



mism and growing desperation, it was discovered that although cocoa grows well in Tome Açu, it does not bear enough beans to make it a commercial proposition.

The investment company gradually and with embarrassment withdrew. The Brazilian government lost interest and the immigrants, realising that their bitterness was futile and that help from the outside would not arrive, came to terms with the jungle. They concentrated on raising rice and vegetables, as these could be planted two or three times a year for several years before the soil was exhausted and the farmers needed to move on to new land. They formed a producers' cooperative which marketed their crops in Belém. Each family grew, harvested and marketed its own crops. Because of the constant need to move to new land, the neat settlement planned by the Japanese company soon disintegrated as the farmers began to drift deeper into the jungle in search of this. Most settlers accumulated cash and moved out of the colony to the suburbs of Belém and to southern Brazil, but approximately 66 households stayed in Tome Açu.

The survivors doggedly sought a profitable long-term cash crop by constantly experimenting with alternatives. Spice pepper was one such crop and its growth happened by sheer chance. In 1932, an old lady going to Brazil died on an immigrant boat off the coast of Malaysia and was taken ashore for burial. On the way back to the ship one of the pall-bearers purchased some young pepper cuttings of the kind which are grown commercially in India, Malaysia and Indonesia. Two of these survived the voyage to Brazil and were planted along with experimental crops. By 1948, the farmers successfully developed spice pepper vines that could prosper in Tome Açu. There was a large market for pepper, as this grew nowhere else in the western hemisphere and the second world war had seriously depleted world pepper supplies. This was due to shipment priorities of war material and also the Japanese destruction of the Dutch pepper plantations in Indonesia.

Keen to expand domestic production, the Brazilian government gave generous tax and tariff benefits. Suddenly, from being subsistence farmers constantly on the move for more land, the Japanese farmers could settle and direct their attention to one cash crop. Pepper gave an annual guaranteed income, providing they reinvested their profits into fertiliser to maintain high yields. Moreover, they already had a producers' cooperative which could market their crops and give them a maximum income free from middlemen.

The farmers energetically expanded their holdings, with the result that pepper production has greatly increased since 1949. Domestic demands in Brazil are provided for first, then other parts of South America, North America, Great Britain and western Europe. The skill of cultivating and harvesting pepper has been easily mastered by rural Japanese, who are already competent in raising wet rice and garden crops. The main limiting factor the farmers experienced was shortage of labour. Here again, outside planning combined with local innovation. The Japanese government was casting about for places to settle the returning repatriates from Manchuria, the Philippines, Malaysia and other parts of the former Japanese empire. Frustrated by the poverty and cramped living conditions of post-war Japan, many of the returnees welcomed the opportunity to leave again. The Brazilian government and the prewar Tome Açu immigrants wel-

comed these postwar pioneers. A mutually profitable exchange was worked out. The new immigrants were employed by individual prewar farmers, who provided housing, wages and instructions in pepper-farming techniques in return for labour. After two or three years the postwar immigrants were given land. Gradually they became independent and were finally admitted as members of the producers' co-operatives.

The plan worked out well. Between 1953 and 1960, despite some initial friction, several hundred postwar households settled and were absorbed into the community. Eventually most Japanese farmers became managers over a workforce of wage labourers. As emigration from Japan fell after 1960, rural Brazilians have been trained in the skills of growing and cultivating pepper. As complex long-term agricultural planning is needed to make large-scale pepper farming a profitable venture, so rural Brazilians attracted to Tome Açu have preferred to hire themselves to the Japanese farmers (at wages slightly higher than those paid to agricultural workers elsewhere in Brazil) or to grow manioc, beans and vegetables on independent farms in the outlying jungle. These crops can then be sold to the Japanese, who specialise in just growing pepper because of its higher financial return for their own skills and efforts.

Although there has been relatively little interracial marriage, the Japanese get on well with their Brazilian neighbours. Their children attend Brazilian schools, master Portuguese, are nominally Catholic and participate with gusto in local politics and sports, notably football. Brazilian merchants and government officials are very satisfied that Tome Açu pays the third highest revenue in the state and provides valuable employment for some 6,000 rural Brazilians who would otherwise live at poverty level in the jungle, or migrate to overcrowded urban areas.

