

From *la guerra sucia* to ‘A Gentleman’s Fight’: War, Disappearance and Nation in the 1976–1983 Argentine Dictatorship

JAMES SCORER

University of Manchester, UK

Analysing the last Argentine dictatorship in the light of contemporary re-examinations of war, this article argues that the 1976–1983 dictatorship can be understood as a shift in war(s), from *la guerra sucia* to the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, from a limitless and unsustainable internal war to a bracketed external war. That external war is shown to be an attempt to re-found a nation imploding through disappearance. Drawing on the history of disappearance in Argentina reveals that, despite obvious differences, there are many continuities between the dictatorship and other regimes, emphasising the dangers of a politics that encourages a nation ‘re-malvinizada’.

Keywords: Argentina, dictatorship, disappearance, Falklands/Malvinas, nation, war.

In his 1982 folksong, ‘La hermanita perdida’, Atahualpa Yupanqui sung of how Malvinas, the lost little sister of the fatherland, had been abducted by a blond pirate. Besides placing itself within the popular discourse of a burgeoning nation confronting an outdated colonial power (Lorenz, 2006: 73), the song also expressed the incestuous desire to populate Malvinas: ‘para llenarte de criollos’ [‘to fill you with creoles’]. In December 1999, the actor Fabián Stratas, under the direction of José Luis Marqués, travelled to Las Malvinas for the production of what would be the eighth Dogme film, *Fuckland* (Marqués, 2000b).¹

1 Dogme, a film movement created in 1995, is based on a set of principles – known as the ‘Vow of Chastity’ – that attempt to strip away the ‘illusion’ of cinema. Principles include shooting on location, the use of only diegetic music, filming with hand-held cameras, the reduction of special lighting and not crediting the director (see Dogme, 1995). In the main, *Fuckland* adheres to these principles. There are, however, some significant diversions, including the use of montage sequences, non-diegetic music and voice-overs spoken by Fabián.

Echoing the yearnings of Yupanqui's song, the film documents Fabián's mission: to populate Las Malvinas with little Argentines and so re-take the island(er)s, a literal enactment of the male citizen impregnating the female '*patria*'. Fabián documents his visit illicitly with a camera hanging from his midriff, making his stay comparable to a covert military operation and justifying the film's tag line – 'A Clandestine Film'.² Fabián, taking shots of unassuming Kelpers, Puerto Argentino/Stanley and the local landscape and fauna, shoots (in more ways than two) from the waist. He starts seeing Camilla, a local islander, and decides that she is to be the target of his 'seduction' techniques – 'How I'm going to fuck you'. After having sex with Camilla on two occasions it is, Fabián says as he is about to leave the islands, 'mission accomplished'.

Fuckland is a biting satire of British nationalism and Falkland Islanders' provincialism and xenophobia: the camera draws attention to the public billboard stating that Argentines will be welcome only after they drop claims to sovereignty, as well as to the nationalistic names of local hostelrys such as 'Colony', 'Rose' and 'Victory', and the film begins with the sound of the islanders singing the British national anthem. And yet *Fuckland* is above all a tongue-in-cheek satire of Argentine nationalist *desires*, exemplified by Fabián pinpricking the condom he is to use for his first encounter with Camilla. His distasteful plan, uncomfortably close to nationalist practices of 'breeding out' unwanted ethnicities and identities through rape, is almost undermined by Camilla's own clandestine message in which she tells Fabián, among other things, that the earth did not move when they had sex and that he should just not be quite so pleased with himself – but her message falls on deaf ears. The film concludes with Charly García's rock version of the Argentine national anthem, a suitable ending for a film that problematises national narratives and that begins with the vigorous rendering of 'God Save the Queen'. Fabián's visit, therefore, and his relationship with Camilla, seemingly a local *ovejita* [lamb] but along with Fabián the only other professional actor in the film, ridicule male nationalism. His attempt to populate the islands is not only about "fucking" the Falkland Islanders but also about making fun of Malvinas.³ It is a parody that reveals how Malvinas – that innocent lost sister, that virgin territory – has also been "fucked" and de-sacrilised.

Argentine politics in the 1970s was, on both left and right, haunted by the phantasmal imaginary of war (Vezzetti, 2002: 58). Leading up to and for much of the 1976–1983 dictatorship, many Argentines were happy to accept intensified militarisation and a growing discourse of total war. 'Por algo será' [It must be for some reason], people muttered to each other, implicitly justifying counter-insurgent terrorism in the name of

2 Indeed, both the journey to the islands, with the actors and crew travelling under false pretences and in separate groups, and the process of filming itself were, as Marqués states, clandestine: 'Esta fue una película clandestina en todo sentido; desde su formato, en el que la gente no debía saber que se la estaba filmando, hasta la historia misma, que transcurría en las Malvinas, lugar en el cual a los argentinos se nos considera "el enemigo"' ['This was a clandestine film in every sense; from its format, in which people were unaware that they were being filmed, to the story itself, which takes place in Las Malvinas, a location where we Argentines are considered "the enemy"'] (2000a: 22).

3 Federico Lorenz draws a useful distinction between 'Malvinas' (as symbol) and 'Las Malvinas' (as territory) (Lorenz, 2006: 15).

a mythical notion of order (Vezzetti, 2002: 59). A 1977 article entitled 'Subversión: Estas mujeres también han ganado la guerra', published in the magazine *Gente*, indicates the widespread dispersion of the notion of war (Blaustein and Zubieta, 1998: 198). The article focused on the lives of women who had lost sons, husbands and fathers in the fight against 'subversion', emphasising that they had all been touched by war: 'It's war – they'd told them – and in war there's no such thing as privileges'. Neither was there any rejection of the public use of the term *la guerra sucia* [the dirty war], already being used publicly by the Church in mid-1976 (Osiel, 2001: 218, n. 104). As the brutality of the military and particularly the practice of disappearance became increasingly acknowledged at the end of the 1970s, however, there was a shift in perspective: implicit or explicit consent was no longer given to war and its discourse – they were both rejected outright. Instead, civil society was reconfigured (and reconfigured itself) as a helpless, innocent bystander to a war being imposed upon it by a dictatorship that was no longer regarded as a saviour of order but as a foreign occupying force (Vezzetti, 2002: 60).⁴

