CHAPTER 3

Colonialism and Urbanisation

In the previous chapter, we have noted that intensified participation in the Classical, Islamic, and then the expanding capitalist European world all led to urban growth in Africa, growth of a kind that was linked to a more general commercialisation of society. The towns that developed in consequence could be described as exploitative: they lived off trade and state formations that systematically extracted wealth from pastoralists and peasants, although they also engendered communities with distinctive skills, cultures, and ways of life. Urban growth continued under colonial occupation from the late nineteenth century but extended itself by leaps and bounds, particularly in the final generation of colonial rule beginning with World War II. According to one estimate the percentage of Africans living in cities rose to 4.8 percent in 1920 and 14.2 percent in 1960.¹ This meant impressive growth both in the size of cities (see Table 1) and in the extent of urbanisation taken as a whole; it also meant that the commercial vocation of cities in Africa became far more intense.

To this, we should probably introduce two important qualifications. On the one hand, not all urbanisation should be linked directly to commercial expansion. Some towns and cities developed as sites of capitalist production, particularly in the case of mining operations. As we shall see, the remarkable expansion of towns on the central African Copperbelt, in the colonies of Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian

TABLE 1. Population of Some Significant African Cities in the Colonial Era
(in thousands)

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<tr>
<td>c. 1900</td>
<td>910 (1897)</td>
<td>686 (1897)</td>
<td>102 (1896)</td>
<td>20 (1897)</td>
<td>264 (1897)</td>
<td>210 (1900)</td>
<td>18 (1897)</td>
<td>35 (1897)</td>
<td>5 (1897)</td>
<td>146 (1910)</td>
<td>18 (1904)</td>
<td>74 (1900)</td>
<td>77 (1901)</td>
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<td>c. 1939</td>
<td>1,312 (1837)</td>
<td>1,335 (1837)</td>
<td>283 (1837)</td>
<td>257 (1837)</td>
<td>264 (1837)</td>
<td>387 (1837)</td>
<td>61 (1837)</td>
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<td>127 (1837)</td>
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<td>85 (1837)</td>
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Congo, became a kind of benchmark for colonial African urbanisation more generally. This kind of production, however, was narrowly tied in to colonial Africa’s vocation as a supplier of raw materials for the West. In addition, colonial administrative facilities attracted both rural migrants and outsiders to the continent towards capital cities, which contained the greatest variety of new services. “Primate” cities, those which dominate the urban process, were thus expanding far more rapidly than provincial towns, except where international commerce required a different focus of activity.

On the other hand, not all African towns and cities grew. Those which were associated with African states dissolved and crushed by colonialism often withered away; so did many others whose commercial life depended on caravan routes that were no longer operative, eliminated through the new colonial borders and through the establishment of roads and rail routes that no longer necessarily followed old patterns. Typically transport routes were now focussed on the
evacuation of mineral and agricultural produce from the African interior to the port towns, many of which were also capitals, while Western imports were brought into Africa along these routes.

Urban sociology used to characterise some cities as parasitic rather than generative. This is a persuasive argument to the extent that the state is itself oppressive and manned by large numbers of officeholders who support many servitors but effectively live off an impoverished peasantry. The parasitic view of the city had an important element of truth in it before colonialism, but it subsequently became less true. Colonialism appears at times as a deliberately structured system for sucking up Africa’s wealth. The primate city held the new forms of wealth in any territory to a disproportionate extent, but that wealth was based on forms of social control and exploitation that lay at the heart of colonialism. Wealth in Africa began to be commercialised on a larger scale, and it is through providing the sites for the processing, transport, and administration of that commerce that urban growth largely took place. This was simultaneously exploitative and stimulating. It was only in the towns that capitalism could be engendered, organised, and administered even in the raw state in which it was forming in Africa. Exploitative does not mean parasitic: the advance of capitalism in colonial Africa, albeit highly uneven, was dynamic and led to deeper and deeper changes in society. Previously, sophisticated and urbaine communities could coexist for centuries with a minimally altering countryside, a peasantry constrained mainly by its relationship to the natural environment, and perhaps the tribute extracted from it by an elite. Now the town began to dissolve older relations of production in the countryside as the twentieth century proceeded. The relationship of town to countryside changed and, particularly as we move on into the independence era, transformation intensified. In the course of this chapter, this phase of urbanisation will be examined, but in addition considerable attention will be paid to academic and policy debates that took place around urbanisation at the time and afterwards.

Old African Cities; Degrees of Change

As many scholars have noted, a study of colonialism reveals a variety of types of African towns. For this chapter, it will be suggested that it may be useful to consider this variety in terms of a spectrum rather than a typology somewhat as follows: a) (superficially) unchanged towns; b) towns with a visibly hybrid character; and c) new cities. As one moves
along this spectrum, the differing nature of large urban settlements becomes clearer.

We might start at one end of the spectrum, where we can find those towns which were essentially already established, not just spatially and demographically but also culturally, before colonial rule. Some examples on this end of the spectrum would be Zanzibar or Ibadan. In all these cases, a process of modernisation which seriously altered life in the towns and involved new physical infrastructure did take place. However, it might require a close look before a freshly arrived observer
could pick up the changes that occurred. Continuity and accretion were more apparent than radical change.

In the Nigerian city of Ibadan, sprawling around neo-classical Mapo Hall on its hill, densely populated and difficult-to-negotiate passageways and alleys still separated compounds which remained the homes of extended families. A large portion of men continued to spend much of their week on adjacent farms beyond the outskirts throughout the six decades of British rule. Much of the craft and commercial life of this largest of Yoruba-speaking cities appeared to continue unchallenged. In particular, as A. L. Mabogunje, the outstanding Nigerian student of African urban life, long ago pointed out, the old markets, which so characterised urban solidarity in pre-colonial times, retained much of their vitality. Under Nigerian style indirect rule, whereby the British tried as much as possible to administer Africans through what were considered to be modified African institutions, Mabogunje’s other pre-colonial Yoruba urban anchor, the palace, also retained relevance. However, just as Mapo Hall was hardly representative of pre-colonial architecture, the chiefship and the disputes it invariably took on were hardly a continuation of the contradictions of some pre-colonial “constitution.” The vitality of the internal commercial economy and the social relations that connected with it gave this huge conurbation an apparent sense of continuity that can, however, be exaggerated.

Colonial Ibadan, never conquered by the Islamic jihad states of the North in the turbulent nineteenth century, was rapidly becoming a majority community of Muslims. On the outskirts, a new commercial area arose, not incidentally focussed on Lebanon Street, where Middle Eastern immigrants dominated new forms of exchange. Indeed, here, on the periphery of Ibadan, large numbers of Nigerians, Yoruba-speaking and otherwise, agglomerated in response to economic opportunities and the territorial transport infrastructure that knit the colonial federation together. The important Hausa-speaking community, now linked to “Northern Nigeria,” became detached from the authority of

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2 Ibadan, however, lacked a single palace representing city authority. Indeed, it was under colonialism that an attempt to create an Olubadan, or overarching ruler, of the city was first seriously made. The very high levels of violence and disorder which represented an inheritance from Ibadan’s distinctive history were a problem the British had to deal with, as Ruth Watson has recently discussed in ‘Civil Disorder is the Disease of Ibadan’: Chieftaincy and Civic Culture in a Yoruba City (Oxford & Athens, OH: James Currey & Ohio University Press, 2003).
the elders of Ibadan and more autonomous from the city in general. Muslim of course, its leaders followed the precepts of the Tijaniyya brotherhood, which distinguished them from Yoruba Muslims. In accordance with British ideas, ethnic cultural autonomy was thus given recognition; colonial states were about establishing pacified boundaries between those defined as culturally different from one another, not about nation-building. In addition, there was a spacious administrative quarter for whites as well as increasingly significant educational, health, and other new spaces in Ibadan. Colonialism enabled the plural society to form, where apparently separate and antagonistic culturally defined groupings met in the marketplace with peaceful dealings guaranteed by the colonial protector. Horace Miner, an American anthropologist, observed this clearly in Timbuktu, which had become an outlying provincial centre in the northern French Soudan, incorporated into French West Africa, on the eve of World War II. With the establishment of French suzerainty, this ancient town, in decline but not terminal decline, appeared sociologically to be a colonial plural ethnic space where different ethnic communities dominated different sections of town and sectors of the economy. Ritualised fights between community youths confirmed boundaries; there was a kind of assumption that the town had held together largely through the intervention of the colonial suzerain, lacking as it now did a common identity for all. This was a city without common citizenship.

