



James II, by an unknown artist, c. 1690

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Revolution

*The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy,
1685–1720*



PENGUIN BOOKS

nation without conscience or fear of God . . . while the Irish Catholics have showed themselves honest men in giving every one his due: to Caesar what is Caesar's; to God, what is God's; to fellow-subjects what is theirs, by not invading their lands or their goods'. Those Irish soldiers who, following the Treaty of Limerick, enlisted to fight in William's army, this author insisted, were 'foes to their country by siding with her enemies', and did 'betray the cause of their religion in strengthening the party of heretics'.²²⁷ In short, the struggle had come to be seen as one between rival religions. As a Dublin diarist put it, as early as January 1689, 'Protestants and Papists' had now become 'the words of contests'.²²⁸ Sir Richard Cox, referring to the religious divide in Irish politics in the introduction to his *Hibernica Anglicana* of 1692, believed that 'This great concern' had 'so silenced all the rest, that at this Day we know no difference of Nation but what is expressed by Papist and Protestant'.²²⁹

Conclusion: The Revolutions, Their Aftermaths, and the Remaking of Britain, 1691-1720

A MAN TO 'ABHOR AND DETEST'? JAMES II AND HIS DOWNFALL

James II was not born to be king. He did not die one either. After fleeing from the Battle of the Boyne in July 1690, he was to spend the rest of his days in exile at St Germain-en-Laye, just outside Paris. Although the exiled court at St Germain became the centre for Jacobite intrigues, James himself appears not to have been that eager to try to reclaim his throne. He dedicated himself to a life of prayer and devotion, believing that his misfortunes were a sign of God's displeasure – not for his promoting Catholicism, of course, but for the sins of his younger days, when he had competed with some of the best rakes at the Restoration court. One of the prayers James wrote in exile opened with the lines, 'I detest and abhor myself when I reflect how oft I have offended so good and mercifull a God, and for having lived so many years in almost a perpetual habit of Sin'. The only way to make atonement, he believed, was through 'corporal mortification', and in his last years James took to scourging himself and wearing an iron chain around his thigh 'with little sharp points which pierced his skin'. Prone to excess in this, as in many other aspects of his life, his confessor eventually had to intervene in order to mitigate 'his zeal in this particular'. Getting the balance right, it seems, was never one of James's strong points.

James was to live some eleven years in exile. In late February 1701 he suffered a stroke, which left him partially paralysed for a while, although he did then begin to show signs of recovery. He fell ill once more in August, complaining of pains in his stomach and 'spitting of

blood now and then', the telltale signs of a stomach ulcer. He collapsed on the 22nd while at mass, and again two days later, this time vomiting 'a great quantity of blood'. Despite the worst that turn-of-the-century physicians could inflict on him (which included blistering and the dreaded 'kinkinna' or Jesuits' powder, derived from the bark of the quinquina tree), James managed to keep going for a couple more weeks. He grew dramatically worse on 4 September, being 'taken with continual convulsions or shakeing in the hands'. He died on the following day at about three in the afternoon, a little over a month short of his 68th birthday.¹

It was an ignominious end to an ignominious career. The more we reflect on the fall of James II, the more remarkable it seems. James was both powerful and popular when he came to the throne in 1685. The challenge of the Whigs had been contained and radicalism seemed to be a spent force, as testified by the speed and ease with which the rebellions of Argyll and Monmouth were put down. The vast majority of James's subjects, including those who held power, believed that their king ruled by divine right and was absolute. Yet James ended up being resisted by people who believed in non-resistance, and was held to have done wrong by people who believed that the king could do no wrong. Indeed, it was he who was held accountable while some of his ministers continued to hold on to the reins of power – one thinks here of Sir John Dalrymple and, especially, Tarbat in Scotland, and Sunderland in England (who after a brief period in exile returned to become one of the key political managers under William III). This was the wrong way round. As the Quaker Jacobite Charlwood Lawton complained in 1693, 'that admirable Maxim, That the King of England can do no wrong' was supposed to mean that the deeds of the king were 'comprehended in his Ministers' and if those ministers were 'Troublers of our State', then they were 'to be punished'. Yet 'this Revolution', Lawton continued, had resulted in the keeping in employment 'the Men that persuaded King James to, and acted in, what we imputed to him as false steps', when they 'should have been punished, and not [the King] himself dethroned'.² For James to have brought this situation about was quite a remarkable achievement.

The jury will doubtless remain out on James for a long time. What

exactly was he trying to achieve? Was he an egotistical bigot who wanted to promote Catholicism at all costs and who refused to listen to any who questioned him? Was he a tyrant who rode roughshod over the will of the vast majority of his subjects (at least in England and Scotland) and subverted the rule of law as he took his three kingdoms further down the road of monarchical absolutism? Was he simply naïve, or even perhaps just plain stupid, unable to appreciate the realities of political power in early modern Britain and the fact that there were just some things that a ruler – no matter how absolute in theory – could never get away with? Or was he a well-intentioned and even enlightened ruler – an enlightened despot ahead of his time, perhaps – who was merely trying to do what he thought was best for his subjects?

Opinion will remain divided because it is possible to recognize some attractive traits in James's personality, to identify with some of James's professed goals (or at least the rationalizations he offered for pursuing them), and even, perhaps, to feel sorry for the man. The Jacobite *Life of James II*, a retrospective account based to a large extent on James's own memoirs, inevitably put a positive gloss on what James had sought to achieve. Thus it claimed that James

had given all the marks of love, care and tenderness of his Subjects, that could be expected from a true father of his people: he had . . . encouraged and encreased their trade, preserved them from taxes, supported their credit, [and] made them a rich, happy and a more powerfull people, than they had ever hitherto appear'd in the world.

Indeed, the *Life* elaborated, James was so 'far from affecting an Arbitrary Power', that if only he had been less scrupulous in using that power 'which the Law had put in his hands', he would never have fallen into the hands of his enemies in the first place. Thus James's two major goals were, allegedly, to ensure that his subjects did not suffer, and to enable them to 'encreas their riches whilst others lavished theirs and their blood away' – hence his motive not only for 'granting libertie of Conscience' but also for refusing to enter 'the Confederate League against France', so that by remaining neutral 'he might draw greatest part of the Trade of Europe into the hands of his Subjects'.³ We might recognize these as admirable ambitions by modern-day standards.

What, then, did the Glorious Revolution save James's subjects from: a Catholic absolutist, bent on augmenting his own power, or a well-intentioned and committed tolerationist, who was prepared to sacrifice his own crown in the pursuit of what he believed was right? It is a question upon which the three-kingdoms perspective helps to shed fresh light.

Let us begin with James's professed commitment to religious toleration. As he sought to promote greater religious freedoms for his co-religionists, James repeatedly protested that he had always been of the opinion that conscience 'ought not to be constrained' or 'people forced in matters of mere religion' (to cite the wording of his English Declaration of Indulgence). The question is whether we can take such boasts at face value. Certainly, as a man who had made life extremely difficult for himself by converting to Catholicism, James must have known as well as anyone that an individual's conscience was not something that could be forced. There is little reason to doubt that James managed to convince himself that he had always been 'against persecuting any for conscience sake', as he put it in a letter to William of Orange on 18 March 1687.⁴ Moreover, the government had always claimed that the disabilities had been placed on nonconformists because they were political subversives, not because they were damaging their souls by adhering to a false religion. The penal laws, in other words, had been designed to meet a political threat, not to counter heresy. Many champions of Restoration religious intolerance, therefore, could honestly profess that people were not being forced in matters of mere religion. James's position was that since he, as a Catholic king, could have no reason to doubt the loyalty of the Catholics, they deserved to be immune from the penal laws – as indeed did those Protestant nonconformists of whose loyalty he was convinced. Given that this was how James rationalized the situation to himself, his claim to be 'against persecuting any for conscience sake' was doubtless sincere.

Yet the truth of the matter is that James had in the past shown himself to be a keen advocate of the enforcement of the penal laws against Protestant nonconformists in all three kingdoms; he appears to have believed that most nonconformists were, by definition, political subversives (having a particular dislike of the Presbyterians), and he had

backed a policy of ruthless persecution when in Scotland in the early 1680s, and again in England during the years of the Tory Reaction. When the bishops of Rochester and Peterborough scrupled to sign an address of thanks in support of James's first Declaration of Indulgence, they told Sunderland that 'they could not but remember how vehemently the King had declared against toleration, and said he would never by any counsel be tempted to suffer it'. Sunderland replied: 'though they could not choose but remember it, yet they might choose whether they might repeat it or not, for other men as well as the King had altered their minds upon new motives'.⁵ Even when James began trying to woo the dissenters in Scotland and England, he showed a hesitancy that seemed to betray a deep uneasiness about the general principle of liberty of conscience. James was somewhat ambivalent in his attitude towards the Huguenot refugees, and he certainly was not as outraged at Louis XIV's efforts to crush the Protestant heresy within France as we might have expected an ardent tolerationist to have been. As James moved towards toleration in England in the second half of 1686, he was nevertheless prepared to allow the continued persecution of those nonconformists who did not petition for relief, making it clear that he wanted dissenters to know that whatever benefits they were going to get they would enjoy by grace of the crown, not because of some natural right to liberty of conscience. Yet it was in Scotland where James really betrayed the limits to his belief in toleration. His initial Scottish Indulgence of February 1687 did not afford the same liberties to Presbyterians as to Catholics or even Quakers, and it was only when the political costs of failing to do so became apparent that James reluctantly agreed to concede more ground. Some might be quick to point out that James's hesitancy was due to the fact that he feared Scottish Presbyterians as political subversives. This would explain the prohibition against field conventicles, which applied equally to Presbyterians and Catholics, and which was retained in the revised Indulgence of July 1687; however, it does not explain why James initially forbade moderate Presbyterians from holding meetings in purpose-built places of worship (an allowance which he granted to the Catholics and Quakers). Besides, the 'political subversives' rationale was the same that Protestants had offered for the penal legislation against Catholics,

which James himself was so eager to repeal. The fact that James could free himself of this particular prejudice but found it much more difficult to detach himself from the Stuart monarchy's traditional bias against the Scottish Presbyterians (even of the moderate kind) is revealing. James's professed belief in religious toleration was a rationalization, though one which he undoubtedly came to believe was sincere, of a policy he wanted to pursue for his own political and personal reasons.

