


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1 Nietzsche's works and their themes

Interpretation of Nietzsche's thought is a complex enterprise. Because of his avoidance of any conventional philosophical system and his many experiments with styles and genres, Nietzsche's writings seem to demand a sense of active reading. The "Nietzsche" that emerges from scholarly discussion typically depends on the interests of the interpreter and especially often those of the interpreter's discipline. Themes which are taken to be most central to Nietzsche's philosophy often depend on which works are regarded as most important or most accessible; but the relative importance which attaches to each of Nietzsche's works is by no means obvious. Indeed, Nietzsche scholarship has experienced fads with regard to given points of interest. As we will consider below, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra's* celebrity outside of Germany declined after the Nazis invoked it for propagandistic purposes, while Nietzsche's early essay "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" has assumed new importance in recent literary-critical discussion, in part because it suggests that all language is metaphoric.

In what follows, we shall trace the chronology of Nietzsche's writings, mentioning themes that are prominent in each work. We shall also indicate central interpretive issues provoked by particular works and themes. While the Nietzsche that emerges here will, of necessity, be "our" Nietzsche, we hope that this synopsis will offer a basic map of the terrain of Nietzsche's works.

THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY FROM THE SPIRIT OF MUSIC

Nietzsche was appointed Associate Professor of philology at Basel University before he had written a dissertation, on the basis of the

enthusiastic support of his supervising professor, Albrecht Ritschl. His first book was, therefore, awaited with great expectations by his fellow classicists. Unfortunately, *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music* (1872) was far from what Nietzsche's philological colleagues had had in mind. The book, which defended a theory of the origins and functions of Greek tragedy, was largely speculative and utterly devoid of footnotes. It began by appealing to its readers' experiences with drunkenness and dreams, and it ended with an appeal to popular culture in the form of a paean to Richard Wagner.

In this work, Nietzsche theorizes that Greek tragedy was built upon a wedding of two principles, which he associated with the deities Apollo and Dionysus. The Apollonian principle, in keeping with the characteristics of the sun god Apollo, is the principle of order, static beauty, and clear boundaries. The Dionysian principle, in contrast, is the principle of frenzy, excess, and the collapse of boundaries.

These principles offered perspectives on the position of the individual human being, but perspectives that were radically opposed to one another. The Apollonian principle conceived the individual as sufficiently separate from the rest of reality to be able to contemplate it dispassionately. The Dionysian principle, however, presents reality as a tumultuous flux in which individuality is overwhelmed by the dynamics of a living whole. Nietzsche believed that a balance of these principles is essential if one is both to recognize the challenge to one's sense of meaning posed by individual vulnerability and to recognize the solution, which depends on one's sense of oneness with a larger reality. Greek tragedy, as he saw it, confronted the issue of life's meaning by merging the perspectives of the two principles.

The themes of Greek tragedy concerned the worst case scenario from an Apollonian point of view – the devastation of vulnerable individuals. Scholarship had concluded that the chanting of the chorus was the first form of Athenian tragedy. Nietzsche interpreted the effect of the chorus as the initiation of a Dionysian experience on the part of the audience. Captivated by music, audience members abandoned their usual sense of themselves as isolated individuals and felt themselves instead to be part of a larger, frenzied whole.

This sense of self as part of a dynamic whole gave a different ground for experiencing life as meaningful than one would recognize in the

more typical Apollonian condition, which entails a certain psychic distance. Feeling oneself to be part of the joyous vitality of the whole, one could take participation in life to be intrinsically wonderful, despite the obvious vulnerabilities one experiences as an individual. The aesthetic transformation of the audience member's sense of the significance of individual life aroused a quasi-religious affirmation of life's value. "It is only as an *aesthetic phenomenon* that existence and the world are eternally *justified*," Nietzsche concluded.¹

The function of characters and drama later added to tragedy depended on the fundamental, enthralled experience of oneness with the chorus, according to Nietzsche. Already incited to a Dionysian state before the tragic hero appeared on stage, the audience would see the character before them as a manifestation of the god Dionysus. Unfortunately, Euripides restructured tragedy in such a way that the chorus's role was diminished. Euripides wrote plays that would encourage an Apollonian stance of objective interest in the drama. Nietzsche contended that in his attempt to write "intelligent" plays, Euripides had killed tragedy. He had done so, moreover, because he had fallen under the influence of Socrates.

The Birth of Tragedy is the first of many works in which Nietzsche re-evaluates the traditional view that Socrates was the quintessential philosopher. Although granting that Socrates was a turning point in world history, Nietzsche contends that Socrates was responsible for directing Western culture toward an imbalanced, exaggerated reliance on the Apollonian point of view. A defender of reason to an irrational degree, Socrates had taught that reason could penetrate reality to the point that it could correct reality's flaws. This had become the fundamental dream of Western culture, a dream that was later manifested in the modern approach to scholarship. Unfortunately, the optimism of the Socratic rational project was doomed to failure. Reason itself, through Kant, had pointed to its own limits. Whatever reason might accomplish, it could not "correct" the most basic flaws in human reality – the facts of human vulnerability and mortality.

The Birth of Tragedy also involves an indictment of contemporary culture as well as an account of the significance of tragedy. Contemporary culture's reliance on reason and its commitment to scientific optimism had rendered the modern individual largely oblivious to the Dionysian character of reality – a character which engulfed all

individuals in the flow of life but which also rendered everyone subject to death and devastation. The repression of vulnerability was psychologically disastrous, in Nietzsche's view. The only hope for modern culture was that it might turn to myth, which could compensate for the culture's excesses, before a crisis.

Nietzsche's defense of Wagner as a cultural hero emerged in connection with this endorsement of myth as the necessary antidote to reason. Nietzsche believed that Wagner's operatic embodiments of Germanic myths had the potential to effect a new merger of the Apollonian and Dionysian principles, with redemptive effects on German culture. Nietzsche's great expectations of Wagner were not only central to his first book – they were also fundamentally important to him personally. Nietzsche and Wagner shared an enthusiasm for Schopenhauer, and for a number of years Nietzsche was a personal friend of Wagner's, visiting him regularly at his home in Tribschen – and sufficiently close to have been sent on one occasion to do some of the Wagners' Christmas shopping.

Nietzsche's endorsement of Wagner in the context of a philological work struck many of his professional colleagues as jarring. One, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, responded to *The Birth of Tragedy's* publication with a hostile pamphlet called "*Zukunftphilologie*" ["Philology of the Future"], playing on Wagner's grandiose aspirations to create a *Kunstwerk der Zukunft* [artwork of the future]. The pamphlet presented *The Birth of Tragedy* as thoroughly unscholarly, filled with omissions and inaccuracies. With Nietzsche's encouragement, his friend Erwin Rohde wrote a pamphlet (October 1872) replying to Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, entitled *Afterphilologie* [Ass's Philology], which emphasized Wilamowitz-Möllendorf's own inaccuracies in citing from *The Birth of Tragedy*.

The Birth of Tragedy failed initially to secure esteem for Nietzsche among his philological colleagues. Nevertheless, the work has had enduring influence. In particular, the analysis of Apollo and Dionysus has had an impact on figures in diverse fields, among them Thomas Mann and C. G. Jung.²

THE UNFASHIONABLE OBSERVATIONS

Nietzsche wrote "David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer" (1873), the first of his *Unfashionable Observations*, at the behest of

Richard Wagner. David Strauss was an eminent theologian, whose *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined* (1864) had had a tremendous impact due to its demystification of Jesus' life.³ Strauss had contended that the supernatural claims made about the historical Jesus could be explained in terms of the particular needs of his community. Although Strauss defends Christianity for its moral ideals, his demythologizing of Jesus appealed to Nietzsche.

Nevertheless, Wagner had been publicly denounced by Strauss in 1865 for having persuaded Ludwig II to fire a musician-rival. Not one to forget an assault, Wagner encouraged Nietzsche to read Strauss's recent *The Old and the New Faith* (1872), which advocated the rejection of the Christian faith in favor of a Darwinian, materialistic, and patriotic worldview. Wagner described the book to Nietzsche as extremely superficial, and Nietzsche agreed with Wagner's opinion, despite the similarity of his own views to Strauss's perspective on religion.

This *Unfashionable Observation*, accordingly, was Nietzsche's attempt to avenge Wagner by attacking Strauss's recent book. In fact, the essay is at least as much a polemical attack on Strauss as on his book, for Nietzsche identifies Strauss as a cultural "Philistine" and exemplar of pseudoculture. The resulting essay appears extremely intemperate, although erudite, filled with references to many of Nietzsche's scholarly contemporaries. The climax is a literary tour de force, in which Nietzsche cites a litany of malapropisms from Strauss, interspersed with his own barbed comments.

Not surprisingly, the elderly Strauss was stunned and stung by Nietzsche's essay. He wrote to a friend, "The only thing I find interesting about the fellow is the psychological point – how one can get into such a rage with a person whose path one has never crossed, in brief, the real motive of this passionate hatred."⁴ Nietzsche, apparently, had some qualms after his essay was published. When he heard that Strauss died six months after its publication, he wrote to his friend Gerdsdorff, "I very much hope that I did not sadden his last months, and that he died without knowing anything about me. It's rather on my mind."⁵

Nietzsche's second *Unfashionable Observation*, "On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life" (1874), is "unfashionable" because it questions the apparent assumption of nineteenth-century German educators that historical knowledge is intrinsically

valuable. Nietzsche argues, in contrast, that historical knowledge is valuable only when it has a positive effect on human beings' sense of life. Although he acknowledges that history does provide a number of benefits in this respect, Nietzsche also contends that there are a number of ways in which historical knowledge could prove damaging to those who pursued it and that many of his contemporaries were suffering these ill effects.

Nietzsche contends that history can play three positive roles, which he terms "monumental," "antiquarian," and "critical." *Monumental history* brings the great achievements of humanity into focus. This genre of history has value for contemporary individuals because it makes them aware of what is possible for human beings to achieve. *Antiquarian history*, history motivated primarily out of a spirit of reverence for the past, can be valuable to contemporary individuals by helping them to appreciate their lives and culture. *Critical history*, history approached in an effort to pass judgment, provides a counterbalancing effect to that inspired by antiquarian history. By judging the past, those engaged in critical history remain attentive to flaws and failures in the experience of their culture, thereby avoiding slavish blindness in their appreciation of it.

The problem with historical scholarship in his own time, according to Nietzsche, was that historical knowledge was pursued for its own sake. He cited five dangers resulting from such an approach to history: (1) Modern historical knowledge undercuts joy in the present, since it makes the present appear as just another episode. (2) Modern historical knowledge inhibits creative activity by convincing those made aware of the vast sweep of historical currents that their present actions are too feeble to change the past they have inherited. (3) Modern historical knowledge encourages the sense that the inner person is disconnected from the outer world by assaulting the psyche with more information than it can absorb and assimilate. (4) Modern historical knowledge encourages a jaded relativism toward reality and present experience, motivated by a sense that because things keep changing present states of affairs do not matter. (5) Modern historical knowledge inspires irony and cynicism about the contemporary individual's role in the world; the historically knowledgeable person comes to feel increasingly like an afterthought in the scheme of things, imbued by a sense of belatedness.

Although Nietzsche was convinced that the current approach to history was psychologically and ethically devastating to his contemporaries, particularly the young, he contends that antidotes could reverse these trends. One antidote is the *unhistorical*, the ability to forget how overwhelming the deluge of historical information is, and to "enclose oneself within a bounded *horizon*."⁶ A second antidote is the *suprahistorical*, a shift of focus from the ongoing flux of history to "that which bestows upon existence the character of the eternal and stable, towards *art* and *religion*."⁷

Nietzsche's third *Unfashionable Observation*, "Schopenhauer as Educator" (1874), probably provides more information about Nietzsche himself than it does about Schopenhauer or his philosophy. As R. J. Hollingdale remarks, this is almost wholly about Schopenhauer as "an exemplary type of man."⁸

Schopenhauer, in Nietzsche's idealizing perspective, is exemplary because he was so thoroughly an individual genius. Schopenhauer was one of those rare individuals whose emergence is nature's true goal in producing humanity, Nietzsche suggests. He praises Schopenhauer's indifference to the mediocre academicians of his era, as well as his heroism as a philosophical "loner."