The theme of continuity masking change can be pursued as well north of the Sahara. A careful study of early colonial Salé in Morocco shows that although the outward show of urban civility – in which respectability is related to the antiquity and piety of families, to the practice of particularly honoured craft activity, and to the combination of urban artisanal operations with farming in the vicinity – remained extremely visible, the reality was changing by the time of World War I. Commerce – as opposed to the honoured old naval craft of piracy at the expense of infidels – was of growing importance, and Jews, who focussed on commerce rather than industry, thrived; connections to the new colonial state were critical in accessing new forms of influence and power. Poor Berber speakers from the mountains arrived as migrants. Colonial Salé was not the dignified chasse gardée of a cooperative Muslim aristocracy, as the French hoped, but an encapsulated and in some respects ossified suburb of Rabat. Older elements in the town, in fact, felt threatened and disempowered through change and tended to withdraw from public life in bitterness. Both Salé and
(relatively speaking) Ibadan were neglected by the colonial state. It was Lagos, the colonial capital of Africa’s most populous territory, which experienced the most change while Casablanca, a place of previously minor significance, became the burgeoning economic centre of the new Morocco.

Omdurman on the Nile, the capital of the Khalifal state established in the 1880s on the ruins of the Egyptian Sudan, represented a somewhat similar kind of urban experience. After the conquest of 1898 and the proclamation of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, it lay cheek by jowl with the restored and replanned colonial capital of Khartoum. Khartoum North, a third attached urban community, tended to house the growing number of colonial employees, for instance on the railways. Omdurman became an inward-looking and relatively sleepy town. Its complex property and social relationships did not fit the theories with which the British sought to govern the colonies, and its importance dwindled dramatically. Yet it survived as a reminder of different times and was testimony to continuities in the economic activities of older urban compounds. In the Khartoum complex, the heart of the new working class, which was active in service, transport, and artisanal activity, probably consisted of emancipated slaves and their children. Omdurman itself lay near the starting end of our spectrum, but, if we consider the whole of the so-called Three Towns – the entire Khartoum-Khartoum North-Omdurman complex – one moves somewhat further away from the continuum end of the spectrum compared to cities that seemed the most “traditional,” such as Ibadan towards the hybrid middle. The totality was a mixed urban community with very contrasting sections.

In other cases, ostentatious colonial suburbs eventually engulfed older communities, marginalizing them or rendering them less and less relevant to the broader patterns of social dynamism. For instance, Accra had its origins in three old Ga settlements which enjoyed a rich urban tradition. After British rule was established, these settlements gradually become overwhelmed by a colonial city in which the proportion of Ga people diminished while modern commercial and administrative sections were established. With time, the old Ga central neighbourhoods became less and less fundamental to the life of the city as a whole. They were not marginalized exactly, but they were not easily integrated into a new Accra. Less than a decade after independence, the American anthropologist Marion Kilson grasped the feel of
the old Accra, which was her own subject of interest, but she realised as well its diminishing role:

Central Accra is a densely populated, active, noisy centre of African urban life in the heart of the national capital of Ghana... A visitor walking through the byways of Central Accra senses that he might be in any comparable residential area of marginal elites and manual labourers in any West African capital. The smells, sights and sounds which he encounters are as characteristic of Treichville[sic] in Abidjan or Ginger Hall in Freetown as they are of Central Accra: the deep, open, trash-filled gutters, the sizzling smell of frying plantain, the occasional whiff of urine, the small open shops of artisans, the barber cutting hair under a tree; children chasing home-made wheel toys; men playing checkers in the shade of a house; women carrying sleeping infants on their backs and possessions on their heads; the sharp clank of aluminium pails, the reprimanding shouts of mothers, the rhythm of highlife pulsating from an open window, the warm laughter of good fellowship. Nevertheless these superficial sensory similarities mask wide social and cultural variations in the lives of the inhabitants of such urban areas.3

Janet Abu-Lughod, in a paradigmatic study of the Moroccan city of Rabat, uses the South African term of “apartheid” to describe the process by which another old city with its rich and distinctive traditions becomes a kind of cultural museum, less and less relevant to much of the dynamic of colonial Morocco, while apparently surviving physically intact. The French assumption was that the Moroccan population of Rabat would remain unchanged as befitted the charming yet decadent world of Islam, pickled with medieval spices; there could be no expectations of dynamism, growth or in-migration.

Of course this was Morocco, not the Transvaal; no pass laws or racial codes permanently and consistently determined the movement and residence of Arab, Jew, or European. Repressive legislation played a much smaller role than the thrust of urban colonial planning in creating an urban bifurcation. For, outside old Rabat, as Gwendolyn Wright has explored more generally in Morocco, Islamic atavism was paired with the promotion of a relatively avant-garde modernism in architecture and city planning for the new colonial city, populated by thousands of “Europeans,” that developed outside the perimeter of old

Rabat. Such a modernism, promoted by French planners and architects, could embrace Moorish architectural motifs, providing a local grace note. They thought these to be more tasteful than the awkward and overly commercial addenda to older structures and facades that were generated by the eclectic locals. From the 1930s, Wright argues in fact that a yet more thorough and universalist modernism became dominant, eliminating the local colour. Moroccan preservationism had fitted very well the increasingly dominant theories of indirect rule by which the “natives” were encouraged to rule themselves along “traditional” lines, making administration cheaper and easier (and obviating claims towards membership in the emerging colonial society) while dynamic colonial society expanded freely.

The largest Mediterranean port of Africa was Alexandria, whose Stock Exchange dominated the Egyptian cotton trade. There was little left of ancient Alexandria before the nineteenth century. The city was virtually reborn under the deliberate patronage of Muhammad Ali (who was himself actually a Muslim Albanian and not an Egyptian by birth), the Turkish governor who became effectively an independent ruler of Egypt and his successors. This was a new Alexandria which arose, deliberately intended to cater for commerce with Europe and as a home for Europeans and migrants from all over the Mediterranean and Near Eastern world, of whom the most numerous were Italian and Greek. In this context one can hardly talk about analogies with apartheid. Yet it is equally true that the huge population of “outsiders” in Alexandria had relatively little to do with Egyptians on a basis of social equality, were not administered under Egyptian law, typically held strong anti-Egyptian prejudices, and certainly did not think of themselves as Egyptian. Eventually, when the monarchy was overthrown and the nationalist tide rose in the 1950s, almost all departed. As in the Maghreb, this did not prevent a cosmopolitan population – perhaps a quarter of the total urban population – from creating its own cultural life. Alexandria rivalled Athens as a centre of Greek literary culture until well into the twentieth century, for instance, and was the beloved lifelong home of the great poet Constantine Cavafy.

The case of the Egyptian capital of Cairo is also perhaps salutary. It was not really the plots of the British or their discourse about Orientals but the press of the modern city, of capitalist thirst for change, that led to a gradual transformation. The city expanded dramatically to the west; the Nile was first bridged in 1872, and a massive drainage programme of low-lying and previously neglected land instituted in
1907. Between 1882 and 1937, Cairo physically expanded sixteenfold. Modern highways and bridges were constructed, as well as lighting and transport facilities. Even for Egyptians, the good life was signalled in Baron Empain’s suburb of Heliopolis, constructed in the desert on the road that led to the airport. Better-off Egyptians left the inconvenient quarters they had called home for life in a Europeanised and more convenient city. Old Cairo became a quaint part of a larger city, picturesque but known for crowding, overpopulation, poor amenities, and poverty – this without direct colonial planning aimed at it. These North African cities – Cairo, Alexandria, Rabat – were hybrids, with the modern style particularly dominant in Alexandria. But hybrid cities were also found elsewhere.

For the British, Northern Nigeria under the administration of Frederick Lugard and his successors provided a model of indirect rule applied elsewhere. In its numerous towns, the pattern was one of “native administration” within the old-walled birane while direct administration covered the emerging administrative and commercial sections as well as the New Towns or Sabon Garis inhabited by a growing “native foreigner” population. The authoritative late colonial geography text on Nigeria had this to say on the great savanna city of Kano.

Note, as in the case of Ibadan; the composite character of the city; the old Hausa city, incompletely occupying the space within the twelve mile circuit of walls and centring upon the great market-place which has replaced the sacrificial grove of pre-Islamic days; the Strangers Settlement outside the walls occupied by immigrants from the south such as Yorubas and Ibos; the commercial-administrative zone in proximity to the station; and the government residential area insulated by its building-free zone.

