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Men and Facts

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A swelling output of historical writing based on professional principles resulted from the richly imagined work of seminars, archives, and households. In contrast to amateur work, this writing was said to be "scientific," and its political subject matter supposedly had significance far beyond that of any other history. In fact, the expansion of nation-states seemed to launch a new kind of writing about the past—a kind deemed scientific and political—and this development may look odd indeed from a certain perspective. History before professionalization, in comparison to the type that evolved in the nineteenth century, took a number of forms and comprised a wider field of human experience, a more varied source material, and a more complex epistemology. It could have an emotional valence or an erotic one, and could convey a sense of the past in all its memorialized immanence. If amateurism was being constructed as the "low," the extreme narrowing of subject-matter focus under professionalization and the "scientific" methodology of men in universities was part of the creation of the "high."

The concentration on national politics in professional and scientific accounts of the past has been explained as a natural development and one without gender import. As the unity of European religious belief fragmented and was replaced by the nation-state, historian Michel de Certeau wrote, history stepped in to give the new states a positive content, a knowledge of themselves that had previously been incomplete.[1] Others make the claim that scientific history had enriching potential for national identity. Anthropologist Benedict Anderson, for instance, has postulated that the nation-state came into being imaginatively through the medium of

literature, which worked to create common bonds of information and stories among people who never saw one another. As modern nations developed their power in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the increasing production of history by scholars and its eager reception by readers was a premier way to make the nation a reality in people's minds.[2] Philosopher Jürgen Habermas has posited the creation of a public sphere of opinion and knowledge that intersected with the growing political capacity of the state. History, no less than journalism and other institutions of social life, figured in this development of public discourse.[3] No matter how radically ongoing scholarship has modified some of these formulations, the primacy of politics stands, immediately making gender issues seem small—mere "slogans," as one historian put it, that intrude on this most authentic sphere of scholarship.

This scientific political history was new. It eschewed history's former role of bombastically praising dead monarchs and dynasties. It also increasingly avoided a moralistic or religious approach that strove to find sanctity, evil, or other ethical traits in the past. Empirically minded professional historians dismissed philosophical systems from which the past might be deduced, and excoriated their predecessors' romantic approach to history—an approach based on evoking emotional responses to all that was dead and gone. Plain writing, impartial judgment, and detailed factuality constituted the ingredients of scientific knowledge, which would drive modern political history. But the question remains: How did this focus on facts and on a knowledge of politics gender or regender historical writing, and how did the accrual of words like "reality" and "significance" serve a gendered motif? Moreover, in an ironic twist, political history came to serve as a sign of neutrality, whereas other subfields (for example, cultural and economic history in the late nineteenth century, and today's labor, ethnic, and gender history) were interpreted as being "political" and thus biased.

Political history's canonical place as objective, scientific knowledge has generated unsatisfactory explanations from eminent historians. Some claim that political history is dominant because political history of men formed the paradigm for Western historical writing as far back as the Greeks and Romans. But if professional history is only a repetition of old paradigms, in what way is it scientific and new? How did it come

to be called "modern" from the mid-nineteenth century on, and why did young men become so excited about it? We should still be rejecting the heliocentric universe if science merely repeated its old paradigms. Others remark that, because men have always had power, they write about men and power politics to instruct one another in the ways of power politics. This answer has virtues but also limitations, especially those inherent in the very idea of a scientific history—one containing the universal truth of the past and thus beyond bias. Was this universal truth not also beyond the contingency of masculine prerogative? And if it were not, how had we come to believe—and why do so many of us still believe—in history's "universal" import, its truth, and its ability to convey knowledge? In other words, "politics" and "science" are not only terms that need exploring in and of themselves. More centrally, we must further scrutinize the force and import of their pairing, even as nations (to say nothing of political regimes) come and go and even as their incompatibility is from time to time announced (in the dictum that history is art, for example).

The coupling of science and politics is the quintessential installation of sexual difference at the core of professional history. The gendering of scientific history occurred, moreover, in a completely "natural" way, so that even today people will ask: "What has gender to do with historiography?" There is little more to say, some would claim, than that men are the historians. But how did that come about? Everyone said that historical science transcended all contingent categories, yet for many decades it appeared normal that those who practiced it professionally were mostly (and in some countries exclusively) men. The very naturalness of scientific political history belied the omnipresence of gender (history was about men only, and distinctly not about women) and its invisibility (history was about universal truth, not about men) in the nineteenth century. From the Age of Revolution onward, issues of class, gender, and race fueled politics, leading to the development of such mass movements as socialism, feminism, and anticolonialism. Yet historical science wrote its political narratives about a relatively small group of men of European descent, all the while appearing so genderless and—despite the pronounced gendering of society and the many contests over gender power—so real. This kind of history enraptured its practitioners through

the "objective" depiction of past politics. What kind of magic could the rhetoric of facts perform, and why was it so entrancing?

The Science of Facts

History was professionalized in the nineteenth-century West as a science of facts and detail. Imaging themselves as scientists, historians founded a genre congruent with history on the basis of facticity, in contrast to the old-fashioned history based on chronicle, the evolution of spirit, and philosophical deduction. Early in the nineteenth century, Romantics had begun to analogize historical work and science. They valued the specificity involved in the amalgamation of history and science more highly than the abstract truths of Enlightenment philosophy. Emphasizing the retrieval of lost objects, the reappreciation of forgotten monuments, and the rediscovery of obscure sources of history (such as old documents), the Romantics saw in these material remnants of the past the foundation of history. Insofar as concrete materials, not mind or ideas, formed such a foundation, Friedrich Schlegel maintained, "there can be only one science: *physics,* for everything belongs to nature."[4] Late in the century the analogy gained power: "It must be made clear," wrote Ephraim Emerton of Harvard, "that the claim of history to rank among the sciences is founded in fact—the fact that it has a scientific method."[5] It has never been obvious why claiming this status and its attendant self-description was so attractive, especially because the invocation of the sciences constantly evolved and changed. Within the university (where professionalization was taking place), scientists still had less institutional power than theologians and classicists. Yet on the eve of professionalization, science was seen as congruent with history on the basis of shared facticity, and most professionalizers accepted this association.

The practices of the natural and physical sciences were already on their way to becoming highly gendered, tempting one to argue that the historian in his performance as scientist merely adopted a ready-made language and set of hierarchical values which helped construct his own masculinity and that of his subjects. Science was awash with active men observing, manipulating, dissecting, and finding the truth about women's bodies and the reproductive secrets of the universe. Some of the most dramatic discover-

ies of biology and zoology concerned ovulation and the menstrual cycle, while some of the most foundational beliefs in these fields focused on the impact of the uterus on women's mental capacity. Genetics concentrated on biological inheritance, thus on reproduction, while medicine itself evoked images of physicians experimenting in the many charity hospitals for unwed and poor mothers. Psychology's dramatic moments involved spectacular cases of murderesses where alienists debated the effects of menstruation, pregnancy, and the womb on women's ability to control their instincts, and equally spectacular depictions of psychiatrists dealing with hysterical female patients.[6]

Science had a capacity not only for portraying this relationship between male observer and female object, but also for projecting the gendered hierarchies of Western society onto the natural world. For example, "mammals" received this appellation during a time of intense debate over the female breast, even though the creatures classified under this rubric did not have mammae and even though other names like "the hairy ones" or "those with inverted ears" would have been more apt. Botanists, biologists, zoologists, and others scientifically described plants and animals in terms of human heterosexual frenzy, as these organisms produced seeds or developed eggs.[7] In other words, the language of science, just as historians began to make copious use of it, was already the language of gender and its hierarchies.