Strangely, given Schopenhauer's legendary pessimism, Nietzsche praises his "cheerfulness that really cheers" along with his honesty and steadfastness.⁹ But Nietzsche argues that in addition to specific traits that a student might imitate, Schopenhauer offers a more important kind of example. Being himself attuned to the laws of his own character, Schopenhauer directed those students who were capable of insight to recognize the laws of their own character. By reading and learning from Schopenhauer, one could develop one's own individuality.

Nietzsche intended to write a fourth *Unfashionable Observation* devoted to the profession of classical philology. He began dictating "We Philologists" in 1875, but this meditation was never finished.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the notes that remain are extensive, and they offer insight into Nietzsche's aspirations as a classicist and his disillusionment with the profession as practiced. In its critique of contemporary education, the notes share an elective affinity with the *Observation* on history. Unfortunately, Nietzsche argued, classical philology was pursued as a relentless labor for its own sake, without concern for its relevance to contemporary life.

Classical scholarship as knowledge of the ancient world cannot, of course, last forever; its material is exhaustible. What cannot be exhausted is the perpetually new adjustment of our own age to the classical world, of measuring ourselves against it. If we assign the classicist the task of understanding *his own* age better by means of the classical world, then his task is a permanent one. – This is the antinomy of classical scholarship. Men have always, in fact, understood *the ancient world* exclusively in terms of *the present* – and shall *the present* now be understood in terms of *the ancient world*? More precisely: men have explained the classical world to themselves in terms of their own experience; and from this they have acquired of the classical world in this way, they have *assessed*, evaluated their own experience. Hence experience is clearly an absolute prerequisite for a *classicist*. Which means: the classicist must first be a man in order to become creative as a classicist.¹¹

“Richard Wagner in Bayreuth” (1876), the fourth and final of Nietzsche’s published *Unfashionable Observations*, was intended as a paean to Wagner, somewhat akin to “Schopenhauer as Educator.” Nietzsche’s relationship to Wagner had been strained by the time he wrote this essay, however, and the tension is evident in the text, which emphasizes Wagner’s psychology (a theme that would preoccupy Nietzsche in many of his future writings). Nietzsche himself may have been concerned about the extent to which the essay might be perceived as unflattering, for he considered not publishing it. Ultimately, Nietzsche published a version of the essay that was considerably less critical of Wagner than were earlier drafts, and Wagner was pleased enough to send a copy of the essay to King Ludwig.¹²

A break with Wagner was probably inevitable for Nietzsche. Wagner showed considerable arrogance toward the younger Nietzsche, whom he frequently treated on the order of a servant. The personal styles and sensibilities of the two men clashed. Wagner was brash and vain; Nietzsche, in contrast, was extremely polite. Thus, Nietzsche was annoyed by Wagner’s rude denunciations; Wagner, in contrast, suggested to Nietzsche’s physician that his headaches were the consequences of excessive masturbation. Nietzsche’s disgust at the philistinism of Wagner’s followers provoked him to leave a Bayreuth festival in 1876, and the final break was precipitated by Wagner’s opera *Parsifal*, which struck Nietzsche as hypocritically religious.

The break with Wagner was extremely significant to Nietzsche. The importance of the relationship is evident from the extent to which Nietzsche's works analyze Wagner and "artists" more generally. Among the works of Nietzsche's final lucid year were two on Wagner, *The Case of Wagner: A Musician's Problem* (1888) and *Nietzsche contra Wagner: Documents of a Psychologist* (1895), an edition of passages on Wagner assembled from Nietzsche's various books.

EARLY ESSAYS

Besides the four *Unfashionable Observations*, Nietzsche drafted a number of additional essays in the early 1870s which he never elected to publish. These include "The Philosopher: Reflections on the Struggle between Art and Knowledge," "On the Pathos of Truth," "The Philosopher as Cultural Physician," "Philosophy in Hard Times," "The Struggle between Science and Wisdom," "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," and "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks."¹³ These manuscripts reveal considerable thematic overlap. Nietzsche apparently intended to integrate the various drafts into a single book, a companion to *The Birth of Tragedy*, but this integration never occurred.¹⁴ Nevertheless, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" and "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks" have received sufficient scholarly attention and commentary to warrant discussion here.

Nietzsche's early essay "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" (1873) makes some claims designed to startle those who see philosophy as essentially a quest for truth in the correspondence sense, a search for accurate representation. He contends instead that "truth" is a mode of illusion and that the schemes our intellects impose upon things by means of language, while practically useful, are fundamentally deceptive. Moreover, while language is always metaphoric, one usually forgets that this is so, imagining that the conceptual schemes of one's own construction are permanent fixtures. In fact, Nietzsche argues somewhat paradoxically, reality is a flux that language cannot capture. Most famously, Nietzsche contends,

What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically

and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins.¹⁵

The stock of "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" has risen in the eyes of many scholars over the past few decades, primarily because it analyzes truth in terms of metaphor. Many literary theorists and philosophers influenced by literary criticism, in particular, interpret Nietzsche as defending a view of "truth" that treats it as an illusion foisted upon us by language. Truth, on this view, amounts ultimately to a mode of rhetoric.¹⁶ The essay's striking images have also inspired reflection and commentary from contemporary literary critics.¹⁷ For example, Nietzsche describes the human being's lack of self-knowledge as follows:

Does nature not conceal most things from him – even concerning his own body, in order to confine and lock him within a proud, deceptive consciousness, aloof from the coils of the bowels, the rapid flow of the blood stream, and the intricate quivering of the fibers! She threw away the key. And woe to that fatal curiosity which might one day have the power to peer out and down through a crack in the chamber of consciousness and then suspect that man is sustained in the indifference of his ignorance by that which is pitiless, greedy, insatiable, and murderous – as if hanging in dreams on the back of a tiger.¹⁸

Among philosophers less influenced by recent literary theory, however, the essay has more typically been seen as an early statement of Nietzsche's thoughts on truth that he was later to revise and supplant with more philosophically sophisticated views. Maudemarie Clark, for instance, contends that, "Far from a precocious statement of Nietzsche's lifelong views, . . . ["On Truth and Lies"] belongs, according to my interpretation, to Nietzsche's juvenilia."¹⁹

Nietzsche also wrote a manuscript primarily about the early Greek philosophers, drawing on a series of lectures that he gave during the summer of 1872 on the pre-Platonic philosophers. He worked on this project until his visit to the Wagners at Easter of 1873. Nietzsche set this manuscript aside after this visit, when Wagner incited him to write the essay on David Strauss, which led Nietzsche to the idea of a whole series of *Unfashionable Observations*.

The unpublished manuscript that exists, "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks" (1873), however, gives insight into Nietzsche's approach to both classics and philosophy. Nietzsche treats the pre-Platonic philosophies as archetypes for all basic philosophical moves and postures, which he does not separate from the types of individuals expressing them. Most striking to Nietzsche was the fact that these early thinkers took the ordinary as cause for wonder. He also emphasizes two other problems of importance to these thinkers: the purposes in nature and the value of knowledge.²⁰

HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN

Nietzsche is often said to have entered a new period with the publication of *Human, All Too Human, a Book for Free Spirits* (1878). The book is considerably more "positivistic" than his earlier writings.²¹ It aims at debunking unwarranted assumptions more than at defending a grand interpretation of its own, and it marks the high point of Nietzsche's interest in and applause for natural science. The book is deliberately anti-metaphysical.

Nietzsche describes what he means by "*free spirits*" in the preface to the second edition of *Human, All Too Human*. Free spirits contrast with the typical human being of his era, who was, as the title suggests, all too human. Free spirits, in contrast, are ideal companions that do not yet exist but may appear in the future. They are those who have freed themselves from the fetters of acculturation, even the bonds of reverence for those things they once found most praiseworthy. The dangerous period of the free spirit is introduced by the desire to flee whatever has been one's previous spiritual world, a desire that leads to a reconsideration of matters that previously had been taken for granted. The ultimate aim of this liberation is independent self-mastery and supreme health in a life of continual experimentation and adventure. This ideal is akin to images Nietzsche develops later, particularly in "On the Three Metamorphoses" in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and in the description of the philosophers of the future in *Beyond Good and Evil*.

Although Nietzsche suggests a perspectival view in the unpublished "On Truth and Lies" essay, *Human, All Too Human* is the first published work in which he defends his famed *perspectivism*, the view that "truths" are one and all interpretations formulated

from particular perspectives.²² Scholars take various positions on the matter of how radical this position is. On one extreme are those who see this as a brand of neo-Kantianism that simply spells out the implication of Kant's theory that the world as it appears to us is constructed by our particular human faculties. On the other extreme are those who read Nietzsche's perspectivism as a radical form of relativism, one which denies any basis for preferring one perspective to another.

Philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition are also especially fond of examining Nietzsche's perspectivism from the standpoint of the famed "liar's paradox." The liar's paradox afflicts the liar who claims, "Everything I say is false." If that sentence is taken as true, it is actually false, since it would itself be a true claim made by the liar. Nietzsche has been accused of adopting a similarly paradoxical position. If all knowledge claims are interpretations, that should hold also for the claim that all knowledge claims are merely interpretations. But if this is so, according to some, Nietzsche has undermined the status and force of his own claim. Others, however, see no reason why Nietzsche would not acknowledge that his own claims are interpretations, pointing to textual passages where he seems to do just that.²³

Nietzsche's perspectivism figures importantly in his debunking critique of morality, which is first presented in *Human, All Too Human*. Nietzsche denies that morality is anything but perspectival. Contrary to the claims of moralists, morality is not inherent in or determined by reality. It does not limn human nature. Instead, it is the invention of human beings. Moreover, morality has not been the same in every culture and at every time. Nietzsche explicitly contrasts Christian and Greek moral thought, typically claiming that Greek thought had been vastly superior.

Personally, Nietzsche considered the book a breakthrough because it openly articulated his unconventional conclusions for the first time. It also sealed the break with Richard Wagner, who received the book with stony silence. Nietzsche also considered himself to have moved beyond the sway of Schopenhauerian metaphysics by this point.

Human, All Too Human also represents a stylistic departure from Nietzsche's earlier writing. While his previous works had typically been in the forms of essays or similarly structured longer works,

Human, All Too Human is the first of Nietzsche's "aphoristic" works. That is, it is written as an assembly of short discussions (sometimes literally aphorisms) which are strung together like beads, often without obvious connections between adjacent fragments. This appearance is often deceptive, however. Nietzsche orders his fragments to achieve a given effect, suggesting but not dogmatically asserting comparisons and contrasts, while challenging his readers to draw their own conclusions.

From *Human, All Too Human* onward, the fragmentary "aphoristic" style predominated in Nietzsche's writings. The biographical motivation for composing in this style may have been largely one of necessity – Nietzsche's migraines were so oppressive and visually impairing that he had to resort to intermittent bursts of writing and dictation as a method.²⁴ Nevertheless, Erich Heller rightly notes that this format suits this thinker, who was avowedly ant systematic.²⁵ This is particularly evident in Nietzsche's many gems of psychological insight, which are offered as verbal snapshots of disparate vignettes, usually without over-arching commentary. Moreover, this style is a suitable vehicle to reflect the movements and discontinuities of thought on given topics, an issue with which Nietzsche was profoundly concerned.²⁶

In 1886, Nietzsche published a second edition of *Human, All Too Human*, in which the previously published work was made Volume I of a two-volume work. Volume II consisted of two aphoristic works that Nietzsche had written and published separately, *Appendix: Assorted Opinions and Sayings* (1879) and *The Wanderer and His Shadow* (1880). These books were more conventionally aphoristic than the earlier volume, largely consisting of extremely terse, condensed formulations. Schopenhauer and Wagner receive more direct attacks than previously, and Nietzsche is more strident in his rejection of metaphysics on the grounds that (like historical scholarship) it is not approached with sufficient attention to its value (or lack of value) for actual living.