Post-dictatorship Argentina, therefore, was characterised by the desire to re-establish (a different kind of) order and the force-of-law: to strengthen the authority of the lawful State recently recovered from its temporary state of terrorism. The government's necessary emphasis on human rights and the public demand for justice, the latter epitomised by the *juicio a las juntas* [trial of the juntas], both reflect this desire for reordering the State. The theory of the *dos demonios* [two demons], which argued that responsibility for the dictatorship lay with the military and the guerrillas, constructed as two clearly defined bodies in opposition, originates from this post-dictatorship period, the clearest example of which can be found in the first sentence of the prologue to *Nunca Más*, put together by the Comisión Nacional para la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP) to document the crimes of the dictatorship: 'During the 1970s Argentina was convulsed by a terror that originated both from the extreme right and the extreme left' (2003: 7). *Nunca Más* both set out the theory of the *dos demonios* and also positioned the nation as their victim, later describing the period as 'the worst catastrophe that *the Nation has suffered* in all its history' (2003: 11, emphasis added). The theory of the *dos demonios* has come to be widely rejected, principally because it suggests that the guerrillas were a viable fighting force, in turn implying that the military's discourse of conflict was justified. Even by 1976, left-wing guerrilla organisations had very limited military means of fighting the state's armed forces (or, indeed, right-wing death squads, such as the Alianza Anticomunista Argentina) other than sporadic and isolated bomb attacks on high-ranking officials, and the number of active guerrillas was dropping quickly. To suggest as the dictatorship did, therefore, that their strong-armed leadership was necessary to contain the guerrillas is evidently false (Vezzetti, 2002: 77). Furthermore, whilst at the beginning of the regime the dictatorship talked of exhausted guerrilla forces, only when it was faced with growing international criticism about its human rights record did it begin to talk of a powerful guerrilla enemy. Nevertheless, the military's erroneous

4 Such a reconfiguration is somewhat ironic considering the military's discourse about the non-Argentine subversive: it is as if the dictatorship was redrawn as a non-Argentine military oppressor.

arguments about viable left-wing armed guerrillas, the sheer brutality of torture and disappearance, and the recognition that many if not the majority of the victims had no direct connection to guerrilla organisations, has resulted in the tendency to situate an innocent, non-participatory society as passive victims of military brutality. Instead, it is important to recognise that the dictatorship 'put Argentine society to the test ... and it has to be admitted that very few passed that test' (Vezzetti, 2002: 38), a recognition that has also been prevented by lack of rigorous public debate over the birth and growth of militancy in the late 1960s and early 1970s.⁵

Examining the 1976–1983 Argentine dictatorship in terms of war and nation, therefore, I will ask where *la guerra sucia* and the 1982 Malvinas conflict should be placed within the context of contemporary re-examinations of global war. There has been much contemporary Argentine interest in the changing nature of war and the resurgent importance of war theorists, in particular Carl von Clausewitz and Carl Schmitt.⁶ Argentine interest in what Jon Beasley-Murray has called 'a typology of war' (Beasley-Murray, 2005: 218), however, has rarely been transferred into any serious reconsideration of war in recent Argentine history. Federico Lorenz, in his recent book on Malvinas, has reflected on the problems and limitations of the relationship between politics and war:

The war is not thought of as war because it is analysed as one more aspect of the military dictatorship's methods of doing politics. Though this is a valid perspective, it is necessarily incomplete, as it leaves to one side the fact that a war, like any social phenomena, has its own particular characteristics. ... Nevertheless, the relationship between the forms of politics and those of war is central, since the logic that orientated politics during the second half of the twentieth century applied warlike terminology to political debate. (Lorenz, 2006: 308, emphasis in the original)

Despite similar work by Rosana Guber on the 1982 war and its aftermath (2001, 2004), however, Lorenz's brief reflection on politics and war in terms of Malvinas is still unusual. Any suggestion, furthermore, that the 1976–1983 dictatorship was a war in any sense continues to be refuted outright. Such dismissals, often relying on fixed notions of war, are understandable reactions to the discourse of the dictatorship itself,

5 Debates over politics and militancy during this period are now beginning to emerge in Argentina, bringing the notion of a passive victimised public under serious scrutiny. See, for example, the polemic that began in the magazine *La intemperie* in 2005, sparked off by a letter written by Oscar del Barco in response to a testimony by Hector Juvé, which described the execution of one of Juvé's companions by fellow guerrillas in the 1960s. Del Barco assumed partial responsibility for the execution because of his position as a contemporary intellectual involved in militant networks, arguing that he had failed to uphold the maxim 'you shall not kill'. His argument received a number of vitriolic responses. For the letter by Del Barco and some responses see *Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies* 16(2) (2007).

6 See, for example, Dotti (2000), Dotti and Altamirano (2004), Vicia (2005) and Fernández Vega (2005).

which continually justified its action with reference to *la guerra sucia*. Nevertheless, the term *desaparecido* [disappeared], on the other hand, which originated from the Nazi doctrine of Night and Fog and was introduced by the Argentine military during the dictatorship (Feitlowitz, 1998: 51), has been widely re-appropriated as a consequence of human rights organisations, not least the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo. Though conscious of the dangers of falling into the reductive and misleading discourses of the military, therefore, I want to suggest that the absence of armed conflict should not exclude the possibility of war. Indeed, the vital focus on the 'dirty' has concurrently obfuscated any far-reaching reconsideration of 'war'. There is a serious need to re-appropriate the use of the word 'war', precisely to wrest it away from purely military associations and to reintroduce it both as a means of reconsidering the nation and of reconfiguring relations between society and State.

'The Blood and Mud of Battles'

In *The Nomos of the Earth*, Carl Schmitt, a crucial theorist in the typology of war, argued that only a spatially ordered earth could create a successful world order, in which political security depended on defensive structures and borders that divided 'a pacified order from a quarrelsome disorder, a cosmos from a chaos, a house from a non-house, an enclosure from the wilderness' (2003: 52). Conflicts between States pertaining to that *nomos* [law of order] were engagements between *justis hostes* [lawful enemies], leading Schmitt to compare war to a duel: 'a conflict of arms between territorially distinct *personae morales* [moral personae], who contended with each other on the basis of the *jus publicum Europaeum* [European public law]' (2003: 141–142). It precisely the 'just' that vindicates his comparison: 'a duel is not "just" because the just side always wins, but because there are certain guarantees in the preservation of the *form*' (2003: 143, emphasis in the original). Like the duel, therefore, Schmitt saw war as legitimising an ordered resolution of disputes through violence with rules so as to limit other forms of violence, a limitation or 'bracketing' that Schmitt understood to be Europe's greatest achievement. Writing post-Second World War, Schmitt was concerned that this achievement was being threatened 'by the spatial transformations that give us a new world order' (Beasley-Murray, 2005: 218).

