

Pakistan's total export earnings from other sources and amounted to over half the foreign exchange cost of the country's imports.

141 Imperial measures have given way to metric in the post-colonial era. The prime task of the Metre Convention is to secure agreement on uniform standards because 80 per cent of world trade in finished goods involves measurement. If this goal is to be achieved, the United States will have to adopt the metric system. See the *Financial Times*, 20 May 2000, p. 11.

142 Robert Brenner, 'Uneven Development and the Long Downturn: The Advanced Capitalist Economies from Boom to Stagnation, 1950–1998', *New Left Review*, 229 (1998), pp. 1–265.

143 Cox, 'Perspective on Globalization', pp. 21–2.

144 Immanuel Wallerstein, 'States? Sovereignty? The Dilemmas of Capitalism in an Age of Transition', in Smith *et al.*, *States and Sovereignty*, pp. 20–33; quotations on pp. 32 and 33.

145 Castells, *The Information Age*, vol. 3, pp. 164–5.

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'Archaic' and 'Modern' Globalization in the Eurasian and African Arena, c. 1750–1850

In 1771 Captain James Cook crossed the Pacific on HMS *Endeavour* looking for specimens, taking sightings and observing peoples. He sailed to the coast of Java, already long controlled by the Dutch East India Company. He had taken with him his interpreter and intermediary from the Pacific island of Tahiti, a man called Tupia. Cook and Tupia landed at the East India Company's great emporium of Batavia, now Jakarta. Cook's journal reads:

Of all the circumstances which engaged the attention of Tupia, nothing struck him so much as the variety of dresses worn by the inhabitants of Batavia; he enquired the reason of what appeared to be so extraordinary in his eyes, and being told that the people were of a variety of nations, and that all were dressed according to the mode of their own country, he requested permission to follow the fashion; this request being readily complied with, a person was despatched to the ship for some South Sea cloth, with which he soon clothed himself in the dress of Otaheite.¹

This is a description of 'first contact' under the general rubric of globalization. The arena was an east Asian emporium which in most respects still functioned as any other of the great trading marts of the Mataram empire or, earlier, of the Hinduized state of Srivijaya which preceded it. Ethnic and cultural difference was marked through variety of dress, language and deportment. A newcomer from a completely alien cultural area was able immediately to understand the logic underlying this. By wearing his own dress and adapting his deportment to that of others in the city, Tupia was able to merge into his new environment. But there was no homogenization of styles, no aspiration to a common European or local ethnic norm. Tupia's sartorial cosmopolitanism was one among the processes which constituted what I shall call 'archaic globalization'. In another, more sombre, way Tupia became a

symbol of the consequences of such global connections. Within the space of a few days he had died from a disease which was raging in the city, one among innumerable victims of the illnesses which had always spread over huge distances down the inter-regional trade routes.²

The encounter in Batavia was also symbolic of the confluence of older forms of globalization with proto-globalization: systems of trade and political organization which had been more recently generated at the heart of the developing capitalist world economy. Most of the capital accumulated in Batavia was of local origin, even when it was in the hands of the Dutch East India Company. But Amsterdam merchants and the London financiers, who already held a large stake in the Dutch capital markets, had made small but significant long-distance direct investments in regional trades. The Dutch East India Company had attempted to 'internalize protection costs' in the words of Niels Steensgaard³ by producing a modern system of accounting which included military costs. Standing alongside Tupia and James Cook was one 'Mr Banks', a scientific observer whose project to categorize the whole of natural history and human society represented the beginnings of modern state-sponsored scientific and anthropological research in Britain.⁴ A few months later Sir Joshua Reynolds drew a portrait of Tupia's countryman, Omai, who had survived the voyage.⁵ Omai was shown in the flowing robes and turban of an eastern Raja, not the stiff, pounded bark product, 'south sea cloth'. The Tahitian was thus absorbed into the universal visual categories of the European Enlightenment. Finally, the voyage across the Pacific was more than a benign humanistic exploration. Cook's voyages, along with those of his French *alter ego*, Admiral Bougainville, marked the beginning of the export to the region of the vicious conflicts between European nation states which were to partition the world over the next 150 years.⁶

This essay seeks to isolate in time and discuss the logic of archaic forms of globalization and to show how they were subordinated by, but sometimes empowered, the modern forms of globalization which were emerging from the Atlantic world economy and the western European nation state at this time.⁷ The broad scheme of the essay apparently bears some similarities to that employed two decades ago by Immanuel Wallerstein.⁸ The difference is that I discuss a wider range of agents of what he called 'world empires' and 'the Atlantic world-economy' in action and inter-action over a particular period of time. In doing this, I seek to avoid the rigid teleology of his approach. I intend to show that the agents of archaic globalization could become active forces in the expansion of the Euro-American-dominated world economy and even survive and transcend it. Equally, I do not attempt to erase the competitive difference between Europe and other world civilizations in the early modern period, as André Gunder Frank so resolutely does in *ReOrientate*.⁹

Does the concept of globalization offer anything to historical debates which have long discussed the 'expansion of Europe', 'the Atlantic world economy' and 'Asia before Europe'?¹⁰ The concept of globalization – a progressive

increase in the scale of social processes from a local or regional to a world level – became fashionable because a variety of disciplines came to realize that the study of the village, province, nation state or regional bloc of human communities was inadequate to capture causation even within the 'fragment'. Economists concluded that international flows of capital were becoming so massive that no single government could control them. Anthropologists realized that even small and apparently isolated communities were now directly linked to each other and to the wider society through television, the mobile telephone, the internet and population movements. Sociologists recognized that diaspora and refugee communities were as worthy of study as the working classes of particular Western countries. Writers in the broad area of 'cultural studies' noticed that symbols of American consumer culture were now universal, but that baseball hat, trainers and Pokemon cards came to mean different things when transplanted to the Philippines or Inner Mongolia. In a memorable metaphor, Arjun Appadurai concluded that the global did not eliminate the local, but that the local and the global 'cannibalized' each other.¹¹

In its most useful sense, 'globalization' is a heuristic device, not a description of linear social change. It draws attention to dynamics that transcend the old units of analysis in different academic fields and attempts to quantify or to model them. While at some periods globalization might appear to be a linear process, it was at best a very discontinuous one. Archaic globalization was itself a ruptured process, set back by the fall of ancient empires and the Mongol invasions. A new phase probably began in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, as Janet Abu Lughod has proposed.¹² This phase did not flow smoothly into proto-globalization and on into modern globalization. The shift between these forms was accompanied by disruptions in patterns of politics, cultures and economies. Periods when global interactions increased were followed by periods when these links were reduced or severed. Globalization had always stimulated countervailing trends to regionalism and localism.

