By the same author

Political Psychology

The Revolutionary Ideas of the Marquis de Sade (1934)
The Life and Ideas of the Marquis de Sade (3rd edition 1964)

Travel

Africa Dances (1935)
Bali and Angkor (1936)
Hot Strip Tease (1938)

Political Satire

Nobody Talks Politics (1936)

Social Anthropology

Himalayan Village – a study of the Lepchas of Sikkim (1938; 2nd edition 1967)
The Americans – a study of national character (1948)
Exploring English Character (1955)
Death, Grief and Mourning in Contemporary Britain (1965) (in collaboration with Dr John Rickman)
The People of Great Russia – a psychological study (1949)

Collected Essays

The Danger of Equality (1966)

SEX & MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND TODAY

A study of the views and experience of the under-45s

GEOFFREY GORER

Nelson

Tables 1–9

Introduction: The Research and the Sample

i

One of the most interesting recent developments in social anthropology has been the re-studying of known societies after a lapse of years to discover what alterations the changes in technology, political organization or raised expectations had produced.* I could not, as I would have wished, do a re-study in the field, partly because of my failing health, and partly because Sikkim had been declared a prohibited area by the Indian government after the frontier clashes with China, so that a return visit to the Lepchas† was not feasible.

The advantages of re-studying a known society were much in my mind in 1968. By having a base from which change could be measured, one can state with far more certainty the direction in which a society is moving than is possible when the only information about the past is based on memory or tradition, either one's own or that of one's informants. The rate and extent of change are frequently misinterpreted by those involved. On the one hand, technological innovations, with their concomitant alterations of social habits, are accepted almost unconsciously, so that it needs an intellectual effort to recollect what our life was like before we had radio, or television, or air-travel, for example (all inventions made in my lifetime); on the other hand, there has been an increasing tendency in this century, and not only in the technologically advanced societies, to state the differences between generations in the

* Margaret Mead's *Growing Up in New Guinea* (1930) and *New Lives for Old* (1956), two studies of the same group of Manus in the Admiralty Islands, were the pioneering works in this field. Since then, there have been several other re-studies.

† *Himalayan Village* (1939) is my original study of these people.

most extreme terms, so that, for the elderly and middle-aged, the young are betraying all the traditions and flouting all the decencies in which they were raised, and, for the young, the middle-aged and old are responsible for all the injustices and inequalities of which they are conscious and the shackling rules which prevent them developing their potentialities.

In England the press, and other media of mass communication, chiefly directed at middle-aged audiences, insisted that there was a major change in the sexual morals of the young; the 'permissive society', 'swinging London' and all the other clichés implied that the young were far more licentious than their elders had ever been and had an ever-diminishing regard for the importance of marriage as an institution. Such casual observations as I had been able to make made me doubt the validity of these observations; I thought the censorious commentators were confusing changes in word-style with changes in life-style; but I knew that my casual observations had no more validity than the generalizations of the Press.

This, it seemed to me, was a situation where a re-study could establish some of the facts about the rate of change and its direction in one institution and topic in our contemporary society. In 1950 I had collected and analysed the views of a very large sample of volunteers on love and sex, on their hopes, fears, and experience of marriage;* if the same questions were to be asked of a sample of young people in 1969, this would surely give an indication as to the changes in attitudes and values over the last twenty years.

From the scientific point of view, the chief drawback of *Exploring English Character* was that it was majorly founded on the replies of volunteers. Although the number was large, there was no guarantee that the sample was representative. True, a number of the same questions had been asked simultaneously of a stratified sample, and the percentages were close enough to give confidence in the representative value of the volunteer sample; but the only questions asked in this checking survey were those with answers which could be ticked, either Yes or

* *Exploring English Character* (Cresset Press and Criterion Books, 1955): Chapter VII 'Love', Chapter VIII 'Ideas About Sex', Chapter IX 'Marriage I: Hopes and Fears', Chapter X: 'Marriage II: Experience'; pp. 83–177.

No, or with a limited range of alternatives; and I had found that I got much the most information from 'open-ended' questions, from questions which did not suggest any answers to the respondent. The question from which I had got the most revealing information in 1950 was: 'If you were told that a small child, say between 3 and 8, had done something really bad, what would you think the child had done?'

