

## THE ESTADO NOVO,

1937-1945

On the morning of November 10, 1937, writer Joel Silveira, then a young law student in Rio de Janeiro, found the iron gates of the law faculty building locked. "Gentilo pulled off a coup," another student told him. "He closed the Chamber, the Senate. There'll be no classes today." Traveling downtown by streetcar, Silveira saw soldiers guarding the legislative palace, standing around smoking cigarettes. That evening, Vargas addressed the nation over the radio. He spoke gravely, in his usual monotone. "[His words] tumbled out," Silveira recollects, "heavy, measured utterances, unctuous, dull, dripping like oil. We were told that with the help of the military we have been saved. Vargas explained, like a teacher, that a Communist plot was imminent. . . . He, Vargas, and his praetorian guard would stand watch over us. From that moment, we, citizens of Brazil, workers of Brazil, could rest assured. . . . In the wings stood, without a doubt, the SS of Major Felinto Müller, the gaulleter of the capital."<sup>1</sup> This version, of course, benefits from hindsight and literary license, since Silveira wrote his memoirs four and a half decades later. If others felt similarly, they kept their reaction to themselves. Across Brazil, life went on as usual.

Waldo Frank, touring Latin America, described the Brazilian leader some time later: "Vargas has the small, square hands, hairy and hard, of a worker. His head sits on his shoulders like a precocious student's: there is the discrepancy between it and his oldish body, which reveals excess development of mind over emotion. The head is harmoniously shaped; the eyes have cunning and humor; both head and eyes give him the air

of youth. Vargas has lived hard, but saved emotion." As psychoanalysis, Frank's characterization was amateurish, but he was an astute observer, and in the span of a short visit he sized up what many others took years to express. Vargas, he wrote, "is a marginal man in Brazil," referring to his birthplace on the Argentine border and his excellent knowledge of Spanish. Vargas "is as cool as a glacier, and nearly as slow. He is known to be fearless . . . [partially] due to his deliberate and controlling strength of reason."<sup>2</sup>

Cool as ice or not, Vargas masterfully orchestrated the events through which the Estado Novo was imposed. He secured the support of the military command and assured journalists, especially foreign correspondents reporting from Brazil, that things were under control. The presidential elections were unceremoniously canceled and the 1934 Constitution abrogated in favor of a new document written by the arch-conservative jurist Francisco Campos. This constitution ceded virtually all power to the head of state. It was based on the Italian Carta del Lavoro and fascist Poland's 1935 charter, which proclaimed that the "sole and individual authority of the State is concentrated in the person of the President of the Republic." Opponents nicknamed the Estado Novo constitution "the *polacca*" ("the Polish one"), alluding to the term's meaning as slang for European prostitutes.

Vargas opted for the coup because it was the only way he could remain in office beyond his legal term, which would have ended in a few months. He had become adamant that only he could move Brazil forward to national integration, and the election campaign between Armando de Sales Oliveira and José América de Almeida dismayed him as a choice between a *pauleta* restoration and uncontrolled radical populism. "To combat the poverty and disorganization of [Brazil's] public life," he told his radio audience, the presidential campaign, "transformed into an unruly exchange of charges and demagogic promises," had to be canceled. His concluding promise was that "I will continue to serve the nation."<sup>3</sup> He then permitted a story to circulate in the press affirming the existence and threat of the scurrilous "Cohen Plan," although this was a blatant lie, and blamed Communists for bringing

1. Paraphrased from Joel Silveira, *O Presidente no Jardim* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 1991), 43-45.

2. Waldo David Frank, *South American Journey* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1943), 342.

3. Afonso Henriques, *Ascensão e queda de Gentilo Vargas* (Rio de Janeiro: Distribuidora Record, 1966), 428-429. See also Thomas E. Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 29.

Brazil to the edge of calamity. This was preposterous, and even some of Getúlio's closest supporters, including Oswaldo Aranha and Assis Chateaubriand, reacted with anger after the Estado Novo was imposed. Aranha resigned from the government. But if Vargas was upset, he did not show it. He welcomed the opportunity to crack down on the opposition and on dissent. He had Müller tap the telephones and open the mail of everyone in the government, even General Góes Monteiro, to whom Müller gave his "word of honor" that his phone conversations would remain private.<sup>4</sup>

Vargas surrounded himself with officials who shared his outlook. Francisco Campos, the author of the 1937 Constitution, justice minister, and the major intellectual defender of authoritarian corporatism, flatly rejected liberal democracy on the grounds that the entry of the masses into political life required repressive measures to resist degeneration into class conflict, "Muscovite inundation," and anarchy. Instead, Campos advocated a strong centralized state to serve the entire nation, not class interests.<sup>5</sup> The role of the state was to guide, not to control. Labor was to be organized vertically, from local *sindicatos* (unions) up through national confederations, representing in organic fashion not only the workers but management, producers, and the state. Azevedo Amaral, explaining the Estado Novo's position, argued:

Docile submission to the authority of the State is not repugnant and cannot be repugnant to normal individuals, for they intuitively understand that in order for a people to transform itself into a nation, it must organize itself into a hierarchical structure. The solidity and efficient functioning of this structure requires the action of an authority capable of coordinating and orienting the elements which are juxtaposed in society.<sup>6</sup>

Powerful interests, like the São Paulo industrialists, were incorporated into the decision-making process, but organized labor was treated

paternalistically and manipulated. Vargas-era syndicalism was imposed from the top down. Vargas, Erickson shows, held his coalition together through concessions, force, and the promise to mobilize a national effort to bring Brazil out of the Depression.<sup>7</sup> Pluralism in Brazilian society was permitted only if it did not challenge the government. Furthermore, Vargas remained in power only with the backing of the military. Before 1937 there had been a pretense of popular support; after 1937 this was no longer claimed as a justification for dictatorship.

Free from the restraints of liberal constitutionalism, Vargas was able to restructure the government as he wished. The ban on political activity also extended to self-help voluntary associations, including groups organized by blacks in São Paulo earlier in the decade. Citizens' groups like the *Paulista* Society of Friends of the City (SAC) remained in operation but without effect; all initiatives now came from the state. Mayors were no longer elected but appointed by Vargas's state intervenors. Vargas imposed a policy he called *descaminuação*, a decree forbidding anyone from holding more than one public job. This dealt a blow to thousands who had accumulated several public jobs as patronage, but also had harmful effects, hurting poorly paid university professors who needed to hold more than one post to make a living.

