

were necessary if the Ottomans were to prevent the Russians from gaining control of the Bosphorus Strait. He saw the document as an appeal to British and broader European opinion meant to justify a concerted anti-Russian effort on behalf of the Ottomans. Moreover, de Redcliffe and Ottoman officials hoped that the offer of equality would encourage Eastern European areas under Ottoman rule to embrace Ottoman citizenship rather than pursue separation, which offered pretexts for outside intervention.

Likewise, the conclusion of the Crimean War saw British efforts to draft a document reaffirming Ottoman adherence to the Hattı Sharif before the convening of the Congress of Paris in 1856 where penalties against the Russians would be imposed. The new declaration, the Hattı Humayoun (see Document 1.1), proclaimed unequivocally the equality of Ottoman dhimmis with Muslims in access to education and in the administration of justice, and it guaranteed freedom and openness of worship. Officials ordered to implement these policies in the provinces often encountered popular resentment, with the anger directed mostly at the European powers that were seen as forcing the sultans to issue the decrees. As a consequence, Muslim animosity toward Ottoman Christians flared, the most explosive example being the massacre of thousands in Damascus in 1860 as a result of Maronite Catholic-Druze tensions in Mount Lebanon. There had also been anti-Christian riots in Aleppo in 1850 and in Nablus in northern Palestine in 1856, the latter instigated by the accidental killing of a Muslim by an English missionary.⁶ The interrelationship of local sectarian rivalries and outside interference would take a new turn in Palestine once Arab Christians and Muslims joined in opposing European Jewish claims to the region.

PALESTINE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The Ottomans had divided Palestine into districts known as *sanjaks*, incorporated within the province of greater Syria and governed from Damascus since the seventeenth century. These were the sanjaks of Gaza, Jerusalem, Nablus, Lajun, and Safad. Jerusalem was granted as a source of income to the governor in Damascus, who sometimes imposed excessive taxes. In general, life in the towns and villages of the hill country was secure, but the bedouin were a constant threat to travelers and farmers in the coastal areas. Urban inhabitants and peasants often suffered more from the exorbitant revenue demands of local Ottoman officials left unsupervised by a faltering imperial government in Istanbul than from bedouin encroachments. Over time the Ottomans came to rely on leading Arab clans to carry out local governmental functions. During the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a number of prominent Palestinian families emerged as tax collectors, guardians of charitable endowments, and the like; among them were the Khablīs, Nusaybas, Alamis, Husaynis, and Nashashībīs.

Still divided into several administrative entities in 1800, Palestine underwent various transformations as the century progressed. The officials primarily responsible for the area were the pashas of Sidon and Damascus. The pashas

of Sidon resided in Acre, within Palestine; on occasion they controlled areas of Lebanon up to and including Beirut, the Galilee in northern Palestine, and parts of the northern Palestinian coastal region. The pashas of Damascus, in addition to their responsibilities in Syria, were concerned with the administration of central Palestine on a north-south axis, including Jerusalem.

These *pasalıklar* of Sidon and Damascus were divided into *sanjaks*, or districts, where local notables appointed by the Ottomans were responsible to them for security and the collection of taxes. Further subdivisions extended down to the village level, where the small area known as a *wahya*, made up of several villages, was represented by a dominant local family.

The most heavily populated region was the central mountain terrain, which was more easily defended against bedouin incursion and invasion by outside powers. The area was dotted with villages and several large towns. Political authority lay in the hands of notables or chiefs, heads of prominent families who became the tax collectors of their regions. In some areas one or two families might dominate; in others, such as Nablus, there were eight or nine families vying for power whose fortunes waxed and waned according to their willingness to serve Ottoman interests and the strength of their opponents. Village coalitions grouped by clan loyalties dominated the countryside. The situation was different around Jerusalem because Jerusalem notables did not control land and the collection of land revenues at this time. Their authority rested on their possession of religious offices, as the Muslim hierarchy in Jerusalem appointed functionaries in the Palestinian towns. Nonetheless, these functionaries could derive a good deal of wealth from these offices. In addition, they profited from their control of the many charitable endowments (*waqf*) in the area; their collection of taxes and security payments from the dhimmis; and the constant flow of pilgrims, most of them Christian, to holy places in the city and its environs. As in rural areas, there existed intense competition among Jerusalem families for these posts.

Changing Patterns: Trade, Land, Agriculture, and Population

Palestine, like the rest of Syria, had felt the impact of Ottoman agreements that opened the Levant to European trade using local agents. The British-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838 in particular drew the region more directly into the world economy. At the same time, local merchant communities, already part of regional trading networks reaching to Damascus and Cairo, were able to take advantage of these developments. Nonetheless, this dynamism had its price: "Regional trade networks lost much of their autonomy as they were subordinated — or more accurately as Nablus merchants were integrated — into the larger regional or world economies."⁷ The margin between subordination to these larger economies and profitable integration into them could be a narrow one; workers in certain industries in Greater Syria were severely affected as the century wore on. The local monetary/trading networks

of the interior of Palestine responded creatively to the dual impact of competition from European trade and Ottoman centralization policies in the first half of the century. But Nablus merchants were gradually forced to focus their attention more on the centers of importation of European goods, Beirut notably but also Jaffa and Haifa. And with greater European religious interest in Palestine, Jerusalem gradually became an object of Ottoman attention as well, giving it a political and administrative status it had not held previously.

The question of land ownership and the impact of the Ottoman land reform laws passed in 1858 and 1867 seriously affected social relations and power in the latter half of the century. As we have seen, the Ottomans issued the *Hattı Humayoun* in 1856 in the hope that a guarantee of equal rights for all Ottoman subjects would reduce the separatist tendencies of non-Muslim minorities and thus promote stability within the empire. Equally important to this process of stabilization in Ottoman eyes was their reassertion of authority over Anatolia and the Arab provinces, whose tax revenues had been lost to Istanbul because of inefficient administration and the Egyptian occupation of Syria. Ottoman officials began applying *Tanzimat* principles in earnest in Syria and Palestine. One goal was to regularize the structure of land ownership and the cultivation of land throughout the empire. By establishing clear proof of title to possession or use of land, the Ottomans could make the holders of these titles liable for taxes and thus increase state revenues. The law of 1867 granted foreigners the right to own land but only if they agreed to pay taxes on it to the Ottoman government. Ottoman officials sought to lessen the scope of the capitulations and to force foreigners, mainly Europeans, to submit to Ottoman jurisdiction in return for their investment in land in the empire.

