

The technical clashes around budget time tend to obscure the fact that the Social Science Research Council has been trying to stimulate econometric modelling since the mid-sixties. Some of the most valuable contributions to a real understanding of Britain's economy may not come from the more publicised sources. Typical of such quieter projects are two at Southampton and Warwick Universities. At Southampton, Professor Ivo Pearce has 200,000 pieces of information and up to 700 equations on a computer, in an effort to build a model which will give long-run views of the economy. He feels that existing models rely too much on "guess-work and straight extrapolation." The sort of question he would like to answer is whether the late sixties carried the seeds of the present "stagflation." At Warwick, Professor Malcolm Anderson, a politics don, is working with Geoffrey Wood, formerly with the Bank of England and now in the Warwick economics faculty. They are trying to identify how different constraints on economic policy operate in different political contexts, and to relate approved policies to what actually happens.

Meanwhile, the brightest new star in the economic monitoring sky is unquestionably Godley's Cambridge Economic Policy Group, a lively nine or ten of the 35 in the university's department of applied economics. Godley, the younger son of Lord



The Cambridge group's Wynne Godley

Kilbracken and once a professional oboist, is the kind of brooding thinker who gets described as charismatic. He returned to Cambridge from the Treasury in 1970 to direct the department—though now he is again working part-time at the Treasury. He was determined that more effort should go into assessing the national economy. Godley strongly believes that economists have a duty in the present situation to stick their necks out and make recommendations. (He passionately denies, incidentally, that he is a "socialist.")

The controversy over the Cambridge prescription of import controls has also enveloped the model which suggested it—a schema developed by Godley, Cripps, Robert Neild and Lord Kaldor from an idea of Kaldor's. Its axiom is that the sum of the public and private sector balances equals the surplus or deficit of the balance of payments. Other economists tend to say they knew that already; or find it unhelpful because the private sector usually shows a surplus and the public sector a deficit. But the theory's significance is that it encour-

ages a Chancellor to run down the public sector deficit and to get nationalised industries to charge economic prices.

But there was a pleasant touch of the unexpected in the fact that the main barb pointed at the Cambridge recommendation came in March from a trio of Nuffield economists, at least one of them best known for his work on developing countries, and that their pamphlet was published by a centre originally set up as a focus for internationalist, free trading opposition to Britain's EEC membership. The pamphlet, *Import Controls versus Devaluation and Britain's Economic Prospects* is by Professor Ian Little, Professor Max Corden and M. F. Scott. It is in the tradition of academic controversy. The group had not been collaborating on other research.

The Trade Policy Research Centre, at 6 Buckingham Street, behind Charing Cross station was the inspiration of the industrious, Canadian economist, Harry Johnson. Johnson remains its director of studies although he flamboyantly threw up his chair at the London School of Economics to return across the Atlantic and is about to take up a chair at the graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. The centre has a study under way on the aid policies which governments actually adopt towards industries protected by import controls.

Though the centre's interests are rather different, its publishing policy is not so different from that gadfly proponent of the free market—the Institute of Economic Affairs. The IEA abhors fine tuning and short-term forecasting. Its influence on the economic debate is perhaps more enduring than those who tweak the Chancellor's ear each spring. It has, for example, been important in introducing the ideas of Professor Milton Friedman and the American monetarists to a British audience (though Peter Jay really set the ball rolling with an article in *The Times* in May 1968).

The IEA was founded in 1957, when its vivacious general director, Ralph Harris, worked for £10 a week in a tiny room in the



The IEA's Ralph Harris

City, and it has prospered in its own market. This interest in markets has taken it from car parking to education vouchers. Harris, a former journalist, has an eye for topicality and publicity. As John Wood, the deputy director, puts it, "There is a confusion between economics and astrology. The NIESR is strictly about astrology. Our approach is always: Is there a market? If not, why not? We've even had conversations at lunch over whether the state should

return prisons to the private sector."

The IEA is in now the same Westminster street as the Harold Wilsons, and round the corner from the NIESR. But it occupies a different mental world. In its own reckoning it is part of a revival of neo-classical economics, though it is perhaps no coincidence that it began when consumerism was developing as a serious force.

