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**“I Know
Well, but All
the Same . . .”**

As soon as we begin to attend to the psychological problems thrown up by beliefs, we discover that they cover a very broad range of experience and display rather close similarities across the most widely divergent domains. Because these problems remain unsolved, we are not only unable to say with certainty what a sixteenth-century humanist—Rabelais, for instance—did or did not believe, but are not much better off when it comes to assessing our contemporaries’ ambivalent belief in superstitions. The ethnographers cite astonishing statements by their informants, who assure them that people *used* to believe in masks *in the old days*; but these ethnographers do not always clearly tell us just what has changed since, as if the change in question could be chalked up, as it were, to the steady spread of enlightenment. It is a fairly safe bet that a belief of this sort has *always* been associated with the old days; but we would like to know why. A person watching a magician perform does not for an instant believe that his tricks are magic, yet she insists that the illusion be “perfect.” We would be hard put to say who is supposed to be fooled. Something similar occurs in the theater—is, indeed, so much a part of the theater that playwrights have devised “induction scenes,” as in *The Taming of the Shrew*, or imagined little fables about naive, gullible spectators who take what happens on the stage for real life. These are run-of-the-mill examples of the problem of belief; others, as we shall see, are more surprising.

Psychoanalysis, which encounters problems of belief every day, has

not made much effort to elucidate them. Freud has suggested how it might, but he makes the suggestion obliquely and unexpectedly, which doubtless explains why virtually no one has explored the path he has opened up. It may be noted that neither the word "belief" nor any of its equivalents in other languages appears in the index to any edition of his works.

The problem of belief necessarily arose very early for Freud, and he never lost sight of it. It forms the subject of one of his last writings (left unfinished in 1938),¹ which approaches the question as something both quite familiar and altogether new. But it is in a very short 1927 paper on the problem of fetishism that Freud opens up the problematic of belief, in the course of defining *Verleugnung* with all the precision the concept requires. This German term may be rendered by the French *désaveu* or *répudiation* [or the English disavowal or repudiation]. It occurs in Freud as early as 1923, always in passages that turn, implicitly or explicitly, on the question of belief. This is so consistently the case that, to locate the passages in question despite the lacuna in the indexes, one need only look up the term *Verleugnung*.

It is well known how *Verleugnung* comes into play in the constitution of fetishism, according to Freud's 1927 essay. When a child first becomes aware of the anatomy of the female body, he discovers, in reality, the absence of a penis; but, so as to preserve his belief in the existence of the maternal phallus, he disavows or repudiates the refutation of his belief that is imposed by reality. Yet he can retain this belief only at the price of a radical transformation (which Freud tends to treat, first and foremost, as a modification of the ego). "It is not true," says Freud, "that, after the child has made his observation of the woman, he has preserved unaltered his belief that women have a phallus. He has retained that belief, but he has also given it up. . . . a compromise has been reached, as is only possible under the dominance of the . . . primary processes. The child has maintained a divided attitude towards that belief."² This "divided attitude" becomes, in the 1938 text, the *splitting* of the ego. . .

Belief is transformed under the influence of the primary processes; in other words, it is subject, in the final analysis, to the effects of the repressed, especially of unconscious desire. In this sense, it obeys the basic laws. However, *Verleugnung* itself has nothing in common with repression, as Freud expressly states and as we shall explain in a mo-

ment. It may be understood as a simple *disavowal* of reality (although it must also be distinguished from scotomization). Laplanche and Pontalis have accordingly translated *Verleugnung* as *déni de la réalité* [disavowal of reality] in their (unpublished) *Vocabulaire de la Psychanalyse*, which they are writing under Daniel Lagache's direction.³ This is, to be sure, the first meaning of the term; what is initially disavowed is the refutation, imposed by reality, of a belief. But the phenomenon is more complicated, as we have already seen, for the reality that is observed does not remain without effect. The fetishist has disavowed the experience that proves to him that women do not have a phallus, but he does not cultivate the belief that they have one; he cultivates a fetish because they *do not* have one. Not only is the experience not eradicated, it is ineradicable. It leaves an *indelible mark* on the fetishist, one he bears forever. What is eradicated is the *memory* of the experience.

We shall see that Freud's 1927 paper is far from elucidating the problem of fetishism, although it is generally only cited in discussions of that perversion. In fact, the paper examines a precondition for elucidating this problem, by showing how a belief can be abandoned and preserved at the same time. The obstacles that we run into if we go down the path that Freud thus points out—they probably explain why no one has taken it after him—are of a rather special kind, as the reader will discover soon enough: one finds oneself torn between an impression of extreme banality and a powerful feeling of strangeness. The matter that requires explanation also seems to be plain as day. This was Freud's own experience in 1938; his paper begins with the words, "I find myself for a moment in the interesting position of not knowing whether what I have to say should be regarded as something long familiar and obvious or as something entirely new and puzzling."⁴ This impression is rooted in the very nature of the subject: we have to do here, at any rate, with phenomena we encounter at every turn, in daily life as well as in our psychoanalyses. In analysis, they take a—indeed, virtually stereotypical—form: the patient, ill at ease in some cases and quite relaxed in others, employs the phrase, "I know well, but all the same. . . ." Of course, the fetishist does not use a phrase of this sort to describe his perversion: *he knows well* that women do not have a phallus, yet he cannot add a "but all the same," since his "but all the same" is his fetish. The neurotic spends her life saying "but all the same," yet she cannot, any more than

the fetishist, declare that women have one after all; she spends her life stating this in other ways. However, like everyone else, by virtue of a sort of displacement, she utilizes the mechanism of *Verleugnung* in connection with other beliefs, as if the *Verleugnung* of the maternal phallus furnished the paradigm for all other disavowals of reality and was at the origin of all other beliefs that manage to survive their refutation by experience. Thus fetishism obliges us to consider, in a "puzzling" form, a class of phenomena that can easily escape our attention when they wear a familiar, everyday aspect.

As everyone knows, Freud once had a patient who was told by a fortune-teller that his brother-in-law would die of shellfish poisoning that summer. After the summer had passed, the patient said to Freud, in sum, "I know well that my brother-in-law hasn't died, but, all the same, that prediction was wonderful."⁵ Freud was amazed by this comment, but he was preoccupied by a very different problem at the time and did not pause over the form of belief that his patient's statement implied. Something on the order of belief had to have subsisted, with the fortune-teller's help, in order to be recognizable, despite its transformation, in this feeling of satisfaction, which was patently absurd. Yet it is neither more nor less absurd than the construction of a fetish, although it is a phenomenon of a very different order.