The implementation of these laws and their impact varied widely. Traditionally, there were three categories of land: state land (*miri*), privately owned land (*mülk*), and land cultivated by peasants who practiced a form of communal ownership of the soil they tilled (*mushâa*); for this last category, shares of land would be rotated. According to the new legislation, peasants, in addition to mülk land, could buy title to parcels of *miri* so long as they could pay taxes on their shares. Women also could participate, and they could designate heirs to their property. Recent research indicates that in areas of southern Syria and present-day Jordan, many peasant villages saw inhabitants taking title to both state and private lands, while extensive use of *mushâa*, or collective land, also prevailed.⁶

Similar studies are lacking for Palestine, but it appears that the inconsistent application of these laws, coupled with peasant indebtedness, opened the way for extensive outside investment with little Ottoman success in controlling the tax revenues. A great deal of land in Palestine had been state land (*miri*), some of it uncultivated for decades because of the insecurity of life in the area. Some had been taken over by landowners, including peasants, who exploited it as private property (*mülk*) without the Ottoman government's benefiting from either the revenues paid for the use of state land or from the taxes they could assess on private landholders.

Ottoman functionaries had often victimized Palestinian peasants, and peasant resistance to the imposition of taxes was well known; officials in Damascus had on occasion destroyed whole villages that had openly defied attempts to collect revenues from them.⁷ Many peasants were in debt to larger landholders and could not pay the fees to establish title, let alone pay taxes on the land. In addition, many peasants who were able to pay were afraid to do so because they or their sons would become subject to military recruitment once their names appeared on the tax rolls. Consequently, they, as well as the indebted peasants, were quite willing to have title to their lands registered in the names of individuals who assumed the tax burdens and became large landholders in the process. As a result, relatively few people or families acquired extensive areas of land while the peasants on much of that land continued to farm it as before and assumed that they still had customary rights to its use.

Palestinian Notables and Absentee Landowners. Among those who purchased land in this manner were Palestinian notables, many of whom served as tax collectors for the Ottomans. These included families from Jerusalem who had not previously owned land. Others were merchants — local Christians, Lebanese, or Europeans — who began to invest in land in Palestine, especially Christian merchants from Beirut. The most prominent was the Sursuq family; Greek Catholics who owned a silk factory there and exported textiles. The Sursuqs bought land from peasants or acquired uncultivated state land that the Ottoman government offered for sale. They acquired a total of 230,000 *dunams*, approximately 57,500 acres (one *dunam* equals a quarter acre), in the Galilee, mostly in the *Marj ibn Amir* (Plain of Esdraelon) and near Nazareth, where much of the land they bought had belonged to nearby villages. This latter sale violated a provision of the 1858 land law that forbade the possession of village (*mushâa*) lands by an individual, but the Ottoman desire for revenue prevailed. Extensive Jewish investment and colonization did not begin until after 1882.

It is clear that a major transformation of landholding patterns had occurred in Palestine prior to Zionist immigration. One estimate from the turn of the twentieth century is that "only 20 percent of the land in Galilee and 50 percent in Judea was in the hands of the peasants."⁸ Nevertheless, peasant and village landholders retained possession of two-thirds of the cultivable land, nine million *dunams*, with other large tracts owned by tribes who cultivated the coastal plains of Gaza and Beersheba. This left one million *dunams* for the Sursuqs, the Sultans, and other great families. What had changed was the increase in the amount of Palestinian land under cultivation. Much of the property bought by the Sursuqs in the *Marj ibn Amir* had not been tilled for years because of local strife.

Palestinian Agricultural Productivity. What then of the land's productivity? Palestine experienced major economic growth following the Crimean War, when the restoration of Ottoman authority brought greater regional security. More land was cultivated, by peasants and tribes as well as by large cultivators, in

response mainly to world market developments. Gaza became an important grain-producing region, initially because Russian grain exports declined during the Crimean War. During the 1860s Palestinian cotton production exploded to meet increased European demand, owing to the loss of American cotton during the Civil War, but this market did not last beyond the mid-1870s.

More successful and better known was the vast expansion of citrus cultivation, especially of oranges. "The garden area of Jaffa (orange plantations and vegetable gardens) was quadrupled between 1850 and 1880 . . . [with] the annual yield of the orange harvest . . . cited as 20 million in 1856 and 36 million in 1882."²⁹ Similar expansion in wheat production and exports was matched by "a doubling of the soap factories at Nablus from 15 in 1860 to 30 in 1882 [which] corresponded to the expansion of olive cultivation and the doubling of soap export via Jaffa."³⁰ Production continued to increase after 1880 in response to European demand and also because growers introduced European agricultural techniques. From the 1880s to 1914, the orchard area for oranges around Jaffa multiplied by seven times, and exports nearly quintupled. By 1913, Jewish colonists at Petah Tikva near Jaffa were exporting about 15 percent of Palestine's crop.³¹

As these figures indicate, a major expansion of Palestinian agricultural and industrial productivity occurred before Zionist colonization. But they also reflect a phenomenon occurring in other colonial contexts, namely, the relative inefficiency of indigenous production methods compared to those introduced by European colonists, in this case the Jews and others, such as the German Templars, from the 1880s onward. Palestinian per capita agricultural output would be lower than that of colonists who had access to imported technology and external capital (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2). A similar contrast can be seen in industries such as soap and olive oil manufacturing, where Arabs continued to use traditional methods of production and exported to regional markets, including Egypt, while European immigrants built factories that used imported machinery.

Tourists and Immigrants. Tourist and pilgrim traffic to the Holy Land grew rapidly during the latter half of the nineteenth century, as conditions for travel improved and Muslim hostility to foreigners, frequently noted by travelers during the first half of the century, seemed to abate. Various European Christian groups organized tours from the 1850s, and travel agents began touting excursions from the 1870s, part of a Christian rediscovery of Palestine that included Protestant American missionary efforts in the Middle East dating to the 1820s. During the 1870s between ten and twenty thousand pilgrims visited Jerusalem annually, the largest contingent from Russia. These visitors provided an important source of revenue for several cities in Palestine, especially Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and the ports of Jaffa and Haifa. This tourist influx also reflected a growing European interest in antiquities. Most archaeological expeditions and surveys of Palestine during the century "were concerned with the geography of the region in relation to its past" and in identifying biblical sites.³²



Figure 1.1 ■ Arab Farmers in the Jezreel plain, circa 1900

Arab agriculture continued to rely on camels and donkeys as well as cattle long after the Zionists had begun importing tractors from Europe. Note also the traditional one-handed wooden plow, which continued to be used, whereas Zionists, aided by Rothschild funding, introduced a heavy metal plow ultimately powered by steam. (See also Figure 1.2.)
Library of Congress, LC-USZ62-32672

Other visitors to Palestine intended to establish a presence there. French Catholics participated in what they called "the peaceful crusade," visiting holy places and donating sums to build religious institutions. The German Templars established agricultural colonies with the idea of settling in Palestine and Christianizing it if possible. Finally, Protestant missionaries from England and America came to Palestine. They sought converts among members of other Christian sects and encouraged Jewish migration. As evangelical Christians who considered the end of the world to be at hand, they hoped to bring Jews to Palestine and convert them to Christianity in the Holy Land before the Day of Judgment. Similar aspirations can be found today among Christian fundamentalists in the United States and form one component of their support for Israel.

