A.A., "Castile", in Miller, J., ed., *Absolutism in Seventeenth-century Europe*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990, p. 87.
9. Elliott, J.H., "Spain and Its Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", in Elliott, ed., *Spain and its World 1500-1700*, New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1989, p. 15.
10. Quoted in Cañeque, A., *The King's Living Image: The Culture and Politics of Viceregal Power in Colonial Mexico*, New York, NY and London: Routledge, 2004, p. 17.
11. Cañeque, 2004, p. 25.
12. Elliott, J.H., *Imperial Spain, 1469-1716*, London: Penguin, 1963, p. 176; one historian has argued that the Council of Italy held less authority than other Councils. She argues that the confluence of its late founding (1558), limited prerogatives, mixed composition and the heterogeneity of the Italian dominions diminished its authority. See Peytavin, M., "Government/Administration: The Italian Kingdoms within the Spanish Monarchy", in Dandeleit, T. and J. Marino, eds., "Introduction" to their *Spain in Italy: Politics, Society and Religion, 1500-1700*, Boston, MA and Leiden: Brill, 2007, p. 366.
13. Sanchez, C.J.H., *Castilla y Nápoles en el Siglo XVI: El Virrey Pedro de Toledo. Linaje, Estado y Cultura (1532-1553)*, Salamanca: Junta de Castilla y León, 1994, p. 197.
14. Guarino, G., "The Politics of Appearances: State Representations and Images of Power in Spanish Naples during the Seventeenth Century", PhD Dissertation, Cambridge University, 2004, p. 5.
15. An idea developed in Musi, A., "The Kingdom of Naples in the Spanish Imperial System", in Dandeleit and Marino, eds., 2007, p. 83.
16. Villari, R., *The Revolt of Naples*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993, p. 10.
17. Phean, J.L., *The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century: Bureaucratic Politics in the Spanish Empire*, Madison, WI and London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967, p. 124.
18. Haring, C.H., *The Spanish Empire in America*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1947, pp. 114-115.
19. Phean, J.L., "Authority and Flexibility in Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy", *Administrative Science Quarterly* 5, 1960, pp. 47-65.
20. Quoted in Haring, 1947, pp. 5-6.
21. Figures taken based on New Spain. See Cañeque, 2004, p. 17.
22. Calabria, A., *The Cost of Empire: The Finances of the Kingdom of Naples in the Time of Spanish Rule*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 37.
23. Galasso, G., "Trends and Problems in Neapolitan History in the Age of Charles V", in Calabria, A. and J.A. Marino, eds., *Good Government in Spanish Naples*, New York, NY: Lang, 1990, pp. 43-44. See also his *Alla periferia dell'impero. Il Regno di Napoli nel periodo Spagnolo (secoli XVI-XVII)*, Turin: Einaudi, 1994.
24. Elliott, J.H., "A Provincial Aristocracy: The Catalan Ruling Class in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century", in Elliott, ed., 1989, p. 90; as Elliott has observed elsewhere, Neapolitan elites employed "substantial leverage, which could be used on the one hand to exert pressure on the crown, and on the other to extend their social and economic dominance over their own communities". See Elliott, 1992, p. 56.
25. See Yun Casalilla, B., "The Castilian Aristocracy in the Seventeenth Century: Crisis, Retendalisation or Political Offensive?" in Yun Casalilla and I.A.A. Thompson, eds., *The Castilian Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: New Perspectives on the Economic and Social History of Seventeenth Century Spain*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; the similarities to the Portuguese case are striking. See Bouza Álvarez, F., *Portugal no Tempo dos Filipes: Política, Cultura, Representações (1580-1668)*, Lisbon: Cosmos, 2000.
26. Guarino, 2004, p. 21. Dandeleit and Marino have recently made a similar point: "the *pax hispanica* in Italy was not only the result of military pacification, but also in large measure a product of this reciprocal exchange under Spanish imperial rule". See Dandeleit and Marino, "Introduction" 2007, p. 7.
27. Parker, G., *Philip II*, 4th ed., Chicago, IL: Open Court, 2002, pp. 178-179.
28. Elliott, J.H., *Richelieu and Olivares*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 63-64.
29. Quoted in Pujol, X.G., "Un Rey, una Fe, Muchas Naciones: Patria y Nación en la España de los Siglos XVI y XVII", in Alvarez-Ossorio, A. et al., eds., *La Monarquía de las Naciones*, Madrid: Fundación Carlos de Amberes, 2004, p. 64.
30. Elliott, J.H., *The Court-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline*, New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1986, pp. 193-197 *passim*; see also Stradling, R.A., *Philip IV and the Government of Spain 1621-1665*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
31. Calabria, 2001, p. 45.
32. Villari, 1993, *Naples*, p. 4.
33. Marino, J., "The Rural World in Italy under Spanish Rule", in Dandeleit and Marino, eds., 2007, p. 429.

