

Chapter 5



The Resurgence of Religion in Politics

For several decades, in much of the Muslim world, Islam has been reasserted into personal and public life. This phenomenon has variously been described as the Islamic resurgence, **Islamic revivalism**, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamism, and political Islam. The struggle and debate over issues of identity, faith, culture, and practice occurs today not only in the Muslim world but also among Muslim minorities in the West. In the twenty-first century, the sharp distinction between Islam and the West no longer exists. Islam today is indeed a global religion. Muslims in Muslim-majority countries from North Africa to Southeast Asia struggle with the role of Islam in state and society. Muslim-minority communities in Europe and America grapple with issues of faith and identity, cultural and economic integration, or assimilation.

THE ISLAMIC RESURGENCE

To speak of an **Islamic revival or resurgence** since the late twentieth century is not to imply that Islam was dead or irrelevant in previous Muslim societies. However, the contemporary revival increased the importance of religious identity and practice in individual and corporate life and the role of religion in Muslim politics and society. It has been reflected in an increased emphasis on religious observances (mosque attendance, fasting during Ramadan, abstention from alcohol and gambling, new forms of Islamic dress); a new vitality in Sufism; the proliferation of religious literature, television and radio programs, audio and video cassettes, and DVDs; Islamically oriented websites; the growth of new Islamic associations committed to socio-religious reform; and the reassertion of Islam in Muslim politics.

Understanding the meaning, causes, and significance of the role of religion in Muslim politics and society today requires that certain contrasting

presuppositions be recognized. The first is the modern Western secular tendency to separate religion and politics or to presume that secularization is the only modern option possible. The second is the realization that, for many Muslims, Islam is a total way of life and thus speaking of religion and politics as two utterly distinct arenas is not acceptable. Muslims believe that religion and society are interrelated and thus Islam is relevant and integral to politics, law, education, social life, and economics. There is no sharp dichotomy between the sacred and the profane. The question is not if but when and how religion should inform life. Religious orthodoxy (or more accurately, orthopraxy/correct practice) and cultural authenticity require it. For many Muslims, the mixing of religion and politics is not the issue; the issue is whether religion is utilized to produce a more moral and just society or distorted to manipulate and control people.

Throughout many parts of the Muslim world, Islamic symbols, slogans, ideology, and actors have become prominent fixtures. Islam has been used by governments and by reform and opposition movements alike. Rulers in Libya, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Egypt, Morocco, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia have used Islam to enhance their legitimacy and policies, while resistance, reform, and opposition movements have also appealed to Islam in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, the Persian Gulf, Pakistan, and the southern Philippines. Why and how has Islam reemerged so significantly in Muslim life?

In the post-World War II period, modernity was no longer a new external European colonial force infiltrating or invading Muslim lands. Instead it became the established internal order of newly independent Muslim nation-states, their political, legal, and educational institutions, and the outlook of their leaders. Most governments had tackled the arduous task of nation building by establishing states with a more secular orientation, circumscribing the role of religion in public life, and fostering various forms of secular nationalism, both local (Egyptian, Sudanese, Tunisian) and regional (Arab and Baath nationalism/socialism). However, during the 1960s, Arab socialist regimes that had seized power in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Algeria buttressed their appeal for popular support by a deliberate, selective use of religion to legitimate their socialist ideologies and governments. Gamal Abd al-Nasser in Egypt provides a classic case. Determined to emerge as a pan-Arab leader and legitimate his Arab socialist revolution and ideology, Nasser created a state-supported periodical, *Minbar al-Islam* ("The Pulpit of Islam"), in which leading scholars and religious leaders linked Arab socialist policies to the Islamic tradition. The shaykh (rector) of al-Azhar gave fatwas reconciling socialism

and state policies with Islam. Yet, the general trend in these and in most Muslim countries was to restrict religion to personal matters and personal laws, with the exception of those instances when regimes found it useful to appeal to religion.

The late 1960s signaled a turning point and the dawn of a new phase, a retreat from the secular path and the growth and spread of religious revivalism.

Why did religion again become such a visible force?

For the Arab world and many in the broader Muslim world, the **Six-Day War with Israel in 1967** generated a period of soul-searching and self-criticism as Muslims tried to fathom why and how they had reached this nadir in their history. From its creation in 1948, Israel and its Arab neighbors had been at odds over the issue of a Jewish state in Palestine. However, the 1967 war transformed an Arab and Palestinian problem into an Islamic issue. The decisive rout of the combined forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in just six days and their massive loss of territory (the West Bank, especially East Jerusalem, Gaza, and the Golan Heights) raised serious questions about the force of Arab regimes and their nationalist policies, in particular Nasser's Arab nationalism/socialism. Most important, the loss of Jerusalem—the third holiest city in Islam—and its sacred shrines was a major blow to Muslim pride and faith, precipitating a crisis

COMMON CAUSES OF THE RELIGIOUS RESURGENCE IN ISLAM

The original causes of the resurgence are many and need to be appreciated within the specific contexts of individual countries and regions. However, several common phenomena were:

1. an identity crisis precipitated by a sense of failure, loss of identity, and lack of self-esteem;
2. disillusionment with the West—the failure of many Muslim rulers and their Western-inspired governments to respond adequately to the political and socioeconomic needs of their societies;
3. the newfound sense of pride and power that resulted from military (Arab-Israeli war) and economic (oil embargo) success in 1973 and the Iranian revolution of 1978-79; and
4. as a result, a quest for a more authentic personal and public/political and social identity, rooted in Islam and Islamic history.

of confidence and identity. The "liberation of Jerusalem" became not only a regional political problem but also a worldwide (Islamic) religious/political slogan and issue.

For many, the 1967 war, remembered in Arab literature as "the disaster," demonstrated the continued state of decline and the utter impotence of Muslims despite their independence from colonial rule. If Islamic belief and history taught that success and power were signs of a faithful community, many again asked, as they had during the colonial period: What has gone wrong in Islam? Why has God seemingly abandoned His community? Whereas some blamed the hold of an outmoded traditional way of life and saw religion as the culprit, religious leaders asserted that Islam had not failed the Muslims. Muslims had failed Islam by relying on the West for their guidance and development. Adopting the discourse of religious revivalism, they called for a return to Islam. Behind this call was the belief that it was Islam that had united Arabia under Muhammad, inspired the early expansion and conquests, informed the glories of Islamic empires and civilizations, and served as a motivating force in revivalist reforms. The lessons of faith and history were clear. Muslim strength and success were dependent on faithfulness to God's Word and Prophet. Massive failure could only be a sign of waywardness and faithlessness. Coping with modernity did not require new, foreign-inspired alternatives when the community (*umma*) had a tried-and-true faith and way of life.

Many Western-oriented intellectuals and elites were also disillusioned. They had relied on a process of modernization that borrowed heavily from the West; and their hopes and expectations had been shattered. They could not claim to have strengthened their societies or to have built secure bridges with their Western mentors and allies.

The ignominious defeat of Arab forces and Israel's movement of its capital from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem symbolized both Muslim military failure and the failure of the West as an ally. Israel was regarded as a Western state or colony in the Arab world, created and sustained by support from Western powers, in particular the United States. The message seemed clear: relying on the West for its models of development or as an ally had not worked. The sense of disenchantment and failure felt by many modern elites coincided with the criticisms of more traditional religious sectors of society. This disenchantment was reflected in Muslim literature in the late 1960s and early 1970s.¹ Whereas previously the content and concerns of secular and religious literature had generally differed, now popular, intellectual, and religious literature had common themes—a growing criticism and rejection of the West; a quest for identity and authenticity; manifested in a nostalgia for a past golden age of Islam; efforts to recover

and incorporate an awareness of native (Islamic) cultural and historical identity; and emphasis on traditional moral values. Many believed that Muslims had failed to produce a viable, authentic cultural synthesis and social order that was both modern and true to indigenous history and values. Western models of political, social, and economic development were criticized as imported transplants that had failed, fostering continued political and cultural dependence on the West and resulting in secularism, materialism, and spiritual bankruptcy. Neither Western liberalism nor Egypt's Gamal Abd al-Nasser's Arab nationalism/socialism had succeeded.

Behind their democratic parliamentary facades, problems of authoritarianism, legitimacy, and limited political participation plagued most Muslim countries. Government promises and development programs had created rising expectations that often went unfulfilled. Poverty and illiteracy remained unchecked. Modernization seemed to benefit a disproportionate few, the new urban-based middle and upper classes, fostering conspicuous consumption and corruption. The negative impact of modernization on village and family life and traditional religious and social values seemed to threaten the religious and moral fabric of society. The adoption of a Western lifestyle (its institutions, values, dress, music, cinema), once enthusiastically embraced as a symbol of progress and modernity, was now increasingly criticized as responsible for the Westernization and secularization of Muslim societies, a threat to cultural identity, and the cause of moral decline and spiritual malaise. Many revivalist themes reemerged: the need for greater self-reliance and a desire to reclaim the accomplishments of the past and to root individual and national self-identity more indigenously (to find pride and strength inside, not outside, the community) in an Islamic tradition that had once been a dominant world power and civilization. The prevailing mood was reflected in the language of authenticity, religiocultural revival (*tajdid*), reform (*islah*), and renaissance.

Events in 1973 and 1979 provided a new source of pride and served as catalysts for Islamic revivalism. In the eyes of many Muslims, October 1973 reversed the ignominious Arab defeat of 1967. Although the Israeli army was ultimately victorious, many in the Arab world felt vindicated by Egyptian successes in the war. Most importantly, Anwar Sadat's use of Islamic symbols and rhetoric to mobilize and motivate Egyptian forces gave a decidedly religious character to its battles and led to its being regarded as an Islamic war and moral victory. This was the Ramadan war (named for the sacred month of fasting during which it occurred); its code name was Badr, the first great victory for Islam under the Prophet

Muhammad; its battle cry was *Allahu Akbar* ("God is most great"), the traditional summons to the defense of Islam as well as to prayer. Those who died in this holy war were not regarded simply as patriots but as religious martyrs.