Professional history nonetheless had a gendered trajectory of its own, in which scientific analogies merely enabled history to develop. It was based in philological inquiry, which took a raw text and—by breaking down or analyzing and then recombining the elements in the text—produced a new, more accurate and knowledgeable exegesis or synthesis. When it came to reading texts and dealing with them critically, as the early modernizers of the field proposed, the analogy to chemistry was more pertinent. It was, to Schlegel's mind, nothing less than the "enthusiasm for chemical knowledge: for grammar is certainly only the philosophical of the universal art of dividing and joining."[8] As Ernest Renan later put it, one worked "on words and syllables, like a chemist in his laboratory."[9] And still later, Numa Fustel de Coulanges found the work of scientific analysis, "in history as in chemistry, a delicate operation . . . an attentive study of each detail to separate from the text all that one finds there."[10]

Philology influenced history as a discipline based on the minute, the detailed, the particular. Having developed its own methodology in the eighteenth century, philology isolated words, presented them as details and particulars within texts, and then explored their variety across time. Today the production of details and facts about individuals, institutions, and various aspects of the social order is central to modern epistemologies in the human sciences—medicine and criminology, for instance.[11] In a similar vein, the concern for "dividing"—that is, separating the detail or fact from the whole—was also central to the modern discipline of history. Modernizing historians made their relationship to facts a weapon against other genres and forms of historical writing. Philosophy and theology, Ranke wrote in the 1830s, submerged the individual and particular in the whole, the system, the totality. By contrast, history "turns sympathetically . . . to the particular . . . It hallows the phenomenal world."[12] Historical science differentiated itself from philosophical and theological brands of historical writing and from the arts by giving priority to research on facts and details.

The world of past experience, of course, was blanketed with particulars, an infinite field of them that women amateurs had endlessly described (or invented) in their wide-ranging histories. Professional history contrasted itself vis-à-vis the amateur relationship to facts in two ways. First, it professionalized the term "fact." The fact was not mere information that existed obviously or even naturally. Rather, its status depended on its discovery, scrutiny, and verification by the historian. In other words, it demanded his active input. As Ranke put it, "History is a science of collecting, finding, penetrating," and one that did not satisfy itself "simply in recording."[13] "Finding" as a disciplined act refused spontaneously to accept the past's initial appearance. "The fabric of events," wrote Wilhelm von Humboldt in his pioneering essay of 1821, "is spread out before [the historian] in seeming confusion."[14] The confusing appearance of historical information was only the point of departure, just as nature in its self-presentation was only the point of departure for science. "The historian, like the draftsman, will produce only caricatures," Humboldt maintained, "if he merely depicts the specific circumstances of an event by connecting them with each other as they seemingly present themselves."[15] The disciplining of the historian, along with the disciplining of historical confusion,

was situated in the production, evaluation, and ordering of details, so that in their finished form they might serve as well-ordered facts.

Professional standards for historical work on facts relied on breakthroughs in philology. Philological pioneers imagined their ultimate task as the creation and control of knowledge, "reproducing all that alien thought so that it becomes mine," as the great August Böckh wrote in his encyclopedia of philological method. Historians envisioned their work in a similarly productive and empowering way—work that differed from philology's while using its methods. Philologists had set new rules for verifying whether texts had been changed over time, and whether certain words had even been present in early versions of a literary work. A word or group of words and their arrangement in documents had a different status for historians, because words comprised not the important "facts" and "particulars" that historians sought but only their traces. The trace was the starting point leading to the fact, whereas the words themselves and the rich history of variations that would be produced around them satisfied philologists. Beginning with these traces or symbols found in the words in documents, historians worked backward through a series of "intermediary" signs until finally reaching a point at which they could construct a fact. "It is this series that one must reconstitute to ascertain to what extent the document is tied to a fact and can serve to understand it." Thus a fact took "a chain of essential operations in order to produce it."[16] While establishing history's difference from other disciplines, including some of the sciences, the complex work of tracing back from documents to produce facts depended on the historian's ingenuity, skill, training, and effort in a number of procedures—such as epigraphy, tracking down documents, and the like. These were all indicators of his disciplinary prowess. Additionally, by the time he brought forth or "produced" his facts, they had lost their originary luster in rhetorically splendid narratives, their own capacity to haunt or arouse.

Instead, facts had been reconstituted, authenticated, and qualified by the professional, who took pleasure in detail. Love of detail—filling books and letters—bound men together. For instance, Frederic Maitland and Henry Jackson corresponded at length over the letter "y" in a manuscript dating from 1285.[17] Simultaneously, the mastery of detail and the creation of facts produced manly competence and professional status, allowing one

to measure oneself against another and thereby create an identity. "Bopp is completely beaten on the debate over *ao*," one scholar wrote home to his family. "In fifteen pages [of a manuscript he has just found], I have not seen a single *ao*."[18] In a much-publicized debate in 1887, Fustel de Coulanges accused Gabriel Monod of ignoring "the minute study of words and things, the patient accumulation of details, and that which one used to call the enumeration of facts." Monod, he claimed had been "seduced" by the "fashion" for large-scale comparisons.[19] "Le bon dieu est dans le détail" ("God is in the details") ultimately became a common credo for historians, in part because the capacity to survey even the smallest matter was a sign of infinite power. Here, too, Böckh had set the tone: "The task of philology is to dominate that which it has reproduced."[20] While the professional produced facts, the reputation for an accumulation of many well-constructed facts produced professional authority and distinguished one historian from another. Individuation, community, and top-ranked status in a professional hierarchy resulted from the use of historical operations to create facts.

The field of relevant facts ultimately detected by and known to the historian was always larger than could be processed in a narrative, and it was in this second regard that the professional also distinguished his love of detail from that of the amateur. Much of the past was irrelevant to history: real knowledge, wrote one advocate of philological and scientific study, "cannot be got from life."[21] Part of the historian's task lay in jettisoning most detail in favor of a small but important group of facts of higher value. Mastery of detail discriminated the more adept from the inferior historians, and, conversely, the ranking of detail itself created an additional space where the vocabulary of hierarchy informed historical science. Disciplinary standards measuring the relative importance of various details focused on their utility rather than their elegance, their status as "causes" rather than their own piquant or evocative qualities. The articulation of hierarchy and the establishment of standards for importance constructed professional expertise and power.

This articulation critically relied on gender to explain the process of discriminating among details. The task of historical science for the young Ernest Renan consisted in fundamentally dividing life in two parts: "One is vulgar and has nothing sacred, consisting in needs and pleasures of an

inferior sort (everyday life, pleasure, wealth, etc.); the other is what one might call ideal, celestial, divine, disinterested, having for its object pure forms of truth, beauty, and moral perfection." Renan's division of the realm of the concrete into the everyday (associated with women) and the ideal (associated with men) had developed over the course of history's metamorphosis into historical science, and structured the imaginings of practices like seminars and archival research. But he explicitly saw the division between the nonhistorical and the historical as "the opposition between the *body* and the *spirit*."[22] This antinomy of body (concerning women and everyday life) to spirit (indicating politics) generally resonated through the language of professionalization: Theodor Mommsen, for instance, believing strongly in the superiority of peoples federated into nations, contrasted the disunited Greeks unfavorably with the united Romans. "For the Greeks," he wrote, "everything is concrete, everything has a body; for the Romans, abstraction and its formulations alone engage their spirit."[23]

Such a division might seem to undermine the analogy of historical science to the natural sciences and other human sciences, because scientific method rested on observing physical bodies. Scrutinizing physical entities such as rocks, plants, and animals was crucial to the natural sciences, whereas census takers (an example of fledgling social scientists) counted bodies, observing their location in commercial, domestic, and industrial space. Both inner and outer aspects of bodies could serve the interests of science. For instance, a medical symptom might consist of an outward manifestation, from a rash or skin discoloration to gushing blood; it could also be an internal sensation of pain. Bleeding stemming from either a flesh wound or a more profound injury could be treated on the surface of the body.[24]

For historians, the first step in investigation did indeed occur in the realm of outward appearance. The initial focus was "the phenomenon itself, . . . its condition, its surroundings, chiefly for the reason that we would otherwise be incapable of knowing it."[25] The body metaphor helped organize these phenomena. Mommsen classified Roman laws, inscriptions, and other primary materials as part of a "body," an "organic unity," an "organism," whose "parts" he would analyze for "function." Such an analysis involved looking; it took a kind of observation practiced "solely

