Before
THE REVOLUTION

✤

AMERICA'S ANCIENT PASTS

Daniel K. Richter

ion of New England. In Boston, crowds threw Randolph and other officials in jail and forced Andros to yield control of the city's fort and join his comrades in captivity. The victors reestablished their old charter government in the name of the new Protestant monarchs and packed the tyrants on a ship bound for England. In New York, a militia led by a colonist named Jacob Leisler similarly took control of the royal fort and induced lieutenant governor Francis Nicholson to flee for the British Isles. In Maryland, meanwhile, a group calling itself the "Protestant Associators" forced the Catholic Lord Baltimore's lieutenant governor from office and, like their counterparts in Boston and New York, justified their actions in the name of William and Mary. Restoration imperialism seemed dead, and the planters once again seemed firmly in control—if "control" was the right word to describe the fragile power of those who presided over the shattered economies and societies of New England and the Chesapeake.

TWELVE

Revolution, War, and a New Transatlantic Order

"WHEREAS HIS LATE Majesty King William the Third, then Prince of Orange, did, with an armed Force, undertake a glorious Enterprize, for delivering this Kingdom from Popery and Arbitrary Power; and divers Subjects of this Realm, well-affected to their Country, joined and assisted His late Majesty in the said Enterprize; and it having pleased Almighty God to crown the same with Success, the late happy Revolution did take Effect, and was established." Or so it looked from the year 1710, when members of the House of Lords voted to impeach a clergyman named Henry Sacheverell for daring publicly to question the legitimacy of the events of 1688–1689.[1] Britons on both sides of the Atlantic would one day tell themselves that King William, patriotic subjects, and the Protestant god had created a happy world of liberty and prosperity where people were free of the twin evils of "Popery and Arbitrary Power."

Yet a closer look reveals much older forces at work—forces familiar to progenitors, conquistadores, traders, planters, and imperialists alike: war and the expansion of the imperial state. In many respects, imperialism after the Glorious Revolution looked much the same as before. Three major factors made all the difference, however. The resolutely Protestant domestic and foreign policy of the new regime removed the ideological dissonance that had always rendered Stuart patriotism suspect. William's unquestioned Protestantism led not only to a religiously congruent war with France, but to a war that, because of the parallel tracks on which the two empires had been running, quickly spilled over into North America. And the nature of the French and Spanish empires in North America ensured

that Native peoples, north and south, would be in the thick of the fighting. This had the ironic consequence of creating a firm place within the imperial system both for a set of powerful Indian nations and for the English planter regimes that otherwise would just as soon have seen the Indians dead.

Looking back on it, one sees that there *was* much to find glorious in the "happy Revolution" begun in 1688. On receiving the crown of England, William and Mary agreed to a Declaration of Rights, which was subsequently incorporated into a Bill of Rights adopted by Parliament in 1689. Responding to a list of specific acts through which "the Late King *James* the Second, by the assistance of divers Evil Counsellors, Judges and Ministers Employed by him, did endeavour to Subvert and Extirpate the Protestant Religion and the Laws and Liberties of this Kingdom," the members of the Lords and Commons spelled out English men's "Ancient Rights and Liberties." Monarchs had no power to suspend or ignore acts of Parliament or to establish courts, levy taxes, or maintain standing armies without the consent of the Lords and Commons. Parliamentary debate had to be free, and elections frequent. "Subjects which are Protestants" had the right to bear "Arms for Their Defence suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by Law." All English men had rights to petition the king without fear of persecution for their opinions, to be allowed jury trials, and to be free of "Excessive Bail," "excessive Fines," and "Cruel and Unusual Punishments."[2]

Only by agreeing to protect these rights were William and Mary and their heirs entitled to assume the throne—or at least that was the official line. And, the same dogma insisted, only by the presumed freedom of Protestantism could English liberties be preserved. "Whereas it hath been found by Experience that it is inconsistent with the Safety and Welfare of this Protestant Kingdom to be Governed by a Popish Prince, or by any King or Queen Marrying a Papist," Parliament decreed "that all and every Person and Persons that . . . shall Profess the Popish Religion, or shall Marry a Papist, shall be Excluded and be for ever uncapable to Inherit, Possess or Enjoy the Crown and Government of this Realm." Moreover, should a future monarch go over to the side of the Antichrist, "the People of these Realms shall be and are hereby Absolved of their Allegiance," as if that monarch "were naturally Dead."[3]

"Popery and Arbitrary Power" thus became more strongly linked than ever in English minds, with England's Protestant liberty guaranteed by a novel contractual theory of monarchy that philosophers such as John Locke were busy codifying. The Bill of Rights defined the obligations of kings and queens to protect the liberties of their subjects, whose allegiance depended upon royal fulfillment of those obligations. The same contractual theory prevailed in Scotland, where William and Mary agreed to a "Claim of Right" drafted by the northern kingdom's parliament. This document outdid the English Bill of Rights both in its list of particulars and in its portrayal of the former king as a "profest *Papist*" who "did by the Advice of Wicked and Evil Counsellers Invade the Fundamental Constitution of this Kingdom, and Altered it from a Legal Limited Monarchy, to an Arbitrary Despotick Power."[4]