This “composite character” clearly did not emerge from human nature unguided.

European authorities in general were reluctant to acknowledge and sustain the property rights of established African populations. Even in West Africa, plans for the destruction of existing African residential communities were often ruthlessly pursued before World War I. Struggles over such plans in the German-controlled port city of Duala in

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Cameroun reached a peak when the authorities hung Rudolf Manga Bell, who had led the struggle against redevelopment, for treason. There were plans in this period for the destruction of the old city of Mombasa on the coast of Kenya while the British also toyed in 1908 with the idea of destroying the old sections of Accra following a plague epidemic. The French authorities were keen to dismantle and entirely destroy the *medina*, or native quarter, that existed alongside the market of the increasingly grand capital of French West Africa, Dakar. The future of the *medina* hung in the balance after the plague epidemic of 1915, a typical episode in the colonial struggle to segregate African cities. It was perhaps characteristic of the milder French approach that although the *medina* was reconstructed on more salubrious lines, it was not actually removed. The French could put aside entirely neither the claims of the native Lebou population, some of whom lived in the *medina*, nor of the voters born in the *Quatre Communes* (often Lebou in fact) and thus qualified as French citizens in the Third Republic, who constituted a significant part of its population. Overcrowded, insalubrious, but economically vibrant and convenient for a variegated population, it has remained an important part of the modern city. Gervais-Lambony has shown the long (and benign) shadow cast on the once-German colonial capital of Lomé in Togo by the authorities’ willingness to recognised urban property rights from before conquest. As a result, Lomé was a relatively integrated town by colonial standards.

Stubborn opposition to colonial racism and removal policies have continued to have a long shelf life. Where older urban property rights and customs were threatened, Africans proved very reluctant to endorse urban reform in later years, even if clearly justified in terms of traffic, hygienic, or planning needs. Thus the old Ga fighting companies, the *asafo*, were adapted into organisations that were very successful at resisting the creation of any form of modern tax system in Accra that might have paid for amenities. Indeed this kind of resistance significantly slowed up the engulfing of the older urban communities within the colonial city.

**New Cities in Africa**

With hindsight, continuities with the pre-colonial past are perhaps clearer now to writers on African cities. By contrast, a generation ago the focus was much more on discontinuities, based in particular on the “typical” new cities of the southern half of the continent. It has
to be said that here urbanisation had previously been on a small scale or had hardly existed at all, although this point can be exaggerated, as previous chapters have stressed. For instance, the Ndebele capital of Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia had been the important centre of a strong kingdom; it was also chosen as the focal point for the new colonial province of Matabeleland and as such became an important railway, commercial, and, to some extent, industrial town with close links to South Africa. Through much of the colonial period, it was larger than Salisbury, the capital. Yet the pre-colonial population had scattered, and traces of the past are impossible to find beyond perhaps the fact that Ndebele speakers were much quicker than Shona speakers to find domiciles in town. This sharp discontinuity is only somewhat less true for Kampala, where one can still see the royal huts of the Buganda Basekabaka (kings). The capital of the new colonial Uganda was located in the suburb of Entebbe alongside Lake Victoria Nyanza, but in Kampala itself a new commercial and administrative centre took pride of place in what became the reconfigured city centre. Yet these cities are close to, or at the far end of, our spectrum: they were virtually new colonial towns.

Other colonial cities were really entirely new, such as Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, Lusaka, the capital of Northern Rhodesia, Zomba, the tiny capital of Nyasaland, or Elisabethville, the provincial capital of the copper mining province of Katanga in the Belgian Congo (today Lubumbashi). Indeed, even in northern Africa, the desired forms of economic exploitation seemed to require new urban settlements, for instance Port Said and Ismailia on the Suez Canal, Bizerte, the naval base and port on the Tunisian coast, Philippeville (now Skikda) in Algeria, and Port Lyautey (now Kenitra) on the Atlantic shores of Morocco. The main African Red Sea port south of the Isthmus of Suez was Suakin, located for security on a small island; in consequence, the British constructed Port Sudan from scratch to replace it.

Sometimes such new settlements had at first a noticeable militarised element with a fortified core; they were islands of control dominating a potentially hostile countryside. Thomas Spear has created a dramatic image of early Arusha in northern German East Africa, rising like a ship from the great savannas of that part of the continent and only too obviously placed in order to dominate.\(^6\) Here there were dramatic signs

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of an urban space sharply delineated from its surroundings. Especially noteworthy were the cases where European settlers were numerous enough to establish business and residential communities that broke radically with the world around.

Such communities were absolutely central to the colonial purpose. From the late nineteenth century, segregation was the colonial watchword throughout the continent. The colonial city emerged and differentiated itself, often very ruthlessly, from preexisting patterns. As has long been noted, the growth of urban segregation was typically linked not merely with the establishment of racial theories of superiority but with panics about epidemics and the need to keep the new ruling class of the colony healthy through isolation from contact with the bulk of natives. An early example goes back to the devastation of malaria on the sugar-growing island of Mauritius in 1866–68. In consequence, the state created the rail system that allowed the white population of Port Louis to leave the city every day for the apparently more salubrious and higher Plaines Wilhelms, admittedly not on a racially defined basis. The pestilence carried off one-seventh of the population, including a particularly high portion of the remaining ex-slave population and their children, who had lived in town after leaving the sugar plantations following emancipation.

The British Colonial Office medical advisory committee opined in 1911 that “it has been proved that the separation of the European from the natives is one of the most efficient means of protection against disease endemic amongst native races.” A 1914 report from Kenya on “sanitary matters” called for racial segregation as essential urban policy barring all but the “highest class Indians” from the white town and, as a matter of course, using these as a barrier between white settlers and migrant African unskilled workers. Settlers dreamt of entirely reconstructing the landscape, recentred around their needs and desires and taking America or Australasia as idealised models. Racial segregation in its heyday was made also into a moral imperative: white peril episodes in the history of colonial Rhodesia expressed settler anxieties about contacts between white women and black men at the domestic level.

One of the most dramatic cases was that of Freetown, the West African capital of Sierra Leone, precisely because it was so unlikely. Freetown was established in 1788 as a centre for ex-slaves returned to Africa. In the nineteenth century, it became an important commercial town with a noticeable Anglicised professional class known as Creoles. In some respects, it already was a “modern” town, a classic nineteenth-century commercial entrepôt. White residents lived interspersed in a lively and diversified urban community. Health was the primary reason given for trying to transform this situation: above Freetown, Hill Station was planned as a healthy home for whites only, focussed around bungalows constructed for colonial officials. From 1902, British-made prefabricated dwellings were hauled up to this site while a special railway was constructed to serve its favoured inhabitants. Politically this marked sharply the decline of the Sierra Leone Creole elite in the colony in favour of imperial officials with their racist world-view.

However, Hill Station was not especially successful as a new suburb intended to mark a bold step forward in colonial development: “It was originally intended that no African should be allowed to sleep in the reservation, but it was found impossible for Europeans to live there without having at least one servant residing on the premises.”9 Whereas urban reconstruction may have sometimes led to substantial improvements in health as they allowed for higher standards of hygiene, the “sanitation syndrome”10 was largely an excuse to justify intensified racial segregation. Malaria, the apparent cause for the creation of Hill Station, was just as prevalent there as near the waterfront. However, the concomitant creation of an all-white social club and an all-white tram service was bitterly resented by the Sierra Leone Creole elite.

Creating entirely new quarters for existing towns involved considerable town planning, in which the homes of those who laboured in the city were consigned to irrelevance. In the new Kenyan capital of Nairobi, founded on the line of rail in the centre of the new colony in 1899, massive suburban tracts were laid out with tree-lined boulevards and no expectation of public transport whatsoever. This was an English Garden City in the tropics – for the privileged. White (and to a lesser extent Indian) property speculators were able to make substantial profits from the sale of privatised land. The African quarters that emerged near the centre were an afterthought, wretched and

10 A term used in a classic article on Cape Town, South Africa by M. W. Swanson.
unplanned. This meant small purpose-built rooms, intended to serve single workers on the most Spartan of models. The real economic heart of the population of such towns was in fact excised and treated as an unwelcome appendage. African migrants to town were essential to their functioning but unwelcome to any claim of citizenship; their comings and goings deemed them to be forever “impermanent.” In these precarious circumstances, poor African neighbourhoods got flattened and removed when they were seen as inconvenient. The early history of Nairobi is marked by such episodes. Areas initially demarcated for Africans in Nairobi, for example, although characterised mainly by neglect, were simply demolished as the city centre expanded and land was required for more “significant” purposes.