In his earlier work, *The Concept of the Political*, Schmitt had argued that the basis of the political was the dichotomy friend/enemy, an inside–outside antagonism that made friend/inside and enemy/outside interdependent: 'Words such as state, republic, society, class, as well as sovereignty, constitutional state, absolutism, dictatorship, economic planning, neutral or total state, and so on, are incomprehensible if one does not know exactly who is to be affected, combated, refuted or negated by such a term' (Schmitt, 1996: 31). The 'bracketing' of war helped balance and reinforce these precarious dichotomies:

The military battle itself is not the 'continuation of politics by other means' as the famous term of Clausewitz is generally incorrectly cited. War has

its own strategic, tactical, and other rules and points of view, but they all presuppose that the political decision has already been made as to who the enemy is. In war the adversaries most often confront each other openly; normally they are identifiable by a uniform, and the distinction of friend and enemy is therefore no longer a political problem which the fighting soldier has to solve. ... War is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics. But as an ever present possibility it is the leading presupposition which determines in a characteristic way human action and thinking and thereby creates a specifically political behavior. (Schmitt, 1996: 33–34)

Both Clausewitz's famous dictum and Schmitt's understanding of friend and enemy are based on the assumption that war and politics are separate entities (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 6; Beasley-Murray, 2005: 218). And yet Schmitt's understanding of war as 'an ever present possibility' that determines 'human action and thinking and thereby creates a specifically political behaviour' reveals that just as the friend (or State, republic, society, etc.) is dependent on an enemy, politics, despite his claim otherwise, is dependent on war.

The recurring metaphor of war in current 'presidential political vocabulary' is a result of the fact that 'the sovereign power of the president is essentially grounded in the emergency linked to a state of war' (Agamben, 2005: 21). The fact that the President of the United States is also the Commander in Chief of the Army, for example, indicates 'a situation in which the emergency becomes the rule, and the very distinction between peace and war (and between foreign and civil war) becomes impossible' (Agamben, 2005: 22). The combination of president and army chief, then, is a clear example of the difficulty of separating dictatorship and democracy and, indeed, friend and enemy: 'the term *dictatorship* is entirely unsuitable for describing [the regimes of Mussolini and Hitler and] the clean opposition of democracy and dictatorship is misleading for any analysis of the governmental paradigm dominant today' (Agamben, 2005: 48). The state of exception, traditionally exemplified by the dictatorship, 'insofar as it is a suspension of the juridical order itself, defines law's threshold or limit concept' (Agamben, 2005: 4). It is 'an anomic space in which what is at stake is a force of law without law (which should therefore be written: force-of-law)' (Agamben, 2005: 39). In Argentina, the principle aim of the post-dictatorship *juicio a las juntas* to re-establish the force of law was constructed precisely around the attempt to emphasise the difference between dictatorship and democracy, between force-of-law and force of law. Not reinforcing the law would have meant that the military's actions were not crimes but 'alternatives of a political struggle ... located beyond the law' (Vezzetti, 2002: 26).

Though he strikes at the very heart of the problem, Hugo Vezzetti, in his study of war, dictatorship and society in Argentina, explains away this precarious balance between politics, war and legality by referring to the 1976–1983 dictatorship as either 'State terrorism' (2002: 11), the 'criminalisation of the management of the State' (2002: 12), or finally 'political *barbarisation* and degradation of the State' (2002: 13, emphasis in the original). The barbaric State may not be a non-State, however, but the state laid bare, inherently dependent on war. Rather than accepting that States, monarchies and

societies are born with the laying down of arms, we should acknowledge that war 'presides over the birth of States: right, peace, and laws were born in the blood and mud of battles' (Foucault, 2003: 50). And if Clausewitz 'simply inverted a sort of thesis that had been in circulation since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries' (Foucault, 2003: 48), then we should revert to the prior maxim: 'politics is the continuation of war by other means' (Foucault, 2003: 16). Hence the perceived exceptionality of the dictatorship (a 'temporary' period instigated under the perceived necessity to restore 'order') gives way not just to the permanence of the dictatorship but also to the permanence of the warlike State, dictatorship or otherwise. As General Roberto Viola, one of the members of the first junta, said of *la guerra sucia* in 1979: 'This war, unlike classical war, does not have a determinate beginning nor a final battle at which the victor will be crowned' (quoted in Osiel, 2001: 114). The Argentine dictatorship is, then, the State revealed as a permanent State (and state) of war.

Schmitt's argument for a necessary *internal* enemy of the State further reveals how all politics, both between and within sovereign entities, is dependent on war: 'As long as the state is a political entity this requirement for internal peace compels it in critical situations to decide also upon the domestic enemy. Every state provides, therefore, some kind of formula for the declaration of an internal enemy' (Schmitt, 1996: 46). The State's need for an internal enemy can be traced to *homo sacer*, the figure who reveals precisely that bare life is not excluded from political life but rather included through its exclusion and the sovereign's ability to declare the state of exception (Agamben, 1998: 11). Such is the paradox of sovereignty: if the sovereign has the authority to declare the state of exception, that is, to suspend the validity of the law, then the sovereign, 'having the legal power to suspend the validity of the law, legally places himself outside the law' (Agamben, 1998: 15). If the sovereign can declare a state of exception in which life can be taken without the commission of homicide, then this is no longer simply a state of exception but rather a power 'to decide the point at which life ceases to be politically relevant' (Agamben, 1998: 142). *Homo sacer*, then, is the figure that most clearly represents the politically (ir)relevant life, being the life that may not be sacrificed, as being outside divine law, but that may also be killed without consequence, as also being outside State law.