DAYBREAK

Daybreak: Thoughts on Moral Prejudices (1881) goes further than *Human, All Too Human* in elaborating Nietzsche's critique of Christian morality. It is perhaps also more masterful than the earlier work

in its artful use of “aphoristic” juxtaposition to engage the reader in his or her own reflections. Indeed, Nietzsche seems bent on conveying a particular type of experience in thinking to his readers, much more than he is concerned to persuade his readers to adopt any particular point of view.²⁷

Nietzsche criticized the Christian moral worldview on a number of grounds that he was to develop further in his later works. His basic case rests on psychological analyses of the motivations and effects that stem from the adoption of the Christian moral perspective. In this respect, *Daybreak* typifies Nietzsche's *ad hominem* approach to morality. Nietzsche asks primarily, “What kind of person would be inclined to adopt this perspective?” and “What impact does this perspective have on the way in which its adherent develops and lives?”²⁸

Nietzsche argues that the concepts that Christianity uses to analyze moral experience – especially sin and the afterlife – are entirely imaginary and psychologically pernicious. These categories deprecate human experience, making its significance appear much more vile than it actually is. Painting reality in a morbid light, Christian moral concepts motivate Christians to adopt somewhat paranoid and hostile attitudes toward their own behavior and that of others. Convinced of their own sinfulness and worthiness of eternal damnation, Christians are driven to seek spiritual reassurance at tremendous costs in terms of their own mental health and their relationships to others.

For instance, Christians feel that they need to escape their embodied selves because they are convinced of their own sinfulness. They are convinced of their own failure insofar as they believe themselves sinners and believe themselves to be bound by an unfulfillable law of perfect love. In order to ameliorate their sense of guilt and failure, Nietzsche contends, they look to others in the hope of finding them more sinful than themselves. Because the Christian moral worldview has convinced its advocates that their own position is perilous, Christians are driven to judge others to be sinners in order to gain a sense of power over them. The Christian moral worldview thus encourages uncharitable judgments of others, paradoxically despite its praise of neighbor love.

The fundamental misrepresentation of reality offered by the Chris-

tian moral worldview provokes dishonesty in its adherents, particularly in appraisals of themselves and others. It also encourages them to despise earthly life in favor of another reality (one that Nietzsche claims does not exist). Still further psychological damage to the believer results from the Christian moral worldview's insistence on absolute conformity to a single standard of human behavior. Nietzsche contends that one size does not fit all where morality is concerned, and that most of the best and strongest individuals are least capable of living according to the mold. Nevertheless, Christians are urged to abolish their individual characters, and to the extent that they fail to do so they reinforce their own feelings of inadequacy.

Nietzsche's picture of Christian morality seems dismal. He regards it as the motivation for attitudes that are self-denigrating, vindictive toward others, escapist, and antilife. Nietzsche never alters this basic assessment of the moral framework of his own tradition; instead, he continues to develop these themes in all his later discussions of morality and ethics.

THE GAY SCIENCE

Nietzsche's *The Gay Science* (1882)²⁹ [*Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*] proposes an antidote to the condition of contemporary scholarship [*Wissenschaft*]. As opposed to what he saw as contemporary scholars' antlike drudgery in amassing facts, he recommends "the *gay science*" – a kind of scholarship that would be light-hearted and deliberately "superficial – out of profundity," as he claims that the Greeks were. Aware of the murkier aspects of human experience, the ancient Athenians responded by taking aesthetic delight in life and becoming "adorers of forms, of tones, of words."³⁰ In his own era, in which many felt belated in history and incapable of transforming reality, Nietzsche proposed that this would be the appropriate convalescence for scholars, as it had been for him in his personal life.

The most famous statement in *The Gay Science* is the claim, "God is dead."³¹ It appears twice, first in Section 108, which opens Book Three:

New struggles. – After Buddha was dead, his shadow was still shown for centuries in a cave – a tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but

given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown. – And we – we still have to vanquish his shadow, too.³²

Somewhat surprisingly, the section that follows this statement seems to drop this theme and attacks the contemporary attitude toward science instead. An extended theme in the work, however, is the danger that science will be treated as the new religion, serving as a basis for retaining that same damaging psychological habit that the Christian religion developed.

The more famous appearance of the statement “God is dead,” however, arrives in Section 125, entitled “*The Madman*.” The madman in the section appears in the marketplace and makes this announcement, rather frantically, to the scientific atheists who are gathered there. They merely laugh. The madman tells them, “*We have killed him* – you and I. All of us are his murderers.” He explains as best he can to his listeners, who respond only with silence. Finally, he breaks the lantern he is carrying on the ground and says, “I have come too early . . . ; my time is not yet. . . . This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars – *and yet they have done it themselves*.” The section continues with the report that the madman visited several churches later that day and sang the *requiem aeternam deo* of the funeral mass. “Let out and called to account, he is said always to have replied nothing but: ‘What after all are these churches now if they are not the tombs and sepulchers of God?’ ”³³

This parable suggests the inappropriateness of the popular characterization of Nietzsche as the hardened atheist who delights in nothing more than debunking other people’s beliefs. Nevertheless, the perspective that Nietzsche proposes throughout *The Gay Science* is naturalistic and aesthetic, in opposition to traditional religious views.³⁴ Indeed, many of the work’s sections might be considered practical advice for the spiritually sensitive atheist who is concerned lest he or she return to old religious habits out of desperation. Nietzsche proposes as an alternative to religious views that seek life’s meaning in an afterlife, an immanent appreciation of this life in aesthetic terms. Ideal, he suggests, is the experience of *amor fati* [love of fate], in which one loves one’s life, with all its flaws, just for what it is.³⁵

Nietzsche's most complex and controversial image for the satisfaction that one would ideally take in one's earthly life is his "doctrine" [*Lehre*] of eternal recurrence. The concept of eternal recurrence seems to suggest that time is cyclical, with the entire sequence of all events recurring over and over again. In Nietzsche's published works, this concept is first suggested in the penultimate section of Book Four of *The Gay Science*, entitled "The Greatest Stress." The section presents a thought experiment, akin to Descartes's thought experiment of the evil genius:

What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: "This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence. . . ." ³⁶

The section goes on to ask how the reader would respond to this suggestion. Would it cause the reader to gnash his or her teeth, or would the reader imagine this prospect as divine?

The conception of eternal recurrence, often labeled a "doctrine," recurs in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in various forms and images.³⁷ In these, as in the passage from *The Gay Science*, the vision of time as cyclical is presented as something that should have existential import for an individual. The image of eternal recurrence appears to serve as a test that will determine whether an individual genuinely considers his or her life meaningful. So construed, as an *existential* theory, eternal recurrence is important primarily because it indicates a desirable attitude toward life. If one can genuinely affirm eternal recurrence, one considers one's life intrinsically valuable, worth living over and over again.³⁸

Some scholars have accepted the existential construal of the theory, but elaborated it in ethical or aesthetic terms. On one reading, the theory is offered as a kind of ethical admonition to live one's life as one would if one genuinely believed that one's life would eternally recur.³⁹ Eternal recurrence has also been interpreted in terms borrowed from aesthetics. On this view, the doctrine provides instruction as to how to construct one's life (and one's interpretation of it) as an artistic whole, with sufficient aesthetic merit to make its recurrence desirable.⁴⁰

Although the published passages that deal with eternal recurrence lend support to the “existential” reading, some of Nietzsche’s unpublished notes suggest another reading of eternal recurrence. In his notes Nietzsche sketches various “scientific” proofs of eternal recurrence, based on the assumptions that time is infinite while configurations of energy are finite. Some scholars emphasize these formulations over the published formulations, which do not offer “scientific” demonstrations of the doctrine. These interpreters regard eternal recurrence as a *cosmological* theory that offers an account of the nature of time in the context of the universe. So understood, the doctrine is not primarily about human beings, but instead deals with the entire structure and content of the universe.⁴¹

The first edition of *The Gay Science* ends with the vignette that opens Nietzsche’s next book, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Entitled “*Incipit tragoedia*” [“The tragedy begins”], it describes the prophet Zarathustra’s emergence from his mountain cave, addressing the sun, and beginning the descent that will commence his teaching mission. The passage plays with the imagery of Plato’s famous “Myth of the Cave” from Book 7 of the *Republic*. Zarathustra, although a fictional character in Nietzsche’s works, is modeled on the Persian prophet of the same name, founder of the Zoroastrian religion. In his discussion of his choice of this figure in *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche’s description suggests that he sees the Persian prophet as an appropriate alternative to the Christian worldview (which he frequently describes in terms of “good and evil”):

Zarathustra was the first to consider the fight of good and evil the very wheel in the machinery of things: the transposition of morality into the metaphysical realm, as a force, cause, and end in itself, is *his* work. But this question is at bottom its own answer. Zarathustra created this most calamitous error, morality; consequently, he must also be the first to recognize it. Not only has he more experience in the matter, for a longer time, than any other thinker – after all, the whole of history is the refutation by experiment of the principle of the so-called “moral world order” – what is more important is that Zarathustra is more truthful than any other thinker. His doctrine and his alone, posits truthfulness as the highest virtue. . . . To speak the truth and to *shoot well with arrows*, that is Persian virtue. . . . The self-overcoming of morality, out of truthfulness; the self-overcoming of the moralist, into his opposite – into me – that is what the name of Zarathustra means in my mouth.⁴²

THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA

Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None* is probably his most famous work – and also the work least popular among philosophers, at least in the Anglo-American tradition.⁴³ This is probably partially because it is written in fictional form. Many philosophers who want to treat issues discussed by Zarathustra prefer to find what they regard as similar discussions elsewhere in Nietzsche's works and to avoid the need to factor the fictionality of the work into their reading.⁴⁴ *Zarathustra* is also well designed to frustrate twentieth-century philosophy of the analytic tradition, which seeks conceptual clarity at the expense of rhetorical form, indeed often insists on the separation between a concept and the vehicle of its expression. The subtitle itself reveals the book's propensity for paradox; and Zarathustra's stance as a pontificating sage chimes poorly with the analytic effort to subject insinuated authority to critical conceptual analysis. Moreover, the employment of *Zarathustra* by the Nazi war effort to inspire German soldiers did little to improve the book's reception in the Anglo-American world.⁴⁵

Nevertheless, the book is philosophically interesting, in part because it does employ literary tropes and genres to philosophical effect. *Zarathustra* makes frequent use of parody, particularly of the Platonic dialogues and the New Testament. This strategy immediately presents Zarathustra on a par with Socrates and Christ – and as a clear alternative to them. The erudite allusions to works spanning the Western philosophical and literary traditions also play a philosophical role, for they both reveal Nietzsche's construal of the tradition he inherited and flag points at which he views it as problematic.

Much of the book consists of Zarathustra's speeches on philosophical themes, and these often obscure the plotline of the book. The book does involve a plot, however, which includes sections in which Zarathustra is "off-stage," in private reflection, and some in which he seems extremely distressed about the way his teaching and his life are going. Heidegger sees the plot as essential to the kind of teaching that Zarathustra effects. Zarathustra attempts to instruct the crowds and occasional higher man that he encounters in the book; but his most important teaching, in Heidegger's view, is his education of the

reader, accomplished through demonstrative means. Zarathustra teaches "by showing."

