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What is This?
Mission control: The origins of a humanitarian service

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Abstract In effect, this article is a summary of the first part of a larger piece of historical research, which in its entirety concentrates more on the writings of practitioners and interested outsiders. The result of this approach has produced a revised history of the probation service that challenges orthodox accounts, builds on the work of commentators like Bill McWilliams, and reflects on how a focus on practice as opposed to policy discourse renders different meanings to, and understandings of, the development of the concept during the 20th century. This article focuses on the origins and early period of probation history.

Keywords Christianity, eugenics, John Augustus, police court missionaries, probation history, psychology

Most histories of probation trace its origins to the Victorian era and pressure for penal reform applied by a united movement motivated by humanity and Christian principles. This article, drawn from a fuller study of probation history that highlights practice-related discourse as the missing ingredient of criminological theorizing, argues that the early origins and development of the probation service are more complex than has been represented by orthodox accounts. It suggests that, although the evangelical humanitarian mission is an important element in the story of early probation, the emergence of the study of individual psychology, the shift from individualism to individualization in the application of punishment, and political and societal concerns about the maintenance of social order have been neglected or at least underplayed. Whilst acknowledging that the history of probation is in part the story of a ‘moral good’ driven by humanitarian concern (Celnick and McWilliams, 1991), it asserts, therefore, that it should more appropriately be seen within the context of those different and sometimes contradictory factors. It concludes with some reflections on contemporary probation.
A familiar tale

The orthodox history is well known and only needs to be summarized here. The legend (Osler, 1995) of the letter of Frederic Rainer to his friend and vicar, Canon Ellison, who was at that time the chairman and co-founder of the Church of England Temperance Society, is essential to most accounts of the origins of the probation service (Ayscough, 1929; Bochel, 1976; Gamon, 1907; Grinnell, 1941; Jarvis, 1972a, 1972b; King, 1969; Minn, 1950; Page, 1992; Timasheff, 1941). Furthermore, it symbolizes acceptance of undiluted altruism towards the unfortunate as the prime motivation for work with people who offend. Those accounts, and others, present a variety of explanations of the origins of the concept of probation. These include Athelstan, Anglo-Saxon king (Report of the Departmental Committee on the Treatment of Young Offenders, 1927, cited in Le Mesurier, 1935, p. 19), the Pilgrim Fathers (Glueck, 1930, cited in Le Mesurier, 1935, pp. 20–1) and the London ‘City Custom of Apprentices’ by which the Chamberlain of London dealt with the misbehaviour of apprentices (Tallack, 1884). Most place emphasis on the Boston magistrates in the 1830s (Moreland, 1941), the use of recognizance in England in the 16th century (Timasheff, 1941), the Warwickshire magistrates, Edward Cox and Matthew Davenport Hill in Britain and John Augustus in America.

In the 1820s, the Warwickshire magistrates adopted the practice of committing young people who came before them to the care of their employer following, it is suggested, imprisonment for a day. Matthew Hill, a Recorder in Birmingham, introduced what he believed to be an improved system that involved the keeping of a register and follow-up inquiries by ‘a confidential officer’ (Bochel, 1976, p. 5; Minn, 1950). Edward Cox, when he was both the Recorder of Portsmouth and Chairman of the Second Court of the Middlesex Sessions from 1870 to his death in 1879, took Hill’s idea a step closer to the modern concept of probation by introducing a form of supervision by an enquiry officer, George Lockyer (Bochel, 1976; White, 1978). In 1846, John Augustus, the Boston cobbler, began the practice of intervening in cases, making a ‘cursory’ investigation, recommending bail and then supervising the offender before providing a report at the end of the period of bail (White, 1978). The final piece of the orthodox history involves the appointment by the Church of England Temperance Society (prompted by Rainer’s letter) on 1st August 1876 of George Nelson to the Southwark and Lambeth courts, and in the following year of William Batchelor to Bow Street and Mansion House courts.

