Slave Resistance in Brazil: Bahia, 1807–1835
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From the day we left the shores
Of our father's land
We've been trampled on, Oh now
Now we know everything, we got to rebel
Somebody got to pay for the work
We've done, rebel.
Bob Marley, "Babylon System"

During the first half of the nineteenth century, Bahia, an area of Brazil known for its many sugar plantations, experienced a wave of slave revolts and conspiracies that profoundly marked the consciousness of those who lived in this period as well as their descendants. Throughout Brazil, Bahian slaves stood as a bad example to the slave class in the eyes of the protectors and beneficiaries of the slave order. Collective slave resistance had occurred before in the region, but slaves had never demonstrated such militancy as between 1807 and 1835. In this article, I will discuss how Bahia became an environment conducive to rebellion, who the rebels were, how they organized themselves, and what kind of politics dominated their lives and times. I will try to demonstrate how Africans from similar backgrounds organized their lives along ethnic lines and how ethnicity worked on the one hand as a fundamental aspect of slave resistance and, on the other hand, as a major obstacle to the development of slave class solidarity and to the success of slave rebellions.

THE SETTING

"... if African slaves are treacherous, creoles and mulattoes are even more so; and if not for the rivalry between the former and the latter, all political power and social order would crumble before a servile revolt. ..."
Luis dos Santos Vilhema, circa 1798.

"The division among Africans is the strongest guarantee of peace in Brazil's large cities."
Conde dos Arcos, Governor of Bahia, 1814.

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Bahia in the early nineteenth century underwent substantial socioeconomic, demographic and political changes which profoundly affected the nature of slavery and the composition of the slave class. These changes made slave life more difficult in terms of everyday living conditions, the ability to create a viable slave family, and the integration of individual freedmen in Bahia's polity. On the other hand, slaves and free blacks in Bahia, both in the cities and in the rural areas, probably did not feel lonely within a white-dominated world. On the contrary, their great numbers allowed them to retain a good deal of their African memories and to forge new cultural and organizational strategies of coping with class and ethnic oppression.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Brazilian sugar, the dominant export crop of Bahian plantations, experienced a great revival after a depression of over fifty years. The origins of this prosperity, like that of other colonial and dependent economies, lay primarily in transformations in world politics and economy, and in changes in colonial policies. The European wars, the disruption of the plantation society in Saint Dominique in the 1790s, and a world economic trend of prosperity all helped to enlarge Brazil's share in the international market. The colony was also favored by the Portuguese Pombalian reforms which better organized Atlantic commerce and established quality control of Brazilian export products. Internally, the decline of the southern mines ended the diversion of labor and capital to the mining region. Finally, the transference of the Portuguese court to Brazil and the consequent opening of the ports to international navigation further stimulated the colonial economy.1

This boom of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries occurred on a scale never before experienced. The number of engenhos (sugar mills) and the area allocated to sugar cultivation increased manifold, solidifying the power of the senhores de engenho (sugar mill owners), the local dominant class.2 As more slaves were needed and slaves were purchased with tobacco, this crop also prospered. It was also at this time that cotton became the third most important export crop.3

With the extension of cane fields and other export crops, land previously allocated to the growing of foodstuffs such as manioc and beans were taken away. Slaveowners wanted to utilize all available land for sugar cane and did not follow an old colonial provision that obliged the planting of 500 garden plots of manioc for each slave.4 As the famous "Brazilian system" of slave food supply, known and imitated in the Caribbean and other plantation areas decayed, the decline of subsistence agriculture provoked a severe food scarcity and pushed food prices upward. Concomitantly, wages of salaried groups fell consistently behind the prices of basic food items.5

The prosperity of export-agriculture adversely affected the slave class, probably intensifying exploitation. Vilhena, Lisboa and other colonial chroniclers and travellers commented on the extremely bad working and living conditions of slaves.6 A more significant testimony of these trends was offered by a group of

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slaves on a plantation in southern Bahia who rebelled around 1790. They wrote a unique peace treaty which denounced, among other things, the increase in the workload and the denial of access to subsistence gardens. Their manifesto clearly demonstrated that there had been a "better time," wiped out by the new wave of prosperity.  

Sugar prosperity lasted until the early 1820s, when Bahia suffered from economic marasmus, social violence and natural disasters, not to mention a greater incidence of slave rebellions. The economic depression of the 1820s and 1830s again revealed the limits of an economy dependent on foreign markets, as the expansion of Cuban sugar production and the development of sugar beets in Europe diminished economic opportunities. Tobacco and cotton agriculture also declined. Grown in the hinterland, cotton involved great transportation costs. The lack of good roads, coupled with the competition of U.S. cotton, destroyed the viability of the crop, while tobacco collapsed with the decline of the legal trade in slaves from Africa.

The turning point of the depression coincided with new political trends. In 1822 Brazil became independent. In Bahia, the Portuguese troops resisted for about one year and during the 1820s and 1830s the region was struck by a series of anti-Portuguese riots, military revolts and federal uprisings, all very characteristic of Brazil's early national era. With the explosion of Portuguese troops in July 1823, and the activities of anti-Portuguese crowds after that date, Portuguese merchants, the traditional financial suppliers of the planters, chose to leave Bahia. Their flight further increased the troubles of the sugar industry, and soon Bahian planters, who had fought the Portuguese from 1822 to 1823, found themselves petitioning for the safe return of Lusophile businessmen.

In this period Bahia was also hit by severe droughts. Masses of people fled the interior for the cities of Recôncavo and Salvador, Bahia's capital city. In March 1834, the council of the city of Cachoeira reported that the price of manioc flour, a basic item for the popular classes, had reached extreme figures and many people had already died from famine. Food prices were driven up by tremendous inflation, originating during the war when the Brazilian forces freely minted copper coins. After peace came, attempts at monetary control were made, but apparently many privileged Bahians shifted their economic activity from sugar production to the production of counterfeit money.

Clearly, the depression brought no relief to the slave population. After 1821, in spite of low sugar prices—and probably because of them—sugar production maintained roughly the pre-depression levels. But the decline of the slave trade provoked labor shortages and increased slave prices, which might indicate that fewer slaves were producing more sugar per capita. Of course, food shortages also worsened the slave diet. In 1845, a Bahian planter shamelessly confessed to a foreign traveller that, "in the interior... slaves are badly fed, worse clothed, and work so hard that their lives do not exceed six years." This
kind of treatment was certainly an important ingredient in the revolts of the period.

However, the effects of economic fluctuations in the creation of poor working and living conditions should not be accepted mechanically as causes of revolt. Poor treatment of slaves in Bahia was filtered through social and demographic conditions and the ways slaves dealt with their oppression, thus creating an ideal environment for the outbreak of rebellions.14

The tremendous influx of Africans and the natural demographic growth of the free colored population in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century created a sizable black majority in the Bahian population.15 Around 1798 Vilhena calculated the population of Salvador and the Recôncavo to be about 110,000 inhabitants, of which "only a third would be whites and Indians."16 A 1775 census of Salvador indicated that whites constituted thirty-six percent of a population of 35,253. Another census in 1807 indicated a decline in the proportion of whites to 27.8 percent of a population of 51,112. There were 4,207 free mulattoes, 3,630 free blacks and 14,696 slaves in Salvador in 1775. We do not have details for 1807, but the number of blacks, both slave and free, in Salvador had increased to 25,502. In the Recôncavo, slaves outnumbered whites even further. In 1814 a group of frightened slaveowners estimated that the 400 plantations of the area housed only six whites and mulattoes for every 100 slaves.17 After independence, with the flight of the Portuguese, the white minority had shrunk to less than a quarter of Bahía's population. In 1824 population figures for Bahía and the small neighboring province of Sergipe del Rey indicated that only 22.37 percent of 858,000 inhabitants were whites. The fast-growing group of free blacks and mulattoes represented 15.03 percent of that population and over 60 percent were slaves.18