Indeed, *Zarathustra* stands in the tradition of the German *Bildungsroman*, in which a character's development toward spiritual maturity is chronicled. Zarathustra can be seen as a paradigm for the modern, spiritually sensitive individual, one who grapples with nihilism, the contemporary crisis in values in the wake of the collapse of the Christian worldview that assigned humanity a clear place in the world.⁴⁶

In the popular imagination, Nietzsche's idea of "the Superman" [*Übermensch*] is one of his most memorable and significant ideals. In fact, however, the concept of the *Übermensch* [superhuman being] is actually discussed rather little in the book.⁴⁷ The topic is the theme of the first speech in "Zarathustra's Prologue,"⁴⁸ which he presents to a crowd gathered for a circus. The audience interprets Zarathustra as a circus barker and the speech as an introduction to a performance by a tightrope walker. The concept is mentioned recurrently in Part I as something of a refrain to Zarathustra's speeches. But the word "*Übermensch*" rarely occurs after that.

In addition, the notion of the *Übermensch* is presented in more imagistic than explanatory terms. The *Übermensch*, according to Zarathustra, is continually experimental, willing to risk all for the sake of the enhancement of humanity. The *Übermensch* aspires to greatness, but Zarathustra does not formulate any more specific characterization of what constitutes the enhancement of humanity or greatness. He does, however, contrast the *Übermensch* to the *last man*, the human type whose sole desire is personal comfort, happiness. Such a person is "the last man" quite literally, incapable of the desire that is required to create beyond oneself in any form, including that of having children.

The status of the *Übermensch* concept has been much debated among Nietzsche scholars.⁴⁹ Among the issues are the following: Is the notion presented to establish a set of character traits as most desirable, or does it represent instead an ideal attitude?⁵⁰ Is the *Übermensch* an attainable goal? Is it a solipsistic goal? Is it an evolutionary goal in a Darwinian sense? Does the doctrine stand in any particular relationship to Nietzsche's other doctrines? In particular, does it describe the type of person who would be able to affirm eternal recurrence?⁵¹ What is to be made of the fact that the notion of the

Übermensch is virtually abandoned after Part I of *Zarathustra*? Does Nietzsche give up on the idea?⁵² Does he mean it to be implicit in Zarathustra's later speeches? Does the theme of eternal recurrence supplant that of the *Übermensch* as the fundamental theme of the book?

Zarathustra's opening speech, besides proposing the *Übermensch* as the ideal for humanity also places emphasis on this world as opposed to any future world. "Let your will say: the *Übermensch* shall be the meaning of the earth! I beseech you, my brothers, remain faithful to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of otherworldly hopes!"⁵³ In particular, Zarathustra urges that human beings reassess the value of their own bodies, indeed their embodiment. For too long, dreaming of the afterlife, Western humanity has treated the body as a source of sin and error. Zarathustra, in contrast, insists that the body is the ground of all meaning and knowledge, and that health and strength should be recognized and sought as virtues.⁵⁴

Another prominent theme in *Zarathustra* is its emphasis on the relative importance of will. In part, this emphasis follows Schopenhauer in claiming that will is more fundamental to human beings than knowledge. However, Nietzsche stresses the will's attempt to enhance its power, whereas he views Schopenhauer as placing greater stress on the will's efforts at self-preservation. Nietzsche's famous conception of will to power makes one of its few published appearances in *Zarathustra*.

"Indeed, the truth was not hit by him who shot at it with the word of the 'will to existence': that will does not exist. For, what does not exist cannot will; but what is in existence, how could that still want existence? Only where there is life is there also will: not will to life but – thus I teach you – will to power."⁵⁵

The formulation "will to power" has received considerable attention by Nietzsche scholars and by a larger spectrum of society as well. Easily exploited by the Nazi war effort and utilized by murderers Leopold and Loeb as justification for their crime, this theme has had an unsavory history beyond the world of scholarship. Scholars have endeavored to set the record straight, but they have disagreed as to the significance and importance of "will to power" in Nietzsche's thought.

Some scholars have argued that its appearance reveals the extent to which Nietzsche remains Schopenhauerian in his thinking, despite the changed formulation he proposes.⁵⁶ Some have contended that the idea is a cornerstone of Nietzsche's thought, observing that some of Nietzsche's notes reveal his definite plans to write a book about it.⁵⁷ Others have pointed to the paucity of published mentions of "will to power" and suggested that this idea was not particularly central to Nietzsche.⁵⁸ Scholars disagree on whether the will to power should be viewed as a psychological observation or a metaphysical doctrine, and they have also disagreed on whether Nietzsche intended this primarily as an explanation of human behavior or a more general cosmological account.⁵⁹

Those discussions of will that appear in *Zarathustra* particularly occur in connection with the doctrine of eternal recurrence.

"To redeem those who lived in the past and to recreate all 'it was' into a 'thus I willed it' – that alone should I call redemption. . . . All 'it was' is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful accident – until the creative will says to it, 'But thus I will it; thus shall I will it.' "⁶⁰

Much of the plot of *Zarathustra* concerns his efforts to formulate his idea of eternal recurrence. At times, the idea possesses him in the form of visions and dreams. At others, he seems reluctant to state it categorically or to accept its implications. During a particularly despairing moment, he shudders at the implication of his doctrine that "the rabble," the petty people who comprise most of the human race, will also recur. The eagle and snake who have been his companions urge him to stop speaking and to sing instead. They suggest their own formulation of eternal recurrence, which is perhaps one of the clearest suggestions of how eternal recurrence might give one a sense of meaning in life. And yet, it is not Zarathustra's words one reads.

"And if you wanted to die now, O Zarathustra, behold, we also know how you would then speak to yourself . . .

" 'Now I die and vanish,' you would say, 'and all at once I am nothing. The soul is as mortal as the body. But the knot of causes in which I am entangled recurs and will create me again. I myself belong to the causes of the eternal recurrence. I come again, with this sun, with this earth, with this eagle, with this serpent – not to a new life or a better life or a similar life: I come back eternally to this same, selfsame life, in what is greatest as in what is

smallest, to teach again the eternal recurrence of all things, to speak again the word of the great noon of earth and man, to proclaim the *Übermensch* again to men. I spoke my word, I break of my word: thus my eternal lot wants it; as a proclaimer I perish. The hour has now come when he who goes under should bless himself. Thus *ends* Zarathustra's going under.' "⁶¹

The fact that Zarathustra objects to the recurrence of the rabble is indicative of Nietzsche's elitism.⁶² Consistently, Nietzsche and Zarathustra contend that human beings are not equal. Nietzsche objects to the democratic movements of his era in favor of more aristocratic forms of social organization that would place control in the hands of the talented, of necessity not the majority.

Nietzsche is also often reputed to be a sexist, in large part because of a famous line that appears in *Zarathustra*: "You are going to women? Do not forget the whip!" What is rarely remembered is the fact that this line is not spoken by Zarathustra, but instead by an old woman in partial objection to Zarathustra's romanticized image of male and female roles. The line certainly requires interpretation, but it should not be construed as a straightforward statement of Nietzsche's views.⁶³

Nietzsche's alleged sexism is a complex topic. In some of his writings he mouths the inflammatory misogynistic imagery of Schopenhauer's "On Women," arguably the most notorious denunciation of women in German.⁶⁴ At other times, he presents psychological vignettes depicting interactions among women and men; frequently in these, he seems to be sympathetic to women.⁶⁵ He frequently personifies abstract ideas in female form, and he appeals to stereotypical images of women, although in the latter cases he often plays with the images or refers explicitly to male perceptions of women.⁶⁶ The passages in *Beyond Good and Evil* dealing with women are often read as stridently antifeminist; but Nietzsche significantly prefaces these immoderately modulated passages with a confessional remark akin to what one would expect in a male consciousness-raising group:

Whenever a cardinal problem is at stake, there speaks an unchangeable "this is I"; about man and woman, for example, a thinker cannot relearn but only finish learning – only discover ultimately how this is "settled in him." At times we find certain solutions of problems that inspire strong faith in us; some call them henceforth *their* "convictions." Later – we see them only as steps to self-knowledge, signposts to the problem we *are* – rather, to

the great stupidity we are, to our spiritual *fatum*, to what is *unteachable* very "deep down."

After this abundant civility that I have just evidenced in relation to myself I shall perhaps be permitted more readily to state a few truths about "woman as such" – assuming that it is now known from the outset how very much these are after all only – *my* truths.⁶⁷

Nietzsche's biography might also be brought to bear on his views on women. He was raised in a family of women of rigidly moralistic views. His marriage proposals were all rebuffed; and the women whom he seemed most to admire, Lou Salomé and Cosima Wagner, were strong-willed individuals who did not especially subscribe to conventional roles for women. No doubt, Nietzsche had many motivations for complicated reactions to "woman as such." At any rate, his published references to women present more a suggestive interpretive puzzle than a coherent statement.

Nietzsche claims that he wrote the first three parts of the four-part *Zarathustra* in ten-day outbursts, although it is evident from his notes that he had plans in mind for a considerably longer period. The work was published in various segments and sizes. Parts I and II were published together in 1883, and Part III was published in 1884. Part IV was published in a limited edition in 1885. Nietzsche distributed Part IV to a few friends, but he wanted them to keep the book quiet. Only in 1892 was Part IV published in a public edition.

Part IV certainly contrasts with the other three parts. The narrator's voice is more critical of Zarathustra and of claims it reports. The plot is more prominent. It is, moreover, funny. Besides involving an irreverent parody of the Last Supper and Plato's Symposium, it involves a number of characters, called the "higher men," who ludicrously personify Zarathustra's teachings. The higher men have each taken one of Zarathustra's doctrines as fundamental – so much so that each exaggerates one feature of Zarathustra's perspective. They represent a kind of "worst case scenario" for Zarathustra as teacher.

Zarathustra, moreover, appears more ludicrous himself in Part IV than in the earlier three parts. He makes foolish mistakes in identifying the higher men; and when the higher men slip in their atheism, he reacts, contrary to his own insight, like a defender of the faith. Nevertheless, he sees through his own folly and responds with *laughter*. He resolves at the end of the book that his pity for the higher

men, expressed in inviting them to dine in his cave, will have been his "final sin." Throwing off his error as those burdened by original sin could not, he begins his teaching mission once again, descending from his mountain cave as he did at the beginning of the book.

Part IV has been a source of controversy among Nietzsche scholars. Some are convinced that the book is stronger without Part IV,⁶⁸ and others apparently seem comfortable relegating Part IV to the status of a postscript.⁶⁹ Recently, however, a number of commentators have reassessed the importance of Part IV, offering accounts of why Nietzsche would have felt the need for a comic finale to an otherwise tragic work.⁷⁰ These readings suggest that Nietzsche had a more ironic perspective on Zarathustra's prophetic stance than traditional readings have appreciated.

BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL

Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (1886) represented a shift in Nietzsche's basic goals as an author. "After the Yes-saying part of my task had been solved, the turn had come for the No-saying, No-doing part: the revaluation of our values so far, the great war. . . ." ⁷¹

Nietzsche goes on to describe *Beyond Good and Evil* as "a critique of modernity."⁷² The modernity attacked includes culture broadly construed; but Nietzsche appears to be especially concerned with the direction of philosophy and its role in future history. Indeed, the subtitle is "*Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*." The book opens with a Preface and first section that are often witty in criticizing traditional philosophy and its presuppositions. After the famous opening line about truth being a woman, Nietzsche asks, "Are there not grounds for the suspicion that all philosophers, insofar as they were dogmatists, have been very inexpert about women?" ⁷³

Nietzsche attacks particularly the dogmatism of philosophers. Philosophers have typically regarded themselves as seekers of truth – but from the book's beginning, Nietzsche casts suspicion on their motives. Philosophers, he argues, have simply assumed that truth is valuable, without inquiring as to whether this is so. They have posed their conclusions as objective, while in fact "every great philosophy so far has been . . . the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir."⁷⁴ Unwittingly, philosophers

have sought to impose their own moral outlook on nature itself, and read into it what they have wanted to find.