Nor were such ideas peculiarities of the British. Lourenço Marques, the new capital of Portuguese East Africa, was a raw, unserviced frontier settlement with an extraordinarily mixed population in the 1890s. By the time of the First World War, it had been transformed; its heart now consisted of a well laid-out town with wide boulevards and some impressive public buildings, what the locals called Xilinguine, the white man’s place. Shacks, mud, and garbage were expelled to the city outskirts. When urban neighbourhoods, whether constructed or just laid...
out by the state, were authorised for Africans clearly essential to the labour force required in towns, they were constructed on Spartan lines and on marginal locations. However, as economies grew, these neighbourhoods were never sufficient. In such North African cities as Algiers and Casablanca, \textit{bidonvilles}, shack settlements, began to spring up beyond the planned perimeters by the end of the 1920s.

This kind of urban process has been conceptualised \textit{in extremis} at the other end of the continent for the eastern Algerian city of Bône, now known as Annaba. What was once a walled Turkish garrison town, focussed on its mosque and fortifications, was remodelled by the early twentieth century. The old town, most of whose Muslim population fled into the interior initially after the French conquest, was marginalized and swallowed up by a much larger city – two-thirds of its population at peak was European – whose economy was based on the evacuation of mineral products from the interior, with the port and line of rail critical factors. European trees lined graceful boulevards while public spaces were marked out with statuary commemorating French colonial figures. The great promenade, named in honour of French Bône’s most remarkable politician, Jérôme Bertagna, swept up from the harbour to culminate at the foot of a neo-Gothic cathedral. The town hall, with
its mansard roof, took on the aura of a well-constructed metropolitan hôtel de ville. Commercial life was dominated by the typical French artisanal and mercantile activities, and there was hardly an Arab face to be seen in a promenade through the town core. Arab survivals were relegated to the picturesque – and to the slum. Not merely was Bône drastically Europeanised; it evolved with other Algerian towns a colon culture that was distinctive and potentially autonomous in terms of dialect, folk heroes, political culture, cuisine, and so forth, not unlike the situation at the other end of the continent in South Africa. Indeed, if French, Maltese, Italian, and Spaniard tended to fuse into a single European “community,” if that is the right word for it, this evolution also brought increasingly articulated internal class distinctions, albeit in a context where there was little secondary industry to discipline working class life.

Peasants or Workers? The New Urbanites

Nowhere in colonial Africa was urbanisation rawer and newer than on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt. Here towns grew with great speed from the time of mineral development in the middle 1920s to 1964 when Zambia became independent. There was no question about the demand for Africans to live in towns here on the part of the employer, although the white labour force on the copper mines was proportionately larger than in South Africa. The administration of urban Africans and the whole question of citizenship which urbanisation brought in its wake represented a particular dilemma for the British rulers of the colony who conceptualised Africans as tribal residents living under the control of chiefs in a suitably pacific and modified manner, caring for their cows while their women harvested crops. The problem, however, lay in the need for labour in an era when so many Africans, while basing themselves on continued membership in rural societies, spent varying phases of their lives in towns and when the labour needs of capital were consequently enormous. It required the involvement of hundreds of thousands in order to attract tens of thousands of labourers to do the hard and poorly paid work of colonial capitalism at any one time. On the Copperbelt, a particular onus

11 It should perhaps be noted that much of the “European” population was fairly poor. Some distance from the centre, a segregated working-class suburban environment for Europeans emerged from the late nineteenth century onwards. This was the birthplace of the French novelist Albert Camus.
was left with the mining companies which did amass large amounts of capital and had the direct interest in creating a stabilised, if not an urbanised, workforce and were prepared to research and experiment to find solutions to their problems. Until the eve of independence in 1964, the vast majority of Copperbelt Africans were resident on mines property, although some 20 percent were estimated to be living in informal housing on the edge of the mining cities.

This worry brought administrators to introduce into the colony a set of anthropologists to attack the problem of the “detribalised Bantu” that they felt they would be facing, more urgently given large-scale industrial action in 1935 and 1940. Those anthropologists associated with the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute were in fact pioneers in the intellectual construction of urban life in the southern half of Africa. As has been recently discussed by James Ferguson, they were in a sense the left wing of the settler world of southern Africa, a left wing that aspired to a breakdown of the bifurcated colonial society offering some kind of multiracial citizenship focussed on the opportunities that social transformation might bring. The pioneer urban anthropologists operated on an emerging agenda: Northern Rhodesia was experiencing a kind of Industrial Revolution of which they were observing the early stages.

In the heyday of colonial rule, this was not an easy task. Colonial administrators, by contrast with the anthropologists, took for granted that the African was a naturally rural inhabitant whose urban experience was a danger to the integrity of African society as well as to colonial authority. As Dame Margery Perham, an influential and in some respects liberal colonial ideologue wrote, “this situation subjects them [Africans] to an intense social strain.”12 The work of more critical intellectuals was tolerated in the hopes of relieving the strain.

Yet starting with Godfrey Wilson, the anthropologists wrote increasingly complex and sophisticated accounts of what was at first called detribalisation. Max Gluckman famously pointed out that “an African tribesman is a tribesman; a miner is a miner”;13 workers were above all workers and needed to be treated as such in the context of labour disputes and labour organisation. Gluckman, along with J. Clyde Mitchell and A. L. Epstein, tried to examine the new habits, tastes, and aspirations of black townsmen. They were all superb observers and recorders of new cultural phenomena. One of Epstein’s most important books

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examined the growing importance of first, trade unionism and then, nationalist politics as an urban phenomenon. However, he still felt obliged to point out that “the urban African remains a tribesman and yet is not a tribesman.”

Even writers such as the Rhodes-Livingstone scholars lived in the shadow of assumptions about the dominance of tribes and custom. One of the enduring strengths of these scholars, notably Max Gluckman, however, was their understanding that many African residents of Copperbelt towns and cities aspired to the modern, the cosmopolitan; however, they defined it in their own terms. Indeed, as the years went by, and especially with the approach of independence, they increasingly tended to see themselves as sociologists and to drop the conceptual baggage of anthropology as it existed. The Rhodes-Livingstone scholars never really tried to conceptualise the urban community as a whole; they concentrated fairly strictly on the African migrant. Somewhat paradoxically, their subjects were in one sense unable to be normal townsman in that they continued to reside on mine company property.

The British anthropological approach tended to explain African life in cities in large part through ethnic diversity. Ethnicity, important a subject as it was, could clearly be stretched by others virtually to dissolve any idea of the modern and transformational. In a classic study along these lines in a collection that tended in this direction, W.A. Shack wrote about the Gurage unskilled workers of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, not of course a colonial city, very much as a coherent and intact “tribe” that came to the city to fulfil particular expectations without ceasing to be in any sense Gurage. If they encountered any new ideas in the city, these represented adherence to another tribal ethic – the Amhara prestige pecking order dominant in town. Ethnic identity overshadowed urban change. Indeed, in West Africa, emphasis for

14 In a later evolution, Epstein moved to a position that saw urbanization as a profoundly important but not entirely predictable or straightforward process (“Urbanization and Social Change in Africa,” Current Anthropology, VIII, 1967, 275–95). Mitchell for instance promoted the more “sociological” concept of social networking to understand Copperbelt transformation and described neo-tribal elements as historically transitional (Mitchell, ed., Social Networks in an Urban Situation, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969). Eventually he compared the Copperbelt town to the US city attracting immigrants and rejected anthropological concepts of “culture” as being irrelevant to the city (Cities, Society and Social Perception, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). It can be argued, and has been most eloquently by James Ferguson in Expectations of Modernity recently, that in so doing, he moved to a point where he could no longer grasp the failed modernism of the economically decaying contemporary Copperbelt.
observers of the cities in the decade before independence lay on social fragmentation and new forms of ethnic identity. The discipline of social anthropology provided a wonderful stimulus to “fieldwork,” original observation that allowed new paradigms to emerge and new phenomena to be highlighted. But the cultural biases of social anthropology as it was also made it hard for this school of writers to conceptualise very effectively a new urban lifestyle. At best, urbanisation needed to be comprehended as part of a “folk-urban continuum” (Southall, ed., 1973). And of course, tens of thousands of new townsmen and townswomen in Africa were what later social scientists call straddlers, people who passed their lives between town and countryside and used opportunities that opened for them where possible in either or both context. In the Great Depression, it was particularly notable that the extreme recession of the copper mining industry did not lead the whole black population to vacate the urban settlements to which they were still relative newcomers. On both sides of the Belgian-British frontier, many still found enough in town life to cling to the urban setting. When Belgian authorities attempted to deport unemployed Africans out of Elisabethville, they met with sturdy resistance. Yet the question posed for intellectuals focussed continually on how much of the older African culture was surviving in the harsh world of the towns.

Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch has insisted with some justice that this has not really been a significant issue in French scholarship in Africa to the same extent. For one thing, French colonialism coincided in good part with those parts of Africa where clearly an earlier urban tradition existed and had to be acknowledged. However, the emphasis on reconstituting tribalism along lines that could safely be managed under colonial development was very much less consistent. If there is a Francophone figure comparable to the Rhodes-Livingstone school of anthropologists, it must be Georges Balandier, who published an influential study of the rapidly expanding equatorial city of Brazzaville in 1955. Balandier was a sociologist, not an anthropologist, and the weight in his work lay in identifying original cultural and social features of the African town – “une veritable culture n´egro-urbaine” – and as such he built his social model around the évoluté – the educated man – not the rural tribesman come to town. He too generalised from the African community within the town rather than spend much time on considering Brazzaville, colonial capital and home of thousands of French merchants, officials and their families, as a totality. However, he laid the groundwork intellectually in which Africans could claim the city, and not just an apparently traditional walled town preserved by
tasteful colonists, as their own. In contrast to the hesitant and careful views of British anthropologists, we can note the early celebration of the African city in the work of the British writer on African politics, Thomas Hodgkin, who even before independence suggested in English that the cities represented a “new indigenous civilisation” quite distinct from what rural Africa had ever brought forth.

The exploration of a new urbanity in Africa was handled with particular effectiveness by the radical French anthropologist Claude Meillassoux. Meillassoux, in a study of social groupings and associations in the Malian capital, Bamako, showed a succession of institutions and cultural forms that were integrating established residents and immigrants of Bamako into a new, distinctive culture. Meillassoux recognised that ethnicity had a very ancient pedigree in the West African city, where it could be remoulded but also form part of a larger urban pattern without disintegrating. In Bamako, the Muslim religion and what Meillassoux calls the Banaba language [Bambara] as lingua franca became defining elements of urbanity that transcended ethnicity in important ways. In looking at urban associations, which partly reinforce but partly crosscut ethnicity, he identified the social glue which held neighbourhoods and urban life together. It is the quartier, or neighbourhood, which defines Bamako urban life rather than ethnicity while the family compound contains mostly that which is familiar to social structure and built environment in rural Mali as well. But this importance of neighbourhood was no doubt very great in many African cities.

It was not only the lack of access to cars and the absence of decent public transport systems but also the fragmentation of the colonial city and the exclusion of the masses from central facilities to which the authorities paid the most attention that led to what would be called in French enclavement. Most interesting are Meillassoux’s discussions of organisations that perform and that dance. Such public spectacles involving voluntary participation are particularly significant in taking new cultural forms forward in Africa. At first dance forms tended to reproduce older cultural values and have a rural feel, but over time they change. Here, he argued, young people questioned or even ignored older forms of seniority and paternalist authority. “Beyond the apparent license and futility of the clubs, we can perceive a groping attempt

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to shape a new society, a new social order and new sex relationships.”

This attempt was less developed before independence in 1960, when older forms of authority and ethnic adherence received far more obvious adherence in the structure of dances then still dominant. At about the same time in the Belgian Congo, Jean Lafontaine captured the significance of the matonga, the typical and large-scale urban funeral rite of Léopoldville where kinship groups and older spiritual forms played little part but ceremonial was dominated by the widow and friends of the deceased and was essentially secularised.

Scholars of West Africa such as Michael Banton and Kenneth Little had already laid much weight on the emergence of voluntary associations as new forms of social glue in African cities. Such associations are at once eminently practical in the creation of networks that sustain economic linkages and providers of prestige and status. Parker has shown for Accra that whereas such associations were not very significant to the native Ga, who had a plethora of older integrative cultural and social associations of their own, they were especially significant for the growing number of Gold Coasters of other origins who flocked to the colonial capital in the twentieth century.

In his landmark study of the working class of Mombasa, the historian Frederick Cooper has taken apart a variety of elements for examination that reveal some aspects of this variegated and fragile civilisation. Mombasa’s working class did contain members who belonged entirely to the old world of this commercial coastal town. However, many of its workers in the colonial period were men who shifted usefully between town and countryside. Cooper drops the discomfort of the Rhodes-Livingstone anthropologists with this apparent contradiction. The availability of much casual work, notably on the docks, suited such straddlers’ quest for more autonomy following the dissolution of slavery. They sought membership in the cultural world of Muslim Mombasa but not on the terms of slavery and disrespect that the poor had known in the past. Their relationship with landlords in Majengo (the neighbourhood where many lived) was usually exploitative if paternalistic but also contained elements of autonomy and mutual respect. Mombasa also attracted, however, up-country workers, notably Luo from the shores of Lake Victoria Nyanza at the other end of Kenya, who worked on the railways and were complete

outsiders to the Islamic world of Mombasa. Thus there were different
types of workers who made different types of claims on the city.

More recently Laura Fair has taken up a similar set of themes with
regard to colonial Zanzibar. Fair considers, as has Ahmed Sikainga
for the urban Sudan, how slave populations in Islamic societies coa-
lesced after emancipation into a new working class distinct from the old
master class but retaining relatively little from their often distant soci-
eties of origin.17 Observers like Cooper and Fair who wish to consider
the city as a new remarkable social formation are looking at features
such as dance and music, clothing and costume, conviviality based
on drinking spots, sport, and other forms of social communication.
Cooper noted, as the Copperbelt anthropologists had long before, the
remarkable importance of dance and dance societies in the nature of
social cohesion in African cities. Fair has recently commented that men
enjoyed participation in cross-dressing dance displays just as much as
participation on football teams along the lines that British sponsors
took to be conventionally masculine, much to the astonishment of
white observers. Urban sport was also not always played according to
white man’s rules. Parry, Phimister, and van Onselen have recounted
urban boxing contests in Bulawayo, the railway junction city in colo-
nial Southern Rhodesia, which operated according to distinctive local
rules and represented structured ethnic competition. They were con-
tests replete with symbolic significance in which magic played as much
a role as skill.18

With regard to clothing, it is remarkable that Godfrey Wilson,
the first important Rhodes-Livingstone scholar, commented that no
less than 60 percent of early copper miners’ wages went on clothing.
Wilson looked on this as an economic issue while realising that clothing
bore a great importance as carrier of prestige; today’s scholars are more
apt to ask what type of clothing was bought and how clothing worked
as cultural signifiers. The use of European clothing elements would
seem to entangle African workers in the fine net of capitalist accumu-
lation, but with time clothing display could also reflect new forms of

17 This point has also been made by Cooper for Mombasa and by Post & Jenkins for
Ibadan.
18 Parry’s piece is included in the Raftopoulos & Yoshikuni collection. For
Phimister & van Onselen, see “The Political Economy of Tribal Animosity: A Case
Study of the 1929 Bulawayo Location ‘Faction Fight’”, Journal of Southern African
Studies, VI(1), 1979, 1–43.
respectability and identity that were independent of how Europeans actually clothed themselves in the colonial setting.

Long ago, the linguist Joseph Greenberg pointed out that African cities were often the site of dramatic linguistic invention in the colonial period as new lingua francas spread and became accepted as characteristic of particular towns. Thus Lingala, a language that spread to further trade relations on the lower Congo River, became such a lingua franca amongst Africans in Léopoldville, capital of the Belgian Congo. The cities also incurred the attention of indigenised religious movements, Muslim and Christian, even if white Christian missionaries generally preferred to target peasant communities for their outreach. Parker considers for Accra that, in the earlier colonial phase, “an ongoing, uneasy dialogue between Christianity and indigenous belief” was typical.19 In many West African cities such as Ibadan and Lagos, the poor converted in very large numbers to Islam, which became associated with the indigenous and local popular culture. By contrast, in colonial East Africa, the early prominence of Islamic urbanism sometimes gave way to the dominance of Christianity as converted peasant migrants became more numerous and the earlier urban core population was marginalized.