The IEA, as a commissioning and publishing house, is not precisely bound to all the views of its papers and books. But its sympathy for a market and monetarist position keeps it in contact with people like Professor Alan Walters at the LSE; Jack Wiseman, Alan Peacock's colleague and the director of the Institute for Economic and Social Research at York; and Professors David Laidler and Michael Parkin at Manchester.

Non-monetarists (ie, most of them, Keynesians) quarrel about how far the money



The Financial Times's Samuel Brittan

supply affects the demand for, and supply of, goods. One of the weaknesses of the monetarists in this country is that they do not yet possess a full model of the economy. Some would say that this matters less now they have caught the ear of Samuel Brittan. For Brittan, like Peter Jay, contributes to the economic debate in his own right, as well as recycling other people's ideas. As with so many others in their world, they are part-insiders, part-outsiders. Brittan worked at George Brown's Department of Economic Affairs. Jay, who is married to James Callaghan's daughter, once worked at the Treasury. Neither pretends to instant influence with Treasury officials. Their political stance is different: Brittan has more in common with Keith-Josephites; Jay has a more liberal socialist position. But they have a high mutual respect. Many would say it is a pity they do not differ more radically in print—especially perhaps the NIESR, which seems to have caught their wrath simultaneously.

Analysts and forecasters have suffered, inevitably, from the depressing performance of the economy. But Professor Anderson, whose work should be published next year, is examining the role that control of information plays in budget-making. He believes that more fluid, American style budget making may develop here if collective cabinet responsibility breaks down: in that case he believes that publication of all Treasury forecasts would be desirable. Until then the outside economy watchers are providing both public guidance and a counterweight to official interpretations.

The hopes of immigrant schoolchildren

Linda Dove

West Indian, Asian and Cypriot teenagers, it seems, set a high value on school. But, this study ends by asking, will the world of work justify their hopes?

How do "immigrant" school-leavers see their future in terms of further education, training and jobs? I put this question to all the 15 and 16 year olds in three London comprehensives in 1972, and this article gives my results. At that time, unemployment was high. Many of the teenagers were among the first to "suffer" the effects of the raising of the school-leaving age, by having to stay at school an extra term or year. Times were hard, so what did the immigrants expect to get out of the next few years? Did they value their educational opportunities? And did they expect to do as well as "indigenous" British youngsters for jobs? Were they optimistic that they would have equal opportunities?

The area in which the young people went to school was predominantly working class and multi-racial. In all, 545 boys and girls took part in the inquiry. First and second generation "immigrants" were included. Of the 545, 31 per cent (169) were black—20 per cent (109) of West Indian origin; and nearly 11 per cent (60) Asian, mostly from East Africa, but with a few from the Indian subcontinent. Seventy per cent (376) were white—55 per cent (298) "British" and 15 per cent (78) Cypriot, mainly Greek. Over half the Cypriots were born in Britain, a quarter of the West Indians, and 7 per cent (4) of the Asians.

I had spent many months before starting investigations in establishing rapport with the schoolchildren concerned. By means of interviews, and a questionnaire, I found out their opinions and ideas about the world in which they were growing up. A comment by a Cypriot boy is a good example of the connection in most of the pupils' minds between school and jobs. "I expect," he said, "to get a good job. After all, you can, if you get good passes in examinations."

The results of a question asking how the youngsters liked school showed that a large majority either liked it or were neutral (see table 1). Cypriots and Asians more often stated that they positively enjoyed it than did West Indians and white Britons. Girls on the whole were more positive and British boys least so.

Table 2 shows what the young people thought of their relationship with their teachers. Most teenagers thought that, on the whole, they got on well with their teachers. Girls tended to be more positive. West Indian boys got on least well of all. It is clear that regardless of whether these young people decided to stay on at school or to leave, their main reason was *not* that they found school intolerable. Most tolerated it, some enjoyed it; only a few found it unbearable.