We are so used to hearing the phrase "I know well, but all the same" that it does not always seem as surprising to us as it does here. In a certain sense, indeed, it is constitutive of the analytic situation. It might be said that, before the invention of psychoanalysis, psychology had focused exclusively on the "I know well," while striving to banish the "but all the same." Since St. Paul, at least, people had been quite familiar with a certain duplicity, a vague prefiguration of the splitting of the ego; but all they could see in it was a scandalous violation of their unitary, moralistic conceptions of the self. Even those psychoanalysts who (a bit like St. Paul) held that it was necessary to strike up an alliance with the healthy half of the subject never imagined that, by privileging the "I know well," they would, once and for all, gain the upper hand over the "but all the same," since that is no longer possible once the analytic situation has been established. Evidently, the sole reason for the "but all the same" is the "I know well." For example, the sole reason for the existence of the fetish is that the fetishist *knows* that women have no phallus. Pre-

cisely this relationship might serve to define *Verleugnung*, for it makes it obvious that *Verleugnung* cannot be confused with denial [*négation*]. The statement "I am quite sure that it is not my mother" does not at all require a "but all the same." For the "it is my mother" continues to be repressed—in the way in which, precisely, repression subsists after denial. In such cases, we speak of *knowledge*, not belief; in other words, there is no reality more or less directly at stake here.

Whenever an analyst fails to recognize an act of *Verleugnung* in the analytic situation—as sometimes happens, since *Verleugnung* is often obscure or disguised—the patient, fortunately, immediately calls her attention to it by replying, "I know that, of course; but all the same. . . ." The analyst may then conclude that what is involved is repression; for instance, she may content herself with the idea that her interpretation has reached the patient's conscious without penetrating his unconscious. This somewhat simplistic topographical explanation has one flaw: it does not help us see what to do. The unconscious is too remote, or the patient is, so to speak, too thick; his consciousness and his unconscious are separated by too dense a barrier. Yet the "but all the same" is not unconscious. It finds its explanation in the fact that desire or fantasy operates, as it were, at a distance. Plainly, that is the point at which we must ultimately arrive. But we cannot do so directly, nor does this justify oversimplifications. After all, we cannot respond to someone who has asked us about the tides by telling him to "consider the moon"; we would be responsible for too many drownings. In other words, although repression is in the final analysis the key to the problem, as always, we must begin by examining *Verleugnung* as such.

No repression is involved where beliefs are concerned. That is one of the founding axioms of psychoanalysis (it dates from May 25, 1897). It is of small importance here that every representation initially appears as a reality; that is a question of a different order, and has to do with hallucination, not belief. It is another aspect of the problem—indeed, *the* other aspect of the problem. Freud himself notes how far we would be from fetishism if the subject opted for the solution of *hallucinating* the phallus.

Problems connected with religious faith have to be put aside at the outset; they are of a different nature, even if it is a fact that faith is always mingled with belief. So as not to create the impression of contenting myself with stating a paradox, I would like to say a word about the matter.

The true nature of religious faith has no doubt been concealed from us by borrowings from Greek ontology. At some point, faith began to concern itself with the *existence* of God—so, at any rate, it would seem. One need only read the Bible to see that the Jews believed in the existence of all the gods; they even waged war on them. Yet they maintained their *faith* in just one. Faith meant their unconditional commitment. The subject to hand is belief: the belief that, for example, allowed the Jews to believe in the existence of Baal, although they had no faith in him. At the limit, a reduction can be effected in this case as well; the stuff of both faith and belief is the word [*la parole*] of others. That, however, does not warrant confounding them at the level on which I am placing myself here.

We will need examples to make this clearer, and they will have to be of a rather massive cast, for the question is, by its nature, an elusive one. I will take the first of them from ethnography: ethnographic literature abounds in them. I have already mentioned the phrase that is constantly on informants' lips: "In the old days, people believed in masks." It raises a hidden problem involving the informants' beliefs—and also, if more subtly, the ethnographers'. Yet it is easy to bring out what is at stake, and even to transform it into an apparent banality.

The French reading public knows Don Talayesva's *Sun Chief*.⁶ The book makes it rather easy to see what the belief in masks consists in and how it is transformed. Hopi masked dancers are known as Katcinas. At a certain season of the year, the Katcinas appear in the pueblos, much as Santa Claus appears in our culture; and, again like Santa, they take a strong interest in children. They also resemble Santa Claus in that they conspire with parents to deceive them. The imposture is very strictly maintained, and no one would dare to expose it. Unlike the ambiguous but easygoing Santa Claus, however, the Katcinas are terrifying figures, for, if they are interested in children, it is because they want to eat them. The children's mothers save their terrorized progeny, of course, appeasing the Katcinas with pieces of meat. In return, the Katcinas give the children little balls of corn meal, known as *piki*, which, though usually yellow, are colored red for the occasion. The error of too simple a psychoanalysis would be to assume that these rites should be interpreted in terms of stages, fantasies, or symbols. Their real interest lies elsewhere, as will soon appear.

"Once," Talayesva tells us, "when there was to be a Katcina dance

within two days, I found my mother in a nearby house, baking piki. I had entered unexpectedly and discovered that she was making red piki. When I saw that it was red piki . . . I was upset. . . . That evening at supper . . . I ate almost nothing. . . . The next day when the Katcinas were distributing their gifts to us I did not want any of their . . . piki. But to my surprise they gave me not red but yellow piki. . . . Then I was happy" (75-6).⁷

This time, then, Talayesva has managed to avoid giving up his belief, thanks to his clever mother's ploy. As to the other judgment, "Mama is fooling me," it is hard to say what becomes of it. It must be present somewhere. It can be seen that what we might call a first test of disavowal causes anxiety, and is not far from being a traumatic ordeal; our young Hopi is relieved to escape it. This crisis is akin to the one that Freud assumes the future fetishist undergoes, and, as it is not directly accessible, proceeds to reconstruct: it is an *unheimliche*, traumatic moment, that of the discovery of reality. Beyond the shadow of a doubt, the crisis of belief in the Katcinas reproduces, as its model, the structure of the crisis of belief in the phallus. Similarly, Freud saw in the crisis linked to castration the model for the kinds of panic that erupt later in life, when people are suddenly overwhelmed by the feeling that "Throne and Altar are in danger." We will already have recognized castration in the emotion that overcomes the young Hopi when he is confronted with the red piki. The alarm soon passes; it is a mere foretaste of what will occur when the boy reaches the age of ten or so, the age of initiation. Yet it is not a matter of indifference, in my view, that things should thus transpire in two distinct periods. This makes an "it was true after all" possible, and this repetition certainly plays an important role.