Nietzsche proposes a reassessment of the way philosophy has been practiced in physiological and psychological terms, recognizing how much against the grain his approach will seem.

A proper physio-psychology has to contend with unconscious resistance in the heart of the investigator, it has "the heart" against it: even a doctrine of the reciprocal dependence of the "good" and the "wicked" drives, causes (as refined immorality) distress and aversion in a still hale and hearty conscience – still more so, a doctrine of the derivation of all good impulses from wicked ones. If, however, a person should regard even the affects of hatred, envy, covetousness, and the lust to rule as conditions of life, as factors which, fundamentally and essentially, must be present in the general economy of life (and must, therefore, be further enhanced if life is to be further enhanced) – he will suffer from such a view of things as from seasickness.⁷⁵

Nietzsche proposes a new direction for philosophy, and a different kind of person as philosopher. Philosophers, on this view, should be free spirits and great experimentalists, as opposed to the mere "philosophical laborers" that are often thought to be philosophers.⁷⁶ The philosopher has "the most comprehensive responsibility" and "the conscience for the over-all development of man," and should utilize religion, education, and political and economic conditions in accordance with this responsibility.⁷⁷ *Beyond Good and Evil* makes explicitly political suggestions, although it is more concerned to propose a type of political arrangement (akin to that of Plato advocating philosopher-kings) than to argue for specific policies.

Central to the agenda of Nietzsche's future philosophers is a reconsideration of the value of conventional morality from a physio-psychological perspective. For the first time, in *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche proposes to develop "a natural history of morals." He implies with this formulation that morality has changed over time. He also suggests that morality can be naturalistically described, that it is not a revelation from another, divine level of reality.

Nietzsche goes so far in employing naturalistic terms in his analysis that he describes the morality of his tradition as a "herd morality." In other words, people follow the same direction as others for

the same reason that cows and sheep follow other cows and sheep. Nietzsche surely recognizes that many readers will find comparison between their moral beliefs and animal behavior offensive. (Presumably, however, he has Scripture on his side, in that the New Testament frequently refers to the faithful as "a flock.")

Nietzsche also suggests that multiple moralities have existed at the same time, and that they reveal their adherents' psychological perspective, which can be either healthy or sick. In particular, he suggests that master morality and slave morality are radically different in outlook. Master morality, typified by those in positions of power, involves a primary judgment of oneself as good, and a judgment of others in reference to one's own traits. Slave morality, by contrast, as the moral outlook of those who are oppressed, is primarily concerned with the reactions those in power might have to any contemplated act. Although slaves hate the master and everything the master represents, they still refer their behavior primarily to the master. Even self-esteem is achieved by reference to the master. Judging the master with hostility, they come to see him (or her?) as "evil," and only then come to judge themselves, relatively, as "good." Nietzsche develops this account of master and slave morality much more thoroughly in *Toward the Genealogy of Morals*, as we shall see.

The concept of will to power appears prominently in *Beyond Good and Evil*. Again, Nietzsche takes issue with Schopenhauer's emphasis on will to life: "A living thing seeks above all to *discharge* its strength – life itself is *will to power*; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent *results*."⁷⁸ Although emphatic in stressing will, Nietzsche is equally emphatic in denying freedom of the will. In fact, he considers the defense of freedom of will to be simply a manifestation of the asserter's desire for power.

'Freedom of the will' – that is the expression for the complex state of delight of the person exercising volition, who commands and at the same time identifies himself with the executor of the order – who as such, enjoys also the triumph over obstacles, but thinks within himself that it was really his will itself that overcame them.⁷⁹

Will to power is also enlisted as a potential basis for explaining physiology and physiologically grounded behavior. Significantly, however, as in many other instances Nietzsche poses this "reduction" as a thought experiment.

Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the development and ramification of one basic form of the will – namely, of the will to power, as my proposition has it; suppose all organic functions could be traced back to this will to power and one could also find in it the solution of the problem of procreation and nourishment – it is one problem – then one would have gained the right to determine all efficient force univocally as – will to power. The world viewed from inside, the world defined and determined according to its “intelligible character” – it would be “will to power” and nothing else.⁸⁰

This picture of the will to power is sometimes interpreted as a basic cosmological theory, and understood as the ontological ground of Nietzsche’s perspectivism. If will to power is seen as the fundamental stuff of which reality is composed, one can read the quest of each thing for its own power, or enhancement, as inherently situated, ontologically located in a position that is distinct from that of every other entity.

Nietzsche’s perspectivism, however, is discussed in more psychological terms elsewhere in *Beyond Good and Evil*. Nietzsche suggests that the perspective different individuals have of human reality depends on their relative stature as human beings. Nietzsche frequently adopts the image of height, describing those who see others from a higher vantage as having a more comprehensive view that is incommensurable with the perspective of those below them. Nietzsche emphasizes the importance of this order of rank, and he often claims that the human species consists of a proliferation of types, some of which are more valuable (or higher) than others. Of greatest importance for Nietzsche is the individual genius, on whom culture most depends. Nietzsche’s view on this matter is unrepentantly elitist: “For every high world one must be born; or to speak more clearly, one must be *cultivated* for it: a right to philosophy – taking that word in its great sense – one has only by virtue of one’s origins; one’s ancestors, one’s ‘blood’ decide here, too.”⁸¹

TOWARD THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS

Toward the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic (1887) is as popular among philosophers as *Zarathustra* is unpopular.⁸² The book’s structure is more evidently argumentative than many of his other works. It is written in the form of three sustained essays on interrelated

topics. The clarity of *Genealogy* is, however, deceptive. While the book does appear to have the structure of an argument (despite its subtitle "A Polemic"), what it presents is more a reading of a number of moral phenomena, a reading whose literal meaning and practical import are far from straightforward.

The book's three essays offer accounts of the origins of our conceptions of the "good," the experience of bad conscience, and practices of asceticism. The book's first essay begins with a critique of utilitarianism. Nietzsche contends that "the good" did not originally refer to that which maximized pleasure and minimized pain. Instead, it referred primarily to the self-description of the person who employed it. However, the individual's specific understanding of the term depended on whether he or she represented the perspective of a master or that of a slave. Those with the outlook of masters, as we have seen above, understood "good" as referring precisely to their own selves and their qualities. They concluded that those who differed from themselves are to that extent "bad." Those with the less healthy perspective of slaves, in contrast, understood themselves to be "good" only derivatively. Judging their masters "evil," they concluded that they were "good," in the negative sense of lacking the masters' evil traits.

Nietzsche suggests, on the basis of this analysis, that Christian morality is inherently structured as a form of slave morality. Slave morality depends on a fundamental disposition of *ressentiment* [resentment, understood as a basic character trait, more nearly the sense in which the poet John Milton characterized it as a sense of "injured merit"] toward the masters, and it accomplishes revenge imaginatively, by means of passing judgment. The strong, active traits of the masters are vilified by the slavish, who come to regard their own passivity and weakness as virtues. Nietzsche suggests this pattern pervades the moral ideals of Christianity. Many modes of self-assertion and self-expression are analyzed as sins on the Christian scheme, while passive suffering is deemed characteristic of the blessed.

The second essay of *Genealogy* traces the origin of *bad conscience* in the human disposition to cruelty. Nietzsche recounts the "festive" history of punishment,⁸³ contending that punishment is gratifying because it involves the imposition of one's will upon that of another. Bad conscience is a manifestation of the same joy in cruelty,

but in this case the cruelty is directed inward. Nietzsche suggests that this introjection of cruelty resulted from humanity's acquisition of consciousness and the subsequent suppression of external manifestations of instinct: "All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly *turn inward* – this is what I call the *internalization* of man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his 'soul.'" ⁸⁴

Nietzsche analyzes bad conscience, the soul's taking sides against itself, as a disease, but a disease that is "pregnant with a future."⁸⁵ Bad conscience, according to Nietzsche, motivated many of humanity's greatest accomplishments. It also motivates apparently "selfless" behavior. Nietzsche analyzes this apparent selflessness as the subjugation of one part of the soul by another, and "the delight that the selfless man, the self-denier, the self-scarificer feels from the first: *this* delight is tied to cruelty."⁸⁶

Bad conscience, combined with humanity's joy in cruelty, according to Nietzsche, is also the basis for monotheism, particularly that of Christianity. Bad conscience motivates a feeling of guilt and indebtedness. At earlier moments in history, feelings of indebtedness were directed toward one's ancestors, whose imagined power became greater as the power of one's tribe increased. This escalation of power reached its climax in the idea of a supreme, all-powerful God.

The notion of an omnipotent deity raises feelings of guilt to extreme heights. In Christianity, guilt was viewed as so extreme that only God himself could redeem humanity from it, as the orthodox view of the Crucifixion contends. Guilt in relation to God is expiated, according to this perspective, as guilt to anyone is expiated – by means of a drama of punishment that gratifies the spectator's lust for cruelty. Nietzsche sees this conception of God as poisonous: "Indeed, the prospect cannot be dismissed that the complete and definitive victory of atheism might free mankind of this whole feeling of guilty indebtedness toward its origin, its *causa prima*. Atheism and a kind of *second innocence* belong together."⁸⁷

Nietzsche's third essay suggests a genealogical account of yet another feature of the Christian moral worldview, its advocacy of *ascetic ideals*. The person who is self-denying, on this worldview, is seen as a kind of exemplar. Ascetic ideals appear paradoxical, for they appear to involve a lively passion for what is contrary to life. Nietzsche concludes that these strange passions must themselves

be in the interest of life, despite appearances to the contrary. Again, he sees *ressentiment* and lust for power at work. "An ascetic life is a self-contradiction: here rules a *ressentiment* without equal, that of an insatiable instinct and power-will that wants to become master not over something in life, but over life itself."⁸⁸

Asceticism is an expression of lust for power as it is manifest in those who are declining, or decadent. Those who feel themselves declining seek self-protection, primarily. "This, I surmise, constitutes the actual physiological cause of *ressentiment*, vengefulness, and the like: a desire to deaden pain by means of affects."⁸⁹

This desire, Nietzsche argues, is fulfilled by the ascetic priest. To those in pain, the Christian moral worldview (and those of other ascetic doctrines) tells them that they are to blame. This produces an orgy of feeling,⁹⁰ constructed around the sufferer's sense of guilt. Feelings of guilt reverse the feeling that one's life is declining: "life again became *very* interesting . . ." ⁹¹ Thus, the paradox of the ascetic perspective is only apparent. The interpretation upon which this perspective depends is actually enlivening, even though it is achieved at the apparent expense of self-esteem.

Nevertheless, Nietzsche views the long-term impact of ascetic ideals as psychologically and physiologically damaging. The practices of asceticism weaken the body and the will. Like other moral phenomena Nietzsche analyzes in *Genealogy*, asceticism accomplishes a gradual poisoning of those who embrace it. Ironically, ascetic ideals offer palliatives to those who are already sick, but these palliatives themselves make the sick sicker in the long term.

Nietzsche concludes the third essay by suggesting that the modern scientific worldview, which might be seen as an alternative to the Christian moral worldview, is no improvement but is instead an extension of it. The scientific worldview itself is based on faith, in this case faith in truth. Moreover, this faith itself motivates asceticism, for it encourages one to quash one's desires in the pursuit of truth, however painful the latter might be.