Despite their apparent muteness in this debate,¹³ some historians have long been studying varieties of globalization in practice. Imperial historians,¹⁴ historians of international trade,¹⁵ historical geographers of species diffusion¹⁶ and historians of Islam¹⁷ and Christianity¹⁸ have all analysed globalization without benefit of modish jargon. The concept, however, holds out advantages for them since it points up a number of linkages between discrete disciplinary sub-fields and isolates a number of geographical and temporal convergences which need to be investigated more closely by historians. For instance, one feature of recent economic history and social anthropology, which could well be developed by world historians, is the relationship between new patterns of consumption and new patterns of production and trade. Jan de Vries¹⁹ argues that 'industrious revolutions' in consumption values and the disposition of family labour were perhaps more fundamental even than 'industrial revolutions' in the creation of economic modernity. But his is a resolutely

Eurocentric view at present. Some historians and anthropologists have examined the cultural logic behind patterns of changing consumption outside Europe.²⁰ But we still have little idea of how culture, consumption and trade facilitated the expansion of Asian, African and, ultimately, European trade in the early modern period.

World economic and social history has been built around a centre-periphery polarity which was one of the problems with Wallerstein's approach. The concept of globalization helps us to remember that for centuries it was not clear what was the 'centre' and what the 'periphery'. Even after strong centralizing impetuses were generated by European capitalism in the early nineteenth century, forms of archaic globalization were still flowing strongly. In time, these could even generate their own centripetal forces. For instance, 'European expansion' before 1850 was accompanied by a Chinese diaspora and had been preceded by Arab and Gujarati Hindu diasporas. These networks of marriage, communication and credit have, in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, served as agents of post-imperial globalization themselves.

This essay aims to illustrate some of these themes for the years 1750–1850 by deploying broad ideal types. This was a critical period because, even before the general diffusion of the electric telegraph, steamship or refrigerated transport between 1850 and 1880, the speed of the consignment and despatch of goods in international trade and government had apparently increased very substantially. The beginnings of the modern international system were driven, therefore, not so much by technological change, but by prior political and cultural change during what I have called 'the first age of global imperialism'.²¹ The argument is that the period saw the subordination of older forms of globalization to new and yet inchoate ones emerging from Euro-American capitalism and the nation state. An essential feature of this proto-globalization was its continued utilization, or 'cannibalization' of forms of archaic globalization.

The Logics and Geography of 'Archaic Globalization'

The ideologies which were formative of modern globalization comprise at core nationalism, capitalism, democracy and consumerism. Before analysing the agents of the archaic globalization which linked much of Eurasia and northern Africa until the mid-nineteenth century, it would be useful to consider in abstract some of the ideologies and bodily practices which underpinned it. This will provide important indications of the nature of earlier global linkages and help to distinguish them from modern processes. Three linked ideologies appear to have inflected the activities of archaic consumers and producers from Europe and northern Africa to China and the Pacific, underpinning old globalization: the notion of cosmic kingship; universal religion and humoral understandings of the body and the land.

The idea of cosmic kingship stands in distinction to the more modern concept of the territorial nation state based on assumed ethnicity. It consequently set different cultural rules for consumption. The Chinese empire is the best-known example of the historic claim to universal rule or the Mandate of Heaven.²² Recently, scholars have reminded us that the Qing also continued to see themselves as Manchu world conquerors, as great Khans whose rights and obligations extended to Tibet and central Asia as well as to the whole of Southeast Asia. The Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal emperors also blended together the concept of the Second Rome and succession to the Caliphate, both globalizing concepts.²³ Like the Qing, the Indian and central Asian Mughals also saw themselves as world conquerors endowed as a family with the light of God. Pre-modern European empires shared some aspects of this mentality, combining the duty of spreading Christ's dominion with the power of Rome, as Antony Pagden²⁴ showed for the Spanish and Portuguese empires.

Besides legitimating long-distance conquests, these claims encouraged pre-modern kings to 'cherish men from afar', to try to create inventories of universal knowledge and universal history and to consume tribute goods and choice products from beyond the boundaries of their immediate realms. The universal King was lord over the variety of God's creation: a myriad of holy sites, products, animals and men. His aim was to aggregate and order, not to assimilate this God-given variety into one.

This common ideology also inflected the logic behind royal consumption over much of Asia and beyond, bringing large quantities of graded goods and products into treasuries each tagged and docketed with the name of the ruler, chief and region from which it came and the auspiciousness of the day on which it was received.²⁵ But these patterns extended downwards through the courts of the nobles to the behaviour of the petty rulers and big men of the localities. It created a nexus of consumption, tribute-giving and gift exchange. Within it, the special qualities and savour of a great range of local producing units across the whole of Eurasia, stretching out into Africa and the Pacific, were preserved and cherished for their difference. In turn, this pattern underpinned the international trade of the great overland caravan traders and the sea-borne trading powers which will be discussed below.

Particular cultural and economic patterns created subtly different patterns of exotic consumption and deportment. The dress code and accoutrements of the Ming and Qing Chinese scholar gentry were generated out of a historicized notion of Confucian propriety which prized the discrimination of scholars as opposed to the vulgar acquisitions of the merely rich.²⁶ This evidently differed from the west Asian pattern of Islamic dress and consumption espoused by Safavid or Mughal rulers and passed on to their subjects.²⁷ But the implications for global trade, exchange and knowledge were equally profound. So, for instance, otter furs from what is now Bangladesh were traded as far as Beijing and northward between 1600 and 1800 because fine fur-trimming was

a seemingly form of dress depicted in Chinese painting of revered, earlier dynasties.²⁸ Rosewood Quran rests, prayer mats, precious books and scribes came into Mughal and post-Mughal India and Southeast Asia from the Middle East, bearing the charisma of the earliest realms of the Prophet's message. The movement of specialist and knowledgeable counsellors and administrative servants followed similar patterns, so that Persian families were found taking high office in Southeast Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.²⁹ The Kashmir shawl, this region's finest product, became part of its tribute to Delhi. Mughal emperors passed shawls down to their subjects in rituals of royal incorporation. They became articles of prized consumption by aristocrats and even village leaders across Eurasia. Kashmiri scholars, administrators and intellectuals serving across the empire embodied these links.