But during most of the century, the Jews who came to Palestine did so for their own religious motives. They were making their pilgrimage to the land of ancient Israel, many in order to die there. They settled in several cities, but especially in Jerusalem where Jews made up the majority of the population by 1890. Another town where Muslims lost their majority was the port of Haifa, which expanded greatly from the 1850s onward. Christians made up the largest



Figure 1.2 ■ A Zionist Settler with a Manufactured Reaper Imported from Europe
This horse-drawn reaper, being used at Petar Tisa, replaced the Arab sickle, already in the mid-1890s. Its use illustrates the Zionist importation of advanced European devices set against traditional Palestinian agriculture.

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single group, many of them Lebanese traders who came to take advantage of the commerce and pilgrim traffic that passed through Haifa. And between 1895 and 1914, forty thousand Jews entered Palestine, often not for religious reasons but to colonize it and establish a base for the future restoration of Palestine as Israel. As Zionists they were more interested in establishing agricultural colonies than in settling in the cities.

Population and Identity. Our discussion of immigration raises the question of the nature of the population of Palestine during this period and the reasons for its increase to about 650,000 by 1914. Was this due to natural causes or immigration, including Arabs from outside Palestine? Israeli and other scholars of the question have concluded that a natural increase in the overwhelmingly Arab population of Palestine from the 1840s would account for an Arab component of the 1914 estimate (650,000) of between 555,000 and 585,000. Taking the lower figure of 555,000 and adding a Jewish population of about 80,000 in 1914 still allows for an additional 25,000 to 40,000 settlers, whether other Europeans or Arabs. Arabs undoubtedly did migrate to Palestine or were settled by Ottoman officials there during this seventy-year period, but they probably composed no more than 8 percent of the Arab population of Palestine in 1914.

Jews constituted approximately 14 percent of the population, with the 25,000 Zionist immigrants 31 percent of that community.¹³

Nevertheless, a predominantly Palestinian Arab population does not necessarily indicate the widespread existence of a Palestinian Arab national consciousness at this time. The concept of nationalism was a recent European phenomenon, just beginning to be known in the Arab world, that often collided with the family and village loyalties that predominated along with one's religious identity. On the other hand, as Haim Gerber has shown, sources dating from the seventeenth century, and possibly earlier, indicate that educated Palestinians were conscious of living in a region called "Palestine" that was distinct from, even if a part of, a larger territory called "Syria."¹⁴ This awareness cannot be called nationalism in the European sense of the term, which defined the bonds linking a people to a specific piece of land as the source of their primary identity. Nationalism was a secular concept, although it could be justified by a religious legacy, as Zionism did for secular Jewish nationalism. Nationalism would not have defined a Palestinian's primary awareness of himself as an Ottoman subject of Muslim, Christian, or Jewish religious persuasion, who nonetheless lived in that part of the empire known as Palestine. This new scholarship does suggest, however, that educated Palestinian Arabs considered themselves to live in Palestine, establishing an identity with a region defined by boundaries. This identification was not simply the result of their encounter with Jewish nationalism in the form of Zionism, as has often been assumed.¹⁵

Nationalism in the European sense was, however, part of Zionism and would be used to justify Zionist claims to Palestine, where a Jewish kingdom had existed two thousand years earlier. Zionists planned to reclaim Palestine as Eretz Israel, the land of the Jewish people.

ZIONISM: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT TO 1914

The modern Zionist movement dates from the second half of the nineteenth century, inspired by secular nationalism and anti-Jewish prejudice in Western and especially Eastern Europe. Underlying modern Zionism was the wish to establish an independent Jewish existence in Palestine, the ancient land of Israel. Modern Zionism differed from the traditional Jewish yearning to return to Zion, Eretz Israel, in that religious Jews viewed the matter as one to be decided by God. Just as their exile reflected Yahweh's punishment of Jews for their transgressions of His laws, so would their return indicate that He had granted them redemption, a redemption that many believed could occur only when the end of the world was at hand. In contrast, modern or political Zionism was activist and predominantly secular. It was a movement of Jews who were disenchanting with their religious culture but who rejected the idea of assimilation into European society, where hostility toward Jews persisted despite the passage of laws in Western Europe granting them equality. The situation was much worse in Eastern Europe, where the persecution of Jews intensified as the century drew to a close.

The Jews of Western Europe

Until the Crusades, Western European Jews had suffered sporadic persecution offset by long periods of relative tolerance. Under Christianity, as in pagan Rome, Jews were the only religious community allowed to retain their religious autonomy. While Christian laws prohibited Jewish proselytization or expansion, including the building of new synagogues, existing structures were protected. With the Crusades, the haphazard expression of Christian hostility toward Jews became more focused during the twelfth century. Intended to seize Jerusalem from Islam, the Crusades aroused intense feelings of hostility toward all who denied the divinity of Jesus and gradually established a climate of hysteria in which the Jews were cast as a people seeking to subvert Christian security.

Latent religious hostility was reinforced by the competition that the Jews presented to a newly emerging Christian bourgeoisie, who were often allied with monarchs eager to acquire wealth to bolster their power. As a result, Jews were expelled from England in 1290, not to return until the end of the seventeenth century, and from France in 1306, although small communities remained. Protestantism was no less hostile to Jews in regions under its control. The most extreme example of Christian fear of subversion occurred in Spain, where the Spanish reconquest led to the expulsion laws of 1492, causing, as noted, an exodus of Spanish Arab Muslims to North Africa and of Jews into the Mediterranean world, especially the Ottoman Empire. During the eighteenth century, northern European countries such as England, France, and some German states began readmitting Jews under state sponsorship, initiating a process of assimilation at the higher levels of society even before the French Revolution. This served as a catalyst for the legal emancipation of Western European Jewry during the nineteenth century.