If slaves constituted the majority of Bahía's population in the 1820s and 1830s, the majority of slaves were African-born and there was also a concentration of slaves from the same ethnic origins. Africans outnumbered creole slaves because the Brazilian slave population never achieved natural growth. This can be primarily explained by the lack of women in the slave population, a result of the pattern of slave trade which, on both the supply and demand sides, favored men. In addition, women fared proportionately better than men in the manumission process. A late colonial chronicler observed that the proportion of slave men to women was three to one.19 In her analysis of 582 urban slaves in the early nineteenth century, Mattoso found that men represented between 62.7 to 67.3 percent.20 Of course, the situation in the rural areas was worse. Besides impairing the "creolization" of the slave population, the lack of women also militated against the formation of a viable slave family. To make matters worse, I believe that there was a high degree of sexual endogamy, meaning that Africans took for their partners primarily Africans and perhaps Africans of the same area of origin. Given that the overwhelming majority of women were creoles, African men had fewer chances of finding sexual partners who were not creoles.21
The typical slave in Bahia in the nineteenth century was then male, young--life expectancy was very low--and African-born. In addition, he came from the Bight of Benin, which was undergoing profound political instability linked to the expansion of Islam in the area. In 1807, the Count of Ponte, Governor of Bahia, stated that Bahia had received 8,037 slaves in the previous year and most of them were Geges (Ewes), Ussas (Hausas), and Nagôs (Yorubas).\footnote{22} According to the British Foreign Office, out of a sample of 55,100 slaves imported into the region between 1817 and 1843, at least fifty percent came from the Bight of Benin.\footnote{23} Recent estimates have placed the total importation from this area between 1800 and 1850 as high as 301,500 slaves. Among these, Yorubans represented the single largest group.\footnote{24}

Bahia's demographic characteristics, especially the composition of the slave population, were instrumental in promoting African autonomy on the plantations and in cities of the region. The size of the slave class coupled with the growth of the free colored sectors prevented the isolation of plantation slaves. The rural areas were now peopled not only by slaves on one side and masters on the other, but also by increasing numbers of small cultivators, landless workers, and vagrants, who could not be effectively absorbed into a slave society.\footnote{25} In 1825 a Bahian chronicler observed that to the towns of the Recôncavo a racially and socially "heterogeneous" population converged on market day to sell their produce and "provoke quarrels, complaints, robberies, confusions and murders."\footnote{26} On market day, slaves from different plantations met each other and interacted with free people. The growing rural villages served as places for entertainment and rest from the master's rule. A zealous judge in the town of Maragogipe complained that slaves are found wandering in the streets and taverns of this village at any hour of the night, involved in African singing and dancing in houses where they form partnerships and have the pernicious freedom of living publicly and scandalously cohabiting in offence to the Religion of this Republic.\footnote{27}

The judge was especially upset with free colored people who rented houses to slaves. The presence of a sometimes marginalized free colored population living side by side with slaves represented more than a small challenge to the ability of the Bahian ruling classes to control them. The social environment of Salvador further complicated the task of the privileged.

In the urban environment of the busy seaport of Salvador, slaves and free colored people developed to the limits allowed by a slave society their creativity in devising strategies of survival, resistance, solidarity and struggle.\footnote{28} The lack of a sizable white population meant that blacks and mulattoes comprised the necessary pool of semi-skilled and skilled laborers. They, in fact, could be found in all positions of the labor structure. In a sample of 582 slaves, Mattoso found forty-two occupations.\footnote{29} They were street peddlers, domestic servants, stevedores,
blacksmiths, tailors and so on. Free and slave black women dominated the so-called small commerce to the disgust of the established merchants and government authorities. In the late eighteenth century, an irritated Vilhena noted that the black ganhadeiras, as these street peddlers were called, practically monopolized the distribution of fish, cooked foods and even contraband. Through an ingenious system of market speculation which they called carambola or cacheteira, which was organized in their quitandas (or small shops), they "gathered to sell everything." In 1839, when he visited Salvador, Kidder found these women in full activity despite the depression of the time.30

The male equivalent of the ganhadeiras were the negros de ganho or ganhadores. They worked primarily as stevedores and chair porters. The stevedores, of course, were fundamental to the sugar export business. Sedan chairs, on the other hand, constituted the most common means of transportation in Salvador, given its irregular topography which did not permit extensive use of carriages or even horses. Mulatto, creole and African tailors, surgeon barbers and entertainers also filled the streets of the city where they exercised their profession in the open air. The slave negros de ganho contracted with their masters to hand over a certain sum at the end of each daily or weekly working-journey. Theoretically, any money exceeding the sum contracted for could be kept by the slave. But the system was far from a paternalistic arrangement if we believe the observation of Spix and Martius who wrote that the condition of ganhadores was very sad, for "they are considered as living capital in action and, since their masters want to recover the capital invested, plus interest, they don't spare them."31 But the capitalist calculations of urban masters encountered certain limits governed by the ability of slaves, together with freedmen, to collectively forge their own work habits, institutions, and even a certain work rhythm.

African slave ganhadores, for example, once thrown into the urban labor market organized themselves into cantos, which were locations in the city where different groups of slaves offered their services. Each canto received the name of a particular district, plaza or street of Salvador. Their organization followed ethnic lines, with the Hausas, Ewes and Yorubans each belonging to their own canto. Each work group also had a leader called "captain of the canto," who functioned as the ultimate link between the slaves and the customers.32

In the cantos, Africans from the same ethnic origin forged new cultural values and collective solidarity. African Muslims used the meeting places to teach Arabic, spread the word of Islam and sew Muslim ritual garments, while waiting for the next customer. Together, slaves and free Africans worked, played, prayed and resisted the loss of their identity. Among themselves they forgot the Christian names given them by the master and instead called each other by their old or new African names. Some were only known by the name of the particular city in Africa from which they came, such as a certain Aprigio, known as Oyo or the slave woman Edum to whom everyone referred as "Ba" (Egba). Others, old and
new Muslims, had kept or adopted Islamic names. In groups of five or six they carried heavy burdens, singing and walking in that rhythmic pace that impressed visitors to Salvador. These Africans, noted a long-time foreign resident,

are extremely independent, they would rather lose the chance of gaining a wage than carry more than they think proper.

But earning money was not a small matter for individual slaves. It could mean, in the long run, a way out of captivity. The passage from slavery to freedom could be obtained through donation and, more frequently, through the purchase of a carta de alforria or manumission letter. Manumissions, however, did not benefit equally all sectors of the slave class. Masters generally favored Brazilian-born slaves, particularly mulattoes and women. It has been estimated that an average of between forty and fifty percent of letters obtained between 1779-80 and 1849-50 were bought by or donated to locally-born slaves, a proportion that did not reflect their number in the slave population.

But although Africans could not acquire their freedom as easily as creoles or mulattoes, many managed to amass enough money to free themselves. They also organized associations called juntas de alforria, which pooled money from freed and slave Africans and served as a kind of credit institution to buy the members' freedom. With the money in hand, slaves could generally count on the tradition of Bahian masters to free their bondsmen upon payment of their value. But no law existed during the first half of the nineteenth century to guarantee that masters would abide by this custom, and cases can be found of their refusal to do so. One such case, that of the Nagô slave Pacifico Licutan, happened in the context of the great 1835 revolt.

Licutan was a highly-respected elderly Muslim preacher. His African kinsmen and religious followers insisted upon buying his freedom at least twice, but Licutan's master systematically refused it. Some three months before the rebellion, Licutan was imprisoned and held in lieu of payment on a debt owed by his owner to the Carmelites. While in prison he always had his cell full of visitors who went there in search of his blessings. A week before the uprising, one of those visitors enigmatically told the Muslim elder that upon finishing the period of fasting he would be released. Accordingly, during the fight the rebels twice attempted to break into the municipal jail and release the esteemed prisoner. Licutan's story illustrates how the manumission question could eventually provide fuel for slave collective resistance.

However, it was mostly by creating a sizable group of freed Africans that manumission enlarged the parameters of resistance. Concentrated in Salvador and villages of the Recôncavo, this class of free Africans often played the role of captains of cantos, organizers of juntas de alforria and leaders of revolts. In the everyday life of Salvador, they lived, worked and celebrated festivals side by side with their slave brethren, as long as they
all belonged to the same "nation." Ethnicity obfuscated the slave/free dichotomy among Africans.

But in a tragic dialectic, the same ethnic identity that prevented the total absorption of the African into the white man's culture and that served as a basis for slave/free African solidarity, also hindered the development of slave class consciousness. The hostility between Africans and Brazilian-born people of color left a profound mark on the slave class. There is no better example of this than the creole slaves who revolted around 1790 and, among other demands, asked that the menial tasks of the plantation be done by African slaves. Recognizing this division or perhaps purely from need, the master class used creole and mulatto troops to control slaves. Vilhena observed the violence with which soldiers treated slaves in Salvador. And Africans retaliated in 1835 by proclaiming that they would kill all whites and creoles, and once victorious, utilize mulattoes as their lackeys.