Most of the new cities were very heterogeneous in ethnic terms. Their residents were associated with a very wide variety of “tribal” groupings as classified by colonial administrators. If in some cities there were massive continuities with the immediate countryside, for example in Yoruba-speaking south-western Nigeria, others were populated very largely by migrants coming from much greater distances with a sense of identity very distinct from that of the “indigenous” population. Arusha (in contemporary Tanzania), for instance, had very few residents from the Arusha-speaking population of the environs; for much of the colonial period, moreover, its population became more and more European and Asian in percentage terms. The greatest colonial conurbation of the East African interior, Nairobi, attracted many Kikuyu speakers from the densely peopled agricultural lands in its vicinity. Colonial Salisbury makes an interesting case. Initially its core urban inhabitants came largely from outside Southern Rhodesia, and short distance migrants, Shona speakers, tended to use the city, as with the Kikuyu in Nairobi, moving in and out in complex intersecting

migration patterns. Chi Nyanja was originally the dominant Bantu language of Salisbury as it still is in Lusaka. However, with time a Shona-speaking elite and a Shona proletariat fixed themselves in Salisbury and became dominant gradually after World War II.

The great majority of immigrants to the Copperbelt, both British and Belgian, were long-distance migrants, and workers were cut off to an extreme extent from the surrounding countryside. Here even the white population had a transient and raw feel to it, understandable from the mining context. It was Clyde Mitchell who used the *kalela* dance on the Northern Rhodesian mines as a kind of symbolic touchstone for grasping the new urban life in the territory in a classic essay published towards the end of the colonial era in 1956. During the dance, different “tribal” groups displayed typical characteristics and differentiated themselves from others in good-natured ways that aimed at creating a new sociability while advertising their participation in the economic life of the Copperbelt. The dance belonged to the copper workers; there was no representation in it of any element of the educated stratum of the population.

Ethnicity remained very important but took on a different cast in the city. Abner Cohen, writing on Nigeria, has proposed that “ethnic groups are in fact interest groupings whose members share some common economic and political interests and who, therefore, stand together in the continuous competition for power with other groups.” This is a strong definition of how ethnicity operates in those parts of Africa where it is most potent. Often particular ethnic discourses that come together define very dynamic elements in society that are able to create wealth and play a very powerful role in the urban environment.

New settlers especially needed relatives and friends from home to provide them with the housing and potential access to income that would make urban life feasible. This engendered ethnic associations.

Often ethnic distinctions that would be important at home were eviscerated in the urban situation where such a variety of people lived side by side. John Iliffe thus refers to the creation of “supertribal” identities in colonial Tanganyika. When Parry writes about boxing in colonial Zimbabwe, his use of “ethnic” also indicates supertribal

21 For example, the Igbo in Port Harcourt as portrayed by Howard Wolpe, *Urban Politics in Nigeria; A Study of Port Harcourt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).
agglomerative identity that made sense only in the new urban context. The city also evoked a sense of wider identity yet. Perhaps we need to examine as well the emergence of territorial or national identities, something which has interested scholars less. It must often be in the city that men and women discovered that they were Kenyans or Togolese or Congolese. This is not to suggest that a new national identity was rapidly taking shape, although it is no doubt in the cities where it would become most relevant.

In fact, the new ethnicities often brought about intense rivalries marked by violence. This was notably true for instance in Balandier’s paradigmatic city of Brazzaville in 1959 and after. Brazzaville, the capital of French Equatorial Africa, has been the pan in which new ethnic identities have been cooked. The two distinct African quartiers of the colonial city, Poto Poto and Bacongo, according to Florence Bernault, stimulated a division between north and south identities for the entire French Congo, with ominous long-term consequences for national peace in the future Republic of the Congo. Van Onselen and Phimister have shown how the structured and symbolic fight contests of early Rhodesia could degenerate in phases of economic downturn and intense competition into genuinely widespread and disruptive ethnic “faction fights.” In Nairobi, during the 1950s, the Mau Mau insurgency had finally spurred the British to engage in massive expulsions of Kikuyu workers from the city, with their places often taken up by Africans from other ethnic groups uninvolved in Mau Mau. This is one of the circumstances that helped bring about the highly charged “tribal” politics of late colonial and independent Kenya.

The typical African city contained far more men than women, especially in eastern and southern Africa, and it is hard to escape the impression that short-term and youthful male migrants must have maintained a massive presence in the eyes of any beholder of colonial African urban life. However, those women that did come to live in the cities had an importance often considerably beyond their numbers. In West Africa, where urban compounds exhibited so much continuity with the past, women both rich and poor could occupy a variety of economic roles and held a time-honoured place in the market and in a range of craft activities. However, urban women also succeeded in making an early and important contribution in early colonial towns and cities of southern and eastern Africa where they had no traditional presence. Luise White has shown for early Nairobi that the women judged by authorities as prostitutes actually could be divided
into various economic categories and were in part involved in providing a range of services beyond sexual favours for men. Such women were the bedrock of social stability in the new, precarious, and violent townships which housed African workmen. They had far more at stake in securing access to housing in their own names and gaining legal recognition as residents. Such women frequently became Muslim in East Africa because Islam was a legitimating factor in casting off any uncomfortable association with a tribe or ethnic group that could empower male elders.22 Susan Geiger demonstrated that independent Muslim women were often very significant in the formation of early nationalist politics in late colonial Tanganyika, the territory to the south of Kenya.23

Throughout the southern half of Africa, women were pushed into exercising their rights on the fringes of legality – selling cooked foods and other goods on the streets, offering their sexual services along a variety of lines or “forms” as White calls them, taking in laundry and brewing beer with its strong associations of sociability and community formation. Such women were really the pioneer African urban entrepreneurs in many cases here. Rarely were they waged employees except as domestic workers, and often their existence in the city was threatened unless they formed marital (or less formal) alliances with men, men whose legitimate role in the urban economy was much more secure in the eyes of the authorities.

For African women, despite the precariousness of life in the city, there was the possibility of liberation from oppression to family obligations and situations of extreme dependence as well as misery that emerged in the rural context. The relationship of colonial authorities to such women was complex. Often they were seen as offensive to patriarchal ideals and highly expendable to the modernising city. They were part of an early urban fringe that lived on the edge of colonial law, with subcultures of “alcohol dealers, gamblers and prostitutes” prevailing.24 However, as White and, in the case of Salisbury, Teresa Barnes, contributing to the same collection as Parry, indicate,

22 Later in the colonial period, Nairobi attracted many women who worked as prostitutes and defined themselves as Bahaya. These women, from northern Tanganyika, did not become Muslim.


24 Parry in Raftopoulos & Yoshikuni, 1999, 57.
there was also often a grudging tolerance based on the contribution of what stabilised women offered to a potentially difficult-to-discipline working class.

An Era of Resistance

Don’t think you’ve snuffed out the Casbah
Don’t believe you can build your new world on our ruins.25

In this final section, having looked at varieties of African urban communities and neighbourhoods, the emphasis lies in disaggregation and struggle. The attempt by colonial authorities to shore up some of these elements while disestablishing others, or to maintain some kind of stable balance, crumbled after World War II. One part of postwar urban history in Africa lay in a reactionary struggle, a struggle in the late colonial period on the part of the privileged against concessions and for the extension of the city white. In the Camerounian port city of Douala, the end of World War II initiated a wave of violence on the part of white settlers afraid of concessions that would decentre their ambitions after the Brazzaville address of General de Gaulle seemed to threaten a deracialisation of French colonial policies. Increasingly extreme incidents mark the later colonial history of Bône, where decolonisation in 1962 would mean the physical departure of almost all the “Europeans” who had formed the majority of the urban population and the deconstruction of the colonial town as it had been conceived by the French – starting with the physical demolition of the cathedral and the colonial statuary. In Nairobi, whites who dominated the City Council struggled constantly for enforcement of pass laws, repatriation of vagrants, removal of informal housing wherever it was deemed inconvenient, and the establishment of curfews and no-go areas for Africans. Lusaka, established as a new capital for Northern Rhodesia in 1930, was, so far as its white population were concerned, a “planned” city with huge residential lots and curving tree-lined streets in place of the conventional grid pattern. The copper boom allowed for the emergence of a private building sector that actually constructed the homes and offices whites used; even the apprenticeships in the industry were

largely confined to whites until independence in 1964. Up to this time Lusaka developed mainly along lines focussed on its expanding white middle-class population, although purpose-built municipal housing for Africans did gradually get allocated and formal racial segregation began to dissolve. Carole Rakodi is right to characterise this kind of planning as “debased” even when it contained elements that were considered the last word in the twentieth-century city.26 As we shall see in the next chapter, this thrust went together with the triumphal urban planning of apartheid in South Africa, but it was doomed even there and from a much earlier phase.