The French Revolution of 1789 and its Declaration of the Rights of Man proclaimed the equality of all people as the basis for true citizenship. Jews were specifically offered the opportunity to assimilate as individuals into French society. Assimilation meant that Jews would presumably give up their commitment to retain their distinctiveness as a separate community adhering to Jewish laws and, with that, their commitment to the idea of a return to Eretz Israel, a hope that had bound them together for centuries. The majority of Western European Jewry opted for assimilation during the nineteenth century as barriers gradually broke down in Germany, Austria, England, Hungary, and later in Italy and France. By mid-century, Jews were permitted to stand as candidates for Parliament in England. In France, and especially in Germany, assimilation proceeded rapidly. Inter-marriage and a declining birthrate led to a sharp decrease in the original German-Jewish community, but the Jewish population there remained distinctive because of the influx of Jews from Eastern Europe.

The Jews had made great strides toward legal and social equality by the end of the nineteenth century, but latent and sporadic open hostility toward them remained, as seen during the 1880s, when an anti-Jewish German author coined

the term *anti-Semitism*. He emphasized the nature of his antipathy as racial and thus "modern," as opposed to the traditional religious antagonism toward Jews. Although anti-Semitism went hand in hand with Jewish efforts to assimilate, most Western European Jews continued their efforts to merge more fully into society. When an active Zionist movement emerged, its initial impulse and its main support came from Eastern Europe, where legal equality, let alone assimilation, seemed increasingly unattainable.

Eastern European Jewry and the Rise of Zionism

At approximately the same time that Jewish equality with non-Jews was declared in Western Europe through the French Revolution, Eastern European Jewry was entering a century-long phase of increased hostility and segmentation within Polish and Russian society. The future of Eastern European Jewry was decided by the partition of Poland, which occurred in three stages in 1772, 1793, and 1795. Portions of the country went to Russia, Prussia, and Austria. As a result, Russian Jewry, heretofore a small community, expanded significantly and created in Russian eyes a question they had to deal with in a decisive manner. The Russians' response was both harsh and contradictory. They attacked Jews for their separatism but usually imposed laws forbidding them to participate freely in Russian society unless they converted. Laws passed in 1790 and 1791 created a territory called the Pale of Settlement. These decrees stipulated that Jews could not live in the major Russian cities of the interior. They were confined to the former Polish territories and certain other areas of southwest Russia, where they were supposed to live in the larger cities. Even here they were later barred from cities such as Kiev and Sebastopol. Although these laws were not always strictly enforced, they reflected an official attitude of suspicion and hostility that led to repeated attempts to isolate Jews from Russians, whether inside or outside the Pale.

The Origins of Zionism. Eastern European Jewry's isolation and forced concentration of populations during the nineteenth century ensured the continuity of its strong religious and communal bonds at a time when adherence to those traditions was fading in the West. Thus it "was the Jew whose attachment to tradition was loosening who found the condition of Jews intolerable," whereas the leadership of Eastern Jewry sought to preserve the strength of the community that lay in its adherence to traditional values and practices.⁶ Modern Zionism found its roots among Russian Jews who had already broken with communal life in the Pale, many of whom had hoped briefly for the opportunity to assimilate into Russian society. The bases of these aspirations lay in the modernist Russian Jewish movement called the *haskala*, which arose in the 1850s. Their members were attracted to Western European literary models and the idea of legal equality with non-Jews that was occurring there. The reign of Tsar Alexander II, which saw the relaxation of many restrictive laws, inspired optimism among

the modernists; Jewish students, for example, could now attend universities in Moscow and elsewhere. But the tsar's assassination in 1881 reimposed a conservative regime hostile to modernization and Jewish integration. Equally alarming to Alexander III and his chief adviser, Pobedonostsev, was the specter of peasant unrest, especially in southern Russia. A means of diverting peasant hostility from the government lay in tolerating, if not encouraging, attacks on Jewish communities, the catalyst for the decision of some Jews to seek a haven in Palestine.

The first series of attacks, or pogroms, erupted in 1881 and continued until 1884. They consisted of peasant assaults on Jewish quarters accompanied by rape, looting, and some killing. Although rioters were brought to court and some were punished by exile, the peasants believed the pogroms had the tsar's approval. The pogroms continued, encouraged by the tacit support of local officials. The impact of these pogroms has lasted to the present day. To many Jews they were proof that Russia would never grant legal emancipation. The result was the beginning of a vast emigration movement, in which 1.5 million Jews left Russia between 1900 and 1914. The great majority headed for the United States, but some, especially Jewish students whose hopes for greater equality had been raised during the reign of Alexander II and who had broken with their communal traditions, directed their attention toward Palestine.

BILU and Hibbat Zion. This movement became known as BILU, an acronym taken from the Hebrew initials in Isaiah 25, "O House of Jacob, come and let us go." Its founders were students from Kharkov who decided to establish agricultural settlements in Palestine. Their success was meager. Most who actually settled there soon left. But BILU ideals left a lasting impression on later Zionists because the group envisaged a Jewish state in Palestine founded on the principles of Jewish agriculture and Jewish labor. And they were quite specific about the need to return to Palestine, the ancient home of the Jews, rather than to seek a haven elsewhere. All these factors would later be part of Zionist labor ideology. Their vision of agricultural communes led ultimately to the forming of the *kibbutzim*, which many saw as the embodiment of Zionist principles.

A more diffuse but longer-lived organization that emerged in 1881–1882 would later be known as Hibbat Zion (The Love of Zion). Circles whose members called themselves Hovevei Zion (Lovers of Zion) began to meet in various cities, including the capital, St. Petersburg. Viewing themselves as the custodians of the Hebrew language and Jewish culture, they found life in Russia intolerable and saw emigration to Palestine as the only answer. Unlike the BILU, the Lovers of Zion did not immediately strive to establish agricultural settlements in Palestine, but they did expand greatly in Russia so that by 1895 they had approximately 10,000 members. The Hovevei Zion attracted diverse types who envisaged the restoration of Eretz Israel, including Y. L. Pinsker, whose book *Autoemancipation* was published in 1881.