All the pupils were asked, "When, if all goes well, do you intend to leave school?" Table 3 summarises their answers to this question. It was the summer term and they were making decisions about their futures in consultation with teachers, parents

and the careers service. Fourth formers who were old enough were deciding whether to leave school or to stay on into the fifth to take O level GCES or CSES. Most had already started preparing for them. Some fourth and fifth formers could, if they wished, stay on after the statutory leaving age with or without taking public examinations.

Table 3 also shows that more white Britons than others were eager to leave school as soon as possible without taking examinations. On the other hand, over half of them intended to try for O levels and a third wanted to take A levels.

In contrast to the white Britons, only a small proportion of all minority groups wanted to leave school at the earliest opportunity. More than half the West Indians and Cypriots intended to take O levels and so did a quarter of the Asians. (Two thirds (38) were aiming to take their A levels.) Generally, between a third and a half of all the teenagers intended to stay at school to 17 or 18 years of age.

The West Indians, particularly the girls, were not especially eager to leave school early; indeed half of them wanted O levels and a third A levels. This is surprising in view of the relatively negative attitudes which they had towards school. Perhaps there is a distinction between an attitude towards a par-

Table 1: Attitude to school

	like school		neutral		dislike school				
	%		%		%				
	m	f m & f	m	f m & f	m	f m & f			
Cypriots	60	43	54	32	54	40	8	4	7
Asians	64	67	66	33	35	34	0	2	2
West Indians	49	43	46	47	56	50	5	0	3
white Britons	31	41	44	39	62	45	16	8	12
all groups	47	49	48	42	46	44	11	6	8

NB: figures in tables do not necessarily add up to 100, as they have been rounded.

Table 2: Relationship with teachers

	favourable	unfavourable	no answer
	%	%	%
Cypriots	74	15	12
Asians	84	12	5
West Indians	65	22	15
white Britons	78	16	8
all groups	75	16	10

Table 3: % wanting to leave school

	as soon as possible	after CSE/O level	after A level	no answer
	%	%	%	%
Cypriots	8	53	37	2
Asians	5	28	63	4
West Indians	5	57	27	12
white Britons	15	59	33	5
all groups	11	49	35	6

Linda Dove is Senior Lecturer, The Faculty of Education and Performing Arts, Middlesex Polytechnic

H. E. R. Townsend and E. M. Brittan, *Organisation in Multi-Racial Schools* (NFER, 1972)

J. Rex and R. Moore, *Race, Community and Conflict* (Oxford University Press, 1967)

The Problems of Coloured School Leavers (Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration HMSO, 1969)

P. Evans, *Attitudes of Young Immigrants* (Runnymede Trust, 1971)

J. Hilton, "The ambitions of school children" (*Race Today*, March 1972)

David J. Smith, *Racial Disadvantage in Employment*, (PEP, vol 60, No. 544, 1974).

particular school and the importance they attached to gaining qualifications. The latter mattered very much to them. It also helps to cast doubt on the racial stereotype of the fun-loving, indolent West Indian, thrown at the bottom of the occupational ladder because he is unwilling to strive for success.

On the whole, there was not much difference between the intentions of boys and girls of the same ethnic group. West Indian boys were relatively undecided about their future and both they and Asian boys were less confident than girls about taking their A levels. A surprising number of Asian girls wanted to take A levels. This is remarkable as, traditionally, they are kept at home. Admittedly, the East African Asians were more westernised than other Asians. Others may have seen a longer education as a means of escaping traditional restrictions, or a way of making themselves eligible to be wives for educated men. The same is not true of the Cypriot girls, however, who are often similarly restricted, for few of them had the confidence to aspire to A levels. It appeared that they expected much less than their brothers.

In general, though, it is remarkable how consistently the teenagers showed a respect for their education and an awareness of the importance of paper qualifications. Table 4 gives their replies to the question of what they intended to do once they had left school. Few teenagers were keen to get a job without any further study. More than a quarter of the girls and nearly half the boys intended to get a job with training. Nearly a quarter wanted full-time education, though British boys and West Indians of both sexes were less keen than others. They made up for this, however, by paying at least lip-service to the idea of spare-time self-education; nearly half the West Indian girls opted for this.