Internal changes and their repercussions continue to affect developments. Since 1959, private Japanese and Brazilian pepper buyers have gained control over half the pepper raised in Tome Açu. Also in that year, the community became an independent municipality. It now elects its own city council and other local officials and controls its own municipal revenues. In early 1973, a new road through the jungle to the Belém-Brazilia highway was completed. This opened the community to urban areas by overland routes (previous contact with the outside had been restricted to river or air service). Finally, the expansion into the jungle is still continuing.

The main danger the farmers continue to face (and are well aware of) is their present dependence on a single crop as their sole means of livelihood. Their present security and affluence—ownership of land, regular profits and the means to purchase trucks, tractors and luxuries—are a stark contrast to the impoverished life they left in Japan. But to prosper they must continue to farm pepper. Now and in the near future there will be no agricultural, commercial or industrial alternatives.

These pioneers are an example of successful accommodation to a new environment. Their experience shows how background factors (farming and cooperative knowledge acquired in Japan), local potentials (the jungle), fate (the tenuous path of pepper from Malaysia), planning (by Japanese and Brazilian officials), financing (by the Japanese government and the limited stock company), combined to bear successful results. Modern pioneers cannot rely on rugged individualism alone.



## Society at work Pakistanis or citizens? Sylvia Whitfield

If you are born in this country, you are a British citizen. You are also one if your father is born here, although you were born abroad. If you are married to a British man you can become a British citizen. And if you have lived in this country for five years without any sort of restriction on your stay you can apply to become one—either by registration if you are a Commonwealth citizen, or by naturalisation if you are an alien.

During the last ten years the majority of postwar Commonwealth immigrants have settled here, to become new members of the established working class. At the end of the sixties, there was a potential downturn in the economy and the demand for unskilled labour was ended. By 1 January 1973 (the date of the coming into force of the Immigration Act, 1971), the gates to Britain were closed; immigration effectively ceased. However, behind these gates were thousands of settled immigrants from the Commonwealth with a legal right to bring in their dependants, and with a legal right to register as British citizens after they had been here for five years.

Several things began to happen which highlighted the vulnerability of immigrants. Men were finding that it was no longer so easy to bring in their dependants. In 1969, entry certificates for dependants became compulsory, and since then it has become more and more complicated and time consuming to get one. With the coming into effect of the Immigration Act, 1971, lack of security for this new sector of the working class began to increase steadily.

Around the same time a substantial sector of the immigrant community became victims of the game of international diplomacy. Following the independence of Bangladesh, on 1 January 1972, Pakistan left the Commonwealth, taking with it the Common-

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wealth status of thousands of Pakistanis who had settled in this country. This precipitated the Pakistan Act, 1973, which came into force on 1 September 1973.

Technically, all Pakistanis became aliens. That act, however, did recognise the special position of Pakistanis settled here, and made transitional arrangements whereby they could apply for registration as citizens of this country as though they were still Commonwealth citizens. It granted them the right to register as British citizens as long as they had lived here for five years, had applied within given deadlines, and their stay here had not been restricted.

Within the first few months of the act being passed, over 100,000 applications for registration had been received by the nationality division of the Home Office. Consequently a backlog rapidly accumulated. Applicants now have to wait on average over twelve months for their British nationality certificate—if the Home Office decides to grant it.

Our evidence is that more and more applications from Pakistanis are being refused. The Home Office has not made any figures available. However, the community development project in Saltley, Birmingham, has been contacted by 75 people who have been refused (see table below). And more are coming all the time. So one is led to the conclusion that in fact the numbers being refused must be considerable.

At one time, registration as a British citizen was virtually automatic. That certainly no longer seems to be the case. And for the unlucky ones who fail in the process, the alternative is "alien" status; but alien status means less "security of tenure." Further, there is no appeals machinery, and a failed applicant is unlikely to reverse his position by naturalisation: to be naturalised, the applicant must demonstrate competent use of the English language, and his spouse must be in this country. One or other condition is unlikely to be fulfilled.

The criteria which the Home Office use to determine a person's eligibility for registration as a citizen of the United Kingdom

### No. of refusal cases coming to Saltley CDP office, September 1974-June 1975

pre	Sept 1974	Sept 1974	Oct 1974	Nov 1974	Dec 1974	Jan 1975	Feb 1975	Mar 1975	Apr 1975	May 1975	June 1975	week 1
5	1	2	1	4	5	9	12	14	18	4		

and colonies is a question of Home Office interpretation of the law. Three cases which have come to the attention of this CDP indicate what is happening.