34. Interestingly, efforts to augment revenues in the short-term did not necessarily require raising taxes and other heavy-handed measures. In Castile in the 1620s and 1630s, "activities still administered directly by the state were turned over the private enterprise". See Thompson, L.A.A., "The Government of Spain in the Reign of Philip IV", in Thompson, ed., *Crown and Cortes: Government, Institutions and Representation in Early Modern Castile*, Aldershot: Variorum, 1993, p. 80.
35. Among other works on various aspects of these revolts and riots, see Elliott, J.H., *The Revolt of the Catalans: A Study in the Decline of Spain, 1598–1640*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963; Gelabert, J.E., *Castilla Convulsa (1631–1652)*, Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2001; and McFarlane, A., "Challenges from the Periphery: Rebellion in Colonial Spanish America", in Thomas, W., ed., *Rebelión y Resistencia en el Mundo Hispánico del Siglo XVII*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992.
36. Trevor-Roper, H.R., "The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century", in Trevor-Roper, *The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: Religion, the Reformation and Social Change*, New York: Harper & Row, 1968, p. 46. The "General Crisis" is the subject of an enormous scholarly literature and debate. For the most important assessments, see Koenigsberger, H.G., "The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: A Farewell?", in Koenigsberger, ed., *Politicians and Virtuosi: Essays in Early Modern History*, London: Hambledon Press, 1986; Parker, G., "Crisis and Catastrophe: The Global Crisis of the Seventeenth Century Reconsidered", *American Historical Review* 113, 2008, pp. 1053–1079; and Elliott, J.H., "The General Crisis in Retrospect: A Debate without End", in Elliott, ed., *Spain, Europe, and the Wider World 1500–1800*, New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2009.
37. Elliott, J.H., "Foreign Policy and Domestic Crisis: Spain, 1598–1659", in Elliott, ed., 1989, p. 132. There were notable losses, of course: the northern Netherlands (1648), Jamaica (1655), and the western half of Hispaniola (1664).
38. Kagan, R. and G. Parker, "Introduction: The Centre and the Periphery", in Kagan and Parker, eds, *Spain, Europe, and the Atlantic World: Essays in Honour of J.H. Elliott*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 24.
39. Koenigsberger, H.G., "Dominium Regale or Dominium Politicum et Regale: Monarchies and Parliaments in Early Modern Europe", in Koenigsberger, ed., 1986, p. 13.
40. Storr, C., *The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy, 1665–1700*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

2

The Vicaria Prison of Naples in the Time of Antonio Serra

Francesca De Rosa

1 Corruption and crimes in the cellars of Castel Capuano

The Vicaria Prison of Naples, the largest of the Kingdom, was housed in the cellars of Castel Capuano from 1537, when the Viceroy Pedro de Toledo determined that the various law courts scattered throughout the Capital should be concentrated in one place.¹ However, the Viceroy's aim of centralizing the administration of justice was fully implemented only in 1540, when the four *wheels* of the Vicaria (two criminal and two civil) – the Collaterale, the Sommaria, the Zecca, and the Bagliva – were brought together and began functioning in the new premises.² Meanwhile the prison, serving as a drain to collect "all the woes of the Kingdom", had – as we have seen – already been functioning for some years. In 1692 Carlo Celano wrote:

Under these Courts of Law are the prisons; and there have at times been as many as two thousand prisoners or more, for incarcerated here are not only the prisoners of the City, but also of the entire Kingdom.³

The area serving for imprisonment was occupied by vast rooms and broad corridors where the prisoners were separated according to the type of crime they had committed; these rooms also housed the poor and the homeless. A description of these places was provided in a long Report, dated 1674, on the *State of the prisons of the G.C. of the Vicaria of Naples before the year 1609 and the changes brought about and maintained to the present year of 1674 by the permanent commission instituted by the Fathers of the Society of Jesus and the constant protection accorded to the mission by the ministers of the Kingdom*. This report, conserved by