To circumvent the old bureaucracies, Vargas created the Administrative Department for Public Service (DASP), a federal super ministry accountable only to him, along with similar agencies at the state level. This afforded the government freedom to innovate, to create regional agencies able to avoid power struggles among jealous state interests, to expand welfare policies, and to invest directly in steel, iron ore, and river valley development, among other activities.<sup>8</sup> The Estado Novo built its programs of social justice and "economic democracy" on Vargas's earlier initiatives. Unlike Mussolini, he never attempted to organize a mass political party to support the regime. His cynical (and former Integralist) labor minister, Alexandre Marcondes Filho, affirmed Vargas's premise that only within a framework of social order and tranquility, based on Christian principles, could the government discharge its duties

4. Transcript of telephone conversation between Góes Monteiro and Dep. Jayme Correa, November 5, 1935, recorded by secret police, reproduced in *Brasil-Notícias*, October 19, 1995, Sinopse, 6.

5. Francisco Campos, *O Estado Nacional: sua Estrutura, seu Conteúdo Ideológico* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1940), 23, 39-40, 61.

6. Antônio José do Azevedo Amaral, *O Estado Autoritário e a Realidade Nacional* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1938), 171, cited by K. P. Erickson, *The Brazilian Corporative State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 18.

7. Erickson, *The Brazilian Corporative State*, 22.

8. Barry Ames, *Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 106. See also Morris L. Cooke, *Brazil on the March: A Study in International Cooperation* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1944), 56.

by providing for the needs of the working class and preventing class struggle.<sup>9</sup>

Vargas had never shied away from heavy-handedness, and he welcomed his new dictatorial powers because he had always felt impatient with political delay. Authoritarian government suited him, and his actions gave the strong impression that he had accepted the ideological position of the conservative far right. Soon after the coup, he let it be known that the Integralists were welcome to join his government by offering the education post to the green-shirt chieftain Plínio Salgado. The Integralist leader initially accepted but then changed his mind, holding out for a more powerful portfolio, possibly justice. When Vargas refused, he sulked. Given that Vargas's antidemocratic proclivities were shared by many in the armed forces, had Salgado accepted, fascism would have probably taken a firmer hold. But Salgado's rejection of the post set into motion events that abruptly undermined his pretensions to amass power and permitted Vargas to consolidate his hold more firmly than ever.

On May 8, 1938, dozens of armed Integralists in the early hours of the morning attacked the Carete palace. Vargas, his daughter Alzira, and his personal staff were forced to barricade themselves and shoot back from their windows. For several hours the military did nothing to intervene, although relief was nearby and the armed forces command had been informed of the assault by telephone. Clearly the military command waited to see what would happen. When loyal troops finally arrived, they quickly quelled the assault. Vargas followed up by banning the AIB and dispatching Plínio Salgado into exile in Portugal. This was a soft punishment — in contrast to Prestes's harsh imprisonment — but Vargas presumably did not want to alienate the European fascist powers. The attempted *putsch* would have been comic had there not been live ammunition on both sides. It short-circuited a more elaborate plot by members of the ex-Democratic Party in São Paulo, led by João Mangabeira, for a second constitutionalist uprising against Vargas, this time in alliance with the Integralists. The assault on the palace was triggered by two green-shirted militia men presumably acting on their own, Lieutenant Severo Fournier and a physician, Belmiro Valverde. Vargas, catching his breath, seized upon the attack to liquidate all pockets of remaining opposition in the country. This stopped the jockeying for power

er that had started with the Liberal Alliance campaign in 1930. Vargas was now firmly in control, although the generals watched him carefully; they were the ones who held ultimate power.

The justification for abandoning representative government was bluntly stated by Agamenón Magalhães, the dour new labor minister who had earned a reputation for nastiness in suppressing dissidents in his home state of Pernambuco. Brazil, Magalhães declared, was “the land of electoral clientelism, of incompetence, of favors, of bureaucratic waste.” We need radical solutions, he added: “simpler ones, more rational, more intelligent, more efficient.”<sup>10</sup> Vargas shared Magalhães's view wholly. Yet for most Brazilians, the Estado Novo did not seem a sinister police state. Persons picked up by police — unless they were wealthy or from the “better” families — expected to be beaten, sometimes savagely; but this always had been the case and was not the result of Vargas's suspending habeas corpus or imposing the Estado Novo. A visiting political scientist in 1941 characterized the regime as a “mild-tempered, semi-totalitarian dictatorship.”<sup>11</sup>

To be sure, Vargas never embraced military fascism. The Estado Novo was administered by bureaucrats, not soldiers. Vargas's paternalism was not new to Brazil but continued the legacy of generations.<sup>12</sup> The Estado Novo was centralized and nationalistic, but in a slack, fragmentary way. Once it was installed, Vargas ceremoniously lowered state flags and replaced them with Brazil's striking green, blue, and yellow national emblem. But this was only theater; Vargas's policies under the Estado Novo simply continued his earlier measures. He championed economic independence and the progress that would come from abandoning partisan and state-based interests. He banned the use of foreign languages in schools and pressed communities of Germans, Italians, Poles, and Japanese to acculturate. In the name of Brazilian unity, foreign-language newspapers and magazines were prohibited. This *Brasilidade* campaign was so effective that individuals who spoke no Portuguese were publicly ostracized in their communities, even in places heavily populated by immigrants. But Brazilians responded positively to the nationalistic measures, and no protests were raised against government actions that inconvenienced individuals and small groups. When Vargas sent troops in 1944 to join the United States Fifth Army in Italy, he boasted that sol-

9. Ludwig Lauethass Jr., *Getúlio Vargas e o Triunfo do Nacionalismo Brasileiro* (Belo

Horizonte: Iarataia, 1986), 247–248.

10. Agamenón Magalhães, in *Folha da Manhã* (Recife), September 18, 1940, 1.

11. Walter R. Sharp, “Methods of Opinion Control in Present-Day Brazil,” 3.

12. Erickson, *The Brazilian Corporative State*, 15.

diers would serve from every single Brazilian state, to affirm Brazil's drive for national unification. That the soldiers were sent virtually untrained went unsaid.

Police and armed forces intelligence agents targeted for arrest or close surveillance tens of thousands of suspected opponents of the regime, most of them leftists. Antiguovernment publications were taken from newsstands and incinerated, as were the National Library's back issues of many Communist newspapers. Many persons unsympathetic to the regime fled into exile. Among those who were imprisoned were the distinguished writers Graciliano Ramos and Monteiro Lobato. For having written a letter criticizing Vargas's petroleum policy as "malevolent,"<sup>13</sup> Lobato was arrested in his house at four in the morning and sentenced to five months in prison. Ordinary Brazilians also suffered indignities. Government clerks streamed open mail, made verbatim copies of letters for their files, sealed the envelopes, and sent them on their way. Many Brazilians learned only decades later that their privacy had been violated during the entire Estado Novo and that they had been considered potential subversives.

