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## The Nietzsche Reader

Edited by  
Keith Ansell Pearson  
and  
Duncan Large

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## General Introduction

With some justification Friedrich Nietzsche can be described as the most brilliant, most challenging, and most demanding philosopher of the modern period. In the opening years of the twenty-first century he continues to be a major reference point in our intellectual culture: along with Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud he is widely taken to be a "modern master of suspicion."<sup>1</sup> The influence of his ideas on twentieth-century artists, novelists, poets, and essayists was arguably greater than that of any other modern intellectual figure. The work of some of the most important writers of the modern period, such as Georges Bataille, Gottfried Benn, Maurice Blanchot, Albert Camus, André Gide, Ernst Jünger, Franz Kafka, Pierre Klossowski, D. H. Lawrence, Thomas Mann, Robert Musil, and Rainer Maria Rilke, to name but a few, bears ample testimony to his influence. His influence on post-war intellectual figures and currents has been no less extensive, with Jean-Paul Sartre's atheistic existentialism, Martin

<sup>1</sup> This description was first coined by Paul Ricoeur, who suggested that Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud could be said to constitute a "school of suspicion," about which he noted a number of important things. First, each one of them takes up the problem of Descartes's doubt – the doubt as to having certain knowledge of self and world – and carries it to the heart of the "Cartesian stronghold." They do this by seeking to expose the illusions of consciousness and demoting its significance in the total economy of life. Second, this does not mean that they are simply to be construed as masters of ultra-skepticism; rather, they are three "great destroyers." However, this "destruction" is to be understood in the sense it has in Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927), where it is a moment of every new transformation. Third, and following on from this insight, all three clear the way for a new reign of "truth" not only by means of a destructive critique but also by having recourse to an art of interpretation: "to seek meaning is no longer to spell out the consciousness of meaning, but to decipher its expressions." Consciousness is not what it thinks it is and each thinker opens up this problem in a distinctive way. Fourth, although all three expose the illusions of consciousness they do not simply stop there, they also "aim at extending it." In the case of Nietzsche, Ricoeur writes: "What Nietzsche wants is the increase of man's power, the restoration of his force; but the meaning of the will to power must be recaptured by meditating on the ciphers 'superman,' 'eternal return,' and 'Dionysus,' without which the power in question would be but worldly violence." For Ricoeur the task of assimilating "the positive meaning of the enterprises of these three thinkers" remains to be carried out. See Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 32–6.

Heidegger's thinking on the history of Being as a history of nihilism, Theodor Adorno's critique of identity thinking, Michel Foucault's genealogies of power and truth, Jacques Derrida's deconstruction, and Gilles Deleuze's novel empiricism all bearing its stamp. In addition, aspects of his thought have had an influence on major philosophical figures in both North America and Great Britain, including Stanley Cavell, Richard Rorty, and Bernard Williams. There are many who continue to lament his rise to prominence and regard his widespread influence as pernicious. If philosophy is defined as an activity of thought committed to modes of sustained argumentation, then Nietzsche's penchant for sophistry and rhetoric is enough for many to dispute his entitlement to being a philosopher. However, Nietzsche is far from being the enemy of reason that he is often made out to be (appeals to reason can be found throughout his writings), and his peculiar styles of writing were not designed to work against the tasks of critical thought. Today he is the subject of a vast array of philosophical treatments, having been adopted by philosophers both of so-called "analytical" persuasions and so-called "continental" ones. Philosophical appreciation of Nietzsche has perhaps never been in a healthier state. Today there are lively debates over every aspect of his thinking, and sophisticated academic studies of his ideas are published on a regular basis.

For some, Nietzsche is a great liberator from the illusions of metaphysics; for others, he belongs to a small but select band of anti-philosophers whose destruction of metaphysics has proved premature.<sup>2</sup> It is not clear that we have yet come to terms with his questions in the sense of taking full measure of them. For Nietzsche, traditional metaphysics may well have come to an end, but questions concerning the "meaning" (*Sinn*) of human existence after the death of God have yet to be adequately developed. This is something he invites us to consider in one of his most powerful and complex pieces of writing, the Third Essay of his *On the Genealogy of Morality*. It is also in this essay that he writes of the curious appearance of the philosopher on the earth, forced to assume "an ascetic mask and set of clothes" in order to make himself possible, and Nietzsche poses the question whether the philosopher who has thrown off the monk's habit is, in fact, "really" possible on earth even today, in our age of enlightenment (*GM* III. 10). Far from being an anti-philosopher, Nietzsche himself believed that the modern age called for a new practice of philosophy, and he devoted a great deal of his intellectual labors to outlining the form such a practice might take (for example, the exercise of philosophical legislation and the determination of questions of value). The tasks required of the new philosophers and free spirits of the modern age include the need for a new philosophical cheerfulness (the practice of "the gay science"), thinking beyond good and evil, calling into question the will to truth, and the need for a new selection and breeding of the human animal so as to ensure the production of the higher human type.

<sup>2</sup> The French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty argued that the kind of negation of metaphysics that we find in Nietzsche (and Marx) cannot take the place of philosophy. He sought to show that the rise of "non-philosophy" which is part of the legacy of these two major modern intellectual figures brings with it a new obscurity. See Merleau-Ponty's essay "Philosophy as Interrogation," in Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. John Wild and James M. Edie (Evanston: North-western University Press, 1963), pp. 167–81, especially pp. 168–70.

There have been two main barriers standing in the way of a serious philosophical engagement with Nietzsche's texts and their posthumous fate: first, the fact that his thought was taken up by the Nazis in the 1930s and, second, the widespread view, common for a long time amongst readers, that his thought is not really philosophy but an over-excited poetry made up of aphorisms, aperçus, and fragments which reveal a highly inconsistent mind. It is not only the labeling of Nietzsche as a proto-Nazi that has served to put off many readers. Other strategies are put into play to avoid dealing with him, and here mention should perhaps be made of his madness. As Gilles Deleuze pointed out (in an effort to write intelligently on this subject), madness is never a source of inspiration in Nietzsche's work. Philosophy for Nietzsche does not proceed from suffering or anguish even if the philosopher is someone who suffers in excess. Notions of health and sickness, and an attention to the differing moods and tempi of life, certainly abound in Nietzsche's writings. He wrote against the idea of there being such a thing as normal health and insisted that there were innumerable *healths* of the body, in which what is healthy depends on the individual's goal and horizon, on their energies and impulses, and "above all on the ideals and phantasms" of their soul (GS 120). Nietzsche proposes that medicine should give up on ideas such as a normal diet and the normal course of an illness. Moreover, illness is not just an event that affects the body and the brain from outside; rather, illness contains a perspective on health and vice versa. Nietzsche located within the "will to health" a prejudice, even cowardice, speaking of it as a "subtle barbarism and backwardness." He chose instead to write about and to esteem the "great health" which recognizes that health is not a constant or a transcendent state of the body. Genuine knowledge and self-knowledge about matters of body and soul can only be attained through living a "dangerous health" (GS 382) which allows for the evolution of different and shifting perspectives on health. There is no doubt, however, as Deleuze notes, that Nietzsche's life did end badly, "for the mad Nietzsche is precisely the Nietzsche which lost this mobility, this art of displacement, when he could no longer *in his health* make of sickness a point of view on health."<sup>3</sup> At this point, when Nietzsche's art fails him, and his masks are conflated into that of a buffoon under the influence of an organic process, the illness from which he suffered becomes inseparable from the end of his oeuvre.<sup>4</sup>

The abuse to which Nietzsche's ideas were subjected during the Nazi period was exposed and taken to task by the translator and commentator Walter Kaufmann, in his study of 1950.<sup>5</sup> This study alone prepared the way for a fresh and serious encounter with Nietzsche's ideas in the Anglo-American world which has lasted up to the present day, influencing a whole generation of scholars and commentators,

3 Gilles Deleuze, *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life*, trans. Anne Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2001), p. 59.

4 One of the finest accounts of the question of madness as it concerns Nietzsche's case is to be found in Pierre Klossowski's *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, trans. Daniel W. Smith (London: Athlone Press, 1997); see especially the chapter "The Euphoria of Turin," pp. 208–53.

5 Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 4th edn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

especially those working in North America. It is not that there were no probing philosophical encounters with Nietzsche prior to the 1950s – three in particular are worthy of mention and still merit the attention of the student of Nietzsche, those by Georg Simmel (first published in 1907), Karl Löwith (first published in 1935),<sup>6</sup> and Karl Jaspers (also first published in 1935) – but it is fair to say that for the most part Nietzsche was read as a literary figure and philosophical dilettante. In the 1960s two very different readings were published, the titles of which are highly significant: Gilles Deleuze's *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, published in France in 1962 and translated into English in 1983, and Arthur C. Danto's *Nietzsche as Philosopher* (1965). The titles were meant to be provocative: Deleuze was keen to promote Nietzsche as a radical empiricist and pluralist, while Danto subjected Nietzsche's ideas to the requirements of an analytical reading. Mention should also be made of Martin Heidegger's *Nietzsche*, based on lectures delivered in the mid-1930s to the early 1940s but published in two volumes in Germany in 1961. Heidegger's lectures were given during the time he was a member of the Nazi party, but they also include a confrontation with the interpretation of Nietzsche promoted by prominent Nazi philosophers such as Alfred Baeumler. Heidegger laid special emphasis on the importance of learning how to read Nietzsche and adequately encounter his principal doctrines such as the will to power, eternal recurrence of the same, the Overman, perspectivism, and nihilism. While the overall effect is to subordinate Nietzsche to Heidegger's own project of thinking the history of Being, in which Nietzsche assumes the role of the last metaphysician of the West (in Heidegger's genuinely thought-provoking designation), his reading contains numerous insights into many core aspects of Nietzsche's thinking and is essential reading for any serious student of him.