Within the perpetual state of exception it is the camp that becomes 'the very paradigm of political space [in] which politics becomes biopolitics and *homo sacer* is virtually confused with the citizen' (Agamben, 1998: 171). The exception of the camp, like the state of exception, is included through its very exclusion. Most obviously manifest in the concentration camps of Guantánamo Bay or Abu Ghraib, the *paradigm* of the camp is also evident 'in the *zones d'attentes* of our airports and certain outskirts of our cities' (Agamben, 1998: 175). The specific location of detention centres in Argentina during the dictatorship reveal how 'the concentration camp, because of its physical proximity, because it is in the midst of society, "on the other side of the wall", can only exist in the midst of a society that chooses not to see, because of its own impotence; a "disappeared" society' (Calveiro, 1998: 147). The military's hold over life, then, indicated by their repeated claim to prisoners that 'We are God' (Calveiro, 1998: 54) and their efforts to prevent suicide because '*suicide, as the last act of the will*, seized from [the prisoners] the possibility of manifesting that right to death that made

[the military] into “gods” (Calveiro, 1998: 55, emphasis in the original), reveals how the disappeared are *homines sacri*.

The extensive network of clandestine detention centres and concentration camps during the dictatorship, ‘that geography of horror’ (Vezzetti, 2002: 175), reveals ‘the permanent spatial arrangement’ of the state of the exception (Agamben, 1998: 169). We should reject, therefore, the temptation to understand the camp as ‘a total and separate reality’ because of its position outside laws, time and space. Instead, we should recognise the camp as ‘perfectly installed in the centre of society, [feeding] off society and spilling into it’ (Calveiro, 1998: 86), a point substantiated by the manner in which some prisoners could watch the legs of people walking by or listen to the cries from nearby football stadiums, or the way in which some passers-by could occasionally hear the screams of tortured inmates. Indeed, even if the city is not a camp in quite the same way, it took on similar characteristics as a militarised zone: houses broken into to look for hidden stashes of weapons, roadblocks, armoured vehicles in the streets, military marches and soldiers making stop-checks of identity documents all contributed to constructing the city as a ‘field of battle’. Such practices indicate how the camp permeated society, emphasising the potentiality of disappearance for every citizen and highlighting how, if the inmates were indeed *homines sacri*, those outside were always potentially so.

A History of Material Exclusions

The generality of war in Empire (Hardt and Negri, 2004) is the culmination of Schmitt’s fears over the threat to the European *nomos*. Once we recognise the permanence of the state of exception and that ‘[w]e are all – actually or potentially – *homines sacri*’ (Gregory, 2004: 261), then war becomes ‘the general matrix for all relations of power and techniques of domination, *whether or not bloodshed is involved*’ (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 13, emphasis added). Schmitt’s emphasis on ‘the ever present *possibility* of combat’ (Schmitt, 1996: 32, emphasis added) and his argument that ‘friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the *real possibility* of physical killing’ (Schmitt, 1996: 33, emphasis added), are reminders of our *potential* to be *homo sacer*. That potentiality has serious and far-reaching implications for the State’s ‘friends’, continually threatened with the possibility of the state of exception. Above all, however, it is the figure of the (internal) enemy which is reconfigured under a permanent state of exception and war in Empire: in a perpetual and omnipresent state of war in which participants are either too far away to be visible or do not wear uniforms, it is ‘[no longer] your enemy, or my enemy; it is a common enemy’ (Beasley-Murray, 2005: 220).

We should not assume, however, that the contemporary state of global war marks the first appearance of the common enemy (Beasley-Murray, 2005: 220). The Argentine dictatorship’s practice of disappearance has a history of precursors in terms of material exclusions of internal enemies to the nation. Indeed, Schmitt’s bracketing of war and his friend/enemy dichotomy were never only threatened by the dissolution

of the *nomos* and the concurrent waning of the nation under globalisation, but also by the historical foundation of the nation itself, always constructed on and around the destruction of internal enemies. Certainly the 'material manner of the disappearance of people' (Calveiro, 1998: 26) is a reminder that the Argentine dictatorship has many differences with other regimes, both in Argentina and beyond, but to think of Argentine history from 1976 to 1980 as an aberration or the military's concentration camps as *exceptional* cruelty, 'is to deny that when we look at them we know that we are looking at our society, the current, existing one' (Calveiro, 1998: 159). The Argentine dictatorship may not be the same as the democratic states (or military regimes) that came before or after, but it may be more similar than is usually acknowledged. That similarity can be illustrated by the long history of the nationalist discourse in which subversives were no longer Argentine but exterior to the nation, an idea that reached its culmination during the 1976–1983 dictatorship when General Ramón Camps declared that 'the subversive has forfeited the right to call himself an Argentine' (Rock, 1993: 227).

If the *desaparecidos* are 'a prime example of the field of power operating the military state through a series of substantive *material* exclusions to define "the people" of the nation' (Radcliffe and Westwood, 1996: 23), then the origin of material exclusions in Argentina as part of the process of forming a national 'people' can be found in the nineteenth century. Domingo Sarmiento's *Facundo*, for example, limits the nation by writing out indigenous populations living in the 'desert' he describes: 'The immense extension of the country ... is entirely depopulated. ... The evil that afflicts the Argentine Republic is its extension: desert surrounds it everywhere, it is in its very entrails' (Sarmiento, 1963: 23). The myth of emptiness was taken up later in the century during future President General Julio A. Roca's campaign to exterminate the Indians who refused to submit to the Argentine Nation, an offensive euphemistically entitled 'La conquista del desierto' [The Conquest of the Desert]. The campaign is 'the minus in the origin' (Bhabha, 1990: 306) in the formation of Argentina: the minus that is forgotten for the will to be a nation to be fulfilled (Bhabha, 1990: 310). It is the moment of 'the blood and mud of battles' that preside over the founding of the State (Foucault, 2003: 50).

In *Indios, ejército y frontera*, David Viñas asks whether the Indians killed during 'La conquista del desierto' were in fact the 'disappeared' of 1879 (Viñas, 1982: 12). Originally published in Mexico in 1982 and in Argentina the following year, Viñas specifically relates his study to the 1976–1983 dictatorship: 'if in contemporary Argentina ... the army has proliferated to the point of occupying the totality of the stage of history, what did it really do in Patagonia more than 100 years ago?' (Viñas, 1982: 11). The ties between the 1976–1983 dictatorship and 'La conquista del desierto' are more than metaphorical: not only did the military government preside over the 1978 bicentenary of the birth of Argentina's liberator, General San Martín, but they also celebrated Roca's campaign in 1979, creating a direct link in terms of war. The dictatorship used the respective enemies as the point of comparison: 'That imaginary comparison between the *savages* annihilated by the forces of the then Colonel Roca with the *subversives* that threatened the essence of the Nation formed the basis of that epic projection of a new origin' (Vezzetti, 2002: 58, emphasis in the original). The disappearances during the

dictatorship, the self-designated 'Proceso de reorganización nacional' [Process of National Reorganisation], therefore, might be seen as the minus in the origin of the 'reorganisation' of the nation.