[by] the historian, whose eyesight is naturally keen and has been sharpened by study and practice."[26] Yet for all the emphasis on visible traces and surface detail, this surface or body of phenomena still had low status in the minds of Mommsen, Renan, and others. To stop at this surface, according to Humboldt, "would be to sacrifice the actual inner truth . . . for an outward, literal, and seeming truth."[27] One had to "plunge deeply" below, "dissect," or "penetrate" this surface or "physiological unity," this "physical world" and "organic life," as Humboldt and Ranke had it; it was only the treasure deep within that counted. Before the reign of science, as Renan saw it, great works were adjudged superficially, much as "we admire the beautiful shape of the human body." The scientific scholar of the future, however, would work "like the anatomist, who cuts through this sensual beauty to find beyond, in the secrets of its interior organization, beauty a thousand times superior." Abruptly changing his metaphors and cementing the superiority of inner to outer, Renan concluded: "A dissected cadaver is horrible in one sense, yet the eye of science discovers within it a world of marvels."[28] It was the bodily exterior that was horrible; deep within lay something higher. The raw material on which the historian worked was hierarchized as inferior to the universal truth that he would make it yield.

Thus far, little suggested the sex of this bodily exterior, which historians so constantly invoked as inferior to the spirit. As scientific history developed, however, professionals clothed "superficiality" and "surface appearances" in feminized language. Every suppression of error found on the surface of things meant suppressing confusion and unreason, which were increasingly defined as feminine, in the nineteenth-century language of science. But the sexing of the surface was more direct. As noted in Chapter 4, U.S. historian Richard Hildreth thought that superficial history was "tricked out in the gaudy tinsel of a meretricious rhetoric." For the sake of "our fathers and ourselves," the great characters in American history should be presented "unbedaubed with patriotic rouge, without stilts, buskins, tinsel, or bedizenment."[29] The *English Historical Review* launched its first issues with a promise not to offer its readers "allurements of style."[30] It praised works for their "utter want of tinsel embroidery" and their refusal to "adorn a tale."[31] Other scientific periodicals pointed to the "tawdry trappings" of more literary works.[32] In the nineteenth century,

allurements, adornments, tawdry trappings, and tinsel embroidery formed the wherewithal of prostitution, of public women and their sexuality. Bad or superficial history, like the whore, was all decked out. "Clio is going to be just a gal-about-town," wrote one American university historian to a colleague, "on whom anybody with two bits worth of inclination in his pocket can lay claims."[33] It took work to sex the body in the nineteenth century, and this was accomplished not only by scientists but by professional historians.[34] Once they had sexed the body as female, historians set it in a hierarchical ordering to indicate how errors had been overcome, the enticements of literary flourishes refused, and even facts superseded. This was an integral and ongoing part of the development of history as a profession, and one that continued to be serviceable.[35]

In a coordinate gesture, the historian's own body disappeared, much like the body of a middle-class man was effaced by his black suit. In the work of science, claimed one historian, "the author is completely absent . . . It is intellectual work, not human work."[36] In general, only one physical part of the historian remained: the eye. The language of scientific history described historical methodology in terms of the historian's keen and well-trained eyesight, his powers of observation. Historical truth, wrote Humboldt, was "like the clouds that take shape for the eye only at a distance."[37] Historians trained themselves in the techniques of observation. Hippolyte Taine's determination to be scientific took him incessantly to the dissecting rooms and laboratories. The eyesight of the professional observer who scrutinized the feminized surface was compared to that of other viewers. For one thing, the historian's eye set his standards higher than those of "the common observer," who "constantly imbues this appearance with errors and half-truths."[38] His eye also distinguished him from those whose gaze might be lascivious, superstitious, or crude: "A miracle reported by a thousand Orientals is less probable than the observation of a single chemist."[39] The impressionable eye of the "savage," Renan believed, saw "a thousand things at once" without being able to prioritize; the result was a "sensual poem," "caprice," or wild metaphysical system—but not science.[40]

The eye of the trained historical observer was ostensibly untroubled by such confusion in the appearance of historical phenomena. Not participating in a bodily economy and thus not conflating the material and the

immaterial, it fed information into the disembodied Cartesian *cogito* that needed, in the long run, not just to see the surface but to think its way toward the unseeable, invisible interior of historical truth.[41] Scientists in the early part of the century were distinguishing the eye and its connection to the brain as constituting a system distinct from other aspects of the body.[42] The eye was an unmoored, transparent lens operating cognitively outside the realm of the sensible (hence passionate, emotional, incorporative, and feminized) body. Specifically, it stood in polar opposition to the devouring eye-mouth of the feminine reader, whose compulsive reading fed erotic appetites.[43] The common image of the professional historian was of someone divorced from the body, as in the still-current image according to which one was "standing outside oneself" when examining evidence. As Humboldt claimed, the "realm of appearances [figured as the realm of the body] can only be understood from a point outside it."[44] The former was the realm of error, bias, and insufficient evidence from which one mentally plunged into the truthful, spiritual interior. The historian's self optimally lacked a physical register. In Fustel de Coulanges's canonical statement: "It is not I who speak, Gentlemen, but History who speaks through me."[45] Even in youth, fledgling historians developed the language of pure *cogito*. "I feel myself becoming a personification of Algebra, a living trigonometrical canon, a working table of Logarithms," one young scholar wrote his parents.[46] Subjecting the body to overwork, cold and damp, and the hardships of travel, the historical *cogito* could simultaneously claim, with some justification, "complete ignorance of real life."[47]

Through these moves, historical methodology articulated the femininity of the physical evidence that one looked at, in ways completely in accord with the general tendency of the modern period to sex the scientifically observed body as female. The methodology gendered history as well, since traits of the male historian recapitulated the general ideals of nineteenth-century manhood: self-regulation, transparency, authenticity, and a representation of universality; the need to accomplish hard work by following detailed procedures; and the priority of the calm, lucid, and disembodied mind beyond the realm of contingencies such as class, religion, race, or nationality. Historical language duplicated the language of a universalized masculinity—that is, a masculinity functioning beyond the realm of such contingencies as gender itself.

Professional history as the standard for "high" truth had major test cases distinguishing the significant from what should be left invisible, the spirit from the body, the male from the female. Confronting contingency and falsehood were necessary to mark out universal claims. In this regard, the case of Pope Joan loomed large in nineteenth-century professionalization. According to the narrative—repeated, rebutted, and refurbished over the centuries—Joan was renowned for her wisdom and was elected to the papacy in the middle of the ninth century. A woman of disputed origin, she went to Athens (or some other urban center) and became one of the most learned people of her day. For two years or so, she conscientiously performed all the duties of pope, but then, in a procession through the streets of Rome, she suddenly gave birth to a child. In so doing, Joan turned a religious display into a carnivalesque one, with cross-dressing and the grotesquery of childbirth right on the papal throne. As a result, she died on the spot (some said she was stoned to death, though Boccaccio's version maintains that she quietly and peacefully retired). From then on, popes received the symbols of office sitting on a pierced chair, so that the maleness of their genitals could be confirmed. Over the centuries, Catholic and Protestant historians, as well as popular culture, either reveled in this story or attempted to suppress it.

The phenomenon of Pope Joan piqued the historical imagination, but in the nineteenth century it became a virtual obsession. In the 1840s and 1850s, distinguished Dutch, German, French, and Italian historians all had much to say about her. Alfred Plummer of Trinity College, Oxford, called her story "monstrous" and "preposterous." Joan had transgressed the norms of credible knowledge, political power, and just about anything else one might think of. The newly opened archives of Europe expunged her from the record when, early in the 1860s, no less a historian than Ignaz von Döllinger, teacher of Lord Acton and definitely his superior when it came to publishing, took on the case once and for all.