Pinsker believed that Jews had to acquire territory somewhere in order to escape the persecution they experienced in Europe, but he was not committed to a Jewish return to Palestine. Although Pinsker wrote his book in response to the Russian pogroms and the plight of Eastern European Jewry, he had little faith in the assimilation process under way in the West. To him, Jewish security in Europe was a mirage. A key to his thesis was that Jews had to emancipate themselves rather than rely on non-Jews, an argument that had great appeal to the Lovers of Zion even though they disagreed with Pinsker's lack of specific commitment to Palestine. Pinsker had written his book as an appeal to German Jews in the West to save their Russian brethren, but he found his audience only in the East. He agreed in 1883 to become head of the Lovers of Zion in Odessa and later became leader of the Hibbat Zion movement until his death in 1891.

In Palestine itself the expansion of Jewish settlements owed little to the Hibbat Zion movement. Indeed, the majority of the Jewish immigrants in the first wave following the pogroms of 1881–1884 were not technically Zionists. Inspired by religious more than nationalist motives, they settled in urban areas. Although between twenty and thirty thousand Jews entered Palestine as part of this first wave of immigrants (*aliya*), fewer than three thousand settled in the new villages founded by BILU. These agricultural enterprises survived not because of funds from Russian Jews but primarily because of the philanthropy of wealthy Western Jews, such as Sir Moses Montefiore and particularly Baron Edmond de Rothschild of the great banking family, who between 1883 and 1889 gave the settlers 1.6 million pounds sterling.¹⁷ But whatever Rothschild's role was in preventing the collapse of Zionist efforts during this period, he was not a leader of a movement. That task fell to Theodor Herzl, an assimilated Viennese Jew, whose efforts produced the formation of the World Zionist Organization in 1897.

Theodor Herzl and the Zionist Movement to 1914

Theodor Herzl's contributions to the development of Zionism were seminal, as many scholars have noted, but they have also stressed that Herzl (see Figure 1.3) did not instigate the idea of Zionism itself. Indeed, for years he was unfamiliar with the strands of Zionist thought and activity current in Eastern Europe. In many ways his decision to seek a solution to the question of the Jews in Europe was self-inspired. He had dreamed of being the leader who would liberate them even while, as a journalist for a prestigious Viennese paper, he appeared to be well integrated into European culture. The catalyst for his decision to commit himself to the cause of European Jewry was the trial of Alfred Dreyfus, a French-Jewish officer falsely accused of treason and sentenced to Devil's Island. The trial aroused the vengeance of the French right at what they saw as the undermining of the nation by the liberalization of its laws, which included the granting of equality of Jews. It became a cause célèbre, with violent anti-Semitic



Figure 1.3 ■ Theodor Herzl, circa 1895

In this photograph, Herzl's intensity and self-confidence are evident on the eve of his achieving prominence as leader of the fledgling Zionist movement.

was not committed to Palestine as the prospective Jewish homeland, although he did not discount it as the ideal solution. Rather, he preferred to accept empty territory that might be offered, such as sections of Argentina. In this, as in his eagerness to seek the aid of prominent Europeans, Herzl's aspirations were quite different from those of the Lovers of Zion, who emphasized self-help within the Jewish community and stressed the need to reestablish the Jewish state in Palestine.

These differences proved to be crucial to the ultimate direction of the Zionist movement. When Herzl called a congress to meet in Basel in 1897 to establish a Zionist organization, he expected to gain the support of leading Western Jews. But most stayed away, fearful that his efforts would endanger their status as newly assimilated citizens of their countries. The majority of delegates to the congress were from the East, Lovers of Zion who were attracted to Herzl's ideas if not in total agreement with them. At Basel, they formed the World Zionist Organization with Herzl as its president. Its program declared that the goal of Zionism was "the creation of a home for the Jewish people in Palestine to be secured by public law."¹⁶ The real objective was a Jewish state, but it was deemed advisable not to declare that openly because of Ottoman objections to the idea of a new nationality seeking self-rule within its territory. Likewise, the term "public law" rather than "international law" was used to allay Ottoman fears that European powers sought to carve up the empire.¹⁷

The question before this and later congresses was how best to pursue Zionist objectives. Herzl favored diplomacy. He continued to seek Ottoman approval for Jewish settlement and the idea of a Jewish state in return for Jewish repayment of the by then substantial Ottoman national debt. He wanted official recognition of the Jewish right to Palestine as a prelude to extensive settlement there; consequently, Herzl opposed the efforts of Eastern European Zionists to create a de facto Jewish presence in the area because he feared they would undermine his diplomatic endeavors. The Ottomans had passed laws forbidding Jews from purchasing land in Palestine, but Zionists evaded them with the aid of foreign consuls and Ottoman Jews sympathetic to their cause. Ottoman officials informed Herzl, who visited Istanbul on several occasions and met Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1901, that Jews could settle in designated areas of Syria and Iraq but not in Palestine and that they could enter Ottoman territory only as individuals, not as a distinct community with political ambitions.

Herzl turned to the British in 1902, seeking the al-Arish area in the Sinai Peninsula because it was adjacent to Palestine and could serve as an opening for future demands for expanded migration to the area. Joseph Chamberlain, then British colonial secretary, replied by suggesting land in British-controlled East Africa, now part of Kenya. Though initially hostile to this idea, Herzl later saw it as granting a temporary haven that might give the Zionists leverage in their demands for Palestine. This led to a major clash with the representatives of Eastern European Jewry who remained steadfast in their commitment to Palestine. They suspected Herzl of being willing to abandon Zionism, a

overtone that caused the French left to take up Dreyfus's defense. Herzl had lived in Paris from 1893 to 1895 and was aware of the depth of French anti-Semitism before the Dreyfus case, but it was the Dreyfus trial that led him to write *Der Judenstaat* (The State of the Jews), which established him as the principal leader of world Zionism.

Herzl and the World Zionist Organization. In *Der Judenstaat* (1896), Herzl called for the creation of a Jewish state that would absorb European Jewry and thus end the anti-Semitism that still prevailed even in Western Europe and proved that assimilation was impossible (see Document 1.2). Though he was vaguely aware of the plight of Eastern European Jewry and of the intellectual currents then prevalent there (he read Pinsker's *Autoemancipation* after completing *Der Judenstaat*), he directed his appeal to European statesmen and wealthy Jews in the West. He hoped that those Jews would provide financial assistance for the formation of an organization, perhaps a company, that would arrange the transference of Jews to their new home. They could also help persuade European leaders of the validity and feasibility of the idea. Herzl saw Jewish migration to Palestine (or possibly elsewhere) as a movement of colonization similar to that being undertaken by European countries at the time, and thus something with which they would sympathize.¹⁸ Like Pinsker, Herzl

suspicion encouraged by Herzl's secretiveness in diplomacy and his aloof personal style. Herzl's death in 1904 ensured the failure of the project. The initiative among Zionists passed to the Russian Lovers of Zion, who stressed the need for practical achievements in Palestine as the prerequisite to political recognition.