Although it is this overriding humanitarian concern that permeates most descriptions of the progress of probation in the last 80 years of the 19th century, some commentators have acknowledged a more complex story. (Indeed, the introduction of probation to the statute book itself was not without controversy about personal liberty – see Hansard, 1907, p. 297). Whitfield (1998) describes the Victorian age in which probation emerged as ‘a time of rising concern at the moral degeneration of the working class’ (p. 12). May (1991) argues that probation developed as the direct result of ‘struggles between various forces’, and at a time when there was increased concern about moral degeneration amongst a section of the working class (p. 159). Mair (1997) alludes to a broader context by
suggesting that probation came about during what might be defined as a moral panic about drink and its effects. Oldfield (2002) explains how the police court missionaries with their techniques of inquiry, friendship and personal influence were welcomed into the courts and how they contributed to the governance of offenders. However, his account (like all accounts and including this one) has its silences as well as its utterances. For instance, in dividing the history of probation into two ages of welfarism and neo-liberalism, he acknowledges their similarities as well as their differences, but gives insufficient weight to the fact that both involved the exclusion of categories of people from society, and both were actuarial in the sense that they were concerned with risk. Moreover, it could be argued that the nature and extent of welfare was even more contentious in the 19th century than now. Certainly charity was, among other things, about changing and improving people who represented a threat and a source of social infection, and even that was opposed by laissez-faire economists and proponents of individual rights and non-intervention.

McWilliams’ (1983, 1985, 1986 and 1987) history remains the most cogently theoretical, ‘influential and compelling’ history of the probation service (Pease, 1999). He explains how the police court missionaries were welcomed in the courts because they provided justifications for lenience to magistrates who were increasingly concerned about the harsh effects of the cumulative principle in sentencing. In addition, he shows how missionaries with their distinct religious philosophy (and eugenicist leanings) yielded to science (McWilliams, 1983, p. 130) because they were drawn into determinist explanations for the removal of drink problems.

A story of conflict and contradiction

In general, therefore, these accounts include all the potential features of a revised history, namely the religious, social and political contexts, the rise to prominence of psychology, and the influence of eugenics. What is lacking, however, is a more detailed analysis that locates probation more firmly within the competing political, religious and cultural ideologies that defined offenders in ways that, in part at least, shaped its purpose.

The foundations of probation were laid in the era Garland (1985) describes as the Victorian Penal Complex, in which uniformity was crucial, and in which the individual was only recognized in terms of moral culpability. However, it grew up in the Modern Complex in which the state became the expert, and the offender was viewed not as a free and rational subject but an individual with uncertain reasoning and a particular type of personality. In this new regime, the focus was on the characteristics of the individual (individualization) and attempts to control behaviour through classification and normative interventions. Probation, as part of the scientific penal project on its journey from individualism to individualization, incorporated science and rationalism into its religious and moral discourses while at the same time providing an alternative to prison for the deserving. It justified the use of imprisonment, initially of those who were not deemed to be deserving...
of mercy, and subsequently of those who did not qualify for community treatment, thus contributing to the exclusion and severe treatment of the undeserving.

Early probation history then is characterized by conflict and contradiction. The political and public concerns about crime outlined by Whitfield and May, are significant to probation in three ways. First, they serve to show that the process of reformation during the Victorian period was underpinned by a complex political struggle between competing political and social elites. Second, as Ignatieff (1978) argues, they show that the state changed its social control strategy to one of identifying, supervising and neutralizing the dangerous. Finally, they expose the growing concern about criminals as a product of degeneracy. The development of probation, therefore, must be viewed in that broader sociological context.

Young (1976) has provided the most telling challenge to the core elements of the orthodox histories of social work and probation. According to his thesis, the origins of probation are entangled with the ideological stances of middle class reformers on the causes and nature of social problems, and the ‘directed social action’, namely charity giving, predicated on those stances. The reform movement did not form, as is commonly assumed, a homogeneous unit with a shared commitment to charitable works and reform of the prison system because of concern about the conditions in which the poor lived their lives. Rather, it constituted a number of heterogeneous groups each with different attitudes to, and views about, charity. Moreover, at about the time the first police court missionary was appointed, charity was primarily in the hands of professionals who were part of a highly centralized system in the shape of the Charity Organisation Society. ‘Scientific charity’ was organized to diminish ‘demoralisation of character’ and pauperism, and to combat indiscriminate charity, which was deemed to exacerbate the very problems it was intended to reduce (p. 49). Charity was not simple altruism but confirmed the rightness of a middle class view of society, and maintained its dominance. Those who failed to take the opportunities presented to them were classified as moral failures, thus bolstering the notion that people had problems because of individual failings and not because of economic or political reasons. Convincingly, Young argues that ‘probation emerged as a policy measure generated out of a relationship between classes in the later nineteenth century’ (p. 55), and that that relationship was essentially to do with social order and the process of controlling the lives of working class people.