Genealogy ends inconclusively, with the modern antidote to the Christian worldview exposed as yet another manifestation of the same basic disposition. Nietzsche hints that other alternatives may be possible. "In the most spiritual sphere, too, the ascetic ideal has at present only one kind of real enemy capable of *harming* it: the comedians of this ideal – for they arouse mistrust of it."⁹² Again, as in

Zarathustra and *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche proposes the comedic or parodic overcoming of the ascetic ideal as positive remedies to the nihilism of his era, presumably once it is understood that our suffering is as much a product of our basic beliefs and self-descriptions as it is a consequence of any “facts” of the matter. Yet Nietzsche does not develop this suggestion. Instead he concludes with a psychological observation suggested by the ascetic ideal and its associated moral phenomena, an observation that reaffirms that will is psychologically fundamental:

We can no longer conceal from ourselves *what* is expressed by all that willing which has taken its direction from the ascetic ideal: this hatred of the human, and even more of the animal, and more still of the material, this horror of the senses, of reason itself, this fear of happiness and beauty, this longing to get away from all appearance, change, becoming, death, wishing, from longing itself – all this means – let us dare to grasp it – *a will to nothingness*, an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions of life; but it is and remains a *will!* . . . And, to repeat in conclusion what I said at the beginning: man would rather will *nothingness* than *not* will.⁹³

Nietzsche’s genealogical method of analysis does not lead him to many specific, literal proposals. He typically leaves the direction of responding to his analyses up to the reader. Nietzsche’s method of offering genealogical accounts of given human concepts and practices has been extremely influential, most notably in the work of Michel Foucault. Like Nietzsche, Foucault utilizes genealogy to undermine the notion that humanly constructed concepts are “given” and unchangeable.⁹⁴

THE WORKS OF 1888

The final year of Nietzsche’s productivity was 1888; it was spectacularly prolific. Nietzsche wrote five books in 1888, beginning with *The Case of Wagner: A Musician’s Problem* (1888).

As Nietzsche acknowledges, the case of Wagner was a personal problem for him; and he cannot resist the occasion as an opportunity to register volleys of witty barbs against Wagner and his music. Nevertheless, Nietzsche now sees the problem posed by Wagner as symptomatic of his entire culture. Wagner and modernity are both

thoroughly decadent. Here, Nietzsche treats his aesthetic descriptions of Wagner's style as characterizations of the tendencies of the entire modern era. Both, he contends, lack integrity, manifesting instead an "anarchy of the atoms" in which "life no longer dwells in the whole."⁹⁵

Nietzsche concludes the body of the book – in self-conscious imitation of Wagner's own bombastic pronouncements – with his own bombastic and moralistic triumvirate of anti-Wagnerian demands for art:

That the theater should not lord it over the arts.
That the actor should not seduce those who are authentic.
That music should not become an art of lying.⁹⁶

Although more comprehensive and synoptic in scope, *Twilight of the Idols, or How to Philosophize with a Hammer* (written 1888; published 1889) similarly suggests the importance of Wagner to Nietzsche, if only as a negative and appropriately unmentioned model. The title, *Götzendämmerung*, puns on the title of one of Wagner's operas, *Götterdämmerung* [*Twilight of the Gods*]. At the same time, it casts Nietzsche as one who, like Francis Bacon, exposes as "Idols" certain deceptive tendencies of the human mind that stand in need of correction.

The subtitle, "How to Philosophize with a Hammer," reinforces this impression of Nietzsche's intentions. Presumably, it alludes to Martin Luther's image of God sculpting the soul with a hammer, although Nietzsche's image is both more crude and more comic: "Another mode of convalescence . . . is *sounding out* idols. . . . For once to pose questions here with a *hammer*, and, perhaps, to hear as a reply that famous hollow sound which speaks of bloated entrails – what a delight for one who has ears even behind his ears."⁹⁷ Presumably, the hollow idols that the hammer detects are not long for the world, and the hammer itself might well be an implement of destruction. Nietzsche's use of the hammer metaphor, however, is ambiguous like Luther's, in which the hammer both smashes the sinner's pride and provokes the beginning of a positive process of transformation. And Nietzsche identifies his hammer with a "tuning fork," not with a sledgehammer, one must also be reminded.

Nietzsche announces in the book's Preface that the transformation he has in mind is the "revaluation of all values." He describes

this as a “question mark, so black, so tremendous that it casts shadows upon the man who puts it down.”⁹⁸ The notion of re-valuating all values is perplexing; evaluation occurs in terms of some value, while Nietzsche allegedly wants to call *all* values into question. But what value speaks here? How can a perspectivist assume a view from nowhere?

Some of the specific values that Nietzsche questions in *Twilight of the Idols*, however, are familiar from and refer to his other works. His primary targets are the “Idols” of philosophers and moralists, with the aspirations of Germans serving as a lesser target. The body of the book opens with a series of aphorisms, followed by an *ad hominem* attack against Socrates, the demigod of philosophy.⁹⁹ The next two sections continue the assault on traditional philosophers’ worship of reason and their variously articulated faith in a “true world” beyond the apparent one.¹⁰⁰ The next several sections succinctly state Nietzsche’s case against Christian morality and moralism in general. Nietzsche proceeds to vivisect the values of Germany and then launches into a series of attacks on a variety of contemporary ideas, people, and phenomena, which he titles “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man.”¹⁰¹

The book draws to a close with a recapitulation of some of Nietzsche’s views of antiquity. He applauds the Romans at the expense of the Greeks, and he gives Plato peremptory dismissal. What he values primarily in the Greeks, he claims, is the conception of *Dionysus*, which he associates with a naturalistic version of eternal recurrence.

What was it that the Hellene guaranteed himself by means of these mysteries? *Eternal* life, the eternal return of life; the future promised and hallowed in the past; the triumphant Yes to life beyond all death and change; *true* life as the over-all continuation of life through procreation, through the mysteries of sexuality. For the Greeks the *sexual* symbol was therefore the venerable symbol par excellence, the real profundity in the whole of ancient piety. Every single element in the act of procreation, of pregnancy, and of birth aroused the highest and most solemn feelings. In the doctrine of the mysteries, *pain* is pronounced holy: the pangs of the woman giving birth hallows all pain; all becoming and growing – all that guarantees a future – involves pain. That there may be the eternal joy of creating, that the will to life may eternally affirm itself, the agony of the woman giving birth *must* also be there eternally.

All this is meant by the word Dionysus . . .¹⁰²

Nietzsche contrasts this significance of Dionysus directly with that of the suffering Christ. "It was Christianity, with its *resentiment* against life at the bottom of its heart, which first made something unclean of sexuality: it threw *filth* on the origin, on the presupposition of our life."¹⁰³ Siding with Dionysus against Christianity, Nietzsche closes with his own salute to embodiment, to sexuality in particular: "This new tablet, O my brothers, I place over you: become hard!"¹⁰⁴

Revaluation remains on Nietzsche's mind when he writes his next work, *The Antichrist* (written 1888, published 1895). "Revaluation of all values!" is, in fact, the closing statement of the book. Nietzsche's notoriety for hostility against Christianity stems largely from this work, his most vitriolic attack on that collection of religions. Although his complaints against Christianity, and particularly against its moral worldview, had been developed in a number of earlier works, his sarcastic tone and extreme hyperbole in *The Antichrist* is more continuous and deftly wielded than in any other work, possibly accepting the *Unfashionable Observations* essay on David Strauss.

The Antichrist offers a historical and psychological account of the development of Christianity from Judaism. Significantly, Nietzsche sharply distinguishes between the teachings of Jesus and the institution of Christianity that developed, largely under the influence of Paul, the principal villain of the book. "In Paul was embodied the opposite type to that of the 'bringer of glad tidings': the genius in hatred, in the vision of hatred, in the inexorable logic of hatred."¹⁰⁵ Jesus is presented, in contrast, as "blissed out," in Gary Shapiro's apt phrase.¹⁰⁶

Using the expression somewhat tolerantly, one could call Jesus a "free spirit" – he does not care for anything solid: the word kills, all that is solid kills. The concept, the experience of "life" in the only way he knows it, resists any kind of word, formula, law, faith, dogma. He speaks only of the innermost: "life" or "truth" or "light" is his word for the innermost – all the rest, the whole of reality, the whole of nature, language itself, has for him only the value of a sign, a simile.¹⁰⁷

Although Nietzsche considers this perspective both childlike and a decadent avoidance of pain, this portrait of Jesus is not devoid of respect. Something akin to admiration is evident in further passages.

The “kingdom of God” is nothing that one expects; it has no yesterday and no day after tomorrow, it will not come in “a thousand years” – it is an experience of the heart; it is everywhere, it is nowhere.”¹⁰⁸

This ‘bringer of glad tidings’ died as he had lived, as he had taught – *not* to ‘redeem men’ but to show how one must live.”¹⁰⁹

In contrast, Nietzsche has little good to say about the institution, the scaffolding that developed around Jesus. Those who constructed the Church, beginning with Paul, fomented lies about Jesus and his aims. They attached their own interpretation to his death, one steeped in *ressentiment*; and they interpreted the “kingdom” not as an inner state but as a promised future life. Recapitulating and further explicating his previous complaints against Christianity, Nietzsche concludes that it is thoroughly harmful. “I call Christianity the one great curse, the one great innermost corruption, the one great instinct of revenge, for which no means is poisonous, stealthy, subterranean, *small* enough – I call it the one immortal blemish of mankind.”¹¹⁰

On his forty-fourth birthday, October 15, 1888, Nietzsche began to write his intellectual autobiography, *Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is* (written 1888; published 1908). The dedication suits the spirit of affirming eternal recurrence:

On this perfect day, when everything is ripening and not only the grape turns brown, the eye of the sun just fell upon my life: I looked back, I looked forward, and never saw so many and such good things at once. It was not for nothing that I buried my forty-fourth year today: I had the *right* to bury it; whatever was life in it has been saved, is immortal. The first book of the *Revaluation of All Values*, the *Songs of Zarathustra*, the *Twilight of the Idols*, my attempt to philosophize with a hammer – all presents of this year, indeed of its last quarter! *How could I fail to be grateful to my whole life?* – and so I tell my life to myself.¹¹¹

As an autobiography, *Ecce Homo* is certainly nonstandard. It is extremely stylized, indeed it defies any traditional genre, and it emphasizes matters such as food, climate, and daily routines. The tone is also immodest at times to the point of megalomania. At one point, for instance, Nietzsche exclaims, “I am no man, I am dynamite.”¹¹² The combination of this tone with the self-adulatory chapter titles – “Why I Am So Wise,” “Why I Am So Clever,” “Why I Write Such Good Books,” and “Why I Am a Destiny” – has led some to conclude that Nietzsche was already mad when he wrote the book.

What such readers are missing is the humor involved in chapter titles that reverse Socrates's pose of modesty when he insisted that he was wise because he knew he was not wise.¹¹³ Lost also to that perspective is Nietzsche's philosophical purpose in emphasizing matters usually unannounced in autobiographies, a purpose that he explains in the book itself.

One will ask me why on earth I've been relating all these small things which are generally considered matters of complete indifference: I only harm myself, the more so if I am destined to represent great tasks. Answer: these small things – nutrition, place, climate, recreation, the whole casuistry of selfishness – are inconceivably more important than everything one has taken to be important so far. Precisely here one must begin to *relearn*. . . . All the problems of politics, of social organization, and of education have been falsified through and through because one mistook the most harmful men for great men – because one learned to despise "little things," which means the basic concerns of life itself.¹¹⁴

Nietzsche's final work of 1888, *Nietzsche contra Wagner: Documents of a Psychologist* (published 1895), is a short anthology of edited passages from other works, all having to do with Wagner. According to the Preface, written on Christmas 1888, the book is offered to psychologists. The upshot, Nietzsche contends, is that he and Wagner are antipodes.¹¹⁵

NACHLASS

Besides his published works, Nietzsche left a vast number of notes, sketches, and literary fragments, known as the *Nachgelassene Fragmente*, or the *Nachlass*. These have been passed on to posterity in a scrambled form, thanks to the mangled editing job by Nietzsche's sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, and her fascistic and racist compatriots. The edition that resulted enlisted a hodge-podge of notes taken from a variety of contexts and arranged in a fashion that emphasized themes that appeared friendly to the ideals of National Socialism. This edition was published as *The Will to Power*, a title that Nietzsche had envisioned for a work that remained unwritten when he collapsed.¹¹⁶

Elisabeth promoted this "work" as Nietzsche's masterpiece, a perspective that was adopted by Martin Heidegger in his influential

works on Nietzsche.¹¹⁷ Heidegger went so far as to claim that Nietzsche's most important book was one that he had never completed and that his central thought was never fully developed: "What Nietzsche himself published during his creative life was always foreground. His philosophy proper was left behind as posthumous, unpublished work."¹¹⁸ Those critical of Heidegger's analysis of Nietzsche, on the grounds that it is more concerned with reinforcing Heidegger's philosophical perspective than it is with fidelity to Nietzsche, have typically been especially appalled by this methodology, which facilitated Heidegger's reading his own concerns into Nietzsche's works.