Döllinger professed to know every archival source in Europe; no authentic written account of Pope Joan, he maintained, existed before the mid-twelfth century. She existed before then merely "in the mouth of the people," meaning well-intentioned but gullible clergy, monks, and other "guileless" folk. The props in her story lacked authenticity. For instance, the story that she had had a Greek education which impressed the Romans

could hardly be true: by the ninth century, anybody who was anybody went to Paris. Then there was the problem of her name. Döllinger found that chroniclers gave her pre-papal name variously as Agnes, Gilberta, Gerberta, Joanna, Margaret, Isabel, Dorothy, and Jutta. Such textual inconsistency threw her very being into question. Her fate was just as inconsistently reported, and the details of how the people protected themselves thereafter from another woman pope were a travesty of historical logic. The pierced chair was not merely used to allow the crowd the chance to affirm for itself that the pope's genitals were male. For the serious and scientific Döllinger, authorities introduced the pierced chair into service only because of its "beautiful colour."[48] In sum, a woman of great learning and power could not have existed, because of universal standards like the beauty of a chair and the truth of writing.

Döllinger's account of Pope Joan was the first example in his book on forgeries and fables, and served as the gendered emblem for the progress of scientific history, conspicuously evoking femininity to repress it in the name of truth. Threatening the notion of history as male plenitude, Joan's story had many ingredients to make it so pivotal in defining the new scholarship. Far from being beyond politics, it served Döllinger's own cause of showing that the universal church could survive even in the face of inaccuracy and scandal. Fighting the secular power intrinsic to the new doctrine of papal infallibility, he was excommunicated in the 1870s. Yet the carnivalesque woman, who inverted the gendering of knowledge and power, was the sign of battle for him; by pushing her to the margins and then outside the canon, Döllinger, like other historians in the process of professionalization, made history universal by suppressing gender. Such stories as that of Pope Joan, and other piquant controversies such as that over the *droit du seigneur* (that is, the lord's right to have intercourse with any bride connected with his dominion), proved not just important to but constitutive of history. For one thing, they continued to channel libidinal energy into historical work providing brushes with dangerous outlaws and sexuality. Using women as the sign of both gender in its entirety (that is, both masculinity and femininity) and of all that was outside history, the new scholarship mimed the general Western world—a divided world in which an ideal and valuable history of the masculine "real" stood in opposition to a lesser, ahistorical sphere that was worth speaking about

only as an example of error. The work of investigating the former was high-minded, legalistic, and noble; the work of suppressing the latter, in all its erroneous and superficial inferiority, often triggered fantasies of violence, mutilation, and passion.

Acting within these methodological parameters, historians claimed to discover the "real"—or, as Humboldt put it in his formative treatise, "what actually happened." Presenting past reality was scientific methodology's supreme, ungendered claim. From Humboldt on, however, some historians were aware of the problem of conveying reality via what could turn out to be a highly charged historical narrative, and they realized the damage it might do to the "real." The transition to narrative texts, as a means of conveying facts and the causes and inner connections unseen to the ordinary observer, did not occur without craft and manipulation. On the one hand, this demanded and created prowess, professional skill. But on the other, it entailed augmenting the seen with the unseen, with something beyond the given, beyond "reality." For instance, one used language, a medium cut loose from historical methodology itself, to materialize the immaterial. But language, "growing out of the fullness of the soul as it does, frequently lacks expressions which are free from all connotations."[49] The most intently scientific historians, like Fustel de Coulanges, tried to devise nonmetaphorical ways of writing—in his case, conspicuously without success.

Writing of what *actually* happened demanded productivity on the part of the historian: something had to be *added* to the bare events. "What do we say of those" (asked Renan), who, using a source, "merely copy or excerpt from it without any sense of what is essential and what accessory?"[50] Historical data could not just appear in its "raw" or "originary" state. The existence of an inner truth demanded its extrication, and addition to the traces of events or facts. "The truth of any event is predicated on the addition . . . of that invisible part of every fact, and it is this part, therefore, which the historian has to add."[51] From his trained position, the historian also saw causes and other invisible outcomes, which also were adduced for the account in question. Or, as Humboldt said, "it is this inner effect that history must always produce."[52] The scientific historical text added footnotes, appendixes, and other apparatus, making the historical "real" far more intense than and far different from what it originally was.

History was not just "what happened"; it was supplemental—"what *actually* happened."

The additional and supplemental constituted scientific representation of the past. They gave "reality" an artificial, excessive nature, situating scientific history in the realm not only of "hyperreality" but of paradox. Adding the many extras effected the representation of past reality as hyperreality, while it also constituted the historian's masculine and professional identity. The professional was not only transparently himself; he simultaneously knew more, saw more, and worked more. To arrive at the point of accessing and producing the real, the historian had abjured the masculine body, presenting his procedures as necessitating his own existence outside the physical or situated self—"independent in regard to oneself," as Fustel de Coulanges put it.[53] Often leading a complex personal life, the hardworking historian produced an identity that was also paradoxical, constituting himself simultaneously as vigorously productive and as a kind of absence. In the hands of these men, the past was similarly real and unreal.

The problems generated by the modern articulation of middle-class intellectual identity have engaged theorists from a variety of intellectual persuasions, who have explored these problems in terms of loss of self or of the body. For instance, the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty offers a cogent critique of rationality, conceived as a process whereby one wills oneself out of the field of being to create an "object" that is totally distinct ontologically from the disembodied observer. Often made with the deepest humility, the claim of the historian to transcend life in general was, ultimately, a claim to extraordinary power and thus a way of constructing the "high." Laura Mulvey, a film theorist, sees the process wherein the splitting off of a bodiless self (in this case, that of the professional historian from the man) enables the individual to fashion an ideal, better self that stands in a complex relationship to a debased or inferior self. Such a split occurs in childhood, when the child gains a sense of identity and differentiates himself from the mother by seeing images that are simultaneously him and not-him. Like Mulvey, many philosophers and historians of science posit identity formation as similarly paradoxical or split. They attribute it to the discursive tradition of Western science, in which the disembodied *cogito* stands as markedly superior to the disenabling body.

Proceeding even further, Mulvey sees the better self as someone who is efficacious vis-à-vis the debased self, someone who can cause and do (in this case mentally), who thinks in terms of cause and effect, with the ideal self often acting upon and triumphing over the debased object (in this case the female surface of disaggregated detail, evidence, materiality) so as to fix the hold of the better self.[54] Nonetheless, the debased object—no matter how repressed or fantastic—remains a touchstone, a potency, which enables work to proceed.

These theories contribute to our understanding of the historian's articulation of self within the middle-class language of male identity in the nineteenth century. As part of a professional middle class, the historian figured his self as transparent, higher, better, and ultimately able to wield professional power so effectively as to reach a realm of universal truth. Better, higher, more disembodied, and thus less debased than women and people of other races, historians simultaneously imaged themselves as absent, empty, split, torn from their perceptual moorings in the body, and left to imagine a world beyond the language, instincts, and perceptions of everyday life. It was from this incredibly enabling but fraught realm of scientific language that history sprang forth as an identically paradoxical set of procedures. Scientific history was the articulation of a past reality that, paradoxically, was different from the historical given and "produced" by the work of historians. It was a history of a higher and more truthful reality than people had lived, so pure and invisible that no one but the trained historian could see. It was a history that jettisoned many physical details of the human past as unimportant, while affirming that what went on in the historian's dematerialized mind represented the "actual" reality. Historians' competition for footnotes, their struggle for virtuosity in finding causes and producing real "effects" and for devising fresh arguments, were part of an ongoing struggle "really" to produce reality by reaching deeper, past the inevitable feminine surface.[55] All of this was the work of facts.