Let us now turn to the question of whether James was an absolutist. It has been claimed that James 'did not set out to undermine the English constitution' and that 'his interpretation of the law and of his prerogative was the correct one'.⁶ One has to remember, however, that royalist propaganda under Charles II, and particularly during the years of the Tory Reaction, had repeatedly insisted that the king of England was absolute, while north of the border the Scottish parliament had even passed legislation affirming that the king of Scotland was absolute. Saying that James did not set out to undermine the constitution, even if true, hardly frees James from the charge of absolutism therefore. It is probably fair to say that James did not come to the throne with the ambition of establishing a very different type of constitutional set-up in his three kingdoms from that which he understood to have existed under his brother. Thus he appreciated the need to work with parliament, in both England and Scotland, and that permanent relief from the penal laws would require parliamentary sanction. Yet at the same time, James was prepared to use the powers of the monarchy to the full, and he certainly believed the rhetoric of the Tory Reaction that the king was a divine-right ruler who did not share his sovereignty with his people and who could not be resisted. Moreover, he realized that the constitutional position of the monarchy was different in Scotland from what it was in England. Just as Lauderdale had taught Charles II that 'never was [a] King soe absolute as you are in poor old Scotland',⁷ so Melfort had taught James that 'Measures need not be too nicely kept with this people' and that the king of Scotland was above the laws.⁸ When James failed to induce his Scottish parliament to grant Catholic toleration in 1686 (much to his surprise, since he appears to have believed that the Scottish parliament existed merely to do the crown's bidding), he pro-

ceeded by way of his prerogative, insisting that he could have acted in this way all along. His Scottish Indulgence of February 1687 was justified by appeal to the king's absolute authority, which office-holders were now required to swear to obey 'without reserve'. There can surely be no question that James was an absolutist in Scotland; one might go further and suggest that he did, indeed, seek to promote arbitrary monarchy in Scotland, for a monarchy that has to be obeyed without reserve and is thus beyond all control is surely arbitrary. James might have continued to hope for a parliamentary endorsement of his toleration in Scotland, but he was intending to rig the elections before he called another parliament north of the border: hence his attack on burgh liberties, which he pursued by dint of his prerogative alone and without recourse to the legal process of *quo warranto* such as Charles II had undertaken in England in the early 1680s, or as James himself was to undertake in both England and Ireland. Even in Ireland, where the opportunity presented itself, James acted in an arbitrary way. Thus his policy of issuing dispensations for Catholics to hold office was done without the same 'colour or form of Law' as it was in England, as William King observed.⁹

In England, James did invariably act by colour of law. When he wanted to give Catholics dispensations from the penal laws, he made sure the judges approved of what he was doing. When he wanted to establish an ecclesiastical commission (to discipline recalcitrant clergymen) or issue a declaration suspending all the penal laws against Catholics and Protestant dissenters alike, he likewise acted in accordance with the best legal advice he saw fit to take. He did, however, appoint the judges himself, rig the judicial bench, and consult legal experts who would give him the answers he wanted to hear. Thus, of course, he came to believe that his interpretation of the law and his prerogative was the correct one. This is not the same as saying that his interpretation was right, or that James did not act in an arbitrary way. All it suggests is that James appreciated that measures did need to be kept a little more nicely with his English subjects than with his Scottish ones, and that he had to play the system, even if he wanted to subvert it.

We further need to recognize that James attempted to exploit the fact that the constitutional powers of the monarch in Scotland were

stronger than in England as a strategy for putting pressure on the English to accede to his demands. In short, James played the British card in the hope of bolstering royal authority throughout his three kingdoms, and was quite conscious about it. He tried to force measures on Scotland first as a means of paving the way for what he wanted to achieve in England. It is hardly surprising then, that as James's English subjects came to see absolutism and arbitrary government promoted ever more aggressively north of the border, they became convinced that the same was intended for England in the near future. Besides, so determined was James to help his co-religionists in all three of his kingdoms that he was prepared to brook no criticism. If people stood in his way, he would circumvent them. He dismissed parliament when it challenged his will; he sacked those who raised scruples about what he was up to; he sought to intrude into political office individuals whom he had reason to believe would support his political and religious agenda. In short, he set out to make the crown independent of any external checks on its authority, whether from parliament, the privy council or the judicial bench at the centre, or lord and deputy lieutenants, JPs and magistrates at the local level – and, of course, even from the ecclesiastical establishment. He sought to suppress the voice of the people in politics; he tried (though he ultimately failed) to stop people from taking to the streets to voice dissident political opinions; and he built up a large standing army that could be used as a police force at home. To all intents and purposes he did seek to establish Catholic absolute monarchy across his three kingdoms. Nor should we be naïve and conclude that James, through the well-intentioned pursuit of noble ideals, became an absolutist by accident. He knew full well, if not that he was playing the system in order to subvert it, that he was pushing the system to its very limits, as evidenced by the speed and extent to which he backtracked in the autumn of 1688 in the face of William's invasion. He knew he had gone too far. He recognized he was guilty of subverting the traditional constitution, as most of his subjects understood it; he had just assumed he would be able to get away with it because of the Church's traditional teachings on non-resistance. He was wrong, and that was to be his undoing. In that sense, the Glorious Revolution undoubtedly did save England, Scotland and Ireland from Catholic absolutism, or,

to put it in the contemporary parlance, it saved the three kingdoms from popery and arbitrary government.

James's failure sheds much light on the realities of political power in the three kingdoms. James was forced into an increasingly absolutist position – and to act more and more arbitrarily – because his subjects refused to cooperate with him. Charles II had made the monarchy strong in his final years in part by appealing to public opinion, and by putting into power at the local level those who bought into the Tory-Anglican ideology that the king, although absolute, was obliged to rule by law, and that therefore even a popish successor would uphold the existing legal establishment in Church and state. Indeed, upon acceding to the throne in 1685, James himself repeatedly promised he would protect the existing establishment in Church and state. When he failed to keep that promise, many of those very people who had supported the Stuart monarchy across the three kingdoms in the face of the Whig threat began to desert the crown. They may not have actively resisted, but they refused to comply, dragged their feet, or even continued to enforce laws James had suspended. As a result, James's regime began to collapse from within prior to William of Orange's invasion. It is undoubtedly true that William's invasion was what finally toppled James's monarchy. But it would be misleading to conclude that the Glorious Revolution was therefore brought about from above and outside, or that it was, first and foremost, a foreign invasion. William's invasion was itself predicated upon the fact that James's regime had already begun to collapse from within; indeed, James had already been forced to backtrack by his subjects – that is, a 'revolution' of some sort had already occurred – before William had even set foot on English soil. The Glorious Revolution was thus equally brought about from within and from below.

The roots of the problems that had bedevilled the British polity in the late seventeenth century can be traced back to the restoration of the monarchy in 1660. Despite widespread celebrating at the return of Charles II, there remained deep political, religious and economic tensions that proved impossible to resolve, and which served to foster and perpetuate bitter divisions in all three kingdoms. Such were these tensions that the Restoration regime had been plunged into crisis by

the late 1670s, and it seemed to many that '41 was indeed come again. In the final years of his reign, however, Charles II devised an effective way of managing these problems, and was able to emerge not only unscathed but with the power of the monarchy significantly enhanced. James pursued a strategy that brought all the unresolved tensions to the fore once more, adding new sources of discontent in the process, and thereby rapidly propelling the Stuart composite monarchy back into crisis. The Glorious Revolution was thus yet another attempt to address and resolve these problems. The solution was to vary considerably from kingdom to kingdom.

There were three different revolutions in 1688-9. In England, where James had managed to alienate Tories and Whigs, Anglicans and dissenters alike, political consensus was sustained and the revolutionary settlement that was forged in the early months of 1689 was a legally conservative one. The Declaration of Rights purported to be doing no more than vindicating and asserting ancient rights and liberties and, in essence, this was true. More far-sweeping reforms were on the agenda, some of which had been outlined in the twenty-eight Heads of Grievances, although these were not incorporated into the Declaration of Rights and, in the short term, only a few were enacted following the transfer of the crown to William and Mary. This is not to minimize the significance of the Declaration of Rights, however. It provided a final adjudication on a number of issues that had been sources of contention between the crown and parliament under the later Stuarts, and decided firmly in favour of parliament's reading of the law; in that sense, it did limit the powers of the crown and also guaranteed the legal sovereignty of parliament. But the Revolution settlement in England did not seek to remodel the Restoration polity in any fundamental way, beyond a limited measure of religious toleration passed in April 1689 and the proviso that no Catholic could in future inherit the English crown included in the Bill of Rights of December 1689. Moreover, in England it proved possible for most groups to accommodate themselves to the settlement that was achieved in 1689. Not that Tories and Whigs, Anglicans and dissenters, all saw things the same way. Nevertheless, what was achieved in 1689 was sufficiently moderate and ambiguous that the Revolution could be interpreted in different ways by different people depending

on one's political and religious outlook. The result was that most people were able to make their peace with the post-Revolution regime and few were driven into Jacobitism.