Adalat Khan first came here over 20 years ago. He had served in the British army before that, and so had a ready-made link with this country. While in the army he spent five years as a prisoner of war in Singapore. In 1953, he came to settle in Birmingham, and has been working in various unskilled factory jobs since then. His family have never joined him; they live in an extended family in a village in an isolated rural part of Pakistan. Khan has always sent them most of the money he earned here, and for many years had not been able to afford to bring them to Britain. Later, the entry certificate system—the two-year queues, the unpleasant questioning by entry clearance officers at the British embassy, the frustration and possible disappointment—had dissuaded him from making arrangements for them to come. He, on the other hand, cannot go back to the village. There is no work there for him, and so how could he feed all those mouths which are dependent on him? Besides, he has established his home here, and hopes his family will join him here eventually.

The Home Office refused to register Khan as a British citizen because, during the five years prior to applying, he had been absent from this country for 40 months. Officials argued that he had broken his "ordinary residence." Khan had waited twelve months to hear this decision. Now he feels extremely disappointed, and most of all indignant that his apparent rights have been denied. For him, there is no explanation.

Why were these visits, which in the eyes of the Home Office broke his ordinary residence, necessary? Khan comes, from the district of Mirpur, along with about 70 per cent of Pakistanis in this country. Mirpur is situated in the hills of north Pakistan where in 1966 one of the world's largest dams, the Mangla dam, was built. It flooded 68,000 acres of Mirpur, and made 85,000 people homeless. Even now the

problems of compensation and resettlement are continuing as a result of that dam, and Mirpures in this country are affected. Khan is among them.

In 1969 he had to go out there to sort out in court the compensation for his family, and to help them resettle in a new village. That took 20 months. Then, within a few months of returning to this country, the head of the extended family, his brother, died, and so it fell again on Khan to return and make the various family arrangements.

While he was there his father, and then his mother died. It was only after nearly two years that he could return here. Now, because of the hopelessness and poverty of the family situation in Mirpur, it has become all the more necessary for him to make arrangements for them to come to this country. The basic "security of tenure" for him, however, has been denied at this crucial juncture, because the Home Office has not grasped the underlying circumstances which made these visits imperative.

Khan is only one of many long-term residents in a similar position who have been refused British nationality. In fact, of the 75 refusal cases Sattley CDP knows about, four fifths had come to this country at least ten years ago, and in a third of the cases they had come here over 15 years ago!

Mohammed Rashid arrived more recently, and is much younger than Khan. He has made only one trip out of the country since he arrived here in 1967. This visit lasted for two years, and on the grounds of that absence, along with the fact that he apparently had left no connections in this country, the Home Office refused to register him. Again his circumstances are typical of many others who have been refused, yet the Home Office does not regard them as relevant to its decision. Since 1967 he has worked here in the same bread factory, making dough. He did a lot of overtime, and was able to buy a small terraced house in the cheap inner area of Birmingham. He did this in anticipation of his wife and child joining him here. At the beginning of 1971, he wrote to his wife that she could come. She too lived in a village in Mirpur many travelling hours from the British embassy—it is compulsory to attend for interview there. In the end Rashid decided he would have to go himself to help her make the arrangements, to get the entry certificate.

The trip, though, was going to be expensive, and so in the end Rashid had to sell his house before he set off. But when he arrived he discovered that the appointment for the entry certificate interview was made for a date 16 months away. He decided to wait, and eventually accompanied his wife through the ordeal of the interview and obtained the entry certificate. By June 1973 his wife and child were able to return with him to Britain. In December of the same year he applied for registration as a citizen of the UK and colonies. Fourteen months later he was told his application had been refused, because he had not been ordinarily

resident here. Ironically, one part of British bureaucracy had forced him to be absent for two unnecessary years and to sell the evidence of his connections in this country so that he could sort out their red tape, while another part used this against him!

Nazir Begum and her husband both live in Birmingham. The husband had got his British nationality. So he filled in the form for his wife—she has the right to British nationality simply because she is married to a British citizen. Some months later the Home Office sent her a questionnaire to establish where her husband was "domiciled" at the time of their marriage in Pakistan. In fact, her husband had been living in England for two and a half years when he returned to Pakistan to marry.

On the basis of the information returned in the domicile questionnaire the Home Office decided that in fact he had lost his domicile of origin, and therefore was subject to British laws. British law states that a marriage which takes place in a country which practises polygamy, even if neither party has entered into a polygamous marriage, is not legal in this country. Nazir Begum's marriage therefore was not legal, and therefore she could not acquire British citizenship by virtue of her husband's British nationality. The Home Office informed her she could go through with a civil marriage here, and then reapply.