Nietzsche now exerts an influence on work being done in all the major branches of philosophical inquiry. Some readers of Nietzsche choose to lament his assimilation into academic philosophy since it undoubtedly domesticates the challenges his mode of philosophizing was seeking to present to habitual and conventional ways of thinking. However, in our view, if Nietzsche's ideas are now the subject of sustained critical inquiry and judgment this is a good thing; it is evidence that the reception of his texts is taking place in an intellectually mature manner. A critical reception of his work within the academy does not mean that more creative appropriations of Nietzsche are no longer possible and can no longer flourish. With respect to the need to provide an assessment of Nietzsche, we should pay heed to the words of one of his most able readers:

Lucid thought, delirium and the conspiracy form an indissoluble whole in Nietzsche – an indissolubility that would become the criterion for discerning what is of consequence or not. This does not mean, since it involved delirium, Nietzsche's thought was "pathological"; rather, because his thought was lucid to the extreme, it took on the appearance of a delirious interpretation – and also required the entire experimental initiative of the modern world. It is modernity that must now be charged with determining whether this initiative has failed or succeeded.<sup>7</sup>

6 An interesting history surrounds Löwith's book. For insight into it, see Bernd Magnus's foreword to the book's English translation (1997).

7 Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, p. xvi.

## Nietzsche's Life

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was born on October 15, 1844 in Röcken, a tiny village near Lützen in Saxony. His father was a Lutheran pastor and was to die only five years after Nietzsche's birth as a result of softening of the brain. The experience of death, of its brute eruption into life and the violent separations it effects, took place early in Nietzsche's life, and the deaths of both his father and his brother Joseph (who was to die before he reached the age of 2) continued to deeply affect Nietzsche throughout the course of his adolescent life and even into maturity. David Krell's text *The Good European* reveals that on the occasion of a court settlement against one of his publishers in the mid-1880s Nietzsche, after paying off his debts to bookstores, bought an engraved tombstone for his father. It was thirty-six years since Carl Ludwig Nietzsche had died.<sup>8</sup>

On the death of his father Nietzsche's family, which included his mother, his sister Elisabeth, and two unmarried aunts, relocated to Naumburg. Nietzsche began learning to play the piano and composed his first philosophical essay, "On the Origin of Evil." In 1858 he entered Pforta school in the Saale valley and was a student at this famous boarding-school for six years. During this formative period of his youth he developed a love of various writers and poets, including Friedrich Hölderlin and Lord Byron. It was also during this period that he composed his first essay in classical philology, and isolated pieces of philosophical reflection, such as "Fate and History" (included in this volume). On his fifteenth birthday Nietzsche declared that he had been "seized" and taken over by an "inordinate desire for knowledge and universal enlightenment." In an autobiographical fragment dated 1868/9 he reveals that it was only in the final stages of his education at Pforta that he abandoned his artistic plans to be a musician and moved into the field of classical philology. He was motivated by a desire to have a counterweight to his changeable and restless inclinations. The science of philology on which he chose to focus his labors was one he could pursue with "cool impartiality, with cold logic, with regular work, without its results touching me at all deeply" (Nietzsche's mature approach to the matter of knowledge could not be more different!).<sup>9</sup> When he got to university Nietzsche realized that although he had been "well taught" at school he was also "badly educated"; he could think for himself but did not have the skills to express himself, and he had "learned nothing of the educative influence of women."<sup>10</sup>

In October 1864 Nietzsche began life as an undergraduate at Bonn University, studying theology and classical philology. He attended the lectures of the classicist Friedrich Ritschl, who was later to play an influential role in securing Nietzsche a professorship at Basel. In his first year of university life he underwent the rite of passage offered by a duel and began his journey of alienation from his mother and sister by refusing to take communion. In 1865 he moved university to study just classical philology,

8 David Farrell Krell and Donald L. Bates, *The Good European: Nietzsche's Work Sites in Word and Image* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 15.

9 See *Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Christopher Middleton (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1969; repr. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), p. 47.

10 Ibid., p. 48.

following his teacher Ritschl to Leipzig. He speaks of his move from Bonn to Leipzig in a letter to his sister Elisabeth dated June 11, 1865, where he states that if a person wishes to achieve peace of mind and happiness then they should acquire faith, but if they want to be a disciple of truth, which can be "frightening and ugly," then they need to search.<sup>11</sup> In his second year of university he discovered Schopenhauer, who suited his melancholic disposition, and in 1866 he found a veritable "treasure-chest" of riches in Friedrich Albert Lange's magisterial study *History of Materialism*. In 1867 he was awarded a prize by Leipzig University for his study of Diogenes Laertius, and he spent the third year of his university studies in military service. During this year he had a serious riding accident; to deal with the intense pain caused by the injury to his sternum he took morphine and had a number of drug-induced hallucinations. He began to experience a disaffection with the study of philology and a more profound one with German cuisine and culture that was to endure throughout his lifetime and intensify in his later years.

In early 1869 Nietzsche was appointed to Basel University as Extraordinary Professor of Classical Philology (he was to apply for the Chair in Philosophy a few years later when it became vacant, but was not successful). He assumed the role and duties of a professor at the age of 24 without completing his dissertation or postgraduate thesis. In May of this year he made his first visit to Richard Wagner and his mistress (later wife) Cosima at Tribschen on Lake Lucerne (he had first met the composer the previous year), and he gave his inaugural lecture, on "Homer's Personality." He also began his acquaintance with the cultural historian Jacob Burckhardt, a colleague in Basel. Cosima regarded Nietzsche as a cultured and pleasant individual, while Richard Wagner tried to get Nietzsche to give up his commitment to a vegetarian diet (Nietzsche speaks of his conversion by Wagner in *Ecce Homo*). Between 1869 and 1872 Nietzsche would make over 20 visits to Tribschen.

In 1870 and 1871 Nietzsche lectured on topics, such as Socrates and tragedy and the "Dionysian world-view," that would form the basis of his first book, *The Birth of Tragedy*. He had the intimation that he was about to give birth to a "centaur" with art, philosophy, and scholarship all growing together inside him. In the Franco-Prussian War Nietzsche served for a few weeks as a medical orderly, but was invalidated when he contracted dysentery and diphtheria himself; on his return to Basel he began to suffer from insomnia, and he was to suffer from serious bouts of ill health and migraine attacks throughout the rest of his life. He wrote most of *The Birth of Tragedy* while on convalescent leave from his university, in 1871, and it was published at the beginning of 1872. Nietzsche's first book is influenced by Schopenhauer's philosophy of music, and proposes that it is only as an "aesthetic phenomenon" that existence and the world can be justified. Nietzsche was later, in 1886, to write an incisive and revealing "self-criticism" of the book in which he considered it to be "badly written," "image-mad and image-confused," as well as "sentimental" and "saccharine to the point of effeminacy." Upon its publication Nietzsche's book met with vehement rejection by the philological community, and after being rejected by his mentor, Ritschl, Nietzsche had to admit that he had fallen from grace and was now ostracized from the guild of philologists. His friendship with Wagner continued to deepen, however, and he lectured on the future of educational institutions and on "Homer's Contest." In a letter to Wagner

11 Selected Letters, p. 7.

he noted that not a single student of philology had enrolled in his courses at the university for the winter semester 1872/3. In 1873 Nietzsche undertook a study of a work by Afrikan Spir entitled *Denken und Wirklichkeit* (*Thought and Reality*) and worked on various projects, such as "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks," the essay "On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense," and his *Untimely Meditations*. Nietzsche planned 13 of these but only four actually materialized, and he regarded the whole exercise of writing them as a way of extracting everything he saw as negative in himself. In 1875 he was to make the acquaintance of Heinrich Köselitz, who adopted the pseudonym of Peter Gast upon becoming a composer and who was to become Nietzsche's assistant, editing and copying his texts; in 1876 Nietzsche struck up an important friendship with Paul Rée, author of *Psychological Observations*. Although his fourth *Untimely Meditation*, on Wagner in Bayreuth, had recently been published, it is in this year that Nietzsche publicly began to distance himself from the Wagner cause and articulate the serious doubts he had held for some time about Wagner as an artist.