Political prisoners fared very badly. Thousands languished in the regime's penitentiaries. Some of the worst were the Maria Zélia and Paraiso prisons as well as the public jail in São Paulo, the Ilha das Cobras stockade in Rio de Janeiro, Recife's fetid House of Detention on the banks of the Capibaribe River, with more than four thousand prisoners crammed into tiny cells, and the penal colony on Fernando de Noronha island off the northeastern coast. Prison space was so much in demand after the November 1935 uprising that naval ships were converted into floating jails anchored in the sweltering heat of Rio's harbor. Arrested persons who were not citizens were deported. The Supreme Security Tribunal (TSN) handed down long prison sentences. Security officials let their own prejudices influence their work. Because Müller and others considered Jews potential Communists, the secret police kept a wide variety of Jewish social and cultural societies under surveillance.<sup>14</sup> When arrested, Jews, blacks, and union militants frequently received harsher treatment than others. Afro-Brazilian religious cults were considered deviant and therefore suppressed by the police. Nazi Party mem-

bers, German nationalists, and fascist Integralists were watched, although they were rarely arrested or mistreated. Generals Góes Monteiro and Eurico Gaspar Dutra, the two most powerful members of the military high command, were friendly to the Integralist movement, and Police Chief Müller maintained almost weekly contact with Integralist officials.<sup>15</sup>

The accelerated expansion of the centralized government after 1937 and the maintenance of a ponderous censorship system were accompanied by propaganda extolling the "new mentality in our country" and the regime's promises to improve the quality of Brazilians' lives. "A country is not just a conglomeration of individuals within a stretch of land," Getúlio told a May Day gathering in 1938, "but above all a unity of race, a unity of language, a unity of national spirit." Vargas's words were the products of Brazil's patriarchal tradition. He was benevolent and judgmental, "perpetually smiling rather than stern, accessible rather than distant, relaxed rather than formal."<sup>16</sup>

The regime celebrated the Estado Novo's first anniversary in November 1938 with an elaborate "Exposition of Anti-Communism and Estado Novo Propaganda" in Rio's elegant Municipal Theater.<sup>17</sup> Visitors viewed displays showing weapons seized during the 1935 Communist insurrection, dioramas and maps pinpointing Communist ventures throughout the world, and graphics depicting the Estado Novo's programs and goals. A display taunting the Spanish Republic was considered so offensive that it led to a formal complaint by the Spanish embassy and, in turn, recognition of Franco by the Brazilian foreign ministry. Police chief Müller regularly received "educational" materials from the Gestapo, and some of it was likely used on this occasion.

The DASP notwithstanding, Brazil remained too vast and inefficient a country to be administered wholly from Rio de Janeiro. As a result, each state fared differently under the Estado Novo depending on the style and motivation of Vargas's appointed interventor. In some states, hardly anything changed. This was not the case in Pernambuco under Agamenón Magalhães. Taking an aggressively populist stance, he an-

15. Augusto do Amaral Peixoto and Jovã Mota, cited in Valentina da Rocha Lima, *Getúlio: Uma História Oral* (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Record, 1986), 107-108.

16. Susan K. Besse, *Restructuring Patriarchy: The Modernization of Gender Inequality in Brazil, 1914-1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 202; Getúlio Vargas, *A Nova Política do Brasil*, 5:205, cited by Besse, 206.

17. Dossier, "Exposição Anti-Comunista e de Propaganda do Estado Novo," Itamarati Archive, Lata 685, M. 10.044, Rio de Janeiro.

13. Letter, Monteiro Lobato to Getúlio Vargas, May 14, 1940, CPDOC archive, Rio de Janeiro.

14. DOPS Archive, Arquivo Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Setor Geral, Pasta 7, Dossier 11.

nounced a program to pressure firms to limit extravagant profits and to lower prices. Citizens were invited to report cases of price gouging and other improper behavior. Magalhães paid subsidies to the Catholic Worker Educational Centers, established privately during the mid-1930s. In 1939 he launched a program to tear down some of the more unsightly *mocambo* shantytowns on the outskirts of Recife. The state administration installed an anti-Communist pavilion at the annual trade fair, and he went after not only Communists and fellow travelers but, in quieter ways, some of the members of the local oligarchy linked to *Estado Novo* factions. In December 1937, state police arrested 269 alleged subversives, all without habeas corpus. The federal Justice Ministry assisted by providing Pernambuco with 40 percent of the entire national budgetary resources earmarked for the "repression of communism."<sup>18</sup> Purges removed intellectuals from their jobs; many were arrested, deported, or savagely harassed. When Ulisses Pernambucano, a psychiatrist and pioneering health administrator in Recife, lay ill with heart trouble, unmarked police cars parked outside his home and honked their horns all day. He died shortly afterward.

Pernambuco under Magalhães was more the exception than the rule. São Paulo mostly ignored the *Estado Novo* and its decrees. Minas Gerais went along with Vargas, yet it received relatively little in funding or new programs. The poorer states received even less. This reality, Vargas's paternalism, and the fact that for most Brazilians life went on much the same as before the coup, muted the hard edge of the new order. Vargas continued to guard his privacy, and he refused to speak on or off the record about the specifics of his administration. He remained symbolically accessible to all citizens but there was little follow-up. He mastered the art of the political visit, dressing comfortably so as not to appear a stuffed shirt, always smiling and waving his hand, cultivating accessibility even if he said little of substance. It was not what he said in public but how he said it. He became a calming, familiar presence in the lives of nearly all Brazilians, unheard of before in Brazil. He traveled great distances for official visits — ninety thousand miles in 1942 — dedicating public projects, cutting ribbons, and speaking from makeshift wooden platforms never built so high that they would separate him from his audience.

His way of speaking evolved. Before 1938, he spoke of "my govern-

18. Dulce Chaves Pandolfi, *Pernambuco de Agamenon Magalhães* (Recife: Ed. Massangana, 1984), 55–57.

ment," "our organization," "your will"; but starting in 1938, under the guiding eye of his Propaganda Ministry, he began to use the term "I." He had made the transition to self-identification with the masses, whom he addressed as "workers of Brazil," and his spoken expressions eliminated any intermediaries between people and government. He now made it clear that he stood at their side: that he and the people were one. He implored Brazilians to celebrate the dignity of work and traditional values. He enlisted the working class to his side: "order and work," "union and work," and, by the mid-1940s, working with the people to achieve the economic emancipation of Brazil. By following him, Vargas guaranteed, they would be assured employment with dignity and just wages and benefits, even though for most Brazilians these were empty promises.<sup>19</sup>

Vargas put his government behind efforts to instill a common and affirmative sense of national identity. He asked members of the Brazilian Academy of Letters to reformulate rules for written Brazilian Portuguese, simplifying spelling and affirming the language's distinctiveness from the Portuguese of the mother country. This was a matter of national pride, a way of institutionalizing the undisputed disdain many Brazilians felt toward the "valiant little Portuguese people" in their tiny country.<sup>20</sup> The Education Ministry, headed by Custavo Capanema from 1934 to 1945, worked to improve the public school network in a variety of ways but also to inculcate the regime's values. It commissioned textbooks to stress national unity and to remind students of the "indifference of past regimes to social questions."<sup>21</sup> Capanema created new agencies, such as the National Book Institute (Instituto Nacional do Livro) to disseminate patriotic culture. School curricula were altered to encourage national pride, discipline, good work habits, family values, thrift, and morality. Brazilian history, geography, and literature received new emphasis. Schools were asked to produce citizens with the kinds of attitudes conducive to national improvement. Officials experimented with newer approaches to the nationalization of culture and the "emotional diffusion of national values."