The Arab oil embargo of 1973 was a second major catalyst for the resurgence. For the first time since the dawn of colonialism, the West seemed dependent on the Muslim world. The Arabs were no longer client-states but a world economic power to be reckoned with. For many, these new signs of wealth and power were a source of enormous pride and a sign of the return of God's blessings. Remembering a once-glorious past, the Muslims believed the return of God's favor and a new renaissance seemed at hand. Major oil powers like Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the United Arab Emirates used their petrodollars to foster revivalism both out of conviction and to extend their political influence. They assisted other Muslim governments (on condition that they foster Islamic measures), supported Islamic organizations and movements, and underwrote the publication and distribution of Islamic literature and the building of mosques, hospitals, and schools.

The **Iranian revolution of 1978-79** seemed a triumphant watershed for Sunni and Shii Muslims alike. The prominence of its Islamic ideology and leadership reinforced its portrayal as an "Islamic revolution." Success in effectively mobilizing Iranians against a seemingly invincible shah seemed to validate Islamic activist claims that a return to Islam would restore religious identity and vitality and enable Muslims, with God's guidance, to implement a more autonomous and self-reliant way of life despite a regime's military power and Western allies. The initial euphoria of postrevolutionary days sparked an enthusiasm and strong sense of pride among many in the Muslim world. The Ayatollah Khomeini's insistence that Iran's revolution was an Islamic, not just a Shii, revolution and his call for others to follow suit inspired not only Shii outbursts in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf but also initial admiration among Sunni Muslims and organizations. The Islamic (Student) Association of Cairo University's "Lessons from Iran" echoed the sentiments of many who saw in the revolution a clear sign of the power of God, a reminder of the Muslim community's vocation as an example and world leader, a vindication of the true nature of Islam as the sole, comprehensive guide for life and the basis of a just society.

Say, O God, possessor of all sovereignty, you give sovereignty to whom you wish and take sovereignty from whom you wish (Quran 3:26)
the importance of this unique and amazing revolution [is] to awaken

Muslims and to restore their confidence in their religion and their adherence to it, so that they may assume the reins of world leadership of mankind once again and place the world under the protection of the esteemed Islamic civilization. "You are the best umma given to mankind; you prescribe the good and prohibit evil and you believe in God, (Quran 3:110)

The first lesson is the influence of the creed on the Islamic people. What spirit that was which moved in the being of this people who had appeared servile and submissive to injustice and tyranny. They exploded like a volcano, not fearing death and not concerned about life flesh conquered steel. The spirit is the spirit of faith. This revolution indicates the nature of this religion which refuses to let injustice befall its followers and guarantees strength and dignity for them.... The revolution also indicates the nature of this religion from another perspective, namely it is a comprehensive religion. It is religion and state, governance and politics, economics and social organization, education and morals, worship and holy war.

.... Perhaps the most profound lesson which this revolution embodied was the fruit of working for countries of the East and West. Rulers sold their countries and were transformed into puppets in the hands of rulers of East and West.²

From Cairo to Kuala Lumpur, Iran's revolution became tangible corroboration for those who sought explanations for the apparent failures of their governments and believed that less dependence on outside forces, greater self-reliance, and the reaffirmation of Islam offered an alternative. Important differences of belief and perspective existed between those for whom greater cultural autonomy and authenticity meant reclaiming an Islamic cultural heritage and those for whom the foundation and point of departure was Islam, an all-embracing religious tradition. For the former, Islam was an element in national cultural identity. For the latter, it was the basis for community identity and life. The heart of contemporary revivalism has been this ideologization of Islam, interpretation of Islam as a total ideology for political, social, and cultural life. This belief is reflected in the belief that Islam encompasses religion and state, that it is a system of belief and law that governs both spiritual and temporal affairs.³

The use of Islam in politics has taken a number of forms or modes of expression conditioned as much by local sociopolitical realities as by religious belief. The ideology of Islamic political activists is the product of faith and experience, a religious worldview interpreted and applied within the context of a specific country or region. This then accounts for the diversity of Islamic revivalism, its actors, organizations, strategies, and tactics. The increased emphasis on religion in Muslim societies has meant

IDEOLOGICAL WORLDVIEW OF REVIVALISM

There are distinctive differences of interpretation, but the general or common ideological framework of Islamic revivalism includes the following beliefs:


1. Islam is a total and comprehensive way of life. Religion is integral to politics, law, and society.
2. The failure of Muslim societies is due to their departure from the straight path of Islam and their following a Western secular path, with its secular, materialistic ideologies and values.
3. The renewal of society requires a return to Islam, an Islamic religio-political and social reformation or revolution that draws its inspiration from the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad.
4. To restore God's rule and inaugurate a true Islamic social order, Western-inspired civil codes must be informed by or replaced by the Shariah.
5. Although the Westernization of society is condemned, modernization as such is not. Science and technology are readily accepted, but they are to be subordinated to Islamic belief and values to guard against the Westernization and secularization of Muslim society.
6. The process of Islamization, or, more accurately, re-Islamization, requires Muslim organizations, who by their example and activities call upon others to be more observant and who are willing to struggle (jihad) against corruption and social injustice.

more widespread attention to such common aspects of worship as prayer and fasting, and it has also included a rich and, at times confusing agenda as governments and Islamic associations have formulated or implemented policies and programs in the name of Islam. The impetus for the implementation of Islam has come from above, imposed by the state or government, or from below, from society, through the pressure of religious organizations or political parties.

State Islam is government imposed, implemented by ruling regimes often with the cooperation of the religious establishment, state-supported clerical leaders. Rulers as diverse as Libya's **Colonel Muammar Qaddafi** (1969–2011), Egypt's **Anwar Sadat** (1970–81), Iran's **Ayatollah Khomeini** (1979–89) and his successors, Sudan's **Colonel Jafar al-Numayri** (1969–85) and **General Omar ul-Bashir** (b. 1989), Pakistan's **General Zia ul-Haq** (1977–88), and the **Taliban** rule in Afghanistan (1996–2001) have used Islam to enhance their legitimacy and policies. State Islam has reflected

a broad spectrum, ranging from the conservative Saudi monarchy to Qaddafi's radical populist "state of the masses," from General Zia ul-Haq's martial law regime to Ayatollah Khomeini's model of a clerically guided governance by the (Islamic) jurist and Taliban rule in Afghanistan. It has included the contrasting styles of monarchs, the military, and the clergy.

Islamic organizations and movements reflect an equally pluriform rather than monolithic Islam, ranging from moderates who work within



Ayatollah Khomeini (1902–89), leader of the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

existing political systems to violent revolutionaries who seek to topple governments; from open membership to secret cells; from the relatively democratic to the totalitarian. Contrary to popular stereotypes, most activists are neither uneducated peasants from rural areas minimally exposed to modern education nor seminary students. They are not anti-modern reactionaries trying to take refuge in the seventh century. Many combine a traditional upbringing with modern education. The majority have been university graduates in engineering, law, medicine, science, or education from major national universities in Muslim countries as well as from centers of learning in Europe and America such as MIT, Cornell, Indiana, Oxford, London, and the Sorbonne.

Whereas the *ulama* and theological faculties played a more important role among the Shii, Sunni organizations have been predominantly lay rather than clerical, their membership drawn heavily from students and young professionals (teachers, lawyers, engineers, doctors) recruited from schools and mosques. They have included both city dwellers and villagers, members of the lower middle and middle classes. Many have been serious, pious, highly motivated people disaffected with the socioeconomic realities of their societies. These were not Muslims reacting to the introduction of modernization, reflexively rejecting a new and unknown reality. They were, instead, from the modern sector of society. Unlike some of their peers, their experience of modernization did not lead them to embrace it but to criticize and reject its excesses and espouse an alternative to the dominant, Western form of modernization prevalent in much of the world.

The moderate (nonviolent) majority pursued reform through the gradual transformation of Muslim society; a radical minority advocate violent revolution. Moderate organizations and parties have participated in electoral politics: the **Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Jordan** (the Jordanian Islamic Action Front), the **Renaissance Party (Ennahda) in Tunisia**, the **Justice and Development Party in Morocco**, the **Reform Party in Algeria**, the **Ummah Party in Kuwait**, **Turkey's Welfare Party**, the **Yemeni Reformist Union**, the **Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan**, **ABIM (Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement and PAS (Party of Islam) in Malaysia**, and the **Muhammadiya and Nahdatul Ulama in Indonesia**. Many ran educational and social programs, youth camps and centers, and legal aid societies and hospitals; they participated in government and student campus elections and even served in the cabinets of Pakistan, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Yemen, and Malaysia. Extremist groups like **Egypt's Takfir wal Hijra** (Excommunication and Emigration), **al-Jihad (Holy War)**, **Gamaa Islamiyya** (Islamic Group), **Jund Allah** (God's Army), and **Algeria's Armed Islamic Group** pursued a policy of violent

IDEOLOGICAL WORLDVIEW OF RADICAL ACTIVISTS

Militant extremists operate on the following assumptions, believing that theological doctrine and political realism necessitate violent revolution:

1. A Crusader mentality, European and more recently American neocolonialism, and the power of Zionism pit the West against the Islamic world.
2. Establishment of an Islamic system of government is not simply an alternative but an Islamic "imperative," God's command and mandate that all Muslims must obey and implement.
3. Because the legitimacy of Muslim governments is based on the Sharia, governments that do not follow it are illegitimate. Those who fail to follow Islamic law, governments and individuals, are guilty of unbelief, are no longer Muslim, and must be fought and if necessary killed.
4. The official religious establishment of *ulama* and state-supported and controlled mosques and preachers have been co-opted by the government.
5. Jihad as armed struggle in the defense of Islam or Muslims against their enemies (Muslim as well as Western governments, groups or individuals), who threaten their existence, is a religious duty. Like the Kharijites in early Islam, radicals demand total commitment and obedience. The army of God is locked in battle or holy war with the followers of Satan. One is either a true believer or an infidel, saved or damned, a friend or an enemy of God.
6. Christians and Jews are unbelievers rather than "People of the Book" because of their connections with Western (Christian) neocolonialism and Zionism. They are seen as partners in a Judeo-Christian conspiracy against Islam and the Muslim world.

confrontation, based on their conviction that the political realities of Muslim life require armed struggle or jihad.