The rise of psychology

Young’s analysis goes some way to tempering the humanitarian tradition of the orthodox histories, but the completion of a revised history requires analysis of a configuration involving the development of the psychology of the individual, the emergence of eugenics, the role of religion, and social and political concerns about social degeneracy. Saleilles (1911) lays the groundwork for an explanation of the future dominance of psychology by offering a resolution of the problem caused by tension between the determinism of the new criminology and the notion of free will of the individual with a classic compromise. He does so by retaining
the valuable 'fiction' of individual responsibility while at the same time arguing for 'a closer study of the complete man, with his distinctive and individual psychology' (p. 3). His 'system of true responsibility' (pp. 74–5) is, in effect, an amalgam of two opposing positions: on the one hand the concern with only the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime, and its view of the offender as incidental (a view that sees only crimes and no criminals); and on the other the adaptation of punishment to the individual (a view that sees no crimes, only criminals).\(^5\) Within this system, the issue of what should be done with an offender becomes an inquiry into the degree of moral freedom exercised in the commission of the offence, which separates those suitable (and deserving) candidates for reform from the rest. Accordingly, this process and the individualization of punishment can be seen to have been given impetus in community-based sentences by probation (Glueck, 1933).

It is a core argument of this revised history that probation theory and practice are an integral part of the story of the rise to dominance of psychology (psychiatry in its broadest sense) in the processes of social control. With some exemptions (Jordon and Jones, 1988; Walker and Beaumont, 1981), psychological explanations have invariably informed probation’s expertise in understanding the offender, and brought it into contact with all kinds of interpretations of the causes of crime and personal and social problems, including eugenics. In his examination of psychiatry as a political science, Rose (1985, 1996) argues that each attempt to control the behaviour of others requires ‘experts’ who have a key role in moulding the problems to be dealt with and regulated, and who constitute the connection between governments and the ‘sites’ where behaviour is processed and responded to. Consequently, since the 19th century, psychiatry through its application to abnormality has been bound up with politics and the problems of governance.

Between 1875 and 1925 (spanning the early history of probation), psychology developed as ‘a coherent and individuated scientific discourse’, and sought its status through its ability to deal with ‘the problems posed for social apparatuses by dysfunctional conduct’ (Rose, 1985, pp. 3, 5). Rose demonstrates how the theory of degeneracy and the danger of hereditary transmission brought a range of pathologies together under the heading of deviation linked to heredity. Probation (as part of social work) became part of ‘a new psychological jurisdiction’ conceptualizing ‘criminality on the model of the causes and spread of epidemic diseases’ and defining (through reports and psychological enquiry) young offenders and other possible future offenders as a distinct group in need of protection from the dangers of moral degeneration (Rose, 1985, pp. 167, 174).

Probation aligned itself closely to the new science of psychology (Brown, 1934; Holmes, 1912; McWilliams, 1984) and to what Stedman Jones (1971) terms ‘the theory of hereditary urban degeneration’ and its close link with eugenics. It was, therefore, bound up with incursions into criminal justice made by psychiatry (using Rose’s broad definition); and because the vocabulary of degeneracy is central to psychiatry’s claim for its relevance as a science, it is central to an understanding of the early history of probation. This embraces also the mental hygiene movement, which Rose represents as a more positive conceptualization of these
problems. Offending had ‘now entered the field of medical, educational and social activity, and in one aspect [had] become a part of the general problem of Mental Hygiene’ (Le Mesurier, 1935, p. 208). Probation officers, as social workers, became caseworkers concerned with individual cases, and in practice brought together ‘the home, the school, the court and the clinic, the playground and the street’ (Rose, 1996, p. 11).6