The discourse of internal threats to the stability of the nation and the notion of non-national subversives runs throughout Argentine history. Leopoldo Lugones's 1923 speech on the infamous *Semana Trágica* strikes of 1919 spoke of the events as 'a war fought by the nation against a foreign enemy. There could be "no civil war against foreigners", he insisted, "because all wars with foreigners are national wars" requiring full-scale military mobilization' (Rock, 1993: 71). Rather than focusing on the economic and class origins of the uprising, Lugones highlighted what he regarded as dangerous foreign influences disturbing Argentina. After the strikes various paramilitary groups sprung up to combat these subversive influences. The groups, which later joined to form the *Liga Patriótica Argentina*, were quick to attack foreign immigrants, particularly Russian Jews (Rock, 1987: 202). During the 1930s, 'the Nationalists continued to denounce "Red plots", whose aim was to destroy "God, the Nation, and the Family", [urging for] a "national dictatorship" to quash "this internal enemy"' (Rock, 1993: 102). Even Juan Perón contributed to this discourse of non-national Argentines towards the end of the 1940s: 'No true Argentine ... can deny his agreement with the basic principles of our doctrine without renegeing on his identity as an Argentine' (quoted in Rock, 1993: 161). In 1963, General Osiris G. Villegas wrote about the new state of permanent war in Argentina, altering Clausewitz's dictum to 'Peace is the continuation of war by other means' (quoted in Rock, 1993: 196–197). Villegas, who later became one of General Onganía's military chiefs during the latter's regime, itself plagued by the perceived threat of communism and the doctrines of national security, was in no doubt as to whom this war should be directed against: 'Subversion is the procedure chosen. The destruction of the nation is the object of this mortal enemy' (quoted in Rock, 1993: 197). Villegas's comments reflect Schmitt's ideas concerning internal enemies to the nation and the collapse of clear boundaries between friend and enemy.

Just as Viñas suggested that the massacred Indians were the 'disappeared' of 1879, the narrative construction of the southern cattle frontiers played a crucial role in the destruction and/or shifting of Indian populations, 'constructing a hegemony whose reproduction relies on the annihilation of an exterior subalternity' (Andermann, 2005). National hegemony, therefore, becomes dependent here on destruction, a variation on Bhabha's notion of the nation's bind to the 'minus in the origin'. The discourse and practice of destroying the non-national subversive, however, creates a problematic dependence. The military dictatorship became reliant on the subversive as Other-to-the-nation. At the same time, however, the minus in the origin of this 'reorganisation' of the nation, the active forgetting of the process of disappearing, was no longer being forgotten so easily. The palpable presence of absencing, though always known, was slowly being admitted to, or *acknowledged*. The acknowledgement of that minus was, by extension, a temporal acknowledgement of a problem in the historical nation. The political unity of the nation necessarily relies on repressing the plurality of the present, where 'nationals' are both the historical 'objects' of nationalist teaching and the temporal 'subjects' of the continual process of re-making the nation (Bhabha, 1990: 297).

If the ideological conflict of the Argentine dictatorship was over the very meaning of the nation itself (Vezzetti, 2002: 73), then the tension between the historical and the temporal in the formation of the nation means that the nation itself becomes a war that needs to be won every day. Not only had the boundaries of Argentine national citizenship been continually contracting but the dictatorship had also created a dependence on an Other that it had metaphorically and literally been excluding through disappearance. The dictatorship was faced with the implosion of its own concept of the nation because of its institutionalisation of disappearance. If the elimination of subversion through disappearance formed the basis of rule, then an un-winnable war would, in its theoretical extreme, result in an empty (i.e. entirely disappeared) nation. The 1982 Malvinas war, therefore, can be read as the military government's attempt to bracket war, both temporally and spatially, when faced with the threat of an unsustainable vacuum in the nation and, consequently, its possible fragmentation and dissolution.

The 1982 Malvinas War: Fighting Like Gentlemen?

The discourse surrounding the 1982 Malvinas conflict drew on the long-standing significance of Las Malvinas in the territorial imagination of Argentina. Frontiers and borders have always been historically loaded issues for the national consciousness and are often relied upon as an 'easy' means of generating unity: 'the issue of frontiers and their contestation (indeed transformation) by outside ("illegitimate") powers has been locally encoded in highly forceful ideological terms which are seen to lie at the heart of national identity' (Radcliffe and Westwood, 1996: 58). In the opening paragraph of *Facundo*, Sarmiento indicates his project of writing the national boundaries of Argentina: 'The American continent ends ... at the Strait of Magellan. To the west [extend] the Chilean Andes. The land that lies to the east of that chain of mountains ... is the territory [of the Argentine Republic]' (Sarmiento, 1963: 23). Argentina is defined in relation to the north-south divide of the Andes with Chile, writing out the border (defined by the frontier with the Indian populations) that existed across the centre of the country and that fluctuated continually until the end of the nineteenth century. Argentina, however, has been particularly vulnerable to a 'contrast between the *perception* of territorial losses and the *reality* of territorial gains' (Escudé, 1988: 141, emphasis in the original). Rather than acknowledge the reality of territorial gains in Patagonia (against the potential threat of Chile) and its northern provinces (against the potential threat of Paraguay), Argentine discourse is constructed on the perception of not having acquired all the possible land it might have. The trope of perceived lack in the very formation of Argentina means that Argentine nationalism continually reminisces about what might be done to satisfy the desire for 'wholeness', a lack played on by the military government in its discourse of incompleteness: 'Massera conceived the *Patria's* boundaries as unlimited, far exceeding the physical markers imposed by cartographers, which he referred to as the "unjust mutilation of geographical limits"' (Taylor, 1997: 77).