The year 1878 proved to be a decisive one in Nietzsche's life: he published the first volume of *Human, All Too Human*, which is remarkably different in tone and outlook from his previous published work. Wagner was repulsed by Nietzsche's new philosophical outlook, and even Nietzsche's closest friends wondered how it was possible for someone to discard their soul and don a completely different one in its place. In *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche had attacked theoretical optimism and the Socratic faith in knowledge, as well as all forms of realism and naturalism in art (where the emphasis is on environmental and biological determinism and on the exclusion of any dimension beyond the factual and the material). Now he was inviting his readers to value "little, unpretentious truths," to celebrate the science of physics for its "modest" and "insignificant" explanations, and to lose faith in all inspiration and in any knowledge acquired by miraculous means. In early 1879 deteriorating health forced Nietzsche to resign from his position at Basel University, which granted him an annual pension. In the course of the next ten years Nietzsche became a veritable European traveler and tourist, with periods of residence in Venice, Genoa, St. Moritz and Sils-Maria, Rome, Sorrento, Nice (where he was to witness an earthquake in 1887), and Turin.

In the summer of 1881 Nietzsche made his first trip to Sils-Maria in the Upper Engadine, which was to become his regular summer residence. It was at this time that he had the experience and inspiration of eternal recurrence, "6,000 feet beyond man and time," as he was later to express it in *Ecce Homo*. In a letter to Gast from Sils-Maria dated August 14, Nietzsche spoke of leading an extremely perilous life and of being "one of those machines which can explode."<sup>12</sup> The intensity of his feelings, he confided, made him shudder and laugh, weeping not sentimental tears but tears of joy (Nietzsche would now oscillate between states of euphoria and depression). In the summer of 1881 he also discovered a precursor in Spinoza, to whom he was brought, he said, through the guidance of instinct. The affinity he felt with Spinoza, as he perceived it, was one of a shared set of doctrines (he mentions the denial of free will, of purposes, of a moral world order, and of evil), and the fundamental tendency to make knowledge the most powerful passion. *Daybreak* was published in July 1881 and *The Gay Science* followed in 1882. It is in these texts that Nietzsche practices his "cheerful" and transfigurative "philosophy of the morning" and conceives of life experimentally

12 Ibid., p. 178.

as a means to knowledge. It is in a famous section of the latter work that he has a madman declare that "God is dead. And we have killed him" (GS 125). In one section of the book Nietzsche suggests replacing churches with botanical gardens in our busy towns and cities as places of reflection where the godless can go to give expression to the sublimity of their thoughts and see themselves translated into stones and plants (GS 280). The original text of 1882 closes with three sections on the dying Socrates, on eternal recurrence (presented as the "greatest weight" and as a daimonic thought that will either crush or change us as we are), and on "the tragedy begins," with an appeal to the redeeming figure of Zarathustra. The year 1882 was eventful for Nietzsche: he visited a casino in Monaco with his friend Rée, who lost a large sum of money; he acquired a typewriter; and he met Lou Salomé and proposed to her, unsuccessfully, twice. In the early part of 1883 he began work on *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and was badly affected by the death of Wagner. Nietzsche would hold alternating views on *Zarathustra*, having serious doubts about it yet regarding it as an epochal work. During all this time Nietzsche's relationship with his sister had been extremely tense, and in 1884 he spoke of her anti-Semitism as the cause of a "radical break." She married Bernhard Förster in May 1885 and they moved to Paraguay in 1886, founding a German colony there.

In 1886 Nietzsche worked on and published *Beyond Good and Evil*, which bore the subtitle "prelude to a philosophy of the future."<sup>13</sup> By now he had also begun writing a major work that was to consist of four books and had the working title "Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values." He was never to bring this planned *magnum opus* to fruition, but something of its nature can be found in the texts *Twilight of the Idols* (published in 1889) and *The Anti-Christ* (published in 1895 and regarded by Nietzsche as the first book of the transvaluation of all values). It is also in 1886 that he composed a set of new prefaces for second editions of most of his back catalog of published texts, and many scholars regard these prefaces as among the finest pieces of philosophical self-reflection Nietzsche ever wrote. In 1887 a new edition of *The Gay Science* was published with an added fifth book which began with a discourse entitled "The Meaning of Our Cheerfulness" and in which Nietzsche elaborated upon the significance of the death of God as a "monstrous event" that heralded a new dawn in which all the daring of the lover of knowledge could once again be permitted. He also read Dostoevsky, began to compose notes on "European nihilism," and published *On the Genealogy of Morality* with its three striking inquiries into the spirit of *ressentiment*, the origins of the bad conscience, and the meaning of the ascetic ideal. He wrote to the renowned French historian Hippolyte Taine, presenting himself as a hermit and sending two of his books (*Daybreak* and *The Gay Science*). Nietzsche regarded it as a "comic fact" that he was beginning to have a subterranean influence among a diverse array of radical parties and circles. He also revealed that at the age of 43 he felt as alone as when he was a child. He spoke of his solitude in terms of a condemned destiny, in which the "unusual and difficult task" that commanded him to continue

13 Nietzsche had been experimenting with the idea of a "philosophy of the future" as early as 1872 in his "Philosophers' Book" (*Philosophenbuch*), no doubt inspired by Wagner's conception of his art as a "music of the future" (*Zukunftsmusik*), which in turn emulated Ludwig Feuerbach's *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* (1843).

living also commanded him to avoid people and to be free of all normal human bonds. In a letter written in December of 1887 to the Danish critic Georg Brandes, the first person ever to lecture on his work, Nietzsche responded favorably to his description of his thinking as an "aristocratic radicalism."

In 1888 Nietzsche spent what turned out to be his last summer in Sils-Maria. Earlier in the year he had written to his friend Franz Overbeck that the world should expect no more "beautiful things" from him just as one should not expect a suffering and starving animal to attack its prey with grace. He confessed to being devoid of a "refreshing and healing human love" and spoke of his "absurd isolation," which made the residues of a connection with people only something that wounded him. In another letter from the early part of this year he spoke of himself as a "sick animal" and *la bête philosophe*. He was becoming fully aware that the philosopher who embarks on a relentless struggle against everything that human beings have hitherto revered will be met with a hostile public reception, one that will condemn him to an icy isolation with his books being judged by the language of pathology and psychiatry. He resolved to set time aside to tackle the "psychological problem" of Kierkegaard, and developed a liking for the city of Turin (recommended to him by Gast). He was in the city in April and May of this year and returned in September, staying there up to the point of his mental collapse in January 1889. In it he found not a modern metropolis but, he wrote, a "princely residence of the seventeenth century" and an "aristocratic calm" with no "petty suburbs" and a unity of commanding taste. He especially liked the beautiful cafés, the lovely sidewalks, the organization of trams and buses, and the fact that the streets were clean. It was also cheap. *The Case of Wagner* was published, and though it received some vitriolic reviews it was welcomed enthusiastically by August Strindberg. While in Turin in May Nietzsche came across a French translation (carried out in India) of Manu's book of laws, which he thought supplemented his views on religion in a "most remarkable way." In a letter to Carl Fuchs written in Sils in July, Nietzsche says that it is neither necessary nor desirable to argue in his favor, and suggests instead that a more intelligent attitude towards him would be to adopt the pose one would in the presence of a foreign and alien plant, namely, one of curiosity and ironic resistance. Nietzsche began work on *Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is* on his birthday, October 15. The text was designed as a way of testing the risks that could be taken with "German ideas of freedom of speech," Nietzsche said in a letter to Gast, in which he would talk about himself and his writings with "all possible psychological cunning and gay detachment." The last thing he wanted, he confided, was to be treated as some kind of prophet, and he hoped it would prevent readers from confusing him with what he was not. He also wrote to various people, including Fuchs and his sister, saying that his health had never been better. He drafted various letters, including one to his sister in which he informs her that he is compelled to part with her for ever, and one to Kaiser Wilhelm II. In December *Ecce Homo* was sent to the publishers and Nietzsche was observed by his landlady chanting and dancing naked in his room.

On the morning of January 3, 1889, as Nietzsche was taking a stroll through the piazza Carlo Alberto in Turin, he witnessed a carriage driver beating a horse. He threw his arms around the horse's neck and then collapsed to the ground, losing consciousness. In the course of the next few days he composed a series of dramatic and disturbing letters. He wrote to Gast announcing that the world had become transfigured.

To Brandes, his champion in Copenhagen, he wrote that now he had discovered him the great difficulty was how to lose him. To Cosima Wagner he wrote, famously, "Ariadne, I love you"; to Overbeck that he was having all anti-Semites shot; and to Burckhardt that he was all the names in history. Burckhardt showed the letter he had received to Overbeck, who then traveled to Turin and brought Nietzsche back to Basel. The diagnosis was "progressive paralysis." Nietzsche spent a year in a psychiatric clinic in Jena; in 1890 his mother took him to Naumburg, and, upon her death in 1897, his sister Elisabeth brought Nietzsche to the Villa Silberblick in Weimar and inaugurated the Nietzsche cult. Nietzsche died in Weimar on August 25, 1900.