19. For a valuable analysis of Vargas's techniques in speaking, see Michael L. Conniff, "Cetíflio Vargas: 'Workers of Brazil! Here I Am at Your Side,'" in John Charles Chasteen and Joseph S. Tulchin, eds., *Problems in Modern Latin American History: A Reader* (Wilmington, DE: S R Books, 1994), 116–117.

20. For a Portuguese view, see Agostinho de Campos, "Poesia e Idioma," *Comércio de Porto* (July 14, 1935), n.p., sent by the Brazilian Consulate to Itamarati in Rio de Janeiro.

21. *Cultura Política*, 1:1 (March 1941), 51–60.

The most important civilian agency of the Estado Novo regime and the one most involved with these newer approaches was the Propaganda Ministry, the DIP. By late 1938, 60 percent of all newspaper and magazine articles were DIP handouts. Its mandate included censorship of all public media as well as responsibility for promoting nationalist sentiment through public events and through the school system.<sup>22</sup> Four years later, the DIP prohibited the broadcast of 108 scripted radio programs and 373 songs, many of them written for performance at Carnival. At the same time, the regime enlisted popular culture to teach popular values. "It Is Good to Marry," went the title of one Carnival samba. *Malandros*, knife-wielding street thugs whose dark exploits had fascinated urban residents, were transformed into conforming, guitar-strumming zoot-suiters, as lovable as actors in the American musical *Gays and Dolls*.<sup>23</sup> Estado Novo publicists sanitized the image of such characters, even, in the case of one propaganda piece, calling Getúlio Vargas the "greatest rogue of all" because he "used his guile" to entice industrialists to behave nicer to workers, as well as protecting workers in other ways with his cleverness.<sup>24</sup> The regime welcomed this "sonorous climate," Alcir Lenharo argues, and used it as a counterpoint to the more caustic (and uncontrollable) compositions that censors were trying hard to domesticate.<sup>25</sup>

Not only did it censor the press but the DIP "suggested" that editors publish its handouts. Those refusing ran the risk of having press runs apprehended or banned. The *Estado de São Paulo* for several years was placed under direct government control, and the editors of Rio de Janeiro's *Diário de Notícias* were pressured by Lourival Fontes personally. Nationwide, many formerly independent newspapers increasingly fell under the domination of networks like the Diários Associados, which by 1937 had also branched out into radio. Assis Chateaubriand's Rádio Tupi ("O Cacique do Ar"), launched in São Paulo, soon acquired the most powerful signal in Latin America.

22. Antônio Pedro Tota, "A Glória Artística nos Tempos de Getúlio," *Isis*, January 2, 1980, 46–47.
23. See Ruben George Oliven, "Malandragem na Música Popular Brasileira," in Ruben George Oliven, ed., *Violência e Cultura no Brasil* (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1983), 52–53; Henrique Dias da Luz, *Os Morros e Cartões no Novo Regime* (Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Olímpica, 1941), 15–16.
24. Mário Lago, *Na Rodanxa do Tempo*, 3rd ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1977), 9.
25. Rui Ribeiro, *Orlando Silva, o Cantor das Multidões* (Rio de Janeiro: FUNARTE, 1985), 11–16.

Vargas's crony, Lourival Fontes, a second-rate journalist from backwater Sergipe, headed the ministry. It was Fontes's idea to portray the bland head of state as the "father of the poor" (*pai dos pobres*) by blanketing the nation with propaganda, popularizing a new vocabulary of hero worship (*voz*, or "voice," as in "voice of the people," was one of the anointed words; another was *poço*). Vargas worked long and hard at perfecting the mannerisms and turns of phrase that contributed to his image of paternalistic competency. His talks were always short and simple, averting the rhetorical flourishes of traditional politicians and avoiding stilted words.<sup>26</sup> Vargas used speech writers – not only Fontes but, during the 1950s, newspaper editor and confidant J. S. Maciel Filho – but he always protected his control of what would be said and how it would be expressed. When Vargas was sent a batch of draft speeches during the 1950 presidential campaign, he rejected them because he found them "very academic, very correct," "not addressed to the masses." "They are more for highbrows," he commented; "they don't deal with the heart of the social and economic crisis that we are undergoing."<sup>27</sup>

Vargas reached his largest audience by radio, speaking frequently on the evening *Hora do Brasil*, a compendium of music, general news, uplifting speeches, tips on farming, nutrition, child rearing, agriculture, and anything else deemed appropriate by the DIP. His major speeches were reserved for holidays – Christmas and New Year's Day, as well as Independence Day and May Day. Whenever Vargas made a public appearance, it was filmed, so that the scene could be repeated across the country via newsreels, short clips accentuating the regime's accomplishments shown in movie theaters before the featured film. Newsreels powerfully shaped the perceptions of every Brazilian with incomes above the subsistence level because cinemas blanketed the country and brought the outside world to their audiences.

Knowledgeable Brazilians understood full well that most of this was a facade. Official broadcasts had the ring of Orwellian truthspeak: in an Independence Day broadcast, Vargas assured the nation that he had brought freedom to Brazil through the Estado Novo, which he termed a "functional democracy." For ten minutes each day the Estado Novo la-

26. Michael Corniff, preface to translation of Lourival Fontes and Glaucio Carneiro, *A Face Final de Vargas (os bilhetes de Getúlio)* (Rio de Janeiro: Edições O Cruzeiro, 1966), in Chasteen and Tulchin, *Problems in Modern Latin American History*, 117.
27. From Fontes and Carneiro, *Face Final*, 119.

bor minister, Marcondes Filho, addressed the nation on the *Hora do Brasil*, starting his talk with the phrase *Boa noite trabalhador* ("Good evening, worker"), reaching the hearts of the listeners in ways never heard before in the country's history.<sup>28</sup> Workers, he said, were "the producers of Brazil's wealth"; they "were manufacturing a new Brazil with fuller rights, social justice, and human dignity."