In the projected re-study, I wanted to combine the relevant open-ended questions with a scientifically valid sample. This was the proposition originally put to Mr Harold Evans, the editor of *The Sunday Times* (I needed a sponsor to pay for the research: I could not afford to pay for it out of my own pocket), by my friend and agent, the late Jean LeRoy. He was sufficiently interested to arrange for me to meet the directors of Opinion Research Centre, Mr T. F. Thompson and Mr H. J. F. Taylor with one of his assistant editors, Mr Ron Hall.

It was at this meeting that the suggestion was first made that, besides repeating the 1950 questions on attitudes towards sex and marriage, we should also ask questions on individual sexual behaviour. This presented a major challenge to the directors of Opinion Research Centre. All previous surveys of sexual behaviour with which I am acquainted had depended on volunteers (as with Kinsey), or on small groups selected from students at a single university or clients of a hospital, birth-control clinic or marriage guidance service. Despite some ingenious statistical manipulation of the raw data, such information had never been collected from the sort of sample which is used to survey all less 'sensitive' attitudes or behaviour; it was widely believed to be impossible.

I agreed that it might be feasible in 1969. Although I doubted whether people's sexual behaviour had changed as much as was frequently alleged, there was no doubt that there had been a major change in the topics which could be discussed openly and seriously, and the language which could be used. I think the turning-point was the acquittal of the paperback edition of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* of obscenity in 1960. By this decision, the old, powerful taboo'd words had been robbed of nearly all their magic, and the objects and actions to which they referred were free for serious discussion. I think the seriousness should be emphasized. The dirty joke and the *double entendre* do not seem

to have lost any of their attraction, their ability to titillate and evoke snigger, giggle and guffaw; but exactly the same topics can now be mentioned seriously without undue embarrassment. If the interviewers could ask the questions, I believed the informants would answer them.

The questionnaire was gradually developed over several months' consultation between members of Opinion Research Centre and myself and several different types of pilot survey* were tried out to discover what method would be most likely to get a high proportion of answers to 'sensitive' questions and which forms of words were most easily understood. *The Sunday Times* agreed to undertake the very considerable expense of having the questionnaire administered to an adequate sample and analysed; and the interviews were made in April and May 1969.

ii

Since the validity of this study depends to a great extent on the validity of the sample, this must be discussed in some detail.† Nine hundred and forty-nine men and 1,037 women were interviewed. They were selected from the electoral registers in a hundred parliamentary constituencies (out of 511) in England, stratified by the Registrar General's standard regions, conurbation and size of town, and political complexion. Alternate constituencies were arbitrarily designated as 'male' and 'female'; in the 'male' constituencies men interviewed male informants if they were of the appropriate age; in the 'female' constituencies women interviewed women. In each constituency a random number was generated; every fifth elector thereafter was underlined, until eighty had been designated of the appropriate sex.

Of these 8,000 electors, 65% proved to be ineligible, mostly because they were over 45, but in a few cases because they had moved, or could not be traced, or had died. Two thousand seven hundred and ninety-one interviews were attempted and 1,831 completed, a success rate of 65·6%. One hundred and

* See Appendix One, by Humphrey Taylor.
† Further technical details can be found in Appendix One.

fifty-six young people between the ages of 16 and 21 who were not on the electoral register were also interviewed. Four hundred and sixty-five people were not interviewed because they were out after four calls or, in a few instances, were away on holiday, in hospital or otherwise unavailable; 495 (17·8%) refused to be interviewed. For a random sample these percentages appear satisfactory.

The skilled interviewers from Opinion Research Centre had no freedom of choice as to whom they would interview; their instructions were exactly the same as those in any other survey based on a stratified random sample; and, as far as people aged 21 or over are concerned, this survey would seem to have the same sort of validity as other polls conducted on the same sampling basis.*

In 1969 people under the age of 21 were not on the parliamentary registers. To discover informants between the ages of 16 and 21, interviewers were instructed to ask if there were young men or women (as the case might be) in the households where they were interviewing a parent. In the event of there being more than one of the appropriate age and sex, the interviewers had to attempt to interview the person the initial of whose Christian name was nearest to their own. Even in this situation, the interviewers' preferences were controlled.

Since only young people who were living in their parents' homes were interviewed, they and the unmarried (who are to a large extent the same group) are rather seriously under-represented, in proportion to the figures of the census.† This discrepancy can be rectified in the tables by the appropriate statistical 'weighting' and inspection of the tables will show that this has been done frequently; the difference made by the 'weighting' is usually less than 2%. To minimize the effect of this flaw in the sample as much as may be, the views and

* Surveys based on the employment of volunteers run the risk of attracting an undue proportion of exhibitionists; when information is paid for, there is a risk that the informants will say what they think the interviewer wants to hear. Informants traced through a hospital or any counselling service have a tendency to be untypical inasmuch as they hve been led to seek assistance through their disturbed condition.