## Reading Nietzsche

A collection of this kind is primarily intended to give the reader a detailed insight into the range and evolution of Nietzsche's philosophical ideas, but at the same time it also provides an opportunity to survey the range and evolution of his means of expressing them. Nietzsche is often referred to as an "aphoristic" writer, but on the evidence of this collection such a description falls far short of capturing the sheer variety of forms and styles he adopted. How else, then, might we characterize the formal features of Nietzsche's writing? The underlying organization of this *Reader* follows the generally accepted tripartite division of Nietzsche's career into "early" (pre-1878), "middle" (1878-82) and "late" (1883-8) periods based on phases in the development of his ideas, and to a certain extent such a tripartite division holds for his stylistic development, too. More specifically, such a division recognizes that, stylistically as well as philosophically (and the coincidence of the two is entirely uncoincidental), *Human, All Too Human* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* mark the two great breakthroughs in his career.

In the period up to 1878 (which in fact includes the juvenilia and early published works up to and including the fourth *Untimely Meditation* in 1876), the standard form Nietzsche adopted for his writings – in accordance with his professional training as an academic classicist – was the essay or pamphlet. In the "middle period" he explored not only a new kind of philosophy, drawing inspiration from the psychological observations of French Enlightenment thinkers, but a new means of expressing it, which was equally inspired by the aphoristic works of the French *moralistes*.<sup>14</sup> The break with this period was marked by the rhapsodic philosophical poem *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, which was stylistically *sui generis*, but thereafter Nietzsche moved freely between the more "essayistic" and more "aphoristic" modes of before, according to the nature of his material. After completing *Zarathustra* in 1885 he recognized that the "free spirit period" had not yet run its course, after all, so his next two substantial works – *Beyond Good and Evil* and the extra Book V added to the second edition of *The Gay Science* – were

14 *The Wanderer and his Shadow* lists six of the most important – Montaigne, La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyère, Fontenelle, Vauvenargues, and Chamfort (*WS* 214) – to which must be added Pascal, "the most instructive of all sacrifices to Christianity" (*EH* II. 3). On Nietzsche's French inspiration in this period and beyond, see the classic study by W. D. Williams, *Nietzsche and the French: A Study of the Influence of Nietzsche's French Reading on his Thought and Writing* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952), and more recently Brendan Donnellan, *Nietzsche and the French Moralists* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1982).

both conceived as thematic and stylistic continuations of the middle-period works.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, the more polemical works of sustained advocacy that follow – *On the Genealogy of Morality* (explicitly subtitled “A Polemic”), *The Case of Wagner*, and *The Anti-Christ* – return to the more “essayistic” style of the first period.

Even a more nuanced schematization such as the above still fails to do justice to Nietzsche’s formal repertoire, though, and in two different respects: on the one hand it underestimates the stylistic versatility of his writings, especially in the last period, and on the other, paradoxically, it also underestimates their stylistic continuities. In *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche claims for himself “the most manifold art of style any man has ever had at his disposal” (*EH* III. 4), and a work such as *Twilight of the Idols* – a dazzlingly varied stylistic *tour de force* – goes some way towards bearing out the claim. *Ecce Homo* itself, Nietzsche’s late autobiography, is another work that belongs in a category of its own, with a stylistic breadth encompassing lengthy quotations from *Zarathustra* and an extensive chapter devoted to book reviews (that is, reviews of Nietzsche’s own earlier books). His two last works, though, both emphasize the thematic and formal continuities in his career: in order to demonstrate to the readership of *The Case of Wagner* that such anti-Wagnerian polemic is no flash in the pan, *Nietzsche contra Wagner* gathers together anti-Wagnerian excerpts from all of Nietzsche’s writings since *Human, All Too Human*, while his very last book – on which he was found still attempting to work after his mental collapse in January 1889 – is a slim volume of poetry from the period of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, *Dithyrambs of Dionysus*, which reminds us that no categorization of Nietzsche’s styles would be complete without the poems, or small groups of poems, which he would routinely sprinkle around his earlier (supposedly more “prosaic”) works, too – from “Among Friends: An Epilogue” at the end of Book I of *Human, All Too Human*, to “From High Mountains: Aftersong” appended to *Beyond Good and Evil*, and the two substantial collections added to the second edition of *The Gay Science* (“Joke, Cunning and Revenge” and “Songs of Prince Vogelfrei”).<sup>16</sup>

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Nietzsche’s style, however, and the true common denominator which links both the more “essayistic” and the more “aphoristic” works, is not the occasional flash of poetry but what amounts to the essential building block of his prose style, namely the (numbered) paragraph. The Nietzschean paragraph is an extraordinarily supple unit, ranging in length from a bare line to several pages. The number of genuine aphorisms in his works is relatively small; instead, most of what are called Nietzsche’s “aphorisms” are more substantial paragraphs (imitating the classical period), which exhibit a unified train of thought frequently encapsulated in a paragraph heading indicating the subject-matter, and it is from these building blocks that the other, larger structures are built in more or less extended sequences. A thinker

15 In the case of *The Gay Science* Book V this continuity is overt; the book that eventually became *Beyond Good and Evil*, on the other hand, was initially conceived as a continuation of *Human, All Too Human*, then as a continuation of *Daybreak*, and indeed includes a section entitled “The Free Spirit.” See Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche’s Task: An Interpretation of “Beyond Good and Evil”* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), p. 5f.

16 On Nietzsche’s poetry, see Philip Grundlehner, *The Poetry of Friedrich Nietzsche* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

for whom “The will to system is a lack of integrity” (*TI* I. 26) is inevitably going to balk at constructing the kind of conceptual edifice in which his philosophical predecessors so often delighted,<sup>17</sup> and Nietzsche at times deliberately disperses groups of thematically related paragraphs, but on the other hand he is also capable of linking such paragraphs together into an extended sequence with a single thematic unity stretching for a whole “essayistic” book, as in *The Anti-Christ*, and contemporary criticism is beginning at last to give adequate recognition to the surprising degree of structural coherence shown by even his more fragmentary works.<sup>18</sup>

Unfortunately Nietzsche’s English (and other) translators have routinely seen fit to divide up his longer paragraphs in order to emphasize their points of articulation; where this had occurred with the passages included here we have restored Nietzsche’s original paragraphing. Another feature of his style which has been easily obscured by translations and other later editions of his works (and here our *Reader* is no different) is that he himself refrained from using footnotes. Across the whole of his (voluminous) published output Nietzsche uses only four notes in total – one at the end of the First Essay of *On the Genealogy of Morality* (*GM* I. 17, included here), and three in *The Case of Wagner* (*CW* 9, Postscript 1 and Epilogue).<sup>19</sup> Significantly, then, when he had a chance to revise his published works for second editions in the mid-1880s he wrote new contextualizing prefaces but left the texts themselves untouched; moreover, in the first place his texts are remarkably innocent of references, even in the early years when he was still trying to establish himself as a university professor. Throughout his career, then, his style is very different from standard academic writing, from that of the “philosophical workers” he describes so condescendingly in *Beyond Good and Evil* (*BGE* 211): in the words of Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, Nietzsche’s notorious early antagonist who published a pamphlet attacking *The Birth of Tragedy* for its professional shortcomings, “Mr Nietzsche by no means presents himself as a scholarly researcher.”<sup>20</sup> Nietzsche’s own critiques of scholarly myopia and asceticism are scathing; above all, he wants to distinguish himself from the tradition of German academic philosophy that preceded him, which he finds lifeless and, ultimately, simply boring. In turn he is highly conscious of what he calls, in a letter to his friend Paul Deussen,

17 Not that that has prevented commentators from seeking to derive an esoteric Nietzschean system. See especially John Richardson, *Nietzsche’s System* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). For Nietzsche’s most systematic critique of systematizing, see the essay “On Truth and Lies” and the analysis of it by Sarah Kofman in *Nietzsche and Metaphor*, trans. Duncan Large (London: Athlone Press; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), especially pp. 59–80 (“Metaphorical Architectures”).

18 For a superb example of such an approach, see Lampert, *Nietzsche’s Task*.

19 Kaufmann is thus mistaken when he describes the *CW* notes as “the only footnotes Nietzsche himself included in any of his books.” See “A Note On This Edition” in “*The Birth of Tragedy*” and “*The Case of Wagner*.”

20 Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, “Future Philology! A Reply to Friedrich Nietzsche’s ‘Birth of Tragedy’,” trans. Gertrude Postl, *New Nietzsche Studies*, 4/1–2 (Summer–Fall 2000), pp. 1–32 (p. 3). Nietzsche himself would of course object to the book in his later (1886) “Attempt at a Self-Criticism” from quite the opposite direction – finding it an “impossible book” because it was too much like what had gone before: “It should have *sung*, this ‘new soul’ – rather than spoken!” (*BT*, “Attempt,” 3).

his “whole *philosophical heterodoxy*”:<sup>21</sup> he does not simply present his reader with problems concerning truth and knowledge, but he dramatizes them through a series of parables, thought-experiments, imagined conversations, and the like. His aim is always to energize and enliven philosophical style through an admixture of aphoristic and poetic – broadly speaking, “literary” – forms.