The Facts of Politics

History as the "science" of facts solidified its position in tandem with the establishment of the modern nation-state. The linkage was both institutional and personal, professional and emotional. Historians gladly served

their country in time of war, and many professionals had political or official identities; Jean Jaurès and Ernest Lavisse are two of numerous nineteenth-century French examples. Many historians—and not only zealots like Treitschke—were nationalists and patriots. It was "love of the Fatherland," that motivated the historian Heinrich Böhmer: "'For people and fatherland': that is the motto of my life."[56] Moreover, it was common for professionals to serve political leaders as advisors and friends. Lord Acton spent his fondest moments with Gladstone, just as Arthur Schlesinger did with John F. Kennedy. While professing to occupy the highest, most disinterested reaches of truth, historians longed for—and still long for—political fame and influence. Some even achieved it: in the 1990s, François Furet has been called one of the three most powerful men in France. What is this seemingly paradoxical amalgamation of historical truth, defined as the sum of impartial facts, with an attendant fixation on so politicized an institution as the nation-state? And for our purposes, how does this amalgamation or "congealing"—this slide from facts to political value—connect with gender?[57]

Professionalizing historians wrote factual political history, imaged their work as an important contribution to civic virtue, and explicitly aligned themselves with the power of the nation-state. For more than a century, observers in a variety of fields emphatically connected science with citizenship, and factuality with the nation-state. "Disinterestedness" as a "mode of attention and concern," according to the earl of Shaftesbury, was a major condition of civic virtue.[58] "A republican government and science mutually promote and support each other," a Boston preacher sermonized late in the eighteenth century.[59] Professional historians felt no differently: "The power to stimulate national sentiment and moral strength lies in the historical-philosophical sciences," the historian Wilhelm Dilthey maintained in the 1870s, as part of his plea for reorganizing the University of Strasbourg.[60] Although the connection between history and the nation-state is often invoked as an obvious one between history and men, logically the connection seems contradictory when writing the history of the nation-state and of men is seen as an apolitical undertaking. Even a historian's service to a partisan political leader fails to undermine his status as a truth-teller and scientist. In contrast, writing the history of women and minorities is usually discredited as partisan, "political."

History helped the postrevolutionary nation-state establish its identity. As Michel de Certeau suggested, history "permits a society to situate itself by giving it a past in language; and it thus opens up to [the society] its own space in the present."[61] By this account, historians perform a defining function for the nation-state, providing a story of the state's past that marks off and distinguishes the past as the neutral backdrop to the present state—a backdrop composed of mathematical time. Insofar as nations evolved in the modern period, history fundamentally enabled that evolution by continually creating narrative accounts of what had gone before, in order to give historical universality to a contingent, highly politicized institution. As each future became a present and then a historical past in the progressive time of historical science, history ensured "depth" and thus projected the nation's ongoing existence.

Having a past was indeed seen as the essence of a nation. Renan's "What Is a Nation?" (1882) argued against basing nations on visible markings such as race, ethnicity, and geographic boundaries. Like truth itself, the nation was "a spiritual principle"; it was "sacred," and rested on "a heroic past." The nation was "a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices one has made in the past . . . It presupposes a past."[62] Historical science did the major work, arguing over and searching incessantly for—among other issues—the ground or origins of the nation's existence (as did, for example, Herbert Baxter Adams and Fustel de Coulanges).[63] Jean-Luc Nancy has modernized this theory of history's efficacy as an essential act of "presencing" the community, or, in Benedict Anderson's phrase, "imagining" it, by showing citizens to one another even in the nation's most distant corners.[64] Like-minded nineteenth-century scientific historians testified to the defining role that history played in the formation of a nation. Scientific methods in history, wrote Augustin Thierry, provided the nation with a "history of everyone, written for everyone."[65] The wide-ranging political data found by professional historians in the French national archives comprised an "ossuary, enshrouded but living, that is France."[66] In this way, history served as one of the productive human sciences, generating discrete information, classificatory principles, and clusters of facts whose display created "real" images of the modern state for its citizens to read about. It helped the modern state unite people through a communal understanding of universally true historical facts and

data, not through overt displays of dynastic might. It helped shape a modern, transparent legitimacy to replace a baroque one.

The story of the nation as it chronicled wars, revolutions, and the triumphs of great leaders became the center of narrative excitement. Just as the seminar focused and galvanized historical practice, so the nation-state fixed the written efforts of professionalizers, doing battle against cultural, social, and other varieties of historical thinking. Using official documents to answer looming questions about the state, large-scale institutions, and their rulers, professionally written history replaced local lore and culture, family sagas of dynasties and noble lines, and narratives in which God's will manifested itself in the past. Separating off the realm of appearance and prioritizing some aspects of knowledge above others entailed highlighting information about the nation-state, as we have seen, and repressing error and superficiality. It was Hegel who made the enduring formulation of these procedures when they were connected with the political history of European nations. Positing the preeminence of the state as the subject matter of history, and judging the detailed particulars of the state's history as very important manifestations of its evolution, Hegel derided Asian countries for having an immature history (because of their attenuated development) and African countries as having none. He pointedly scorned the history of either private life or the dynastic family as impermeable to modern analysis and narrative, for their interest was "confined to the family and the clan. The uniform course of events which such a condition implies is not a subject of serious remembrance." The historian's task was to suppress narratives based on these inferior subjects. "The community," Hegel maintained, "creates itself in what it represses and what is at the same time essential to it: womankind in general, its inner enemy. Womankind—the eternal irony of the community—alters by intrigue the universal purpose of government into a private end." This imperative, which subsumed the odious category of the local and familial under the still more odious feminine as the enemy of history, remained pertinent. Even in the mid-twentieth century, when Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre had to some extent restored the local, Febvre emphasized that scientific history shunned the feminine above all: it refused to recount, he wrote, the romances of Mary Queen of Scots or to "throw light on the Chevalier d'Eon and her petticoats."[67]

In this repression lay some of the irresistible attraction of scientific, political history. The community or nation, like the procedures of history, was born of the creation of the high and the low enacted as a suppression of women (or Africans and Asians) in which truth and freedom entailed getting past female substantiality by incising or eliding it. The nation, like its history, was not materiality, which was feminine or local or clanlike, but rather an intangible universal that was arrived at in an exciting way. Michelet's achievement in his successive histories of France was not only a product of assiduous archival research; it was also said to rest on showing "the successive victory of human liberty over the totality of nature." The state—the culmination of the advance in human institutions—did not result from physical force, according to Fustel de Coulanges. Rather, it developed from the free play of spirituality, human consciousness, and morality—"the work of our mind."[68]

The disinterest of the citizen—that is, his freedom from attachments other than his civic ties—provided the vocabulary of both civic ideology and historical methodology. Thus, scientific history, wrote Fustel, "demands that the researcher be free," exercising "an absolute independence."[69] The discursive intertwining of historical science and the narration of the state lay at the heart of professionalization: "Above all, [history] should benefit the nation to which we belong and without which our studies would not even exist."[70] Methodology had already defined the realm of superficial narrative as feminine—as that which took "appearances for reality," in the words of Fustel de Coulanges. In terms of subject matter, the feminine was disqualified for its antipathy to the universal. Truth was where women were not—some invisible and free territory purged of error by historical work; purged of superficial, trivial, and extraneous detail; and thus purged, through a variety of procedures, of femininity. If methodologically historical truth lay in opposition to the feminine, in terms of subject matter (as historians from Hegel to Febvre put it) this realm of truth was the nation-state, where a congruent opposition to the feminine had been constructed in philosophy and in constitutional and positive law. The nation, like its history, lay in a realm of disembodied (one might say "empty") freedom, freedom defined as freedom from error—that is, femininity. Both nation and history were spiritual, like the historian, who was similarly operating in a disembodied

realm, holding the feminine at bay beyond their borders. As Henri Berr put it, in his attempts to give more weight to generalization and synthesis in scientific history, France's "true grandeur is in its spirit."[71]

The nation's history operated in the free realm of time, posited from the scientific and Kantian revolutions forward as existing beyond all contingencies, including creed (that is, it was not God's time). It was a neutral, mathematical, unmarked time matching the transparency of both the citizen and professional historian and contrasting with the thick sluggishness of feminine space, as Droysen explained it.[72] Chronology, according to Ernst Bernheim, had served "since time immemorial as the eye of historical science."[73] In this regard, secular time was the transparent condition of possibility—the possibility of scientific history and that of the nation. At the moment of professionalization, the Western political imagination still contained localisms, ritual and household time, and aristocratic lore. It might also attach political rulership to a divinely ordained ordering of time and space. Historical science (like astronomical and geological science) evacuated such qualities from time, in order to make room for a new consensus about a transcendent, secular, serial time that was the same for everyone, yet outside household, family, church, and other competing senses of time.