#### CHANGING TIMES

Many of the Estado Novo's propaganda claims proved hollow. The enlarged bureaucracy and continued use of patronage to fill government sinecures created the need for thousands of *despachantes*, personal expedients who for a fee could cut through red tape and receive favored treatment for their clients. The DIP churned out propaganda asserting and reasserting Vargas's compassionate championing of the poor. By telling the working classes that they were the bedrock of his political movement, he expanded his popularity while police raided nongovernmental unions.

Yet there was substantial progress in other areas. The Education Ministry created vocational schools and funded agronomy institutes, in part at the prompting of visiting United States technical missions. Production of electric power increased, and cement production and mineral extraction improved. In turn, the unprecedented demographic and technological changes that were transforming Brazil from a rural to an urban nation facilitated the dissemination of Estado Novo propaganda. Nearly a million radio sets by 1940 were able to tune into programs emanating from Rio de Janeiro. Migratory streams of unskilled northeasterners poured into southern cities, arriving crammed into open trucks that bounced along on the new roads built by the government. The DIP used posters and billboards to carry its messages, and distributed millions of photographs of Getúlio Vargas that were placed in homes, businesses, and government offices. Newcomers to Brazil, more than any other group, benefited from the regime's encouragement of industrial development. Nearly half of the founders or chief developers of firms with

more than one hundred employees in São Paulo were immigrants, another one-quarter had foreign-born parents, and another 11 percent were grandchildren of immigrants.<sup>29</sup>

Foreign observers tried to see in Vargas a Latin American version of Mussolini or Franco, but the descriptions never seemed apt. He is "cold, plump, and spider-like," Waldo Frank wrote in *Foreign Affairs* after a visit; not bothering to explain what he meant by "spider-like."<sup>30</sup> Frank and others were dismayed at Vargas's anticommunism as the justification for the imposition of authoritarian rule. "Communism," Vargas reported in his 1936 New Year's address, was "the most dangerous enemy of Christian civilization" because it brought disorder and, for workers, a regime of slave labor under the guise of proletarian freedom. Brazilian workers, he exhorted, would resist Bolshevism, exported from those countries whose vitality had been sapped by World War I. "National security," he stated in a speech in July 1936, necessitated the sacrifice of lesser goals and requires a climate of labor peace. A new Brazilian nationality would soon emerge, he promised, stretching from North to South and rooted in respect for order and resistant to the agents of subversion working clandestinely. Workers would be protected by the National Security Law, which would rid the country of subversives.

Vargas succeeded in using the political stability brought by the Estado Novo to transform Brazil's productive structure and to mold its economic evolution. Creating new economic policy instruments not only accelerated the growth of needed infrastructure but it reduced the traditional power base of the landed oligarchy.<sup>31</sup> During the entire period, developments abroad continually influenced Brazilian politics. Leftists sympathized with the Spanish Republic; at least sixty-five men volunteered to fight in the International Brigades. Comintern-backed newspapers ran story after story about Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, about the growing abuses of Hitler's Reich, and about lynchings of blacks and capitalist exploitation in the United States. Integralist newspapers praised the European fascists. Groups within the police and armed forces stirred up can-

28. See Frank, *South American Journey*, 12, 58; Pandolfi, *Pernambuco de Agamenon Magalhães*, 54; Michael A. Ogorzaly, *Waldo Frank: Prophet of Hispanic Regeneration* (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1994), 135. In comparison

with Vargas, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who also used the radio to great advantage, spoke much less frequently. During the dozen years of his presidency, Roosevelt averaged less than three "fireside chats" each year. Vargas spoke with much greater frequency.

29. Joseph L. Love, *São Paulo in the Brazilian Federation, 1889-1937* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), 19.

30. Could he have been playing with the meaning of the name of Oswaldo Aranha, which means spider? See Frank, *South American Journey*, 32.

31. Antônio Barros de Castro, "Renegade Development: Rise and Demise of State-Led Development in Brazil," in William C. Smith et al., eds., *Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America* (Coral Gables, Fla.: North-South Center, 1994), 186-187.

paigns against Jews in Brazil, motivated by the fact that many Communists and socialists were immigrant Jews. Foreign embassies stepped up their cultural programs to curry favor with educated Brazilians. The Alliance Française offered language classes and sponsored French theater. After the fall of France in 1940, both Gaullist and Vichyist organizations vied for the attention of Brazilian elites. The Nazis targeted a narrower group, sending films, books, and other materials designed to stir pride about Teutonic culture to every teacher in German-speaking communities in southern Brazil. Pi sudski's Polish regime sent Brazilian-born Polish youths to Warsaw to train as pilots. The Spanish government worked hard to win support for its cause although in January 1939 Vargas recognized Franco and added Spanish Republicans to the list of enemies of the Estado Novo. In 1942 the United States's Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA) sent movie producers, filmmakers, dance troupes, and scholars to Brazil as part of the Good Neighbor Policy.

The major powers jockeyed for position in Brazil, a source of critical resources (especially rubber) and potentially a vast market for trade and technology as Vargas's drive to diversify the economy proceeded.<sup>32</sup> Foreign governments were upset at Brazil's high protective tariffs but were not willing to risk antagonizing Vargas. In foreign policy, Vargas maneuvered between the world powers, negotiating extensively with Wilhelmstrasse's ambassador Curt Prüfer about trade and armaments. On June 11, 1940, Vargas made a speech aboard the carrier *Mimus Gerats* that seemed to favor the Axis. Observers suspected that the speech was a lever to extract economic aid and military armaments from the United States, but it was also known that he deeply feared the repercussions on his policies of economic independence that would come from an American alliance.<sup>33</sup> Germany offered to give Brazil all the weapons it want-

32. In the case of the United States, private philanthropy was active even before 1930. The Rockefeller Foundation gave millions for medical education, public health, and programs to combat epidemic diseases, and oversaw the reorganization of the University of São Paulo's medical school. Nelson A. Rockefeller, who headed the Office of Inter-American Affairs during the war, channeled extensive amounts of funding into programs to eradicate malaria and to improve hygiene among Amazon rubber workers. In the decade after 1945, Rockefeller channeled foundation aid to programs in Brazil ranging from public administration to medicine to food distribution.