The specificity of Nietzsche’s style, then – what J. P. Stern terms his “middle mode of discourse”<sup>22</sup> – lies in the fact that it occupies the ground midway between what one might call philosophy and poetry “proper.” Perhaps the most appropriate way of describing Nietzsche’s style is with reference to its multifarious “impropriety,” for its lack of scholarly niceties is but the least of its provocations. Nietzsche’s favorite lyric poet was Heinrich Heine, whom he praises in *Ecce Homo* for possessing “that divine malice [*Bosheit*] without which I cannot imagine perfection” (*EH* II. 4), and this transgressive “wickedness” is of course a quality he himself assiduously cultivates. His stylistic ideal, as he puts it on the title page of *The Case of Wagner* (parodying Horace), is the paradoxical one of “ridendo dicere severum” (“saying what is *somber* through what is laughable”), and these two modes, the somber and the sunny, are mischievously intertwined in his philosophy, without the reader necessarily being sure which one is uppermost at any one time. Nietzsche is the masked philosopher *par excellence* – “Everything deep loves a mask,” he writes in *Beyond Good and Evil* (*BGE* 40) – which means that his work is an unsettling provocation not just for his philosophical antagonists but for his readers, too, especially when his breadth of allusion and lack of references, the love of impropriety and paradox, are combined with an ideal of concision spelt out in *Twilight*: “my ambition is to say in ten sentences what everyone else says in a book – what everyone else does *not* say in a book . . .” (*TI* IX. 51). The texture of Nietzsche’s work, then, is often very dense: he is under no illusions that he is straightforward to read, and indeed deliberately erects barriers to understanding him. As he puts it in *Ecce Homo*: “My triumph is precisely the opposite of Schopenhauer’s – I say ‘*non legor, non legar*’” (*EH* III. 1 – “I am not read, I *will* not be read”), and when he conjures up “a perfect reader” later in the same chapter, he envisages “a monster of courage and curiosity, also something supple, cunning, cautious, a born adventurer and discoverer” (*EH* III. 3). He lays down a challenge to his readers, and sets them – us – a pedagogical, hermeneutic task, that of learning to read him well, before we can begin to appreciate the philosophical tasks he invites us to undertake.

### Nietzsche’s Tasks

One of the pre-eminent intellectual figures of the post-war period, Michel Foucault, contested the idea that there is such a thing as a single or core Nietzscheanism (a view endorsed by Bernard Williams). Foucault suggested that the right question to ask is “What serious use can Nietzsche be put to?” However, while it is the case that there is no single or core Nietzscheanism, he did bequeath to us moderns a set of novel philosophical tasks, and seeking to comprehend these tasks and secure the measure of

21 See Letter to Paul Deussen, September 14, 1888, in *Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*, pp. 310–11.

22 J. P. Stern, *A Study of Nietzsche* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 199.

them is one of the best ways of introducing Nietzsche to the new reader. These projects and tasks include “historical philosophizing,” “the gay science,” thinking “beyond good and evil,” a “genealogy of morality” (entailing a critique of moral values), the self-overcoming of the will to truth, and a new conception of the “tragic.” What unites these projects is Nietzsche’s strongly held view that metaphysics has come to an end and reached a crisis-point. By metaphysics he means something quite specific, namely, belief in something unconditioned, i.e. something which would be true, absolutely and unconditionally, outside of all temporal and perspectival conditions. In addition to this belief in a “true” world that stands outside time, history, and nature, metaphysics also refers for Nietzsche to the positing of supernatural and imaginary causes, forces, and entities, to a preoccupation with the otherworldly, to an ascetic denial of human impulses and drives that comes close to a pathological hatred of the human, and to a quest to encounter the “thing-in-itself” (another term for the “true” world).

### “Real” and “apparent” worlds

At the center of Nietzsche’s work is an attack on modes of thought, such as Platonism and Christianity, which posit a dualism between a “true” world and a merely “apparent” one. In such modes of thinking the “true” world is held to be outside the order of time, change, multiplicity, and becoming – it is a world of “being” – while the world of change, becoming, and evolution is held to be a false world, a world of error and mere semblance. In section 1 of “‘Reason’ in Philosophy” in *Twilight* he argues that the peculiar idiosyncrasy of philosophers in general is their lack of historical sense and their hatred of the idea of becoming, what he calls their “Egypticism.” Philosophers dehistoricize things and in the process mummify the concepts they are using to comprehend things. What has not been adequately dealt with are processes of life – such as death, change, procreation, growth – so that whatever truly has “being” is held not to become and what becomes is held to be nothing real and without being. In section 4 of this part of the book he notes how in metaphysics the most general and emptiest concepts – the absolute, the good, the true, the perfect – are posited as the highest and richest concepts. These concepts must be posited as miraculous causes of themselves and be free of the “contamination” of growth and evolution. The thinnest and emptiest of all these concepts is that of “God.” In section 5 Nietzsche argues that metaphysicians have been led astray by the language of reason. Language emerged at the time of the most rudimentary form of psychology and scientific knowledge, and within its emergence there can be identified a “crude fetishism” that makes us think in certain ways that have now become habitual, such as positing the will as a cause of things and of actions, and positing a unified “I” as the center of our being in the world (the “I” as substance), and so on. In short, words and concepts have developed in a way that has led us to forget their empirical grounding and to the extent that we are led to think that they arise spontaneously out of some independent faculty of reason which has no connection with anything empirical, historical, and evolutionary.

Nietzsche locates the seduction of the concept of “Being” at work even in the most progressive forms of thought such as the naturalism and materialism of the Greek atomists. He concludes this section on “‘Reason’ in Philosophy” with his famous statement that we cannot get rid of God because we cannot get rid of grammar. Our metaphysics – and, in part, our science – lead us to think in certain ways and modes

owing to the conceptual fetishism concealed in language and the forgetting of this reification within our history and evolution. In the final section Nietzsche advances four positive theses. First, the reasons why metaphysicians have designated the empirical world as something merely apparent actually serve to show that it is the only reality that there is, and any other reality is simply unprovable. Second, what is called the “real world” has been constructed through a series of negative deductions from the features of the actual world. This is a point Nietzsche makes as early as 1868 in his critique of Schopenhauer – it means that the real world is simply an idealized projection of a true world, one that is held to be outside time, change, becoming, and evolution. Third, attempts to invent stories about another world are literally “senseless” and can serve only to denigrate the empirical world, casting suspicion on life and on its most essential conditions (growth, change, death, etc.). Fourth, all attempts to divide the world into real and apparent dimensions are a symptom of declining and decadent modes of life. Nietzsche concludes by speaking of the artist: what the artist deifies as “appearance” (*Schein*) is reality but reality “selected, strengthened, and corrected.”<sup>23</sup> The “tragic” artist – tragic because of the recognition that there is only appearance and this must be willed in all its forms, even the form of illusion – is not a pessimist, since this artist “says *yes* to all that is questionable and even terrible; he is *Dionysian*. . . .”

23 The word *Schein* is rich in ambiguity and Nietzsche makes extensive use of this richness in his writings. It means semblance, deception, illusion, apparentness, and it can also refer to the “being” of that which appears or shines (from the verb *scheinen*, to shine or to glisten). In *BGE* 34 Nietzsche argues that “life” is only possible “on the basis of perspectivist assessments and apparentnesses [*Scheinbarkeiten*].” He adds, however, that the nature and extent of this perspectivism is neither given nor fixed, and stresses that there are “degrees of apparentness [*Scheinbarkeit*] . . . lighter and darker shadows and hues of appearance [*Scheins*] . . .”). In a note from August–September 1885 entitled “Against Appearance [*Erscheinung*]” he writes that he does “not set ‘*Schein*’ in opposition to ‘reality’” but rather, on the contrary, takes “*Schein* as the reality that resists transformation into an imaginary ‘truth-world’.” He then adds that a “determinative name for this world would be ‘will to power’, namely, characterized from inside and not from its ungraspable, flowing Proteus-nature” (*KSA* 11:654). For insight into Nietzsche’s use of *Schein*, see Michel Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, trans. Michael Gendre (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), pp. 52–67; Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, ed. David Farrell Krell, trans. David Farrell Krell et al., 4 vols (San Francisco and London: Harper & Row, 1979–87), vol. 1, pp. 211–20; and especially the superb analysis in Karl Heinz Bohrer, *Suddenness: On the Moment of Aesthetic Appearance*, trans. Ruth Crowley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), ch. 6, pp. 113–48. A series of original insights into *Schein* can be found in various writings of Walter Benjamin (1892–1940). See, for example, “On Semblance” (which name-checks Nietzsche) and “Goethe’s Elective Affinities” (which reads Goethe’s novel in terms of notions of beautiful semblance and the Dionysian shock of the sublime), in Walter Benjamin, *Selected Writings, Volume 1 (1913–26)*, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 223–6, 297–361 (esp. pp. 349–51), and “The Significance of Beautiful Semblance,” in *Selected Writings, Volume 3 (1935–8)*, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 137–8.

This positive estimation of art, on account of its displaying “the good will to appearance” (*Schein*), is one that runs throughout Nietzsche’s writings (see, for example, *GS* 107, *GM* III. 25).