Herzl had been unable to gain international recognition of the Jewish right to a state of their own. Toward the end, he had encountered strong opposition from Eastern European Zionists who, unconcerned with international approval, stressed the need for continual settlement in Palestine. But the success of their efforts in coming years was to a large degree the result of his endeavors. With his encouragement, the World Zionist Organization created its own bank in 1899, and in 1901 the Jewish National Fund was established for the express purpose of purchasing and developing land for Jewish settlements in Palestine. The fund played a major role in the acquisition of land that became inalienably Jewish, never to be sold to or worked by non-Jews, as part of the program to establish a dominant Jewish presence in the area.

Militant Zionism: The Second Aliya. Equally important, however, was the ideological commitment of the second wave of immigrants, those who came to Palestine between 1904 and 1914, among them David Ben-Gurion (né Gruen), who later became Israel's first prime minister. Many were socialists nurtured in the revolutionary atmosphere then prevalent in Russian intellectual circles. But they were also Zionists who were determined to achieve their socialist ideals within a separate Jewish environment rather than as part of a world movement. Their vision of a new Jewish society entailed a commitment to the land and to the creation of a socialist agricultural basis for the future Israel. In this they fused their socialist ideals with the agricultural vision found in the writings of David Gordon (d. 1922), an educator and activist who extolled the "religion of labor" by which Jews would redeem the land of Israel.

Jewish labor alone would be the basis of this new society, a principle that caused these new immigrants to look down on the earlier generation of Jewish settlers whose farms employed Palestinian Arabs. For the Zionists of the second wave, Jewish socialism meant an egalitarian Jewish society that excluded Arabs. They formed two groups, Poale Zion (Workers of Zion) and Hapoel Hatzair (The Young Worker), both of them devoted to creating new settlements that reclaimed the land for cultivation by Jewish labor and communal living based on socialist principles. They were helped in their land purchases by the Jewish National Fund founded in 1901 as part of the World Zionist Organization. By 1914, of the forty-four Jewish agricultural settlements, fourteen had been sponsored by these groups, the nucleus of Zionist efforts in Palestine from that time onward. Jews owned over 400,000 danams of land (about 100,000 acres), of which slightly more than half was under cultivation.

Out of the approximately 85,000 Jews then in Palestine, 12,000 lived on the land. Most Palestinian Jews were in their dress and appearance not dissimilar from Arabs, part of a Middle Eastern society quite different from the vision

imparted by the European Jews who now appeared (see Figure 1.4). Nevertheless, despite their small numbers, the Zionist drive to purchase land and the openness of their commitment to a separate Jewish entity in Palestine had, by 1914, already aroused Arab fears, which were well known to Zionist leaders in Palestine but were ignored or downplayed by Zionist leaders in the West.

THE ARAB RESPONSE TO ZIONISM

At the turn of the twentieth century, Palestine was divided into two principal administrative districts: the northern sector, the sanjaks of Acre and Nablus, was part of the vilayet (Arabic: *wilaya*) of Beirut; to the south, the independent governorate of Jerusalem, overseen directly by the Ministry of the Interior in Istanbul, encompassed most of central Palestine (see Map 1.1). The direct link between Jerusalem and the Ottoman capital probably reflected the increased pace of tourism and immigration into southern and central Palestine during the latter half of the nineteenth century, which prompted Ottoman authorities to keep closer surveillance on Jerusalem and the surrounding areas.

The Arab population of Palestine was overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim. Eleven percent were Christian, primarily Greek Orthodox. Despite local rivalries, a sense of community prevailed, especially among the Muslims, because of the religious festivals that brought them together from various parts of Palestine and also because of the influence of the highest religious official, the mufti of Jerusalem, whose authority extended into the northern vilayet. The al-Husayni family controlled the post of mufti from the mid-nineteenth century and consequently attained national prominence, which was buttressed by their hold over various administrative posts in Jerusalem as well.²² Their longevity in office led to British recognition of the then mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, as the leading Arab representative during the Mandate following World War I, but it also contributed to resentment among rival Jerusalem families and in prominent clans in other areas.

Arab conceptions of identity varied. Beyond local and family ties, Muslims considered themselves to be Ottoman subjects and gave allegiance to the sultan/caliph as head of the Islamic community. Christians, especially the Greek Orthodox, seem to have been more aware of living in a specific region called Palestine, and it is among them that there emerges the dominant journalistic opposition to Zionism. Nevertheless, as noted, there seems to have existed a general conception of Palestine as an area distinct from Syria, even if considered part of it for administrative purposes, reflected in documents and in the Ottoman government's term "the land of Palestine."²³

It is clear that Zionism, with its goal of establishing a dominant Jewish presence in Palestine, revised significantly the Arab conception of the Jews and their place in a Muslim society. As noted, Muslims had traditionally viewed Jews as occupying dhimmi status, protected by, but subordinate to, Muslims, a role that most Ottoman Jews had continued to play despite the legal equality granted to




Figure 1.4 ■ The Western (Wall) in Jerusalem, circa 1900

This photograph illustrates the narrow passage giving access to the Western Wall and the clothing and appearance of Palestinian Jews, which did not differ greatly from that of Arabs, nor, apparently, did men and women segregate themselves when praying as rigorously as they would do at a prayer at Congress, C.D. Campbell (1975).

Map 1.1 ■ Ottoman Palestine and Syria, 1910

This map indicates the separate status of the Sanjak of Jerusalem, which was directly under Istanbul control. It also shows the Hijaz Railroad, then reaching to Medina, which the sultan



them along with Christians as a result of Tanzimat reforms. Zionism however, as a European movement, appeared to be another attempt by Western imperialism to subordinate Muslims to Europeans. It became even more threatening once Palestinians, Christians as well as Muslims, realized that the Zionists wished to take part of what had been Arab lands for centuries and remake it into a Jewish homeland. Arab opposition, shared by Muslims and Christians alike, emerged before World War I in response to Zionist immigration and land purchase.

Ottoman Policies and Jewish Land Purchases

As we have seen, official Ottoman policy toward Zionism remained consistent: "Jewish immigrants will be able to settle as scattered groups throughout the Ottoman Empire, excluding Palestine. They must submit to the laws of the empire and become Ottoman subjects."³⁵ The Ottomans feared the creation of another "national" problem similar to those found in the Balkans, which continued to erode their hold on territories they had controlled for hundreds of years.