The situation was very different in Scotland. Here, consensus was not sustained. The Episcopalians were either driven out of, or chose to absent themselves from, the Scottish Convention, which, as a result, came to be dominated by Whigs and Presbyterians who proceeded to forge a highly partisan settlement. Thus the Scots, in their Claim of Right, did declare illegal certain powers that the Scottish crown had undoubtedly possessed under the later Stuarts, powers which had even been confirmed by act of parliament. They also committed the crown to further reforms, in part by calling for the abolition of episcopacy in the Claim of Right, not in their Articles of Grievance (the Scottish equivalent to the English Heads of Grievances), and also by making the offer of the crown conditional upon William and Mary's acceptance of both the Claim of Right and the Articles of Grievances. The result was a more fundamental restructuring of the Restoration polity in Church and state north of the border than anything attempted in England: the Scottish crown was stripped of crucial prerogatives; the Scottish parliament was made more independent of executive interference through the abolition of the Lords of the Articles; and episcopacy was overthrown to be replaced by a Presbyterian system of Church government. There were obvious winners and losers in Scotland, and the losers were the Episcopalians. It thus proved impossible to rebuild consensus after 1689, and many of those who lost out were to be driven into the arms of the Jacobites.

The situation was different yet again in Ireland. Here the majority of the population – the Catholics, of both Old English and Gaelic Irish stock, plus a minority of Protestants – remained loyal to James II, who saw Ireland as a perfect launching pad for a French-backed military effort to regain his Scottish and English crowns. The result was a bloody war between William and James that was to last until 1691. In the spring of 1689 James's Dublin parliament enacted legislation which, if made effective by Jacobite victory in arms, would have amounted to a sweeping revolution, undoing the Restoration land settlement, overturning the Protestant ascendancy, restoring

political and economic power to the Catholics, and destroying the imperial dominance of Ireland by England. The Jacobites, of course, were not to win the war, and the attempted Catholic revolution was thwarted by the Williamite victory in arms accompanied by a peace settlement that essentially sought to restore things to the way they had been in Charles II's reign. In Ireland, as in Scotland, there were obvious winners and losers – in Ireland's case it was the Catholic majority who lost out. Yet the upheavals of James II's reign, and the experiences of the war of 1689–91, had the effect of hardening the attitudes of Protestants towards Catholics. Whereas the problems in Ireland had never essentially been about religion, but about a series of interacting political, constitutional and economic issues that tended to break down along confessional lines, after 1689 the essence of the problem came to be increasingly seen (by Protestants in Ireland, in particular) as religious in nature – that is, that the Catholics could not be trusted because they were Catholics. The Revolution in Ireland was thus to have a profound impact on the perception of the nature of the Irish problem which, as we shall see shortly, was to have significant implications for the Williamite victory in Ireland over the course of the next few decades.

Just because the Revolution in England was legally conservative does not mean that it was a tame affair. There was widespread and violent rioting in the latter months of 1688, as crowds across the country attacked mass-houses, local Catholics and the men associated with the implementation of James's unpopular policies. The crowds might have been protesting against men and measures under James II, rather than demanding the installation of a new order, and (in the time-honoured fashion of English crowds) defending what they took to be their rights and liberties against the illegal actions of those in authority. But this did not make them any less frightening. At the same time, armed gangs of noblemen and gentry, together with their tenants, were riding across large parts of the north, the Midlands, East Anglia and Wales, forcibly disarming Catholics, taking over royal garrisons and asserting their own authority over and above that of the royal government. It was clear for all to see that James had lost control of his kingdom. Contemporaries were alarmed and terrified by the levels of crowd violence, as indeed was James himself – hence,

in part, his decision to pack his wife and son off to France and to attempt to follow suit himself. This, by itself, should make us wonder whether it is right to see the Glorious Revolution as a tepid, docile affair in comparison to its mid-century counterpart. The assumption that the levels of crowd violence in 1688 were less than in 1641–2 is questionable, at the very least. Sixteen eighty-eight was no mere palace coup, quietly engineered from above. It was a messy, violent affair, which saw the total disintegration of the government and created what to many people at the time must have seemed like a near anarchic situation.

There was also considerable crowd violence in Scotland. Some of this was similar to the type of collective violence that took place in England, with attacks on Catholic chapels and the houses of local Catholic gentry. Yet there was also a more radical form of crowd protest north of the border, as Presbyterian crowds in the south-west took the opportunity presented by the breakdown in royal government to try to enforce their own religious settlement, by forcibly driving local Episcopalian ministers out of their parish livings. And this crowd activity had considerable impact on the eventual Revolution settlement, since the Scottish Convention – the composition of which had been influenced by the intimidatory practices of Presbyterian crowds that had descended upon Edinburgh – actually came to sanction the forcible ejections that had been carried out over the winter of 1688/9. No one, of course, would ever think of calling the Revolution in Ireland a tame affair. Indeed, the popular image of the Revolution of 1688–9 as 'glorious' and 'bloodless' has only been sustained over the years by wilfully leaving Ireland out of the picture (and also by paying insufficient attention to Scotland, one might add). Whatever one makes of the Glorious Revolution – whether one sees it as conservative or radical, restorative or innovative – tame it most certainly was not.

One of the advantages of pursuing a three-kingdoms approach to the political upheavals of the later-Stuart period is the comparative perspective it offers us. We are able to reach a fuller understanding of exactly what was (and what was not) achieved in England in 1688–9, for example, through comparison with what was achieved in Scotland. Despite the efforts of recent historians, studying England in

isolation, to invest the Glorious Revolution with more Whiggish and hence more radical credentials, the settlement in England in 1689 appears much less Whiggish or radical when set against what transpired north of the border, and certainly much less revolutionary than what the Catholics in Ireland were trying to achieve through legislation enacted by the Dublin parliament of 1689. Yet the rationale for a three-kingdoms approach is not solely premised on the benefits to be gained from comparative history. There are, it is true, separate national histories that need to be told for the later-Stuart period; and there were separate revolutions, in the three kingdoms, the roots of which lay (in large part) in their own, distinctive national histories. However, there is also a British story to be told; indeed, one cannot fully make sense of the problems and crises that afflicted the later Stuarts – and how the Restoration monarchs could or could not resolve them – without recognizing that these problems and crises were intimately bound up with the fact that the Stuarts ruled over a multiple-kingdom inheritance.

REVOLUTIONARY IMPLICATIONS

So far our account of the dynastic shift and accompanying political and religious settlements brought about by the Glorious Revolution has taken developments up to 1689 in England, 1690 in Scotland, and 1691 in Ireland. We cannot leave the story there, however. The working out of the implications of the separate Revolution settlements was to have significant repercussions, both within each kingdom individually and also for the nature of the relationship between the three kingdoms. Thus the revolutions in turn spawned further dramatic changes in England, Scotland and Ireland, which must be seen as part of the same, respective revolutionary settlements. They also spawned a fourth, 'British' revolution, which not only had implications for the three kingdoms individually but also for the multiple-kingdom inheritance as a whole, transforming that inheritance in the process and resulting in the creation of the British state.

England

Historians have long recognized that further significant change occurred within the English polity during the reign of William III (1689–1702); indeed, so far reaching were these that one scholar has even claimed that the true English revolution occurred neither in mid-century nor in 1688–9 but in the 1690s.¹⁰ They disagree, however, over whether such changes were the result of the Glorious Revolution itself or of the subsequent war against France (the Nine Years War, or War of the League of Augsburg of 1689–97) in which England became involved. In many respects this is to posit a false dichotomy, since the war was a direct, intended consequence of the Revolution. William invaded intending to bring England into his European alliance against France, and many of those in England who made or supported the Glorious Revolution did so precisely because they wanted such a revolution in English foreign policy.¹¹

The war proved incredibly expensive, as contemporaries knew it would, and necessitated a major restructuring of state finances, which in turn carried constitutional implications. Whereas the crown's total yearly income under James II had never exceeded £3 million, annual military expenditure alone had reached £8.1 million by 1696, and spending on war was to peak at £10.2 million in the following decade. In order to help meet some of the cost, a new system of public credit was set up, involving the floating of long-term, funded loans, which in turn resulted in the origin of the National Debt in 1692–3 and the creation of the Bank of England in 1694. Since the interest on these loans had to be guaranteed by parliamentary grants of taxation, the National Debt assured the need for regular parliaments. By 1712 nearly £16 million had been raised on a funded long-term basis. Not all the cost of war, however, could be met by loans; in fact, initially, only a very small percentage of it was. The rest had to be made up by parliamentary grants of taxation – both indirect taxes, such as customs and excise, and England's first, high-yield direct tax, the Land Tax (introduced in 1693). The English state also abandoned the old distinction between ordinary and extraordinary revenue. The financial settlement of 1690 in any case had been deliberately designed to be insufficient for the king to live on in ordinary times,

and this immediately became apparent when peace was restored at the end of the Nine Years War in 1697. In 1698, the Civil List Act formally recognized this reality: the king was now given a 'civil list' of revenues – estimated to yield £700,000 a year (any surplus was not to be spent without parliamentary consent) – to meet the expenses of his household and government, while all military and naval expenditure, even in times of peace, were to be the responsibility of parliament.¹² In short, it was the Financial Revolution of the 1690s, rather than the Declaration of Rights, that secured regular meetings of parliament after the Glorious Revolution.