When the children are initiated—in the course of ceremonies that are intended to be as impressive as possible, and that *directly* evoke castration—the adults who are known as fathers and uncles in the Hopi kinship system reveal, by removing their masks, that they were the ones who played the Katcinas. How do the initiated react when they learn the truth?

"When the Katcinas entered the kiva without masks," Talayesva writes, "I had a great surprise. They were not spirits. . . . I recognized all of them, and I felt very unhappy, because I had been told all my life that Katcinas were gods. I was especially shocked and angry when I saw

that all my clan fathers and uncles were dancing as Katcinas. I felt the worst when I saw my own father" (84).⁸

Indeed, what can one believe if authority is deception [*mystification*]?

What is truly puzzling here is the fact that this ceremony of demystification and the blow it deals to the children's belief in the Katcinas provide the institutional foundation for the new belief in them that forms the heart of Hopi religion. Reality—the fact that the Katcinas are the initiates' fathers and uncles—has to be disavowed by way of a transformation of belief. Yet is this so puzzling after all? Do we not tend to find it natural? "Now you know," the children are told, "that the *real* Katcinas do not come to dance in the pueblos *the way they did in the old days*. Now they only come invisibly, and, on the days of the dance, they dwell in their masks in mystical fashion." A Hopi Voltaire would doubtless reply that, having been fooled once, he won't be fooled again! But the Hopis distinguish and contrast the way the children are deceived and the mystical truth into which they are initiated. A Hopi can say in all good faith, in a way that is manifestly not quite identical to the formulation we meet with in psychoanalysis, "*I know well* that the Katcinas are not spirits; they are my fathers and uncles. *But, after all*, the Katcinas are present when my fathers and uncles dance masked."⁹ The formula "in the old days, people believed in masks" is not as simple as it seems. I shall come back to the relationship between belief and imposture.

Thus, after this trying experience, in which infantile beliefs are refuted, these beliefs can continue to exist in adult form: something has, as it were, gone over to the other side (the definition of initiation). When Talayesva later falls ill and is saved by a tutelary spirit, the spirit appears to him in the guise of a Katcina. At another point, Talayesva takes pleasure in the thought that he will come back to dance as a Katcina in his pueblo after his death. But he also says something else: that all of this has been a lesson to him, and that, from now on, he will take care to do what is right. We have here a reaction that recalls the establishment of the superego; but it also and all but indiscernibly recalls the moment when belief, shedding its imaginary form, is symbolized sufficiently to lead on to faith, that is, to a commitment.

Since some might ask, though the answer is obvious, about the question of castration, it should be pointed out that this question arises for Talayesva too, both apparently and explicitly; but it arises elsewhere,

without ever intersecting the question of belief in the Katcinas or even the symbolic castration rites that are part of initiation. This is a general phenomenon that will not surprise us any more than the fact that the fetishist does not associate his worship of the fetish with his castration fantasies. What we have already glimpsed will be confirmed as we go along: namely, that belief in the presence of the maternal phallus is the first belief that one disavows and the paradigm for all other acts of disavowal. Let us also note how difficult it would be to rewrite Talayesva's history in terms of repression or fantasy. The concept of the splitting of the ego does not appear to be of much service here; it is not, at any rate, indispensable, probably because we no longer conceive of the ego as a synthetic apparatus.

Talayesva's story is everybody's story, whether she is normal or neurotic, Hopi or not. After all, it is plain that we have installed God in the heavens, although we have found no trace of him in the sky, by dint of a transformation comparable to the one carried out by the Hopis. But, obviously, this story cannot be the same as the fetishist's; if we examine the matter more closely, we shall see that there are major differences among the effects of disavowal, whether they are acknowledged or ignored. Because these differences are hard to define, we shall have to try to rough out, for better or for worse, a classificatory schema. Talayesva would provide a good model for the simplest, most straightforward class in this schema.

I have so far left aside a very important point, the fact that there always remain non-initiated children who continue to be taken in by the imposture. A crucial feature of every initiation is that the initiated make a solemn vow to keep the secret. They will take part in perpetuating the imposture in their turn; one might say that the children are a kind of prop for the adults' belief. In some societies, the women too are among the credulous; but, in all societies, beliefs are based, first and foremost, on the credulity of the children.

Here I am repeating an idea that forcefully impressed itself on me when I asked myself, while doing other research, what sustained the belief of theatergoers;¹⁰ I wondered where the imaginary credulous spectator was. I will add that I do not think we have paid enough attention to the question as to exactly what transpires when, in our societies, an adult feels the need to deceive a child — about Santa Claus, the stork,

and so on—to the point that she sometimes fears that Throne and Altar, to use Freud's expression, will be endangered if someone suggests disabusing the victim. Because of our geneticist preconceptions, we make childhood a means of diachronic explanation. But, in synchronic perspective, the child can, as someone who is both present and an outsider, play a non-negligible role by assuming, as he does among the Hopis, the burden of our beliefs after disavowal. He is not privy to the adults' secrets. This may seem to go without saying; but we know well that, in the case of certain perverts, it is the normal adult who is assumed to be credulous and ignorant of the child's secrets. To put it differently, the situation is not as natural as it may seem; if psychoanalysis has delivered us of the myth of children's purity and innocence, it has not gone very far in analyzing the function of this myth. Dazzled by the resistance that the revelation of infantile sexuality initially provoked, analysts were persuaded that, by pointing to the repression (the amnesia) of adults, they were on the way to clearing everything up. But if we admit that invoking the ostensible innocence of children is only a way of talking about their credulity, the picture is considerably altered. As with the Hopis, if more confusedly, infantile credulity helps us disavow our own beliefs: needless to say, even if we have no direct contact with children, our mental representation of them suffices. Many adults would readily confess—they are sometimes struck by the absurdity of the situation—that they are religious not for their own sake, but for their progeny's. This reasonable concern for children's spiritual education is not the whole explanation for the large place that children hold in the organization of beliefs. Yet this concern alerts us to the interest that specialists in belief of all kinds take in children, in a way that is somewhat reminiscent of the Katcinas', even if the social institution that regulates *Verleugnung* is much less well organized in our societies.