These cultural integers of consumption therefore differed from modern capitalist consumption in that they emphasized the special products and qualities of distant realms. Whereas modern complexity demands the uniformity of Levis and trainers, the archaic simplicity of everyday life demanded that great men prized difference in goods, learned servants, women and animals and sought to capture their qualities. Modern 'positional' goods are self-referential to themselves and to the markets that create demand for them; the charismatic goods of archaic globalization were embedded in ideologies which transcended them. In one sense archaic lords and rural leaders were collectors, rather than consumers. What they did, however, was more than merely to collect because the people, objects, foods, garments and styles of deportment thus assembled changed the substance of the collector.

Secondly, archaic globalization was structured by the idea of cosmic religion. Great teachers had been given broad and concentric spiritual domains by God. This underlay a very different pattern from that of the national religious missions of the nineteenth century. All the major world 'religions' or, rather, cults, conceived of a world centred on places of special spiritual power, whether Jerusalem, Boddh Gaya or Mecca. All religions viewed prayer and sacrifice at these centres as specially efficacious thus supporting both traditions of lifelong eremitism and short-term pilgrimage. The world was, therefore, dotted with the traces of God and God-driven men. Wandering renouncers travelled huge distances bringing news from one place to another. Sufi orders, archaic globalizers *par excellence*, spread across Eurasia and Africa. Hindu renouncers visited shrines in central Hungary and Russia; Chinese Christians travelled to Jerusalem. By 1600, great periodic pilgrimages had brought into being a large infrastructure of transport, victualling and credit systems, making a large contribution to international trade. Hadhramauti Sayyids travelled to Southeast Asia and Javanese and Sumatran pilgrims returned to the Arabian peninsula in large numbers.³⁰ In a more sinister sense, the semi-observed Islamic command to take slaves from among non-believers pushed out Muslim armies and traders beyond the bounds of the *dār-al islām*, into

sub-Saharan Africa³¹ and even as far as Ireland and Iceland, where the 'Barbary Pirates' raided as late as the seventeenth century.

Religious ideas penetrated to the level of bodily practice and modified consumption and trade. Clothing was influenced by religious norms. So too was food. In most Eurasian societies the 'royal table' of meat, game and wine products was set in contrast to the 'sacral table' of religiously sanctioned products. For instance, sugar played a part in Chinese ritual and this slowly domesticated it as a purely pleasurable consumable.³² Japanese fish food bore the imprint of Shinto sacrifice, its cooks remaining priests of the kitchen. Ancient firms producing soy sauce bear witness to the economic importance of this pattern.³³ Brahminical food restrictions in India and old Southeast Asia powered the global spice trade.³⁴ The medieval western European fishing industry was supported by the needs of societies which could be legitimately abjured to switch from the royal to the sacral table once a week on Fridays in commemoration of Christ's Passion.

Thirdly, archaic biomedical and astrological systems designed to fortify the body and the land and to improve the individual's control over the future were predicated on notions of consonance between certain moral states and certain objects and natural products. Until late in the eighteenth century the central physiological and agricultural doctrines of Eurasia and Africa were humoured and had been generated from an ancient dialogue between China, the Islamic world and the inheritance of ancient Greece.³⁵ This put a premium on different types of medicinal plant, spice, precious metal or precious stone. The huge value commanded by these products was another stimulant to global trade and gift exchange, bringing disparate regions together with one another. The cultural logic underlying this notion of consonance between humours and substances³⁶ differed both from the fetishism of precious objects as signifiers of wealth and from the universalizing principles of modern medicine. The objects themselves were expected to transform the biomoral substance of the wearer. This idea still lies behind contemporary trade in rhinoceros horns, for instance. In this, its leading assumptions are in flat opposition to modern ecology which aims to protect, rather than strategically to consume diversity.

These cultural preferences for consumption were archaic, but not static. By the seventeenth century six newly desired products greatly modified the older types of consumption and acted as a breach through which the forces of European-led proto-globalization were ultimately to surge. Refined sugar, tobacco, tea, coffee and opium galvanized these earlier systems of consumption, trade and cultural exchange.³⁷ None was widely used throughout Eurasia before the fifteenth century. All five had become firmly entrenched in the world's major consuming centres before 1800. All five could be seen as 'addictive' commodities, in a chemical sense. But that is an inadequate explanation for their popularity. As sociologists from Werner Sombart³⁸ onward have pointed out, their consumption took place in certain cultural sites: in leisured courtly salons, in newly constituted units of household labour

and in new forms of sociable public space. To Jan de Vries's idea of 'industrious revolutions' we could add 'revolutions of sociability', which brought into being simultaneously London coffee houses and Chinese opium parlours.³⁹ These commodities, though the harbingers of modern capitalism and colonialism in Eurasia and Africa, also fitted into the biomoral logic previously discussed. They were expected to enhance taste, health, mental acuteness and sexual pleasure and to improve the quality of archaic lordship.

Finally, silver and gold, key catalysts to the velocity of global trade had something of this two-sided aspect: they responded to the values of archaic consumption but also pressaged proto-globalization and market-driven exchange. The building-up of hoards in royal and family possession was an aspect of archaic consumption.⁴⁰ At the same time, the widening use of money in the early modern period across the world was a marker of the growth of the state. The currencies of all the Eurasian empires were dependent on imports from Mexico and Peru before 1700. But later, this archaic fiscal globalization was severely ruptured by consequences for the new world of the Napoleonic Wars. The collapse of the *ancien régime* in Europe was distantly linked to contemporary Asian convulsions. The end of the Spanish empire, for instance, helped to deepen the crisis which began with the White Lotus Rebellion in China.⁴¹ It exacerbated the problem of silver supply, already diminished by the outflow to cover imports of opium.