33. See John D. Wirth, *The Politics of Brazilian Development, 1930-1954* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970); Ricardo Antônio Silva Seirentfus, *O Brasil de Getúlio Vargas, 324-325*.

ed, whereas the United States demanded that Brazil pay for them over a ten-year period, and even that was held up by agency infighting in Washington. From Rio de Janeiro, United States Ambassador Jefferson Caffery warned Sumner Welles at the State Department in June 1940 what would happen should the Reich prevail in Europe:

Here in Brazil the Army can make and unmake Governments, can remove President Vargas any day it sees fit to do so: if it is literally impossible for us for well-known reasons to help them to acquire arms, et cetera, in the United States, the Army will turn to Germany, accept the arms, et cetera, from them and almost inevitably receive German military and air missions as well. In other words, it will be very, very, very difficult to keep them from aligning themselves openly with a victorious Germany.<sup>34</sup>

Vargas relished the opportunity to use Brazil's neutrality to play both sides against one another. In May 1941, Vargas dispatched a telegram to Hitler with "best wishes for your personal happiness and the prosperity of the German nation."<sup>35</sup> He kept up pressure on the United States through the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, extracting, in March 1942, funding from the Export-Import Bank in Washington for the creation of the Companhia Vale de Rio Doce to mine iron ore and ultimately to generate hydroelectric power. Twenty million dollars was also granted for a Brazilian steel mill at Volta Redonda, a wholly planned industrial city, the symbol of Vargas's goal of economic independence. More than anything else, however, it was Vargas's fear that falling into the American orbit would doom any chance of postwar economic independence for Brazil. He was too much the realist to believe otherwise. It was the inevitability of the eclipse of Brazilian sovereignty, not any real admiration for the Nazis or their collaborators, that led Vargas to delay his decision until the last minute, leaving him with a sardonic tinge at the bargain that he had made.

By 1942, the United States had pledged financing for Brazilian railroad improvement, the manufacture of aircraft engines, allocation of

34. Confidential letter, Jefferson Caffery to Sumner Welles, Personal No. 150, Rio de Janeiro, June 24, 1940, 810.24/112-1/3, National Archives II, Washington, D.C.

35. *New York Times*, May 10, 1941, cited by Dulles, "The Contribution of Getúlio Vargas," 48.



needed chemicals and steel products, price supports for unsold coffee and cacao, and arms. Nelson A. Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs, funded by his family's foundation, ran medical and sanitation programs in the Amazon as part of a frantic Allied effort to increase rubber production by improving the health of workers. On the whole, though, the war set back Vargas's plans. Railroads and ports stagnated and suffered equipment breakdowns and fuel shortages; plans for petroleum drilling were stalled, and other promised aid from the United States only materialized after the war ended.

On the home front, Vargas's aides initiated a speaking campaign in which they thanked the chief of state for the social benefits decreed by the government, including the eight-hour day, paid vacations, and the creation of pension institutes for members of *sindicatos*.<sup>36</sup> Vargas was credited for expanding the vision of Brazilian government: he was bringing government services to rural areas, spokesmen said, consistent with the government's "March to the West" policy, encouraging colonization of the frontier and an expansion of national goals, a latter-day resurrection of the colonial-era *bandeirante* saga.<sup>37</sup> Vargas was the first head of state to travel to the far reaches of his country. In 1940, he spoke in Manaus, in the heart of the Amazon Basin, reminding his listeners of the centuries-old claim that Brazil's interior was the gateway to El Dorado. If access to the country's riches had been blocked in the past, he suggested, it was because of lack of political foresight, personal courage, capital, and technology.<sup>38</sup>

On the whole, the balance sheet for the 1940s was mixed. Vargas declared that ordinary Brazilians were "weakened by poverty, poorly fed, indolent, and lacking in initiative," but through education and example they would be lifted to higher levels.<sup>39</sup> But he took few concrete steps to aid them, and his *sindicatos* ignored the millions of lower-class Brazilians who lacked skills to find work. The government unions were for the

36. See, for example, Magalhães's speech as inventor of Pernambuco to Rio de Janeiro's Commercial Employees Syndicate, December 30, 1937, cited by Eulália Maria Lahmeyer Lobo, ed., *Rio de Janeiro Operário* (Rio de Janeiro: Access Editora, 1992), 127.

37. See Cassiano Ricardo, *Marcha para Oeste* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1940).

38. Leo A. Despres, *Manaus: Social Life and Work in Brazil's Free Trade Zone* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 1.

39. Célio da Cunha, *Educação e Autoritarismo no Estado Novo* (São Paulo: Cortez Editora, 1981), 118.

cream of the working class, but despite the generous benefits offered to them, even most trained workers stayed away as well. During the whole of the Vargas period, the large majority of industrial workers refused to affiliate. São Paulo's Textile Workers' Union enrolled fewer than 3 percent of the city's millworkers; only 5 percent of metalworkers joined the official union for that sector. Few factories anywhere had more than 20 percent union members. In Minas Gerais, some *sindicatos* remained practically empty until Vargas initiated a membership campaign in 1943. There were more beggars on the streets of Recife than dues-paying members in unions. In some parts of Brazil, individual large employers dominated — for example, the St. John d'el Rey Mining Company in Morro Velho — offering benefits attractive to workers in the paternalistic tradition of urban industrial factories like Maria Zélia in São Paulo and Bangü in Rio de Janeiro.<sup>40</sup>

The Estado Novo generally ignored women, although they provided more than half the work force in the formal economy (mostly in textiles and as clerks and teachers) and an even larger percentage of the alternative, or underground, economy, producing lace, hats, hankies, embroidery, and working as farm laborers, domestic servants, and nursemaids. Women, nonetheless, were discouraged from joining *sindicatos*, just as they traditionally had been excluded from independent unions, shunted instead into charity work. Catholic welfare agencies were often run largely by women, and the fascist Integralist movement segregated women members into women's auxiliaries that marched in Integralist parades, usually at the rear. The DIP praised women as homemakers, emphasizing that work was a masculine domain. Only 7 percent of the members of employees' syndicates in Rio de Janeiro in 1940 were women. In São Paulo, even though more women than men worked as factory operatives in textile factories and some other trades, women made up well under 10 percent of the members of the official unions in that state. A confidential summary of a fact-finding tour to the State Department by Mary Cannon, of the U.S. Labor Department's wartime

40. Joel W. Wolfe, "The Faustian Bargain Nor Made: Gentio Vargas and Brazil's Industrial Workers, 1930-1945," *Luso-Brazilian Review*, 31:2 (Winter 1994), 77-96. For Minas Gerais, see Maria Andréa Loyola, *Os Sindicatos e o PTB: Estudo de um Caso em Minas Gerais* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1980), 51-57; Yvonne de Souza Grossi, *Minas de Morro Velho: A Extração do Homem; Uma História de Exploração Operária* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1981); and Marshall C. Eakin, *British Enterprise in Brazil: The St. John d'el Rey Mining Company and the Morro Velho Gold Mine, 1830-1960* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1989).

