The Shock of the Global

THE 1970s IN PERSPECTIVE

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ond, integrating the story of the SEP into the history of the 1970s brings that decade into focus as a pivotal time in the emergence of processes of global governance. It offers a perspective on the international history of the 1970s that encourages us to look beyond nation-states and consider the impact of international organizations and other non-state actors in the global arena. It also suggests that we need to disaggregate states rather than imagine them as unitary actors in international affairs, shifting some of our attention away from the official organs of foreign policy and onto components of the U.S. government, such as the CDC, that have hitherto rarely made an appearance in traditional narratives of the international history of the decade.

Tracing the networks of historical causation and significance that neither are produced primarily by foreign policy and diplomatic establishments nor lie within the boundaries of any one state, then, permits us to explore aspects of the history of globalization and global governance—epidemic disease and public health, the dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge, and the environment in its global context, to give but a few examples—that have thus far remained on the margins of the international history of the 1970s. Given the growing salience of precisely these themes in the contemporary conversation on global affairs, it is not a moment too soon to begin writing their history.

CHAPTER 16

The Environment, Environmentalism, and International Society in the Long 1970s

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AMONG THE UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS of the 1970s was the rise of modern environmentalism around the world and the emergence of global-scale environmental anxieties and awareness. Why did this happen, and what did it matter?

Within the concept of modern environmentalism a distinction is in order. Although broadly simultaneous, there was and is a difference between environmental concern for the globe as a whole and the globalization of environmental concern. I call the first *global-scale environmentalism.* It embraces such issues as climate change, ozone depletion, population, overfishing, and so forth: matters that seem to pertain to major parts of the globe if not all of it. I call the second *globalized environmentalism,* meaning the emergence, almost everywhere around the globe, of locally focused environmental movements. The mobilizing issues discussed here varied from place to place: industrial pollution in Japan, the despoliation of natural beauty in New Zealand, dam building in India, oil spills in California, and so on. Both global-scale environmentalism and globalized environmentalism deepened and broadened in the 1970s, generating popular movements with political consequences on local, national, and international scales.

Modern environmentalism has many tangled roots. Intellectual precursors and influences are legion, from Buddha and Saint Francis to Humboldt and Thoreau. Popular indignation over specific environmental ills also has a long history. State regulation of scattered environmental matters, say, wildlife conservation efforts or antipollution measures, also ex-

tends back for centuries. Scientific concern over certain environmental issues, such as soil erosion in the 1930s, attained nearly worldwide levels. But between about 1965 and 1980 these roots somehow absorbed additional nutrients and gave flower to something new, a popular environmentalism that bloomed all around the world to become a significant factor in political life. Why? Much of the answer, I think, lies in the interactions among technology, culture, economics, and ecological change. But some of it lies within the arena of politics itself.

Technology was important in several ways. First, the ingenuity of chemical engineers combined with the availability of cheap petroleum to spawn a plethora of new organic chemicals after about 1920, and especially after 1945. Many of these, such as DDT or PCBs, proved both durable (in the sense that they do not easily break down chemically) and toxic, so that once loosed in the environment, they became persistent hazards. In general, industrial chemistry created a near infinite variety of new pollution problems that threatened the health of human beings, other species, and ecosystems.

Second, different technologies allowed detection of environmental changes and depictions of environmental conditions as never before. Photographs of the earth from space, published widely in the late 1960s, helped people to see their planet in a new way: small, alone, vulnerable. One such photo, often called "Earthrise," appeared on a U.S. postage stamp in 1969. LandSat imagery, available after 1972, showed in dramatic fashion the expansion of some deserts at the expense of pasture and farmland, encouraging the view that desertification was indeed on the march. The shrinkage of the Aral Sea became readily visible via satellite. Computers, albeit primitive by later standards, allowed oceanographers to crunch streams of data and demonstrate the global climate connections we now know as ENSO (El Niño and Southern Oscillation), a phenomenon familiar to only a few scientists until the big El Niño of 1972–73. Satellites, computers, and other new technologies allowed atmospheric scientists to hypothesize (in the 1970s) and then to prove (in the 1980s) that the earth's protective shield of stratospheric ozone was rapidly corroding under the impact of chlorofluorocarbons. In short, technological change helped to create some environmental problems but helped to reveal, measure, and study some as well.

Third, communications technology, especially television, made it easier for people to learn about environmental issues far from home. This contributed to the rise of global-scale environmentalism as, for example, TV images of starving children in the Sahel deepened worries about global overpopulation or desertification. But it also contributed to the globalization of environmentalism, as TV viewers in East Germany could see West Germans organizing marches against nuclear waste management plans, and Venezuelans could watch Californians mobilizing against oil spills. Certain environmental problems are "made for TV," such as oil spills or the decline of panda and polar bear populations; others, often more serious by most metrics, such as stratospheric ozone loss, do not measure up to the standards of TV producers. In the 1970s, it is well to remember, they were cultural gatekeepers with far greater power than they had in the 1950s, when TV was rare, or by the late 1990s, when cable and Internet diversified the media marketplace. So TV, and to a lesser extent other communications technology, assisted in the emergence of modern environmentalism while at the same time shaping its character in otherwise unlikely ways.