Many contemporary observers maintained that the creation of a slave culture along ethnic lines checked the slaves' sense of deprivation and appeased their tendency to revolt. If rebellions occurred, they argued, they were caused by mistreatment. This explanation, however, lacks substance. The formation of a marginal work culture may have served as a means of adaptation and even accommodation to a slave society. But it also blurred the possibility of total objectification, idealized by the master class, and which theoretically lay in the essence of slavery. This represented in itself a form of resistance. Confronted with the overwhelming presence of Africans without families, the Bahian privileged classes did not succeed in involving the foreign slaves and freedmen in a web of paternalistic relationships. Had paternalism and a stable African family developed, ethnic and slave class solidarity would have been much weaker and slaves would have thought twice before endangering the lives of their beloved kin in violent confrontations. The only triumph possessed by the master class were ethnic tensions within the Bahian colored community, which impeded the formation of a broad alliance between the Afro-Brazilians, African-born slaves, and freedmen against the master class. Instead of an alliance, these social groups forged separate movements of their own. Creoles and mulattoes did strike in the course of this troubled period of Bahian history, but they rarely joined Africans in protest—the protectors of the status quo always managed to coopt Brazilian-born people of color against the Africans. It is these weaknesses and strengths of the rebels and the reality behind the revolts that I will discuss next.

THE REVOLTS

"It is true that times are not good."
Antonio Manoel do Bom Caminho,
Yoruba freedman, 1835
Slave revolts and conspiracies occurred in Bahia in 1807, 1809, 1814, 1816, 1822, 1824, 1826, 1827, 1828, 1830, 1831 and culminated with the great urban uprising of 1835.43 There is also evidence of conspiracies in Salvador and the Recôncavo in 1844 and 1845.44 In addition to these revolts, slaves also formed runaway communities, known in Brazil as quilombos or mocambos, some of which were directly involved in violent confrontations with the custodians of the slave society.

The first attempt at revolt in the early nineteenth century took place in 1807, during the government of João Saldanha da Gama, the Count of Ponte. The colonial governor, known for his intolerance toward slaves, unleashed systematic repression against quilombos in the vicinity of Salvador. In a letter to the Overseas Council, he guaranteed the Portuguese colonial body that, as a result of his actions, slaves now obeyed their masters "and freedmen paid much more respect to whites."445 Six weeks later, the discovery of a conspiracy in the capital proved him wrong.

The 1807 conspirators had planned to revolt on the 29th of May, the day of the religious festival of Corpus Christi. They intended to burn a building in a district in the northern limits of Salvador as a diversionary tactic and then proceed to seize ships in the port and escape to Africa. But the plot was denounced by a slave. The authorities later found out that the movement encompassed a sophisticated organizational hierarchy of leaders in each urban district and an agent, whom the rebels called "ambassador," responsible for contacts with slaves in the Recôncavo. The authorities confiscated bows and arrows, knives, pistols and a shotgun which, together with drums and good-luck charms or "mandingas," were taken as evidence. According to the reports, the slaves involved were Haussas. Two persons, one slave and one freedman, faced the firing squad and eleven others received 150 lashes each. After the 1807 plot the Count of Ponte became even more stringent, enacting laws prohibiting batuques (African gatherings for dancing and religious rituals) and restricting the geographical mobility of freedmen and slaves.46

The governor's energetic measures, however, did not prevent an actual insurrection in 1809. The stage of this rebellion was the Recôncavo, in the outskirts of the manioc-producing county of Nazaré das Farinhas. It involved mass slave flights from Salvador and sugar plantations and the formation of a quilombo. On January 4, 1809, an estimated 200 to 300 escapees tried to seize Nazaré, apparently in search of arms and supplies, but they did not succeed. Defeated and leaving many dead behind, they retreated to the woods where, two days later, troops sent from Salvador and local militiamen suffocated the rebels in a bloody battle. Many surrendered. The fate of the eighty-three men and twelve women captured is unknown.47

Although the main nucleus of the rebellion had been crushed, small groups of four, five and more fugitives still wandered throughout the Recôncavo for some weeks. Some may have travelled as far as the neighboring captaincy of Sergipe del Rey, where the authorities accused slaves from Bahia of fomenting an uprising.48
To prevent the seditious consequences of success by these primitive guerrillas, very strict ordinances were drafted. The district judge of the Recôncavo village of Maragogipe, for instance, ordered that all slaves should return to their masters or suffer whippings; he also established an early evening curfew, prohibited batuques, imposed fines against landlords who rented rooms to slaves and asked the governor's permission to enforce arrests and to shoot and kill blacks who resisted arrest.49 Those were typical measures of slave control under the Count of Ponte.

The 1809 rebellion established a threatening precedent at many levels. The majority of the rebels were again Hausas, but there were reports indicating the presence of Ewes and Yorubas among them. They displayed a capacity for organization and worked out an effective tactic of mobilization. However, above all, the uprising occurred in the economic heart of the captaincy, the Recôncavo, where the overwhelming majority of the slave population lived.

The third important revolt of the period happened under D. Marcos de Noronha, the Count of Arcos who governed Bahia between 1810 and 1818 and whom many considered too liberal on matters of slave control. The rebellion of 1814 overshadowed the previous ones in number of participants and violence. It started on February 28 among slave fishermen in Itapoan, a coastal district about two leagues north of Salvador. The rebels killed the foreman and members of his family, burnt down two engenhos and proceeded to the village of Itapoan. They planned to march on to the Recôncavo, but had their way blocked by troops sent from Salvador. After a bloody encounter the insurgents were defeated, losing fifty combatants on their side. Four slaves were later hanged in public and twelve deported to Portuguese colonies in Africa. This time the Hausas again constituted the majority among the insurgents. However, some slaveowners, upset with the governor's liberal stance, noted that a cross-ethnic alliance had existed.50

Slaveowners clearly preferred the Count of Ponte's style of slave control. If Ponte believed that the leniency of masters caused slave insubordination, Arcos maintained that it resulted from maltreatment. To the slaveowners that urged the repression of batuques, the colonial governor responded that African slaves were divided into several "nations" and to allow their cultural manifestations would only enhance their differences. Moreover, he argued, singing, dancing and ritual gatherings would make slaves "forget for several hours their sad status." Faithful to his approach to the problem, the Count, even after the 1814 uprising, permitted slave batuques in two sites in Salvador.51 For the slaveowners this policy represented an invitation to rebellion, since this cultural communion would increase African solidarity. And they pointed to the last insurrection as a proof of the ability of African "nations" to unite. In their petition to the governor, they showed a different picture than that painted by Arcos:
One can see the Negroes getting together at night on the streets as they did before; they talk in their idioms what they wish and continuously use whistles and other passwords. They even speak openly in our language of their revolts and comment on the events in Haiti which they know of and they speak revolutionary discourse to the point of saying that by St. John's day there would be not one white or mulatto alive.52

As a concession to the owners, the governor prohibited the use of firecrackers in that year's festivities of St. John's Day (Dia de São João), a measure that did not appease the slave masters. Interestingly enough, the slaves in a way grasped the split between the colonial state and the master class, and during the 1814 revolt they elected Arcos their "prince,"53 in the same fashion that many so-called primitive rebels everywhere considered the King the "Fount of Justice."54 But it goes without saying that the ultimate goal of Arcos, Ponte and the master class was one and the same: the maintenance of the slave society.

The differences between the Count of Arcos and the Bahian slaveowners reached a delicate point after the last slave rebellion of colonial Bahia. On February 12, 1816, following a religious celebration, slaves in the Recôncavo districts of Santo Amaro and São Francisco do Conde burned down several engenhos, attacked the village of Santo Amaro and killed a number of whites. The uprising lasted four days and terrorized the plantation zone until it was crushed by local militiamen and loyal slaves under the command of a planter, Colonel Jerónimo Muniz Fiuza Barreto, who later received the title of "Savior of the Recôncavo" for his actions.55 Immediately after the defeat of the insurgents (again Hausa slaves), the planters organized a meeting to evaluate the situation and put pressure on Arcos to abandon his strategy of slave control. In view of the governor's resistance, Brigadier Felisberto Caldeira Brant Pontes (a sugar planter, military governor, and future Marquis of Barbacena), wrote the central colonial government in Rio de Janeiro, in the name of the planter class:

Las Casas soliciting from the throne of Spain its royal mercy on behalf of the Indians and Wilberforce and others advocating in the English Parliament the extinction of slavery, are without doubt benefactors of mankind. . . . But that same language in the mouth of a Viceroy in Mexico or a Governor of Jamaica would provoke the murder of all Spaniards and Englishmen and would cause the execration of the universe. Such is, neither more nor less, our situation.56

He further regretted that in Bahia, "the negroes are the beloved sons of the Representative of the Sovereign."57 Placed between a rebellious slave class at the bottom and a colonial governor deaf to their complaints at the top, Bahia's planters undoubtedly advanced their class unity and refined their argument. Very soon their differences with the Portuguese state at other levels beyond
and probably more important than the question of slave control would lead to the movement of independence. For the moment, however, the planter's insistence apparently produced some immediate results. Although not convinced he had been wrong, the governor did enact some antislave legislation.58

The Count of Arcos left office in 1818 without having to face another slave revolt and confront the inevitable criticism. In fact, much of his last two years in power were spent suffocating the 1817 liberal revolution in Pernambuco, a movement that, because of its social implications, soon became a nightmare for the privileged classes of northeast Brazil.59 His efficiency in the repression of this movement, coupled with the absence of any important slave rebellion during Arcos' last two years as governor certainly helped to pacify the two factions in the debate over slave control.