Militants viewed most Muslim governments as anti-Islamic regimes that either co-opt and control religion or repress the attempts of authentic Islamic movements to implement Islam. Many criticized or condemned such government policies, but extremists saw them as a general pattern that made most established governments the object of jihad. Radicals believe that the refusal of Muslim governments to implement Islamic law and their repression of Islamic activism necessitate

violence and armed struggle against the enemies of God, despotic rulers and their foreign allies. Indeed, they saw it as a religious obligation to resist and fight. In contrast to conservative and modernist leaders, who tended to emphasize nonviolent interpretations of jihad, militants believed that Islam is in danger, locked in a defensive war against repressive anti-Islamic or un-Islamic rulers and states. They regarded themselves as the "true" defenders of Islam, in whose name they assassinated opponents like Egypt's Anwar Sadat and attacked government installations and foreign embassies. Although many spoke of an Islamic alternative, shared aspirations, when translated into ideology and strategy, often yielded differing interpretations and agendas.

Religion in Modern Muslim Nation Building

A more detailed review of several Muslim countries reveals the multiple uses of Islam by governments and activist organizations in Turkey, Egypt, Libya, Iran, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.⁴ Modern nation building in the Muslim world demonstrated three patterns: secular, Muslim, and Islamic.

Turkey

At one end of the spectrum, Turkey, under the leadership and direction of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk, Father of the Turks, d. 1938), was the only Muslim country to choose a completely secular path, restricting religion to private life. At the other end of the spectrum, Saudi Arabia became a self-proclaimed Islamic state. The vast majority of countries in the Muslim world fall in between. After independence, most pursued a path of political development that was heavily indebted to the West for political, legal, economic, and educational institutions. Most are Muslim states in that the majority of the population and their heritage are Muslim. Moreover, most of these states have "Islamic" provisions, such as a requirement that the head of state must be Muslim, a declaration that Islam is the state religion, or state control of religion through a ministry of religious affairs. Yet the prevailing tendency in the postindependence period was to foster secular forms of national identity and solidarity and to limit religion to private rather than public life. Thus, local (Egyptian, Syrian, Libyan) or regional/linguistic (Arab or Baath) forms of nationalism or socialism prevailed. The secular trend changed almost imperceptibly in the 1960s and 1970s, for reasons we will now discuss.

Egypt

When Gamal Abd al-Nasser and the Free Officers overthrew the Egyptian monarchy in July 1952, they came to power in a nation that had for more

than a century pursued a Western-oriented path of development. Despite the initial support Nasser had received from the Muslim Brotherhood, he continued to steer Egypt on a secular nationalist course. However, by the late 1950s, faced with opposition from the Brotherhood and wishing to establish his leadership in the Arab world as well as Egypt, Nasser broadened Egyptian nationalism into an Arab nationalism/socialism, rooted in the region's common Arab-Islamic heritage. He preached a common Arab unity and identity—based on a shared language, history, and religion—whose concerns and interests transcended national borders.

Increasingly, Nasser used religious symbols, language, leaders, and rhetoric to legitimate and win support for his Arab socialist ideology and policies. State control of al-Azhar University and a state-sponsored Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs were used to legitimate and promote the Islamic character of Arab socialism. Official pronouncements or legal decrees (*fatwas*) were obtained from Islamic scholars at al-Azhar University, which had been nationalized in 1961, to establish the compatibility of Arab socialism and Islam. The state-sponsored Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs published a journal, *The Pulpit of Islam*, in which articles interpreted traditional Islamic beliefs regarding the equality of believers and social justice to legitimate Nasser's socialist policies and programs of land reform, nationalization, and birth control.

Nasser's use of Islam was challenged internationally and domestically. Saudi Arabia resented this popular and charismatic leader's scathing denunciation of conservative Arab monarchies and his regional influence. The Saudis obtained decrees from their *ulama* condemning socialism and preaching a pan-Islamic, which included a pan-Arab, message. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which had been disaffected by Nasser's failure to create an Islamic state, stepped up its opposition. In 1965, the Brotherhood was accused of attempting to assassinate Nasser. Their leaders were imprisoned and a number were executed, among them **Sayyid Qutb**, who is remembered as the martyr of Islamic revivalism. The Brotherhood was ruthlessly suppressed. Although it seemed to be effectively eliminated, the Brotherhood continued to exist in prison, in exile, and underground and reemerged under Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat.

The shock and grief that Nasser's unexpected death caused in the Arab world was reflected in the millions who took to the streets of Cairo for his funeral. However, the pride that Nasser had fostered and the hopes of his Arab socialism had been shattered by the catastrophe of the Arab defeat in 1967. Yet, Nasser's charismatic personality created a void that few men could have filled. Sadat had been completely eclipsed by Nasser's shadow. Upon Sadat's accession to power, he was careful to see that his picture was

displayed alongside that of Nasser. As Sadat sought to emerge as a leader in his own right, enhance his political legitimacy, and counter the opposition of Nasserites and leftists who opposed his pro-Western policies, he relied heavily on Islam. Sadat appropriated the title "The Believer President," had the mass media cover him praying at the mosque, increased Islamic programming in the media and Islamic courses in schools, built mosques, and employed Islamic symbols and rhetoric in his public statements. Sufi brotherhoods and the Muslim Brotherhood, suppressed by Nasser, were permitted to function publicly. The Sadat government encouraged and supported Islamic student organizations on campuses to offset the influence of Nasserite and Marxist student groups. He marshaled the support of al-Azhar's religious establishment to legitimate key government policies such as the Camp David Accords and family law reforms and to denounce as extremists the Islamic activists who increasingly challenged the regime during the latter part of the 1970s.

As Islamic organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood and student groups gained momentum, they became more independent and critical of Sadat policies: his support for the Shah of Iran and early condemnation of the Ayatollah Khomeini, the Camp David Accords, and Sadat's pro-Western economic and political ties. They were also more vocal in their demands for the implementation of Islamic law. A new crop of secret revolutionary groups, some funded by disaffected and radicalized former Muslim Brothers who had been imprisoned under Nasser, began to challenge both what they regarded as Sadat's hypocritical manipulation of Islam and the moderate posture of the Muslim Brotherhood. Militant groups like Muhammad's Youth (also known as the Islamic Liberation Organization), the Army of God, and Excommunication and Emigration (*Takfir wal Hijra*) resorted to acts of violence in an attempt to overthrow the government.

Springing up in both cities and provincial towns, these groups recruited heavily from schools, universities, and local mosques. Many members were educated and highly motivated. Despite their differences, all condemned Sadat and Egyptian society as un-Islamic, politically corrupt, controlled by infidels (that is, people who were not "true believers"), and dominated by alien and decadent Western laws and lifestyles that fostered secularism, materialism (conspicuous consumption), and a spiritually lax and permissive society. They believed that the liberation of Egyptian society required that all true Muslims undertake an armed struggle or holy war against a regime they regarded as oppressive, anti-Islamic, and a puppet of the West. Their concern was not only over Egypt's political and military dependence but also its cultural penetration and acculturation,

the more insidious threat. Their grievances erupted into attacks against bars, nightclubs, cinemas, Western tourist hotels, as well as government institutions and personnel.

Sadat's growing authoritarianism and suppression of any dissent came to a head in 1981, when more than 1,500 people from a cross-section of Egyptian society (Islamic activists, lawyers, doctors, journalists, university professors, political opponents, ex-government ministers) were imprisoned. On October 6, 1981, Tanzim al-Jihad assassinated Anwar Sadat as he reviewed a parade commemorating the 1973 war. Lieutenant Khalid Islambuli, the leader of the assassins, had cried out: "I am Khalid Islambuli, I have killed Pharaoh and I do not fear death." Sadat's popularity in the West and his international image as a flexible, enlightened leader stood in sharp contrast to his growing unpopularity at home, where his secular and religious opposition referred to him as pharaoh.

If Islamic revivalism or fundamentalism in Egypt during the 1970s seemed to be a movement of confrontation and violence, the 1980s witnessed the fruits of the broader based, quiet revolution that had been overshadowed or eclipsed by the conflict between Sadat's growing authoritarianism and his militant opposition. The most important characteristic of Islamic revivalism in Egypt since the 1980s, as in many parts of the Muslim world when Islam is not controlled or suppressed by governments, is the extent to which Islamic activism has become part of moderate, mainstream life and society rather than merely a marginal phenomenon. Islamic identity is expressed not only in formal religious practices but also in the social services offered by psychiatric and drug rehabilitation centers, dental clinics, day-care centers, legal aid societies, and organizations that provide subsidized housing and food distribution or run banks and investment houses.

The *ulama* and the mosques have also taken on a more prominent role. The popularity of preachers has made some of them religious media stars. Their presence is known not only through television but also from their regular newspaper columns, cassettes, DVDs, websites, and books, which enjoy widespread distribution in bookstores, in airports and hotels, and through street vendors. Their popularity extends beyond Egypt to much of the Arab world. Mosques and their imams (leaders) are also part of the mainstreaming of revivalist activities.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the two faces of political Islam (violent and nonviolent) were evident in Egyptian politics and society. Extremist organizations like the Gamaa Islamiyya (Islamic Group) and Islamic Jihad attacked and killed government officials, intellectuals, and foreign tourists as well as Egyptian Christians in clashes in southern

Egypt. At the same time, Egypt's "quiet revolution" became more evident as Islamic activism became increasingly more visible as an effective social and political presence, institutionalized within mainstream society. Islamically motivated associations and societies ran schools, hospitals, clinics, and other social services as well as banks and publishing houses. At the same time, the Muslim Brotherhood, banned as a political party, formed coalitions with legal political parties and emerged as the leading opposition in parliamentary elections. Islamic activists also proved successful in professional associations (medicine, law, engineering, education) and university faculty elections.

The prominence of Islamic activism in mainstream society proved a tacit critique of the ineffectiveness of the Mubarak government in delivering adequate social services and mobilizing popular support. In its early years, the Mubarak government had distinguished between violent extremists, whom it silenced, and nonviolent opposition, which it tolerated. However, in the 1990s, the government increasingly moved to silence any and all opposition, blurring the line between violent revolutionaries and those who participated within the system. It charged that there was little difference (other than tactics) between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Gamaa Islamiyya or Islamic Jihad. Muslim Brothers were arrested and convicted in special, extrajudicial, military courts ostensibly created to counter terrorism. The government moved to pass new laws to prevent or disqualify Islamists from office as heads of professional associations and moved to take control of (nationalize) all private or independent mosques (many of which were sources of opposition).