Fourth, a few new "greener" technologies helped focus attention on environmental problems by seeming to address them. No one likes impossible problems, but soluble ones attract people hoping to do good or add meaning to their lives (and politicians hoping to make names for themselves). Smokestack scrubbers, catalytic converters, and dozens of other new technologies carried the promise of reduced pollution and more efficient resource use. Thus technology contributed to interest in environmental problems because it seemed to provide at least a partial solution—although for a few of the most committed environmentalists the only admissible solutions involved the abandonment of modern technology altogether.

Modern popular environmentalism arose, at least in some places, in a context of countercultural critique of any and all established orthodoxies. In the late 1960s the familiar subserviences of women to men, young to old, blacks to whites (in the United States or South Africa), peasants to party cadres (in China) seemed increasingly insupportable. Authority became suspect on principle. This "counterculture" of course had different features in each setting, in some places revolving around objections to the Vietnam War, in others to racism, or merely to stifling school curricula. Broadly speaking, it was more pervasive in the prosperous lands where

young people had the leisure to acquire schooling and did not worry about the source of their next meal. But cultural revolutions of one sort or another bubbled up in Mexico, Chile, South Africa, and China, as well as in Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and North America.

This cultural trend made it easier for popular environmentalism to succeed. At root, environmentalism was a complaint against economic orthodoxy, whether of the capitalist or Communist variety. It was a critique of the faith of economists and engineers, and their programs to improve life on earth. It was in some forms, such as what evolved into the "Deep Ecology" of the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, an accusation against human society of hubris and crimes against the biosphere.[1] All this fit congenially with the broader trends. In subsequent decades, parts of the counterculture became mainstream and other parts faded away, but environmentalism, despite ebbs and flows, survived as well as any component of the 1960s critique of society and authority—mainly because environmental ills remained routine and often worsened with time.

Perhaps most indispensably, popular environmentalism arose after 1965 in response to the economic and ecological trends of the postwar and decolonization era (roughly 1945–1970). This might be dubbed the Age of Exuberance. In quantitative terms, it witnessed the fastest economic growth in the history of the world. Cheap energy, postwar reconstruction, market integration, population growth, urbanization, and technological advance contributed to this boom.

In the decolonized world, newly empowered leaders generally made extravagant promises about economic growth, often sincerely imagining that once the shackles of colonialism were cast off, prosperity would lie just around the corner. Their faith in steel mills, aluminum plants, hydroelectric dams, and the like was nurtured by the World Bank and other apostles of economic development. They chose ecologically disruptive programs of economic growth as the best means to right the historical wrongs of colonialism, to bring prosperity to the masses, and in some cases to line their own pockets.

In the major Communist economies ideological commitments to proletarian society, a fervent wish to outstrip capitalism as quickly and as conspicuously as possible, and the urge to build military-industrial complexes fueled a similar investment in heavy, pollution-intensive and resource-intensive industry. Despite a flock of albatrosses around its neck, the Soviet economy grew quickly from the late 1940s to the 1970s, and so did

those of Eastern Europe. China's grew too, mainly by virtue of rapid population growth.

In the industrial capitalist core, economic growth almost matched that of the Third World and the Communist economies, thanks in large part to Japan's recovery and expansion. A few lonely dissenters notwithstanding, the existing paradigm of heavy industry remained securely in place, joined by an increasingly industrialized agriculture. In quantitative terms, the world economy by 1970 was dizzy with success.

Exuberant growth, and the forms it took, quickened the metabolism of the world economy. The quantities of energy and materials required, and of wastes and pollution generated, more than tripled in a generation.[2] This unprecedented (and still unmatched) spurt of global economic growth, averaging nearly 5 percent per annum, had many cheerful effects, but it came with some unsettling ecological trends. Because of cheap energy and market integration, much of the ecological disturbance occasioned by this growth could take place in remote, lightly peopled, or politically weak regions, as the populous, prosperous, and powerful centers preferred: no French *département* would have tolerated the nickel mining and smelting that occurred in New Caledonia, nor would New York have accepted what was routine in New Mexico. But everywhere, in one form or another, economic growth made increasingly visible demands on ecological support systems.

A big part of the global economic growth spurt derived merely from global population growth. No one worried about this in the 1930s, but by the late 1940s a few voices raised doubts about the implications of further growth, and by the late 1960s many distinguished scientists and statesmen did as well. Human numbers climbed from about 2.5 billion in 1950 to nearly 4 billion in 1970. By 1968–1972 population growth reached a historic rate, just above 2 percent per annum. This provoked acute fears of famine, resource depletion, and overcrowding that would diminish the quality of life and perhaps invite epidemics and pandemics.

In low-fertility countries population growth also provoked political worries among those of a Physiocratic bent. If one believed that power accrued to countries with large populations, then the geography of the population boom held implications for the international distribution of power. The old European colonial powers, the United States, and the Soviet Union, despite their baby booms, were reproducing far more slowly than the former colonial populations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Eu-

rope (west of the USSR), for example, accounted for a sixth of humankind in 1945 but only a ninth by 1975. Limiting population growth in a global sense necessarily meant checking it in the "Third World" and thereby slowing the demographic eclipse of the great powers. Thus population limitation held a political appeal to some for whom environmental concerns normally did not register.