Figure 1.5 ■ Turkish Troops Marching in Jerusalem, 1898

This parade would have served to stress Ottoman control of the city, but the European consuls and "notables" lining the street and the cries of many onlookers call attention to the growing Western presence in the city. The procession has attracted many guests to the windows and to the roof of the Central Hotel in the distance.

Library of Congress, LC-A923-12925

But official Ottoman policy was not effectively implemented in Palestine. Jewish immigrants entered the area as tourists or pilgrims; once there, they acquired the protection of foreign consuls as the European powers were eager to protect their own rights under capitulations laws. Restrictions on land sales to foreigners were circumvented by having Ottoman Jews or foreign consuls buy the land for them. As a result, concern about Jewish immigration and land purchases existed in certain circles in Palestine before the World Zionist Organization was created in 1897. In that year, an Arab commission was formed in Jerusalem, headed by the mufti, to examine the issue of land sales to Jews, and its protests led to the cessation of such sales for several years. Jewish agents discovered that it was much easier to buy land in the northern vilayet, and in 1900 the Jewish Colonization Association opened an office in Beirut. Purchases were facilitated both by the fact that many large landholders in northern Palestine resided in Beirut and by the willingness of the Ottoman officials there to ignore regulations. Similar practices occurred in and around Jerusalem from 1901 onward as the appointed Ottoman governors permitted Jews to buy land in return for financial favors. For example, the Anglo-Palestine Company, the first Zionist organization to be established in Palestine, found that despite Ottoman laws, local Ottoman authorities would permit land sales in return for loans from the company to the governor.

Although Ottoman regulations and protests by Arab officials were often ineffective in blocking Jewish purchases of land, general Arab opposition did not arise immediately. Arab peasants initially opposed Jewish land purchases, and in cases where they were ousted from their homes, violence and armed resistance resulted. Most peasants, however, gradually accepted Jewish landowners through the 1890s because the latter usually permitted them to work the soil and receive income from it, a practice that was condemned by labor Zionists.³⁶

Growing Apprehension: Palestine and the Arab World

Alarm appeared more frequently among Arabs by the end of the decade, including those Arabs outside Palestine who were also aware of Zionism. Thus the Syrian Christian-owned journal *al-Muqtataf*, based in Cairo, published an article in 1898 warning against Jewish hopes to control trade in Palestine. The next year Yusuf Diya al-Khalidi, a prominent Jerusalemite, wrote to the chief rabbi of France, telling him that although "historically it is your country" and Zionism could be understood in theory, in practice its implementation would require "brute force"; he pleaded with the rabbi to "let Palestine be left in peace." Herzl replied by reassuring al-Khalidi that Zionism meant no harm and that the Arabs' wealth and well-being would increase through Zionist investments.³⁷ Rashid Rida, a Muslim reformer born in the Beirut vilayet but living in Cairo, published an article in 1902 in his journal, *al-Muvasar*, stating that Jews entering Palestine sought national sovereignty, not simply a haven from persecution, a charge echoed by the Lebanese Catholic, Neguib Azoury. (See Document 1.3.)

These Arab protests, with the exception of that of the Jerusalem commission of 1897, were the work of individuals, but they presumably reached a receptive audience. *Al-Muqtataf* and *al-Manar*, although totally different in character, circulated throughout the Arab world and were read in Christian and Muslim circles, respectively. More significant was the nature of the opposition that emerged from 1908 onward, presumably in response to the more strident calls of labor Zionism, which openly opposed Jewish employment of Arabs and called for the establishment of a separate Jewish entity in Palestine. These arguments, espoused in the Zionist press and translated into Arabic, became known to increasing numbers of Palestinian Arabs, especially once a Palestinian Arab press appeared in 1908.

The editors of the papers most emphatically opposed to Zionism were Greek Orthodox Christians. The papers were *al-Karmil*, created in 1908, and, significantly, *Filastin* (Palestine), founded in 1911; the former was published in Haifa, the latter in Jaffa. *Al-Karmil* was openly pro-Ottoman in its loyalties, although following the Young Turk Revolt of 1908 it became increasingly critical of the governing Committee of Union and Progress for failing to protect Palestinian interests. *Filastin* backed the Committee of Union and Progress, but as its name indicates, it stressed local nationalism rather than Ottoman allegiance; it referred to Palestine as an entity and to its readers as "Palestinians."²² The importance of the press is indicated by the fact that when *Filastin* was first founded, Jews (under Arab pseudonyms) submitted articles to it supporting Zionism.

While most Palestinian Muslims remained loyal to Ottoman authority, they usually agreed with those Palestinian Christians who led the public opposition to Zionist immigration, land purchases, and, in a general way, Jewish exclusiveness. Debates in the Ottoman parliament in Istanbul, where Arab Muslim representatives from Palestine called for greater Ottoman vigilance against Zionist activities, echoed editorials in *Filastin* and *al-Karmil*. A key issue was the fact that the Zionists, as European Jews, were protected by the capitulations while bringing in wealth lacking to the Arabs: "they [rely] on the special rights accorded to foreign powers in the Ottoman Empire and on the corruption and treachery of the local administration. Moreover, they are free of most of the taxes . . . on Ottoman subjects."²³ For one Palestinian candidate for elections to the Ottoman parliament in 1914, Jews would be welcome if they were willing as individuals "to accept Ottoman nationality and [to] learn the language of the country. . . . [B]ut if the foreign subject comes to fight us with the weapons of his foreign nationality and despises our sons and brethren and breaks our statutes and laws, then it is our duty not to pass over this in silence."²⁴

CONCLUSION

Among educated Muslims and Christians in Palestine, Zionism contributed to a growing sense of their common identity as Palestinians. This emerging national identity contrasts with increasing Muslim suspicion of Christians elsewhere in

the empire because of Ottoman territorial losses in the Balkans. At the same time, there were rising tensions in Palestine that led to outbursts against foreign Christians and Jews, usually reflecting socioeconomic circumstances in which Muslims found themselves progressively at a disadvantage with respect to outsiders. Most urban disturbances from 1860 onward "broke out in towns where Muslims had originally been in the majority [especially Haifa and Jaffa], but where their majority status either had been obliterated or was seriously threatened by the influx of foreigners and non-Muslims. . . . [and where] poverty, disappointment, jealousy, and exposure to new and unfamiliar ways of life, all combined to produce social instability."²⁵

By 1914 and the outbreak of World War I, Zionist officials in Palestine were well aware of Arab fears and their opposition to Zionist goals. But despite these developments, the Tanzimat land reforms had yet to impact the lives of most Palestinians in a traditional society where Muslim, Christian, and Palestinian Jewish religious celebrations were shared by all. The Muslim Nebi Musa festival "merged with Christian Orthodox Easter." The Jewish Purim "was celebrated by Christian and Muslim youth in Jewish neighborhoods" by all as Ottoman citizens, practices found throughout the Mediterranean world at this time.²⁶ The coming of the war presaged new developments. By 1920, the Nebi Musa festival would turn into an Arab, primarily Muslim, riot against Jews owing to public Zionist demands for all of Palestine and the fact that the new British occupation mandated religious separatism as part of the wartime agreements that decided the fate of the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire.

QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION

1. How did the Tanzimat reforms affect Muslim-Christian relations in the Arab lands ruled by the Ottomans?
2. Why did Britain come to consider the Suez Canal important to its imperial interests? How did its involvement change the balance of power in the Middle East?
3. What goals did Eastern European Zionists share with Theodor Herzl? In what ways did they disagree?
4. How did Palestinian Arabs react to Zionist settlement in Palestine before 1914?
5. What was Zionist policy regarding land use and ownership?

CHRONOLOGY

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|------------|---|
| 1453 | Ottoman Turks take Constantinople; end of Byzantine Empire. |
| 1516–1918 | Palestine under Ottoman rule. |
| 1740 | French-Ottoman treaty granting France the right to protect Roman Catholics in the empire. |
| 1774 | Russian-Ottoman treaty allowing Russia to protect Eastern Orthodox residents of Istanbul. |
| 1789 | French Revolution begins. |
| 1790–1791 | Russia passes laws restricting Jews to Pale of Settlement. |
| 1798 | Napoleon invades Egypt. |
| 1831–1840 | Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali controls Syria and Palestine. |
| 1838 | Ottoman-British Baita Liman Convention. |
| 1839 | Hattı Şerif of Gulhane reforms Ottoman justice system. |
| 1854–1856 | Crimean War. |
| 1856 | Hattı Humayun proclaims equality of dhimmis with Muslims. |
| 1858, 1867 | Ottoman land reform laws passed. |
| 1869 | Suez Canal opens. |
| 1875 | Britain buys Egyptian ruler's shares of Suez Canal Company. |
| 1881 | Y. L. Pinsker's <i>Autoemanzipation</i> published. |
| 1882 | Founding of BILU and Hibbat Zion. Britain occupies Egypt, remains until 1956. |
| 1896 | Theodor Herzl's <i>Der Judenstaat</i> published. |
| 1897 | Founding of World Zionist Organization. |
| 1900 | Jewish Colonization Association opens office in Beirut. |
| 1901 | Jewish National Fund established. |
| 1905 | Naguib Azoury's <i>Le Reveil de la Nation Arabe</i> published. |
| 1908 | Young Turk Revolution. Ottoman Parliament reopens. |
| 1908, 1911 | Al-Karmel and Filastin Palestinian Arab newspapers founded. |

Notes

1. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, vol. 1, *The Central Lands* (New York, 1982), 1.
2. Mark Mazower, *Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews, 1430–1950* (London, 2004).
3. Discussion of these matters can be found in two works by Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine* (Oxford, 1968) and "Changes in the Position of the Jewish Communities of Palestine and Syria in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," in *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period*, ed. Moshe Ma'oz (Jerusalem, 1975), 142–63.
4. David Kushner, "Intercommunal Strife in Palestine during the Late Ottoman Period," *Asian and African Studies* 18 (1984): 197. For Maronite-Druze clashes and the Damascus riots, see Lella Fawaz, *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860* (New York, 1994).
5. Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700–1900* (Berkeley, 1995), 94.
6. Martha Mundy and Richard Sammarz Smith, *Governing Property: Making the Modern State. Law, Administration, and Production in Ottoman Syria* (London and New York, 2007).
7. Two travelers' accounts mentioning the destruction of villages are Henry Light, *Travels in Egypt, Nablus, Holy Land, Lebanon, and Cyprus in the Year 1814* (London, 1818), 158–59; and William C. Prime, *Ten Years in the Holy Land* (New York, 1857), 220.
8. Alexander Schösch, "European Penetration and the Economic Development of Palestine, 1856–82," in *Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, ed. Roger Owen (Carbondale, Ill., 1982), 23–24. My discussion of economic development and land transfers in Palestine is drawn primarily from Schösch and from E. R. J. Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1689–1914* (New York, 1981), 153–79, 264–72.
9. Alexander Schösch, *Palestine in Transformation, 1856–1882: Studies in Social, Economic, and Political Development*, trans. William C. Young and Michael C. Gerrity (Washington, D.C., 1993), 285. This collection of Schösch's articles remains an important source for the period.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Owen, *The Middle East*, 271.
12. C. Gordon Smith, "The Geography and Natural Resources of Palestine as Seen by British Writers in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century," in Ma'oz, ed., *Studies on Palestine*, 90. Recent studies of missionary efforts in the broader Middle East include Ussama Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conquest of the Middle East* (Ithaca, 2008), and Heather Sharkey, *American Evangelicals in Egypt: Missionary Encounters in an Age of Empire* (Princeton, 2008).
13. Haim Genber, "The Population of Syria and Palestine in the Nineteenth Century," *Asian and African Studies* 13 (1976): 58–86; Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, "The Population of the Large Towns in Palestine during the First Eighty Years of the Nineteenth Century according to Western Sources," in Ma'oz, ed., *Studies on Palestine*, 49–69; Alexander Schösch, "The Demographic Development of Palestine, 1850–1882," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17 (November 1985): 485–505, an excellent overview; and Judith McCarty, *The Population of Palestine: Population Statistics of the Late Ottoman Period and the Mandate* (New York, 1990). The question of population has been the subject of sensationalist studies claiming that the numbers of Arab immigrants equaled that of Jewish immigrants, claims rejected by scholars. The best — or worst — example of this effort is Joan Peters, *From Time Immemorial* (New York, 1984).
14. Haim Genber, "'Palestine' and Other Territorial Concepts in the 19th Century," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30 (November 1998): 563–72. See also Genber's *Remembering and Inventing Palestine: Identity and Nationalism from the Crusades to the Present* (New York, 2008).