Egypt has long been regarded as a leader in the Arab world—politically, militarily, and religiously. Among the most modern of Muslim countries, it has experienced the full array of Islamic revivalist activities. Once a barometer for a modernization that was predominantly Western and somewhat secular in orientation, Egypt provides a full-blown example of the more complex, and at times volatile, experience of many Muslim societies attempting in a variety of ways to integrate their Islamic heritage and values with their sociopolitical development. The Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed considerable success in parliamentary elections despite government harassment and repression, and Egyptian society continued to reflect the growing strength of Islam in society. As we shall see, in 2011 Mubarak would be forced to resign and the Brotherhood would briefly come to power.

Libya

During the late 1960s revolutionary regimes came to power in military coups d'état in Libya and the Sudan. Both colonels Muammar Qaddafi of

Libya and Jafar al-Numayri of the Sudan were admirers of Egypt's Gamal Abd al-Nasser, patterned their revolutions on Nasser's model, and justified their coups in the name of Arab socialism. However, by the 1970s, both had found it necessary to buttress their secular nationalist ideology with an appeal to religion.

Libya was the site of one of the earliest and most controversial state implementations of Islam. Although Qaddafi had emulated the policies of his hero, Nasser, regarding religion, by the 1970s Qaddafi was reinforcing nationalist slogans and ideology with an espousal of Islam. Qaddafi embarked on a series of reforms aimed at eradicating the vestiges of European colonialism and reaffirming Libya's Arab-Islamic heritage. He declared that Libya's Arab socialist path was the socialism of Islam, "a socialism emanating from the true religion of Islam and its Noble Book."³ Churches were closed and missionary activities curtailed. Arabic replaced European languages in official transactions, names of localities, and street signs. In the early 1970s, Qaddafi announced the introduction of Islamic law. In fact, however, Islamic law was never fully implemented. Instead, Qaddafi introduced Islamic penal laws and punishments for gambling, alcohol, theft, and adultery. Full implementation of Islamic law was replaced by his grand design, the Third Way or Third Universal Theory, in which he provided an Islamic alternative to capitalism and Marxism for Libya and the world. The blueprint was delineated in *The Green Book*. The symbolism and significance of this title was not lost on a Muslim audience. The Quran is the Noble Book; Jews and Christians are "people of the book," possessors of revelation; green is the color of the Prophet Muhammad. The Chinese in mainland China at that time were followers of Mao Tse Tung's *Red Book*. *The Green Book* (published in three installments—in 1975, 1977, 1979) was billed as an alternative to prevailing ideologies and blueprints for society, whether Western European (Judeo-Christian) capitalism or Soviet or Chinese Marxism.

Publication of *The Green Book* signaled Qaddafi's own modern and idiosyncratic interpretation of Islam. He claimed *The Green Book* replaced the traditional position of Islamic law as the blueprint for society. He radically redefined Islam and Arab nationalism, stamping them with his own interpretation. Islam in Qaddafi's hands was transformed into a form of Islamic revolutionary socialism. Muhammad was portrayed as a revolutionary leader whose battle with the power and wealth of the Arab political establishment is likened to the modern-day struggle against kings and princes. For Qaddafi, the principal cause of Muslim backwardness was not Islam but the legacy of European colonialism and the forces of modern political and economic imperialism. He maintained that Islam was

a progressive, socialist movement that stands for a worldwide political and social revolution against these forces of oppression. Qaddafi's linkage of Islam with a "progressive, populist revolutionary universalism" could be seen in his assertion that to achieve their God-ordained goal, Muslim nations must support liberation movements wherever they occur, whether or not they are Islamically inspired.⁶

The ire of many of the *ulama*, and indeed many Muslims, across the Islamic world was particularly aroused by Qaddafi's methodology and interpretations of Islam. He challenged the status and role of the *ulama* by emphasizing that all Muslims had a right to interpret Islam and by interpreting Islam himself in a rather sweeping style with innovations that broke with traditional belief and practice. Raising his *Green Book* to the status of the Sharia, interpreting Islam for state and society, and encouraging others to do so—all these actions flew in the face of the traditional role of the *ulama*. Qaddafi also encouraged Muslims to break with the centuries-long Islamic practice of dating the Muslim calendar from the emigration (*hijra*) of Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina. Instead he introduced a new Muslim calendar, which began with the death of the Prophet.

For many, the proof of Qaddafi's hubris and unorthodoxy was his position regarding the authenticity and binding nature of the corpus of Prophetic traditions, the *hadith*. Like some Muslim scholars and much of Western scholarship, Qaddafi questioned the authenticity of the traditions of the Prophet, given alterations, interpolations, and fabrication. He concluded that due to this lack of certitude regarding the Sunna of the Prophet, only the Quran should be regarded as binding and as an infallible guide. Many of his critics charged that Qaddafi was merely clearing the way for the authority of his own statements and teachings. Indeed, Qaddafi rejected the binding nature of the Sunna, the schools of Islamic law (which he regarded as sectarian movements), and the traditional religious establishment. Moreover, in a direct assault on the authority of the *ulama*, he had encouraged his youthful followers to take over the mosques.

In the final analysis, Qaddafi advocated an ideology and system of government based less on revelation than on his own personal guidance and dictates. Muammar Qaddafi's idiosyncratic, and for some heretical, populist reinterpretation of Islam and Arab socialism, which he imposed on Libyan religious leaders, earned the opposition of the religious establishment in the Arab world and Libyan Islamic movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood, who were targeted as "public enemies" and repressed, driven into exile, and silenced. Qaddafi remained in power until he was overthrown and killed in October 2011 during the Arab Uprisings.

Iran

For many in the West, the Iranian revolution was the occasion for their encounter with Islam and its role in Muslim politics. For more than a decade thereafter, events in the Muslim world would be viewed primarily through the prism of the Islamic revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran: the fall of the Shah, long regarded by the Western media as an enlightened, modernizing monarch and a staunch ally of the United States; the wrenching spectacle of the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran and of "America Held Hostage" by Islamic militants, shown nightly on television and in the press shouting "Death to America"; and the kidnapping of Americans and bombings of American embassies and Marines in Lebanon, attributed to Iranian-inspired and supported Islamic radicals. The Iranian experience exemplifies a publicly proclaimed "Islamic" revolution and government as well as the clash of interpretations of Islam that accompany the politicization of Shii Islam.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the Shah of Iran's White Revolution had attempted to implement a wide-ranging modernization program. Despite noteworthy gains, the real impact and advantages of modernization had primarily benefited urban areas and a new modern middle class of technocrats and professionals. Most important, modernization had not included significant political reform. Many sectors of Iranian society had become increasingly critical of the Shah's growing autocratic rule and the rapid, uncritical pace of modernization, which posed a threat to Iranian national autonomy, identity, and culture.

In the face of the regime's refusal to grant broader political participation and its suppression of dissent, an alliance evolved between the traditional, religiously oriented classes (religious leaders, merchants, and artisans), who felt many of the Shah's modern reforms to be an assault on both their religion and livelihood, and many modern, Western-educated intellectuals and professionals. Both shared common concerns about political freedom, the dangers of military and economic dependence on the United States, and the threat of cultural alienation due to the Westernization of Iranian education and society—what one secular intellectual termed "Westoxification" or "Weststruckness," that is, indiscriminate borrowing from and dependence on the West. Although all shared the goals of overthrowing the Shah and creating a more indigenously rooted government and society, their religious and political outlooks and agendas were in reality quite diverse. For many, the Islamic alternative meant a return to Islam, the establishment of an Islamic state and society. Others wished to restore national pride and identity through a conscious preservation and incorporation of Iran's Persian-Shii identity and cultural heritage. Their

differences would emerge once the Shah was overthrown and Iran's new leaders moved from opposition to a common foe to the implementation of an Islamic republic.

As opposition to the Shah mounted, the reinterpretation and politicization of Shii Islam emerged as the most viable and effective vehicle for articulating national concerns, for legitimating demands for reforms, and for gaining popular support. Islam provided an indigenous, non-Western alternative—a sense of identity, a common set of religiocultural symbols and values and thus an ideological framework within which a variety of factions could coexist. The ideological worldview of Shii Islam, in particular its religious history, gave meaning and legitimacy to a mushrooming opposition movement. Indeed, early Shii religious history and belief lent itself to the interpretation of Shiism as a religion of protest and revolution: the disinheritance of Ali, Husayn, and the early Imams by Sunni caliphs; Shii revolts against Umayyad and Abbasid Sunni rulers; and especially the martyrdom of Husayn at Karbala. All these events offered inspirational examples and symbols for the ensuing battle against oppression and injustice and the legitimacy of protest, martyrdom, and, if necessary, revolution.

Modern Iranian history had also provided selective examples or precedents for the use of Islam in protest movements to preserve Iranian independence and national interests. In the Tobacco Protest (1891–92) to prevent the selling of tobacco concessions to Europeans and the Constitutional Revolt (1905–11), which set some limits on the Shah's power by instituting liberal reforms, a modern constitution, and parliamentary form of government, local religious leaders (mullahs) were pressed into service, joining with other sectors of society in the protests. In both cases, religious leaders and institutions were part of broad-based movements to safeguard Iranian identity and autonomy and check an autocratic Shah. Similarly, during the 1970s the mullah-mosque network offered a ready-made system of organization and mobilization.

The imprisonment of many key secular leaders and the imposition of martial law accentuated the more independent status and role of religious leaders, who represented a vast reservoir of grassroots leadership. Their mosques, situated throughout Iran's cities, towns, and villages, became centers for political organization and agitation. Government regulations could not restrict the functioning of mosques, the economic support that religious leaders received from wealthy merchants and others who paid their Islamic tithes or taxes (the annual tithe on wealth for the poor, *zakat*, and the Shii religious tax on income, *khums*, which is paid directly to religious authorities), or the sermons at Friday community prayer that

drew on Shii religious history to excoriate the evils of imperial oppression. The battlefield at Karbala in the seventh century became the streets of Tehran and other Iranian cities in the twentieth century; the confrontation between the armies of Caliph Yazid and the martyred Husayn was transformed into the contemporary confrontation between the Shah (the new Yazid) and the modern-day forces of Husayn, the Iranian people. Thus, the classic Shii myth of good and evil, the army of God versus that of Satan, with its lessons of sacrifice and martyrdom, had its modern-day meanings and application. Similarly, traditional Twelver Shii belief in the return of the hidden Twelfth Imam, its promise of ultimate victory and a reign of perfect social justice, could be drawn on to inspire and motivate.