Out of genuine concern, and in response to carrots and sticks, countries around the world adopted population restriction policies, a novelty in statecraft. For most of the last five thousand years, states concerned themselves with population growth only if trying to maximize it. The most effective attempt at fertility control was China's so-called one-child policy, adopted in 1978 shortly after Mao's death. His successors, worried about the prospect of famine (they all remembered the Great Leap Forward), reversed Mao's usual position that there could never be too many Chinese. That telescoped a demographic transition into twenty years. India, building on colonial precedents, as early as 1953 adopted policies to discourage fertility, though less stringent than China's.[3] A conspicuous outlier in population policy was Ceauşescu's Romania, where after 1966 all forms of fertility control were illegal and the secret police saw to it that Romanian women did not shirk their reproductive duties.

People inclined toward a biological view (economists normally saw things differently) feared that population growth would lead to Malthusian crunches, and thereby to revolutions and wars. Hence governments took notice, and international organizations sprang up or retooled to help limit fertility, all in the interest of preserving either the environment or tranquillity among nations—or both. Population anxieties were a central part of global-scale environmentalism, and remained so until climate change seized center stage in the late 1980s.

While population growth did not in fact lead to widespread famines, other trends supported the belief that ecological stress threatened human (and biospheric) well-being. Consider, for example, the Green Revolution, urbanization, and motorization.

The Green Revolution, a technological package of high-yield crops, fertilizers, pesticides, and (in most cases) irrigation and mechanization, was the main reason why population growth did not provoke giant famines in the 1960s and 1970s. Yields per acre in wheat, rice, and maize doubled and tripled. It was the equivalent of finding a new continent with the size and soil fertility of North America. Despite the political and public relations focus on the Green Revolution in the Third World, its miracles applied in Sussex and Saskatchewan as much as in Sonora and Sindh. Only the USSR remained unaffected: Soviet commitment to Lysenkoism through 1964 prevented the necessary manipulation of crop genomes, obliging the USSR to gamble on plowups such as the ill-fated Virgin Lands scheme in place of a revolution in yields. (Trofim Lysenko, 1898–1976, Stalin's favorite biologist, maintained that acquired biological characteristics were heritable, counter to the standard view, and thus that crop breeds could be improved by manipulating their environments.) Even Mao's China, despite the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution, succeeded in developing high-yield rice strains. Everywhere, under all manner of economic systems, the technologies of the Green Revolution strongly rewarded larger scales of production: sprawling fields of single crops.

Everywhere the success of the Green Revolution required new agrochemicals. The pesticides needed to combat the vulnerability of monocropping often proved indiscriminate killers. Most of them were persistent in the environment and bio-accumulative, meaning that they worked their way up through the food web in ever larger concentrations. They killed helpful and harmful insects alike, and often birds and reptiles that ate the insects, as Rachel Carson among others pointed out.[4] Where farmworkers lacked sufficient protections, pesticides slowly killed them too, via nasty toxins absorbed through their skin and lungs. Fertilizers upset aquatic ecosystems by providing excess nitrogen and phosphorus, the key limiting elements in most plant growth, thereby leading to algal blooms, especially in stagnant and warm water. (Untreated sewage also made major contributions of excess nitrogen and phosphorus.) When they decayed, these blooms gobbled up dissolved oxygen, robbing other species of their share, creating "dead zones" without aquatic life. Huge ones developed in the Black Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, for example, and eventually in the Yellow Sea too.

Almost everywhere the Green Revolution also required a new scale of irrigation. More and bigger dams went up; the 1960s and 1970s formed the historic peak in dam construction around the world. This inevitably meant flooding out forests or populated areas, disrupting downstream aquatic ecosystems, changing the erosion and sedimentation regimes of rivers, and much more besides. People and other species had to adapt, migrate, or disappear. The irrigation water provided by the dams helped

crops to grow. Most of it did not enter root systems, however, but either evaporated or lingered in the soil, leading to rising water tables and waterlogging. Where evaporation rates were high, as in Australia, Punjab, Xinjiang, or Mexico, that brought salinization. Snowy-white crusts of salt slowly appeared on farmers' fields, showing intensive irrigation to be, in places, a short-term strategy.

So the food won in the Green Revolution came at an ecological and human health cost. This accounts for part of the controversy that swirled around it from the 1970s onward (the other part derives from alleged impacts on property concentration). In Mexico and India especially, but also in California and Languedoc, the Green Revolution's chemicals earned many enemies. They seemed, to some, part of another colonial or Yankee imposition, an arrogant expression of presumed superiority on the part of technical experts at the expense of peasants.

The food surpluses of the Green Revolution helped accelerate the twentieth century's trend of urbanization. Fewer and fewer people could grow more and more food, so the villages sent their unneeded young to the cities. Whereas in 1900 about a seventh of humankind lived in cities, by 1975 more than a third did. Meanwhile (1880–1950), an unremarked turning point came in the human condition: urban death rates sank below urban birthrates for the first time in history. Formerly city life had killed people faster than others were born, but improvements in disease control after 1880 gradually revised that fundamental fact. After 1950 urban growth increasingly outpaced the capacity of municipal administrations to build infrastructure for sewage, water, or electricity. So the proportion of people living in shantytowns grew, especially in the Third World, where village birthrates remained high. Enormous—and enormously discouraging—slums soon surrounded megacities such as Manila, Karachi, Abidjan, and Lima. In the rich world, urbanization after 1950 took the form mainly of suburbanization, the auto-enabled sprawl pioneered in the United States and Canada in the 1920s.