The 1816 slave uprising was the last late colonial slave revolt in Bahia. Six years later the region would become the battlefield of a different struggle. Following the 1821 liberal revolution in Oporto, the return of D. João to Portugal and the attempts made to revoke the privileges Brazil obtained because of the presence of the court in the colony, a strong movement for Brazilian independence ensued. The independence of the country was peacefully declared in September. In Bahia, however, there was actual armed conflict between Brazilian and Portuguese troops. From the Recôncavo the Bahian planters successfully led the fight against the Portuguese who controlled Salvador.60

During the war (1822-23), the slaves rebelled on at least three occasions, but in revolts of a small scale. One revolt occurred in the village of São Mateus (February 1822), another on the island of Itaparica (June 30, 1822) and finally in December of the same year a number of slaves, in a move instigated by the Portuguese, attacked Brazilian forces. In the latter incident, more than fifty slaves captured were brutally executed.61 In general, notwithstanding, no important uprising took place in the course of the Brazilian-Portuguese conflict. Because of that, it has been argued that the bondsmen lost a good chance to rebel at a time when the white population was mostly divided.62 However, though not united, whites had never been so well-armed as in the period 1822 to 1823, a circumstance that probably did not escape the perception of the slaves.

In any case, the uncertain political situation that followed the war did affect slave discipline. In the 1820s Bahia experienced at least ten uprisings. The first movement of some importance in this decade was the insurrection of August 25, 1826, in the plantation district of Cachoeira. It was led by a certain "King of the Negroes" and was quickly put down.63 Later in that same year a more serious outbreak occurred. The December 1826 revolt involved the convergence of fugitive slaves to Piraja and the formation of a runaway community, the Quilombo do Urubu. On December 15, the rebels successfully attacked a village in the neighboring district of Cabula. Only two days later a party of thirty soldiers was sent from Salvador. The slaves, armed with
bows and arrows, knives, pitchforks, hatchets and spears, successfully resisted the first combat. But with the arrival of reinforcements, the government forces defeated the rebels in a violent battle. At the quilombo, only one black woman, Zeferina, was arrested. She confessed that the attack of Cabula had been planned only as a diversionary tactic to weaken the military strength of Salvador. In the capital, Africans intended to rebel on the 18th, but they did not, probably because the police immediately arrested several slaves, free Africans and even mulattoes accused of being involved in the plot. Of the punishment received by the rebels, it is only known that Zeferina and the would-be leader, Antonio, were condemned to forced labor. As for the ethnic profile of the insurrection, it was clearly Yoruba-dominated. The runaway hideout served as a site for a candomblé, a Nagô religious place, and among the objects seized by the authorities were arms, drums and several articles used in candomblé rituals.64

Between 1827 and 1831 a series of small slave uprisings disturbed the tenuous equilibrium of Bahia. With the exception of the urban skirmishes of 1830, these actions happened in sugar plantation areas. In 1827 two slave revolts are known to have taken place: one in Cachoeira on March 22, and another in Abrantes, whose date of suppression seems to have been September. The Abrantes uprising was comprised of a series of raids and robberies by organized runaways. More threatening was the Cachoeira rebellion. On the evening of March 22, the slaves of the Engenho da Victoria, owned by the wealthy planter and merchant Pedro Rodrigues Bandeira, rebelled and killed the foreman and his brother. Apparently, the slaves of three nearby engenhos, owned by Bandeira, also participated. The insurgents, however, were soon defeated by two regiments of cavalry and militiamen. Thirty slaves were arrested but their fate is unknown.65

Slave uprisings occurred again in Cachoeira on April 17 and 22, 1828. On June 15 of the same year, the southern Bahian village of Ilhéus suffered a revolt. In December yet another rebellion took place in the Recôncavo district of Santo Amaro. But the most serious outbreak of the year started in Pirajá on March 11. A group of Nagô slaves attacked several engenhos of the area and proceeded to the coast, where they stormed the buildings of Manoel Ignacio da Cunha, a former president of the province and victim of a previous revolt (1814). Some of Cunha's newly-arrived African slaves (negros novos) joined the rebel party which returned to Pirajá but never reached its destination. After a battle where twenty slaves were killed and eight soldiers wounded, the uprising was controlled.

After the Santo Armario revolt, the president of the province, the Viscount of Camamu, designed a plan of military aid for the Recôncavo, thus responding to numerous complaints from the region's residents. The plan, dated December 10, 1828, called for "more than seven hundred men effectively armed in several detachments very close one to the other."66 These measures were enforced by an order from the Minister of Justice on March 20, 1829.
In addition, the senhores de engenho, not entirely satisfied with the plan, declared their interest in helping to raise funds for more troops. But more military control did not prevent new incidents. As the president of the province realized, troops could not stop rebellions from occurring; their function was rather to prevent a general revolt. And the president was correct. On October 16, 1829, the slaves of three engenhos owned by the Colonel José Maria de Pina e Mello, burned a sugar mill and killed three people before local militiamen and civilians were able to control the situation. After this outbreak still another revolt took place before the end of the year, probably in November.

In 1830, the arena of rebellions shifted from the rural areas to the city of Salvador. Early in the morning of April 10, about twenty negros de ganho assaulted three hardware stores, supplied themselves with fifteen swords and long knives, and attacked a warehouse that served as a slave market. There, more than 100 Yoruba negros novos joined the insurgents and some eighteen of them were punished with death because they refused to get involved. Augmented in their numbers, the Africans tried to invade a police station, killing a soldier in the process. The garrison resisted the attack until more soldiers joined them, putting down the revolt. Defeated, the Africans were pitilessly lynched by the policemen and the populace. This uprising has been explained as a rehearsal for a better organized revolt scheduled to start on April 13, but it has not been shown why the latter was preceded by an almost suicidal action three days before.

In the course of the five years following 1830, it would be the free and freed people who would contribute more constantly to the political agitation in Bahia. These movements included anti-Portuguese riots, secessionist revolts, military rebellions and free mulatto and black creole movements of protest. But although free peoples' agitation dominated the early 1830s, slave insurrections never disappeared. In addition to military revolts which seriously jeopardized the security of the province, the national government was in the process of cutting federal spending, including provincial defense budgets, in order to overcome financial crisis. Bahian presidents opposed such cuts systematically and their argument, of course, invariably rested on the slaves. In October 1831, upon receiving orders from the Minister of War to disband the cavalry troops, President Barros Paim rebutted:

It is indispensable to have some cavalry troops here in order to help crush promptly any movement of slaves for, because of their great number, even the smallest uprising . . . becomes very dangerous in this region.

Fortunately for the slave system, the cavalry was maintained. It would prove its value four years later, in 1835, when Bahia experienced the most organized slave uprising of its history.

The revolt of January 24–25, 1835, best known as the malê or Muslim revolt, was basically an urban affair. Planned to begin
at dawn on January 25, the day of Nossa Senhora da Guia, the revolt was denounced some hours before by a freed Nagô woman, Guilhermina Roza de Souza. Guilhermina knew about the plot from her husband, also a Nagô freedman, who had been informed by sailors in the port. She received additional information from her comadre Sabina da Cruz, a Nagô freed washerwoman, whose husband was involved in the seditious movement, and who could tell of a house on Guadalupe Street, in the heart of the city, where some of the rebels had a meeting.\footnote{73} Informed of the situation, the president of the province ordered the chief of police to carry out investigations and increase patrols in the city. A group of civilians, soldiers, loyal slaves patrolling the Ladeira da Praça and Guadalupe streets arrived at a suspicious-looking two-storyed building owned by the mulatto tailor Domingos Marinho de Sã Falcão. Domingos lived on the first floor with his mulatto companion, Joaquina de Santa Anna, a son and his Nagô slave, Ignacio. He rented the loja or basement to two manumitted Africans, the Nagô Manoel Calafate (Manoel the Caulker) and Aprigio, Nagô-Oyo, a bread peddler. Asked if there were Africans gathered in his basement, Domingos denied it. But upon the insistence of a neighbor of his, the soldiers forced their way into the loja. Suddenly a group of about sixty blacks left the place shooting and shouting "kill the soldiers." The revolt had begun.\footnote{74}

The Africans easily overcame their opponents and headed to the municipal jail only a few blocks away, where Pacifico Licutan, the old Muslim slave, was held prisoner. They unsuccessfully attempted to invade the jail. Repelled, they attacked the guard of the government palace in the same square. From there they proceeded south, knocking at the doors of other conspirators and shouting their names. Midway to the elegant Victoria Street, another group joined the original party. Together they attacked the fortress of São Pedro, which garrisoned the artillery troops, suffering their first serious losses in the attack. They then returned downtown, struck another barracks in Mouraria and proceeded to the palace square, where they attempted once again to capture the jail, but without success. They attacked one more police station before converging on Agua de Meninos, where the decisive and final battle with the Municipal Cavalry took place. Here, after more than fifteen minutes of fighting, many blacks were killed and wounded. Others surrendered. Some who attempted to escape by swimming either drowned or were killed by the sailors of a war frigate strategically sent to the waters close to the cavalry barracks. Many Africans escaped into the woods and hills surrounding Agua de Meninos.