Again, Nazir Begum is only one of several such cases which have come to our attention. She has been forced to go through the humiliating experience of remarriage to the man she is already married to—merely to please the absurdities of British bureaucracy.

These three cases are typical of the pattern of refusals. Is the original spirit of the Pakistan Act being denied? After all, the act was introduced in part to safeguard Pakistanis who had settled in this country from the insecurity of alien status. Yet refusal to register an applicant is, more often than not, a clear endorsement of alien status.

The timing of the act undoubtedly caught out many people on the ordinary residence qualification. Many Pakistanis were necessarily out of the country. They were victims of circumstances, forced to leave the country in which they had settled for temporary periods of time.

In these circumstances, to make the process of registration more stringent contradicts the original intentions of the act. As the number of applicants who fail to register as citizens of the UK and colonies increases, one is led to the conclusion that access to British nationality is also being used to introduce insecurity and fear into immigrant communities with the long term aim of reducing their number.

I have described three cases which I believe are typical. One is led to ask: is the law really made to deal with a human problem? Or does it all mean that laws are made not to help the people, but to aid and abet the permanent machinery of the state to interpret, twist and use those laws in any way it likes?

## Notes

### Local finance

TERENCE CHEETHAM writes: First the good news—not that good, but local government finance is not the most cheerful of subjects. The government has agreed to an additional grant payment towards the extra expenditure incurred in 1974-75 by local authorities, predominantly arising from increased payments to teachers as a result of the Houghton award.

The additional grant totals £231 million, and is 60.5 per cent (the same percentage as the original grant for the year) of the accepted additional expenditure of nearly £400 million: the arithmetic doesn't stand meticulous checking, but it will do. The local authorities claim that the allowed expenditure for the Houghton award should be £24 million more, and that an allowance should be made for rising costs on transport which cannot be met by fare increases. On the latter, Anthony Crosland says there's nothing doing; on the former Fred Mulley said he'll think about it if the local authorities could prove the Department of Education figures were wrong—experience has proved that that is by no means impossible.

The history of the 1974-75 rate support grant is indicative of the inflationary problems for local authorities. The original settlement was for £3,431 million, now increased to £4,748 million—an increase of some 38 per cent; and whilst these figures indicate grants of 60.5 per cent of the total expenditure, local authorities (and that largely means local rates) still have to find the remaining 39.5 per cent. Little wonder then local authorities started with a tremendous difficulty, arising from 1974-75, when they started budgeting for the 1975-76 rate calls. No authority could have allowed for 38 per cent increases in 1974-75 expenditure when central government was then suggesting that 9 per cent would be appropriate.

But at least the local treasurers can see some more money coming to their depleted coffers. They will already have allowed for it in closing the 1974-75 accounts, and they will all be hoping that the actual increased income will be more than the provision they have made.

With this background, it is not surprising that Crosland's suggestion that local authorities may have over-provided for inflation in 1975-76 and that "they may then have extra money left over next April" is greeted with hollow (or maybe empty) laughter by local authority treasurers. They know the highest inflation level likely to be allowed is 20 per cent, and that most authorities made lower provision; they know that wage and salary awards, and other costs, have in many cases already exceeded that figure. They know, too, that talk of a 1½ per cent

growth rate might be an interesting economic exercise, but that as far as the rate-payers are concerned the comparison is cash demanded to cash demanded, and no one is going to confuse *them* with talk of growth rates and real term expenditure.

So the outlook for 1976-77 rates is already gloomy. We shall almost certainly have many deficiencies arising from 1975-76, and in the meantime we have to sort our way through some of Crosland's more quotable statements, such as "the party is over" (local government is complaining that they were never invited), "we—all of us—are in a different ball game now" (local government would at least like to see an impartial referee, whatever the ball-game), and "we cannot eat our cake and have it" (and Marie Antoinette can go to the back of the class).

### Race relations

PAUL HARRISON writes: True to his promise to harmonise legislation against racial discrimination with the new Sex Discrimination Bill, Roy Jenkins in May called for submissions from interested organisations as to just how that might be done. In the last couple of weeks, two of the most important organisations concerned, the Runnymede Trust and the Community Relations Commission, brought out their new revised versions of possible race relations legislation (from 62 Chandos Place, London, WC2, and 15 Bedford Street, London, WC2, respectively). Despite the possible objection that law enforcement duties are hard to combine with an educative function, the Community Relations Commission comes out strongly in favour of ending the present division of functions between itself and the Race Relations Board, which it says can produce duplication of effort, operational conflict, and confusion in the public mind. The board itself, and the Runnymede Trust, concur that the advantages of combining the two outweigh the disadvantages.