The Islamic component in Iran's revolution had many sources, drawing on a variety of Islamically oriented leaders and their ideological interpretations of Islam. Among the more prominent and influential were Mehdi Bazargan, Dr. Ali Shariati, and the Ayatollah Khomeini. Bazargan (1907–96), who would become the provisional prime minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, was a French-trained engineer and Islamically inspired political activist who had been a longtime critic of the Shah and had been imprisoned for his beliefs. Bazargan was particularly effective because he combined a traditional religious outlook and vocabulary with modern concerns and was thus able to speak to the *ulama* as well as modern, educated students and professionals.

Ali Shariati (1933–77), the son of a preacher-scholar, was a Sorbonne-educated intellectual and teacher. He had been active in Bazargan's Liberation Movement of Iran in the 1960s and influenced by the example of the Algerian and Cuban revolutions. Shariati synthesized Shii Islam and Western social scientific language to develop a thoroughgoing reinterpretation of traditional Islam, a kind of liberation theology. He denounced "world imperialism, including multinational corporations and cultural imperialism, racism, class exploitation, class oppression, class inequality, and *gharbzadegi* [Weststruckness]."⁷⁷

Shariati's teachings disturbed both the political and the religious establishments. The Shah regarded Shariati as an Islamic Marxist and revolutionary, and many of the *ulama* condemned his innovative reinterpretation of traditional Shii beliefs, which was critical of the *ulama's* role in Iranian history. Shariati distinguished between original Islam (the Islam of Ali and his early followers)—which he claimed was dynamic, progressive, scientific, and revolutionary—and the scholastic, institutionalized, bureaucratic Islam (Safavid Islam) of the *ulama*, who had been co-opted by the Safavid rulers. The *ulama* produced a rigid, passive and retrogressive religion of the establishment. For Shariati, both Western imperialism and a retrogressive

religious leadership were responsible for the decline of Muslim society. The *ulama* had too often become government advisers or fallen into quietism rather than asserting their true role as protectors of Islam against oppressive governments. Thus Shariati believed that reform must come primarily from lay intelligentsia rather than from the traditional religious leaders. His dynamic revolutionary Islam, which preached a more indigenous ideology—Iranian-Islamic rather than Western-imperialist—proved very effective among many of Iran's modern, educated professionals and students. More than 100,000 copies of his lectures were published and distributed, and thousands flocked regularly to hear him speak. For them, Shariati demonstrated the relevance of Shii Islam to modern life and to serve as the basis for a much-needed social revolution.

In sharp contrast to Shariati stands the champion of clerical rule, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–89). If Shariati was the ideologue of the Iranian revolution, Khomeini was its living symbol and guide. An early, outspoken critic of the Shah, he had been forced to live in exile from the 1960s until his triumphant return from France in 1979. The freedom and independence he enjoyed in exile enabled him to remain vociferous in his call for reform and to cultivate his image and role as the symbol of opposition to the Shah, the outspoken voice and conscience of Islam and the Iranian people. From exile, he continued to guide his followers in Iran; his speeches and writings were smuggled into Iran on audiocassettes and pamphlets and widely distributed through the mullah-mosque network. Khomeini, like many others in Iran and throughout the Islamic world, condemned Western imperialism, the Westernization of Muslim societies with its threat to Islamic identity and culture, and Israel, which he regarded as an outpost of American neocolonialism.

In contrast to Bazargan and Shariati, Khomeini remained religiously conservative in his education, vocation, worldview, and lifestyle. Although all three shared common national and religious concerns—the experience of government repression, opposition to the Shah, rejection of political quietism, and the struggle for Islamically oriented sociopolitical reforms—Khomeini's outlook was shaped by his clerical background and interests. For Khomeini, the comprehensiveness of Islam and its integral relationship to society were inseparably linked to clerical dominance.

However, religious traditionalism did not preclude change and development in his interpretation of Islam. His doctrine of jurist rule asserted that because an Islamic government is one based on Islamic law, the most qualified to rule would be an expert (*faqih*) or group of experts in Islamic law. However, Khomeini's opinions would have remained academic if the political situation had not deteriorated so badly in the mid-1970s.

The increasingly repressive measures of the Shah transformed an opposition movement demanding reform into a resistance movement, organized under the umbrella of Islam, calling for a new political and social order. This movement comprised diverse groups in the Iranian political and ideological spectrum: from secularists to Islamic activists, from liberal democrats to Marxists. In 1970, the Ayatollah had spoken of an Islamic revolution that might take centuries; he could not foresee that events in 1979 would lead to his triumphant return to Iran and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Khomeini and his clerical followers consolidated their power and dominated Iran's government, parliament, judiciary, military, Revolutionary Guards, the press, and media. Censorship of news and publishing, ideological control of university curricula and professors, and prohibitions on alcohol, gambling, drug use, and sexual offenses were all enforced in the name of Islam. Islamic courts and judges sentenced and punished those convicted of offenses ranging from drug smuggling and homosexuality to political dissent. Dissent, both Islamic and secular, was silenced. Competing interpretations of Islam were often no longer tolerated but eclipsed or displaced by a doctrinaire ideology that left little place for the followers of Islamically oriented laity like Shariati and Bazargan or for dissenting clerics. Many were driven out of office, fled the country, imprisoned, or executed.

Khomeini's espousal of a nonsectarian, universalist Islam, transcending Sunni-Shii differences, informed Iran's advocacy of a universal Islamic revolution to liberate all the oppressed and justified Khomeini's outspoken leadership on Islamic issues internationally. This doctrine was used to justify the incitement, of revolts in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Iraq; to support the Moro in the southern Philippines; to legitimate Iranian intervention in Lebanon; and to justify Khomeini's condemnation of Salman Rushdie. Debate over the interpretation and application of Islam has continued throughout the existence of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Critical to understanding the Islamic Republic have been and continue to be its factions and shifts of power, a history of factionalism, and the loss of equilibrium and increasing polarization among the governing elites. The contending forces within Iran were reflected in 1997, when many were stunned when the "favorite son" of the ruling elites lost in a landslide to the "Cinderella candidate," Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, who received 69 percent of the vote. Khatami had run on a liberal platform in a country where "liberal" was synonymous with "Western decadence."

During Khatami's presidency open public discussion and debate on topics like democratization, civil society, and the rule of law were

accompanied by factional disputes over the concept and future of the institution of the *faqih* (jurist). The debate included a questioning of the historical and theological legitimacy of the concept of *vilayat-i faqih* (guardianship of the jurist) or the Supreme Leader of the government as well as the limits of popular sovereignty, civil society, and rule of law.

The hardliners bounced back with the election of the sixth president of the Islamic Republic, who enjoyed the support of a coalition of conservative political groups. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad espoused a hardline religious and political position, winning 62 percent of the votes in a runoff election to become president in August 2005.

Ahmadinejad proved to be a very controversial figure within Iran and internationally. Criticism crested with his election to a second term in June 2009, the results of which were rejected by the major opposition candidates, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a former prime minister under Ayatollah Khomeini, and Mehdi Karrubi, former Speaker of Iran's parliament, charging the elections were rigged and also widely criticized internationally. On June 23 and 25, 2009, two years before the Arab Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, in protest against Ahmadinejad's declared victory, up to 3 millions demonstrators in Tehran poured into the streets in a pro-democracy movement that came to be called the Green Movement, whose supporters included former president Khatami and other reform-minded politicians and clergy, many chanting the slogan "Where is my vote?" Mass demonstrations and civil disobedience continued in major cities until February 2010 when police and other security forces suppressed the demonstrations. More than seventy-two were killed and thousands arrested and tortured. The government in Tehran shut down and attempted to block social media and banned public rallies. Mousavi and Karrubi and more than one hundred other leaders of the movement were arrested, subjected to show trials, and imprisoned.

In June 2010 Mousavi issued a Covenant for the Green Movement, calling for democratic reforms. In contrast to the Arab uprising that led to the overthrow of Arab dictators, the Green Movement continued to call for pro-democracy reforms and civil rights. While recognizing the role of Islam in society, the covenant called for the separation of religious institutions from institutions of the state," although it acknowledged that "religion will certainly have a presence" in Iran's democratic future.

Lebanon

The dominant reality of Lebanon during the late 1970s and the 1980s was its civil war. Lebanon also offers the second major example of militant Shia politics. Ironically, the two Middle Eastern countries most torn by

violence and civil strife, Iran and Lebanon, were once regarded as the most stable, modern, and Western-oriented. It was not uncommon for Lebanon to be referred to as the Switzerland of the Middle East or for Beirut to be described as the Paris of the Middle East (reflecting the influence of French culture and fashions). Moreover, Beirut's banks, shops, boutiques, cinemas, and leading universities (the French Jesuit University St. Joseph and the American University of Beirut) reflected Western influence and offered the best that was available in the United States and Europe.

Shii organizations such as **AMAL**, **Hizbollah**, and **al-Jihad**, which mobilized Shii Muslims in protest and revolutionary activities, were major actors in the Lebanese civil war. Since the late 1970s, a Shii community, long a distant third in political and economic power in a state dominated by Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims, has become a formidable force. The Shii of Lebanon existed in a confessional or sectarian state whose government was based on the balancing of several major religious-political communities or confessional groups' interests.

Historically, with the division of the Ottoman empire after World War I, Lebanon and Syria had been placed under French rule, known as the French Mandate. The French subsequently oversaw the creation of modern Lebanon, with a government that was based on an informal agreement, the National Pact of 1943, designed to assure the dominance of France's Christian Lebanese allies. A sectarian system of government, based on the census of 1932, which identified the Maronite Christians as the largest community, institutionalized the relative population strengths of Lebanon's major religious communities: Maronites, Sunni Muslims, Shii Muslims, and Druze. Thus, the president was to be a Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the chamber of deputies a Shii. Key positions in the government, cabinet, parliament, ministries, and military were apportioned along confessional, or sectarian, lines. Within this system, the Shii minority were a distant third to the more numerous and prosperous Christian and Sunni Muslim communities. However, Shii prominence in political affairs increased in the 1970s, and a major catalyst for this turn of events was an Iranian-born and educated Shii cleric, Imam Musa Sadr. As the Ayatollah Khomeini had come to symbolize the hopes and aspirations of Iran's dispossessed, so too the charismatic Musa Sadr came to represent the reinvigorated and mobilized Lebanese Shii community.