In the proliferation of both shantytowns and suburbia it was easy to see environmental degradation. In the first case, crowded and unsanitary conditions prevailed most conspicuously, and only children born and raised among the garbage and impromptu sewers, unaware that any other human habitats existed, did not find such urban conditions a form of degradation. Ex-villagers, even if they could make a better living picking over the garbage dumps of a megacity than they could tilling a tiny plot back home, resented the transition they felt forced upon them. This helped fuel an urban form of what Juan Martínez-Alier calls the "environmentalism of the poor," focused on local health and quality of life issues, and informed by burning social resentments.[5] Suburbia, while it might have looked like paradise to those stuck in shantytowns, was seen by others as the loss of fertile farmland, wetland wildlife habitat, or old-growth forests, combined with the proliferation of ugly strip malls, parking lots, and soulless housing tracts. Hence the urban turn in late-twentieth-century world history, in its various forms, helped inspire notions that humans were degrading their planet and their lives.

Motorization helped support this impression too. In the nineteenth century, railroads had led to deforestation (for fuel and crossties), pollution, and the sudden ability of urban populations to escape the city and appreciate the splendors of nature. Automobiles did equivalent things, only more so. While they did not have much direct impact on forests, they led to huge expansions in road networks, pavement, and attendant changes in local ecologies; to enormous increases in urban pollution loads and changes in urban air pollution chemistry; to the proliferation of rubber plantations (for tires) in Liberia, Malaysia, and elsewhere; and to a new ability to visit nature on the weekends. Once cars became routine accoutrements of middle-class and even working-class family life (1915–1950 in the United States and Canada, 1950–1970 in Western Europe), the "demand" for nature in agreeable forms skyrocketed. After cars entered the picture, the crowded, noisy, and polluted conditions of city life, and perhaps the banality of suburbia too, drove people to seek antidotes, or at least relief, amid forest and stream. Where they did not already exist, accessible arcadias had to be created: parks and protected areas acquired political support as never before. This process obtained chiefly in those lands where cars had colonized human life, which as of the 1970s meant only North America and Western Europe, and to some extent Japan.

All these trends (and others unmentioned here) contributed to the emergence of the new environmentalism. So too did some portentous ecological and political events of the 1960s and 1970s. They might have gone unnoticed in earlier times, but in the context of the age, and with its communications media, they instead became iconic symbols of a world gone ecologically awry. Oil spills such as that of the *Torrey Canyon* off Cornwall (1967), the Union Oil platforms in the Santa Barbara Channel (1969), or the *Amoco Cadiz* off Brittany (1978) made the TV news and galvanized

formerly placid populations against pollution. Plans to turn one of New Zealand's scenic wonders, Lake Manapouri, into a reservoir for a new dam turned countless Kiwis into conservationists almost overnight. A successful lawsuit against a chemical company that had lethally contaminated Minamata Bay, killing and grotesquely deforming local residents, inspired environmentalist enthusiasm in Japan. The 1973 oil crisis, while entirely unecological in character, seemed to confirm the dire predictions of resource depletion made above all in the Club of Rome's 1972 *Limits to Growth*.[6] The big El Niño of 1972–73 ruined Peru's anchovy fisheries and sent that nation's economy into a tailspin. A 1976 explosion at a chemical plant producing herbicides just north of Milan loosed a dioxin cloud on unsuspecting Italians, especially in the downwind community of Seveso. A 1979 accident at Three Mile Island (Pennsylvania) cast new doubt on the safety of civilian nuclear power.

Ten thousand more industrial accidents, mountain landslides, legal battles, and scientific revelations helped mobilize new publics in the cause of environmentalism. Sometimes, as with the oil shock or El Niño, the events had nothing to do with human mistreatment of the environment. Others, such as Three Mile Island, although it came close to a meltdown, were in fact much less serious than previous (more secret) accidents. But nonetheless, they all contributed to a general sense that things were out of whack and business as usual was responsible. Citizens, where they had liberty to do so, demanded their governments step in to protect the environment and public health.

Armed with a growing sense that the environment was under siege, and galvanized by the cultural climate in which demonstrations and marches had become commonplace, ecologically minded citizens took to the streets. Street demonstrations, long a part of politics in industrial cities, worked especially well in the TV age and proliferated in the 1960s. For American environmentalists the culmination came in 1970 with Earth Day, a demonstration and "teach-in" across the United States that by some counts involved 20 million people, or roughly a tenth of the national population. The fact that it fell on Lenin's one hundredth birthday (April 22) heightened suspicion in some quarters that its organizers, who included a senator from Wisconsin, served Communist interests.[7] Smaller demonstrations picketed notorious polluters, at least in countries where such displays carried minimal risks to life and limb: in Pinochet's Chile or Brezhnev's USSR, street demonstrations over environmental issues were few and far between.