This very clear-cut example is more a model than anything else: it quite plainly shows how a belief can, if transformed, survive even if it flies in the face of reality. It will be readily granted that the structure conforms to this model in those cases in which what occurs is rather well concealed from the consciousness of the subject; but, as will soon appear, we also have to admit the possibility of other kinds of structures, not all of which correspond to the same model. For the moment, let us content ourselves with noting that a belief may be retained without

the subject's knowledge. In analysis, we often observe that unexpected reactions or effects reveal irrational beliefs or "superstitions" of which the subject is not conscious, although they are not repressed; we cannot make them manifest by overcoming a resistance. Rather, they are elusive, insubstantial, difficult to grasp. The reason is that they are attributed to others. Examples of this are to be found everywhere. Thus, in a recent book on Dien Bien Phu, Jules Roy notes that the code name of the *Groupement opérationnel du nord-ouest* [Northwest Operational Group] was "GONO." This was, he says, a name of ill-omen,¹¹ a circumstance the general should have taken into account. No doubt. But who believes in this sort of ill omen? Would Roy himself confess to a belief in divination based on the sounds of certain words? Surely not. Nobody believes in it—and everybody does. It is as if we live in a world in which certain beliefs are in the air, even if no one will admit to having them. *One* has such beliefs. There is nothing more common than the kind of remark Roy makes—and yet nothing more puzzling, if we stop to think about it.

Let us, then, put aside what others believe in order to observe how a belief may appear to the subject himself, and in what sense it more or less eludes his grasp. For reasons that are no doubt suspect, but hidden, I sometimes read the rather rudimentary horoscopes published in certain papers. It seems to me that I do not take much of an interest in them. I wonder how people can believe in them. I like to imagine the kind of tragedies that such predictions may occasionally provoke. Once, last year, my horoscope said that "tomorrow will be an extremely favorable day for tidying up the house." This was not a spectacular prediction, except that I had long been planning to move on the day in question. I burst out laughing at so funny a coincidence—and it was undeniably happy laughter. As I realized after thinking about it, the coincidence would have been just as funny if the horoscope had said that "tomorrow will be an extremely unfavorable day for moving," but it would have made me laugh differently. I could say that I am not superstitious because I pay no mind to such things. But, to be precise, I should rather say: I know well that coincidences of this kind are meaningless, but I take a certain amount of pleasure in them all the same. The banality of this remark does not relieve us of the obligation to pay attention to it.

Mobilizing a very different set of categories, Descartes had already

observed that the operation by virtue of which one believes something is different from that by virtue of which one knows that one believes it; the remark comes in a passage in which he considers the question, precisely, of other people's beliefs. Naturally, he himself has no doubt that he knows what he believes, or even that he can believe whatever he wants. He thus exposes the essence of the nature of belief and, above all, the obstacles that his study puts in our way, obstacles that are not exactly of the order of resistance.

The “I know well, but all the same” may be said to crop up all the time in analytic sessions, if we extend it to cover beliefs that are inaccessible to the subject himself. Its frequency and banality by no means help us assess its significance, but there are cases that are more edifying than others. I would like to cite one that is rather typical.

I do not find it altogether agreeable to bring up this example because everything began with a mistake of mine. But nothing is more instructive than our mistakes, as everyone knows, especially in psychoanalysis. I have already mentioned the example in question to a number of analysts, but, no doubt because these questions are elusive ones, they failed to grasp its import; annoyingly enough, they only noticed my gaff. Now, in the light of all that has preceded, readers will appreciate the considerable importance of this incident.

I have no choice but to begin by telling the story of my mistake. It went back to a telephone conversation. Someone who had taken a call for me had distorted the caller's name, making it sound like that of a black poet from whom I had been expecting a friendly visit. I was busy, so I asked that the poet be given the message to come see me as soon as he could; we would have the time, I added, for a pre-dinner drink. The person who was to open the door was informed of all this. The doorbell rang, and, a bit surprised despite himself, he came to tell me, “Monsieur, it's not a Negro, it's a client of yours.”

Of course, there was nothing particularly distressing about the situation, since it was clear enough how I should handle it. What I had to do was to usher the patient to the couch, as usual, and wait to hear what his first words would be. But I waited for these first words with more than the usual interest, after all. We shall see in a moment that that, precisely, was my mistake.

Naturally, I later remembered these first words verbatim, and am not

in the least likely to alter them now. After a short silence, the patient declared, in a rather satisfied tone, "Yes, I knew that you were joking about that pre-dinner drink. But all the same, I'm terribly pleased." Almost in the same breath, he added, "especially because my wife thinks you meant it." A remark of this kind may well be called puzzling. At the time, I was very surprised to hear it; but, unfortunately, I too was quite pleased, if not for the same reasons as my patient. My uppermost concerns were technical, so that I was glad to see that he had slipped right back into the correct analytic situation, as his use of the formula "I know well, but all the same" sufficed to show. The fact that everything had so easily fallen back into place was, I realized, due to the state of the transference at the moment. I did not realize that my mistake had a deeper effect on me than on him; but, thanks to my curiosity to hear what would come next, my residual caution, and my satisfaction over the technical aspect of things, the rest of the session was satisfactory and ran smoothly. The incident was never spoken of again.

But it was late, well after the hour when I usually received patients, and I had time for reflection. The expression my patient had used now seemed odder than it had before; moreover, it reminded me of something—of the expression used by the patient of Freud's whose brother-in-law had not succumbed to shellfish poisoning. I had a rather hard time locating the passage. It occurs in a short paper on telepathy. (I do not think that this is mere happenstance; telepathy poses a problem of belief.) I saw that what Freud had singled out for attention was the fact that the fortune-teller had guessed her client's unconscious—or rather, in this case, conscious—wish. After all, we go to people who practice divination so that they can divine things about us. That, however, did not apply to the case at hand. True, it was quite as if I had guessed my patient's wish, even if I had not done so telepathically. But we cannot account for my patient's satisfaction in this way, or for Freud's, unless it is so pleasant to hear someone divine one's wishes that one cannot but be satisfied. No, the effect had not been called up by naming my patient's desire, but by reinforcing a belief of his, just as his wife had. No doubt belief ultimately finds its explanation in desire: this is a truism that we find even in La Fontaine's *Fables*, which, although it is a charming book, has never ranked as a very original one as far as psychology is concerned. Freud's discovery was rather that desire acts at a

distance on conscious material, causing the laws of the primary process to manifest themselves there: *Verleugnung* (thanks to which belief survives disavowal) is explained by the persistence of desire and the laws of the primary process. One might deduce from this that my patient, for example, continued to desire that I ask him over for a drink, but the real point lies elsewhere: he continued to believe that, in a certain sense, I *had* asked him over, and he was expressing his gratitude for the invitation.