The Christian dimension

However, as Bowpitt (1998) shows, Christianity also held a distinct position within this process, and is critical to the development of probation and social work. (Indeed, as some commentators such as Dark (1939) and Potter (1927) confirm, the predominance of the religious motive and focus on spirituality was maintained well into the century.) Bowpitt (1998) identifies two distinct features of the Christian origins of social work: first, effort aimed at social improvement; and, second, a conviction that this was best achieved by social action rather than the saving of souls or action by the government (p. 678). Illuminatingly, he demarcates these features as the main reasons for the subsequent disconnection of social work from philanthropy, and its increasing dependency on ‘the rational application of methods derived from social science and practical experience’ (p. 679). Now, this is an interesting point as far as probation history is concerned because although the tensions implicit in Bowpitt’s analysis existed in the ideologies of police court missionaries, a heavy emphasis on spiritual regeneration, as he puts it, is manifest in the evidence about their activities at this time. Moreover, although social science emerged triumphant in probation too, the battle lasted well into the 20th century (McWilliams 1983, 1985). In essence, the core ideology of the missionaries (and social workers) was moral citizenship based on self-reliance, civic duty and fervency for social improvement. The principal, overarching vehicle for these ideas was the Charity Organisation Society whose objectives retained their political substance (bringing order to Victorian philanthropy by challenging indiscriminate almsgiving; regulating the working class; and domestication of women while paradoxically providing a professional outlet for women). The political conflict that emanated from these objectives is evident, for example, in the controversy surrounding the temperance movement. It began as a ‘crusade [against] intemperance’ and ‘direct aggressive effort on this special form of evil’ (Church of England Temperance Chronicle, 1873), and as Harrison (1971) reveals, many Chartists and socialists were sceptical about the motives of the temperance movement, believing that it was more concerned with governance of the poor than their salvation.

The views of commentators and practitioners

The evidence of the relationship between the police court missionary, the early probation project and eugenics, moral degeneracy, and psychological aspiration...
is in the statements and stories of those directly and indirectly involved. For instance, the humanitarian views of Matthew Davenport Hill were circumscribed by the use of the future vocabulary of eugenics and political concerns about egalitarianism and Chartism (Bartrip, 1975; Hill, 1857). The annual reports from 1873 to 1912 of the Howard Association, which played a prominent role in the pressure that led up to the introduction of a probation system in 1907 (Le Mesurier, 1935; Rose, 1961), were underpinned by an understanding of the causes of crime that encompasses intemperance, education that is ‘perverted when it is so one-sided as to convey a practical contempt for labour’, lack of religious and moral training in the right habits, and improvidence (Howard Association, 1878, p. 18). Moreover, its solutions embrace humanitarianism tempered by ‘authoritative and compulsory power’, self-responsibility and control, and concerns about social degeneration (Howard Association, 188, p. 4) and the ‘mischievous tendencies of the promiscuous massing of either adults or juveniles in excessively large penal, or charitable, institutions’ (Howard Association, 1883, p. 3, emphasis added).

The writings of two important figures in the Association and, in one case, the Police Court Mission itself, further illuminate and confirm not only the often contradictory nature of the humanitarianism on offer in the penal reform movement, but also its connection with classical criminology and some of the foundations of incipient eugenic ideology. For example, in 1884 Tallack set out his arguments for a probation system (Tallack, 1884), but 12 years earlier made clear in a paper presented to a meeting of American Prison Officers in New York (Tallack, 1871) that prisoners ‘as a class, are of mean and defective intellect, generally stupid’ and that ‘in by far the greater proportion of offences, crime is hereditary’ (p. 23). Thomas Holmes, whom one commentator has described as a ‘less explicit eugenist’ (Garland, 1985, p. 101), was concerned for disadvantaged and troubled human beings and worked tirelessly on their behalf (Holmes, 1902; Holmes, 1908) but believed that some groups of people such as inebriate women should be detained indefinitely and that some offenders should have no ‘opportunities of perpetuating their kind’ (Holmes, 1912, p. 81), as did another police court missionary with the same name (Holmes, 1915; Holmes, 1923).

The views of the Howard Association, Tallack and Holmes, illustrating as they do the discourse in the social and political realms within which probation materialized, are reflected also in the writings and observations of psychologists, other penal reformers, people within the probation service itself and politicians. In the debate on the second reading of his Probation of Offenders Bill, Howard Vincent made it clear that he was not motivated by a ‘spirit of sentimental philanthropy’ towards habitual offenders whose crimes were the ‘product of a criminal and habitually vicious mind’; rather, he regarded them as ‘social pests’ who should be kept in prison (Hansard, 1886, pp. 333–4).