Rural populations engaged in acts of political environmentalism too. It was much harder for them to attract attention, and more tempting for authorities to use force to disperse them. But despite the less promising ratio of risk to reward, villagers in various settings organized themselves to protest, and sometimes to try to prevent, logging or dam building or mine pollution in their vicinities. Peruvians protested the expansion of copper smelting that doused their pastures in sulfur dioxide. Ecuadorians objected to oil drilling that left pools and residues of petroleum in their forests and fields. Filipinos tried to block logging companies from harvesting timber. Hundreds of such environmental protests took place in the 1970s (and afterwards). Sometimes they involved sabotage and violence; sometimes they led to army and police massacres. Often they ended in brokered deals and financial compensation that scarcely affected the balance sheets of logging and mining companies, though they satisfied at least some of the protesting poor. Rarely did they bring about major reductions in the pace of logging or mining, but occasionally these deals lessened their environmental impacts.

Wherever the law was a suitable instrument, the environmental movement quickly became institutionalized and bureaucratized, and lost some of its spontaneous and countercultural qualities. Legislatures began to turn out environmental law, and law schools to churn out environmental lawyers. Environmental NGOs, many of which had existed as single-interest groups for decades, became lobbying and fund-raising machines, especially in the United States and Europe. This inevitably disappointed some environmentalists, for whom lawyers and lobbyists could never be on the side of the angels, and thus fragmentation followed, as a few purists preferred various forms of direct action, while the majority supported or acquiesced in the political taming of environmentalism. This rift showed most clearly in West Germany, where a Green Party formed in 1979. Electoral success in 1983 obliged it to take part in the sausage making (as Bismarck called lawmaking) of the Bundestag; its membership split into "Realos," willing to work within the system, and unwilling "Fundis." In this trajectory of growth and schism, environmentalism resembled many other social (and religious) movements that splintered under the impact of success.[8]

Even the environmentalism of the poor underwent institutionalization to some degree. In the Indian Himalaya, a landscape with a rich tradition of peasant protest, a formal organization sprang up in 1973 to contest loggers' access to montane forests (the Chipko Andalan). In 1977 the Kenyan Green Belt movement coalesced, an organization mainly of women devoted to planting trees to check erosion and desertification. These, and several hundred like movements, emerged in response to peasants' grievances over new initiatives to log, mine, or dam up parts of the environment of use to them. They did not, by and large, extol biodiversity, wilderness, or beauty in nature. They were concerned with the practical benefits of forests, soil, water, and with who had the rights to these benefits. They were, in the main, rural. Many were composed chiefly of, and some led by, women; they, after all, were the ones who collected fuel wood from the dwindling forests, carried water from stream to home, and took responsibility for the health of children. Most of the development projects intended to lift poor countries out of poverty, and much of the quickening of the globe's metabolism, carried unwelcome consequences for rural women. In many countries, India and Brazil included, it was also politically astute to have women stand athwart logging roads defying trucks and bulldozers, as it raised the political costs to the state of using violence to help the loggers and dam builders on their way. These new organizations often found allies within religious establishments dedicated to the welfare of the downtrodden, the Catholic Church (at least its liberation theology wing) in Latin America, or the Buddhist clergy in South and Southeast Asia.[9]

Meanwhile governments and state bureaucracies adapted nimbly to the political implications of popular environmentalism. Beginning in 1967 in Sweden and 1970 in the United States, ministries and agencies appeared, charged with safeguarding national environments. This was new. For centuries regulations had existed concerning specific environmental nuisances or problems such as local air pollution or regional soil erosion. A few rulers had busied themselves with forest or wildlife protection, such as Peter the Great in Russia (1672–1725). In West Germany a spate of regulations concerning air pollution had come in the late 1950s. But now the state stepped in, assuming powers to regulate the environment as a whole. Traditional conservatives who typically scorned everything associated with street demonstrations, men such as Adenauer, Pompidou, and Nixon, sought to align themselves with environmentalism and supported

the new regulation. After 1970 environmental agencies and ministries proliferated, so that almost every country not enmeshed in civil war created one. Local and provincial governments opened their own offices for environmental protection too. Of course the impact of all this was variable. In Cuba, for example, environmental law and regulation had minimal impact. In West Germany it had a lot.[10]

On the level of international politics, modern environmentalism, especially environmental globalism, made minor impacts. The exigencies (real and imagined) of the Cold War, combined with commitments to economic growth, narrowed the opportunities for environmentalism to affect world affairs. Cold War powers felt constrained to build and maintain military-industrial complexes, including nuclear weapons, and to accept the environmental costs. Indeed Cold War pressures provided convenient ways to demonize environmentalists, who in the Soviet Union were often depicted as traitorous agents of the capitalist enemy and in the West as "the Trojan horse of the Soviet cavalry."[11] Leaders of poor countries, such as Indira Gandhi, often maintained that their people wanted more pollution rather than less, because pollution meant national economic progress.[12] Nonetheless, the growing pressure from the grass roots, together with mounting anxieties among scientists and diplomats, brought environmental issues squarely into the arena of international politics.

There were precedents. Bilateral accords on fishing rights and seal protection date back to the early twentieth century or before. Perhaps the first major instance of environmental concerns affecting international politics was the nuclear test–ban treaty of 1963, intended (among other things) to limit the radioactive fallout in the atmosphere.