As I continued to peruse Freud’s text, I came across a sentence that pulled me up short: “I myself,” says Freud, “was so much struck—to tell the truth, so disagreeably affected—that I omitted to make any analytic use of [my patient’s] tale.”¹² I, for my part, had not been disagreeably affected by my patient’s remarks, but I had not made any analytic use of them either. Moreover, rightly or wrongly, I did not much regret it. I thought I saw what had struck Freud: beliefs involving the sciences of the occult and predictions of death. In my case, the only thing that had been in question was a pre-dinner drink, which had nothing unsettling about it. But I understood that I had consented too readily to my patient’s “I know well”; it gratified me, and I did not care to know anything about the “but all the same.” I suppose that much the same held for Freud, given what we know about his somewhat superstitious attitude toward the predictability of the day of his death. I felt, for my part, that my patient’s satisfaction was all too absurd from the moment that he “knew well.” Thus I was relapsing into the position that psychologists and psychiatrists had occupied before the emergence of psychoanalysis. My mistake had left my patient in the position of the analyzed, but it had evicted *me* from my position of analyst! *He* had given up the belief that he had come as my guest, but he had a credulous wife who made the task easier for him, and he had preserved enough of his belief, in a different form, to be terribly pleased. *I*, occupying a position I ought not to have, would have preferred that nothing at all survive of his belief, for I had never believed that I had issued him an invitation. That taught me a great deal about the inner attitude to maintain after a mistake or unexpected turn of events: one needs to survey the consequences it has for the analyst, not the patient. If we were to put it superficially, we might say that the patient really had received an invitation, at least in his wife’s eyes. But we would have to add that, as he said, “he knew well” that it was just a joke—which means that this superficial explana-

tion is of no use at all. In a word, the belief must survive its refutation, even if it thereby becomes impossible to grasp and one can see nothing but its utterly paradoxical effects.

This example opens up paths of all sorts: the use of misinformation to propagandistic ends, even if it must later be admitted that the information given out was false; hollow promises; the psychology of the practical joke; and the psychology of impostors. There is no reason that someone who does magic tricks, however reasonable and lucid she may be, should not make a living from the transformed belief that she is a magician, or that that should not greatly enhance the pleasure that plying her trade gives her. Like the Hopi who admits that there are no real Katcinas left today, she holds a "but all the same" in reserve, one that is much harder to grasp than the Hopi's "but all the same," or even all but impossible to pin down, except in little details that require interpretation. Yet sometimes it is obvious that the belief that one might suppose had been abandoned has in fact been maintained. I shall give some examples of this; the first, which we owe to Claude Lévi-Strauss, is famous. It involves a shaman who, although he knows the tricks of his and his fellow shamans' trade inside out, one day finds himself fascinated by another shaman who uses the same tricks; he becomes capable of believing again, with all his former naiveté. I have summarized the story poorly, but everyone has read the essay in question and been more or less surprised by this paradox; as he describes it, Lévi-Strauss interprets it as proof that an impostor can be his own dupe and invent an excuse for himself in all good faith. As the preceding pages will have suggested, the real explanation is different, and, not surprisingly, at once more obvious and more puzzling. Voltaire's treatment of imposture, which comes down to repeating that two shamans or two Katcinas ought not to be able to look each other in the face without laughing, does not reflect the reality of the matter.

Pace Voltaire, we have already begun to glimpse that there are several ways of believing and not believing. There is some slight resemblance between the shaman and the Hopi: the shaman too must have believed naively before repudiating his belief, although we do not know anything about the crisis he may have undergone when he was initiated into the tricks of his trade. However, the positions that the two end up in are not identical: the shaman recovers his naiveté, but his faith is not reinforced.

He is, moreover, a medicine man by virtue of his personal powers, not, like the Katcinas, an officiant by virtue of something that transcends the group; thus these two cases are not reducible to each other. The reader will already have thought of the case of the con artist or the swindler who only needs a credulous victim in order to lend credence, in a certain sense, to his own fabrications. The con man knows, for instance, that everything will come out in the end, but all the same, etc. There is still a great deal left to explore here.

But what is still lacking, and what we need above all, is a means of classifying these various cases, or, still better, of establishing a sort of syntax or a system of permutations that would allow us to pass from one to the next, and, ultimately, to arrive at a precise formula for the fetishist's game of *Verleugnung*, which is plainly different from everything we have seen so far. Another example will help us make some progress here.

I take it from Casanova's *The History of My Life*. It is a lovely episode that covers the end of volume two and the beginning of volume three, which, I am afraid, suffers a bit when we reduce it to its essentials, as we must here. Casanova has been something of an embarrassment for psychoanalysts. His sexual behavior appears "normal," while exhibiting a streak of, as it were, counterphobic activism; Casanova poses as the champion of anti-castration. One hardly knows where to place him: Is he, first and foremost, a phobic neurotic who overcompensates? Is he a pervert of a peculiar kind? Does he illustrate a transition between phobic neurosis and perversion? In what follows, our interest will be focused on Casanova the impostor.

In 1748, Casanova, who is twenty-three, happens to be in Mantua. There he is accosted by a stranger who insists that Casanova come look at his natural history collection—a ridiculous accumulation of bric-à-brac, with nothing authentic in it. This collection contains, among other things, an old knife, ostensibly the one with which St. Peter struck off Malchus's ear. It is a knife of the kind to be found everywhere; Casanova has seen one in Venice. His reaction is immediate; without a moment's hesitation, he joins in the game. He has no doubt recognized the stranger for what he is at a single glance: an impostor or a gull, it makes no difference—or, better, an impostor *and* a gull. For Casanova, the game will consist in taking the impostor's role entirely for himself while leaving the stranger in the gull's. But in the end, as we shall see, it is Casanova

who finds himself in the position of the gull, because what induces him to take part in this game are his disavowed beliefs.