Few Nietzsche scholars since Heidegger have gone as far as he in enlisting the *Nachlass* in their readings of Nietzsche. Nevertheless, the status of the *Nachlass* has been a central debate in recent Nietzsche scholarship. The opposing views are those of the "lumpers," who treat the *Nachlass* as on a par with Nietzsche's published works, and the "splitters," who draw a sharp distinction between the published and unpublished work.¹¹⁹ While some scholars defend one position theoretically and practice another, the positions scholars take on the status of the unpublished material often has repercussions for how significant they consider certain themes in Nietzsche's work as a whole. In particular, lumpers and splitters often divide over the importance of the concept of the will to power (which is mentioned rarely in published works) and the cosmological version of the doctrine of eternal recurrence (which appears only in unpublished works).

The purpose of this overview of Nietzsche's works has been merely to provide a first approximation of what each of his texts is "about." This task, we are keenly aware, is dangerous. Alternative summaries could have been written; and surely greater subtlety and nuance are required than we have been able to provide in this introductory survey. That, however, is precisely the purpose and justification of the essays which follow.

NOTES

- 1 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* [together with *The Case of Wagner*], trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), hereafter noted as "BT," p. 52; *Kritische Gesamtausgabe: Werke*, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari, 30 vols. in 8 parts (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967ff), hereafter indicated as "KGW," III/1, p. 43. See also BT, p. 22.

- 2 Nietzsche's analysis of Apollo and Dionysus is also sufficiently flexible to suggest perspectives on a variety of phenomena. Tracy B. Strong's "Nietzsche's Political Misappropriation" (in this volume), for instance, discusses *The Birth of Tragedy* and its duality of deities in terms of a theory of politics. Alexander Nehamas's "Nietzsche, Modernity, Aestheticism" (also in this volume) discusses *The Birth of Tragedy* in connection with Nietzsche's critique of modernity.
- 3 Jörg Salaquarda's "Nietzsche and the Judaeo-Christian Tradition" (in this volume) suggests that *The Life of Jesus* was at least somewhat influential for Nietzsche's own views of Christianity.
- 4 David Strauss to Rapp, December 19, 1873; cited in J. P. Stern, "Introduction," in *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. xiv. See the entire introduction for further information about the context and analysis of Nietzsche's *Untimely Meditations* (pp. vii–xxxii).
- 5 Nietzsche to Gersdorff, February 11, 1874, in J. P. Stern, "Introduction," p. xiv. Although the David Strauss essay was arguably Nietzsche's most hostile, Nietzsche made systematic use of *ad hominem* arguments in many of his works. See Robert C. Solomon, "Nietzsche's *Ad Hominem*: Perspectivism, Personality, and *Ressentiment* Revisited" (in this volume).
- 6 Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," in *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 120.
- 7 Ibid., p. 120. Jörg Salaquarda (in "Nietzsche and the Judaeo-Christian Tradition") considers the importance of Nietzsche's analysis of history for his historically based critique of Christianity. Alexander Nehamas (in "Nietzsche, Modernity, Aestheticism") also discusses this analysis, focusing on its significance in Nietzsche's more general critique of modernity.
- 8 See R. J. Hollingdale, "The Hero as Outsider" (in this volume). Hollingdale describes the legend that grew up around Schopenhauer as a prototype and precursor for the legend that came to surround Nietzsche, as well as the basis for Schopenhauer becoming so significant to both Wagner and Nietzsche.
- 9 Friedrich Nietzsche, "Schopenhauer as Educator," in *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 135.
- 10 Despite the fact that Nietzsche never completed "We Philologists," William Arrowsmith included the unfinished text ("We Classicists") in his edition of the *Untimely Meditations*, [*Unfashionable Observations*] whose title he translates *Unmodern Observations*. See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Unmodern Observations*, ed. William Arrowsmith, trans. Herbert

Golder, Gary Brown, and William Arrowsmith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). In his introductions to the various finished meditations, Arrowsmith, a classicist himself, also stresses the extent to which each of the *Unfashionable Observations* reveal Nietzsche's relative preference for antiquity over modernity and address contemporary philological issues.

- 11 Friedrich Nietzsche, "Wir Philologen," Sec. 7, included in part in "Nietzsche on Classics and Classicists," selected and translated by William Arrowsmith, *Arion*, II, No. 1 (Spring, 1963): 10–11; KGW, VI/1, no. 3 (62), p. 107.
- 12 See Ronald Hayman, *Nietzsche: A Critical Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 184ff.
- 13 All but the last of these essays, along with additional plans and outlines from the early 1870s, appear in *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's*, trans. and ed. Daniel Breazeale (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press; Sussex: Harvester Press, 1979). The last is published separately: Friedrich Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, trans. Marianne Cowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1962).
- 14 See Daniel Breazeale, "Introduction," in *Philosophy and Truth*, trans. and ed. Breazeale, p. xxvi and xlv.
- 15 Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," in *Philosophy and Truth*, trans. and ed. Breazeale, p. 84. See also Richard Schacht's "Nietzsche's Kind of Philosophy" (in this volume).
- 16 See, for example, Paul de Man. *Allegories of Reading* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1979). For a philosophical discussion of Nietzsche's essay and poststructuralist readings of Nietzsche, see Alan D. Schrift, *Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation: Between Hermeneutics and Deconstruction* (New York: Routledge, 1990), especially pp. 124ff.
- 17 See, for example, J. Hillis Miller, "Dismembering and Disremembering in Nietzsche's 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,'" in *Why Nietzsche Now?*, ed. Daniel O'Hara (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), pp. 41–54.
- 18 Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," in *Philosophy and Truth*, trans. and ed. Breazeale, p. 80.
- 19 Maudemarie Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 65.
- 20 Graham Parkes's "Nietzsche and East Asian Thought: Influences, Impacts, and Resonances" (in this volume) discusses Nietzsche's praise for Heraclitus's intuitive powers, which may have had an impact on the Japanese thinker Watsuji Tetsurō's reading of Nietzsche.

- 21 For example, see R. J. Hollingdale's "The Hero as Outsider" (in this volume). Indeed, Nietzsche himself used the expression "positivism" in a description of his aspirations with respect to the book in one of the prefaces he drafted but did not use. See Erich Heller, "Introduction," in Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. xiii.
- 22 The centrality of perspectivism in Nietzsche's thought is suggested by the number of essays in this volume alone that emphasize it: See Nehamas, "Nietzsche, Modernity, Aestheticism"; Robert B. Pippin, "Nietzsche's Alleged Farewell: The Premodern, Modern, and Postmodern Nietzsche"; Jörg Salaquarda, "Nietzsche and the Judeo-Christian Tradition"; Richard Schacht, "Nietzsche's Kind of Philosophy"; Solomon, "Nietzsche's *Ad Hominem*: Perspectivism, Personality, and *Ressentiment* Revisited"; and Tracy B. Strong, "Nietzsche's Political Misappropriation."
- 23 See, for example, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1966), hereafter indicated as "BGE," Section #22, pp. 30–1: "Supposing that this also is only interpretation – and you will be eager enough to make this objection? – well, so much the better."
- 24 See Hayman, *Nietzsche: A Critical Life*, p. 198 and p. 215.
- 25 Erich Heller, "Introduction," in Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, p. xvii.
- 26 The preface to the second edition of *The Gay Science* discusses the art of the philosopher as the spiritual transposition of various states of health. See Friedrich Nietzsche, "Preface for the Second Edition," *The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), hereafter indicated as "GS," p. 35.
- 27 See Michael Tanner, "Introduction," in Friedrich Nietzsche, *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. ix–xi. See also Kathleen Marie Higgins, *Nietzsche's Zarathustra* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), pp. 43–6.
- 28 See Robert C. Solomon, "Nietzsche's *Ad Hominem*: Perspectivism, Personality, and *Ressentiment* Revisited" (this volume) for further discussion of this approach. See also Jörg Salaquarda, "Nietzsche and the Judeo-Christian Tradition" (this volume) for further discussion of Nietzsche's conceptions of Christian morality and Christian psychology.
- 29 The first edition of *The Gay Science*, published in 1882, consisted of four books. Nietzsche added a fifth book to his second edition, which appeared in 1887.

- 30 GS, "Preface for the Second Edition," p. 38.
- 31 As Robert Pippin notes in "Nietzsche's Alleged Farewell: The Premodern, Modern, and Postmodern Nietzsche" (this volume), this statement was first made by Hegel in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. There, however, it appears as a description of a particular condition of consciousness rather than a blanket characterization of the modern condition.
- 32 GS, #108, p. 167.
- 33 GS, #125, pp. 181–2. See Ernst Behler's "Nietzsche in the Twentieth Century," Alexander Nehamas's "Nietzsche, Modernity, Aestheticism," Jörg Salaquarda's "Nietzsche and the Judaeo-Christian Tradition," and Alan D. Schrift's "Nietzsche's French Legacy" (all in this volume) for discussions of this parable.
- 34 Alexander Nehamas has made much of Nietzsche's aestheticism in *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985). In this volume, Nietzsche's (alleged) aestheticism, and particularly Nehamas's construal of it, is discussed in Alexander Nehamas's "Nietzsche, Modernity, Aestheticism," Graham Parkes' "Nietzsche and East Asian Thought: Influences, Impacts, and Resonances," Robert Pippin, "Nietzsche's Alleged Farewell: The Premodern, Modern, and Postmodern Nietzsche," Richard Schacht's "Nietzsche's Kind of Philosophy," and Robert C. Solomon's "Nietzsche's *Ad Hominem*: Perspectivism, Personality, and *Ressentiment* Revisited."
- 35 Graham Parkes considers the Japanese reception of this concept in "Nietzsche and East Asian Thought: Influences, Impacts, and Resonances" (in this volume).
- 36 GS, #341, p. 273.
- 37 Robert Gooding-Williams has suggested a reading of Zarathustra in which the plot's unfolding is analyzed in terms of changes in the way the doctrine of eternal recurrence is formulated. See Robert Gooding-Williams, "Recurrence, Parody, and Politics in the Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche," dissertation, Yale University, 1982.
- 38 For further discussion of the existential reading of the doctrine of eternal recurrence, as well as alternative readings, see Bernd Magnus, *Nietzsche's Existential Imperative* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978).
- 39 See Tracy B. Strong, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 270–1. See also Robert C. Solomon, *From Rationalism to Existentialism: The Existentialists and Their Nineteenth-Century Backgrounds* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 137.
- 40 For such an aestheticist reading, see Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 141–65.