The Community Relations Commission rejects any idea that local community relations councils should be integrated with local authorities to provide a better career structure for community relations officers: this, it says, would jeopardise their independence. But local authorities should be given a duty to consider the needs of their ethnic minorities, and to give financial support to the local CRC.

Here the Runnymede Trust diverges. It proposes that the local CRCs should be run, staffed and serviced from a new department of a ministry, or division with an under secretary in charge, concerned solely with race relations. One branch of this new department, which might not be the Home Office, would be a strengthened urban programme, which, the Runnymede Trust argues, should return to concern itself more closely with its original *raison d'être*: deprivation in areas of immigrant concentration in the inner city. Projects and spending should be concentrated on problems that, although they also affect poor white residents, mainly hit the immigrant population.

The Community Relations Commission makes a similar plea for a more coherent and powerful government approach to race relations. It is happy with the subject staying with the Home Office, but suggests that a new department be set up to deal exclusively with race relations and the urban programme.

What is already obvious is that the submissions, and the ensuing white paper will not simply concern themselves with harmonising practice for sex and race, but will involve a review of the administration and of the positive programmes to promote better race relations, too.

### Family service

JEF SMITH writes: By and large voluntary agencies in the personal social services field have been looking rather lost since the Seebohm reforms. If local authorities are to provide a comprehensive family service on a nationwide basis, is there any room left for non-statutory initiative except in the field of pressure politics where charitable status is vulnerable and council grants emphatically not to be excepted?

Family Service Units, described today (in *Time to consider: Papers from a Family Service Unit*; Bedford Square Press, 75p); have survived the change of times with more dignity than most and their success makes a neat object lesson. Local units retain a good deal of independence of headquarters and the teams remain small, at most a dozen workers. They make no bones about their status vis-à-vis the social services departments, accepting high levels of local authority grant aid with often attendant limits on their freedom. But most of all, their distinctive contribution comes from their single-minded identification with a particular client group—the multiple-problem families.

If their client focus has remained unchanged, the same is not true of the units' mode of work. In their initial, pacifist days, the stress was on real practical service, scrubbing and cleaning up like specially understanding home helps. Now they have adopted a much more eclectic pattern of operation. This collection of papers from the Leicester Unit demonstrates the variety of techniques employed: the unit organiser contributes an introductory essay on the multi-method agency and then four members of staff—a group worker, a caseworker, a counsellor and a community worker—each relate and comment on a particular case history.

Their common theme is the need, in social work practice, for the rigorous setting of aims. This is most clearly laid out by Janet Butler who with the help of a friendly systems analyst drew up a scheme of objections, tasks and targets for her work with one family, and what is more, records with telling honesty their level of attainment. Social workers who regard this as overschematic must ask themselves whether their own lack of clear planning is either a help or a model to already disorganised clients.

Meanwhile even Miss Butler does not pursue the tentative suggestions that, given the widespread use of casework by objectives, caseworkers could be paid by their results.

### High-rise flats

JANE MORTON writes: In a way, the most interesting thing about *The Social Effects of Living off the Ground*, a summary of research on life in high flats, by Barbara Adams and Jean Conway of the Department of the Environment's housing development directorate, is that someone in the department should have considered it worth issuing, free of charge, as an occasional information paper.

Wide as it ranges, however, the authors' main points merely echo the message that has been drifting across for some years now, from the department's research section—notably in the design bulletins, *Families Living at High Density* (1970), *The Estate outside the Dwelling* (1972) and *Children at Play* (1973), on which they draw extensively. They are as fair as they can be. The evidence suggests that "the success or failure of tall buildings is largely determined by the type of household living in them."

But it's fairly plain, by the end, that as far as the British public housing sector is concerned, the balance is not in their favour. The authors end, in fact, with a warning. "Where high densities are absolutely necessary and high buildings are the only suitable form of provision, it is essential to ensure . . . that families with children are accommodated only on the ground or first floors." A research study now in progress at the department is actually probing the numbers of families with children housed at higher levels, and the scope for rehousing such families. Another project is exploring alternative uses for high buildings.

Perhaps it was easier to let the research team spell it out. A political source would

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