His first words are a gambit: the knife, he says, is worthless, because the stranger does not own the sheath. Christ's words are "sheathe your sword," *gladium in vaginam*. Let us not pause to interpret this; it is not what matters here. What does Casanova plan to do? For the moment, this remains vague. He has made his first move the way one advances a pawn; the combinations will come later. Quite simply, because he has chanced upon a "fool"—that is the word he uses—he must take advantage of him.¹³ He spends the night fabricating a sheath out of an old boot sole and making it look ancient. He presents this to himself and to the reader as a tremendous farce.

What happens next? In Cesena (near Rimini, about one hundred miles from Mantua), lives a peasant, another credulous sort, who imagines that there is a treasure buried beneath his cellar. I omit the impostures and maneuvers that follow: by the time they are over, Casanova has persuaded his dupe that, with the help of the magic in the knife (and the sheath), gnomes can be made to bring this buried treasure to the surface. For Casanova, there is nothing to be gained from all this beyond the pleasure, as he puts it, of unearthing, at the expense of one fool, a nonexistent treasure that another fool thinks he has in his cellar. The gain would seem meager if he did not add that he is dying to play the magician, a role he loves past all thinking. It is hardly stretching matters to translate this as follows: I know well that there is no treasure, but this is wonderful all the same.

Another credulous character makes her appearance in Cesena: Genoveffa, the daughter of a peasant. Casanova sees a potential conquest in her, of course, but not a romantic conquest; he wants to make her submit to him, unconditionally, with nothing but his magician's hocus-pocus. To explain this to himself, he comes up with reasons that are interesting in their absurdity: Genoveffa is a peasant girl, and it would take too long to educate her and awaken her sensibility for love! In fact, possessing Genoveffa will put the crowning touch on his triumph as a magician. This sheds a first ray of light on the reason that our hero loves the magician's role to excess. Genoveffa is a virgin, and Casanova declares that her virginity is essential to the success of his magic spell. (A study might well be made of Casanova and the taboo of virginity, but I can only note that in passing.)

Casanova prepares everything very carefully. He has special garb made for himself, as well as a huge circle of sheets of paper that he bedecks with cabalistic signs. He has read a good many books on the occult; the critics note that he invents nothing, but simply follows the usual procedures. Simultaneously, he pursues his design on Genoveffa: for magic reasons, they bathe together, each washing the other. This is a wise precaution, since Genoveffa is a peasant girl from Cesena; at the same time, it ensures that Casanova will be able to seduce her later—the more so as the virgin sleeps in his bed, where, for the time being, he respects her virginity. The farce continues.

When the time is ripe, Casanova goes outside at night, and, wearing a magic surplice, takes his place inside his paper circle. At precisely this moment, a storm comes up. This is enough, as will appear in a moment, to throw our hero into a state of panic. Just before telling us that he stepped into the circle, he utters a sentence that has an odd ring for an analyst: he says that he knew that his operation would fail. Impossible, and he knew it! Implicit in a sentence of this sort is an unspoken "but all the same." I think that it would be a mistake to evoke the notion of doubt here, in whatever form, and to say that Casanova was not all that sure he would fail. In fact, he has no doubts about the inevitable failure of a magic operation that he himself calls a farce; he is as certain as we are. *Verleugnung* has nothing to do with doubt. The belief in magic is disavowed and very conveniently assigned to the credulous. But we shall now see what happens to our magician when, at the worst possible moment, he has to manage with no one credulous on hand.

Indeed, when the storm breaks, his first thought is cast in the form of an eloquent regret: "How I should have been admired," he exclaims, "if I had dared to predict it!" (3: 4). His assessment of the situation is right on the mark: if he had predicted the storm, the farce could have gone on amid the thunder and lightning. Superficially, one might say that Casanova would have had the storm on his side and remained master of the situation, in a position of superiority. But this explanation explains nothing: no one has contested his mastery of the situation, and he is still in a position to run the show as he likes. The reversal precipitated by the absence of a gull takes place within Casanova himself. The role assigned to the credulous has to fall to *someone*, after all. We shall have occasion to examine this idea when we discuss the position of the fetishist.

"As all this was perfectly natural [*I know well*], I had no reason to

be surprised at it; nevertheless [*but all the same*], a beginning of terror made me wish I were in my room." Here we see the last of Casanova's defenses before panic takes over, and the most futile: common sense. We know enough now to explain why it should be futile: common sense is always allied with the "I know well," never with the "but all the same." The "I know well" is blown away like a wisp of straw amid Casanova's utter panic. Magic has its revenge: "In the terror which overtook me I persuaded myself that if the flashes of lightning I saw did not strike me down it was because they could not enter the circle. . . . But for my false belief . . . I should not have remained in the circle for as long as a minute" (3: 4-5). Thus the circle was magic . . . all the same.

Because of this false belief, then, Casanova stays put until the storm blows itself out, returning to his room in a very sorry state. Genoveffa is waiting for him there, but *she frightens him*. All he wants to do is sleep, and he sleeps for eight hours. The next morning, he says, "Genoveffa . . . seemed a different person." Here is how he explains this to himself: "She no longer seemed to be of a different sex from mine, *since I no longer felt that mine was different from hers*. At the moment an idea whose superstitiousness took nothing from its power made me believe that the girl's innocence was protected and that I should be struck dead if I dared to assail it" (3: 6). One would be hard pressed to come up with a better description of the discomfiture—the utter decomposition [*débandade*]—of our hero of anti-castration, as I called him a moment ago.

A great deal might be said about so rich an example. I shall leave aside the non-negligible but secondary role that the taboo of virginity plays here, although anyone who sets out to study Casanova in the light of psychoanalysis would do well to start with this powerful superstition and appeal to the concept of *Verleugnung*, which is always pertinent where superstition is involved. The focus here must above all be on what happens as soon as the gull disappears and her role falls to Casanova, or, rather, as soon as Casanova falls into the slot vacated by the missing term. At that moment, the storm takes the part of the Other (with a capital O, to use Lacan's terminology). Casanova knows this well; he exclaims, "I recognized an avenging God who had lain in wait for me there to punish me for all my misdeeds and thus end my unbelief by death" (3: 5). He expresses himself poorly, yet, after all, well enough; it is the image of the big Other that appears amid, appropriately, thunder and lightning. We understand that Casanova had not intended to take

the place of the magician in his own eyes—for he says he didn’t believe in it (in other words, that he was not mad!)—but in the eyes of the gull, the other with a small *o*. He adds, “My philosophical system, which I thought was proof against assault, was gone” (3: 5). Unfortunately, just like the fetishist, he is altogether incapable of telling us exactly what that system consists of.