Musa Sadr had come from Iran to Lebanon in 1959. The Lebanese Shii were primarily rural, poor, and disorganized. By the early 1970s, he had become the leading Shii cleric in Lebanon, a major force in organizing a weak, disparate community. Musa Sadr appealed to Shii identity and

community solidarity to sustain a populist movement for social and political reform, and in 1974 he organized the Movement of the Disinherited. Musa Sadr reinterpreted Shii religious history and belief. Early Shii suffering at the hands of Sunni rulers was likened to the tyranny, discriminating, and exploitation suffered under the Christian-dominated Lebanese political system. He identified AMAL ("Hope": the militia that had evolved from this movement) with the liberation of Lebanon's oppressed and disinherited. In a land of militias and escalating sectarian warfare, AMAL, originally organized to provide the Shii community with protection, to defend the rights of a community who had now grown in numbers to become Lebanon's largest confessional group, became radicalized.

Four events precipitated a radicalization of Shii politics: the Lebanese Civil War of 1975, the disappearance of Musa Sadr in 1978, the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, and the Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982. The failure of Lebanon's Christian-dominated government to acknowledge the changed demographics (no census was taken after 1932!) and redistribute power more equitably to reflect a Muslim (Sunni and Shii combined) majority and of the Christian and Sunni Muslim leadership to respond to the needs of a Shii community that had grown from 18 percent in 1968 to 30 percent, or approximately 1 million, of the population, plus the presence of significant numbers of Palestinians in the south had exacerbated an already fragile and volatile political situation.

The mysterious disappearance of Musa Sadr while visiting Muammar Qaddafi in Libya in 1978 transformed Musa Sadr from a symbol of Shii protest to a cult hero and breathed new life into AMAL. Musa Sadr's disappearance fit nicely into the Shii paradigm of martyrdom and the occultation of the Hidden Twelfth Imam. He was transformed into a religious hero, a worthy descendant of Husayn. Many maintained that Imam Musa Sadr had not died; he had merely disappeared and would return.

The Iranian revolution and the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982 significantly contributed to the further deterioration of Lebanon's war-torn politics and the radicalization of the Shii. The impact of the Iranian revolution, with its heightened sense of Shii pride and identity, testified to the power of Shii faith and ideology and verified the politicized Shii model of resistance and its promise of ultimate triumph. However, by 1982, AMAL, under Musa Sadr's lay successor, Nabih Berri, had increasingly pursued a moderate, pragmatic policy, maintaining relations with Lebanon's Christian-dominated government and Western powers. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the massacres at Shatilla and Sabra in 1982, attributed to a Christian militia, discredited Berri in the eyes of more alienated and radicalized Shii youth and Iranian-influenced militants. They rejected

AMAL and Berri as collaborators with the Christian government, Israel, and the United States, regarded as an ally and sponsor of both the Lebanese and Israeli governments.

With the assistance of Iran, radical Islamic organizations like Islamic AMAL, Hizbollah, and Islamic Jihad emerged in Baalbek, a Shia center in the Beqaa Valley. Calling for an "Islamic revolution," Iran offered a more militant, confrontational, and explicitly Islamic alternative to the Shia of Lebanon. Like Islamic AMAL, which broke with Berri and opted for a more explicit Islamic identification, all rejected AMAL's secular nationalism and, influenced by the example of Iran, called for an Islamic republic for Lebanon and the implementation of a more Islamic way of life. The groundwork had been well prepared. Ideologically, like the Ayatollah Khomeini, Lebanese Shia religious leaders such as Musa Sadr and Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (Hizbollah's ideologue and adviser) had been engaged in a powerful reinterpretation of Shia Islam that supported a populist, militant, political activist movement of resistance and protest.

Hizbollah, the Party of God, had sprung up in the wake of the Iranian revolution with the support of Iranian Revolutionary Guards ostensibly sent to Lebanon to fight Israel. Its motto ("the Party of God will surely be the victors") was taken from Quran (58:22), for they perceived their battle as that of the Party of God against the Party of Satan (58:19–20)—whether Christian militias, Israeli forces, Western imperialism, or even AMAL. Quoting Khomeini, Hizbollah ideologues maintained that "the original objective of the imperialist countries is to destroy the Holy Koran and to obliterate it, and to destroy Islam and the Muslim ulama (leadership) and their plan is to keep [Islamic countries] backward, and in the name of encouraging education they have suppressed religious schools."⁸

Pro-Iranian Shia clerics provided leadership and guidance for Hizbollah. Their mosques became centers for recruitment, training, and mobilization. The clerics attracted students and young professionals, who regarded their situation as so desperate as to justify armed struggle (jihad) in their defense against political oppression, imperialism, and social injustice. Iran provided training, arms, and substantial financial aid to Hizbollah and supported its military operations as the building of mosques and the reconstruction of war-torn homes, hospitals, clinics, schools, and farms.

Throughout the 1980s Hizbollah grew to be an umbrella group with which a variety of smaller groups, such as Islamic Jihad, allied themselves. Within the shifting alliances of Lebanon's civil war, it fought Christian militias, Israeli and Syrian troops, and AMAL and engaged bombings such as those of the American and French embassies as well as the barracks of multinational forces in Beirut in 1983.

With the end of civil war in 1990 and return to parliamentary government, both AMAL and Hizbollah remained significant, although differing, Shia voices in Lebanese society. In the 1990s, both participated in parliamentary elections. AMAL's leader Nabih Berri became Speaker of the Parliament. Both AMAL and Hizbollah joined with Sunni Muslim, Christian, and Druze in rebuilding Lebanon and participated in institutes, conferences, and projects to improve interreligious understanding and cooperation. Hizbollah kept up its substantial military resistance to Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon, claiming a victory when the last Israeli troops withdrew from southern Lebanon in May 2000.

Six years after the last Israeli troops withdrew from southern Lebanon, Israel launched a full-scale war on Lebanon in the summer of 2006 in retaliation for Hizbollah's raid on Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) that killed seven IDF soldiers and captured two others. Hizbollah responded with rocket attacks targeting northern Israeli cities. The air strikes on Lebanon's airport, runways, gas stations, lighthouses, bridges, buses, residences, and power plants left an estimated 1,200 Lebanese dead, most of them civilians, and a million people homeless. Israel lost 117 soldiers and forty-one civilians in the war.

On August 11, 2006, the United Nations Security Council voted for a ceasefire that went into effect three days later. After intense fighting between Hizbollah and Israel, Hizbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, declared a strategic victory over Israel and emerged as the most popular figure in the Middle East. According to *The Washington Post*, "Nasrallah managed what the tens of thousands in the armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan were unable to do for half a century—force Israel to retreat. Today, his is the last private army left in Lebanon."⁹ Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert countered, claiming that Israel dealt a major blow to Hizbollah.¹⁰ Subsequent history would see Hizbollah's continued influence both in Lebanese politics and in the Syrian civil war, where it provided significant military support to Syria's President, Bashar Al Assad.

Saudi Arabia

A visitor to Saudi Arabia is initially struck by a host of images that seem to confirm the Islamic character of the state—a seemingly endless number of mosques; a society that seems to stop at prayer time as shops close and the faithful, wherever they are, face Mecca to pray; prohibition of alcohol; and women veiled and segregated in public life. Saudi Arabia provides a striking and at times paradoxical example of a traditional yet modern self-styled Islamic state. The Saudis proudly proclaim their Islamic heritage and traditions.


is the guardian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina and of the annual pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca.

Although the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was officially established as a nation-state in 1932, its roots date back to the eighteenth-century Islamic revivalist Wahhabi movement, with the alliance of religion and political power under **Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab** (1703–92) and **Muhammad ibn Saud** (d. 1765). The Saudi flag, which combines the Muslim confession of faith (“There is no god but the God...”) and the crossed swords of the House of Saud and ibn Abd al-Wahhab, reflects this union of faith and politics. The Wahhabi spirit and strict interpretation of Islam have remained a prominent force in Saudi politics and society.

Islam provides the ideological basis for Saudi rule. The Quran is its constitution and the state is said to be governed by Islamic law, applied by a Sharia court system whose judges and legal advisers are ulama. The House of Saud has been careful to cultivate its relationship with the ulama, the guardians of Islamic law, through intermarriage and state patronage. The monarchy itself has been justified or rationalized by maintaining that the king himself is subject to the Sharia, God’s law. For example, a ruling (fatwa) from the ulama cited the Islamic legal principle of “public interest” or general welfare of society was used to legitimate the removal in 1964 of King Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz, an inept ruler, and transfer of power to his brother, King Faisal. Thus, the ruler, government, law, and judiciary are in principle Islamically rooted and accountable.

Wahhabi Islam’s ultraconservative interpretation of Islam—literalist, puritanical, exclusivist, and intolerant—is based on the belief that they follow the pristine, pure, unadulterated message of the Prophet. Their brand of Islam is not shared by many other Sunni or Shii Muslims, whom many Wahhabis would condemn as unbelievers or religious hypocrites. Like hardline Christian fundamentalists, Wahhabis aggressively seek to convert the world and can be intolerant of other faiths as well as other Sunni, Shii, and Sufi Muslims.

Wahhabi ultraconservatism is reflected in the activities of Committees for the Enforcement of Virtue and the Prohibition of Vice. An adaptation of a traditional Muslim institution, religious officials or police, who in the early Islamic era supervised public markets and morals, monitor proper “Islamic” public behavior; making sure that shops close during prayer times, the fast of Ramadan is observed, alcohol is not consumed, and men and women dress and act modestly. Their activities have included raiding homes where they suspect alcohol, caning women for not covering properly, arresting unrelated males and females caught socializing and priests or ministers suspected of conducting religious services, banning



Hassan Nasrallah (1960–92), Secretary General of Hizbollah.