The last, poignant action of this rebellion occurred early on the morning of the 25th when six slaves, armed with pistols, spears and knives, burnt their master's house and were said to have attempted to reach Agua de Meninos. Halfway to their destination they were killed. The legal forces now had complete control over the situation. During the revolt, official reports claimed, over fifty Africans, five soldiers, and two civilians died.\footnote{75}
The inquiries that followed the 1835 revolt produced an abundance of data which allow us to analyze more closely the organization, leadership, participants, ideology and a few other aspects of slave life not discussed in the first part of this article.

There is no doubt that the rebellion was planned and executed by Muslim Africans, slaves and freedmen. To begin with, they fought in the streets wearing Muslim costumes to which the authorities referred as "war garb." Many had protective charms or papers with Muslim prayers around their necks and in their pockets. At the loja subletted by Manoel Calafate and Aprigio the police found ritual garments, a banner, rings, "four small books written in Arabic," handwritten papers, and two sheep, probably for sacrificial purposes. The leadership reflected the religious hierarchy. Muslim teachers or mestres in at least three cases were old Africans respectfully called "fathers." Manoel Calafate, for example, was undoubtedly a preacher and a participant in the uprising. According to court records, officials found in his loja a pole with a white cloth crossed with velvet, as if forming a banner, with three small bags made of leather and cloth. The black Ignacio declared that in front of the banner an oath was taken that they would not die in bed, but with Father Manoel Calafate.

Another religious man, Pacifico, known in the African community as Licutan, declared in court that his African name was Bilai. Irritated, the judge stated that to his knowledge, Pacifico's name in African was Licutan. The slave courageously responded that he could choose whatever name pleased him. The authorities lost sight of the fact that "Bilai" was, and is a very common Muslim name. Defeated on the battlefield, Pacifico (or Licutan, or Bilai) defied with dignity his oppressors in court. He simply declared that in the "white man's land he had never seen the 'Arabic papers' shown to him." To say that Islam profoundly influenced the 1835 rebels is not to say that all African Muslims participated in the revolt. The authorities of the time, however, concluded that any African known to be a Muslim necessarily took part in the rebellion. Later students, more recently Pierre Verger, elevated the outbreak to the dimensions of a holy war which reproduced in Bahia the jihads of the same period in West Africa. The Arabic papers recently translated by Monteil and Reichert give no evidence to support the idea that a jihad was fought in Bahia in 1835. The papers only contained verses from the Qur'an or were good-luck charms, although some included strong millenarian proclamations. One of them read: "Victory comes from God. Victory is close. Good News for the believers." Nevertheless, the Muslim function in the revolt could be approached from a different angle other than the expectation of reading revolutionary declarations between the lines of religious
writings or emphasizing the question of direct influence of external, even if holy wars.

The function of the Muslims was basically organizational. The African Muslim community in Bahia, composed of disciplined and dedicated believers, offered an example of cohesiveness and resistance that other Africans were able to emulate. Africans without a family, without a home, without economic or other security and despised by the white element, found in Islam a means to discipline their bodies and minds. Thus organized, their sense of deprivation transcended the individual to reach the collective level. Evidently, even when religious in character, when Africans joined to perform their ritual, in a society decisively hostile to African associative manifestations, they were acting politically, in the sense that they were contrasting their ability to organize, and therefore their power, against the situation of their disrupted lives. This political dimension, always to be understood in the context of power in a slave society, did not escape the perception of the guardians of the slave system. The president of the province declared that it "was undeniable that they had a political goal, because there is no evidence that they stole any house, or secretly killed their masters." Religious organization and leadership, of course, permeated the Africans' attempt at seizure of power. In Hobsbawm's terms, religious was also the language of the movement.

Religion had played a role in previous Bahian rebellions, namely in 1816 and 1826 and in the 1807 conspiracy. Islam itself has been suggested as the force behind all Hausa-dominated outbreaks. But our knowledge of the religious content in those rebellions is vague. Of course, we can assume that supernatural protection always influenced the decision of slaves to rebel. The 1835 uprising, on the other hand, very clearly followed a period of intense religious activity which apparently involved massive conversion to Islam. This phenomenon is evidenced by the Arabic papers seized by the authorities. Some of them were written by very educated Muslim hands, but many were copies of passages of the Qur'an and Islamic verses painfully sketched by neophyte Mohammedans. Therefore, many of the fighters of 1835 were ardent recent converts.

Nevertheless, the rebels were not religious fanatics. If they were, one would have expected them to attack at least one of the dozens of Catholic churches of Salvador in their struggle against the infidels. This did not happen. They attacked secular symbols and guardians of the status quo. They attempted to obtain arms supplies from the several barracks they struck. Concerning their ultimate goal, very little is known. "Mysterious" Arabic papers revealed little. Towards the end of February 1835, Albino, the Hausa slave of a Bahian attorney, translated some of the latter, providing only explicit evidence linking these writings to the plans and the immediate purpose of the insurgents, but since the originals have not been found, it is impossible to determine his accuracy. In any case, according to Albino the plan was to unite slaves of Salvador with slaves of neighboring engenhos in Cabrito.
and kill "everybody in the white man's land." Some papers designated paths that could be used by the rebels without harm; one of them was signed by a certain Mala Abakar, the commandant of the whole operation. Albino's testimony had some consistency—perhaps too much consistency—with other sources of information. Guilhermina's husband, for example, denounced the aim of the uprising as an attempt "to take over the land, killing whites, cabras and creoles . . . leaving the mulattoes as their lackeys lackeys and slaves."88 One witness declared to have heard the war cry of the rebels: "death to the white, long live the Nagô."89 Long live the Yoruba, not the Muslims. Nevertheless, this provides little evidence to evaluate the kind of society Bahia might have become under the rule of the Nagôs.

Most Africans prosecuted were Yorubas, probably reflecting the pattern of the slave trade at the time. But a variety of other ethnic groups were also represented, including the two mulattoes who lived in the house where the uprising started.90 Ethnic tensions were not lacking in the context of 1835. Although not as profound as the African-Creole differences, the African community was also divided. Many non-Yoruba Africans denounced the Nagô to be proud and to despise other slaves. The Hausa freedman, Domingos Borges declared, "he hated those peoples [the Nagô] and didn't have business with them."91 Besides ethnic tensions, the movement of Islamic conversion also created divisiveness. For example, Carlos, a Yoruba slave of Ijebu origin, said that

the Nagôs who know how to read and are associated with the insurrection neither shook the hands of the others, nor treated them well, calling them kafir [atheist] with disdain.92

The literate Nagôs were Muslims who most certainly found themselves to be superior to the majority of their kinsmen who still practiced the traditional Yoruba religion of the Orishas. Of course, Christian slaves were not spared from Muslim criticism.

Muslims accused the slave Marcelina, for example, of adoring wood in the altar, for the "[Catholic] images are not saints."93 Evidently, the words of Africans in court should be considered with care. But even so, the consistence and multiplicity of their arguments uncover the tensions undermining the African community.