† There should have been 352 informants aged between 16 and 20; there were in fact only 150. The unmarried should have represented 30% of the sample; they in fact only represented 19%.

experiences of the unmarried are considered exclusively in Part Two, Chapter Ten; the nine chapters of Part One quote exclusively from the 81 % who were or had been married (though the unmarried are, inevitably, included in most of the totals). Sixteen of our informants had been divorced, thirteen had been widowed, and twenty-four were separated from their spouse.

In absolute figures, interviews were administered to:

age 16–20: 150 people (7½ %)
age 21–24: 321 people (16½ %)
age 25–34: 691 people (35 %)
age 35–45: 809 people (41 %)

iii

All informants were asked their occupation or, if appropriate, that of the 'head of the household'; and these were then grouped according to the categories established by the Registrar General. The Registrar General has grouped all occupations in a five-fold list: (I) professional and managerial; (II) intermediate; (III) skilled; (IV) semi-skilled; (V) unskilled. Since modern technology has produced an absolute majority of skilled workers, the third category is frequently divided into 'skilled manual' and 'skilled non-manual'. To avoid ambiguity in writing, the roman numbers are frequently replaced by the first five letters of the alphabet; and this practice is followed here, as is the grouping together of the first two classes (AB) and the bottom two (DE). Skilled non-manual is designated C1 and skilled manual C2.

By these categories our sample were 12 % AB, professional and managerial; 23 % C1, skilled non-manual; 44 % C2 skilled manual; 21 % DE semi-skilled and unskilled manual. In the three lower categories men and women are in approximately equal numbers; but the AB category contains 61 % women and 39 % men. This disparity between the sexes in the AB category is relevant where tables are analysed according to the Registrar General's categories.

There is a similar disparity between the sexes in the claim to middle-class status in our informants' answers to the question: 'If you were asked to say what social class you were, how would you describe yourself?' Informants were asked to choose

between: upper class; upper middle class; middle class; lower middle class; skilled working class; upper working class; working class. Twenty-six per cent of the men and 40 % of the women (34 % of the total) stated that they were middle class. This would suggest that, both subjectively and objectively, women's occupations tend to be graded higher in the social scale than do men's; it is also possible that in meetings with strangers (and the interviewers were, of course, strangers to all the informants) women have a tendency to claim high social status.

Self-classification by social class is clearly congenial to the vast majority of the younger English population. Only 132 individuals (less than 7 % of the total) refused to do so; 6 % of the men and 4 % of the women – and these include informants not born in England – said they could not answer the question, and a further 3 % of the men and 1 % of the women stated at some length that such classifications were inappropriate today, that they belonged to a repudiated past and so on; they made miniature political speeches rejecting the notion of social hierarchy. The rest of the information in their interviews suggested that it would not be difficult to assign these informants to an appropriate social class; but the rejection of a social class label, like the rejection of a sectarian label,* would seem to be significant indicators of the informants' attitudes to various aspects of sex and marriage; we have therefore included this uncertain or 'rebellious' group under the rubric 'blank' in the analytical tables.

It did not seem worth while including in these tables the eight individuals who called themselves upper class (often with little apparent justification; one had the impression they were teasing the interviewers) or the sixty-seven who called themselves upper middle class. Most of these latter would appear to be objectively justified in their claims through their professions or managerial occupations†; but the number is so small that the figures of distribution appeared to be of little significance. Their attitudes did not appear to differ in any consistent way from

* See below, pp. 10–11.

† When I quote informants I am giving their age, their occupation, and, where relevant, their religion; but I am not giving any other information, such as where they live, so as to protect their anonymity.

those of our informants who called themselves middle class without a modifier.

Thirty-one per cent of our sample (32% of the men and 30% of the women) described themselves as working class, without a modifier. They, and the 34% who consider themselves middle class, can be considered the 'core' social classes of contemporary English society.

In many ways the 29% of the population who place themselves between the two 'core' classes are both the most idiosyncratic and the most consistent in their views and practices. Nine per cent, equally divided between the sexes, call themselves 'lower middle class'; this tends to be the most censorious and most conventional group. Twelve per cent (15% of the men and 8% of the women) called themselves 'skilled working class' and 5% (6% of the men and 4% of the women) 'upper working class'.