Religion is the basis of Saudi Arabia’s national identity, society, law, and politics. The House of Saud has relied on Islam to unite and rule its tribal society, to legitimate its authority and institutions, and to assert its leadership in the Islamic world. Saudi Arabia encompasses an area that is the original birthplace of Muhammad and the homeland of Islam. It

Valentine's Day gifts, and beating or flogging violators. The House of Saud Islam has employed Islam both domestically and internationally. Religious interpretations and justifications have been used to outlaw political parties and trade unions as un-Islamic and at the same time to justify the infusion of modern technology and social change. Thus, although tradition has been the source of strict separation of the sexes in public life and the veiling of women, the limits of revelation and the application of the rather rigid and strict Hanbali interpretation of Islamic law have paradoxically proven quite flexible in other ways. Islam has been utilized to demonstrate the compatibility of religion and modernization. The Quran and the traditions of the Prophet have been interpreted to justify using foreign workers and to gain acceptance of everything from television and automobiles to women's education. The Quran and Islamic law are strictly enforced, but reforms have been implemented where revelation is silent. In these areas, the Saudi government has claimed the right to interpret (ijtihad) and apply Islam. In the name of Islamic legal principles, such as public interest, regulations, or royal decrees (as distinguished from human legislation, which is technically proscribed) can introduce modern commercial regulations or laws.

Internationally, Islam has been a factor in Saudi Arabia's diplomacy and foreign policy. When Egypt's Gamal Abd al-Nasser sought to extend his influence in the Arab world as the leader of a pan-Arab nationalist movement in the 1960s and to present Arab socialism as an "Islamic socialism," King Faisal responded to the challenge of pan-Arabism by invoking Islam as a counter-ideology and placing himself at the head of an alternative pan-Islamic movement. Saudi-Egyptian rivalry for leadership in the Arab world became an occasion for the king to reinforce Saudi leadership in the broader Islamic world as well.

King Faisal set Saudi Arabia on a course of Islamic leadership that has lasted to the present day. The king emphasized his role and that of Saudi Arabia as protectors of the holy sites and, by extension, of Islam and the interests of the Islamic world. Ideologically, Saudi Arabia has cultivated its image as the defender of Islam against Arab and Islamic radicalism (whether it be the brand of Nasser, Qaddafi, or Khomeini), Zionism, and atheistic communism.

A host of international Islamic organizations, such as the Muslim World League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), have been established, based in and funded in large part by Saudi Arabia. The Muslim World League, based in Mecca but with branches throughout the world, seeks to promote Saudi Arabia's interpretation of Islam; it funds programs, conferences, and other

Islamic activities and projects. The OIC fosters intergovernment cooperation among Islamic governments, and the IDB supports economic development projects in Muslim countries. Over the years the Saudis have used their oil wealth to support and spread their Wahhabi brand of Islam, promote missionary activities worldwide, translate and distribute Islamic literature, and encourage and provide financial incentives to Muslim governments to further Islamize their societies.

The Saudi appeal to Islam has proven to be a two-edged sword. Islam has been used as a yardstick by which opponents of the House of Saud have attacked the government. As a result of the Islamic revival, the Iranian revolution, and Saudi domestic politics, the Saudi monarchy became even more attentive to its Islamic image in the 1980s. Religious symbolism and social values were reemphasized. The influx of foreigners was more strictly controlled, as was their observance of prohibitions on alcohol and modest dress and behavior in public. At times the religious police became more assertive in their enforcement of public morality.

The Gulf War of 1991 and its legacy brought new challenges for the monarchy. Although the religious establishment rallied to support the House of Saud and even provided fatwas to legitimate royal decisions, sharp voices of dissent, including that of Osama bin Laden, condemned the presence of American (foreign, non-Muslim) forces on Saudi soil. In addition, the leaders of many Islamic movements, some of whom long enjoyed Saudi financial support, also joined the opposition. In the post-Gulf War period, the House of Saud faced growing criticism and demands from diverse sectors of society.

By the mid-1990s, the government appeared to have effectively silenced its opposition, co-opting some, imprisoning others, and driving still others underground. That silence was shattered by bombings, which targeted the American military, in Riyadh at the National Guard Headquarters in November 1995 and the U.S. military housing compound in Dhahran in June 1996. The bombings were seen by many as a reaction by militant Islamists to the government crackdown and a warning to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states about their ties to and dependency on America and the West.

Despite Saudi Arabia's creation as an Islamic state and its deliberate Islamic profile, the House of Saud's security, legitimacy, and leadership domestically and internationally would continue to be threatened by domestic terrorists as well as the Saudi-born and raised Osama bin Laden and **al-Qaeda** and its leadership and perceived security in the Gulf challenged by Iran and its nuclear program. As we shall see, Saudi Arabia would play a major role in its opposition to prodemocracy

A QUIET ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

Although the 1980s had been dominated by fears of an Iranian-inspired wave that would destabilize governments and come to power through violence and terror, by the 1990s failing economies and widespread public unrest produced an unexpected result. Viewing Islam and events in the Muslim world primarily through the prism of violence and terrorism had resulted in a failure to see the quiet revolution. Islamic movements were no longer on the periphery of society but had become part of mainstream Muslim life.

Islamically oriented social and political movements pursued reform within mainstream civil society. They included professional associations (journalists, physicians, engineers, and professors), as well as human rights and women's organizations. Many, where permitted, participated in electoral politics. Islamic movements also provided schools, clinics, hospitals, day care, legal aid, youth centers, and other social services. Private (non-government-controlled) mosques and financial institutions such as Islamic banks and insurance companies also proliferated. The emergence of an alternative elite, modern and educated but more Islamically oriented, offered an alternative that challenged the Western, secular presuppositions and lifestyles of many in the establishment.

In response to failed economies and "food riots," public protests and mass demonstrations, countries like Jordan, Tunisia, Sudan, Algeria, and Egypt held elections. Islamic political parties or individual activists (in countries that banned Islamic political parties) were "permitted" to participate. To the shock of many regimes and Western countries, Islamic candidates from North Africa to Southeast Asia proved a credible—often the only—political opposition, winning in local and national elections and assuming leadership in professional associations and trade unions. If much of the 1980s had been dominated by fears of Iran's export of a radical revolutionary Islam, in contrast, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, Islamically oriented candidates were elected as mayors and parliamentarians in countries as diverse as Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia. They served in cabinet-level positions and as speakers of national assemblies. In Turkey, the bastion of secularism in the Middle East, Dr. Ecmettin Erbakan became the first leader of an Islamic party (Welfare) to become a prime minister (1996–97); in Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, the founder in 1971 of ABIM, the Muslim Youth Movement, served as the Deputy Prime Minister from 1993 to 1998; Abduraahman Wahid in Indonesia, head of the country's

largest Islamic movement, Nahdatul Ulama, was elected President by the People's Consultative Assembly in 1999.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, religiously oriented parties and candidates continued to prove successful at the polls. Islamic candidates and Muslim parties increased their influence in 2001 parliamentary elections in Morocco and in Pakistan; Islamic candidates in Bahrain won nineteen of forty parliamentary seats. In Turkey's secular republic, the **Justice and Development Party (AKP)**, whose principal founders were former leaders of the Islamist Welfare Party, came to power in 2002 parliamentary elections and were reelected in July 2007 with a stunning victory in which the AKP took 47 percent of the vote.

In post-Saddam's Iraq's general elections in late 2005, the Shiite alliance won 128 of 275 seats.¹³ Islamic activist candidates performed strongly in Saudi Arabia's 2005 polls, winning all the seats on the municipal councils in the cities of Mecca and Medina.¹⁴ Sunni and Shii Islamic parliamentarians were a formidable force in Kuwait's National Assembly.

Among the most surprising performances, the officially "outlawed" (as a political party) Muslim Brotherhood's 2005 electoral performance rocked the government-controlled Egyptian political system. The authorities used many means to bar Brotherhood candidates from elections or to limit dramatically the size of its participation, including harassment by government-supported thugs, widespread arrests (of nearly nine hundred Brotherhood members and supporters), and the imprisonment of many, accompanied by government tampering with the electoral process. Although the Brotherhood ran for only one third of all parliamentary seats in order not to provoke the Mubarak government, its candidates still managed to win a surprising eighty-eight seats, more than any other opposition party, and therefore to control 20 percent of Egypt's parliament. As we shall see in the next chapter, during the Arab Spring, the Muslim Brotherhood would dominate Egypt's first parliamentary and presidential elections.

Without doubt the most stunning political victory belonged to **Hamas**. After winning local elections in late 2005 in the West Bank's largest cities, Hamas overwhelmingly defeated the ruling Fatah party, sweeping to power in early January 2006 in Palestinian parliamentary elections, sending shock waves through the region and beyond. Unprepared to accept the results of what was widely regarded as a free and fair election, the United States and Europe, along with Israel, refused to accept the Hamas electoral victory, to recognize and deal with Hamas's democratically elected leadership, and instead engaged in policies to isolate Hamas and undermine its influence.

The continued performance and success of Islamic movements in many countries reflected the failures of their governments and the extent to which mainstream Islamic movements were prepared to participate in the electoral process and remain a potent force in mainstream Muslim politics. The rise of al-Qaeda and the threat of global terrorism reinforced regimes, their security states and policies, and Western support.


GLOBAL TERRORISM

September 11, 2001, signaled a major crisis and struggle not only in global politics, but also within Islam and among Muslims. The terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon raised disturbing questions about the nature of Islam itself: Was it a religion of peace or a peculiarly violent religion? Many in the West asked "Why do they hate us?" and expressed strong concerns about the religion of Islam and about Muslims and their relationship to violence and terror. The most persistent questions revolved around Islam's relationship to global terrorism, democracy, and modernity: Is Islam more militant than other religions? What does the Quran have to say about jihad, or holy war? Does the Quran condone this kind of violence and terrorism? Is there a clash of civilizations between the West and the Muslim world? Are Islam and democracy compatible? Can Muslims in Europe and America be loyal citizens? These questions continued as America pursued its war against global terrorism, eventually toppling Saddam Hussein via a multinational military coalition. Terrorists countered with attacks from Spain and Morocco to Saudi Arabia and Indonesia.

Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda symbolized a global jihad, a network of extremist groups threatening both Muslim countries and the West, whose roots proved deeper and more pervasive internationally than most had anticipated. This new global threat, which had emerged from the jihad against the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan, exploded across the Muslim world, from Central, South, and Southeast Asia to Europe and America. It also highlighted a struggle for the soul of Islam between mainstream Muslims and religious extremists.

THE GLOBALIZATION AND HIJACKING OF JIHAD

The war in Afghanistan, the subsequent emergence of al-Qaeda and role of global communications and travel, the meaning and use of jihad became more complex and widespread. On the one hand, jihad's primary Quranic



Osama bin Laden (1957-2011), leader of al-Qaeda.

religious and spiritual meanings, the "struggle" or effort to follow God's path, to lead a good life, and build a just society, became more widely applied to contemporary social and political problems. Jihad was used to characterize the spiritual struggle to lead a moral personal life as well as to create a more just society by engaging, for example, in educational, community, and social service projects. On the other hand, in response to authoritarian regimes and political conflicts, jihad became a clarion call used by resistance, liberation, and terrorist movements alike to legitimate their causes, mobilize support, and motivate their followers.

Militant groups like the Afghan mujahidin, the Taliban, and the Northern Alliance each waged a "jihad" in Afghanistan against foreign powers and among themselves; Muslim movements in Kashmir, Chechnya, Dagestan, the southern Philippines, Bosnia, and Kosovo have fashioned their struggles as jihads; Hizbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad in Palestine characterized war with Israel as a jihad; Algeria's Armed Islamic Group engaged in a jihad of terror against the government and their fellow citizens; Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda waged a global jihad against Muslim governments and the West.

The politicization of Islam in Muslim societies enabled militant extremists to use religion to legitimate the use of violence, warfare, and terrorism. However different, militant groups shared a common

worldview, a theology of hatred that sees the world in mutually exclusive, black-and-white categories: the world of belief and unbelief, the land of Islam and of warfare, the forces of good against the forces of evil. Whether Muslim or non-Muslim, those who are not with them are enemies to be fought and destroyed in a war with no limits and no proportionality. Extremists legitimated their acts of violence and terror by appealing to and reinterpreting the Islamic doctrine of jihad, creating a jihadi culture taught in mosques, schools, and seminaries.

Most militants and movements have been directly or indirectly influenced by the most prominent and influential ideologue of modern Muslim extremism, the late Egyptian, Sayyid Qutb. In the late twentieth century, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda became the most visible symbol of the new global jihad. Bin Laden's upbringing and exposure to Wahhabi Islam in Saudi Arabia, coupled with the strong influence of Qutb's vision of a new Islamic order and global jihad, transformed this somewhat shy, serious, devout, polite young man into a godfather of worldwide terrorism.

SAYYID QUTB: MARTYR OF ISLAMIC RADICALISM

Sayyid Qutb's (1906–66) journey took him from educated intellectual to militant ideologue and activist who inspired many militants, from the assassins of Anwar Sadat to the followers of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Qutb received a modern education and, after graduation from university, worked as an official in Egypt's Ministry of Public Instruction in Cairo. He was also a poet and literary critic and became a great admirer of Western literature.

Qutb's visit to America in the late 1940s proved a turning point in his life. His observations and experiences produced a culture shock that made him both more religious and highly critical of the West's moral decadence, from its materialism and sexual permissiveness to its use and abuse of alcohol to its racism. In addition, Qutb's stay in America coincided with the creation of the modern state of Israel. He felt betrayed by what he considered America's anti-Arab bias in government and the media. Returning to Egypt, Qutb joined the Muslim Brotherhood. He quickly emerged as a major voice in the organization and its most influential ideologue amid a growing confrontation with Nasser's regime.

Imprisoned and tortured for alleged involvement in a failed attempt to assassinate Nasser, Qutb became increasingly radicalized, convinced that the Egyptian government and its security forces were repressive and un-Islamic and had to be overthrown. Qutb's revolutionary vision is set

forth in his most influential tract, *Milestones*, in which he sharply divided Muslim societies into two diametrically opposed camps, the forces of good and of evil, those committed to the rule of God and those opposed, the party of God and the party of Satan. Qutb saw no middle ground. He emphasized the need to develop a special group of true Muslims, a righteous vanguard, within a corrupt and faithless society. Given the authoritarian and repressive nature of the Egyptian and many other Muslim governments, Qutb concluded that change from within the system was impossible. Because the creation of an Islamic government was a divine commandment, he believed that it was a divinely mandated imperative that Muslims strive to implement or impose it immediately. Islam was on the brink of disaster; jihad as armed struggle, he urged, was the only way to implement a new Islamic order.

Qutb came to regard the West as the historic enemy of Islam and Muslims, demonstrated by the Crusades, European colonialism, and the Cold War. He saw this Western threat as political, economic, and religious-cultural. Equally insidious, he believed, were the elites of the Muslim world, who ruled and governed according to Western secular principles and values that threatened the faith, identity, and values of their own Islamic societies. Qutb denounced governments and Western secular-oriented elites as atheists against whom all true believers must wage holy war. Sayyid Qutb's radicalized worldview became a source for militant extremists from the founders of Egypt's Islamic Jihad group to Osama bin Laden and other terrorists who call for a global jihad.

As we have seen, the Wahhabi movement takes its name from Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an eighteenth-century scholar, and his revivalist movement. Wahhabi Islam over the years has been subject to multiple interpretations, including the ultraconservative exclusivist theology of the religious establishment and militant theologies of hate and violence. Many Wahhabi preachers and followers tend to be literalist, rigid, puritanical, and religiously intolerant, believing that they are right and all others (people of other faiths as well as Muslims who do not follow their version of Islam, which they believe is the pristine, pure, unadulterated message of the Prophet) are wrong. Saudi Arabian Wahhabis have sought to propagate and impose beliefs and interpretations throughout the Muslim world as well as Europe and America.

In the last half of the twentieth century, Islamic activists from other countries, mainstream and extremist, often fleeing their home governments, found refuge in Saudi Arabia. They found jobs teaching in universities and religious schools as well as working in government ministries and organizations. After Sayyid Qutb's execution in 1966 and the suppression

of the Brotherhood, Muslim Brothers including Muhammad Qutb, Sayyid Qutb's brother, fled to Saudi Arabia, where he taught at King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah, where Osama bin Laden majored in civil engineering. Among bin Laden's teachers was Dr. Abdullah Azzam, a Jordanian member of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, who would later become prominent in Afghanistan. Azzam was an advocate of a militant global jihad ideology and culture, sometimes popularly called the "Godfather of Global Jihad," seeing it as a duty incumbent on all Muslims: "This duty will not end with victory in Afghanistan; jihad will remain an individual obligation until all other lands that were Muslim are returned to us so that Islam will reign again; before us lie Palestine, Bokhara, Lebanon, Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, the Philippines, Burma, Southern Yemen, Tashkent and Andalusia [southern Spain]."¹⁵

Bin Laden was also a keen student of Islamic studies. As a result, he was exposed to the more militant theological interpretations of Islam present among Saudi and foreign Muslim professors and fostered by Saudi support for the militant Islamic groups and **madrāsas** (seminaries) in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Internationally, Saudis, both government-sponsored organizations and wealthy individuals, funded the export of Wahhabi Islam, in its mainstream and extremist forms, to other countries and communities in the Muslim world and the West. They offered development aid; built mosques, libraries, and other institutions; funded the publication and distribution of religious tracts; and commissioned imams and religious scholars to preach and teach abroad. Wealthy businessmen as well as private and government organizations (knowingly or unknowingly) in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region provided financial support to extremist groups who spread a militant brand of Islam with its "jihadi" culture. As with forms of religious fundamentalism in all faiths, there often seemed to be a fine line between those who propagated an ultraconservative, exclusivist theology and militant religious extremists, such as Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, who then turned to violence and terror to implement their vision of God's will.

THE MAKING OF A TERRORIST AND HIS GLOBAL JIHAD

Osama bin Laden had fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan, a struggle that allied him with a cause supported by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and many other nations. However, after the war bin Laden became alienated from the House of Saud and radicalized by the prospect

that an American-led coalition coming to oust Saddam Hussein from his occupation of Kuwait in the Gulf War of 1991 would lead to the increased presence and influence of America in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.¹⁶

Bin Laden was regarded as an inspiration to and major funder of terrorist groups suspected in the bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993, the slaughter of eighteen American soldiers in Somalia in October of the same year, bombings in the Saudi cities of Riyadh in November 1995 and in Dhahran in June 1996, the killing of fifty-eight tourists at Luxor, Egypt, in November 1997, and threatened attacks against Americans who remained on Saudi soil and promised retaliation internationally for cruise missile attacks.¹⁷

In February 1998 bin Laden and other militant leaders announced the creation of a transnational coalition of extremist groups, the Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. Al-Qaeda was linked to a series of acts of terrorism: the truck bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998, that killed 263 people and injured more than five thousand, followed on October 12, 2000, by a suicide bombing attack against the USS *Cole* that killed seventeen American sailors.

Afghanistan and Pakistan became primary centers for the globalization of jihad and the culture of jihad through networks of madrāsas and training camps. The Taliban and al-Qaeda provided refuge and training for militants, many of whom had had to flee their home countries, from Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Chechnya, and Xinjiang province in China. A hitherto little noted part of the world spawned a Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance that became the base for a network of organizations and cells from across the Muslim world that hijacked Islam, indiscriminately slaughtering non-Muslims and Muslims alike.

The attacks of 9/11 and subsequent acts of terrorism in Muslim countries and in Europe brought into sharp relief the magnitude of global terrorism. Jihad has been waged not only against unjust rulers and governments but also against a broad spectrum of civilian populations in the Muslim world, who have been its primary victims, as well as civilian populations in the West.

Osama bin Laden, like the secular Saddam Hussein and the cleric Ayatollah Khomeini before him, cleverly identified and exploited specific grievances against Muslim regimes and against America that are shared across a broad spectrum of Muslims, most of whom are not extremists. He then interpreted or used religious texts and doctrines to justify his jihad of violence and terrorism. Anti-Americanism is driven not only by terrorists' blind hatred but also by a broader-based anger and frustration