Certain of the fiscal changes of the 1690s were anticipated by some of those who backed the dynastic shift of 1688–9 and welcomed the revolution in foreign policy that occurred as a result. Calls for a national bank had been voiced as early as the 1650s and were to be endorsed again in the second half of the 1680s by opponents of James II's foreign policy and his particular understanding of political economy.¹³ There were other consequences of the war which carried with them constitutional implications, however, that could not have been easily foreseen. One was the emergence of the cabinet system of government, to deal with the fact that William was so frequently out of the country in the 1690s leading his armed forces on the Continent. During the second phase of the struggle against France under Queen Anne (1702–14) – the War of Spanish Succession of 1702–13 – the Queen's poor health and limited grasp of public business resulted in the emergence of a prime minister, in the person of the head of the treasury (Robert Walpole's position under George I was in this sense anticipated by the earls of Godolphin and Oxford under Anne), and the establishment of responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy in the secretaries of state.¹⁴ More generally, the wars saw a major transformation in the machinery of executive government: a dramatic expansion of administrative personnel, the creation of new government departments, professionalization and a more scientific approach to government.¹⁵

Warfare also enabled parliament to secure further political reform. Thus, in 1694, the need for money forced William to agree to a Triennial Act, which provided not only that parliament must meet every three years but also that it should not last more than

three years,¹⁶ thereby addressing the demands in the Heads of Grievances both that the 'frequent sitting' of parliament 'be preserved' and that 'the too long continuance of the same Parliament be prevented'. An additional degree of toleration came in 1696 following the abortive assassination plot against William, when Quakers were allowed to affirm rather than swear when giving evidence in court (except in any criminal cases), to accommodate Quaker scruples about taking oaths.¹⁷ Ironically, however, the major issue which the dynastic shift of 1688–9 left unsolved was the problem of the Protestant succession. William's inability to provide an heir, and his sister-in-law's failure to produce a child who could outlive her, necessitated further legislation to settle the succession – the Act of Settlement of 1701 – which, in turn, provided another opportunity to address grievances that had been articulated in 1689. Thus the Act of Settlement stipulated that the succession would pass to Princess Sophia, Electress of Hanover, and her heirs should William and Anne die without issue, paving the way for the eventual succession of George I in 1714. It also required that all future monarchs should be communicating members of the Church of England and provided that judges should hold office on good behaviour (operative 1714), and that royal pardons no longer be pleadable to impeachments in the Commons.¹⁸ To be fair, the Act of Settlement was in part a reaction against political developments under William and not just a belated attempt to enact some of the reforming agenda of 1689: hence the proviso concerning the religion of the monarch (reflecting concerns not just about the Lutheranism of the Hanoverians but also William's Calvinism) and other provisos preventing a future monarch from leaving the British Isles without parliament's consent (repealed 1716) and barring placemen or pensioners being MPs (repealed 1707). Nevertheless, in so far as the Act of Settlement of 1701 was designed to address problems, relating to the succession, that had arisen as a result of the dynastic shift brought about in 1688–9, it has to be seen, at least in part, as a working out of the implications of the Glorious Revolution and therefore as part of that Revolution settlement.

The cumulative effect of the reforms and innovations that occurred during the reigns of William and Anne as a result of

the Glorious Revolution, and the revolution in foreign policy which the Glorious Revolution inevitably brought about, went a long way towards creating a new type of monarchy in England. The English monarchy became limited, bureaucratic and parliamentary. It ceased to be a personal monarchy in quite the same way it had been under Charles II or James II. Yet in many respects it became a monarchy with more real power, as a result of the creation of the fiscal military state and the concomitant ability to harness the economic wealth of the country in the service of the sovereign – now the king-(or queen)-in-parliament. It is in this sense that the Glorious Revolution, despite the legal conservatism of the Declaration of Rights, truly brought about a revolutionary transformation of the English state.

Scotland

Let us turn to Scotland. The fact that Scotland and England had two very different revolutions in 1689 transformed the nature of Anglo-Scottish relations. Since the union of the crowns in 1603, the Stuarts had pursued a policy of convergence in ecclesiastical affairs (in order to try to bring the two Churches of the respective kingdoms closer together), and had sought to maintain a tight grip over Scottish affairs through the crown's ability, via the Lords of the Articles, to control legislation enacted by the Scottish parliament. With the Glorious Revolution, however, the policy of convergence in the Church was abandoned, while the abolition of the Articles increased the independence of the Scottish parliament and necessitated the development of new forms of political management to ensure that Scotland backed (or at least accepted) policies initiated in London. The trouble was that the policies decided upon in England – and which were seen as essential to the interests of the crown when viewed from a metropolitan perspective – were not always seen by the Scots as in their best interests. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that the Revolution had transferred sovereignty in England to the king-in-parliament. The Scots had not always taken kindly to being bossed around by an absentee king to whom they at least acknowledged they owed allegiance; they bitterly resented any attempts by the new coordinated sovereign power of

king and English Lords and Commons, which in practice meant the king's English ministry, to determine policy for Scotland. The separate revolutions in Scotland and England, in other words, increased tensions between the two kingdoms and made some sort of redefinition of the Anglo-Scottish relationship inevitable.¹⁹

Tensions between the two kingdoms emerged soon after the Glorious Revolution, as the new regime in England revealed itself to be peculiarly insensitive in its handling of Scottish affairs. William's attempt to pacify the Highlands turned into a disastrous tragedy in 1692, when the dreadful massacre at Glencoe was carried out because MacDonald of Glencoe accidentally missed the deadline for swearing the oath of allegiance to William by five days. Although most of the clan escaped, leaving just thirty-eight to be butchered in the glen, the brutality of the deed was shocking even in this age and did more than anything else to promote Jacobitism in the Highlands.²⁰ The Episcopalians, of course, who dominated in the north-east coastal plain, had been alienated as a result of the settlement attained in 1689–90. Yet William also managed to upset those lowland Scots who had welcomed or accepted the Revolution through his apparent determination to frustrate Scottish pretensions to greater political independence which they believed they had won in 1689. Thus William kept his Secretary of State for Scotland in London and ignored the demand for frequent parliaments in the Scottish Claim of Right, instead keeping the Convention Parliament in Scotland sitting for nine consecutive sessions. William's foreign policy was determined with English and Dutch interests in mind, but with scant regard for the concerns of the Scots. Scottish trade with France was badly hit by the Nine Years War, at a time when the Scottish economy was suffering in any case, and for all their sacrifices the Scots gained nothing for themselves at the peace treaty of 1697. Furthermore, the English did their best to prevent Scottish merchants from trading illegally with English colonies through a stringent enforcement of the Navigation Acts, and helped frustrate the Scots' attempt to establish their own colony on the Darien peninsula in Panama in the late 1690s, resulting in the capital loss of £153,000 (over £1.8 million Scots), perhaps a quarter of the nation's liquid assets.²¹ To be fair, the English were not solely responsible for the failure of the Darien scheme – Spanish

opposition and Scottish mismanagement must also be taken into consideration – while the English cannot be blamed for the series of disastrous harvests (caused by a combination of poor weather, poor soil and an outmoded feudal economy) that afflicted Scotland in the 1690s. Nevertheless, many Scots came to feel that the ills which afflicted their country in the last decade of the century were due to William and his ministers and the nature of the political relationship between the two countries fostered by the union of the crowns.

Things seemed merely to go from bad to worse in the new century. Following the King's death in 1702, William's ministers failed to call a new parliament within twenty days (as required by an Act of 1696), waiting ninety days instead in order to give the English privy council time to declare war on France without facing opposition from the Scottish parliament. But the biggest problem in the early eighteenth century centred around the succession. The English Act of Settlement did not apply to Scotland, but it inevitably had enormous consequences for the northern kingdom and the Scots were understandably upset that they were not even consulted. Furthermore, the English tactlessly included in the act clauses which did apply to Scotland, such as that forbidding a future monarch from going 'out of the Dominions of England, Scotland and Ireland without the consent of parliament'. The implication seemed to be that the Scots would be bound by the dynastic settlement reached in England, and even, therefore, that the English parliament had the right to legislate for Scotland. The measure caused a furore in the Scottish parliament of 1703. As Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun asked, when the English nation nominated a successor to their crown, 'Did they ever require our concurrence? Did they ever desire the late King to cause the parliament of Scotland to meet, in order to take our advice and consent? Was not this to tell us plainly that we ought to be concluded by their determinations?'²² To some it seemed that Scotland was to be reduced to the same state of dependency as Ireland. As an anonymous paper circulated among Scottish MPs enquired, 'I desire to know . . . where lies the difference of our case, from that most deplorable state of Irish parliaments'.²³

The Scottish response was to raise the stakes: they would go it alone, if need be. Thus on 13 August 1703, the Scottish parliament passed an Act of Security stipulating that if Anne were to die without

an heir, the Scottish parliament should nominate the successor to the Scottish crown, who should be both a Protestant and of the royal line of Scotland, but not the same person designated to succeed in England, unless 'there be such conditions of Government settled and enacted as may secure the honour and sovereignty' of Scotland, 'the freedom, frequency and power of Parliaments', and 'the religion, liberty and trade of the Nation from English or any foreign influence'. At first the English ministers refused to allow the Scottish commissioner to confer the royal assent, but the need for money forced them to back down and in 1704 the measure became law.²⁴