### “Historical philosophizing”

It is with the publication of *Human, All Too Human* in 1878 that Nietzsche first began to outline an approach to philosophical questioning that would inform all his subsequent work. It is what he called “historical philosophizing.” The position Nietzsche adopts on philosophical questions and topics in the opening of *Human, All Too Human* finds an echo in the first section of *Beyond Good and Evil* entitled “On the Prejudices of Philosophers.” In the opening section of *Human, All Too Human* he focuses on the question of how something can originate in its opposite, and sets up a contrast between “metaphysical philosophy” and “historical philosophy.” The former answers the question by appealing to a miraculous source to explain the origin of something held to be of a higher value. The latter, by contrast – which Nietzsche insists can no longer be separated from the natural sciences and which he names as the youngest of all philosophical methods – seeks to show that there are no opposites but that all things arise from and are implicated in a process of sublimation (*Sublimierung*), hence his call for a “chemistry of concepts and sensations.” This historical mode of philosophizing gives rise to a number of provocative ideas that have proved seminal in modern thought: that there are no “unalterable facts of mankind,” that everything that exists is subject to “becoming,” that our faculty of cognition, far from being the transcendental source or originator of our knowledge of the world (the reference is to Kant), has itself become, and that a society’s order of rank concerning what it holds to be good and evil actions is constantly changing (*HH* 2. 107). We do not require certainties with regard to the “first and last things” in order to live a “full and excellent human life” (*WS* 16). Nietzsche proposes that a fundamental rupture be effected with regard to customary habits of thinking. Concerning the first and last or ultimate things – What is the purpose of man? What is his fate after death? How can man be reconciled with God? – it should not be felt necessary to develop knowledge against faith; rather, we should practice an *indifference* towards faith and supposed knowledge in the domains of metaphysics, morality, and religion. One of the reasons why Nietzsche takes issue with “philosophical dogmatists” of all persuasions – be they idealists or materialists or realists, he says – is that they seek to force us into taking decisions “in domains where neither faith nor knowledge is needed” (*WS* 16). The “greatest lovers of knowledge” will thus practice knowledge in a different way and remain steadfastly and gaily indifferent to the first and last things.

In *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche teaches the responsibilities of the “dangerous Perhaps” and argues that it is necessary now to wait “for a new category of philosophers” to arrive (*BGE* 2). These “coming” philosophers will be ones who do not accept at face value the belief of the “metaphysicians” in the “opposition of values.” The taste and inclination of these philosophers will be very different from that which has hitherto guided philosophical inquiry. They will ask some new questions – Might truth arise out of error? Might altruism be a form of egoism? Might the pure contemplation of the wise man arise out of covetous desire? – and so on. In the opening part of this book Nietzsche attacks what he regards as a large number of philosophical

reifications and mystifications. For example, he argues that logical thinking is informed by value judgments that are “physiological demands for the preservation of a particular kind of life” (BGE 3); that the world is continually “falsified” through our schemas of thought (such as number) (BGE 4); that our thinking is fundamentally informed by a multiplicity of warring instincts (BGE 6); that questions of truth and knowledge have to be situated and assessed in the context of an appreciation of “the perspectival optics of life” (BGE 11); that the primary desire of a living being is to discharge and release its strength (life is “will to power”) and thus the drive to self-preservation, often conceived by philosophers as the fundamental drive of life, needs to be regarded as “only one of its indirect and most frequent consequences” (BGE 13); that many concepts deployed in philosophy – free will, for example – are of the order of a “cloddish simplicity” (BGE 21); and, finally, that questions of psychology must be pursued in a completely free manner, that is, free of moral prejudices and fears, and, furthermore, rendered subordinate to what he calls “the morphology and evolutionary theory of the will to power” (BGE 23).

### “The death of God”

Informing Nietzsche’s views on the demise of metaphysics is the statement that “God is dead.” This statement is presented in the final book of Nietzsche’s “free spirit” trilogy, *The Gay Science*. Book III of this text opens with the declaration of God’s death (GS 108); this death is then put in dramatic form several sections later (GS 125), and its “meaning” receives a further clarification at the opening of Book V, which Nietzsche added in 1887 (GS 343). He is not the first philosopher to speak of the death of God (the expression can be found in Hegel). Furthermore, this death is a fundamental feature of Christianity itself; indeed, it could be said that the Christian religion is built upon the death of God. It is not simply that Christ, as the Son of God, died on the cross for our sins, but that God himself died on it, too.<sup>24</sup> Ever since,

24 Hegel understands the death of God in these terms in his *Philosophy of Religion*, which has a section entitled “The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence.” He cites from a Lutheran hymn of 1641 which contains the phrase “God himself is dead.” For Hegel this expresses “an awareness that the human, the finite, the fragile, the weak, the negative are themselves a moment of the divine, that they are within God himself [ . . . ] This involves the highest idea of spirit.” On the one hand, Hegel says, there is the death of Christ which “means principally that Christ was the God-man, the God who at the same time had human nature, even unto death. It is the lot of human finitude to die.” On the other hand, a further determination is brought into play, which is that “*God has died, God is dead,*” and which is “the most frightful of all thoughts” since it means that “everything eternal and true is *not*, that negation is found in God.” See *The Hegel Reader*, ed. Stephen Houlgate (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 497f. An attempt to contrast Hegel and Nietzsche on the death of God can be found in Deleuze’s *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone Press; New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), especially pp. 152–9. Deleuze argues that Nietzsche’s conception of the death of God differs from Hegel’s in that it is not offered as a “speculative” proposition but rather as a dramatic one, by which Deleuze means that it is “pluralist, typological, differential.” Everything depends, he says, on the kind of forces that seize on this death

a Christian-moral culture and civilization has been mourning the death of God and bound to him in terms of an infinite debt. With the death of God, then, Nietzsche is giving this death a new form and meaning. For him the death has the status of an “event.” The humanity that emerges in the wake of this death, and that now has to give it a sense and a meaning, and to do so as a task, will be very different to the humanity that preceded it. For Nietzsche there is a sense in which we have to become equal to the event, hence his emphasis on new tasks and on a new philosophy conceived as a “philosophy of the future.” The most demanding task he sets is that which he names the “self-overcoming” of “the will to truth” (GS 344; GM III. 27).

The death of God can be interpreted in two senses: it can mean the death of the “symbolic God,” that is, the death of the very specific and particular God of Christianity that has held European humanity in bondage for two millennia. It can also mean the death of the God of theologians, philosophers, and some scientists, that is, the “God” that serves as a guarantor of order, structure, and purpose in the universe. We think it is clear that for Nietzsche God is now dead for us in both of these senses. There are a number of passages in his work that show this, and an important passage for gaining an insight into this issue is GS 109, a long section which comes immediately after the very short section where Nietzsche has the death of God first announced. It is significant because in it he makes clear that there are “shadows” of God that continue to emit a curious light and must now be vanquished. There are a number of things we now need to “beware of,” he tells us: for example, thinking of the universe as either a living being or a machine, thinking that there are “laws of nature” when there are only necessities, thinking that death is opposed to life, thinking that there are enduring substances, and recognizing that “matter” is as much a fiction as God, and so on. Nietzsche argues, in short, that we now face a situation of difficulty because we realize that none of our aesthetic and moral judgments apply to the universe. Hence his call at the end of this section for these shadows of God to stop “darkening” the human mind – a situation which can only come about, he thinks, if we carry out a specific task, one that he calls the “de-deification of nature.”

Nietzsche does not offer pronouncements on the death of God by deliberating on the value and validity of various proofs and disproofs of God’s existence (see D 95). For him the key point to grasp is that it is *belief* in God that has now become *unbelievable*. He explicitly approaches the issue in these terms at the opening of Book V of *The Gay Science* (GS 343). For Nietzsche it is not necessary for atheists to engage

and give it a sense. He writes: “Nietzsche, in contrast, to his predecessors, does not believe in this death. He does not bet on this cross. That is to say: he does not make this death an event possessing its meaning in itself. The death of God has as many meanings as there are forces capable of seizing Christ and making him die” (p. 156). This contrasts with Hegel’s view that the death has an essential and single meaning (the becoming of spirit, the reconciliation of finite and infinite, the unity of God and the individual, and so on). The contrast between Hegel and Nietzsche on the death of God is also made in instructive terms by Karl Löwith in his important text, *Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, trans. J. Harvey Lomax (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1997), p. 36ff.

in counter-proofs of God's existence. The new philosophical approach operates in a very different manner, deploying methods and insights from the various sciences to show how belief in God arose, the place of this belief in the context of a specific historical culture, and so on. A number of things have contributed to making the belief in the Christian God simply unbelievable, including advances in knowledge in the natural sciences, the cultivation of scientific methods, including the philological methods of reading and interpretation, and the development of the intellectual or scientific conscience, or what Nietzsche calls the desire for intellectual purity and cleanliness (see *GM* III. 27 and *GS* 2). This is also a conscience that has developed through a process of sublimation out of the "confessional punctiliousness of Christian conscience" itself (*GM* III. 27).