Las Malvinas, however, is a particularly powerful national symbol precisely because they have never been contested internally: *Las Malvinas*, as everybody knows, *son argentinas*. Even Carlos Escudé, whose article on Argentine territorial nationalism discredits almost all Argentine claims to land, makes a claim to Las Malvinas, arguing that the islands are a particular case because they are 'the only very minor territorial loss which can be considered as such in objective historical terms' (Escudé, 1988: 155). A history of education has taught Argentines that Las Malvinas are part of their national territory, and in 1982 Argentines believed they had a watertight claim for sovereignty to the islands. General Leopoldo F. Galtieri's speech of 2 April 1982 stated that the armed forces had recaptured 'the southern islands that by legitimate right form part of the national patrimony' and, in so doing, had safeguarded national honour (Guber, 2001: 30). Galtieri presented Argentina, both geographically and conceptually, as having passed beyond lack, the recovery of the islands making whole what had been incomplete for so many years. Galtieri placed the Malvinas within 'the great patriotic gestures at the start of the nineteenth century' (Guber, 2001: 30), stating that 'the recovery of Las Malvinas ... has formed part of every Argentine government since 1833' (*La Nación*, 1982). The specific nature of Las Malvinas and the perceived legitimacy of the Argentine claim to the islands, together with a territorial nationalism that created the sensation of lack in the origin, meant that the islands could work as a symbol that would, without exception, unite the nation.

The 1982 conflict, as suggested above, can also be understood as the military government's attempt to 'bracket' war, both spatially and temporally. In this reading, the Malvinas war can be understood as a traditional conflict between sovereign states: two countries doing battle over disputed territory through their respective formal armies, a point emphasised by the suggestions (on both sides but with different intentions) that the war belonged to the age of colonies and the British Empire.⁷ The conflict attempted to limit the spatial frontiers of war: unlike *la guerra sucia*, the conflict was to take place within the confines of a specific territory, and the civilian inhabitants of the islands were not to be directly involved. The territory itself was Argentine and yet not in Argentina: the capital could experience the war without suffering the effects of increased militarisation. The conflict had temporal restrictions: the war would be fought from the date of the invasion of the islands until either side declared a ceasefire. Furthermore, bearing in mind Schmitt's references to external war, the two sides were also wearing uniforms such that friend and enemy were clearly distinguishable. The different perspectives on the sinking of the *General Belgrano* indicate the significance of a bracketed war. One high-ranking Argentine naval officer said that the sinking 'was consistent with the rules established by the British' and that 'as a military man I cannot see the decision to sink the *General Belgrano* in sentimental terms' (quoted in Burns, 1987: 229). Post-war, the event has been treated, both by ex-combatants and by former President Carlos Menem, as a war crime, as have instances of executions of unarmed

7 The notion of merely two sovereign states at war is true only in so far as any war is limited to those directly fighting. There are many global aspects to the 1982 conflict, from the role of the Pentagon during the war to, say, the French technology involved in the making of the Exocet missile or the role of the Ghurkhas in the British army.

Argentine soldiers by British soldiers (Lorenz, 2006: 178–179, 250–251). Both perspectives illustrate that, in this war, there are perceived 'rules' and notions over what is deemed to be 'acceptable' fighting, even if 'acceptable' can be variously defined. Post-dictatorship, one Argentine soldier stated about *la guerra sucia*, 'We would all have preferred to fight in uniform, a gentleman's fight' (quoted in Osiel, 2001: 52). The soldier reveals how conceptualisations of appropriate behaviour for both state and citizens run through these wars. If *la guerra sucia* was not a gentleman's fight, did not fit Schmitt's notion of war as a duel subject to clear rules, then presumably the Malvinas conflict was a gentleman's war, the kind of war the military liked as it was not 'dirty' (at least, not in the same way).⁸

At first glance, the military government appeared to have been successful in (re)generating a sense of national identity. Marginalised Argentines took the opportunity to emphasise their nationhood: 'Japanese faces, Argentine hearts' read one banner. General Jorge R. Videla, president of the first military government of the dictatorship, proclaimed after the recapture of the islands that it was 'a transcendent moment to see that this group of citizens [...], despite their political and sectorial differences, united in singing the National Anthem' (quoted in Guber, 2001: 35). This new war enabled the military leader responsible for the most brutal era of the dictatorship to embrace the political differences that he had tried so hard to (literally) erase and to unite them under the auspices of national unity. The difficulties of trying to bracket the war, however, were quickly revealed. The writer Ernesto Sábato, later made president of the Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP), indicated one way in which such unification was possible. Speaking on Spanish radio he said tearfully: 'Don't be mistaken, Europe; it is not a dictatorship that is fighting for the "Malvinas"; it is the whole Nation' (quoted in Burns, 1987: 93). Sábato's comments show that it would be mistaken to assume that support for the war was, by definition, support for the dictatorship, further illustrated by several popular chants of the time, including 'Galtieri, Galtieri, prestá mucha atención; Malvinas argentinas, el pueblo es de Perón' [Galtieri, Galtieri, pay attention; the Malvinas are Argentine, but the people belong to Perón] (Guber, 2001: 44) and, by the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, 'the Malvinas are Argentine. So are the disappeared' (Guber, 2001: 45).

Malvinas united the nation, therefore, only in so far as it was perceived as a national symbol and not a political one: it represented unity *beyond* politics. After years of social division and a crisis in the discourse of nationhood, Malvinas was the only acceptable form of collective belonging, such that for the previous 50 years 'Argentines were accustomed to thinking of the Nation as the only base of legitimacy before and against the powers [...] of the State' (Guber, 2001: 62). Videla's comments cited above, however, follow precisely the same discourse of national unity ('despite their political

8 After the outbreak of the war, the newspaper *La Nación* ran an article stating that married women could no longer be identified by whether they wore a ring as so many had given theirs to the fund created to raise money for the war effort, adding a further twist to the notion of 'a gentleman's war' and the male desires found in *Fuckland*. For a consideration of the ties between gender, nationhood and war in the Falklands War see Noakes (1998).

and sectorial differences'), indicating the problematic conflict at the heart of this symbol. Until 1982, the symbol of Malvinas 'was kept "pure", which is to say, outside the world of "the political"' (Guber, 2001: 108). At the time of the invasion, the national quality of the war was hardly questioned, despite being implemented by the explicitly political body of the dictatorship.⁹ Post-war, however, some Malvinas veterans have fought hard to remind those who treat them as innocent victims of the dictatorship that the principal enemies of the war were the British (Guber, 2004: 159). In the eyes of the veterans 'remembering the War and the territorial claim should be part of a "national memory", not of a partisan or politicised past, like that of the Proceso' (Guber, 2004: 155). After the defeat, the general tendency has been to emphasise Malvinas as having been stained by politics in its inextricable association with the dictatorship, questioning the 'purity' of Malvinas and either banishing the war (and the symbol) to oblivion or labelling it an example of the dictatorship's irrationality (Guber, 2001: 112).