Court records also shed light on other pressures facing the African community of Salvador, such as the tense interaction between whites and Africans. Salvador was not characterized by racial segregation of its inhabitants. Slaves, of course, generally lived in the basement of the same houses their masters occupied, when they did not rent rooms from fellow free Africans. The latter lived in districts and streets where white "citizens" of various social positions resided as well. The governmental palace, the city house, the municipal jail, the military barracks, the cathedral were all located only a few steps from the houses of Africans. Actually, Bahia's capital fit almost perfectly Hobsbawm's "ideal" insurrectionary city:
In the ideal insurrectionary city the authorities—the rich, the aristocracy, the government or local administration—will . . . be as intermingled with the central concentration of the poor as possible.94

I believe this is a fundamental parameter in the analysis of Salvador as structurally conducive to urban disorder. The absence of geographical racial segregation certainly enhanced the Africans' perception of deprivation. Although not isolated spatially, Africans were supposed to respect their white neighbors—whoever they might be—as their superiors. On one hand, this situation fed racial tensions and constituted an important factor of insurrection. On the other hand, it gave repression a privileged position in terms of information about the lives of Africans. During the prosecution proceedings, white and Afro-Brazilian witnesses were able to give more or less precise information about the habits, behavior and characters of their African neighbors. From behind the windows of their houses they could see who lived with whom, who visited whom, who organized batuques, who behaved adequately and who was "uppity" toward whites.95 This closeness eventually helped the authorities to carefully direct repression against the African community, especially the free African element.

After 1835, a war was declared against the Africans. Five were condemned to face the firing squad, and dozens of others received sentences of up to 600 lashes, life imprisonment with forced work, deportations and so on. Free Africans were deported in great numbers and many others returned to Africa spontaneously so as to escape the climate of terror imposed on the African community. Manumitted Africans could no longer freely rent houses, organize batuques, participate in candombês or be Muslims. The authorities prohibited the importation of drums, "war drums" as they viewed them, and controlled trips to and from Africa.96 The repression of the free Africans was defended by the president of the province on the following grounds:

. . . since the African freedmen were not born in Brazil, and have a language, customs and even religion different from the Brazilians', and since by the latest events they have declared themselves the enemies of our political existence, [they] therefore must never be considered Brazilian Citizens and enjoy the guarantees offered by the constitution.97

Nevertheless, free Africans were more "Brazilian" than the president could realize. First of all, their own civil status as freedmen presupposed long years of bondage in Brazil until enough money could be earned to pay for a letter of manumission. Even if they received free manumission, that meant a certain period of loyal services to the master and a degree of assimilation into the white man's ways. Many freedmen even became slaveowners. For example, the Nagô Gaspar da Silva Cunha, a tailor deeply involved in the 1835 insurrection, owned a Congo slave called José, who was
also a tailor. José declared that he did not have permission to participate in Muslim gatherings with his master because "he was a slave and contraband to the others."²⁸ Apparently Gaspar played his role of master as any white man would.

African freedmen were "Brazilians" in other ways, too. Take the question of naming practices. Among the Africans prosecuted in the first district of Salvador there were fifteen freedmen of which only four had African names—eleven could only be identified by their Christian names. In contrast, all seven slaves prosecuted carried African names; not one slave was known only by the Christian name.²⁹ If we take the naming practice as a measure of cultural assimilation, the conclusion would be that freedmen were more distant from their roots. The possession of Christian names and surnames probably constituted a symbol of African achievement in the slave society, and since freedmen borrowed their last names from former masters, that meant a continuation of dependency through other means.

Free Africans like Gaspar and Belchior da Silva Cunha were privileged individuals within the African community. Both had been manumitted by their deceased master, Manoel da Silva Cunha. Gaspar was a tailor and owned a Congo slave, and Belchior was a mason who owned a house, part of which he rented to Gaspar and other Africans. Both lived with women. Yet, Belchior was an active member of the Muslim community and little doubt exists that he participated in the 1835 revolt. Gaspar, on the other hand, was learning to write Arabic: he was a neophyte Muslim. Why did these men join the rebellion? Far from being an academic question, this same puzzle intrigued Belchior's companion Agostinha:

She told Belchior that he had come from his land as a captive and became a freedman here; and that the whites didn't molest [him]; and that one earned his money, ate and drank—this is why she said Belchior had never had the inclination to go to war...²⁰

But the fact was that he did make war against the white man. Why?

The recent literature on slave resistance in the New World and even the literature on social movements in general has shown that the leaders of rebellions have usually been the most "Europeanized elements." Fanon's analyses of African colonialism, for example, have suggested that the subjugated native adopted European standards to judge himself—but by these standards he is usually found wanting. Liberal scholars such as Oberschall have completely dismissed the theory of the marginal-man leadership. More specifically in the area of slave collective resistance, James noted that the leaders of the Saint Domingue revolution were those who profitted most from "the cultural advantages of the system." Mullin's competent analysis of Gabriel Prosser's conspiracy concluded that there was a direct connection between acculturation and slave revolt.²⁰¹ More graphically and in his peculiar clarity, Sidney Mintz wrote:
The house slave who poisoned her master's family . . . had first to become the family cook. The runaway slaves who created viable communities . . . needed to learn the techniques of cultivation in an alien environment. And the slaves who plotted armed revolts in the marketplace had first to produce for the market, and to gain permission to carry their produce there.102

In short, resistance presupposed a certain degree of integration into the slave society. The more integrated the slave, the more tense his relations with the oppressors as a result of his dubious status. The African freedmen were located in the extreme of this spectrum. A man like Gaspar, for example, sought refuge in Islam in order to overcome this contradictory status. It was resistance to being further absorbed subordinately into the "white man's land" that led him to Islam, and not the latter which led to resistance. Religious communion, however, made his outrage collective.

The key role played by sometimes privileged African freedmen in 1835 and in previous rebellions has misled students of these movements on important issues. It is on the basis of the pro-
jihads argument: the revolt was fought both by slaves and freed-
men, therefore, it does not qualify as slave revolt. In an otherwise valuable review of the literature, R. K. Kent affirms that African resistance will only be understood through a minute research of "intra-African" relations. Thus he dismisses marxists who, without any further analysis, considered the rebellious instances of "class struggle." But Kent's assertion that the "class struggle" model does not explain the mulâ revolt because some of the Muslim leaders constituted a privileged group is as simplistic than the vulgar marxism that he attacks.103 A much more serious challenge to the "class struggle" argument, and this time a challenge from within the marxist community itself, would be the question of whether the Africans in Bahia represented a class or not; or a more general question on whether slaves—and for that matter any pre-industrial, subordinated "class"—can be viewed as a class.104

There are at least two more or less established routes that one could follow to discuss those questions. One would be the identi-
fication of slaves as a class only in the sense that they held a specific position in the slave relations of production, that their surplus labor was appropriated by the master-class in a specific fashion akin to the slave mode of production and last, but not least, that their juridical status involved the masters' property rights over them. In this case, the concept of a slave class is arrived at as a result of a theoretical construct. It only means that slaves formed a class in itself. Another route of analysis would require that the concept of class include the existence of class consciousness. In this sense the members of a class must recognize their membership in that class and the interests that hold them together against other classes; in other words, they must constitute a class for itself.105 Slaves in Bahia, of
course, can be said to have been a class in the first meaning of the term. However, as we have seen, slaves were profoundly influenced by ethnic allegiance. Creole slaves never participated in African slave rebellions. Besides, slave and free Africans often rebelled as Hausas or Yorubas—"long live the Nagô" was the slogan heard in the streets of Salvador in 1835. It seems that Africans fought their battles as an ethnic group, not as a class. Therefore, they do not qualify to be called a "class" in the second usage of the term. Should we then exclude the idea of a "class struggle?" I do not think so. First, by the same token that "class" can serve as a heuristic concept to discuss pre-capitalist people, "class struggle" properly qualified may also serve to identify their struggles. In addition, I agree with E. P. Thompson's argument that in concrete historical experience, the concept of class must be derived from, and not precede the process of class struggle. Thus there is the possibility of "class struggle" without the existence of a mature class, of class for itself.

Africans in Bahia constituted the majority of the slave class, and the majority of Africans throughout the first half of the nineteenth century were slaves. Although this quantitative measurement is important, it should not mystify us. The quality of the slave class is of greater importance. It was foreign and its culture could not be directly traced to the slave experience in the New World. The slave experience was understood, reacted to and in some sense transformed by means of a tense interaction between live African cultural symbols and institutions and the "white man's" culture. The African trajectory in Bahia unavoidably impaired the flourishing of a "slave consciousness" as such, of a consciousness immediately derived from the position of slaves in the social relations of production. But, ironically, this was the force behind the greater militancy of Bahian slaves and it helped produce a "hotter" class struggle.

POSTSCRIPT: THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF SLAVE RESISTANCE

[The Brazilian population is divided between two classes], the masters and the slaves. . . . There exists a third, the free proletariat; but this is relatively few in number, and in reality compromised by both others. . . . The class of masters concentrates all political influence in Brazil. . . . If the proletarian as a class has little importance, it is also true that they are free men, and have no grounds for complaint because they possess all the constitutional rights and privileges, without any bias whatever of caste, color or custom.