In the 1970s international environmental accords followed thick and fast: on dumping at sea, on Antarctica, on regional seas such as the Baltic and the Mediterranean, on acid rain. Under UN auspices nations gathered to discuss the environment (Stockholm, 1972), population (Bucharest, 1974), and food problems (Rome, 1974). The UN created its own unit for environmental preservation in 1972, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), headquartered in Nairobi. The fact that the UN already existed, and that preservation of the health of the earth was an easy goal for all to support, at least in the abstract, helped to turn the tide toward international cooperation and accords.

Conventional Cold War politics did not fade away: the USSR and Poland, for example, boycotted the Stockholm gathering because East Ger-

many was not invited. Nonetheless, almost everywhere mid-level bureaucrats, diplomats, and their masters had begun either to take environmental issues seriously or at least to calculate that they must appear to do so. No doubt many of them felt genuinely, as millions of less powerful people did, that something needed to be done, and they sought arenas where they could achieve something. Their conception of how best to protect national interests now extended into new terrain—population, food, women's reproductive rights, seafloor mining, the distribution of weather information from satellites, and so forth. In their quest to do the right thing, sometimes they negotiated accords that cost their domestic constituents.[13]

In taking this environmental turn, they received some help from détente beginning around 1969–70. As the United States began to seek a way to leave Vietnam, and the USSR grew more worried about China, the superpowers became more open to negotiation. They and their allies found that environmental issues suited their situations: little of immediate value seemed to be at stake, and something of an international community of scientists existed which could be enlisted to support negotiations, and for whom geopolitical issues were less divisive.

Thus, for example, in the late 1960s and early 1970s the states bordering the Baltic Sea came together to try to hammer out accords on pollution control. The Baltic for reasons of physical geography is especially vulnerable to pollution, and in the mid-twentieth century it got a heavy dose of urban sewage, industrial effluent, and agricultural runoff. Anyone with eyes or a nose was easily persuaded of the problem. Finland's neutrality helped to bring the parties together, but quarrels over the status of East Germany (not then recognized by West Germany) bedeviled negotiations. After much wrangling, which led to the formal recognition of East Germany in 1972, diplomats in 1974 achieved the first multilateral convention signed by members of rival Cold War alliance systems. The USSR used the Baltic environmental issue to achieve recognition of East Germany. But at the same time, the resolution of the German question and the general atmosphere of détente made environmental accords much easier to reach. It is hard to imagine diplomats negotiating the Helsinki Convention amid the chilly Cold War politics of the 1950s or the early 1980s. So in short, environmental negotiations boosted détente and détente smoothed environmental negotiations.[14]

Environmentalism also added energy to nuclear disarmament initiatives. By the 1970s the nuclear arsenals of the great powers, especially the superpowers, worried almost everyone who knew of them. Most of the anxiety concerned the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used for the purposes for which they were built. But part of it concerned the possibility of accidents and contamination. Constituencies formed, especially in Europe, for which antinuclear politics served as the unifying principle, bringing together peace activists and environmentalists. Their numbers, commitment, and influence tended to be strongest in NATO countries that hosted nuclear weapons installations, West Germany above all. People in Warsaw Pact countries often felt much the same way about nuclear weapons, and often were permitted to voice public support for peace and disarmament, but rarely for the reduction or abolition of nuclear weapons on environmental grounds.

In short, in the context of Cold War politics, while there were constraints on the degree to which states felt they could deviate from the template of heavy industrial energy- and pollution-intensive economies, these constraints loosened slightly with détente. Simultaneously, with looser constraints, the arena for environmental diplomacy widened, some agreements were reached, and some trust was built, in turn making détente a bit deeper. When détente died in 1979–80 and the Cold War entered another frosty phase, the room for political maneuver available to advocates of environmental restraint narrowed dramatically.

Détente, interestingly, had its ecological consequences too. When the United States began to ship grain to the Soviet Union, an exchange of sea creatures accompanied the cargoes. All oceangoing vessels carry ballast water from time to time, which they take in at one harbor and often deposit weeks later in another. They also take in small species of marine life, and the eggs or small fry of larger ones. In this way the Black Sea acquired a species of comb jelly *(Mnemiopsis leidyi)* via American freighters coming from East Coast harbors. In the estuaries of eastern North America it was and is an inconspicuous and inoffensive creature, sometimes called "sea walnut," easily kept in check by local predators. In the Black Sea, however, it reproduced exuberantly and ruthlessly devoured the same foods that had formerly sustained a large anchovy population on which a Soviet fishery was based. By the mid-1980s the comb jelly accounted for the majority of the biomass in the Black Sea, and the anchovy fishery vanished, adding slightly to the economic woes of the crumbling USSR. (In

the late 1980s Soviet ecosystems retaliated with the zebra mussel, a major nuisance to North American aquatic life at a cost of billions of dollars a year.)

The long 1970s saw the crystallization of a new force in the culture and politics of the world: modern environmentalism. Taking shape in response to the environmental disruptions that came with pell-mell economic growth in the Age of Exuberance, in a context of counterculturalism, and with the aid of new technologies (of pollution, of detection, and of communication), environmentalism influenced political life on local, national, and international scales. A new concern emerged for global-scale issues that seemed to require international cooperation, but at the same time, local-scale environmental activism and political action proliferated around the world.