Some scholars have argued in regard to post-colonial globalization that it should really be seen as a process of regionalization. It is marked by the emergence of the European Union, the American free-trade area and other regional economic entities, rather than by a truly world flow of capital and trade. This idea has some resonance for archaic globalization which tended to link complementary zones together into regions. Social processes in central Asia had long spilled over periodically into India and China; Chinese taste, trade and forms of state-building pushed trade into the Nanyang, Southeast Asia. The sea slugs and birds' nests which drove entrepreneurs to the shores of Australia played very specific roles in Chinese scholar-gentry cuisine. But some relatively new inter-regional links, as far as large-scale trade and cultural exchange were concerned, seem to have developed in the period between 1500 and 1800. Indian influence and desire for household slaves and exotic trade goods integrated Southeast Asia and the 'Swahili coast' of Africa into the broader Indian Ocean with the growth after 1300 of large emporia such as Malindi in east Africa. Similarly, southern European commercial and political influences in the Mediterranean Sea and its southern hinterland increased markedly in the eighteenth century.

Some truly global linkages however, were established. As we know, silver exports across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans were the most striking case. The Portuguese overseas empire which displayed some features of an archaic thalassocracy writ large and some features of proto-capitalism was another case in point. By the eighteenth century, Indian blue cloth had become a mark of


honorific status in west Africa. Maori whalers had been settled in southern Africa. Cultural forms seem to have begun to transcend regions and become global, too. The Iberian notion of caste, *castas*, represented an old Mediterranean juridical status category melded with an Atlantic slave terminology which placed African slave blood in antithesis to Christian European purity.⁴² In the East, these concepts merged in turn with an Indian notion of purity and pollution which had already been filtered through the judicial categories of Muslim law. If the Indian 'caste system' was, indeed, an invented category, its invention was already well under way in the globalizing pre-modern society and did not await the coming of British imperialism to India.

'Economy' and 'Culture'


Here we should pause and ask what relations between the two abstractions 'culture' and 'economy' have been proposed thus far. This essay seeks to avoid simplistic cultural reductionism as well as simplistic economic reductionism by re-integrating value-driven and profit-driven approaches to archaic societies.⁴³ In a sense, all economic activity was and is 'cultural'. But that does not get us very far because with equal plausibility we might assert that all cultural activity is economic, as rigorous Marxists used to do. Instead, the chart overleaf attempts to chart what is implied by this essay. Certain products, such as basic grains and basic cloth were more or less universally required and universally produced in all pre-modern agrarian economies. Economic activities based on production and consumption at this level were predictable and differed little from one civilization to another. They were determined by the harvest, distance to markets, the relationship of supply and demand. Their exchange summoned up all the common attributes of economic man. By contrast, there were other products and patterns of consumption which were both geographically specific and heavily determined by cultural preference: Arab horses, other skins, certain types of medicinal spices and diamonds, for instance.⁴⁴ There were also products which carried a heavy freight of cultural value and reputation, but which were produced fairly evenly across regions: flowers and fruit, for instance.

Intermediate and long-distance trade in early modern Eurasia was not simply a matter of preciosities, as used to be said, though transport costs were critical. However, trades and complementary patterns of consumption with both a high geographical and high cultural specificity were disproportionately important in regional economies and in emerging patterns of global connection for a number of reasons. First, they attracted silver and gold as media of exchange: one preciosity attracts another. This focused the attention of states and their agents on exploiting and protecting such products. Secondly, their production involved the use of rare embodied labour skills, knowledge and reputation, which could not easily be reproduced. The opportunity cost of


A. 'Old' global society, c.1650 ('archaic globalization')



B. 'Early modern' global society, c.1750 ('proto-globalization')



C. Modern global society, c.1880



training a silk-weaver in a poor economy was very great. Eurasian rulers, therefore seized and 'repatriated' specialist weaving and artisan communities. There was little notion of the transfer of skills to their own populations through education or economic development: these are modern ideas. Labour was captured not trained. Conversely, rulers went to great lengths to protect the trade secrets of production and merchant intermediaries to promote the reputation of their products. The Republic of Venice, for instance, forbade the dissemination of the secrets of Murano glass factories on pain of death. Apocryphally, the factors of the East India Company cut off the thumbs of specialist Bengali weavers. Reputation and rarity ensured the development and continuation of global patterns of land and sea-borne trade in these commodities.

The first wedge of what the Introduction has termed proto-globalization was represented by the plantation and American slave system. This was designed to re-distribute what had been geographically specific commodity production and labour while maintaining reputation and the cultural specificity of consumption. Dutch and later English plantation-produced coffee, for instance, was soon cultivated in areas far distant from the old production areas of southern Arabia. But by controlling supply and maintaining the link between its consumption and elite sociability and medicinal reputation, the companies were able to ensure that coffee remained an expensive rarity which families locked away in hardwood boxes. Labour was coerced and new modes of production diffused at a global level, but the agents of early capitalism were happy to maintain archaic ideologies of consumption because this helped to increase profits, at least in the medium term.

Agents of old globalization and their modern fate

(1) TRIBAL DYNASTIC MIGRATIONS AND PIONEER HORSEMEN

This essay now moves on to examine some of the agents of archaic globalization in greater detail. It considers the form of their decline in the period of proto-globalization, but also shows how some of these agents persisted into the nineteenth century and beyond because they could play a functional role in the new world division of labour and knowledge.

First, the periodic irruption of nomadic soldiers, founding new dynasties, disrupting patterns of trade but eventually creating new politics and new commercial links, was an ancient feature of Eurasian and African society. Invasive warrior dynasts from Alexander and Attila through Genghis Khan and Tamberlaine to Nadir Shah⁴⁵ in the eighteenth century, were genuine agents of global change. They traversed huge tracts of land, bringing local, often tribal and shamanistic, practices to new regions. Their destruction or revamping of political systems brought into being new patterns of government.

This form of warrior globalization declined in importance between 1750 and 1850. By the end of the nineteenth century, it was reduced to a small-scale local phenomenon.