Two great interests tend to reunite and conglomerate all the members of an association so constituted . . . the sentiment of nationality, and the need to conserve dominion over the slaves.

Correio Official (Rio de Janeiro, 1833).
After independence in 1822, Brazil became a nation politically divided by competing groups, each with its project of state-building. The presence of a growing class of free people lent fuel to the tensions of the period. With liberal elements and dissenting elite members appealing for the following of the free masses and the latter's own dissatisfaction with their reduced chances in a slave social formation, social tensions exploded in conflicts, especially between 1830 and 1840. Bahia was no exception in this era of turmoil. This situation expressed disunity within the privileged classes and the Brazilian free classes as a whole—and slaves did not miss this chance to revolt. Nevertheless, we must not put too much emphasis on it. If political instability did influence post-Independence slave revolts, it cannot explain the rebellions and conspiracies of 1807, 1809, 1814 and 1816. Perhaps it can explain their frequency; compared to the four revolts of pre-Independence Bahia, after 1822 there occurred at least fourteen uprisings and conspiracies.

It is true, as Morton has argued, that African slaves never rebelled when the differences within the free classes reached the point of armed conflict and rioting. But it is also possible to argue that the climate of social disorder in Bahia never ceased to exist in one single year between 1822 and 1839. Moreover, to conclude that the slaves lost their best opportunities to revolt in this period is to expect unlimited resourcefulness from the slave class. It is to assume that bondsmen and their free African allies were always ready to initiate planned, articulated and violent collective resistance. However, I believe that the question of the timing of slave revolts can be better approached from a different angle.

The timing of slave rebellions and conspiracies was not directly related to the dealings of conventional politics but rather to the relations which took place at the level of civil society. This resulted from the nature of the state in a slave social formation which denied bondsmen any political existence. Slaves had very limited or no access to the state apparatus. Individually, they could petition to the authorities against masters who continually abused their power, especially in the context of urban slavery, but one can imagine the risks implicit in such actions. Evidently, they were not allowed to act collectively before the law. More often, their "introduction" to the state came through the agents of law enforcement, i.e., the police. The function of the police as guardian of public order meant the repression of slave collective association in their batuques and religious gatherings and, at the individual level, it meant control of each slave when outside the direct power of the masters or when the slave was in public. But if the police were the tool of collective control, at the individual level it was still the power of the master that counted.

Rebellions and conspiracies being the result of the sum and synthesis of individual will and outrage, they tended to occur at times when relaxation of collective and personal control met. The degree of collective control was undermined by the constant social
agitation and barracks' revolts in Bahia between 1822 and 1838. It is at this juncture that a more precise causal relationship between political instability and slave revolts can be established. Nevertheless, personal "decontrol" constituted the fundamental factor in the timing of slave uprisings.

As the president of the province realized by 1831, slave "disorders" tended to happen with more frequency during religious festivals, especially at Christmastime. On these occasions, slaves usually had their days off while masters were investing their time in feasts and celebrations of their own. The lack of master cultural hegemony over the African meant that slaves shared those auspicious dates with their own folk, separated from their owners. On such occasions, slaves met other slaves and free Africans, celebrated their own festivals and batuques, and talked and sang about their grievances against the system. Eventually, they also planned and executed rebellions. Violent resistance to be sure did not mean a complete break with the rhythm of festive activities of the African community. It was rather the continuation of the exercise of slave collective power, of slave "politics" by other means. In addition, at such times the free population was relaxed, generally concentrated in one place, transformed into seemingly easy victims. Thus, in Bahia, and in other areas of the New World as well—e.g., New York in 1712, Antigua in 1736, Jamaica in 1831—revolts tended to be scheduled for Christmastime and other holidays or Sundays. In sum the timing of the most extreme political act of slaves, the revolt, greatly disregarded the politics of the state and designed its strategy in coordination with the calendar of civil society.

If there was a politics of slave resistance, it also had its "economics." This question can basically be treated from two perspectives: on one hand, there was the general state of the sugar business in Bahia and, on the other hand, there was the material and human resources required by any planning and execution of an uprising.

As I discussed in the first part of this article, Bahia experienced an era of sugar prosperity, followed by a depression during the late eighteenth and the first four decades of the nineteenth century. Throughout this period, the demands of sugar production and the crisis of subsistence agriculture adversely affected the lives of the slaves. Work routine probably became more intense and slave diet worsened, especially during the 1820s and 1830s. This situation, of course, was more intimately related to plantation life. However, it cannot be forgotten that the city was organically linked to the rural areas. More sugar meant more activity in the port, more sugar crates and rum barrels to carry, more boats to be sailed, more people using sedan chairs and so on. Nevertheless, overexploitation alone cannot account for slave revolts as it did not in other plantation societies of the New World, which leads us to the second level of the "economics" of collective resistance.
Though the heart of the sugar export-economy lay in the Recôncavo, it was the city of Salvador that presented the best structural conditions for the organization of the most organized rebellions. In the city the presence of free Africans offered slaves an infrastructure for resistance. Any planning, proselytism and mobilization could not be done without the freedmen's relatively wide capacity for geographical mobility. Nor could slave plots be arranged without the use of the freedmen's houses as meeting places, arms and money hiding sites, hideouts for fugitive slaves and as locations for cultural, social and religious interaction. In addition, there was the role of the various skilled people whose trades as blacksmiths or carpenters, for example, could provide the rebels with arms; and the religious "specialists" who furnished amulets for protection and who on many occasions constituted the leadership. This wealth of material and human resources stood as a powerful symbolic weapon as well. On one hand, the multiplicity of the African slaves and freedmen's economic roles in the city demonstrated the profound dependence of the society on their labor; on the other hand, it symbolized the possibility of an independent life without the masters' rule. This last point is fundamental. No subordinated class tries to destroy a given social order without feeling prepared to replace the old order. This symbolic possibility of an alternative society could hardly flourish in the specialized environment of the engenhos. The latter, however, represented the determinant nucleus of the slave system.

The fact that the Recôncavo constituted the basis of power in Bahia did not escape the judgment of many conspirators. It was on the plantations that the bulk of the slave population resided and it would be only from there that a decisive blow against slavery could come. Accordingly, in many of the revolts of this period the insurgents attempted an articulation between the city and the rural areas. But the response from rural slaves was limited, therefore impairing the development of a general uprising.

African slaves and freedmen faced enormous difficulties which blocked the success of their revolts—their differences with creoles, intra-group tensions and so on—but the greatest of these was the nature of the enemy. The Africans were facing an enemy who, though divided in its ranks, succeeded in organizing a "Brazilian front" against them. Class control in Brazil was not a tenuous arrangement like in Haiti with its high rate of absenteeism. In Brazil the master class was struggling for the maintenance of a hegemony which had profound roots. It was building a state in order to command, it had a national project and it successfully isolated the areas of tension and conflict, to impede a coalition of its critics. Slavery, of course, was built on the basis of such success. The presence of slaves checked the political ambitions of the free subordinated classes, and the presence of the latter restrained the revolt of the slaves. The tensions and conflicts of both sectors curbed the disintegration of Brazil in a period of secessionist tendencies. The privileged classes became more and more united under the threat of "bottom-up"
"anarchy." Bahia's slave revolts and conspiracies between 1807 and 1835 occurred in this broad Brazilian historical context. Throughout, the question of slavery was there, but the Africans in Bahia proved that this question was not only one of maintaining the "sacred" institution of property, but one of securing and putting to work a troublesome property, slaves who resisted being objectified through a variety of forms, including collective violence.

NOTES

This paper was originally written in 1980.
2Morton, op. cit.
8See Mattoso, "Os Preços na Bahia," pp. 181-182, for a
periodization of the Bahian economy between 1750 and 1850.

9Petitions by the planters of the Recôncavo to the president of the province, May 19, 1831. Arquivo do Estado da Bahia (hereafter AEBa), Presidência da Provincia (hereafter PP), Levante de 1831: Abdicação do Imperador, maço 2867. For the social movements of the period see João José Reis, "A elite baiana face os movimentos sociais: Bahia, 1824-1840," Revista de Historia 54:108 (1976), pp. 341-384.

10AEBa, pp. Câmara de Cachoeira, 1824-1835, maço 1269.


12Sugar prices fell drastically after 1823, but production was maintained; see Morton, op. cit., Appendix 2, p. 383. Sugar prices revived briefly in 1826-27, after two years of many revolts in the plantations.


16Vilhena, A Bahia no século XVIII, 1, pp. 55, 503, 505.


22Accioi, Memorias 3, p. 228, n. 26.


reflux de la traite des négres entre le Golfe de Bénin et Bahia de Todos os Santos (Paris, 1968).