- 41 For a discussion of eternal recurrence viewed as a cosmological doctrine, see, for example, Arthur C. Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), pp. 203–9.
- 42 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is* [together with *Toward the Genealogy of Morals*], trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), hereafter indicated as "EH," pp. 327–8.
- 43 See Ernst Behler's "Nietzsche in the Twentieth Century" (in this volume) for a discussion of Thomas Mann's critical reaction.
- 44 See, for example, Richard Schacht, *Nietzsche* (New York: Routledge, 1983), pp. xiii–xiv.
- 45 About 150,000 copies were distributed to the troops, and *Zarathustra* was among the three most popular works among German soldiers. For further discussion of the Nazi employment of Nietzsche, see Steven E. Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, 1890–1990* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 128–63.
- 46 The theme of Nietzsche's perspective on nihilism is discussed in this volume in Ernst Behler's "Nietzsche in the Twentieth Century," Alexander Nehamas's "Nietzsche, Modernity, Aestheticism," Graham Parkes's "Nietzsche and East Asian Thought: Influences, Impacts, and Resonances," Robert Pippin's "Nietzsche's Alleged Farewell: The Premodern, Modern, and Postmodern Nietzsche," and Alan D. Schrift's "Nietzsche's French Legacy." The essays by Nehamas and Pippin address, in particular, Jürgen Habermas's contention that Nietzsche addressed nihilism by abandoning Enlightenment rationalism in favor of a "postmodern" irrationalism.
- 47 See Ernst Behler's "Nietzsche in the Twentieth Century" for a discussion of George Bernard Shaw's interest in and use of this concept.
- 48 Graham Parkes's "Nietzsche and East Asian Thought: Influences, Impacts, and Resonances" discusses Zarathustra's encounter with a hermit saint during his descent from his mountain cave.
- 49 Besides Behler's discussion, the concept is also discussed in this volume in Graham Parkes's "Nietzsche and East Asian Thought: Influences, Impacts, and Resonances," Robert Pippin's "Nietzsche's Alleged Farewell: The Premodern, Modern, and Postmodern Nietzsche," and Alan D. Schrift's "Nietzsche's French Legacy."
- 50 See, for example, "Nietzsche's Philosophy in 1888: *The Will to Power* and the *Übermensch*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 24, 1 (January 1986): 79–98. See also Bernd Magnus, "The Use and Abuse of *The Will to Power*," in *Reading Nietzsche*, Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988): 218–325.
- 51 See Bernd Magnus, "Perfectibility and Attitude in Nietzsche's *Übermensch*," *Review of Metaphysics* 36 (March 1983): 633–60.

- 52 For reflections on this possibility, see Bernd Magnus, "The Deification of the Commonplace: *Twilight of the Idols*," in *Reading Nietzsche*, Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988): 152–81.
- 53 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1968), hereafter indicated as "TSZ," p. 125.
- 54 See Graham Parkes's "Nietzsche and East Asian Thought: Influences, Impacts, and Resonances" for further discussion of the theme of the body in Nietzsche.
- 55 TSZ, p. 227.
- 56 See, for example, Ivan Soll, "Reconsiderations of Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy*," in *Reading Nietzsche*, eds. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 104–31. Soll argues that Nietzsche exaggerated his differences with Schopenhauer in his later works, and that Nietzsche largely developed his philosophy with Schopenhauerian premises.
- 57 The most notorious defense of this position is offered by Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 2 vols. (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1961). See also the following translations: Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume One: The Will to Power as Art*, ed. and trans. David F. Krell (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1979); Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume Two: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, ed. and trans. David F. Krell (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1984); Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume Three: The Will to Power as Knowledge and Metaphysics*, ed. David F. Krell, trans. Joan Stambaugh, David F. Krell, and Frank A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987); and Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume Four: Nihilism*, ed. David F. Krell, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1982).
- 58 See, for example, Bernd Magnus, "Nietzsche's Philosophy in 1888: *The Will to Power* and the 'Übermensch,'" *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 24 (January 1986): 79–99. See also Julian Young, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1–2.
- 59 See the following articles in this volume for a further sense of the range of positions taken by scholars on the idea of the will to power: Ernst Behler's "Nietzsche in the Twentieth Century," Graham Parkes's "Nietzsche and East Asian Thought: Influences, Impacts, and Resonances," and Alan D. Schrift's "Nietzsche's French Legacy."
- 60 TSZ, pp. 251–3.
- 61 TSZ, p. 333.
- 62 For further discussion of Nietzsche's elitism, see Graham Parkes's "Nietzsche and East Asian Thought: Influences, Impacts, and Resonances" (in this volume).

- 63 Nietzsche might also be seen as sexist because he personifies Life and Wisdom as women in *Zarathustra*, posing Zarathustra as the lover of both and a bit confused as to who is who.
- 64 Schopenhauer's "On Women," occurs in *Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays*, trans. E. F. J. Payne, in 2 vols., Vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 614–26. For Nietzsche's repetition of Schopenhauerian images, see, for example, BGE, #232–39, pp. 162–70.
- 65 This is particularly evident in *The Gay Science*. See, for example, GS, #71, pp. 127–8, which concludes, "In sum, one cannot be too kind about women."
- 66 Presumably, his opening remark in *Beyond Good and Evil*, "Supposing truth is a woman – what then?" (BGE, p. 2) has been interpreted as sexist because it utilizes stereotypical images of women. See Richard Schacht's "Nietzsche's Kind of Philosophy" (in this volume) for such an interpretation. Ofelia Schutte also objects to Nietzsche's preference for female personifications of abstractions over actual women. See Ofelia Schutte, "Nietzsche's Psychology of Gender Difference," in *Critical Feminist Essays in the History of Western Philosophy*, ed. Bat-Ami Bar On, in 2 vols. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993–94). An example of Nietzsche's explicit discussion of male fantasy occurs in GS, #59, pp. 122–3.
- 67 BGE, #231, p. 162.
- 68 See, for example, R. J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), p. 190.
- 69 See, for example, Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche's Teaching: An Interpretation of "Thus Spoke Zarathustra."* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
- 70 Among these are Anke Bennholdt-Thomsen, who sees Part IV as a satyr play that follows a tragedy (as in the traditional Athenian formula); Gary Shapiro, who analyzes the section in terms of carnival and sees the turn to humor as a renunciation of the text's claim to narrative authority; and Kathleen Marie Higgins, who contends that Part IV is modeled on Menippean satire in order to reveal the limitations of doctrinal formulations and to suggest the importance of transfiguring failure through laughter. See Anke Bennholdt-Thomsen, *Nietzsches "Also Sprach Zarathustra" als literarisches Phaenomen. Eine Revision* (Frankfurt: Athenaeum, 1974), pp. 196, 205, 210–11; Gary Shapiro, "Festival, Carnival and Parody in *Zarathustra IV*," in *The Great Year of Zarathustra (1881–1981)*, ed. David Goicoechea (New York: Lanham, 1983), pp. 60–1; Kathleen Marie Higgins, *Nietzsche's "Zarathustra"* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), pp. 203–32.
- 71 EH, p. 310.
- 72 Emphasis ours. *Ibid.*, p. 310.

- 73 BGE, p. 2. See Alan D. Schrift's "Nietzsche's French Legacy" (in this volume) for a discussion of Derrida's reading of this image of truth as a woman. For Derrida's discussion see Jacques Derrida, *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles* trans. B. Harlow (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979).
- 74 BGE, #6, p. 13.
- 75 BGE, #23, p. 31.
- 76 BGE, #211, pp. 135–6.
- 77 BGE, #61, p. 72.
- 78 BGE, #13, p. 21.
- 79 BGE, #19, p. 26.
- 80 GS, #36, p. 48.
- 81 BGE, #213, p. 140.
- 82 Just among the essays in this volume, for example, five devote attention to this work; and particularly Nehamas's construal of it is discussed in Robert Pippin, "Nietzsche's Alleged Farewell: The Premodern, Modern, and Postmodern Nietzsche"; Jörg Salaquarda, "Nietzsche and the Judaeo-Christian Tradition"; Alan D. Schrift, "Nietzsche's French Legacy"; Robert C. Solomon, "Nietzsche's *Ad Hominem*: Perspectivism, Personality, and *Ressentiment* Revisited"; and Tracy B. Strong, "Nietzsche's Political Misappropriation."
- 83 See Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (together with *Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann) (New York: Random House, 1967), hereafter indicated as "GM," II, 7, p. 69.
- 84 GM, II, 16, p. 84.
- 85 GM, II, 16, p. 85.
- 86 GM, II, 18, p. 88.
- 87 GM, II, 20, p. 91.
- 88 GM, III, 11, p. 117.
- 89 GM, III, 15, p. 127.
- 90 See GM, III, 20, p. 139.
- 91 GM, III, 20, p. 141.
- 92 GM, III, 27, p. 160.
- 93 GM, III, 28, p. 163.
- 94 For further discussion of Foucault's use of Nietzsche's methodology, see Alan D. Schrift, "Nietzsche's French Legacy" (in this volume).
- 95 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Case of Wagner* (together with *The Birth of Tragedy*), trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), hereafter indicated as "CW," 7, p. 170.
- 96 CW, 12, p. 180.
- 97 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Penguin, 1968), hereafter indicated as "TI," Preface, p. 465.

- 98 TI, Preface, p. 465.
- 99 For a discussion of this and the role of other *ad hominem* attacks by Nietzsche, see Robert C. Solomon, "Nietzsche's *Ad Hominem*: Perspectivism, Personality, and *Ressentiment* Revisited" (in this volume).
- 100 For a discussion of the section "How the 'True World' Finally Became a Fable," see Richard Schacht, "Nietzsche's Kind of Philosophy" (in this volume).
- 101 See Graham Parkes's "Nietzsche and East Asian Thought: Influences, Impacts, and Resonances" (in this volume) for a discussion of the conception of the individual that emerges from Nietzsche's "Skirmishes."
- 102 TI, "What I Owe to the Ancients," 4, pp. 561–2.
- 103 TI, "What I Owe to the Ancients," 4, pp. 561.
- 104 TI, "The Hammer Speaks," p. 563.
- 105 A, 42, p. 617.
- 106 See Gary Shapiro, "The Writing on the Wall: *The Antichrist* and the Semiotics of History," in *Reading Nietzsche*, ed. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 200.
- 107 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Penguin, 1968), hereafter indicated as "A," 32, p. 605.
- 108 A, 34, p. 608.
- 109 A, 35, pp. 608–9.
- 110 A, 62, p. 656. For further discussion of *The Antichrist*, see Richard Schacht, "Nietzsche's Kind of Philosophy," and Jörg Salaquarda, "Nietzsche and the Judaeo-Christian Tradition" (both in this volume).
- 111 EH, p. 221. *The Songs of Zarathustra* are a series of poems, published under the title *Dionysus Dithyrambs* in 1891.
- 112 EH, p. 326.
- 113 For a discussion of Nietzsche's systematic use of the trope hyperbole, and the question of his styles, see Magnus et al., *Nietzsche's Case: Philosophy as/and Literature* (New York and London: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc., 1993).
- 114 EH, p. 256; KGW, VI/3, pp. 293–4.
- 115 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Penguin, 1968), p. 662.
- 116 Ernst Behler's "Nietzsche in the Twentieth Century" (in this volume) discusses Elisabeth's impact on Nietzsche's life as well as her role in editing the *Nachlass*. Behler also describes the more recent efforts made by scholars to reconstruct the *Nachlass* in its original chronology. Graham Parkes's "Nietzsche and East Asian Thought: Influences, Impacts, and Resonances" (also in this volume) discusses the influence of *The Will to Power* on the Japanese reception of Nietzsche.

- 117 See Ernst Behler's "Nietzsche in the Twentieth Century" for further discussion of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche.
- 118 Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, vol. 1, trans. David Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), pp. 8–9.
- 119 This distinction was formulated in Bernd Magnus, "Nietzsche's Philosophy in 1888: *The Will to Power* and the *Übermensch*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 24, 1 (January 1986): 79–98. See also Bernd Magnus, "The Use and Abuse of *The Will to Power*," in *Reading Nietzsche*, eds. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 218–325.