The only way out of this impasse, as far as the English were concerned, was a treaty of union between the two kingdoms. It would be wrong to suggest that the Scots were completely opposed to some form of union with England. Political moderates such as Tweeddale and the Dalrymples had, as we have seen, pushed for a political union of the two countries back in 1689, and as the 1690s unfolded more Scots warmed to the idea of a union as the possible answer to Scotland's economic ills. Even some of those who vehemently opposed the incorporating union that eventually came to fruition in 1707 would have been willing to accept some other type of union, such as a federal union. But the proposals for union that were put forth in 1689 and again in 1702–3 came to nothing, essentially because England, at this time, was not interested in pursuing them. The union negotiations of 1706, by contrast, came to fruition because the English were now determined that they should. In 1705 the English parliament responded to the Scottish Act of Security with its provocative Aliens Act, threatening that unless the Hanoverian succession was recognized or a treaty of union set on foot by Christmas Day, the Scots would be treated as aliens in England and Scottish exports to England prohibited.²⁵ By a combination of political management and bribery – and, it should be said, a willingness to grant concessions on certain issues in an effort to alleviate public anxiety over possible economic and religious implications – the royal administration managed to persuade the Scottish parliament to agree to a treaty of incorporating union with England, which it finally ratified by a vote of 110 to 69 on 16 January 1707.²⁶ The measure then went rapidly through both houses of the English parliament, passing the

Commons on 1 March 1707 by a vote of 274 to 116, and came into force on 1 May 1707.²⁷

By the terms of the treaty, England and Scotland were 'united into one kingdom by the name of Great Britain'. The Scottish parliament was abolished and a new British parliament created, to which the Scots were entitled to send 16 elected peers and 45 MPs. The new body, however, was in essence just an extension of the English parliament: it continued to sit at Westminster, and whereas Scottish constituencies had to be redrawn in order to reduce the number of MPs from 157 to 45, nothing was done to change the English system of representation. Thus England and Wales continued to send 513 MPs to parliament. This disparity was justified on the basis that England and Wales exceeded the taxable capacity of Scotland by a ratio of 38 to 1; on such a logic, Scotland would have merited no more than 14 MPs, so arguably the Scots were getting a good deal. Yet the population ratio was 5 to 1; proportional representation based on demographic criteria would have suggested that Scotland should have had 103 MPs. The treaty also established economic union – free trade between the two countries, one coinage, one fiscal system, and a uniform system of weights and measures – though a sum of money, known as the Equivalent, was to be paid to Scotland to offset future liability towards the rapidly expanding English national debt. Each country, however, was to retain its own system of private law, courts and jurisdictions, and its separate ecclesiastical establishments – in order to alleviate the anxieties of the Presbyterians, an act guaranteeing the security of the Presbyterian establishment passed the Scottish parliament on 12 November 1706 and was declared to be an integral part of the treaty. A similar act for securing the Church of England as by law established was passed by the English parliament, and both acts were appended to the Act of Union and passed in 1707.²⁸

The Treaty of Union was far from popular in Scotland. Indeed, most sections of Scottish society had reason to be unhappy with the terms agreed. Jacobites and Episcopalians naturally resented being tied to the Hanoverian succession and a Presbyterian Church establishment. Country party politicians regretted the fact that an opportunity for further political reform had been lost, and indeed that some of the worst features of Scottish life, such as the heritable jurisdic-

tions, had been kept. Radicals bemoaned the loss of Scottish independence and with it the chance to secure the rights and liberties of the Scottish people, which they rightly predicted would hardly be a high priority for the new British parliament. The Presbyterians were worried about a union with a more powerful, episcopalian state, one where their enemies, the bishops, sat in the House of Lords. The mere acceptance of a united parliament seemed to imply a recognition of episcopacy, and thus for hardline Presbyterians a violation of the Covenants. More generally, it was feared that union would bring toleration for episcopacy north of the border, or, worse still, attempts to reintroduce bishops in Scotland.²⁹ Even the commercial and trading interests of the burghs were far from enthusiastic, being fearful of higher levels of taxation and of competition from England. It was mainly landowners engaged in the export of grain and black cattle, it seems, who anticipated real economic benefits from the union. There were addresses to the Scottish parliament against the proposed union from some 116 localities (15 shires, 22 burghs, 9 towns, 3 presbyteries and 67 parishes), which between them amassed more than 20,000 signatories, in addition to various 'national' addresses from the Commission of the General Assembly, the Convention of the Royal Burghs, and the Cameronians 'in the South and Western Shyres'. There were also riots in Edinburgh, Glasgow and the south-west in the latter months of 1706, not just by Jacobites but also by Cameronians. There was even talk of a concerted uprising of Highland Jacobites and disgruntled Presbyterians, although such plans came to nothing.³⁰ In the end, the opposition of most mainstream Presbyterians was silenced by the act securing the Presbyterian establishment, though this, in turn, was to cause concern among high church interests in both Ireland and England, who feared that the union might thereby serve to encourage dissent and undermine the ecclesiastical establishment in their respective kingdoms.³¹

On the whole, most Protestants in England and Ireland, it must be said, welcomed the union. In Scotland, however, it left a divided legacy, and enabled the Jacobites and Episcopalians to take over the mantle of Scottish nationalism. Union did at least bring some degree of toleration for Episcopalians. Thus in 1712 a Tory-dominated British Parliament passed an act allowing Episcopalian congregations

to meet and worship provided that they used the Scottish liturgy; this did not affect the Nonjurors, however, who continued to use the Scottish prayer book of 1637. Ironically, therefore, the Toleration Act introduced strife among the Episcopalians. That same year, parliament passed an act restoring lay patronage, which had been abolished in 1690, though a majority of the congregations still retained the right to veto a patron's nomination, leaving the matter to be resolved by the presbytery.³²

Ireland

Let us turn now to Ireland. The Treaty of Limerick of October 1691 was far from being the end of the Revolution settlement in Ireland. There were many Protestants, in both Ireland and England, who felt that the peace terms had been too favourable to the defeated Jacobites and who wanted to make the Irish pay for their rebellion. Yet the war also changed the nature of the relationship between the ascendant Protestant interest in Ireland and the mother country. The crown's need for money to cover the cost of the war gave the parliament in Ireland more political leverage and afforded it the opportunity to challenge the nature of Ireland's subordination to England. It was a challenge which the English could not afford to leave unmet, and resulted in a redefinition of the imperial relationship between England and Ireland.³³

Protestants in England hoped that the cost of putting down the war in Ireland could be met, in time-honoured fashion, by the forfeiture of Irish estates.³⁴ There was, in fact, to be no general Act of Attainder against Catholics in Ireland, such as the Dublin parliament of 1689 had passed against Protestants. Instead, the Williamite regime chose to pursue individual Jacobites on charges of high treason, with conviction resulting in outlawry and forfeiture of property (though there were no executions). A number of leading Irish Jacobites were indicted in England; then, from the autumn of 1690, following victory at the Battle of the Boyne and the subsequent retreat of the Jacobite forces behind the river Shannon, the treason trials began in Ireland in the counties then under Williamite control. Outlawries were also declared against Irish Jacobites for treason committed

abroad. There were nearly 4,000 outlawries in total, although not all of these were Catholic landowners (who numbered about 1,300 in 1688), since many were younger sons, merchants, traders and artisans. In all, 457 landed estates were affected and just over 1 million Irish acres (1.7 million statute acres) of land declared confiscated.

The total number of confiscations, however, was limited by the terms of the articles of Galway and the Treaty of Limerick, which as a bait to induce surrender had allowed not only Jacobite officers but also 'all such as [were] under their protection' in the counties and garrisons then under Jacobite control to keep their lands, provided they swore allegiance to William and Mary. The clause 'all such as are under their protection' was, in fact, omitted from the copy of the articles sent to London for ratification, but William insisted this was merely a clerical error and reinserted it before he signed the treaty in February 1692. Even though the 'omitted clause' was again omitted when the Irish parliament ratified the Treaty of Limerick in 1697,³⁵ this seems to have had little impact on the way claims under the treaty were dealt with. Thus, many Irish Jacobites were able to escape confiscation by claiming the benefit of the articles. Others were saved by royal pardons issued over the next several years. Little of the land forfeited, however, was set aside to pay for the arrears due to the army. Instead, William sought to use it as a form of patronage to reward royal favourites and loyal servants of the crown, and proceeded to make substantial grants to a number of individuals, several of them foreigners. This drew the wrath of the parliament in England, who used the King's desperate need for money to force him to agree to an Act of Resumption in 1700, which empowered thirteen trustees to hear claims on forfeited estates and to sell whatever property remained. In the process, a small number of persons were able to recover their estates.

The combined effect of the Williamite confiscations was to reduce the proportion of profitable land held by Catholics from 22 per cent in 1688 to 14 per cent in 1703. The percentage loss, in fact, was much smaller than it had been between the Irish Rebellion and the Cromwellian ascendancy, when the proportion had shrunk from 60 per cent to a mere 9 per cent in the late 1650s, or even, in fact, between the Irish Rebellion and the Restoration: under Charles II the

Catholics still possessed only one-third of the amount of land they had held in 1641. However, this was not to be the end of the story. The ability of Catholics in Ireland to own and inherit land was also to be affected by the enactment of new penal laws.