The salience and power of environmentalism have ebbed and flowed since the 1970s. Levels of concern have varied with the apparent severity of environmental problems; so, for example, the recent science and publicity concerning climate change have made global warming politically and culturally important. But the waning and waxing of environmentalism varies at least as much with the "space" available on the agendas of citizens and states after attention to the more urgent priorities of short-term security and economic growth. When security seems assured and the economic pie is growing, environmentalism flourishes in the resulting anxiety vacuum. When security is in peril and the economy shrinking, environmentalism fades into the background. That is less a reflection on the relative seriousness of the issues confronting people and politicians than on their temporal urgency: environmental issues seemingly can be put off to tomorrow at low cost. They will, most of them, grow more severe if neglected, but only slowly. Hence the 1970s added a new dimension to global politics, one which altered and complicated, but did not revolutionize, the procedures of international society. Only environmental disaster is likely to change that.

PART V

Ideological, Religious, and Intellectual Upheaval

26. Undated memo, LBJ Library, Office Files of Joseph A. Califano, Box 29 (1737), Folder: "Health."
27. From 1958 to 1979 Moscow donated 1.4 billion doses bilaterally to endemic countries, in comparison to Washington's 190 million doses. In addition, from 1967 to 1984 the USSR accounted for 298 million of the 465 million doses given directly to WHO, while the United States gave only 2.4 million doses. Fenner et al., *Smallpox and Its Eradication*, pp. 469, 564; Henderson, "Smallpox Eradication," pp. 115–116.
28. Henderson, "Smallpox Eradication," pp. 116–117.
29. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge, 2005), p. 397.
30. "President Johnson on International Cooperation Year."
31. Work that explores the origins, contours, and consequences of high modernist policies includes James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, 1998); and Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity* (Berkeley, 2002). But the story of the SEP serves to remind us that, on occasion, some schemes to improve the human condition have in fact succeeded.
32. Kristin L. Ahlberg, "'Machiavelli with a Heart': The Johnson Administration's Food for Peace Program in India, 1965–1966," *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 4 (2007): 665–701.
33. Sencer was CDC head from 1966 to 1977. On his and the CDC's role in the SEP, see Elizabeth W. Etheridge, *Sentinel for Health: A History of the Centers for Disease Control* (Berkeley, 1992), chap. 14; also Lawrence Brilliant to Califano, February 26, 1977, copy in possession of author.
34. Foege was later CDC director and then a senior adviser on global health to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Brilliant has served as head of the Google Foundation and other philanthropic organizations.
35. Jonathan Tucker, *Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox* (New York, 2001), pp. 94–104.
36. Mani to WHO DG, March 16, 1967, World Health Organization Archive, Geneva, Box 193, Folder 416. Also Fenner et al., *Smallpox and Its Eradication*, pp. 417–418; Henderson, "Smallpox Eradication," pp. 114–115.
37. Socrates Litsios, "The Christian Medical Commission and the Development of the World Health Organization's Primary Health Care Approach," *American Journal of Public Health* 94, no. 11 (2004): 1884–93; Sung Lee, "WHO and the Developing World: The Contest for Ideology," in *Western Medicine as Contested Knowledge*, ed. Andrew Cunningham and Bridie Andrews (Manchester, 1997), pp. 24–45. The "horizontal" versus "vertical" debate is sometimes described as one between "holistic" and "reductionist" approaches.

38. David A. Tejada de Rivero, "Alma-Ata Revisited," *Perspectives in Health: The Magazine of the Pan American Health Organization* 8, no. 2 (2003), www.paho.org; Socrates Litsios, "The Long and Difficult Road to Alma-Ata: A Personal Reflection," *International Journal of Health Services* 32, no. 4 (2002): 709–732. The full text of the declaration is available at http://www.who.int/hpr/NPH/docs/declaration_almaata.pdf.
39. Tucker, *Scourge*, esp. chaps. 8–10.

16. The Environment, Environmentalism, and International Society in the Long 1970s

1. Arne Naess (1912–2009) was an academic philosopher who began writing about truth, language, and other such matters in the late 1930s, then in the 1950s about Gandhi's political ethics, and by 1969 about mountains and ecology. He developed the position that humankind is but one among many species and is ethically constrained from harming others except in instances of vital need.
2. Relevant figures from J. R. McNeill, *Something New under the Sun* (New York, 2000); HYDE database of the Dutch Environmental Assessment Agency, http://www.mnp.nl/en/themasites/hyde/index.html.
3. Sanjam Ahluwalia, *Reproductive Restraints: Birth Control in India, 1877–1947* (Urbana, 2008).
4. Rachel Carson, *Silent Spring* (New York, 1962).
5. Juan Martínez-Alier, *The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study in Ecological Conflicts and Valuation* (Cheltenham, 2002).
6. Donnella H. Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind* (New York, 1972). The book sold 30 million copies and was translated into at least thirty languages. Its particular novelty was the use of computer-based projections, which its sponsors insisted upon in the belief that this would enhance its prestige and impact.
7. It was also the birthday of Saint Francis, and by some accounts the organizers thought it was John Muir's too. According to the *New York Times*, April 15, 1971, p. 1, the FBI "spied" on Earth Day activities.
8. This also resulted from aging. People eager to engage in mass action in the streets at age twenty-five normally showed less enthusiasm by age forty. The problem with socialism, said Oscar Wilde, is that it takes up too many evenings; the problem afflicts grass-roots activism of all sorts unless new young people keep joining up.
9. See Ramachandra Guha, *Environmentalism: A Global History* (New York, 2000). In Burma and Thailand "ecology monks" spearheaded resistance to development projects that seemed to undermine the interests of the ru-

ral poor. In India and elsewhere, Gandhian ideology also made a contribution.