Nietzsche responds to the event of the death of God in a number of ways. He clearly wishes to see taking place the cultivation of a new spiritual maturity that will enable us to deal adequately with the new situation we find ourselves in and make it possible for us not to be overcome by disillusionment and despair. He calls on us to "purify" our valuations and opinions in an effort to live post-metaphysically – free of the metaphysics of morality and the morality of metaphysics – in short, to become "over-human" (*GS* 335). He seeks to ward off a simple-minded philosophy of destruction (see *HH* 34). Of course, Nietzsche will advocate a certain philosophy of negation and destruction himself in his later work (from *Beyond Good and Evil* onwards), but for him everything turns on what informs acts and activities of destruction, that is, whether our desire to destroy, which is essential to the task of creating, stems from a spirit of resentment and revenge or whether it springs from an overflowing health and desire for new modes of living. It is in these terms that he conceived his Zarathustra-type as a figure that says "No" and does "No" to everything that has hitherto been greeted with a "Yes" but remains the opposite of a spirit of denial (*EH* III, "Z," 6). Nietzsche mentions the need in a post-metaphysical age for the "requisite temperament," namely, a "cheerful soul" (*HH* 34): this appeal to cheerfulness runs throughout his writings almost from first to last and can be said to constitute the distinctive mood of his thinking. In section 343 of *The Gay Science* he makes it clear that the death of God concerns the Christian one, and he seeks to unfold the sense of his cheerfulness and indicate how it is to be understood: it is intimately connected to his desire to practice "the gay science." In his notebooks of the 1880s the two projects of "the gay science" and thinking "beyond good and evil" become entwined and subsumed within the more general and wider project of preparing the ground for a "philosophy of the future." Clues to what Nietzsche had in mind with his practice of the "gay science" can be found, among other places, in sections 324 and 327 of *The Gay Science* and in the Preface to the *Genealogy* (section 7).

In section 125 of *The Gay Science* Nietzsche makes it clear, through the intoxicated questioning of the madman, that it is we humans who have killed God. We have unchained the earth from its sun in order to release infinity from the judgment of God. Only when God dies can eternity appear in the concrete, transient world. In the discourse on the seven seals in *Zarathustra*, the title character says that he sits with pleasure on the broken churches "like grass and red poppy." As Eugen Fink has noted, these words do not express an unrestrained hatred of God but disclose the essential insight of Nietzsche's atheistic ontology, which conceives the world in terms of chance, chaos, and the innocence of becoming:

The eternal Gods must die so that finite man can understand his finitude as eternity and as eternal recurrence. Human and cosmic infinity cannot tolerate a separate divine infinity. The desire for the world kills God.<sup>25</sup>

### "Gay science"

Science is crucially important to Nietzsche's project, but it is not a question for him of philosophical thinking and questioning being completely subsumed within its ambit. From an early point in his intellectual development Nietzsche read widely in the natural sciences, including new work in the fields of biology, physiology, geology, and physics, and he drew heavily on this work in the articulation of his own philosophical doctrines. A recurring theme in his work is the importance of a correct appreciation of scientific methods. In section 635 of *Human All Too Human*, for example (not included in this volume), he argues that such methods are as important as any other result of inquiry: simply knowing scientific facts is not enough; one must also practice the scientific spirit which teaches "an instinctive mistrust of wrong ways of thinking" and the necessity of "the most extreme circumspection." Nietzsche picks up on this again in section 59 of *The Anti-Christ*, where he criticizes Christianity for ruining the ancient world which had put into place the prerequisites of an "erudite culture," including scientific methods, natural science and the "sense for facts," and the "incomparable" art of reading well, without which there can be no cultural tradition and uniform science. However, Nietzsche does not hold that scientific methods on their own can promote knowledge (*D* 432). There is need for a further level of experimentation, and this is the task of philosophy.

Nietzsche sought to combat what he saw as the timid reduction of philosophy to the "theory of knowledge" (*BGE* 204). He sought to draw attention to what he saw as the debasement of the concept of philosophy at the hands of certain "Engländer" – he names Hobbes, Hume, Locke, Carlyle, Darwin, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer (*BGE* 252–3). He speaks of philosophy as entailing "spiritual perception" or vision of "real depth" (*BGE* 252), and argues that true and genuine philosophers are "commanders and lawgivers" (*BGE* 211). Moreover, the philosopher is "necessarily a man of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow" who exists in conflict with his "today" and must, therefore, assume the guise of an *untimely* one (*BGE* 212). Furthermore, science has its own prejudice, on which Nietzsche comments in section 373 of *The Gay Science*. Here he takes to task what he calls the "faith" of "materialistic natural scientists," which rests on the supposition that the world can find an equivalence and measure in human thought and valuations, such as a "world of truth." He mainly has in mind a mechanistic interpretation of the world, one that "permits counting, calculating, weighing, seeing, and touching," and he argues that such an interpretation amounts to "a crudity and naiveté" and might be "one of the *most stupid* of all possible interpretations of the world" as it would be "one of the poorest in meaning": "an essentially mechanical world would be an essentially *meaningless* [*sinnlose*] world." Nietzsche has to be read carefully when he makes this criticism. There are places in his writings where he

25 Eugen Fink, *Nietzsche's Philosophy*, trans. Goetz Richter (London and New York: Continuum, 2003), p. 100.

recognizes the achievement of scientific mechanism; it wins an important victory over the teleological view of the world that would see final or ultimate purposes everywhere. The new science becomes stupid, however, when it seeks to take over and dominate all questions that can be asked of existence. He is keen to protect what he calls the “*rich ambiguity*” of existence, and calls attention to “ambiguity” a “dictate of good taste, [...] the taste of reverence for everything that lies beyond your horizon.”

Perhaps Nietzsche’s most important and demanding engagement with science takes place in his treatment of the ascetic ideal in the Third Essay of the *Genealogy* (see especially sections 23–7). With God now dead Nietzsche thinks that all the “daring of the lover of knowledge” is permitted once again. This love of knowledge is clearly not philosophy in its traditional sense (*philo-sophia* or the love of wisdom), but neither is it simply scientific knowledge, precisely because a necessary part of the present task is to question science itself, especially the extent to which science continues to rest on a metaphysical faith, notably its belief in the unconditional and absolute value of truth (GS 344; GM III. 23–5). Because science itself rests on a moral foundation, it cannot spearhead the fundamental task now facing us, which is what Nietzsche defines as the “self-overcoming” of morality and of the will to truth (GM III. 27 – just how science can be said to rest on a “moral” foundation is explained in GS 344). Science “never creates values” but rather places itself in the service of a value-creating power, from which it acquires its belief in itself (GM III. 25).

Nietzsche appreciates that his claim that science is linked to the ascetic ideal will sound strange to our ears. Nevertheless, he maintains that science is “a *hiding-place*” for all kinds of ill-humor, “nagging worms,” and “bad conscience” (GM III. 23).<sup>26</sup> By “science” here he does not simply mean natural science but the modern practice of knowledge in general which would include, for example, the historical sciences. But as his references to astronomy make clear, he does not exclude the natural and physical sciences from his claim, either. From section 24 of the Third Essay it is apparent that his appeal to “us knowers,” in whom he places hope for opponents of ascetic ideals, has an ambiguous sense to it (the text of the *Genealogy* opens, in fact, by speaking immediately of these “knowers” who are said to be “unknown” to themselves). On the one hand it names “us moderns” as “idealists of knowledge” in whom the intellectual conscience has taken root; on the other hand, it is the ideal of a genuinely free spirit that has emancipated itself from the “metaphysical” valuation of truth and thus gone beyond the “idealism” of knowledge. It is clear that Nietzsche holds this emancipation to be part of a process that is under way but has not yet been attained, and the intellectual effort of his work is to contribute towards its actualization. It is no small task, but a vitally important one, to work out precisely what Nietzsche means by our present valuation of truth remaining a “metaphysical” one and just what the “critique” of the will to truth entails.

26 For some especially perspicacious insights into Nietzsche on science see Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, p. 138ff. See also Maurice Blanchot, *The Infinite Conversation*, trans. Susan Hanson (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 145ff.

### “The will to truth”

Nietzsche’s views on truth present the reader with numerous paradoxes and a series of genuinely difficult and complex challenges. Is he proposing that in order to overcome the will to truth and science’s overestimation of the value of truth we should abandon truth and give up on this will? It is prudent to pay close and careful attention to his exact words in the key sections that make up his argument in the final part of the Third Essay of the *Genealogy* (GM III. 23–8). Nietzsche asks us to bring – “tentatively” – the will to truth into question. He calls for a “critique” of the will to truth, and we must hear this word in its Kantian sense of setting limits and boundaries in which the scope and range, the value and validity, of something – in this case the will to truth – is to be determined. For Nietzsche critique will not, in contrast to Kant’s position, be determined by the needs of faith, but rather by the needs and desires of a new and higher humanity which emerges in the wake of the death of God (Nietzsche does not know whether such a humanity is possible; he is merely posing the question and establishing a goal and task). Neither modern science nor atheism is sufficient in itself for this task of critique to be properly carried out; nor can either be adequate to the task of giving a new sense or direction to human existence and to the earth.