The first article of the Treaty of Limerick had stipulated that Catholics in Ireland should enjoy the same privileges in the exercise of their religion as they had done during the reign of Charles II. However, there were many Protestants, especially in Ireland, but also in England, who had come to believe that the only way to prevent any future rebellions in Ireland was to place further restrictions on the exercise of the Catholic religion. As a result, over the course of the 1690s and early eighteenth century a series of measures dramatically curtailing the rights and religious freedoms of Catholics came to be enacted.³⁶ The penal laws emerged piecemeal: it would be misleading to portray them as a systematic code. Besides, there was no central decision-making body for Ireland, and because of the workings of Poyning's Law of 1494, which required that any legislation the Irish parliament enacted had to be approved by the English privy council, Irish policy inevitably tended to reflect the interaction of various distinct interests – the members of the Irish parliament, the lord lieutenant in Ireland, the privy council in England, and, of course, the king and his ministers in London – which could pull in different directions.³⁷ Nevertheless, it would be equally misleading to imply that the penal laws emerged totally haphazardly. They did represent the determination of Protestants on both sides of the Irish Sea, in the aftermath of yet another Catholic rebellion in Ireland, to try to make that kingdom safe for the ruling Protestant elite, and at least some of the measures passed reflected a definite Protestant policy constructed by the King, the English parliament and the Irish parliament acting in concord.³⁸

An important preliminary step was taken in 1691, when the English parliament passed an act requiring all office-holders in Ireland and members of the Irish parliament to take the new oaths of allegiance and supremacy stipulated by the English Declaration of Rights, and to subscribe a declaration against transubstantiation.³⁹ Henceforth, membership of the Irish parliament was to be confined to Protestants. This was crucial because, as a result of William's need to

raise revenues in Ireland, the Irish parliament became a much more significant political force after the Glorious Revolution than it ever had been before. No parliament had sat in Ireland since 1666 (not counting James's parliament of 1689); from 1692 it was to meet regularly and was to play a crucial role in shaping what the Revolution settlement was to mean for the people of Ireland.

One of the first things the 1692 parliament did was to pass an Act of Recognition, affirming that William and Mary had 'an undoubted Right to the Crown of Ireland' and that the Kingdom of Ireland was annexed to the imperial crown of England.⁴⁰ This simply confirmed the transfer of the crown that had been determined by the English parliament in 1689. Beyond that, however, MPs showed themselves angry over the leniency showed towards Catholics by the Treaty of Limerick and worried by the government's handling of confiscated property. Thus they rejected a number of bills drawn up by the privy council – including a finance bill, on the grounds that it was the sole right of the Commons 'to prepare heads of bills for raising money' – and threatened to censure office-holders suspected of corruption. On this occasion the then Lord Lieutenant, Viscount Sidney, decided to bring the session to a speedy conclusion, rebuking the Commons for its conduct; the parliament was dissolved the following year.⁴¹

Sidney's successor, however – the virulently anti-Catholic Henry Lord Capel, who served as Lord Deputy in 1695–6 – proved much more willing to appease the prejudices of the Protestant gentry who dominated the Irish Commons. When a new parliament met in 1695 it passed two new penal laws: one imposing a £200 fine on anyone sending their children abroad to be educated in a foreign seminary, abbey, convent or Catholic university or college, the other disarming papists and forbidding them from owning horses worth more than £5 (though a clause was inserted by the English privy council which, in effect, exempted those covered by the Treaty of Limerick). The second act was an understandable security measure, in the aftermath of a Catholic rebellion and at a time of a continued continental war with Catholic France; the Protestants were also alarmed by the increase of rapparee activity in the aftermath of the war, fears of which were heightened by the actions of French pirates off the Irish coast. The first measure was ostensibly motivated by security considerations too:

those educated abroad, the act claimed, abandoned their allegiance 'to the Kings and Queens of this realm, and the affection which they owe to the established religion and laws of their native country', 'engaged themselves in foreign interests', and upon their return invariably became 'the movers and promoters of many dangerous seditions, and oftentimes open rebellion'. The same act also prohibited Catholics in Ireland from teaching or instructing youth in learning: the rationale offered was that conniving at Catholic schools had been a major reason why so many of 'the natives of this kingdom' remained 'ignorant of the principles of true religion', did not 'conform themselves to the laws and statutes of this realm', and failed to use 'the English habit or language'.⁴² The measure, therefore, struck not just at the Catholic faith; it also struck at Irishness.

In 1697 the Irish parliament passed an act banishing all Catholic bishops, Jesuits, regular Popish clergy (monks and friars) and all other papists exercising any ecclesiastical jurisdiction, again on the grounds that such persons had been responsible for promoting and carrying on 'the late rebellions in this kingdom'.⁴³ That same year, when the Irish parliament finally ratified the Treaty of Limerick, it omitted two key articles touching on the religious rights of Catholics – article one, affording Catholics in Ireland the same religious freedoms as they had under Charles II, and article nine, stipulating that no oaths would be required of Irish Catholics other than the oath of allegiance – thereby removing any obstacle to the enactment of any further penal laws.⁴⁴ There followed a measure to prevent Protestants from marrying Catholics – on the grounds that such intermarriage led to conversions to popery, to 'the great prejudice of the Protestant interest' – which basically sought to prevent the possibility of Protestant land or wealth passing into Catholic hands as the result of a mixed marriage.⁴⁵ In 1698 the Irish parliament passed an act forbidding Catholics from practising the law (which was amended, with stiffer penalties, in 1707).⁴⁶ With Catholics already banned from holding office under the crown, the only profession open to them – besides the Church – was now medicine.

The legislation against Catholics was strengthened and extended under Queen Anne. An Act of 1703 forbade Catholic clergy from entering the country after 1 January 1704; with, in theory, no bishops

to ordain new clergymen in Ireland and no replacements allowed from abroad, the supply of priests should have effectively dried up. Again, the ostensible motive was security: the act claimed that Catholic bishops, Jesuits and regular clergy had been entering the country (and thus evading the provisions of the Banishment Act of 1697) 'under the disguise or pretence of being Popish secular priests, with intent to stir up her Majesty's Popish subjects to rebellion', and seems to have been designed as a temporary wartime measure, initially being in force for only fourteen years.⁴⁷ An act of 1704 to prevent the further growth of popery struck against Catholic landowners: it outlawed primogeniture for Catholics, deeming that estates of Catholics had to be divided amongst all male heirs unless the eldest son turned Protestant; it also prohibited Catholics from buying land or leasing it for more than thirty-one years.⁴⁸ The same year an Act for Registering the Popish Clergy required parish priests, on pain of transportation, to take out a bond for their good behaviour – some 1,089 did so – and forbade them from keeping curates and leaving their counties. It also offered pensions of £20 per year to those priests who converted to the Church of Ireland.⁴⁹ However an act of 1709, passed in response to a Jacobite invasion scare of the previous year, stipulated that these priests had to take an oath abjuring the Pretender (or face banishment) and made the Act of 1703 banishing popish secular clergy perpetual; at the same time, it increased the pension for priests who converted to £30 per year.⁵⁰

The driving force behind much of the anti-Catholic legislation was, therefore, concern for the security of the Revolution settlement at a time when the British monarchy remained at war with Catholic France. These concerns were heightened in the early eighteenth century as the succession problem again reared its head following the death of Anne's sole surviving child, the Duke of Gloucester (in 1700), the outbreak of renewed warfare with France (from 1702) and Louis XIV's declaration of support for James Francis Edward Stuart (who assumed the title of James III) following the death of James II, and as doubts about the commitment of the English Tories to the Hanoverian succession began to arise during Anne's reign. However, with the accession of George I in 1714 and the failure of the Jacobite intrigues in England and Scotland in 1715, the Catholic question

became less of a central issue. In 1719, in response to reports that large numbers of Catholic clergymen were entering the country illegally, the Irish House of Commons introduced a bill proposing that unregistered priests should be branded on the face – the Irish privy council suggested castration as an alternative – and increasing the restrictions on Catholic land transactions, but the measure was rejected by the Irish House of Lords. The only major additional legal disability imposed after the Hanoverian succession was an act of 1728 prohibiting Catholics from voting in parliamentary elections, although since Catholics had already been excluded from corporate office (and hence could only vote in a minority of borough elections in any case), and since there was a declining number of Catholics who met the freehold qualification following the Popery Act of 1704, the impact of this measure was less great than one might expect it to have been.

The cumulative effect of the penal laws could have been dramatic, if strictly enforced. The drive against Catholic clergy did sustain some momentum in the immediate aftermath of the passage of the relevant legislation. Thus some 400 regular clergy were deported following the Banishment Act of 1697; others were forced into hiding.⁵¹ But the Protestant administration in Ireland soon showed that it had neither the ability, desire nor stamina to ensure a rigid enforcement of the penal legislation. A major turning point seems to have come in 1709, with the Act for Abjuring the Pretender: only thirty-three clergy conformed, but the measure proved largely a dead letter, and so long as they were registered and stuck to their own counties Catholic clergy were left unmolested. Moreover, there was no actual prohibition of Catholic religious services, nor a sustained missionary effort by the Protestant establishment to convert the mass of the population. By the time of George II's reign (1727–60), if not earlier, the Protestant minority in Ireland had come to terms with the fact that they would remain a minority. Indeed, Protestant landowners and traders, it was said, preferred to have a servile, underprivileged class to do the sort of menial tasks at low wages which many Protestants thought were beneath them; nor did they want the increased competition for rewarding jobs in the law, civil administration, army or Church that a mass conversion of Catholics to Protestantism would inevitably

bring.⁵² But the burden of the penal laws did prove particularly heavy for Catholics from the higher rungs of the social hierarchy and many felt under pressure to conform. Between 1703 and 1789, some 5,500 Catholics registered themselves as converts to the Church of Ireland, most of them members of the professional or landed classes. The result of such conversions meant that the total proportion of land held by Catholics fell dramatically: from 14 per cent in 1703 to perhaps as low as 5 per cent by 1779 (if the oft-quoted guesstimate by Arthur Young can be treated with any reliability).⁵³

The Protestant ascendancy that was being consolidated, however, was to be a Church of Ireland one. The Protestant squirearchy who dominated the Irish parliament were predominantly high churchmen, and they showed themselves almost as concerned about the threat of Protestant dissent, and especially the Scottish Presbyterians in Ulster, as they were about popery. Relations between the Scottish Presbyterians and churchmen in the north of Ireland had never been particularly good, and although differences had been temporarily put to one side in the face of the Jacobite threat in 1689–90, they were soon to re-emerge.⁵⁴ Almost as soon as the siege of Derry was over, the two groups started bickering over who deserved the greatest credit. With the conclusion of the war, the Presbyterians expected some form of legal toleration for the sacrifices they had made on behalf of the Protestant cause. Not that the Presbyterians in Ireland had suffered in the way that their brethren in Scotland or even England had. The main laws that affected them were the Elizabethan Act of Supremacy of 1560, which enforced attendance at parish church, and the Act of Uniformity of 1666, which required all ministers to be episcopally ordained and all clerics and schoolteachers to subscribe a declaration against the Covenant, but these measures had seldom been enforced against Presbyterians. Nonconformists did face occasional persecution in some localities; however, the tacit agreement reached after the Restoration seems to have been that the dissenters would be allowed to hold their own religious services unmolested as long as they did not seek to expand their congregations.