In a speech to a conference on the care of the feeble-minded, Dr. W.A. Potts (1903), chairman of the Birmingham After-Care Committee refers to ‘congenital [tendencies]’ and ‘moral defect[s]’ (p. 89). Edmund du Cane (1885), the Prison Commissioner, insisted that the deliberate, rational offender and the ‘weak-minded or imbecile’ were both incurable, and needed to be ‘dealt with on different principles from those others who may by appropriate treatment be deterred or
reformed’ (pp. 4–5). His successor, Ruggles-Brise, in his preface to Goring’s The English Convict (1919, p. v), concludes that the offender is ‘to a large extent, a “defective” man, either physically or mentally’.

Of course, it is important to be circumspect about attributing a direct influence of these views on the generality of police court missionaries, probation officers and close associates, and they have to be placed in their historical context. However, belief in depravity or moral wickedness or degeneracy (and its implications for selection as appropriate for probation) has a long pedigree in probation history. Augustus, the first probation officer, confined his efforts to first offenders and excluded those who were ‘wholly depraved’ (Augustus, 1852). Moreover, it survived through the early years of the probation service in numerous papers published in the newly created Probation publication. For example, a Chesterfield probation officer (Cary, 1913) defined the clientele of the service as ‘burdened with different kinds and different degrees of weakness’ and ‘morally sick’ (pp. 28–9); and a Stockton-on-Tees probation officer listed the causes of juvenile crime as ‘the degeneracy or degradation of development from the normal type’; ‘defective physique’; ‘imperfectly developed intellects through lack of moral education’; and ‘moral lepers [being] born in the atmosphere of moral and physical rottenness pervading the slums’ (Helmsley, 1915, p. 100). Indeed, as late as 1932 the general secretary of the Eugenics Society was given space in Probation Journal to rehearse arguments about the biological aspects of crime (Hodson, 1932).

Conclusion

Mid way through the 20th century, a principal probation officer (Paskell, 1952) confidently asserted to a European seminar that the birth of casework was the result of Victorian reformers united in their concern about the conditions in which the poor lived. That some concern existed is not in dispute. However, what this article has tried to demonstrate is that the story is a little more complex than that. Pervading all these accounts is evidence of Garland’s conclusion that one of the major successes of the Victorian penal system was that it had clustered criminality in the lowest stratum of the community, and set the people in it apart from their ‘more respectable peers’ (Garland, 1985, p. 38). Moreover, that stratum was a constant source of potential contamination. All of this, Garland argues, was the outcome of an amalgamation of ideologies drawn from criminology, eugenics and religion, in addition to the gift of charity (with its baggage of duty, guilt and social superiority). Social work (and by implication probation) within the penal system is, therefore, according to Garland a part of the political imperative to restore and maintain the social order by reforming or repressing these ‘outcasts of the residuum’ (p. 115). The process of understanding the mixture of help and control, rehabilitation and enforcement which characterizes today’s National Probation Service, therefore, should be informed by an acknowledgement (and understanding) that ambiguity and confusion about these elements, as well as attempts to resolve them, have been at the core of the Service’s theory and practice since its inception.

Such acknowledgement might serve to clarify that some of the political
...and ideological conflicts are the same. Probation at the end of the 20th century remains as entwined in political and societal concerns about social order as it was when Hill promoted the use of recognizance for juvenile offenders. Probation emerged from an interest in people and their plight, but it was shaped and institutionalized by political concerns about the maintenance of what Schon (1973) describes as the ‘stable state’. Its implementation has been characterized by the dynamic interaction of competing realms of thought, namely the scientific and the humanitarian (under which religion is subsumed), and the political and the social (under which welfare is subsumed). In so much as it has involved the exercise of authority over offenders, probation has been bound up inextricably with the use of state power. Separating the deserving from the undeserving by the use of moral judgements has been replaced by separating low risk offenders from high risk. The core elements of probation philosophy – care versus control, treatment versus collaborative change effort, and individualism versus radicalism – still permeate contemporary debate. (For instance, ‘What Works?’ has been judged simultaneously as the triumph of evidence-based practice over mysticism and the eclipse of environmentalism by neo-positivism.) Particular groups remain relatively ill-served by probation policy and practice. (For example, the particular moral approbation set aside for inebriate women at the end of the 19th century remains a potent symbol of how some women offenders are still viewed.)