Just as natural scientists produced a "deep time" in their studies of the universe, earth, and species, historical scientists produced this time for the nation-state by filling its emptiness with the historical facts of great national events and great men's lives. So situating the great individual in vacant seriality, scientific history textured time with the liberal ideal of the developmental man, whose perceptive powers grew incrementally, giving time a shape through narrating the individual unit of the nation: the autonomous male citizen. The emphasis on the individual "fact" as the primary ingredient of history congealed with the value given the individual man as its prime indicator, both of which were produced through complex methodology and hard work. In the hands of the scientist, leaders no longer served as a mere illustration of God's truth, but instead came to possess a deep individuality based on the "significance" of their accomplishments and character. The scientific historian adjudged this significance from the welter of details he surveyed, giving political time further weight.

The passage of historical time, signaled by the movement from one great (universal) individual man to the next, depended on distinguishing the reign of one man from another through detail. This differentiation, in turn, was indicated by showing how rivalries among men took shape and how one man conquered another. An individual character came into relief through comparisons with individuals who had gone before and others who would come after. For instance, Ranke wrote of Julius II: "Then came a pope who made it his object to assume a position directly opposed to that of the Borgias, but who pursued the same end, though he used different, and hence successful, means for his purpose."[74] As each differentiated himself from the others through political struggles, wars, great achievements, or momentous failures, narratives presented the classical agon in which character comes into being through complex contest with the "other." On the one hand, the prior or defeated figure in the agon was deftly feminized as the "weaker," the one surpassed or repressed. On the other, because the agon existed primarily among "the same"—that is, among male characters—the resulting narratives and analyses made the history of truth into an account of male identity which historians painstakingly established by ascertaining minute differences among men and by providing important information about men's lives as the repository of power and plenitude.[75]

Gender further weighted time as progressive, even when the historian was judging large-scale political institutions or entire epochs. Theodor Mommsen's multivolume collections of classical inscriptions and compendia of Roman law towered above all other works of scholarship for their detailed transcriptions, discussions of forgeries, and technical introductions to the material (in Latin). His work culminated in a nine-volume history of Rome, which situated the beginnings of the ancient world in the commonality of language and racial stock, then traced individuation through philology, until the Greeks and Romans came to represent opposite poles of historical development. According to Mommsen, the Greeks modeled such institutions as religion on the concrete—namely, nature: "For the Greeks, . . . everything has a body." This material cast to civilization had its most felicitous manifestation in artistic "fecundity," which "clothed" the Greeks' ideas and institutions. The Greeks excelled in things of the body—games, the theater, amusements. By contrast, the later Romans founded their identity upon abstraction and ideas—not on individual pleasures and the good

life, but on the abstractions of patriarchal obedience, the law, and the state. Whereas the Greeks were thus blocked from unity by a particularist, embodied sensibility, the Romans, from their very awareness of abstraction, "gained a *fatherland,* a *patriotism* unknown in Greece. And it was also for that reason that, alone among ancient civilized peoples, the Romans, with a government founded on populist power, knew how to accomplish national unity and, by this unity, to surpass the ruins of Hellenism itself and arrive at world domination."[76] The progress of political history relied, yet again, on the work of gender, suggesting that political facts were laden with gender values: male importance versus female insignificance; superiority versus unworthiness; spiritual transcendence versus bodily materiality; the high versus the low; the winner versus the defeated.

We have always known that political history was laced with values, and never more so in the modern period, as scientific historians in the West acted zealously and in countless ways on behalf of their nations. Depending on whether a war had just been concluded, they might refuse to invite counterparts from other countries to international meetings or to collaborate in publishing. Many wrote books and essays justifying government policies such as the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1870–1871. But nationalist bias is one value for which it is always said we can correct. Belief in the superiority of one's country, once discovered by the discerning eye, succumbs, and then political history can be read as pure fact once more.

However, facts themselves—and indeed the very notion of political history—are so fundamentally constructed of gendered values that this correction may be difficult. Hailing politics and the factual story of the state, scientific historians saluted men's gender interests. As many historians and theorists have shown, the modern contractual nation involved an unfolding egalitarianism of political rights among men that depended on a concomitant legal and economic subordination of women. History retold this story by foregrounding and universalizing the facticity of the individual man (who was the basic component of the nation), then interpreting it as part of the progress of political entities as a whole.[77] Political history celebrated men's superior rights, actions, thoughts, and struggles, and their sacrifices to preserve that superiority in war—the final enactment of the hierarchy of winner over loser, victor over vanquished, male over female.

Although these values are often difficult to discern and dissect as part of facticity, analytic philosophers have depicted some ways of seeing how facts and values may be conjoined. "I owe the grocer money," is an example of fact and value tightly intertwined.[78] Such statements as Mommsen's—that the Romans were a united fatherland, while the Greeks were disunited; that the Romans were all abstraction, while the Greeks were all body—show this intertwining in the simplest historical formulations practiced by the most scrupulous of professionals. Scientific historians wrote political history in ways that make it hard to distinguish the border between fact and value, thus making assertions that history is "value-free" often quite persuasive.

Assertions of political history's apolitical, factual nature are held in place by various means. For example, seventeenth-century writing by French academicians (heavily supported by state and aristocratic patronage) worked to "cleanse" political traces from intellectual work, making the state appear more powerful, less interested.[79] Historians in the nineteenth century compared their work to that of chemists because of the "purification" their procedures worked, ridding state politics and state papers of their partisanship and giving them status as pure factuality or reality. Methodology removed traces of gender by pointing to itself and its production of facts, to its processes and scientific laws. Gesturing toward its own lawlike fairness, historical science purged itself and the narrative of the nation-state of any hint of gender hierarchy or other inegalitarian politics.

A second device was the professional consensus which grounded definitions of the past and of significant historical truth in decisions reached by a small group of men, but which made them appear to be agreed-upon by everyone. The shift from a heroic medieval perspective in both literature and art to realism in both the novel and painting was an essential ingredient in the privileging of "realism" generally. This new history of the real involved a spreading consensus over continuous (or chronological, serial) time packed with certain sequences of action, events, details, and effects, and over the invariable existence of meaning or abstraction that lay beneath surface differences.[80] The consensus further produced a set of procedures for holding this perspective in place through a distanced relationship allowing time and depth to operate for the observer. As with so-called realistic painting, written realism depends on consensus over practices,

procedures, and principles. In history, this consensus operated to produce "realistic" accounts. To judge the state of mind of the author of a document, according to Seignobos, required judging the state of mind of the author's contemporaries, because "one assumes that similar states of mind will produce similar judgments."[81]

Through new rules for the perspective called "reality," or "factuality," realism in history depended on a community of verifiers who claimed to find this reality while they simultaneously produced it. "It is this knowledge of the standards for observation," wrote Seignobos, "that allows someone learned to accept unconditionally the observations of a colleague whose methods he knows, or similarly the observations of learned men across Europe."[82] Whether finding concordance in the use of a word, or agreement across precise historical accounts by well-trained contemporaries, historical science was tantamount to the group that practiced it. It was law and community, but one that included only males of European descent. Like the universal citizen, the most realistic work was "a plain, unvarnished narrative of facts," "original," "critical," "strenuous," "calm and temperate," "sturdy," full of "commonsense views," and "with a rigid abstinence from all excursions of the fancy."[83]

For the real to take shape, agreed-upon distancing procedures had to become the primary focal point.[84] Ranke, in the preface to his famous history of the popes *(Die römischen Päpste),* described scientific historians as "lookers-on at a distance"—at so great a distance, in fact, that the topics "can now inspire us with no other interest than what results from the development of its history and its former influence."[85] He conspicuously situated himself at a distance from the universal church-state by successively invoking "Rome in the early years and the Middle Ages," "the first half of the sixteenth century," and then a "period of a revived church-temporal power"—all within the first three sentences of his book. His history, Ranke continued in his third sentence, critically depended on finding "certain materials hitherto unknown. My first duty is to give a general indication of these materials and their sources."[86] Between this universal church-state and the historian stood both time and source material, as procedures would stand between the historian and his nation. The depiction of political reality was the work of an imputed distance and separation, and the professional self contained within it the tools for distancing and

distinguishing inside from outside: "A lucid and calm mind rarely takes its own conceptions for a perception," wrote Seignobos.[87] If the historian could stand outside his body to judge truth, this training made him the universal spectator or witness, able to describe the reality of institutions by splitting into someone who for long stretches of his life took up a position outside the scene, who both had and professed to lack a national identity.