The trouble was, in the 1690s the Scottish Presbyterians were expanding in numbers in Ireland – dramatically so – thanks to the arrival of Scots seeking to escape the economic dislocation in their

own homeland (most of whom, except for a few Catholic Highlanders, were Presbyterians). We have no accurate statistics for the size of the immigration, though contemporaries estimated that anywhere between 50,000 and 80,000 Scottish families entered Ulster in the reigns of William and Anne. What we do know is that whereas there were 86 Presbyterian ministers in Ulster in 1689, there were over 130 by 1702.⁵⁵ Moreover, the act of the English parliament of 1691, stipulating new oaths for Ireland, had repealed the old Elizabethan oath of supremacy, which many Scottish Presbyterians found objectionable because it made the monarch head of the Church, and replaced it with one that omitted this wording, thus opening the door for Presbyterians to hold office. As a result of these developments, in many parts of Ulster (especially counties Antrim and Londonderry), Scottish Presbyterians came heavily to outnumber Protestants of the Established Church; and being engaged mainly in commerce and manufacture, they also came to dominate a number of corporations, such as Belfast, Derry, Carrickfergus and Coleraine, and were thus able to use their power to secure the return of Presbyterians to parliament. With the Revolution in Scotland already having resulted in the overthrow of episcopacy, the Protestant landowners in the Irish parliament and the clergy of the Established Church of Ireland began to fear a similar threat to the ecclesiastical establishment in Ireland, and so refused to grant a formal toleration to Presbyterians unless a test was introduced to exclude them from office. Thus proposals for toleration in 1692 and 1695 were thrown out by the Irish council and the Irish parliament; there were even calls for a stricter enforcement of the laws already on the books. A bitter war of words erupted between the two religious interests and relations between churchmen and Presbyterians at the local level deteriorated dramatically: the churchmen claimed that the Presbyterians withheld tithes and insulted their clergy; the Presbyterians, in turn, suffered harassment, as they were prevented from conducting their own weddings and funerals and compelled to hold office as parish churchwardens without being allowed to hire deputies.

The Williamite regime made no attempt to increase the disabilities on Presbyterians; indeed, it not only continued the *regium donum*, the royal pension given annually to Presbyterian ministers in Ireland, but

increased it to £1,200, and resisted pressure from the Irish bishops for government permission to enforce the laws against dissent more strictly. The situation changed under Anne, however, as fears grew among high-church Tories in England, who dominated the royal administrations of the early years of Anne's reign, that the Church was in danger from dissent. Thus in 1704 the English privy council decided to incorporate a clause into the Popery Act of that year requiring all office-holders in Ireland to take the sacramental test, a move that proved very welcome to the Irish parliament, where it was said that the House of Commons was 'made up of two thirds of as High-Churchmen as any in England'.⁵⁶ Gradually, the Presbyterians were forced out of the corporations in Ulster.⁵⁷ The position for Irish dissenters grew even worse during the final years of Anne's reign, when the high-church Tories were once again ascendant: the *regium donum* was suspended in 1714, and there were even plans to introduce the English Schism Act of that year into Ireland. Things calmed down somewhat following the accession of George I in October 1714. The *regium donum* was restored and augmented, and in 1719, under pressure from the new Whig administration in England, the Irish parliament passed a limited Toleration Act. This exempted Protestant dissenters from the Acts of Uniformity of 1560 and 1666, provided they took the oaths of allegiance and supremacy and abjuring the Pretender, and made a declaration against transubstantiation (Quakers were allowed to affirm). The act recognized their right to hold their own religious meetings if they were licensed and the doors left open. It also exempted nonconformist ministers from serving on juries and in parish or ward offices and allowed dissenters to hire deputies if elected to parish office (though explicitly stating that they were not to be exempt from tithes or other parish dues). It nevertheless left the sacramental test on the books, which was to remain in force until 1780.⁵⁸

The transformed political context after the Glorious Revolution also had an effect on the nature of the relationship between Ireland and England. Ireland had long occupied an ambivalent constitutional position. A country that had been conquered by the English crown, starting in the later twelfth century under Henry II – and arguably reconquered several times following English suppression of various

rebellions in Ireland over the centuries – it nevertheless had its own parliament and had been a kingdom in its own right since 1541. Yet Poyning's Law required English approval of any legislation enacted in the Irish parliament, whereas in certain circumstances the English parliament seemed to have the right to legislate for Ireland. Ireland was thus, in some senses, both a kingdom and a colony; not quite a totally independent realm, but neither simply a conquered territory under imperial rule.⁵⁹ The Protestant ascendancy in Ireland, however, had tended to resent attempts by the government in England to regulate Irish affairs, especially when such attempts at regulation were designed to ensure that Irish interests were subordinated to English ones; they were less likely to get upset when English interference in Ireland was designed to protect the Protestant interest in Ireland against the threat of popery. Constitutional theorists in Ireland typically chose to represent Ireland as a sister kingdom to England, which owed allegiance to the same sovereign king – a king whose authority extended to all his dominions – but not to the English parliament, since Ireland had its own, autonomous parliament.⁶⁰ The trouble for this conception of the constitutional relationship was that the Glorious Revolution in England had involved a shift in the perception of where sovereignty lay: no longer in the crown alone, but in the crown-in-parliament. It followed, at least as far as the English were concerned, that the power that the king once had over his dominions was now vested in the king (or queen), English Lords and English Commons. Increasingly, policy for Ireland came to be determined not by the crown but by the crown's ministers, who came to control the appointment of the lord lieutenant and other offices in the Irish executive and even the membership of the English privy council which oversaw legislation for Ireland. The political elite in Ireland, naturally, were far from happy with such developments.

As we have seen, there had been signs of tension already in the 1692 parliament, when the Irish Commons had refused to sanction bills introduced by the English privy council. But things came to a head towards the end of the decade, when the English parliament pushed for an act (first mooted in 1697, passed in 1699) to prevent the export of Irish woollen goods, in order to protect the interests of the English woollen textiles industry.⁶¹ The proposal created a furore

when the Irish parliament met in 1698 and prompted William Molyneux, MP for Trinity College, to publish *The Case of Ireland's being Bound by Acts of Parliament in England Stated* in defence of Irish legislative independence. Molyneux denied a royal title to Ireland based upon conquest, either by Henry II or following any succeeding rebellion; instead, he claimed that 'all the Ecclesiastical and Civil States of Ireland' had made 'an Intire and Voluntary Submission' to Henry II, who in return 'did not only settle the Laws of England in Ireland, and the Jurisdiction Ecclesiastical there . . . but did likewise Allow them the Freedom of Holding Parliaments in Ireland, as a separate and distinct Kingdom from England'. The English parliament was swift to condemn Molyneux's book, and might have taken further action against Molyneux himself had he not died later that year.⁶²

Yet although Molyneux is often held up as the intellectual father of Protestant Irish patriotism, which was to come to full fruition in the 1770s and 1780s, Molyneux's main grievance was less the infringement of Irish sovereignty than government without consent. Indeed, far from being a champion of Irish independence, Molyneux even maintained that the Protestants of Ireland would willingly embrace a parliamentary union with England, though he confessed that this was 'an happiness we can hardly hope for'.⁶³ And as union between England and Scotland came to be placed on the political agenda in the early eighteenth century, many Protestants in Ireland warmed to the idea of a union for themselves – on the grounds that not only would it give them representation in Westminster but would also enhance their prosperity and provide greater security. On three occasions – in 1703, 1707 and 1709 – the Irish parliament made appeals for union, though the English did not see it as being to their advantage and allowed the matter to drop.⁶⁴

Not only did the idea of Irish union come to nothing, but the reality of the Scottish union had a deleterious effect on Ireland. With Scottish independence gone, the tendency for the English to think of Ireland merely as its first colony was considerably reinforced, and the new British administration increasingly tended to appoint Englishmen to civil and ecclesiastical office in Ireland, rather than Protestants born in Ireland. The Irish parliament made one last attempt to assert its

political independence in 1719, following a lawsuit concerning the possession of an estate (*Sherlock v. Annesley*), where, on appeal, the British House of Lords overturned the decision that had first been given by the Irish upper house. The Irish House of Lords made a strong representation to George I, asserting its right of jurisdiction in Ireland and condemning the British Lords for attacking George's sovereignty as king of Ireland. The British parliament responded in 1720 by passing a Declaratory Act, which asserted the right of the British parliament to legislate for Ireland and denied the appellate jurisdiction of the Irish House of Lords.⁶⁵ There could henceforth be no doubt of Ireland's subordinate status. It was certainly not a sister kingdom to England. Indeed, some historians have seen the years 1691–1720 as marking Ireland's final descent from kingdom to colony.⁶⁶

BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: SIGNIFICANCE AND HISTORICAL LEGACY

Finally let us turn to a consideration of the larger significance of the revolutions of the later seventeenth century. Historians have long accustomed us to thinking that if there was a revolution in seventeenth-century England, then it occurred in mid-century. Even those revisionist historians who, in the 1970s and 1980s, tried to persuade us that there was no high road to Civil War and that early Stuart England was a most unrevolutionary place, nevertheless still believed that what eventually came to pass in the 1640s and 1650s was not only a revolution but indeed *'the Revolution'*, a seismic event which had 'profound effects on the subsequent history of the British Isles'.⁶⁷ If anything, the recent Britannic shift that the historiography of the early Stuart period has taken has helped to salvage the revolutionary credentials of the mid-century crisis, since if we cease restricting ourselves to England and look at Britain and Ireland as a whole, the train of events set in motion by the Scottish resistance to the imposition of a new prayer book of 1637 appears to have an undoubtedly revolutionary hue. By comparison, as noted in the Introduction, the Glorious Revolution has usually been seen as a mere after tremor, a tidying-up operation, but not the 'major earthquake itself'.⁶⁸

Yet is it right to downplay the significance of the Glorious Revolution in this way? It might help to shape our thinking about this issue by playing a little intellectual game. Imagine that someone – let us make him an Englishman of moderate Whig leanings – who had died towards the end of the 1630s, miraculously returned from the grave fifty years later (before William of Orange's invasion): would he conclude that a major revolution had taken place in the intervening period? He would find in the 1680s, as in the 1630s, Stuart monarchs on the throne who preferred, as much as possible, to rule without parliament, who sought to establish their royal prerogative above the law, and who appealed to notions of divine right and non-resistance to legitimize their rule – if anything, our man would see a more blatant articulation of theories of royal absolutism in the media in the 1680s than he would have been familiar with from his earlier existence. He would see a similar threat to the Protestant religion and English political liberties from popery and arbitrary government in the 1680s as had been complained about in the years before the Civil War, with the difference that after 1685 there was actually a Catholic monarch on the throne in possession of a sizeable standing army, thereby making the threat seem even more real than it would have appeared in the 1630s. Scotland would likewise probably seem in a worse position in the 1680s than it had fifty years earlier. Although episcopacy had been revived under James VI and I (1567–1625), and Presbyterianism was already being undermined (with the 1630s seeing what to many Scots seemed alarming attacks on the traditional style of Scottish worship), there were as yet no penal laws against Presbyterians. Fifty years later, however, our man would see episcopacy in the ascendant and the Presbyterians suffering brutal persecution, with some even being shot in the fields by the king's forces. With regard to Ireland, he would for sure notice significant changes in the proportion of land actually owned by Catholics by the time of his resurrection – a mere third of what it had been fifty years earlier. Yet he would see that the Catholics were beginning to regain some of their lost land, and witness a dramatic Catholicization of the civil and military administration under James II, with Ireland being placed in the hands of a Catholic Lord Deputy and talk of the imminent overturning of the Restoration land settlement. In all three kingdoms, our man

would see a threat to the rule of law and the rights of borough corporations. If there had been a revolution in the intervening fifty years, he might well be wondering what on earth it had achieved, and how the political and religious freedoms of Protestants had been secured as a result.

Imagine now that a man of similar political leanings, who had died some months prior to William's invasion, returned from the grave just over thirty years later (let us make it 1720, the concluding date of this book). He would immediately notice dramatic differences. He would see a limited monarch, at the head of a British state and the separate kingdom of Ireland, whose prerogative was beneath the law and who shared his sovereignty with a parliament which was now assured of meeting regularly – albeit with general elections every seven years instead of every three, following the passage of the Septennial Act in 1716. Protestantism would appear safe in all three kingdoms; Presbyterianism north of the border secured; and the threat of popery and arbitrary government finally extinguished. It would be immediately apparent that 1720 was a very different world from that of the 1680s. Our man could not help but conclude that something had happened in the meantime which had effected a very fundamental transformation of the British polity.

It is a major conclusion of this study that this fundamental transformation was in large part brought about by the revolutions of the late seventeenth century. This is not to deny the revolutionary credentials of the upheavals of the mid-century; indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, it is important to appreciate what was revolutionary about the mid-century crisis – how it altered the nature of the British dynamic and changed the structure of politics (particularly with regard to the growing importance of public opinion as a force in politics) – in order to understand political developments under the later Stuarts.⁶⁹ Yet this is not the same as saying that there was just one, long drawn-out revolution that took place over the course of the Stuart century as a whole. The transformation that was wrought between the 1680s and 1720s owed little to what had transpired in the 1640s and 1650s. The mid-century revolution had been defeated, and although it had left a legacy of problems to be addressed it can scarcely claim credit for the type of polity that had emerged in the

British Isles by the reign of George I. What transformed the British polity, and what made the political inheritance of the Hanoverians so different from that of the Stuarts, was not the mid-century revolution but the later-seventeenth-century affair that we traditionally refer to as the Glorious Revolution.

Not that this transformation can be attributed entirely to the Glorious Revolution, to be sure. We have to acknowledge that new developments in the 1690s and early eighteenth century also played a vital role in helping to reconfigure the type of political and religious establishments that existed in England, Scotland and Ireland. Nevertheless, this should not lead us to lose sight of the significance of the events of 1688–9. The dynastic shift that was brought about as a result of William's invasion triggered three separate revolutions in all three kingdoms, which, by themselves, were major transformative events in each of those separate kingdoms. These revolutions in turn carried implications – many of which were, in fact, foreseen by those who helped bring about the dynastic shift – that had to be addressed over the next few years and which thus should be seen as part of the working out of the Revolution settlement. These revolutions also affected the nature of the relationship between the three kingdoms, spawning in the process what might be termed a fourth, British revolution, which had fundamental implications for the position of Scotland and Ireland (and their respective relationships with England) within the broader, British polity. One can hardly say that the people who made 1688–9 happen deliberately set out to get to 1707 or 1720. Nevertheless, the fact that the British polity did get to where it was in 1720 had a lot to do, both directly and indirectly, with the revolutions that had happened at the end of the 1680s.

Put like this, the argument may sound unduly Whiggish. Yet it is not my intention to end on a triumphalist note. There were losses as well as gains as a result of the later-seventeenth-century revolutions, as this book has recognized. There would have been hundreds of thousands of people across Britain and Ireland who must have doubted whether the revolutions had done anything to secure the liberties that they particularly cherished: the Catholic majority in Ireland, of course (and the Catholic minorities in England and Scotland, too); the Episcopalians in Scotland (a sizeable minority, to

say the least); many of those throughout the three kingdoms who found themselves liable to a much heavier tax burden; even the supposed victors in Scotland and Ireland who found their own political autonomy under threat from the metropolis. The Glorious Revolution might have saved Britain and Ireland from popery and arbitrary government and defeated the trend towards royal absolutism that we see in the 1680s, yet it also accelerated the existing tendencies towards centralization within the British multiple monarchy.⁷⁰ Scotland lost its political independence, and although the Scots had representation at Westminster they had limited opportunity to get national issues put on the agenda of the newly created British parliament. In this respect, Ireland fared somewhat better, since it kept its own parliament, and although the Declaratory Act of 1720 confirmed the ability of the Westminster parliament to legislate for Ireland, it only normally exercised this power on matters of private business.⁷¹ Nevertheless, the Protestant ascendancy in Ireland resented the way the English (and now the British) treated them, leading to the emergence over the course of the eighteenth century of a distinctive brand of Irish Protestant nationalism. Besides, the Irish parliament hardly represented the people of Ireland. The Revolution had the effect of making Ireland safe for an ascendant Protestant interest that comprised perhaps only 10 per cent of the population; even Protestant dissenters were to be excluded from holding office in the service of the state. Finally, one cannot fail to point out that many of the problems that were created, bequeathed or exacerbated by the revolutions of 1688–9 have survived with us for well over three centuries. The Scots won back the right to hold their own parliament only in 1999. Sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland still defines itself in terms of the struggles of the later seventeenth century.

The Glorious Revolution was indeed a revolution. More precisely, the dynastic crisis of 1688–9 spawned separate English, Scottish, Irish and British revolutions that wrought major changes across the British Isles which go a long way to explaining why the polity that emerged in the eighteenth century was very different from that which had prevailed (and had survived an earlier attempted revolution) in the seventeenth century. This is merely to recognize a reality rather than to applaud the outcome. It is by historical convention that we describe

what took place in 1688–9 as the Glorious Revolution, and it would be churlish to insist that we refrain from using the term altogether, even though we recognize that those contemporaries who coined the term deliberately sought to incorporate a value judgement in the label they affixed to events of which they approved. We can recognize the revolutionary significance of what transpired without necessarily endorsing that value judgement. Glorious for some, not-so-glorious for others, the British revolutions of the later seventeenth century nevertheless had a huge transformative impact. They changed the course of history for the three kingdoms and left a lasting legacy, the implications of which remain with us to this day.