In some respects, the quintessential male urbanites of Africa had been the elites. As colonial states created social services and allowed for the emergence of a new African leadership, the sites where such elites could make a living were disproportionately urban. In the cities they set the stage for new social and cultural forms that were admired and later spread further down the socioeconomic ladder. They were proud of town ways and of their access to the world via the towns, even if colonial authorities exaggerated their isolation from rural forms of organisation and prestige. However, policies based on accommodating small elite numbers became less relevant over time.

Limited categories of Africans then had been afforded tentative urban space, albeit in a contradictory way. Even outside western and northern Africa, where indigenous urban life was so prevalent, colonial authorities had also usually recognised the existence of established urban communities where white settlers were not too exigent. Towards the end of the colonial period, the anthropologist Valdo Pons studied the city of Stanleyville in the Belgian Congo. Belgian authorities recognized that there was an old urban population that preceded colonial control and performed some useful economic function – the arabisés. To accommodate them, the centre extra-coutumier was created where Africans could build “traditional” homesteads and start businesses along controlled lines, although of course the state insisted on continuing to own the land. In Léopoldville, Africans, women included, were eventually given the right to own freehold land in such settlements, but most preferred the longer-established occupation rights to what were called in French lotissements as sufficient. Moreover, “in 1958 a study of housing estates by Albert Attunou showed clearly that the average

Congolese would prefer to acquire his[ sic] own parcelle and build a house to his own specifications, rather than live in a housing estate.”

On such a parcelle, the landlord could become a sort of chief and he could acquire tenants as clients, especially if the spatial allotment was fairly large. This policy accompanied the rigid, legal racial segregation that had typified Belgian rule from the end of the nineteenth century. The historian John Iliffe has underlined the role of landlords, fadhahausi, in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, during the interwar years under British rule. In the centre of town, notably the district of Kariakoo, they represented bulwarks of stability and used compound rents to accumulate capital. “Kariakoo” referred to the World War I carrier corps, and the term elided into a sense of respectability and importance in the colonial order. The lively Kariakoo market was fundamental to the neighbourhood’s economic existence.

However, the property rights of such individuals were usually hedged and everywhere the availability of plots was insufficient. And in cities where Africans did hold entrenched property rights, colonial authorities were ill at ease. The authorities waged a major struggle in Zanzibar to force what was termed waqf land – which engendered no rent and had been in the gift ultimately of the Sultans – into a more commercial system. The gift of such land enabled many poor Zanzibaris to live rent-free across the lagoon from the Stone Town. Such pressure led to a major rent strike in 1928, where solidarity held to the point that the authorities had to yield. As late as the 1940s, a district commissioner in the Sudan considered that “no where else in the world is there so large a community which is so unproductive” as in Omdurman. In Omdurman, life operated still according to social norms over which the colonial economy held little purchase. Homeowners could live off rents while an internal economy of crafts and commerce remained vibrant.

A further element in many African towns were poor peripheral commuters who were not so much acknowledged as tolerated, the straddlers Cooper has introduced to us. Thus in Dar es Salaam, native Zaramo speakers from the vicinity were rarely found in the town centre but tended to construct homes on the urban periphery if they were able


to access money from urban activities. In Nyasaland, a poor colony, the limited space made available for Africans in the vicinity of Blantyre and Limbe was so dreadful – “windowless hovels” – that far more people preferred to make their homes at some distance from town and commute. In early Rhodesia, the prevalence of “private locations” and tribal areas near towns made this kind of commuting a feature from an early period.

With regard to migrants, we are able today to recognise that for the workers themselves the question was not how urban they proposed to become but how to access the resources of town in a way that enabled their lives to be improved. Urbanisation as a process was something that came second to this and workers were inclined to struggle to maintain their situations at both ends rather than be defined by the state as either peasants or proletarians. Because poor urban migrants had themselves valued the importance of a transient and ambulant existence, there was some collusion between their self-defined needs and the systematic tendency of colonial rulers to minimise spending on urban planning and infrastructure. Nairobi’s African population had its first purpose-built housing in the form of a squalid and unsanitary series of tiny rooms and, as we have seen, such housing was seen as highly expendable. Communal laundries and dormitories were initially typical features and stressed the extent to which migrants were conceived of simply as indistinguishable “labour” rather than human beings with a foothold in an expanding urban environment.

Using the South African model to which we shall be referring in the next chapter, we note that lasting improvements for long depended on revenues derived from municipal attempts to control beer drinking with municipal beer houses rather than any system of property rates that might be associated with tenure. In this setting, where a large settler population was resident, the state tried as well to control the physical movement of poor African individuals within urban space through pass laws, an endless source of harassment, and shakedown street politics. Indeed, in Nairobi, the entire town-planning model and most of the employed town planners came from South Africa, something that was largely the case in colonies further south as well. In general, the resources involved in trying to control African drinking habits were too limited for the so-called Durban system to really take effect, although it existed in some form throughout the British colonies in the southern half of Africa and even spread into Belgian colonial usage. Thus in Salisbury, the municipal brewery actually supplied malt
to African brewers, as authorities were unable to wipe out African beer production. No wonder Africans preferred, and fought for, the preservation of neighbourhoods where they had rights and where economic activities were possible, even if such neighbourhoods were also relatively squalid.

With the rapid expansion of African urban populations from the late 1930s on, the plans of colonial administrators for cities based on segregation and on an urban ideal aimed at the affluent began to look less secure and less relevant. Swollen townships alive with underpaid workers and poor people trying to keep their heads above water became the source of resistance to authority. This sometimes provoked forceful strikes, notably of public sector workers, which in turn often played a critical role in creating a mass base for nationalist political leaders and parties but which were also typically concerned with urban conditions. The authorities saw in growing cities the potential source for social and even political disruption, a home for agitators and those who failed to “fit” into colonial paternalist expectations. The “struggle for the city” in Cooper’s terms was partly about shaking authority so as to allow for conditions of extended reproduction where only temporary amenities designed for a small and ambulant population were provided for. Collusion between worker abstemiousness and state stinginess ceased to hold at critical junctures. In conceptualising key struggles, Cooper shed entirely worries about just how “urban” African urban dwellers were in the colonial period; instead he focussed on the consequences of rural Africans domiciling themselves in the city, their basic needs and aims, and how this clashed with the reluctant reception they received from authorities.  

In some cases, the city became the site of resistance to colonial authority, resistance which blended with demands for improved economic conditions in the light of wartime and postwar conditions. If most historians have emphasized the positive aspects of urban leisure time in recent years, one notes that by the 1940s Fair notes also a violent and tense element in urban life. In contrast to more cheerful narratives about structured dance societies, a few writers have taken seriously claims about the extension of delinquency and the spread of crime, especially given the large population of male youths and the

29 Frederick Cooper, Struggles for the City; Migrant Labour, Capital and the State in Urban Africa (Beverly Hills & London: Sage, 1983).
emergence of a quite uncontrolled, raw consumerist “cowboy” culture, in the words of Andrew Burton. Its proponents did not want to be told what elements of capitalism and new forms of wealth to accept and which to abstain from. African urban culture was beginning to acquire an insurgent character, especially in the new colonially generated towns. And authority’s not-entirely-unjustified fears about disorder were also not-entirely-unjustified fears about politics. Thus the “African crowd” of Nairobi represented a major source, in British eyes, of recruitment for the Mau Mau rebellion of the early 1950s. Operation Anvil uprooted and expelled workers from the city on an unprecedented scale. It was notable also that new workers from parts of Kenya where Mau Mau was not significant were sometimes rewarded with better-quality housing (creation of Makadara and the beginning of family housing units for Africans in Nairobi) than had ever previously been made available.