Truth, factuality, and the general quest for knowledge about the nation-state and its heroes were increasingly seductive. Like the state itself, historians justified their exercise of power by claiming to stand for disinterested, high standards in which all had a stake and in which people should train themselves to participate. To ensure those standards, historical work entailed protecting boundaries, setting laws and rules, maintaining consensus, and working against threatening interlopers—the very procedures of politics as it came to be understood in the nineteenth century. The exercise of power through activities surrounding historical knowledge thus generated contradictory expressions. On the one hand, scientific historians spoke of being "passive" or "listening to reason speak within me" when faced with an array of facts to interpret.[88] On the other, many of the same people swung into soldierly action to justify their nation's wars and domestic policies, or to trounce women and people of other races presenting themselves either as practitioners or as subject matter.

At the time, none of this seemed contradictory, nor does it today, for the saturation of putatively neutral facticity with value involved precisely those values that were seen as natural and thus factual. Women, non-Europeans, amateurs, local events, and domestic life *were* inferior, superficial, less well-developed, less important. To catch this truth, one could indeed be "passive" and merely "listen to reason." However, to *protect* male plenitude—to narrate, elaborate, detail, enrich it—took prowess and vigilance. The scientific history of politics was fraught, inciting the profession's unacknowledged libidinal work, most recently imaged as male historians teetering "at the edge of the cliff."[89] Scientific historians wrote that they wanted to eliminate the cathartic side of history by turning it into a value-free knowledge based on facts. Professional knowledge nonetheless produced its own unacknowledged catharsis and erotics—those incited by structuring a factual history of politics out of so primal a value as gender.[90]

100. Humboldt, "On the Historian's Task," 8.
101. Jules Michelet, "Préface de 1869," in Michelet, *Histoire de France,* 18 vols. (Paris: A. Lacroix, 1876), I, xxxvi.
102. Letter to Prévost-Paradol, March 2, 1849, in *Hippolyte Taine: Sa vie et sa correspondance,* 4 vols. (Paris: Hachette, 1902–1907), I, 51.
103. Letter to Heinrich Ranke, November 1827, in Leopold von Ranke, *Sämmtliche Werke,* LIII–LIV, 179.
104. *Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton, D.D.,* ed. Louise Creighton, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, 1906), I, 80–83.
105. See Apter, *Feminizing the Fetish,* 39–40.
106. John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton, Letter to contributors to the *Cambridge Modern History,* in Acton, *Lectures on Modern History* (London: Macmillan, 1950), 315–316.
107. Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History: The Inspiration of Historians* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 24–41.
108. James Bryce, *Studies in Contemporary Biography* (New York: Macmillan, 1903), 386.
109. In stressing the complexity of the practices of objectivity, I take my cue from Megill, *Rethinking Objectivity,* 1–20, a collection devoted to scientific practices in a number of fields. Another exploration of the conflict between gender and the democratic aspirations of U.S. historians can be found in Joan W. Scott, "American Women Historians, 1884–1984," in Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 178–198.

5 MEN AND FACTS

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6. See, for instance, Ludmilla Jordanova, *Sexual Visions: Images of Gender in Science and Medicine between the Eighteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).
7. Londa Schiebinger, *Nature's Body: Gender in the Making of Modern Science* (Boston: Beacon, 1993).
8. Friedrich Schlegel, *Philosophical Fragments,* trans. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 81.
9. Ernest Renan, *L'avenir de la science,* in Renan, *Oeuvres complètes,* ed. Henriette Psichari (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1949; orig. pub. 1890), III, 897.
10. Numa Fustel de Coulanges, "De l'analyse des textes historiques," *Revue des Questions Historiques,* 41 (January 1887): 20.
11. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison,* trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1977).
12. Leopold von Ranke, "On the Character of Historical Science" [manuscript of the 1830s], in Ranke, *The Theory and Practice of History,* ed. Georg G. Iggers and Konrad von Moltke, trans. Wilma A. Iggers and Konrad von Moltke (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), 36–39.
13. Ibid., 33.
14. Wilhelm von Humboldt, "On the Historian's Task" [1821], in Ranke, *The Theory and Practice of History,* 10.
15. Ibid., 14.
16. Charles Seignobos, "Les conditions psychologiques de la connaissance en histoire," *Revue philosophique,* 24 (June–December 1887), 7.
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18. Eugène Burnouf to his father, April 14, 1835, in *Choix de lettres de Eugène Burnouf* (Paris: Champion, 1894), 208.
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passim; Barbara Duden, *The Woman beneath the Skin: A Doctor's Patients in Eighteenth-Century Germany,* trans. Thomas Dunlap (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).

25. Ranke, "On the Character of Historical Science," 39.
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33. Quoted in Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 193.
34. On the body as an entity that is in one way or another assigned a sex, see Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"* (New York: Routledge, 1993); and Anne Fausto-Sterling, "The Five Sexes," *The Sciences,* 33 (March–April 1993), 20–24.
35. See Novick, *That Noble Dream,* for an example of the way in which the debased female body continues to serve, along with the debased black body, as an indicator of the inferiority side of the equation. This interpretation takes its direction from Butler, *Bodies That Matter.*
36. Renan, *L'avenir de la science,* 948.
37. Humboldt, "On the Historian's Task," 6.
38. Ibid., 10.
39. Ibid., 25–26.
40. Renan, *L'avenir de la science,* 862–863.
41. For examples of the ways in which scholars have demonstrated the relationship between the body and the gendering of logic, philosophy, science, and other fields of inquiry, see Andrea Nye, *Words of Power: A Feminist Reading in the History of Logic* (London: Routledge, 1990); Genevieve Lloyd, *The Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" in Western Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, eds., *Feminist Epistemologies* (New York: Routledge, 1993); Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall, *Women, Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Michèle

Le Doeuff, *Hipparchia's Choice: An Essay concerning Women, Philosophy, etc.*, trans. Trista Selous (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991); Sandra Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Donna Haraway, *Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science* (New York: Routledge, 1989).