10. Sergio Díaz-Briquets and Jorge Pérez-López, *Conquering Nature: The Environmental Legacy of Socialism in Cuba* (Pittsburgh, 2000). Of the dozens of studies of German environmental regulation, a recent example is Sandra Chaney, *Nature of the Miracle Years: Conservation in West Germany, 1945–1975* (New York, 2008).
11. The Bavarian conservative politician Franz-Josef Strauss's epithet for German Greens. Guha, *Environmentalism*, p. 97.
12. Ibid., p. 112; Shawn Miller, *The Environmental History of Latin America* (New York, 2007), p. 206.
13. For example, U.S. farmers would have enjoyed advantages if U.S. satellite weather data had been kept from farmers elsewhere; U.S. oil companies would have profited from unrestricted seafloor mining; Soviet and Japanese fishing fleets would have benefited from unrestricted fishing and whaling.
14. The Baltic case is illuminated by Finnish archival material used in Tuomas Räsänen and Simo Laakkonen, "Cold War and the Environment: The Role of Finland in International Politics in the Baltic Sea Region," *Ambio* 36 (2007): 229–236.

17. Globalizing Sisterhood

1. Betty Friedan, "Scary Doings in Mexico City," in *"It Changed My Life"* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), p. 454.
2. Ibid., p. 440.
3. *El Nacional*, June 26, 1975, p. 9.
4. I draw here on Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper's specification of identity as a self-understanding or situated subjectivity that serves as the basis for social or political action—what Gayatri Spivak dubbed "strategic essentialism"—rather than a fixed ontological essence. Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond 'Identity,'" *Theory and Society* 29 (2000): 1–47; and Elizabeth Grosz, "Criticism, Feminism, and the Institution," in *The Post-Colonial Critic*, ed. Sarah Harasym (New York, 1990), pp. 11–12.
5. Judith Butler, "Contingent Foundations," in *Feminists Theorize the Political*, ed. Judith Butler and Joan Scott (New York, 1992), pp. 3–21.
6. Virginia R. Allan, Margaret E. Galey, and Mildred E. Persinger, "World Conference of International Women's Year," in *Women, Politics, and the United Nations*, ed. Anne Winslowe (Westport, Conn., 1995), p. 30. For examples of continued liberal-socialist conflicts, see correspondence in the International Women's Tribune Centre, Accession No. 89S-27, Box 1, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College (hereafter IWTC Collection).

7. Aurelio Caicedo (Colombian Ambassador to the UN) to Kurt Waldheim, October 17, 1974, UN Archives, S-0971–0012–05.
8. Elaine Livingstone to Arlie [Scott], Betty [Friedan], Karen [DeCrow], and Jackie [Ceballos], March 22, 1975, Betty Friedan Papers, Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library on the History of Women, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Betty Friedan Papers (hereafter Friedan Papers), Accession No. 71–62, 77-M105, Carton 37, File 1247.
9. Friedan to Walker, May 19, 1975, Friedan Papers, Accession No. 71–62, 77-M105, Carton 37, File 1248.
10. [Margaret K. Bruce], "Report of the Economic and Social Council," October 23, 1974, NOW-NYC Records, Box 23, Folder 11, National Organization for Women–New York City Records, Tamiment Library, New York University Libraries (hereafter NYC-NOW Collection); *Excélsior*, June 19, 1975, p. 7A.
11. *New York Times*, June 19, 1975, p. 41.
12. Telegram, Curtis H. Taylor to Secretary of State, May 9, 1975, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 220, Records Relating to the U.N. IWY World Conference, Mexico City, June–July 1974, Subject File A–G, Box 22.
13. Marcy to Ingersoll, June 9, 1975, ibid.
14. Adrienne Germain memo, March 17, 1975, IWTC Collection, Accession No. 89S-27, Box 3.
15. Robert Rhodes James to Waldheim, June 13, 1975, UN Archives, S-0273–0012–03.
16. Vicente Lascuráin, "Las dos Conferencias del Año Internacional de la Mujer," *El Nacional*, June 27, 1975, p. 5.
17. *El Nacional*, June 25, 1975, p. 7.
18. *El Universal*, July 2, 1975, p. 1.
19. Matthew Connelly, *Fatal Misconception* (Cambridge, Mass., 2008), esp. chaps. 7 and 8.
20. Thomas L. McPhail, *Electronic Colonialism*, 2nd ed. (London, 1987), esp. chaps. 1 and 3.
21. *New York Times*, June 29, 1975, p. 2.
22. Akira Iriye sees the 1970s as a turning point in the expansion of numbers and influence of international NGOs. See Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organization in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley, 2002), pp. 128–131. For a history of the emergence of NGOs in transnational activism, see chapter 2 of Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders* (Ithaca, 1998). On the growing role of feminist NGOs in international governance, see Elisabeth J. Friedman, Kathryn Hochstetler, and Ann Marie Clark, *Sovereignty, Democracy,*