These two claims to superior position within the working class were included after the pilot surveys, which brought the distinction into prominence. The term 'skilled working class' is much more preferred by those aged over 25 (13%) than by their juniors (8% or 9%), and would seem to be based rather narrowly within the work situation, directly dependent on the length of apprenticeship or other qualifications that the job demands. The term 'upper working class', on the other hand, is much more congenial to the young (9% of those aged under 20) than to their elders (4% of those aged between 35 and 45), and would seem to be based on the length of education, earning power, or representative or entertainment activities outside the work situation. In many ways, I would believe the category of 'upper working class' to be a new phenomenon. Twenty years ago, youngsters of working-class origin with outstanding intellectual gifts or talents would have been likely to try to acquire a B.B.C. accent and to be accepted as a newcomer to the middle or upper middle class (an analogue to 'passing' in a multi-racial society); today they feel no need to hide their working-class origins. In many ways, it would seem that the upper working class have replaced the upper middle class as trend-setters for many of their contemporaries.

It will have been noted that 21% of the men and only 12% of the women differentiate their positions within the working class; this masculine claim for special working-class status counterbalances to a certain extent the feminine claim to middle-class status.

iv

Twenty-eight per cent of the men and 25% of the women in our sample finished their education at the age of 14; these are predominantly those aged over 35, whose education was completed before the school-leaving age was raised. A further 39% of the men and 43% of the women left school at 15. Two-thirds of our total sample left school at the minimum legal age, with high concentrations among those over 35 and those calling themselves working or skilled working class; even among those calling themselves middle class 59% left school at the age of 15.

Twenty-four per cent of the men and 26% of the women finished their education between the ages of 16 and 18. This amount of further education is most general in the lower middle and upper working classes and in those aged under 34. Eight per cent of the men and 6% of the women continued their education beyond the age of 18, or were still studying when they were interviewed; apart from those still at school or university, this highly educated group is most numerous under the age of 24, and tend to describe themselves as middle class or lower middle class; there are, however, 5% who call themselves upper working class, but only 1% who call themselves working class without modification. There is much more further education in the North-East and South-East than there is in the North-West and South-West.

v

Two per cent of the men and 4% of the women refused to answer the question on approximate income or income of the head of the household; 2% of the men and no fewer than 17% of the women said they did not know what their fathers or husbands earned.*

Under 7% of our sample (7% of the men and 4% of the women) were earning less than £13 weekly. This is the group

* See Chapter Four, p. 92, for further discussion of this topic.

which is usually referred to as 'lower paid' workers, but in fact it is composed predominantly of teenagers and apprentices; only 3% of those aged over 35 had so little money, and in this group were several divorced or separated women, and quite a few immigrants.

Twenty-six per cent had incomes of between £13 and £20 weekly, with a heavy concentration among those aged under 24 and calling themselves working class or skilled working class. Forty-three per cent had incomes between £20 and £35 a week; this figure was achieved by more than half of those calling themselves skilled or upper working class, compared with 35% of those calling themselves working class without modification, and by half of those in the 25–34 age-group. Incomes above this level are mostly reached after the age of 35 and by people calling themselves middle class or lower middle class; 8% had incomes between £35 and £50 a week and 4% incomes of more than £2,600 a year.

vi

In contrast to the 7% of our sample who refused to place themselves in one of the categories of social class, no less than 23% refused to place themselves in any religious category. Twenty-five per cent of the men and 21% of the women said that they had no religion and they are rather heavily concentrated among the younger informants: 35% of those aged 16–20, 28% of those aged 21–24, 25% of those aged 25–34 and 18% of those aged 35–45. In some ways these figures are echoed by those who claim membership of the Church of England: 37% of those aged 16–20, 49% of those aged 21–24, 53% of those aged 25–34, and 56% of those aged 35–45. Although I have no evidence to support it, my guess is that there has been little difference in the rate of baptism between 1925 and 1953; but the younger members of our sample did not have the experience of national service, where 'no religion' was not acceptable and so did not grow accustomed to entering 'C. of E.' on the appropriate forms, whatever their private beliefs and practices might be.

Those who reject any religious label are somewhat heavily concentrated in the upper working and working classes and are

relatively scarce in the lower middle class; regionally, they make up a quarter of the population in the South-East and North-East and a fifth or less in the North-West and the Midlands.

The rejection of any religious denomination, like the refusal to place oneself in a social class, would appear to have a significant influence on the sexual behaviour and attitudes of these avowed agnostics or atheists, particularly on the age when they start intercourse and the number of their partners before marriage.