Women's Bureau, disclosed that Brazil's female work force suffered from absenteeism, "lack of ambition," an absence of incentives, lack of education and vocational training, lack of cleanliness and other comforts, lack of safety devices, and a disinterest in enforcing laws protecting women and children. Management and labor department officials believed that women should do the "easy" and therefore lower-paid jobs, thereby making it more difficult for women to rise to better positions.<sup>41</sup>

After 1943, the regime's labor courts and conciliation commissions for the first time began to rule in favor of petitioners, likely part of Vargas's efforts to win political support from workers and leftist intellectuals. In addition, Vargas reduced the Estrado Novo's authoritarian controls over industrial relations. In 1944 he permitted rural workers to join *sindicatos*. Some of his initiatives failed, however. Workers pushed for higher wages, bypassing the labor courts and refusing to listen to syndicalist officials urging caution.<sup>42</sup> Freeing labor from some of the Estrado Novo labor codes backfired in other ways as well. Vargas released Luis Carlos Prestes from prison after nine years, a few weeks after the end of the war, as part of a calculated reach for Communist support, but Prestes refused to cooperate. Members of the Brazilian Communist Party, now legal, rushed to organize strikes, marches, and rallies, and established a Communist-dominated labor confederation, the Workers' Unity Movement (MUT).<sup>43</sup>

Despite Vargas's conviction that the authoritarian apparatus of the Estrado Novo was necessary to achieve his nationalistic goals, however, many Brazilians were disgusted at the arbitrary stripping away of personal liberty. An outcry was raised when Louis Carlos Prestes, languishing in prison, was not permitted to attend his mother's funeral. Opposition to the regime on civil libertarian grounds began to emerge during the early 1940s, among law students, for example, in São Paulo and some other cities. Most Brazilians, however, acquiesced, especially as the European war spurred the economy because of import substitution and raised living standards. Some of Vargas's former allies who had left the

41. See Wolfe, "The Faustian Bargain Not Made," 13-14; Mary M. Cannon, *Inter-American Representative of the Women's Bureau*, U.S. Department of Labor, Confidential Report, August 1943, 832.4055/18.

42. Wolfe, "The Faustian Bargain Not Made," 11.

43. Eduardo Dias, *Um Imigrante e a Revolução: Memórias de um Militante Operário* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1983), 50-52; Gerald Michael Greenfield and Sheldon L. Maram, eds., *Latin American Labor Organizations* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987), 78.

government when the dictatorship was imposed (including Oswaldo Aranha and Assis Chateaubriand) quietly returned to the fold.

#### WORLD WAR II

The year 1942 proved to be an important watershed for Vargas personally as well as for the dictatorship. En route to Rio's soccer stadium on May Day, the automobile carrying Getúlio and his wife was involved in an accident on the Praia do Flamengo in Rio de Janeiro; he fractured a number of bones and took several months to convalesce. His daughter Alzira and Foreign Minister Aranha more or less ran the government, clashing with Góes Monteiro, Dutra, and especially Felinto Miller, but managing to keep things on an even keel until Vargas returned. After his accident Vargas put on weight, taking up golf for exercise although he never seemed to enjoy it. He stopped writing in his diary after dutifully attending to it for twelve years.

Vargas delayed any decision about Brazil's role in the war for three years. During the second half of 1942, however, Nazi submarines had sunk 525 Allied ships in the Atlantic, making commercial shipping impossible and increasing American pressure for Brazil to join the Allies. When six Brazilian merchant ships were torpedoed in the Atlantic Ocean by the German navy between August 15 and 19, 1942, crowds in cities across Brazil attacked German and Italian-owned businesses and clamored for a declaration of war. In Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, crowds carrying American flags attacked suspected Axis sympathizers.<sup>44</sup> The war minister and General Góes Monteiro told Vargas that Brazil was not prepared to commit troops to any conflict, but he overruled them—he wanted the boost in international prestige that a combat role would bring. Brazil declared war on August 22. Right-wing advisors Francisco Campos and Francisco José de Oliveira Vianna were edged aside; now Vargas's speeches embraced democracy and exhorted Brazilians to support the war effort and to look to a future nation that would defend "fuller [citizen] rights, social justice, and human dignity."<sup>45</sup> He ignored the embarrassing fact that Brazil had entered the war against the

44. Late in 1995 a rumor spread widely in Brazil that "documents" had been discovered that showed that the Americans had sunk the ships, to force Brazil into the war, but none was ever cited or reproduced.

45. *Hora do Brasil* broadcasts, 1944-1945, cited by Joel W. Wolfe, *Working Men, Working Women: São Paulo and the Rise of Brazil's Industrial Working Class, 1900-1955* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993), 96.

Axis with a fascist constitution. The military command, which had unenthusiastically backed Vargas's declaration of war against the Axis, ultimately sent more than 25,000 Brazilian soldiers to Italy, where many of them fought in the bloody 1944 campaign at Monte Cassino. Vargas's son Luterio, a fighter pilot, also served in Italy. The Brazilian Expeditionary Forces lost 450 soldiers in combat.<sup>46</sup>

Brazil contributed to the war effort at home as well as in Europe. Vargas permitted American engineers to build airstrips throughout the country and especially in the Northeast, shoring up defenses against a possible Nazi invasion from Africa. Vargas agreed to let the heads of several rubber companies participate in experimental programs sponsored by the United States Department of Agriculture in several Latin American countries to find ways of improving yields and combating plant diseases. In early 1942 Vargas authorized the recruitment of an army of some thirty thousand "rubber soldiers" with the goal of producing sixty thousand tons of rubber per year.<sup>47</sup> Rubber workers were first recruited voluntarily from among refugees from the northeastern drought and then drafted outright, given the option of being sent to the Italian front or the Amazon. An undetermined number of rubber workers died from disease, and many deserted as soon as they could, escaping from the torrid rubber fields where they were worked to exhaustion. At least one government report, written by Dom Helder Cãmara, an Integralist during the 1930s and a progressive cleric later, castigated the program for harming the rubber workers.<sup>48</sup> On the other hand, some soldiers in the "rubber army" considered their assignment positive. In May 1943 a sergeant wrote to his fiancée in Ceará of his loneliness, but also of the fact that food was plentiful in the rubber fields, and that he was helping to ship boxes of oranges and bananas to feed the starving peasants in his home state. "If you come here," he wrote, "you will get fat just from eating fruits, your favorite food."<sup>49</sup>

46. See Getúlio Vargas, *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. 10 (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1938-1947), 244; Frank D. McCann, "Brazil and World War II: The Forgotten Ally," *E.J.A.L.* 6:2 (1995), 61.

47. See Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, "A organização de um serviço de guerra," speech given at DASP headquarters, Rio de Janeiro, August 3, 1943, in *Revista do Serviço Público*, 3:3 (September 1943), 13-20.

48. See *Panfletos*, which operated underground during the war and circulated legally after 1945, especially issues (undated) carrying a series of articles in 1946 by Odálio Amorim entitled "30,000 Côvas [Tombs] na Amazonia!"

49. Letter, First Sergeant José Paiva de Araujo, Alzaminia, to Maria José, May 31, 1943, in Brazilian National Archives, Rio de Janeiro.