The white Britons, mostly working class youngsters, were keen on apprenticeships and fairly keen on full-time education. Nevertheless, a higher proportion of Britons than any others wanted a job

Table 4: Intentions after leaving school

	apprenticeship		job with no study or training		something else/no answer
	full-time education	or day release	evening classes	or else/no answer	
	%	%	%	%	%
Cypriots	42	35	8	15	2
Asians	32	20	32	9	9
West Indians	16	37	38	7	4
white Britons	21	40	21	16	4
all groups	24	36	24	13	7

Table 5: Social class of expected job

	social class of job			
	I, II	III	IV, V	no answer
	%	%	%	%
Cypriots	26	37	10	29
Asians	32	30	9	30
West Indians	15	48	6	31
white Britons	25	46	8	22
all groups	24	44	8	26

Table 6: Social class of ideal job

	social class of job			
	I, II	III	IV, V	no answer
	%	%	%	%
Cypriots	37	44	8	12
Asians	54	30	4	15
West Indians	25	46	5	25
white Britons	40	38	7	18
all groups	38	40	5	18

with no more study or training. Cypriots were very ambitious for full-time education; a third of the girls and half the boys wanted this. Another 42 per cent (21) of the boys wanted apprenticeships but a third (nine) of the girls merely wanted a job. The attraction of apprenticeships must be seen in the light of the opportunities for hairdressing and tailoring in the local Cypriot community.

Nearly a third of the Asians valued full-time education, both boys and girls. Twenty eight per cent (nine) of the boys but quite understandably, only 12 per cent (three) of the girls, wanted apprenticeships. Many Asians of both sexes intended to study in their spare time. This pattern reflects a traditional esteem for education.

Only a small minority of West Indians envisaged a full-time education. Boys favoured apprenticeships and girls evening classes. Many saw the value of further education or training, but lacked confidence to go for it. Social and economic pressures at home helped to depress such ambitions.

Nevertheless, it is true that most youngsters, irrespective of ethnic origin or social class, expected more from life than their parents had had. They were asked to compare their own chances in life with those of their parents. Only 3 per cent (16) thought their own chances inferior and 83 per cent (452) thought they had better chances. West Indians were least optimistic, often expecting their "luck" to be affected by racial or social handicaps.

The teenagers were asked to describe the jobs they would most like to do and also the jobs they expected to get. The answers were difficult to interpret. Interviews revealed that some had only vague and sketchy ideas about what was involved in certain jobs and many were, even at that late date, undecided or confused: "I cannot say yet as one person tells me this and another tells me that. I am mixed up." This girl eventually said she expected to end up "probably in a shop behind a counter, working for £7 a week." Some answers were cautiously vague: "I would expect to get an in between job, in between good and bad." Few boys were as straightforward and specific as this one: "Banking is my career and I'm looking forward to it." Many girls envisaged office work but at what level it was difficult to determine: "I want to do in the office as a sacktray" (sic). Most were able to distinguish between the jobs they would most like to do and the ones they expected. Some were confident: "I expect to get the job I want and do what I want to do." Others were less certain.

There was a fairly high level of "no answers" and "don't know's," particularly among West Indians, though few would say openly to a relative stranger that they did not want or expect to get a job at all. It is reasonable to suppose that the teenagers would be more ambitious about their ideal jobs than their expected ones. Tables 5 and 6 support this.

The disparity between ideal and expected jobs was, of course, greatest in the case of anyone aspiring to social classes one and two (the middle class). The proportion of *expected* clerical and skilled manual jobs (class three) was inflated by those who *ideally* wanted class one and two jobs. The proportions of teenagers aspiring to, or expecting, semi- and unskilled manual jobs was very low.

In the case of white Britons, however, the picture was different: 15 per cent (45) wanted to leave school as soon as possible but only 8 per cent (24) expected semi- or unskilled manual jobs. While too much emphasis should not be placed on a small difference in proportions, it suggests that at this end of

the job ladder, white Britons were unrealistic about their job prospects in relation to their skills.

Nearly half the teenagers hoped to leave school after O levels. But there was a general and misplaced optimism that this level of qualification would open the door to jobs in at least class three.