As everyone knows, there is no reason to worry about what the future holds in store for this twenty-three-year-old young man after his cruel ordeal: he makes amends to one and all by performing certain ceremonies that might be called expiatory, relinquishes Genoveffa, and finds himself back where he started from, as full of life as before, and more the magician than ever. There is nothing surprising about this. But we rather frequently encounter similar moments of panic among perverts in analysis; they do not necessarily have a therapeutic effect. Once the panic subsides, there is a return to the status quo. Yet we saw early on that *Verleugnung*, here as in the case of the fetishist, is part of a system of protection (I would not say a system of defense) against castration. We can also see that there is a certain relationship between magic and the problem of castration.

We psychoanalysts have taken up the notion of magical thinking in too simplistic a fashion. We have assumed, first, that the animism of the primitives was the projection of their own drives, and second, that it provided the model for magical thinking. We have more or less implicitly accepted a rather dubious notion of development: the idea, for example, that people once believed in magic, that ontogenesis repeats phylogenesis, and therefore that children . . . and so on. But nothing warrants regarding magical thinking as infantile; as children, in their “ignorance,” can serve as a support for the disavowed beliefs of adults, we have to approach it more cautiously. The young Hopi who still believes that the Katcinas are gods is not engaged in magical thinking any more than, say, a child who encounters Santa Claus in the street, since her belief in him is underwritten by people she trusts. It is not the young Hopi who is responsible for the fact that he has been deceived, but the adults. He is objectively deceived; his subjectivity does not yet take any part in the matter. The magic obviously can only begin once his belief in the Katcinas has undergone a transformation after disavowal, once it has taken the form of belief in the mystical, invisible presence of the true Katcinas, their presence *all the same*, notwithstanding the evidence

of the real. There can be no doubt that *Verleugnung* suffices to create this magic. After all, what is more profoundly magical than the fetish? Giving it this name was itself a way of acknowledging this. To put it in a striking (perhaps too striking) phrase, I would say that what comes first is not a belief in magic, but a magic of belief. Only by making this correction can we explain the patent links between the presence or absence of the phallus (castration) and magic; for the first magical belief is the belief that the maternal phallus exists all the same, and it remains the model for all subsequent transformations of beliefs.

We come now to the hardest and riskiest aspect of matters. The examples cited above were chosen to illustrate various types of structures; we ought to be able to provide a coherent account of them. The young Hopi, sure of the (non-magical) existence of the Katcinas, flies into a panic at the thought that it might be refuted by reality. He recovers by preserving his belief at the cost of a transformation that makes it "magical"; his people's institutions help him do so. For a psychoanalyst, this crisis is, without any doubt, the repetition of another, that connected with castration. In question here is the loss of something that will subsequently be recovered after undergoing transformation, in a process underwritten by the authorities. The role played by the children's credulity is just as obvious; the deception is institutionalized. But Talayesva can tell us the whole story in his autobiography, for nothing has been wiped out by amnesia. *Verleugnung* continues to be irrational, but everything takes place out in the open.

This particularly simple schema or model is not applicable to Casanova. Children's credulity no longer interests him, but the world is full of credulous people, of "fools"; they make it possible for him to escape the "idea whose superstitiousness took nothing from its power," in which we recognize a refusal of castration. Because of this refusal, magical belief by itself fails to protect him. Quite the contrary: when he finds himself in its grip for lack of a credulous victim—when his belief in magic, as it were, collapses back onto itself—he is overwhelmed by anguish; his system, as he puts it, "goes," and he is left defenseless. The structures of his belief and Talayesva's do not coincide, they cannot be superposed; there is a gap or lag between them.

In the case of the Hopi, we were able to describe the very process of formation of magical thinking. All indications are that Casanova

has gone through a similar period, but has forgotten it, as the fetishist too has. This is the period of the first *Verleugnung*, of the disavowal of anatomical reality, and of the constitution of the phallus as something magic. I am speaking of structures, for in Talayesva's case too, of course, whatever transpired at the moment he discovered female anatomy, the first *Verleugnung*, remains obscure; the crisis of initiation, however, faithfully reproduces the same structure, as is readily seen. With Casanova, however, we have to assume the existence of a second period of which the Hopi model presents not the slightest trace, a period in which magical belief itself is attributed to the credulous, so that it is no longer by magic, but, literally, thanks to an imposture that Casanova possesses the phallus. However, just like the shaman, this impostor is a magician *all the same*; magic itself survives as a “memorial to castration,” in Freud's phrase. Thus Casanova continues to be exposed to the threat of what can perfectly well be called magical castration. The impostor does not really have access to reality: Casanova knows well, as he says twice, that his operation will fail, but this is of no importance to him. What *is* of importance to him is that the “but all the same” seems to be realized: he wants rejection of the imposture to lead back, not to the truth—which would doubtless save him, if he were capable of being saved—but to credulity. That is, he wants to be thrown back from his “system” to the “idea whose superstitiousness took nothing from its power.”

Constructions of this sort would only seem rash if we offered them with a view to reconstituting a real sequence of events, but they are indispensable if we are to get beyond mere description and specify differences in structure. To date, we have not had much success in treating magic in anything other than general terms; we are reduced to making contrastive descriptions of its most pronounced features, without being able to say exactly how an obsessional neurotic's rituals compare and contrast with, say, a “primitive” tribe's. When we try to chart the various effects of the original *Verleugnung* and the way in which they are taken up again and organized, we are led to make finer distinctions.

The logical sequel to the present essay would be an attempt to discover what the magic of the fetish consists of. Here, however, everything is shrouded in darkness; the path we have followed so far does not lead to further knowledge. If *Verleugnung* and the transformations of belief

explain the point the fetishist sets out from, they do not throw any light on his point of arrival.