The eighteenth century in Asia still saw several important movements of this sort. The Persian King Nadir Shah attacked the Ottomans and struck deeply into India in 1739. He pulled together an alliance of free cavalry soldiers (*kazaks*) from the tribal groups of the Iranian and central Asian peripheries. In the 1750s and again in the 1790s, Durrani tribesmen from Afghanistan invaded and destabilized India, continuing an old pattern in which Pathan soldiers descended on the subcontinent and often settled there.⁴⁶ In the second half of the eighteenth century the Wahhabi tribal and religious movement of the Najd in the Arabian peninsula broke out into the satrapies of the Ottoman Empire. The holy places of Mecca, Medina and Karbala were sacked and the trade of Egypt threatened. Throughout, the expansion of the Tsarist empire was preceded by a form of tribal predatory settlement pioneered by the Cossacks. In Africa the *jihad* of Dan Fodio across west Africa in the 1820s displayed some of these features.⁴⁷

Historically, these movements had a number of features in common. Firstly, they were successful because they deployed a novel combination of men and weaponry. The horse-archer of the Mongols; the combination of heavy cavalry and artillery of the Manchus and Mughals; the Russian-style combination of fast cavalry and artillery of Nadir Shah – all these were innovations in their time. Secondly, these tribal globalizers combined military with economic power. By threatening trade routes valuable to urban centres of power in the settled territories, they could either starve or force their rulers to terms. Caches of captured silver allowed them to employ specialist soldiers, artisans and, later, administrators to police newly created realms. Thirdly, young men followed these dynastic invaders because the high valleys, the steppe and the desert fringes were too poor to support an expanding population. In time, as conquering elites in rich agricultural lands the new dynasts encouraged further outflows of young men from the marginal tracts which had once been their homes. Finally, in the Islamic context, the leaders of these great movements summoned up memories of the Prophet's progress to Medina, though Alexander, 'Iskander', was the most common exemplar.

In the eighteenth century these movements did not create new cosmic empires, as they had done earlier. They did, however, weaken the remaining old empires and they drove capital to the enclaves of the new Euro-American proto-global economy. Contemporaries noted that Bengal, for instance, was largely immune to the effects of Nadir's invasion,⁴⁸ but many Indian capitalists moved from Delhi, Agra and Lahore into the coastal territories where the English East India Company was increasingly powerful. An off-hand comment by Warren Hastings of 1786 suggests that the looting of north India's bullion had allowed Iran and Iraq to continue to purchase Indian goods in the latter part of the eighteenth century, so helping to maintain the Company's financial

health in western India.⁴⁹ The last spasms of this form of archaic globalization, therefore, seem to have aided the financial empowerment of the new quasi-capitalist European one.

Zaman Shah Durrani's invasion of India in 1798 was perhaps the last flicker of these old pan-Eurasian bush fires. Why then did this pattern of global change decline in the nineteenth century? The reason was partly a military one. The new European-style armies, including the troops of Muhammad Ali in Egypt and the rulers of early Qajar Iran could stop tribal cavalry charges dead and outgun tribal artillery. The British in India and the French in north Africa created stud farms to breed big Arab horses which outclassed the wiry nomadic horses of central Asia or the Sahara. Again, the extractive nature of the new colonial and para-colonial regimes gave them resources and a degree of credit much greater than those of the older polities; hence they were less vulnerable to predatory attack. But, thirdly, the political and military policies of the colonial and para-colonial powers allowed them to avoid the 'locust-like' massing of small tribal warbands into larger coalitions. Political officers and military governors kept the tribesmen divided and ruled. Recruiting officers coralled the younger sons into tribal regiments of the colonial governments. In the early stages of European colonial empires, these cavalry bands were still employed to extract political tribute for the European rulers. But the context in which they operated had changed out of recognition.

(2) MERCHANT DIASPORAS AND SEA-BORNE TRADING POWERS

In the case of the tribal raiding movements, the individual free cavalryman was the basic unit. Cavalrymen massed together on lines of kinship and patronage under the aegis of a great war leader. Another distinct type of archaic globalization consisted in the linked long-distant networks of sea-borne merchant communities. Here the basic unit was the shipowning captain, or partnership of merchant and shipowner. But these units bonded together in 'shoals' (the equivalent of the land-based 'locust' phenomenon) under the aegis of port kings or corporations who offered them protection and well-fortified central places within which to trade. These long-distant trading communities were communities of mercantile trust, sometimes underpinned by long-range marriage connections and often by common religious confession. Much has been written to show how Islam acted as a bonding agent across the whole area from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean to the Indonesian archipelago.⁵⁰ But beneath this broad umbrella of similarity in religious practice, there existed many smaller communities defined by a loose allegiance to a common headman, prince or sultan who embodied a degree of religious authority. Networks of mosques and the tombs or hospices of Sufi teachers acted as the central places where these communities overlapped with each other. As with the great tribal leaders of the nomadic-warrior caravans or armed bands, big commercial men were able to fund and support shipowners and smaller

merchants, so concentrating power and authority and giving these diasporic communities a degree of internal political coherence.

In the seventeenth century and early eighteenth century, these linked communities formed a commercial ecumene from the north-west African coast to the northern tip of Australia and Mozambique. The most important sea-borne trading powers or thalassocracies which dominated the trading life of the seventeenth century were the Beys of Algiers (the 'Barbary Pirates'), the Knights of St John of Malta, the Republic of Venice, the Greek merchants of the Dodecanese, the Arabs of Muskat and Oman, the Bohras of the western Indian coast and the Bugis of the Malay world.⁵¹ All of these corporations or sea-borne monarchies were formerly subject to great external emperors or kings, but they all retained considerable local political power and the power to arbitrate commercial disputes.