Of the three-quarters of the population who claim some religious denomination, 52% said they were members of the Church of England, 10% Roman Catholics, 6% Methodists and 7% members of other groups, predominantly Nonconformist, among whom, I think, the very observant Jehovah's Witnesses can be included; there were also a few Jews, Moslems, Buddhists, Christian Scientists, spiritualists and adherents to other creeds, but none of them reached two figures, and so are not represented in the tables.

Twelve per cent of those who claimed some religious denomination had visited their place of worship in the week previous to the interviews, and the same number say that they worship weekly or more often. This observant group has slightly more women (12%) than men (10%) and is somewhat heavily concentrated in those under the age of 20 (who may have compulsory chapel) and over 35. The observant are somewhat heavily concentrated in the lower middle class and in the North-West, with its high concentration of Roman Catholics.

Thirty-seven per cent of those who accept a religious label either never enter their places of worship at all or only do so for weddings and funerals; they are most numerous in the working classes and the North-East. Six per cent visit their place of worship less than once a week but more than once a month; 9% go once a month or less often and 18% once or twice a year. As will be demonstrated in Chapter Two, there is a close correlation between the active practice of religion and the preservation of virginity until marriage, or at any rate betrothal.

The percentages of religious belief and creed denomination do not differ significantly from those of twenty years ago, apart from a slight diminution of those calling themselves 'C. of E.'

and a slight increase (2%) of those stating they have no religion. This survey does not suggest that there has been any significant decline in religious belief or practice over the last twenty years; the decline in weekly, or more frequent, church attendance is about 4%.

vii

Sixty-three per cent of the men and 49% of the women had grown up in the place where they were interviewed; a further 17% of the men and 11% of the women had grown up in the same district; three-quarters of the men and nearly two-thirds of the women (women are slightly more likely to change their residence at marriage) live in their natal district. Less than 20% of those under twenty were living in a strange area. Those who consider themselves skilled working class or working class are markedly more stable than those who consider themselves middle class or who won't classify themselves; in both these latter groups over a third were living in an area where they did not grow up. I would think that this picture of geographical immobility is unique to England among the highly industrialized countries.

Of the minority who were living outside their natal district, 16% of the men and 23% of the women came from another English city and 6% of both sexes from a village outside the district where they were interviewed. One hundred and eighty-five of our informants (approximately 9%) were not English. Fifty-six came from other parts of Great Britain – Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland; 61 came from Eire, 5 from Europe, 17 from the West Indies and 26 from Asia.

In the paragraphs above I have written 'district' or 'area' rather than 'region' to avoid ambiguity. In the coding of the answers to this question, the nine districts designated by the Registrar General were used; figures in parentheses show the proportion of the sample interviewed in each region. North-West (13%); North (6%); Yorkshire (11%); East Midlands (8%); West Midlands (14%); East Anglia (4%); Greater London (17%); South-East except Greater London (19%); South-West (8%). For the purpose of analysis these nine regions were reduced to five, by amalgamating the North and

Yorkshire into the North-East: the East Midlands and West Midlands into the Midlands; and Greater London, the South-East except Greater London and East Anglia into the South-East. By this amalgamation a few interesting distinctions have probably been submerged – Yorkshire and East Anglia both appear to be somewhat idiosyncratic – but this arrangement allows of strict comparability with the figures in *Exploring English Character*.

All the variables described in this chapter proved to be relevant to the interpretation of the differing patterns of sexual behaviour and attitudes of our informants.

Figures of Distribution

The relationship between the Registrar General's categories and self-ascribed social class

Middle class 34% AB 57%; C1 48%; C2 26%; DE 22%.
Lower middle class 9% AB 9%; C1 15%; C2 7%; DE 6%.
Skilled working class 12% AB 2%; C1 6%; C2 19%; DE 17%.
Upper working class 5% AB 1%; C1 5%; C2 6%; DE 5%.
Working class 31% AB 5%; C1 15%; C2 34%; DE 55%.
Blank 5% AB 6%; C1 6%; C2 4%; DE 5%.

Social class and sex

Middle class Male 26%; female 40%.
Lower middle class Male 9%; female 9%.
Skilled working class Male 15%; female 8%.
Upper working class Male 6%; female 4%.
Working class Male 32%; female 30%.
Blank Male 9%; female 5%.