Along with his description of the period constitutive of magic, Freud also accounts for the origins of the fetish: it represents the last thing seen before the shock of the discovery of the female body. The memory of this discovery is blotted out by an act of forgetting that Freud quite simply likens to traumatic amnesia. What thus comes into being is, however, only a screen memory; it is not yet a fetish. But a belief in the phallus that is preserved in magical form, on the one hand, and, on the other, a screen memory associated with the anatomical discovery and tied to it in various ways, can very easily exist side by side—this is extremely common—in subjects who are not fetishists.

The future fetishist must necessarily undergo this first experience, but we do not know how things work out for him thereafter. Does he briefly or even only fleetingly adopt an attitude of defiance and imposture, like Casanova's, but without managing to sustain it, unlike Casanova, who rather astonishingly managed to sustain his all his life? However that might be, we should note that instituting the fetish banishes the problem of belief, magical or otherwise, at least in the terms in which we have posed it here. The fetishist needs no gull; as far as he is concerned, other people are in the dark, and that is where he prefers to leave them. The point is no longer to make others believe; consequently, the point no longer is to believe.

Plainly, the place of the gull, the place of the other, is now occupied by the fetish itself. If it is lacking, there arise problems comparable to those that beset Casanova when there is no gull on hand. But Casanova imagines that he knows who believes and who does not. Even if he is in fact mistaken, he can continue to frame the question in terms of belief. Once a fetish has been constructed, the sphere of belief disappears from view; we do not know what becomes of this question. Indications are that the fetishist's goal is to elude it. In the case of *Verleugnung*, the field of belief stretches to take in the whole world; but those who become fetishists fall outside its ambit, at least as far as their perversion goes.

Research of the kind pursued here cannot be conclusive. One should perhaps try to find out what becomes of belief in the fetishist's case, or one should perhaps drop the idea of belief in examining fetishism. And there remain other spheres in which one might, if one were to trace the avatars of belief, be led to make remarks of a different sort. For example,

Freud invites us to explore what becomes of such beliefs when death and mourning are involved. Again, we know that there are cases in which the subject has serious problems because of his fear of losing what he “knows well” that he doesn’t have.

We should add a word about the method utilized in this study, for it was not the result of a deliberate choice: it seemed to be dictated by the nature of the subject. We had a few ideas at our disposal in setting out. Freud had provided *Verleugnung*. We had the topography that Lacan has elaborated. This furnished us with two axioms: that there is no unconscious belief, and that belief presupposes the Other as its support.

That, however, did not point us in the direction of theoretical work, work of the kind meant to develop or test the abstract, coherent apparatus known as a theory. Furthermore, there is virtually no clinical dimension to our discussion; nothing in it resembles a case study.

But there exists something that might be called a Freudian *phenomenology*; it differs from the phenomenology of the philosophers, and tends rather to have something of the meaning the term had before Hegel made use of it. Freud does not often employ the word (it figures, for example, in *The Rat-Man*), but he assigns the method a considerable role in his writings. It is (chapter 7 aside) virtually the only method used in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, where it consists in trying to present examples, without regard for chronological order and without appealing to principles, in such a way that these examples interpret each other, as it were. Many of Freud’s texts are similar. In *The Rat-Man*, he confronts examples of different obsessive phenomena, without being able to formulate a theory. The passage that seems to be devoted to the clinic in fact consists of examples of transference phenomena.

To be sure, the support provided by a theory and illustrations drawn from clinical practice are present throughout; but, in the absence of the phenomenological dimension, which plays a mediating role, theory and clinical experience would each be applied to the other non-productively, with clinical experience illustrating the theory except on the rare occasions on which, in accordance with the methodology of the empirical sciences, the clinic contradicts the theory and invites us to formulate new hypotheses. This would bring us back to Claude Bernard. Freud does at times proceed in that fashion, or, at any rate, seems to, but he does not produce anything new when he does, and that is not the method that we recognize as being typically his. Careful consideration shows that

the Freudian method rests on the premise that the phenomenological dimension (in Freud's sense of the word) is always present, even if it is sometimes occulted, in all authentic psychoanalytic research.

Notes

Octave Mannoni's essay, "I Know Well, but All the Same . . ." is translated and reprinted by permission from Editions du Seuil. It is from "Je sais bien, mais quand même . . .," in his *Clés pour l'Imaginaire, ou l'Autre Scène* (Paris: Points, Editions du Seuil, 1969), 9-33. [Note that comments by the translator appear in brackets in the text and in the notes.]

- 1 [All references to Freud's work are from *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. and trans. James Strachey et al. (London: The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis), hereinafter referred to as SE. The volumes referred to below were published in 1955 (vol. XVIII), 1961 (vol. XXI), and 1964 (vol. XXIII). Freud, "Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense," SE XXIII, 275-78.]
- 2 [Freud, "Fetishism," SE XXI, 154. I have inserted the ellipses. Mannoni presents the whole of the last sentence as if it were Freud's, whereas it is in fact a paraphrase.]
- 3 The book has now been published (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1967). [Jean Laplanche and Jean-Baptiste Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (London: Karnac Books and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1988), 118.]
- 4 [Freud, "Splitting of the Ego," SE XXIII, 275.]
- 5 [Freud, "Psycho-Analysis and Telepathy," SE XVIII, 183.]
- 6 [Don C. Talayesva, *Sun Chief: The Autobiography of a Hopi Indian*, ed. Leo W. Simmons (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942). Mannoni quotes loosely from the French translation of *Sun Chief* (*Soleil Hopi*, trans. Geneviève Mayoux [Paris: Plon, 1959]), 63-64.]
- 7 [I have inserted the ellipses.]
- 8 [I have inserted the ellipses. Mannoni quotes loosely, substituting, for example, "I recognized all of them" for Geneviève Mayoux's accurate translation of Talayesva's/Simmons's "I recognized nearly every one of them" (75).]
- 9 Blaise Pascal, *Pensées de Blaise Pascal* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1942), "When the word of God, which is true, is false literally, it is true spiritually." (*But all the same*, it is true.)
- 10 Octave Mannoni, "Le Théâtre du point de vue de l'Imaginaire," *La Psychanalyse* 5 (1960): 164.
- 11 [Jules Roy, *La Bataille de Dien Bien Phu* (Paris: René Julliard, 1963), 95.]
- 12 [Freud, "Psycho-Analysis and Telepathy," SE XVIII, 183.]
- 13 [Giacomo Casanova, *History of My Life*, trans. Willard R. Trask (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 2: 297.]