42. On this point, see Jonathan Crary, *Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), passim.
43. For one elaboration of this point, with Madame Bovary used as the example of such a reader, see Rita Felski, *The Gender of Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 79–87.
44. Humboldt, "On the Historian's Task," 18.
45. "Fustel de Coulanges," *Revue historique*, 41 (1900), 278.
46. Thomas Babington Macaulay, quoted in John Clive, *Macaulay: The Shaping of a Life* (New York: Knopf, 1973), 38.
47. Renan, *L'avenir de la science*, 928.
48. Ignaz von Döllinger, *Fables Respecting the Popes in the Middle Ages*, trans. Alfred Plummer (London: Rivingtons, 1871), 48.
49. Humboldt, "On the Historian's Task, 6.
50. Renan, *L'avenir de la science*, 921.
51. Humboldt, "On the Historian's Task," 6.
52. Ibid., 10.
53. Fustel de Coulanges, "De l'analyse des textes historiques," 35.
54. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, ed. Claude Lefort (Paris: Gallimard, 1964); Laura Mulvey, *Visual and Other Pleasures* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 14–29.
55. Susan McClary, discussing the sonata form, sees in its general structure (a departure from the original key through ever-ascending chords) a drive toward excess and competition. This drive, introduced by the composer, is resolved only in the return to the original key. See McClary, *Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, and Sexuality* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991).
56. G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century* (London: Longman's, Green, 1913), 69.
57. The term "congealing," and the idea of a mutation of facts into values and vice versa, come from the work of Joel Kupperman ("How Facts Congeal into Values," paper presented at the City University of New York Graduate Center, New York, January 1997). I am very grateful for his help on this central analytic point of the chapter.
58. Anthony Ashley Cooper, third earl of Shaftesbury, *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, ed. John M. Robertson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964; orig. pub. 1711), 338.

59. Phillips Payson, quoted in Michael Warner, *The Letters of the Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 122.
60. Quoted in John Craig, *Scholarship and Nation-Building: The Universities of Strasbourg and Alsatian Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 45.
61. Michel de Certeau, *L'écriture de l'histoire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), 118.
62. Ernest Renan, "What Is a Nation?" trans. Martin Thom, in Homi Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990), 8–21.
63. Numa Fustel de Coulanges, *Histoire des institutions politiques de l'ancienne France,* 2 vols. (Paris: Hachette, 1875).
64. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Birth to Presence,* trans. Brian Holmes et al. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 143–167.
65. Augustin Thierry, *Considérations sur l'histoire de France* (Paris: Furne, 1840), 140–143.
66. Gabriel Hanotaux, "Au temps de l'Ecole des Chartes," in Hanotaux, *Sur les chemins de l'histoire,* 2 vols. (Paris: Champion, 1924), 7.
67. G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of History,* trans. J. Sibree (New York: Willey Book Co., 1944), 60; and idem, *The Phenomenology of Mind,* trans. J. B. Baille (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 496–497. Lucien Febvre, *Combats pour l'histoire* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1953), 40.
68. Lucien Febvre, *Michelet* (Paris: Trois Collines, 1946), 58. Numa Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City: A Study of the Religion, Laws, and Institutions of Greece and Rome* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955; orig. pub. 1864), 132.
69. Fustel de Coulanges, "De l'analyse des textes historiques," 35.
70. Ranke, *The Theory and Practice of History,* 58–59.
71. Henri Berr, *Peut-on refaire l'unité morale de la France?* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1901), 20.
72. On the triumph of masculine time over feminine space, see also Johann Gustav Droysen, *Historik: Vorlesungen über Enzyklopädie und Methodologie der Geschichte* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1958), 411–415.
73. Ernst Bernheim, *Lehrbuch der Historischen Methode und der Geschichtsphilosophie* (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1908; orig. pub. 1889), 312.
74. Leopold von Ranke, *Die römischen Päpste, ihre Kirche und ihr Staat,* 3 vols. (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1854), I, 50.
75. The procedural language of history was similarly agonistic and strife-laden. In doing research the historian struggled with "those passages that raised difficulties in his way"; he "set up masters (including people, facts, and principles) whom . . . he could obey." Interrogating authors and sources led to finding "masters." Historians duplicated this authoritarian rhetoric in setting up the subfield of historiography, where they struggled in the same way that great political figures did.

Their agon was about historical method and historiographic accomplishment, and they struggled with other men for distinction. In their case, however, the emplotment of historiography, because the method of history was vital and alive, set up strings of these historians as "masters," as authoritative figures "to obey." The language of history, flowing from the state as subject of historical research and as source of historical information and from scientific historians engaged in seminar work on politics, was one of authority, power, and mastery—the characteristics of rule mostly attributed to men. By distributing these individuals, nations, and great historians in a professional narrative, according to a sequence that was generally agreed-upon as accurately portraying historical time, professionals further constructed a science of the real that was the story of men's importance.

76. Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte,* 28–33. Progressive interpretation bears the marks of a primal dream of merged identities, unindividuated from a forebear (especially the mother), during which growth and progress entail advancing from a material state of nature, pleasure, and the arts (the Greeks) to a more abstract one that bears the traces of masculine law in the nation-state and its realism in world conquest. The ideal of a modern, developmental man, whose perceptive powers grow incrementally, was embedded in another ideal according to which the nation-state emerges as masculine values differentiate from and triumph over those of a nature-bound, physical, and thus femininely defined primitive state, whether that of a common Indo-European language or of a common classical heritage such as that of a feminized Hellenism.
77. Carol Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).
78. The example is Elizabeth Anscombe's (see her essays "Modern Moral Philosophy" and "On Brute Facts"), cited in Kupperman, "How Values Congeal into Facts," 22–24.
79. Alain Viala, *Naissance de l'écrivain: Sociologie de la littérature à l'âge classique* (Paris: Minuit, 1985), 55–70, 115–116.
80. Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, *Realism and Consensus in the English Novel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).
81. Seignobos, "La connaissance en histoire," 21.
82. Ibid., 22–23.
83. Richard Hildreth's six-volume *History of the United States of America* (New York: Harper, 1849–1852) was little read by the public when it first appeared, but his expressions of scientific commitment won him this kind of praise from professionals. See James Baldwin, *An Introduction to the Study of English Literature and Literary Criticism,* 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Potter, 1883), II, 83; and Henry T. Tuckerman, "A Sketch of American Literature," in Thomas B. Shaw, *Outlines of English Literature* (Philadelphia: Lea, 1852), 450, as cited in Donald E. Emerson, "Hildreth, Draper, and 'Scientific History,'" in Eric F. Goldman, ed., *Historiography and Urbanization: Essays in Honor of W. Stull Holt* (Port Washington, N.Y.:

Kennikat Press, 1968), 143. See also *Littell's Living Age* [Boston], 23 (1849), 365, cited ibid., 145.

84. Ermarth, *Realism and Consensus,* 16–37.
85. Ranke, *Die römischen Päpste,* I, xi.
86. "Preface" to *History of the Popes,* in Ranke, *The Theory and Practice of History,* 139.
87. Seignobos, "De la connaissance en histoire," 20–21.
88. Brooks Adams, quoted in Novick, *That Noble Dream,* 38, n. 26; *R. H. Tawney's Commonplace Book,* ed. J. M. Winter and D. M. Joslin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 42.
89. "'On the edge of the cliff': this image, which Michel de Certeau used to describe the work of Michel Foucault, seems to me appropriate for all intellectual approaches having at their heart relations between the products of discourse and social practices." Roger Chartier, *On the Edge of the Cliff: History, Language, and Practices,* trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 1.
90. This conclusion is influenced by the writings of Hayden White and Nancy Armstrong.

6 HIGH AMATEURISM AND THE PANORAMIC PAST

1. Susan Reynolds Williams, "In the Garden of New England: Alice Morse Earle and the History of Domestic Life," Diss., University of Delaware, 1992.
2. Jackson Lears, *No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880–1920* (New York: Pantheon, 1981).
3. For instance, Antoinette Burton, *Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865–1915* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). For a different interpretation, see Billie Melman, *Women's Orients: English Women and the Middle East, 1718–1918* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).
4. See, for instance, Rosalind Williams, *Dream Worlds: Mass Consumption in Late Nineteenth-Century France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
5. See Mary Chalmers, "Harnessing Revolutionary Passions: The French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, 1832–1848," Diss., University of Rochester, 1995. See also William Reddy, *The Rise of Market Culture: The Textile Trade and French Society, 1750–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
6. Recent literature on feminism, social science, and progressive reform groups includes Kathryn Kish Sklar, *Florence Kelley and the Nation's Work: The Rise of Women's Political Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Eileen Yeo, *The Contest for Social Science: Relations and Representations of Gender and Class* (London: Rivers Oram, 1996); Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, *Righteous Discon-*