Social class and age

Middle class 16–20 27%; 21–24 31%; 25–34 36%; 35–45 33%.
Lower middle class 16–20 7%; 21–24 9%; 25–34 7%; 35–45 11%.

Skilled working class 16–20 8%; 21–24 9%; 25–34 13%; 35–45 13%.
Upper working class 16–20 9%; 21–24 6%; 25–34 5%; 35–45 4%.
Working class 16–20 35%; 21–24 34%; 25–34 29%; 35–45 30%.
Blank 16–20 9%; 21–24 7%; 25–34 8%; 35–45 6%.

Social class and region

Middle class North-East 27%; Midlands 35%; South-East 36%; South-West 27%; North-West 34%.
Lower middle class North-East 6%; Midlands 7%; South-East 10%; South-West 12%; North-West 8%.
Skilled working class North-East 9%; Midlands 15%; South-East 11%; South-West 7%; North-West 13%.
Upper working class North-East 4%; Midlands 5%; South-East 6%; South-West 3%; North-West 6%.
Working class North-East 32%; Midlands 29%; South-East 26%; South-West 48%; North-West 34%.
Blank North-East 17%; Midlands 3%; South-East 7%; South-West 2%; North-West 1%.

Social class and school-leaving age.

Left school at lowest legal age (14 or 15) Middle 59% lower middle 64%; skilled working 80%; upper working 63% working 81%; blank 66%.
Finished education between 16 and 18 Middle 30%; lower middle 35%; skilled working 16%; upper working 33%; working 15%; blank 27%.
Education beyond the age of 18 and still continuing Middle 10%; lower middle 8%; skilled working 3%; upper working 5%; working 1%; blank 8%.

Social class and income

Under £12 19s 11d a week Middle 5%; lower middle 6%; skilled working 1%; upper working 4%; working 8%; blank 6%.
£13–£19 19s 11d a week Middle 18%; lower middle 23%; skilled working 30%; upper working 29%; working 36%; blank 28%.
£20–£34 19s 11d Middle 35%; lower middle 48%; skilled working 54%; upper working 51%; working 39%; blank 43%.
£35–£49 19s 11d Middle 11%; lower middle 8%; skilled working 5%; upper working 4%; working 3%; blank 5%.
Over £2,600 a year Middle 7%; lower middle 3%; skilled working 0%; upper working 1%; working 1%; blank 1%.
Refused and not known Middle 14%; lower middle 13%; skilled working 8%; upper working 12%; working 13%; blank 15%.

Age and income

Under £12 19s 11d a week 16–20 19%; 21–24 7%; 25–34 4%; 35–45 3%.
£13–£19 19s 11d a week 16–20 33%; 21–24 37%; 25–34 24%; 35–45 23%;
£20–£34 19s 11d a week 16–20 15%; 21–24 38%; 25–34 50%; 35–45 45%.
£35–£49 19s 11d a week 16–20 1%; 21–24 3%; 25–34 8%; 35–45 10%.
Over £2,600 a year 16–20 1%; 21–24 1%; 25–34 3%; 35–45 6%.
Refused and not known 16–20 29%; 21–24 14%; 25–34 10%; 35–45 12%.

Social class and religion

Have no religion Middle 20%; lower middle 17%; skilled working 21%; upper working 26%; working 26%; blank 32%.
Church of England Middle 55%; lower middle 56%; skilled working 54%; upper working 47%; working 51%; blank 39%.
Roman Catholic Middle 9%; lower middle 9%; skilled working 12%; upper working 12%; working 11%; blank 11%.
Methodist Middle 6%; lower middle 5%; skilled working 6%; upper working 9%; working 4%; blank 8%.

Region and religion

Have no religion North-East 25%; Midlands 17%; South-East 26%; South-West 22%; North-West 20%.

Church of England North–East 43%; Midlands 57%; South-East 52%; South-West 63%; North-West 49%.
Roman Catholic North-East 9%; Midlands 9%; South-East 10%; South-West 6%; North-West 21%.
Methodist North-East 13%; Midlands 8%; South-East 2%; South-West 4%; North-West 4%.

Age and religion

Have no religion 16–20 35%; 21–24 28%; 25–34 25%; 35–45 18%.
Church of England 16–20 37%; 21–24 49%; 25–34 53%; 35–45 56%.
Roman Catholic 16–20 12%; 21–24 10%; 25–34 10%; 35–45 10%.
Methodist 16–20 8%; 21–24 4%; 25–34 4%; 35–45 7%.

Part One