This form of sea-borne commercial culture survived into the nineteenth century. As Rajat Ray⁵² has shown, the maritime bazaar economy formed an essential underpinning of the expansion of capitalist finance and production across the Eurasian and north African world throughout the colonial period. In many respects it was more resilient than the larger and newer capitalist enterprises that overlay it and weathered the slumps in the north Atlantic economy better. Still, the dominant trend was for the subordination of the old-style merchant diasporas and thalassocracies to larger forms of state and commerce. This was in part the result of a long-term change in economic management. Niels Steensgaard argued that the Portuguese 'sea-borne empire' was in effect a version of pre-modern thalassocracy writ large. He went on to suggest that by 'internalising protection costs' the Dutch effectively replaced this type of international peddling trade with something more like capitalist production.⁵³ Here production is adjusted to raise final prices to the consumer at an international level and to suppress local production costs. K.N. Chaudhuri followed this by showing that the English East India Company was able to exert a surprising degree of control over purchase of its cotton goods in India and sale in Europe. It was in fact, capable of the fine price control which characterize modern corporations.⁵⁴

The deployment of new forms of political authority and military power was equally important in the decline of the thalassocracies. Studies of the Mediterranean have shown that the great powers were already beginning to exercise a form of proto-nationalist hegemony in the early eighteenth century.⁵⁵ French control over trade was diminishing the room for manoeuvre of the Knights of Malta and the Venetians. Meanwhile, the Ottoman government was extending its control over the eastern Mediterranean. Further east, the British in Bombay were flexing their muscles against the mercantile kingdoms in an attempt to force down the prices of Mocha coffee.⁵⁶

By 1830, despite a temporary revival of Muscat and the Bugis during the Napoleonic Wars, indigenous shipping and the old indigenous merchants of the coast and the port kings were all in full decline again.⁵⁷ The dominance of

the Royal Navy (and to a much lesser extent of the French and Ottoman navies) had been confirmed. Punitive action by the British against the Muskat Arabs and Bugis, by the Americans against the Barbary pirates, along with the ending of the rule of the Knights of Malta, had circumscribed the political power of the older forms of mercantile community. Indigenous shipping found increasing difficulty in finding insurers and meeting the legal requirements imposed by European mercantile law. Many of these changes were in place before the major technical changes which accompanied the steamship and the electric telegraph in the 1840s. By 1860 the bulk of world shipping was controlled by the merchant fleets of the great European powers and the United States with the result that the older sea-borne trading powers were reduced to the status of local adjuncts to a system of maritime finance and control which was based on London, Amsterdam, New York and Marseilles.

(3) THE LAND CARAVAN TRADE

Similar in structure to the thalassocracies were the extensive networks of the great land-based merchants operating across Eurasia since the time of the silk-route. At the height of the Islamic and early Tsarist empires, these may well have accounted for a considerable element of global trade. Items of exceptionally high value, such as Arab horses, medicines and silks, passed along these routes. Their importance was enhanced by the important role they played in distributing new-world silver from western and central Europe through the Middle East to India and China. Silver and gold were attracted in large quantities to India where it became stores of value in the form of family jewellery.

The merchants operating on these routes were varied and trade was by no means entirely circumscribed by ethnic-legal categories. Still, among the most important traders were the Armenians who fanned out from the Iranian city of Julfa, westward into the Ottoman Empire and Russia and eastward through India as far as Burma and Thailand.⁵⁸ Armenian families were prominent in eighteenth-century Burma, for instance, where they played a major part in the trade in raw cotton, birds' nests and sea-slugs into western China. Muslim Kashmiri traders plied routes from eastern India through Tibet into central Asia. Indian Khattri and Sindhi merchants traded down into south India and up into Russian central Asia where they had a large colony in Astrakhan on the Caspian sea.⁵⁹ These traders are best described as medium-term diasporic communities. Family members went off to run branch agencies in distant cities for five years or more, sometimes marrying local women, but eventually returning to their home cities. Inter-regional movements of this sort generalized sophisticated double-entry bookkeeping methods along with disciplines of accountancy and categorization. In some cases, they diffused new forms of religious observance.

As with the thalassocracies, these agents of archaic globalization suffered

both a cyclical and a structural decline in the period from 1750 to 1850. They had flourished with the rise of the Islamic world empires and had contributed to their growth. The fragmentation of these polities raised protection costs against them. While every individual regional or local ruler may have had an interest in keeping trade flowing, no one had the authority to enforce their protection as a common good. Exactions severely damaged these trades and the patterns of cultural exchange which accompanied them. The general crisis of the towns of Iran, central Asia and north India affected them,⁶⁰ as did the colonialism. It seems possible, too, that the severe specie crisis caused first by the East India Company's halt to bullion imports into India after 1757 and later by the collapse of production in Mexican and Peruvian mines after 1805 acted to choke off commerce. At the same time, the economies of scale and protection costs offered by the British domination of sea-trade after 1805 meant that sea-trade increasingly outstripped land-trade, fortified as it was with better systems of insurance and quality control.

Similar merchant communities did, of course, continue to trade in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Claude Markovits has recently shown how Sindhi traders linked the manufacture of Japanese exotica with clients in Egypt and even as far afield as central America in the late nineteenth century. At the same time they penetrated deeply into Russia, raising administrative difficulties for the British and Russian empires.⁶¹ But such communities were definitely subordinate to the wider structure of the European capital markets, manufacturing system and national and imperial states. It is perhaps true that the modern descendants of some of the most archaic diasporas have rediscovered their independence in the era of post-colonial globalization. Yet the international division of labour and global information order in which they operate is now so radically different that continuities remain only at the level of language, legend and worship.

Responses to Archaic Globalization

The various globalizing agents discussed here have long been considered by specialist historians. What 'globalization' as a heuristic device may be able to do is to cause them to be viewed in a different light. Rather than being 'noises off' in the history of the expansion of Europe or fodder for study in the more pettifogging of departments of Oriental Studies, they can be better seen as integral dimensions of archaic globalization, that is of a pattern of commerce and culture with a degree of functional coherence.

The same may be true of the relationship between old globalization and the local. An essential part of the model of modern globalization is the assumption that the global and the local are in constant dialogue and conflict. One informs

the other; neither is prior to the other. Thus José Bove the French environmental activist or 'Gandhi des Brebis', is a 'construction' of 'McDonald-ization', rather than being an organic representative of 'la France profonde' perduring through history. This is of relevance to historians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who may need to reassign the weight given to external, globalizing phenomena in their understanding of the development of the early modern state or the regional identities which preceded the nineteenth century.

It is true that some historians have always assigned great weight to such forces in their accounts of the development of particular culture areas or proto-nations. Most historians of Southeast Asia, but notably Anthony Reid,⁶² have persistently argued that diaspora and international trade have been critical factors in the creation of 'Indonesian' states and identities. Again, some historians of the Islamic world such as Marshall Hodgson and Andre Wink⁶³ have gone very far in tying all developments in Islamic Eurasia and Africa to the international spread of trade, Islam and gunpowder. On the other hand, most histories are still predicated on the assumption that it was essentially internal developments, such as the growth of agricultural production, internal class formation and the movement from lineage to state, which determined the emergence of proto-nations, be they England or Syria. External factors have generally been seen as contingent.