28 On Salvador see Azevedo, O povoamento, and in particular Katia Mattoso, Bahia: a cidade do Salvador e seu mercado no século XIX (São Paulo, 1978).


31 Spix and Martius. Viagem 2, (p. 141).

32 Raymundo Nina Rodrigues, Os africanos no Brasil (São Paulo, 1932), pp. 156-157.


34 James Wetherall, Stray Notes from Bahia (Liverpool, 1860), p. 54. Emphasis was given in the original text. In Roll Jordan Roll (New York, 1974), Book 2, Part 20, Eugene Genovese discusses the collective and rhythmic nature of slave labor as a form of checking overexploitation.


36 In 1837, for example, a slave woman petitioned the president of the province to oblige her master to accept her self-purchase: President Francisco de Souza Paraízo to the Minister of Justice, September 13, 1837. AEBa, PP, Correspondencia Presidencial, vol. 683, fol. 227v-278.

37 "Devassa do levante," passim.


42 The "Tailors' Conspiracy," 1798, included only Brazilian-born slaves and free people, with perhaps one exception. This one exception was an African who denounced the conspiracy. Noting the absence of blacks among the conspirators the governor wondered if this didn't reflect the "opposition that exists between pardos and pretos." See Istvan Janos, "Contrações, tensões, conflitos: A Inconfidência Baiana de 1798," tese de Livre Docência, U. Federal Fluminense, 1975, p. 105. In any case the ideological scope of the less privileged participants in this movement was usually radical in the context of their time. Inspired by the ideas of the French philosophers and the French revolution, they sought to achieve free trade, independence, end of racial discrimination in public offices and military bodies and, most important, abolition of slavery. See Katia Mattoso, Presença francesa no movimento democrático baiano de 1798 (Salvador, 1969), and Luís Henrique D. Tavares, Introdução estudo das ideias do movimento revolucionário de 1798 (Salvador, 1959).

43 The factual reconstruction of the most known rebellions was made by several scholars. The reader can consult Howard Prince, "Slave Rebellion in Bahia, 1807-1835" unpublished PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1972, and Verger, Flux et Reflux and the bibliography there cited. Here I will simply trace the general lines of the outbreaks, introducing some new archival material. Geographical location of rebellions can be seen on the map preceding these endnotes.

44 Moura, Rebeliões da sensala, (São Paulo, 1959), pp. 186-188; for a conspiracy in 1845, AEBa, Documentos Avulsos da Polícia, Suebaíta de Insurreição, uncatologued.


46 "Officio do Conde da Ponte para o Visconde de Anadia, Bahia, 16 de junho de 1807," ABN RJ 37 (1918), p. 461.


51 Accioli, Memorias, 3, pp. 235-236, n. 34; and Verger, Flux et Reflux, pp. 330-331.

The Rodrigues Verger, Amaral, severe 680, the Anais Reis the in processuais 6, AEBa, Mota, Reconcavo Britto, conclusively 91-94, for an interesting description of the fear among the Recôncavo residents after the 1816 revolt. 58Caldas Britto, "Levantes de pretos," p. 90.

Ibid. 59On this movement see the excellent study of Carlos Guilhaume Mota, Noerdete 1817 (São Paulo, 1972).

See Braz do Amaral, História da Independência na Bahia, 2d ed. (Salvador, 1957), for a description and documents pertaining to the Luso-Brazilian conflict in Bahia.


Nina Rodrigues, Os africanos no Brasil, p. 76.

AEBa, PP, Câmara da Cachoeira, 1824-1835, maço 1279.

President Visconde de Camamu to the Court, December 17, 1828. AEBa, PP, Correspondência Presidencial, vol. 678, fol. 32v-33. The plan is registered in AEBa, PP, Correspondência expedida, vol. 6, fol. 164.

Camamu to the Court, December 7, 1829, ibid., fol. 175.

Camamu to the Court, December 17, 1829, ibid., fol. 32v-33.

Camamu to the Court, November 5 and December 7, 1829, ibid., fols. 164, 175.

See Prince, "Slave Rebellion," pp. 149-150.

President Honorato Barros Paim to the Minister of War, October 14, 1831. AEBa, PP, Correspondência Presidencial, vol. 680, fol. 19v.

The meanings of the term malê have been the subject of a severe debate, sometimes bordering on the ridiculous: Braz do Amaral, for instance, suggested ma lei (bad law). According to Verger, Flux et Reflux, p. 352, n. 24, it derives from the Yoruba word imele which simply means Muslim.

"Pevassa do levante," p. 61-64.

"Peças processuais do levante," passim.

The best, though not entirely correct account of the revolt is Prince, "Slave Rebellion," pp. 152-170.


Ibid., p. 13. Other examples of sheep sacrifices are found in "Pevassa do levante," pp. 6-7.

Prince, "Slave Rebellion," p. 202, n. 80 argued that Nina Rodrigues gave too much importance to the role of Manoel Calafate. The documents published in "Peças processuais do levante" proved conclusively that Nina was right. In fact, Prince's profile of the leadership closely follows the logic of the authorities of the
time; the latter, for prosecution reasons, considered cabegas do levante or leaders as any African about whom they had material proof of participation. Hence, a rank and file participant found wounded would have been considered leader.


80See Pacifico's trial in "Devassado levante," pp. 84-85. My thanks to Professor Lansine Kaba of the Department of History, University of Minnesota, who shared with me his knowledge of African Islam.


82This historiographical tradition began at the turn of the century with Nina Rodrigues and others, especially the priest Etienne Ignace Brazil, "Os Malês," RINGBR, 72:2 (1909), pp. 65-126. The most recent statement in this tradition is Verger, Flux et Réflux, which follows Nina Rodrigues' arguments word for word.


85President Francisco de Souza Menezes to the Minister of Justice, January 31, 1835. AEBa, PP, Correspondência Presidencial, vol. 681, fol. 197v.


87See Reichert, Os documentos drabes, passim.
89Ibid.
90There is no evidence whatsoever to support the mulatto Domingos de Sa's involvement in the uprising. He was just the landlord of free African rebels.
92"Peças processuais do levante," p. 33. My thanks to Mr. Oyebamiji Oyedele, a Yoruba speaker from Nigeria, who helped me identify the word 'kafiri,' misspelled in the court records as gavere.
93"Devassa do levante," p. 70.
96The best discussion of the repression that followed the 1835 revolt is Prince, "Slave Rebellion," pp. 214-224.
97President Souza Martins to the Minister of Justice, February 14, 1835, AEBA, PP, Correspondência Presidencial, vol. 682, fol. 10-10v.
98"Devassa do levante," p. 75.
99Ibid., p. 94 and passim.
100Ibid., p. 71.
104See the discussion in Eric Hobsbawn, "Class Consciousness in History," in Istvan Mészaros, ed., Aspects of History and Class Consciousness (New York, 1972), pp. 5-21. See also Theotonio dos Santos, Concepto de clases sociales (Mexico, n.d.).
105In pre-industrial societies only the dominant classes unmistakably constitute a class fur sich or a class conscious group; this occurs especially in conflict situations (as was the case of Bahia in the period discussed here). See Immanuel Wellerstein, The Modern World System (New York, 1974), pp. 351-353.

107 Ibid., p. 149.

108 For a contrast with this position in the Brazilian historiography, see Mota, Nordeste 1817, p. 3, and Reis, "A elite baiana," p. 345.


110 Camamú to the Court, January 24, 1831, AEBa, PP, Correspondência Presidencial, vol. 679, fol. 140.

111 Marion Kilson, "Towards Freedom: An Analysis of Slave Revolts in the United States," Phylon 25 (1964), pp. 175-187, especially pp. 183 and 187, has argued that in the U.S. slave revolts tended to take place in areas reputed to have better slave life conditions.

112 In his analysis of the "would-be" Vesey plot in Charleston, South Carolina, 1822, Richard C. Wade, "The Vesey Plot: A Reconsideration," in J. H. Bracey, Jr., A. Meier and E. Rudwick, eds., American Slavery: The Question of Resistance (Belmont, Cal., 1971), p. 136, found a similar pattern of urban slavery (diversification of trades, access to freedom, a more independent life for the slave, etc.), but, in contrast to the conclusions of this paper, he concludes that "a concerted revolt against slavery was actually less likely in a city than in the countryside"; he links the "wider latitude" to slaves in the city with their tendency to accommodate (ibid., p. 138). Wade failed to consider the contradictory nature of urban slavery, and even of social movements in general.

113 The links between urban and rural slave movements in Bahia are also emphasized in Stuart O. Schwantz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia, 1550-1835 (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 468-488.