The rubber campaign generated an intense debate in Brazil and, unlike most government programs, was opposed publicly by some influential members of the government. Valentim Bouças, the powerful editor of the *Estado Novo's Observador Econômico e Financeiro*, disparaged the way the program was being run, the defense was led by Felisberto Carmo, Vargas's head rubber administrator, who as a scientist had a much more accurate understanding of conditions and in the end was proved correct. Clandestine left-wing newspapers decried the program, which became a rallying cry for incipient nationalist feelings during the early 1940s that would come to maturity during Vargas's elected presidency.

Others opposed Brazil's entry into the war against the Axis. In 1941, a small group of armed forces officers conspired, unsuccessfully, to overthrow Vargas. His decision to back the Allies came after a secret meeting with Roosevelt aboard a United States Navy ship in the North Atlantic. As a result, Brazil became the only sovereign Latin American nation to send troops to fight. Nazi Germany had vainly attempted to win the alliance of both Mexico and Brazil, and, failing this, had developed plans for the military invasion of the Western Hemisphere in which troops would invade northeastern Brazil from Africa, then head north through the Caribbean to the Gulf Coast of the United States. In return for its alliance, Brazil received 70 percent of all United States aid given to Latin America during the war years. Washington used its new alliance with Rio de Janeiro to encourage Portugal's Salazar to join the United Nations against Germany.<sup>50</sup> Brazil hoped to boost its diplomatic influence in the hemisphere, long dominated by Argentina, and to win a permanent seat on the new United Nations Security Council. Argentina, in fact, had only declared war on the Axis in late March 1945, when Germany lay in ruins. But when the war ended, neither the British nor the Soviets paid heed to Brazil's wishes; Roosevelt had died, and Washington backed away as it lurched ahead toward the cold war and its more traditional concerns in Europe.

Sending Brazilian troops to fight in Europe sealed the fate of the authoritarian *Estado Novo* and moved the government to a new phase characterized by talk about democracy and activity to build a base of support for Vargas among industrial workers and the urban middle class. Affected by the cultural influence of the United States and wary of being identified with the *Estado Novo*, intellectuals began to distance them-

50. See Gerhard L. Weinberg, *The Greatest War: A Global History of World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 397.

selves from the regime, often resigning from posts they earlier had accepted eagerly. Law students in São Paulo organized against the regime. Many Brazilians had opposed the Estado Novo's cancellation of elections, and Vargas himself gave an interview on November 10, 1943, on the anniversary of the Estado Novo *golpe*, promising to call general elections when the war ended. In February 1945 Rio's *Correio da Manhã* defied the Estado Novo censors and published an interview with José Américo de Almeida (whose candidacy for the presidency had been sidelined by the Estado Novo coup) in which he called for elections. Within a month, most leading newspapers had stopped submitting articles to the DIP for approval, and in March Vargas closed the agency, although censorship continued on the state level well beyond the end of the war.

Early in 1945, Vargas, whom Frank had chided for "not trust[ing] the people," scheduled elections for December 2. Two national parties were created under government sponsorship: the Workers Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, or PTB) and the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrático, or PSD). Both named War Minister Dutra as their candidate, affirming, in so doing, that Vargas would step down as head of state. The PSD was based in the state political machines Vargas had nurtured, and was especially strong in rural and poor states. The PTB was organized by the Labor Ministry and dominated by *pelegos* (government honchos) loyal to Vargas if not to the Estado Novo. It sought to attract all workers, employed or not, and reach out to ordinary Brazilians not previously included in the political process.<sup>51</sup> The PTB became strong in some large cities (although curiously not in São Paulo) and in Vargas's home state of Rio Grande do Sul. São Paulo's reduced influence was accepted by its conservative representatives as a way to curb the potential power of its working-class voting bloc. The opposition União Democrática Nacional (UDN) formed around an anti-Vargas coalition of prodemocracy constitutionalists no longer in control of the state political machines, and affluent urban residents. The Allies, hostile to the Estado Novo, backed Vargas's enemies. Yet in some ways there was little promise of change. None of the new parties presented any clear-cut

\*

51. Barbosa Lima Sobrinho and Ivete Vargas, cited in da Rocha Lima, *Getúlio: Uma História Oral*, 154; Alexandre Marcondes Filho, statement to the press, September 1945, Marcondes Filho archive, CPDOC, Rio de Janeiro. See also Maria Celina D'Araujo, *Sindicatos, Carisma & Poder: o PTB de 1945-65* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1996).

ideological posture. Organizers within each of the three new parties came from within the state apparatus, a signal that the old clientelistic system was hanging on regardless of the trappings of representative democracy built into the new political system. The Communists, exhilarated by their newly granted legality, railed at the role of such men as Dutra and Goés Monteiro as "remnants of a putrid past," but few paid them any heed; nor did the poor, "the starving of the land, the victims of hunger" in PCB banners, rally any support.<sup>52</sup>

Vargas's endorsement of an open, populist political system estranged him from the military command and ended his fifteen-year-long alliance with it. Even if he knew that his days as chief of state were numbered, of course, he continued to go through the motions; when the first troops from the Brazilian Expeditionary Force returned home on July 18, 1945, he was wildly applauded as his automobile brought up the rear of the official welcoming parade. Six months earlier, at a New Year's Eve banquet of generals and admirals, Vargas had announced plans for a return to electoral democracy. Ironically, this was unsettling for some, including the United States State Department, which feared that Vargas would become a demagogue, like Juan Perón in neighboring Argentina, whom the Americans had wanted to oust.<sup>53</sup>

On October 28, 1945, Vargas named his brother Benjamim (Beijo), a lackluster, caustic man with a somewhat unsavory reputation, as the Federal District's chief of police and security, replacing João Alberto Lins de Barros, the old *renente* whose incumbency had again become a liability, just as in 1932 in São Paulo. Rumors flew through the military command that this was Vargas's first step toward keeping himself in power. Fortified by the return of officers who had served in Italy, the armed forces command, with the blessing of Dutra and Goés Monteiro, decided to depose Vargas.<sup>54</sup> The motorized troops of the Rio garrison were instructed by the high army command to take over the city. The next day, with army tanks surrounding the most important buildings in the capital, including the presidential palace, General Corderio de Farias, former interventor in Rio Grande do Sul and Getúlio's personal friend, de-

52. Everardo Dias, *História das lutas sociais no Brasil*, 2nd ed. (São Paulo: Ed. Alfa-Omega, 1977), 51; Ames, *Political Survival*, 107; Joseph A. Page, *The Brazilians* (Reading, Pa.: Addison-Wesley, 1995), 52-53.

53. See Thomas E. Skidmore, *O Brasil Visto de Fora* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1994), 207.

54. Stanley E. Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge, 1917-1947* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), 206.