Though we cannot develop the point very far here, the concept of archaic globalization may give a different picture of the emergence of the early modern state and early modern patriotic identities. In a negative sense, for instance, the periodic irruptions of 'the Turk' from the outside world into India, Iran, China and the Arab lands seem to have been an important force in the creation of the fluid senses of regional identity and patriotism which were apparent even before the eighteenth century in these societies.⁶⁴ By the eighteenth century the Indian Marathas, laying claim to the mantle of the Mughals, asserted that 'no king of Iran or Turan has ever held dominion in Hindustan'⁶⁵ in response to Nadir Shah's incursion. Again, Sri Lankan historians have shown how far a Sri Lankan patriotism had come into being before 1750, defined in part by the perceived twin threat from Tamil south India and the Portuguese.⁶⁶

On the positive side, the speed of state-building in India, China and Southeast Asia between 1500 and 1800 was greatly increased by the influx of precious metals along a myriad of trade routes, including the overland caravan and sea-borne links. Military technology which spread faster even than bullion also helped Asian and African state-builders. Often it was disseminated from Chinese or Ottoman, rather than from European sources. Here knowledge from the wider world was turned inward to build stronger regional powers.⁶⁷ Historical data reinterpreted in this light might help to put African and Asian state-building into the same broad context as Europe's where recent work has

emphasized again the importance of inter-state relations and global conflict in the formation of 'enlightened despotisms'.

Proto-globalization: The Origins of Modern Globalization

When Tupia the Tahitian came to Batavia he fitted into a dimension of this archaic pattern of globalization, becoming representative of another 'nation' of long-distance merchant communities in a multi-ethnic emporium. But, by the eighteenth century, there were distinctly new forces creating parallel and encompassing patterns of globalization. These were in some respects new in scale, in some respects new in quality. Tupia was carried into the Dutch East Indies on Cook's *Endeavour* which represented these forces.

There had long been merchant capitalism across the breadth of Eurasia. Indian, Chinese and Arab merchant communities had developed complex systems of credit and double-entry bookkeeping which paralleled those of Europe. Governments struggled to control the unintended moral consequences of the expansion of commerce which larger states and the spread of archaic consumption entailed.⁶⁸ What distinguished eighteenth-century Europe, the Caribbean and the east coast of north America in the era of proto-globalization, however, was the way in which capitalist relations of production had expanded in scale. By the eighteenth century large sections of whole societies were fully geared to the reproduction of capital. The disposition of land, labour and status operated increasingly through the market. The cultural logics of consumption were driven by the need to display wealth as an external indication of a homogenized social power. It ceased to be a mark of actual bodily practice.⁶⁹ Taste was driven by the teaching of the market by advertising, rather than by the search for affinities and the matching of products to persons.

In this period, the global reach of the European companies and financiers also greatly increased. Direct foreign investment was beginning to overtake the earlier form of local partnership or *commenda*, which had served European adventurers abroad. The most globalized dimension of this proto-capitalist economy was the Atlantic plantation system, especially as it became predominantly a slave-labour system after the mid seventeenth century. While brutal forms of primitive accumulation and the looting of labour underpinned it, the plantations saw new flexible patterns of management, labour control over time, and middle-level technologies. They were vast estates run for profit, central to Britain's creditworthiness.⁷⁰ Management was often divorced from ownership and finance, which was a typically 'modern' pattern of business. Protection was guaranteed by the British, French and Dutch states. The distribution of the produce of the plantations was regularized through large-scale marketing, and increasingly in the eighteenth century novel systems for raising finance, insurance and advertising sales came into vogue. Large

economies of scale in shipping and transport were possible on the Atlantic routes and these advantages were deployed at a global level. Cook's junior officer, William Bligh, soon visited Tupia's relatives in search of calorific economies of scale in slave food.

Most important, perhaps, to new globalization was the re-orientation of consumption captured well in de Vries's theory of 'industrious revolutions'. The plantation system flattened out the picture of geographical specificity portrayed in the chart by generalizing the production of commodities, such as sugar, tobacco and tea, over a much wider geographical area. With the later development of beet sugar, production became universal. Even fine-cloth production was, in a sense, generalized now that Paisley and other manufactures could produce simulacra of Chinese and Indian textiles. At the same time consumption patterns had been flattened and regularized by two factors. Firstly, class formation at a world level had created classes of consumers who had a common interest in acquiring positional goods that homogenized their status, first in Europe⁷¹ and later outside.⁷² Secondly, the international confluence of 'industrious revolutions' created a massive growth in retailing in which shopkeepers through the local print media actively helped to advertise and promote goods as such markers of status. Collectors of prized, exotic and charmed goods slowly became consumers living virtually identical life-styles.

International trading bodies which originated in the age of old globalization transformed themselves. K.N. Chaudhuri and Om Prakash⁷³ have shown that the European East India Companies also achieved a high degree of stock control, creating a transparent market and using skills of advertisement. The form of a public company issuing its own bonds and stock formed an excellent machinery for raising capital quickly. Political and legal safeguards protected this property⁷⁴ to an extent unknown in Asian or north African financial sectors which were always at risk from the forced loan or amercement. All this, if nothing else, refutes André Gunder Frank's polemical attack on the notion that there was anything intrinsically more socially competitive about Europe during its rise to brief world domination.

On the other hand Gunder Frank is surely right to insist that non-European societies were active as well as passive agents in this new capitalist globalization. Arjun Appadurai remarked that in the modern age globalization 'cannibalizes' localism, and vice versa. For the period 1780-1830, it is perhaps more persuasive to argue that new globalization created a hierarchy in which the fractured patterns of archaic globalization were subsumed and put to use as the link between the global and the local. We have already suggested that the old pattern of periodic invasion by world-conquering dynasts drove capital and expertise to the European enclaves in eighteenth-century Asia. In addition, by inheriting and making use of the old predatory Cossack-style raider, the European powers sucked money into their revenue systems and protected

expanding agrarian settlements. Until the 1830s in central and south India, British-sponsored regimes continued to employ cavalry corps often made up of Afghan mercenaries to collect the land revenue.⁷⁵ Genghis Khan and Nadir Shah would have felt immediate affinity with these 'rascally *banditti*' who were nevertheless front-line agents of the gentlemanly capitalists of Leadenhall Street.