And yet Lorenz's analysis of the post-war struggles over the memories of the war, particularly in relation to ex-combatants and the need to reintroduce their testimonies into discussions over the war, highlights that 'Malvinas means many wars' (2006: 16). One key trope Lorenz draws out is the comparison between the disappeared of *la guerra sucia* and the disappeared of Malvinas, the latter those lost in combat and either never found or buried in unmarked graves in the Argentine cemetery on the islands. Both shared the essential characteristic of eternal youth (Lorenz, 2006: 152) and 'the Argentine State reacted to such deaths [of the combatants] in the same way that it had been doing for six years with the victims of illegal repression' (Lorenz, 2006: 119). The two kinds of disappeared are evidently not the same – and yet they are both, as indicated earlier, clear examples of how each and every citizen is potentially *homo sacer*. Furthermore, the post-war vilification of enlisted officers, a discourse, it should be noted, that has been refuted by some ex-combatants who have praised the kindness of some of their superiors, highlights the difficulty of separating friend from enemy in a war that was intended to do precisely that. Lorenz, together with many ex-combatants, has also warned against *desmalvinizar*, the attempt to forget Malvinas instigated by a post-dictatorship government confronted with the difficulty of restoring national unity (2006: 190). The term originated in an interview with French sociologist Alain Rouquié, in which he warned that 'Malvinizar Argentine politics will add another time bomb in the Casa Rosada' (Lorenz, 2006: 191). As Malvinas had become inherently tied to the dictatorship, therefore, the demands of ex-combatants 'were dangerously associated with the re-vindication of *la guerra sucia*' (Lorenz, 2006: 191). And yet

9 See, however, León Rozitchner's *Malvinas: de la guerra sucia a la guerra limpia el punto ciego de la crítica política* (2005). In exile in Caracas, Rozitchner wrote one of the few texts of the period to criticise the invasion and its supporters. Specifically, he attacked the various arguments put forward in favour of the war by the Grupo de Discusión Socialista, a group of Argentine exiles in Mexico whose members included, among others, José Arico, Néstor García Canclini, Emilio de Ípola and Juan Portantiero. Rozitchner saw the group's standpoint on the war as representative of the shortcomings of left-wing intellectual criticism.

Rouquié did not appear to be advocating the practice of forgetting Malvinas – which would be (and has been) unproductive, dangerous and ostracising – but rather ‘de-sacrilising’ the military (Lorenz, 2006: 190). That surely is a practice worth pursuing.

Conclusion: Taking Down Videla's Portrait?

The two wars of the Argentine dictatorship are juxtaposed such that the permanent and perpetual war of *la guerra sucia* is disrupted – or perhaps continued by other means – in the Malvinas/Falklands war. The war of the dictatorship was limitless, both temporally and spatially, and the institutionalisation of disappearance meant that as a war it could have no end, it could not be won or, rather, it was a war that ‘has to be won again every day’ (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 14). Its enemy was a de-centralised and networked enemy internal to the nation and one that, therefore, dangerously undermined the stable boundaries of inside and outside (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 55). This war was not re-active (i.e. a response to an act of aggression) but rather pro-active, one in which the environment required active and constant ‘shaping’ (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 20), as in the official title of the dictatorship: ‘*Proceso de reorganización nacional*’. Not only does the nation require reorganisation or reshaping, then, but this re-ordering becomes a process, a period of permanent continuity or, in other words, a period of permanent (re)shaping. Within this narrative of war, the 1982 conflict reflects the military’s attempt to shift to a different kind of war and their recognition of the need to escape the permanence of *la guerra sucia*, a war that was un-winnable. The Malvinas conflict attempted to shift the enemy to an external, single entity, which could serve as clearly defined Other in opposition to which the fragmenting Nation could unify. The military tried, therefore, to shift from an interminable war (a war that needs to be won each day) to a war perceived ‘possible’ to win; from an interminable (spatially and temporally) war to a (de)finite war. By invading the islands the dictatorship tarnished the one ‘untouched’ symbol of Argentine nationhood. If the post-dictatorship attempt to reaffirm the force of law went some way to reasserting the authority of the State, the nation was no longer the over-arching, unquestioned form of collective identity. What place did the nation have here, in ‘a society punished by persecution, death and disappearance, effectively fragmented and deprived of its old form of collective and organised reaction’ (Guber, 2001: 168)? Post-dictatorship, after two decades of globalisation and neoliberalism, national identity in Argentina has been further undermined. And yet ‘national identity is not the only basis for identification and mutual recognition – as the abductions and disappearances of Argentines by Argentines made clear’ (Taylor, 1997: 18). Rather than regarding the damage to national identity in a negative light, therefore, the uncertainties and instabilities in nationhood have re-opened the door to the multitude, that ‘irreducible multiplicity’ (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 105) that refuses the dichotomy of friend/enemy.

On 24 March 2004, the 28th anniversary of the military coup, President Kirchner participated in a series of events at the Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA), the

site of some of the most notorious and brutal torture during the dictatorship. Kirchner attended a ceremony in which he oversaw the removal of General Videla's portrait from the walls of the ESMA. During a speech later that day, Kirchner apologised 'on behalf of the national State for the shame of having kept silent so many atrocities during twenty years of democracy' (*Clarín*, 2004a). Despite claiming that he was not speaking on behalf of any political party, Kirchner was once again playing the game of emotional politics as a means of generating support. He not only emphasised the difference between the contemporary democratic State and the dictatorship ('murderers'), but also between his government and the previous democratic regimes ('for the shame of having kept silent'). A few days later, on the anniversary of the invasion of Las Malvinas, Kirchner proclaimed that the geographical limits of the nation were not, as so many Argentines seemed to think, that of Capital Federal, but of Las Malvinas. His comments merged one of the President's most lauded characteristics – that he comes from Patagonia – into the discourse of Malvinas as unifying myth. Taken with the renewed and vociferous calls for the return of the islands, Kirchner's politics illustrates that the State persists in returning to the nation as a collective symbol.