The Asians were outstandingly the most ambitious in wanting ideal jobs in class one and two. Half of them wanted jobs at this level and nearly a third expected to get them. Cypriots, though less ambitious than Asians, compared with the pattern established by British youngsters at this level. But the West Indians aspired to, and expected, less.


These data tend to support the proposition that Asians, particularly those with status and wealth, endeavour to get on in Britain, whether they came here as unwilling refugees from East Africa or Bangladesh, or as willing workers seeking opportunities in a wealthy country. The Cypriots in this study tended not to share the higher social status of the Asians. Nevertheless, other parts of the research suggest that they were willing to work hard to achieve occupational success and that, where tradition allowed, they were willing to "integrate." Most West Indians were working class and shared the attitudes of the white Britons. To be a motor mechanic was for many British and West Indian youngsters the height of ambition.

J. Hilton, among others, has suggested that immigrants adjust their expectations of life more "realistically" the longer they live in Britain. But analysis of the data for this study show no consistent pattern of adjusted expectations. Second generation immigrants and those who had lived in Britain all their schooldays (ten years or more), generally expected jobs of at least class three level. But up to half of the West Indians and Asians who had been in Britain all their school days, and a large minority of second generation West Indians, did not name a job expectation at all. Thus, it seems that a large number of these school-leavers had no clear ideas or feared to say the type of jobs they expected.

The findings of one small-scale study are not, of course, statistically representative, but they may at least demolish one common myth. These young school-leavers did not fit the stereotype of the lazy, good-for-nothing immigrant, sapping the strength of the economy and living off the welfare state. True, they had not experienced life outside school; they were partly protected from harsh reality in the workaday world. Yet they assumed that they would be opting into, rather than opting out of, a working life; they accepted as a matter of course that they would be taking jobs after completing their schooling. The high non-response rate on these items, particularly from West Indians, was due, it seems, to an ignorance about what life had to offer, a lack of forethought and confidence, rather than to alienation and cynicism about their roles in an industrial society.

Most of the teenagers were pragmatic. They saw education as a means to a "good" job and most were willing to train or study to that end. Some immigrants openly expressed their appreciation of the chance to go to British schools. Most were not content merely to fit into the occupational structure of British society; they wished to succeed within it.

The schools, however, did not appear to have devoted much time or energy to preparing their pupils for a working life in any but a very general way. They failed to capitalise on the good will which most of the teenagers had for their own schools and teachers. And though all the schools paid lip-service to the ideal of preparing pupils of all races to live in a multi-racial society, they did



Robin Jacques

not go far in preparing them to face the tensions and obstacles which exist outside school walls.

The immigrant teenagers, nevertheless, were as realistic in their job expectations as their white British contemporaries. They almost all took into account the economic situation and their own qualifications. Poorly-qualified Britons and West Indians hoping for skilled manual jobs, and others (particularly Asians) wanting white-collar jobs, were probably the least realistic.

Some immigrants believed that they could ignore racial handicaps. One Asian girl expressed what other immigrants only suggested. Asked if she thought people in Britain treated her fairly or not, she replied: "Some do, some don't—like skin heads and that . . . They're usually fair except Enoch Powell." On the whole Cypriots were less ostensibly conscious of the racial and cultural disadvantages which they might encounter once they left school. Some thought of the "immigrant problem" as one for black people, not for themselves.

There was evidence, however, of some more depressed expectations by West Indians. Many were conscious of racism. As one boy said, "I am one of Powell's abominances." Many were unable to state what jobs they expected and valued less (or were afraid to value more) an extended education or training. A few black teenagers sported Black Power badges in school as an assertion of identity but there is not sufficient evidence to suggest that these school leavers were resentful or embittered.

Most of the youngsters will now have taken their examinations and found themselves jobs; perhaps even changed them several times. How far, one wonders, is life measuring up to their hopes and ambitions?

next week

Roger Ballard and Bronwen Holden, of the SSRC Research Unit on Ethnic Relations, report on a survey which begins to answer Linda Dove's closing question. Our editorial on page 58 considers other existing information