Nietzsche is often taken to be a thinker unconcerned with truth, but this applies only with respect to a metaphysical conception of truth (that is, one that would place truth outside the world and its perspectival conditions and without regard for evolutionary and anthropological factors). He repeatedly insists on the anthropological character of our forms of knowing; we cannot suppose that our forms of knowledge and categories of thought give us truths that are valid outside of our existential domain; “truth” does have a sense and significance, but only as part of a human economy of living. He is best read as a thinker who seeks to ask new and experimental questions of truth. The testing of existential truths lies at the heart of his own experimental philosophy and its free-spiritedness (Nietzsche repeatedly speaks of “his truths” as truths that he has won), and it is essential to his wrestling with the fate of knowledge after the death of God, where life itself is now a “means to knowledge” (GS 327). Why is truth now such a problem for us, according to Nietzsche? And why does he speak of a crisis of the will to truth? (GM III. 27; see also BGE, Preface, and sections 1 and 2). His argument, in part, is that the discoveries of modern science and the insights of modern inquiries of knowledge have demonstrated the extent to which humankind has evolved by occupying the place and site of untruth (GS 121; BGE 4, 11). The fundamental errors of humanity – the error or imprecision of the judgment that there are identical things, enduring and unconditioned substances, a free will, and so on – have been shown by modern science, such as evolutionary theory, to be errors that have their basis in *organic life* (HH 18). These errors are deeply rooted in our evolutionary history and physiological constitution; our reliance on error cannot, therefore, be easily overcome. On a deeper level, however, Nietzsche is concerned that humanity may perish as a result of the blind will to truth which, in his terms, is fundamentally “ascetic.” It is for this reason that the will to truth requires a “critique.” For Nietzsche questions of truth need to be situated in the context of a consideration of the economy of life as a whole, and for him this is the task of the new philosophers and free spirits. An essential part of what it means to think “beyond good and evil” consists in the philosopher placing himself or herself in a critical space that resists “familiar

values in a dangerous way" (BGE 4), and this involves resisting conventional and normal ways of valuing truth. However, this should not be taken to mean that truth is not important to Nietzsche. The opposite is, in fact, the case: his conception of the "passion of knowledge" contains an essential *passion* for truth. Nietzsche knows that truth challenges us — this is its specific *raison d'être* — and the issue he wants us to focus our attention on is that of truth's *incorporation*, which he conceives as a great experiment.

Nietzsche is, in effect, attempting a reform of truth and proposing an education in what he calls the "abyss" of the scientific conscience (GM III. 23). Questions of truth are to be situated in the context of a thinking of life, of nature, of history and culture, of impulses and drives. He wonders whether anyone has yet been sufficiently truthful in speaking about truthfulness (BGE 77). For Nietzsche the real question concerns the extent to which truth can "endure incorporation. That is the question; that is the experiment" (GS 110). Can we live with truth and dwell in the space of truth? If we can, to what extent? Can there be a diet of knowledge? In his early writings we find Nietzsche arguing that although science can probe the processes of nature it can never "command" human beings: "Science knows nothing of taste, love, pleasure, displeasure, exaltation, or exhaustion. Man must in some way *interpret*, and thereby evaluate, what he lives through and experiences."<sup>27</sup> The mature Nietzsche comes to the view that science must now inform what constitutes the matter of interpretation and evaluation (for example, the physiology of the body, the chemistry of concepts and sensations, and so on). However, the disciplines of interpretation and evaluation also require an education in a superior empiricism that knows how to discriminate between noble and base ways of thinking and is able to determine the question of value. Nietzsche writes: "All sciences must, from now on, prepare the way for the future work of the philosopher: this work being understood to mean that the philosopher has to solve the *problem of values* and that he has to decide on the *hierarchy of values*" (GM I. 17, "Note").

The gay science is intended by Nietzsche to mark a new stage in the history of our becoming-human, in which humankind has become mature enough to ask of the world and of itself the most challenging and demanding questions. It seeks to show us that the intellect does not have to be a "clumsy, gloomy, creaking machine" (GS 327). The specific "gravity" of this new gay science stems from the fact that there now takes place a return of the fundamental questions, but staged and encountered in new-found conditions and circumstances: How do we now live? And what do we love? This supposes we are still capable of life and love and that we desire to live and to love.

We would like to close by citing Nietzsche's own demanding words:

All great problems demand *great love*, and of that only strong, round, secure spirits who have a firm grasp on themselves are capable. It makes the most telling difference whether a thinker has a personal relationship to his problems and finds in them his destiny, his distress, and his greatest happiness, or an "impersonal" one, meaning that he can do no better than touch them and grasp them with the antennae of cold, curious thought. (GS 345)

27 Nietzsche, "The Struggle Between Science and Wisdom" (1875), in *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870s*, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979), p. 141.

## A Chronology of Friedrich Nietzsche

- 1844** Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche born in Röcken (Saxony) on October 15, son of Karl Ludwig and Franziska Nietzsche. His father and both grandfathers are Protestant clergymen.
- 1846** Birth of sister Elisabeth.
- 1849** Birth of brother Joseph; death of father.
- 1850** Death of brother; family moves to Naumburg.
- 1858–64** Attends renowned boys' boarding-school Pforta, where he excels in classics. Begins to suffer from migraine attacks which will plague him for the rest of his career.
- 1864** Enters Bonn University to study theology and classical philology.
- 1865** Follows classics professor Ritschl to Leipzig University, where he drops theology and continues with studies in classical philology. Discovers Schopenhauer's philosophy and becomes a passionate admirer.
- 1867** Begins publishing career with essay on Theognis; continues publishing philological articles and book reviews till 1873.
- 1867–8** Military service in Naumburg, until invalided out after a riding accident.
- 1868** Back in Leipzig, meets Richard Wagner for the first time and quickly becomes a devotee. Increasing disaffection with philology: plans to escape to Paris to study chemistry.
- 1869** On Ritschl's recommendation, appointed Extraordinary (Associate) Professor of Classical Philology at Basel University. Awarded doctorate without examination; renounces Prussian citizenship. Begins a series of idyllic visits to the Wagners at Tribschen, on Lake Lucerne. Develops admiration for Jacob Burckhardt, his new colleague in Basel.
- 1870** Promoted to full professor. Participates in Franco-Prussian War as volunteer medical orderly, but contracts dysentery and diphtheria at the front within a fortnight.
- 1871** Granted semester's sick leave from Basel and works intensively on *The Birth of Tragedy*. Germany unified; founding of the Reich.
- 1872** Publishes *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music*, which earns him the condemnation of professional colleagues. Lectures "On the Future of our Educational Institutions"; attends laying of foundation stone for Bayreuth Festival Theatre.

- 1873 Publishes first *Untimely Meditation: David Strauss the Confessor and the Writer*.
- 1874 Publishes second and third *Untimely Meditations: On the Utility and Liability of History for Life* and *Schopenhauer as Educator*. Relationship with Wagner begins to sour.
- 1875 Meets musician Heinrich Köselitz (Peter Gast), who idolizes him.
- 1876 Publishes fourth and last *Untimely Meditation: Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*. Attends first Bayreuth Festival but leaves early and subsequently breaks with Wagner. Further illness; granted full year's sick leave from the university.
- 1877 French translation of *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth* published, the only translation to appear during his mentally active lifetime.
- 1878 Publishes *Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits*, which confirms the break with Wagner.
- 1879 Publishes supplement to *Human, All Too Human, Assorted Opinions and Maxims*. Finally retires from teaching on a pension; first visits the Engadine, summering in St. Moritz.
- 1880 Publishes *The Wanderer and his Shadow*. First stays in Venice and Genoa.
- 1881 Publishes *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*. First stay in Sils-Maria.
- 1882 Publishes *The Gay Science*. Infatuation with Lou Andreas-Salomé, who spurns his marriage proposals.
- 1883 Publishes *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One*, Parts I and II (separately). Death of Wagner. Spends the summer in Sils and the winter in Nice, his pattern for the next five years. Increasingly consumed by writing.
- 1884 Publishes *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part III.
- 1885 *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part IV, printed but circulated to only a handful of friends. Begins in earnest to amass notes for *The Will to Power*.
- 1886 Publishes *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*. Change of publisher results in new expanded editions of *The Birth of Tragedy* and *Human, All Too Human* (now with a second volume comprising the *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* and *The Wanderer and his Shadow*).
- 1887 Publishes *On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic*. New expanded editions of *Daybreak* and *The Gay Science*.
- 1888 Begins to receive public recognition: Georg Brandes lectures on his work in Copenhagen. Discovers Turin, where he writes *The Case of Wagner: A Musicians' Problem*. Abandons *The Will to Power*, then completes in quick succession: *Twilight of the Idols; or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer* (first published 1889), *The Anti-Christ: Curse on Christianity* (first published 1895), *Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is* (first published 1908), *Nietzsche contra Wagner: Documents of a Psychologist* (first published 1895), and *Dithyrambs of Dionysus* (first published 1892).
- 1889 Suffers mental breakdown in Turin (January 3) and is eventually committed to an asylum in Jena. *Twilight of the Idols* published January 24, the first of his new books to appear after his collapse.
- 1890 Discharged into the care of his mother in Naumburg.
- 1894 Elisabeth founds Nietzsche Archive in Naumburg (moving it to Weimar two years later).
- 1897 Mother dies; Elisabeth moves her brother to Weimar.
- 1900 Friedrich Nietzsche dies in Weimar on August 25.

# Part I

## Beginnings