Reading Kirchner's regime in the light of a reconsidered perspective on war, disappearance and nation during the 1976–1983 dictatorship, therefore, indicates that despite Kirchner's attempts to emphasise the differences between the military regime and his own government, they share other points of commonality. Such commonalities should not lead us to declare that the two regimes are one and the same. Neither, however, should the commonalities be obscured, because to do so would hide the dangerous return to friends and enemies. Soon after the symbolic ceremony in the ESMA, it emerged that the portrait of Videla taken down from the building was in fact a copy of the original that had been substituted prior to Kirchner's arrival without the President's knowledge. Kirchner quickly dismissed the incident as irrelevant to the symbolic power of the act, a deed that not only showed Kirchner unhooking the image but also revealed his dependence on the image to be (perpetually) unhooked. It is equally symbolic, however, that the military should have replaced the original portrait in the ESMA, an emblematic exchange the significance of which was intensified by a story in *Clarín* the following day. The newspaper revealed that the image of another portrait of Videla, in this case an oil painting, was circulating anonymously over the Internet, accompanied by a text that criticised the biased memory of 1970s violence and that cited Perón speaking in 1974 of annihilating criminal terrorism (*Clarín*, 2004b). The ongoing presence of Videla's absent portrait and the alternative image on the Internet indicate the danger of returning to the nation and making Malvinas 'virgin' territory once again. Such attempts to return Malvinas to its 'pure' and 'untouched' state can only produce a nation that is 're-malvinizada'.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank J. Beasley-Murray, C. Perriam, and P. Schell, all of whom commented on earlier versions of this article.

References

- Agamben, G. (1998) *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Stanford University Press: Stanford.
- Agamben, G. (2005) *State of Exception*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London.
- Andermann, J. (2005) *Argentine Literature and the 'Conquest of the Desert', 1872–1896* [WWW document]. URL <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/ibamuseum/texts/Andermann02.htm> [accessed 18 February 2006].
- Beasley-Murray, J. (2005) 'The Common Enemy: Tyrants and Pirates'. *South Atlantic Quarterly* 104: 217–225.
- Bhabha, H. K. (1990) 'DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation', in H. K. Bhabha (ed.) *Nation and Narration*. Routledge: London and New York, 291–322.
- Blaustein, E. and Zubietta, M. (1998) *Decíamos ayer: la prensa Argentina bajo el proceso*. Colihue: Buenos Aires.
- Burns, J. (1987) *The Land that Lost its Heroes: Argentina, The Falklands and Alfonsín*. Bloomsbury: London.
- Calveiro, P. (1998) *Poder y desaparición: los campos de concentración en Argentina*. Colihue: Buenos Aires.
- Clarín (2004a) Kirchner en la ESMA: "En nombre del Estado, vengo a pedir perdón", 25 March [WWW document]. URL <http://www.clarin.com/diario/2004/03/25/p-00301.htm> [accessed 18 February 2006].
- Clarín (2004b) 'Un nuevo capítulo por el retrato de Videla', 1 April [WWW document]. URL <http://www.clarin.com/diario/2004/04/01/p-01203.htm> [accessed 18 February 2006].
- Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP) (2003) *Nunca Más*. Eudeba: Buenos Aires.
- Dogme (1995) 'The Official Dogme 95 Website' [WWW document]. URL <http://www.dogme95.dk> [accessed 18 February 2006].
- Dotti, J. E. (2000) *Carl Schmitt en la Argentina*. Homo Sapiens: Buenos Aires.
- Dotti, J. E. and Altamirano, C. (2004) 'La modernidad en cuestión'. *Punto de Vista* 78: 1–11.
- Escudé, C. (1988) 'Argentine Territorial Nationalism'. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 20: 139–165.
- Feitlowitz, M. (1998) *A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture*. Oxford University Press: New York.
- Fernández Vega, J. (2005) *Las guerras de la política*. Edhasa: Buenos Aires.
- Foucault, M. (2003) 'Society Must Be Defended': *Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–1976*. Picador: New York.
- Gregory, D. (2004) *The Colonial Present*. Blackwell: Oxford.
- Guber, R. (2001) *¿Por qué Malvinas?: De la causa nacional a la guerra absurda*. Fondo de Cultura Económica: Buenos Aires and Mexico City.
- Guber, R. (2004) *De chicos a veteranos: memorias argentinas de la guerra de Malvinas*. Editorial Antropofagia: Buenos Aires.
- Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2004) *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*. The Penguin Press: New York.
- La Nación (1982) 22 April, 1.
- Lorenz, F. (2006) *Las guerras por Malvinas*. Edhasa: Buenos Aires.
- Marqués, J. L. (2000a) *Fuckland: cine ficción/verdad*. Atomic Films: Buenos Aires.
- Marqués, J. L. (dir.) (2000b) *Fuckland, Argentina*.
- Noakes, L. (1998) 'Gender, National Identity and Memory: The Falklands War', in *War and the British: Gender, Memory and National Identity*. I.B. Tauris: London and New York, 103–133.
- Osiel, M. (2001) *Mass Atrocity, Ordinary Evil, and Hannah Arendt: Criminal Consciousness in Argentina's Dirty War*. Yale University Press: New Haven and London.

- Radcliffe, S. and Westwood, S. (1996) *Remaking the Nation: Place, Identity and Politics in Latin America*. Routledge: London and New York.
- Rock, D. (1987) *Argentina 1516–1987: From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War and Alfonsín*. I.B. Tauris: London.
- Rock, D. (1993) *Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, Its History and Its Impact*. University of California Press: Berkeley and London.
- Rozitchner, L. (2005) *Malvinas: de la guerra sucia a la guerra limpia*. Losada: Buenos Aires.
- Sarmiento, D. F. (1963) *Facundo*. Losada: Buenos Aires.
- Schmitt, C. (1996) *The Concept of the Political*. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London.
- Schmitt, C. (2003) *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*. Telos Press: New York.
- Taylor, D. (1997) *Disappearing Acts: Spectacles of Gender and Nationalism in Argentina's 'Dirty War'*. Duke University Press: Durham and London.
- Vezzetti, H. (2002) *Guerra, dictadura y sociedad en la Argentina*. Siglo XXI: Buenos Aires.
- Vicia, R. (2005) 'Virtudes de la hostilidad'. *Otra Parte* 5: 41–47.
- Viñas, D. (1982) *Indios, ejército y frontera*. Fondo de Cultura Económica: Mexico City.

Copyright of *Bulletin of Latin American Research* is the property of Blackwell Publishing Limited and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.