Some 90 years ago, Thomas Holmes (1912) declared confidently that probation officers knew as much about crime, its causes and treatment as any of the scientists; and he did so relatively safe from contradiction. In the light of the current concerns about evidence-based practice, the current challenge for the service is that it can begin to assert that kind of confidence and come out from behind the shield of mysticism that Holmes held in front of himself. It has the choice of becoming a genuine learning organization with a knowledge base drawn from informed practice and self-critical evaluation. If it makes that choice, then it has the opportunity to inure itself more effectively to the vagaries of politicians of both the left and right, and consolidate its role of humanizing the enactment of punishment while offering effective services not only to the criminal justice system, but also to offenders and their direct and indirect victims. It can spearhead a new campaign for the 21st century focused on demonstrating that the implementation of social justice has to be demonstrably effective in order for criminal justice to be achieved. In order for it to do that, however, it has to eschew a narrow correctional approach premised on the illusionary concept that somehow a person’s offending can be addressed in isolation from its social context. Perhaps the single most important lesson of this history is that the amelioration of the problem of offending requires a dual strategy of influencing both individuals and systems.

While a commitment to effectiveness presents the most viable opportunity for the service to retain its influence, some fear that the price to be paid might be the final elimination of the service’s humanitarian value base. This need not be the case. First, the attempt to deal effectively with an individual’s offending unavoidably involves the process of personal engagement with that individual and his/her problems. Furthermore, the evidence of research findings tells us that those
problems are likely to be a familiar litany of personal and social issues, which have been the focus of social work intervention for over 100 years. Second, effectively influencing an individual and his/her environment in ways that lessen the likelihood of further offending is closely associated with reduction of harm to both the individual offender and the wider community, and reduction of harm is humanitarian. Finally, if anything is to be learnt from history then it must be understood that social justice depends not just on promoting individual welfare but also on addressing community needs, and an informed, confident probation service that manages (rather than allows itself to be driven by) political concerns can integrate both dimensions.

Notes

1 Oldfield (2002) provides an interesting illustration of this point. In his account of the development of ‘What Works’, he states that it began with ‘conferences and seminars to a large extent derived from the efforts of the Probation Inspectorate’, and his history thus obscures the fact that it began in the United Kingdom (and was, in part, subsequently sustained) through the efforts of practitioners and managers in experiments such as STOP. Indeed, it could be argued that it began much earlier with practitioners’ applications of McGuire and Priestley’s Offending Behaviour Model.

2 Readers interested in the full study should go to Vanstone (2001). In addition, a fuller summary can be found in Raynor and Vanstone (2002). The full study places more emphasis on the story as seen through the eyes of practitioners and other commentators close to practice. In this sense, it is a history from the underside.

3 For an interesting and up to date interpretation of probation history see Oldfield (2002).

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5 In Saleilles’ analysis, the reform movement gradually incorporated a scientific rationale, but had started with humanitarianism distilled from a sense of justice. Awareness, stimulated by the knowledge that not every individual had the same chances in life, prompted a change in the conception of responsibility; thus acceding that it may vary for different people and in different situations. Saleilles moulds this into a version of individual freedom and responsibility, which may be affected by a person’s state of health, pathology or mental disorder.

6 Interestingly, the notion of treatment was part of the metaphor of salvation inherent in the work of the early police court missionaries as demonstrated by Canon Ellison, the founder of the Church of England Temperance Society in the sermon at St. Paul’s in 1873 (referred to above), when he said that in encouraging temperance there is "[r]oom for the Christian physician to reconsider the practice of his noble art; to remove, if it may be so, the reproach that now rests upon it, that he must needs prescribe as medicine" (Church of England Temperance Chronicle, 1 May, 1873).

7 Space does not allow a full account. Interested readers should go to Vanstone (2001).
For instance, Miss E.P. Hughes, who had been Principal of the Cambridge Training College for Women Teachers, prepared a particularly influential report for the Association in which, following a visit to America in the winter of 1900–1, she suggested an experiment in London, Birmingham and Bristol based on the American model of probation (Hughes, 1903, pp. 3–4).

The same Dr. Potts addressed the 1928 NAPO conference on probation and so had remained a figure of significance to the service.

In the same edition another officer refers to ‘juvenile depravity’ and the ‘pernicious influence of picture shows’, ‘gaming on the streets’ and ‘the indiscriminate reading of suggestive and dangerous literature’ (Helmsley, 1915, pp. 109–110) and suggests that the solution lies in the increased use of reformatories and birching (Loughlin, 1915).

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