More generally, tribute in silver derived from a land-revenue system which reflected patterns of archaic globalization underpinned the supposedly capitalist power of the European companies. Primitive accumulation underlay capitalist cunning. Since 1764, the Indian land revenues had been used to bail out the finances of the East India Company's trade account. But as B.R. Tomlinson, has recently reiterated,⁷⁶ East India Company trade in the early nineteenth century was a mechanism by which political profit could be repatriated to Britain through 'false' commerce in Indian piece goods and commodities, such as indigo, which could not be sold at a real profit. The East India Company indirectly helped spread Western-style capitalism and, later, industrial products around the world. But embedded in its core was a tribute-taking mechanism which was the residue of older forms of global military fiscalism.

By the same token, the expansion of industrial production and capitalist relations in Eurasia took place on the back of older global networks of trade. Trade diasporas and thalassocracies, such as the Maltese or the Muskat Arabs, distributed European goods and bulked up local primary produce for transport to European enclaves until well into the nineteenth century. The old south and west Asian system of merchant credit-notes along with the Hakka Chinese equivalent in east and Southeast Asia, continued to move the capital of European traders and governments until the mid century. At a global level, European capitalism was not marked by an inevitable and rapid transition to modern markets and systems of production. Instead, it was modern global capitalism's power to subsume and manipulate earlier social connections and commercial mechanisms which was so striking. The monopoly of power which colonial states tried to secure in Asia and Africa greatly reduced the protection costs incurred by the more archaic networks, so preserving but subordinating them.

Consideration of the state reminds us that the early nineteenth century also saw profound new cultural changes in the global expansion of the European-style nation state and, ultimately, the globalization of nationalism itself. Paradoxically, a state form which was more homogenized than ever before tended to divide regions one from another in a way that the old universal empires never did. Global connections increasingly became international connections in the precise sense that they were structured through the external dialogues of nation states. Old universal empire-building was based on the idea of service to lords in multi-ethnic aristocracies. New empire-building was

based on the notion of allegiance to a nation state, often defined around an exclusive idea of racial identity. National governing bureaucracies replaced the old migrations of German administrative families to Russia, or Persians to Burma. Even the overseas expansion of religion was closely annexed to nationalism. The universal search of men of many nations for traces of God on earth was transformed into the idea of the national mission to civilize the pagan. Missionary societies mimicked the forms of the official report, counting 'souls' in much the same way as their administrative peers counted 'subjects' and enumerated revenue-holdings. The great Sufi orders, bearers of a global message of culture and humanity, were penned in to national boundaries both by government officials and by the agency of normalizing religious 'reformers'.⁷⁷

In time as Arjun Appadurai, Partha Chatterjee⁷⁸ and Prasenjit Duara⁷⁹ have pointed out, Asian and African people began to take up and adapt a concept of 'religion' and 'nation' which was in some essential sense 'derivative' of Western discourses. In this sense, the nation state and doctrinally differentiated religions were globalized even though their tendency was to fragment and enhance difference between societies.

Yet, at the same time, the same point can be made about nation states and modern religions that we have made about the world capitalist economy. They expanded by subsuming earlier globalizing traditions, sentiments and practices. In the early modern period norms of good conduct and good rulership, derived from west Asian ethical traditions (*akhlaq*) and norms of Confucian government, had spread internationally. Rooted to the memories, histories, languages and territories of particular regions, these became local patriotic and religious traditions.⁸⁰ In the same way the universal message of the great religious teachers was embedded in different regional forms of Islam, Buddhism and Christianity.⁸¹ Modern nationalism and modern religious belief did not erase these earlier formations. Instead ancient religion and old patriotisms were subsumed into the new forms of nationalist and religious ideology. In turn they helped root them in particular terrains. During the Indian Rebellion of 1857, Indian insurgents accused the British of violating principles of good government which were derived more from Aristotle than from the ancient Sanskrit texts.

The Tahitian Tupia insisted on wearing his Tahitian dress even in the old global city of Batavia; within a hundred years the protection of indigenous forms of dress and deportment and indigenous forms of weaving had become important for the first generation of nationalists all over the world. Gandhi's *swadeshi* movement, which urged Indians to turn back to consuming the produce of their own weavers and artisans, has been seen as a movement back to the villages. But what Gandhi was distantly invoking was an archaic world in which chains of local producers and consumers stretched across a whole globe as yet undivided by intrusive nation states.

The concept of archaic globalization outlined in this essay is an ideal type or heuristic device. It can help us to investigate discontinuous and ruptured processes which brought large areas of the world into contact with each other before the age of the nation state and the international industrial economy. Though its origins stretched back over many millennia, the pattern of archaic globalization ran particularly strongly from the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries when great land-based, loosely textured empires stretched across Eurasia and Africa, providing a benign context for the movement of traders, mystics, learned administrators and soldiers of fortune on horseback. Many historians, notably Janet Abu-Lughod and K.N. Chaudhuri have analysed this world in terms of trade contacts and state forms. This essay has argued that the particular features of archaic globalization represent a realization in society of a set of ideologies and bodily practices which were mediated through forms of consumption. Economic life was not innocent of the notion of profit. There existed well-developed markets. Economic man had already evolved. Yet social and economic links beyond the locality were heavily inflected by ideologies of power, sanctity and humoral balance. Already, in the period 1750–1850, features of proto-globalization based on the supremacy of market-driven, profit-maximizing forces emanating from Euro-American capitalism and the nation state were apparent. They emerged in symbiosis, and later conflict with trends towards commercialization and ‘industrious revolutions’ in other societies, where archaic consumption had stimulated status emulation among middle-ranking people. The rise of long-distance joint-stock trading companies and the slave-plantation system were economic changes of a different order. However, agents of archaic globalization were slowly subordinated to these forces rather than being wiped out by them. Modern and post-colonial globalization built on and was in turn modified by these earlier social formations, contributing to the persistence of long continuities of form even under modern capitalism.

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- 33 Kikkoman Soy sauce, for instance, has been produced continuously since 1630 (see the Company's beer-mat). It has now become an important branded ingredient for the new global taste for Japanese *sushi* and *sashimi*.
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