Purpose-built state housing of a decent quality by the middle 1950s was no longer entirely a novelty. In Dar es Salaam and elsewhere, new and more enlightened colonial policies did begin to authorize the construction of municipal housing for African clerical and worker families. Magomeni in Dar es Salaam, where workers in government-owned dwellings held down relatively secure jobs, was far more integrated into the colonial economy than was Kariakoo. In Khartoum North, African workers in steady employment were permitted to erect homes on government-assigned plots just as they were in sections of Abidjan, the new capital of the Ivory Coast, near the port, after World War II. Yet nowhere did colonial planning envision the emergence of great cities marked by African proletariats or conceive systematically of the need for cultural and economic continuities and infrastructure aimed at the survival of poor people in large numbers. At best, later planning efforts moved away from racial segregation (except of course in South Africa and neighbouring territories) and began to try to apply modernist ideas based on the social democratic and liberal ideals of contemporary Europe, whether appropriate or not. Efforts at modernising and sanitising West African cities in response to mild dollops of political democratisation met with stalemate; African electors proved profoundly reluctant in coastal Nigeria and the Gold Coast to pay systematic rates that would underscore modernisation. As we

30 Just as did New Bell in postwar Duala. Cameroun witnessed a sustained and violent anti-French insurrection just after the peak of Mau Mau.
have seen, the early history of slum clearance associated with segre-
gation and hygiene cast a long shadow; urban residents fought shy of cooperation with the state.

Attempts to create suitable confined homes for a proletariat, often coupled with removal campaigns aimed at expunging the unwanted, did not begin to resolve the burgeoning advance of the shantytown, the bidonville. Cooper has shown both for Kenya and for Senegal that when the colonial state was unable to force Africans back into their older sit-
tuation, they instituted reform plans which were not so much badly intended as contradictory and unworkable. African wages remained painfully low and formed the basis for savings or for petty accumula-
tion only with difficulty. In particular, the capital costs of constructing working-class family-based neighbourhoods on the European model for the majority of town dwellers proved too high, and the attempt to deal with their inhabitants as though they were inscribed in European nuclear families proved too unrealistic. As late as the beginning of the 1950s, for instance, Herbert Werlin noted that Africans in Nairobi still lived largely in a context where paved roads, drainage, and electricity did not exist. These reform schemes continued, especially in the wealthier colonies, into the postindependence period, but it would then become clearer not only to conservatives but also to those who admired the rise of African nationalism that African cities could not keep pace with the demands for a basic improvement in living on the part of the masses. The potentially antisocial “urban crowd” presented an ever greater challenge to the philosophy of development tied in to a desire for order.

An underdeveloped area in the study of colonial towns lies, per-
haps surprisingly, in politics. Particularly in the later colonial period, distinctive forms of urban politics did emerge. On the one hand, old centres such as Ibadan, Kano, or Accra held out scope for patron-
age to forces clustered around changing networks of African authority structures. In Lagos, Pauline Baker argues that the British, surprisingly given their ideological predilections, sidestepped the chiefly “house of Docemo” but in so doing unintentionally accorded it resistance signif-
icance and status as a political player. She thus shows that it was the survival of older forms, as well as the charisma of specific individuals such as Lagos’ Herbert Macauley, that brought urban politics to life. Sometimes urban politics took the form of bitter contests, notably in West Africa, when impinged on by colonial attempts to squeeze taxes out of residents for modernization plans. Even when shorn of
any racist element, they could evoke intense hostility. The relationship of indigenes to newcomers often bedeviled political development as the newcomers, often ahead in terms of wealth and education, refused to accept the authority of the long-established. Struggles could be dissipated through political concessions, reforms, and divide-and-rule tactics that rigidified ethnic, regional, or religious divisions.

Even in settler colonies such as Southern Rhodesia and Kenya, advisory councils were created so that trusted Africans could assist with the practical side of urban administration, but they invariably had little power, even of a patrimonial sort, and were not viable sites for vibrant political activity. Colonial rulers tended to create modern political representative structures as cities grew in size and importance. These were most effective and important when dominated by white settlers. In British colonies, the vote was based on the payment of property rates, and municipal structures were formed to serve the ratepayers. Thus in Northern Rhodesia the Townships Ordinance gave some kind of self-government of this sort to a number of municipalities. Settler rule was often more parsimonious with expenditure and gave even more short shrift to African services and needs than officials from Europe. Only on the eve of Zambian independence was the municipal franchise extended substantially to Africans, and still they constituted only a minority. In East Africa, Indians were usually included in urban government structures but invariably on a less than equal basis; Nairobi’s white mayor was complemented by a brown-skinned vice-mayor, although the Indian population was perhaps twice as large as the white population.

By contrast, the advisory councils and elected councils of West Africa had too little in the way of resources and autonomy to attract or engender a new African politics. However, there were colonial towns where postwar trade unionism gave urban politics a strong working-class cast; but more typically, the most educated and well-to-do Africans were often able not merely to organize their own class around grievances but to emerge successfully as champions of the masses. As some writers have shown for Nigeria, the urban arena became very attractive by the 1950s to African politicians eager to build up a following and able through provincial and territorial self-government to command resources with which to create the beginnings of urban machine politics and offer symbols of “progress” to constituents. A classic study of a typical late colonial politician in Nigeria, Adegoke Adelabu, makes clear the central role of the Ibadan town council in his rise to power and notoriety. Such politicians did not
really try to engage with the contradictory and challenging problems involved in planning modern cities and accommodating the mass of new urbanites in late colonial Africa. One should not underestimate as well the difficulties involved in organizing the very disparate urban populations of colonial Africa. This was not merely, as we have seen, the question of the racial minorities (or “Europeans” in the case of North Africa) but also of differences between indigenes and migrants, homeowners and tenants, traditional chiefs and educated elites. The struggle for the city had more than one angle.

This chapter has tried to indicate the substantial scale of growth in colonial cities, especially primate cities, to give a sense of the diversity of economic activities that made urban life possible and to consider the social forms that Africans themselves created in this environment. In some cases, the cities sprang up from nothing at all, although continuities and links to rural life remained very important; in others, pre-colonial cities changed perhaps only marginally and subtly but often through marginalization in new colonial structures. This did provoke important differences. Colonial rule, characterized by economic functionalist policy and racist segregation ideas, often tried to impose idealized norms from the metropole, but African realities continued to creep in repeatedly. Though colonial cities experienced stabler phases, they were often the source of social and political crises that revealed the contradictions in colonial ideas about development.

Selected Readings

By contrast with the specific subject matter of the previous chapters, colonial cities in Africa have interested many modern scholars, and there is much to be read on them. Thus the following reading list is far from comprehensive. Again, many of the titles already given for previous chapters – such as Parker, Miner, Peel, and Lloyd et al. – are very relevant to this one as well. A typology of colonial cities that is widely influential is a feature of Anthony O’Connor, *The African City* (London: Hutchinson, 1983). Some thoughtful essays widely cited by students of colonial urban Africa are J. R. Rayfield, “Theories of Urbanization and the Colonial City in West Africa,” *Africa*, LXIV, 1974, 163–85; J. D. Y. Peel, “Urbanization and Urban History in West Africa,” *Journal of African History*, XXI, 1980, 269–78; and Catherin Coquery-Vidrovitch, “The Process of Urbanization in Africa,” *African Studies Review*, XXIV(1), 1991, 1–98. See also David Simon,


Moving towards more general themes, a very substantial study written not long after independence is André Adam, Casablanca, 2 volumes, (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1968). As an example of a smaller city, the Moroccan border town of Oujda, Yvette Katan, Oujda: une ville frontière du Maroc (1907–56) (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1990) is interesting. Moroccan urban development under the French experience was distinctive and far more nuanced than generally was the case in colonial Africa and is in its complexity not done justice in this chapter. For a thoughtful study see Abderrahmane Rachik, Ville et pouvoirs au Maroc (Casablanca: Afrique-Orient, 1994). Kenneth Perkins, Port Sudan: Evolution of a Colonial City (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) traces the development and contradictions of an entirely new colonial city with only a commercial expatriate element. For fine, largely literary evocations of Mediterranean African cities, see Michael Haag, Alexandria: City of Memory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004) and Iain Finlayson, Tangier: City of the Dream (London: Harper Collins, 1992).

An early collection of articles showing a sense of tension and crisis in African colonial cities was published in 1969 in the special issue (III[2]) of the Canadian Journal of African Studies, which notably included Peter Gutkind, “Tradition, Migration, Urbanization, Modernity and Unemployment in Africa: The Roots of Instability.” Urban studies in Africa were transformed by a collection edited by Frederick Cooper with an important introduction: Struggle for the City: Migrant Labor, Capital and the State in Urban Africa (Beverly Hills & London: Sage, 1983). This paved the way for new social historical studies of cities which emphasized first class and then culture and gave some definition to certain previous studies. A few titles along these lines would include Florence Bernault, “The Political Shaping of Sacred