Just as integral to the Revolution as the Bill of Rights and the Claim of Right, and just as integral to what the revolutionaries understood to be their victory over Popery and Arbitrary Power, was the Toleration Act that the English Parliament passed in 1689. With Anglican Royalists discredited, this statute removed nearly all legal restraints from Protestants who behaved themselves, paid their taxes (including levies that supported the state Church establishment), and agreed not to "worship with the doors locked, barred, or bolted" (and thus not to hatch plots or celebrate Mass out of the sight of authorities and neighbors). All one had to do was to swear—or, if one was a Quaker or some other dissenter who thought oath taking was sacrilege, to declare publicly—that he would "be true and faithful to King William and Queen Mary" and "renounce, as impious and heretical, that damnable doctrine and position, That princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope . . . may be deposed or murdered by their subjects," to "profess faith" in the Christian Trinity, and to "acknowledge the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given by divine inspiration."[5] These declarations did not exactly guarantee full religious liberty; Roman Catholics and Jews were defiantly excluded, and a Test Act continued to limit officeholding to communicants in the established Anglican Church. But English Protestants had at last declared something like the spiritual truce envisioned by the founders of Carolina—and by the detested Stuarts.

The fact that those detested Stuarts remained very much part of the picture was also an important aspect of the Revolution. A popular song bravely proclaimed that

The Pillars of Popery now are blown down,
One thousand six hundred eighty and eight,
Which has frighten'd our Monarch away from his Crown,
One thousand six hundred eighty and eight.
For *Myn Heer* did appear, and they scamper'd for fear,
One thousand six hundred eighty and eight.[6]

Those whom Heer William sent scampering settled with James in his court in exile, on a French estate provided by Louis XIV. The Sun King, like the pope and much of the rest of Catholic Europe, continued to recognize James VII and II—and after him his son James Francis Edward, the "Old Pretender" whose birth in 1688 had helped spark the Revolution—as the legitimate "Jacobite" claimants to the Scottish and English thrones. When William brought England into his War of the League of Augsburg, he linked the fate of the Revolution to military victory over the French. As in the days of Elizabeth I, England's national independence again became inseparable from hatred of Catholics.

If anything, the link was stronger in North America than in the British Isles. War, fear of war, and anti-Catholic bigotry had permeated the movements to overthrow the Dominion of New England and the proprietary government of Maryland. On the eve of the revolutions, memories of Bacon's Rebellion and King Philip's War were still fresh, and planters feared that surviving Indians would make common cause with the French to settle old scores. In this context, Restoration imperialism's concern for the rights of Native peoples put governors in the same unpopular position that William Berkeley had occupied in the 1670s, but with an added suspicion that a papist plot was behind it all. "We are every day threatned with the Loss of our Lives, Liberties, and Estates . . . by the Practices and Machinations that are on foot to betray us to the *French, Northern,* and other *Indians,* of which, some have been dealt withal, and others Invited to Assist in our Destruction," Maryland's revolutionaries complained in their printed "Declaration of the Reasons and Motives for the Present Appearing in Arms of Their Majesties Protestant Subjects."[7]

From places such as Maryland and New England, therefore, the Covenant Chain diplomacy of New York's Governor Andros, and his efforts to resettle Native refugees from the conflicts of the 1670s under Iroquois protection, looked deeply suspicious. Yet many people in the province of New York (before it became part of the Dominion) and in the villages of the Haudenosaunee nations saw things quite differently, at least until the mid-1680s. Not only did Andros's policies revive a mutually profitable trade between Albany and Iroquoia; they also helped the duke's governor build political support, both among Dutch- and English-speaking traders who reaped the profits and among Iroquois leaders who hoped to escape French hegemony. Emboldened and supplied by these alliances, in the early 1680s anti-French Iroquois resumed large-scale military campaigns against the Great Lakes nations whom the French considered part of their empire. Haudenosaunee people further declared their independence from the *pax gallica* by expelling Jesuit priests from their communities. In the summer of 1687, these acts provoked some two thousand French and allied Native troops to invade the country of the Senecas, the westernmost Iroquois nation, and sack all of its major towns.

Still knowing nothing of the revolution in the British Isles, English North Americans thus had their worst fears confirmed: French armies were on the move, and James's governors were doing nothing about it. Andros seemed to confirm these fears in a public council held at Albany in October 1688, when he urged the Iroquois to halt retaliatory strikes on La Nouvelle-France. "You have had notice of the truce made by our Great King [James] putting a stop to the French invading this Government, or annoying you further, or your continuing any acts of hostility towards them; which is punctually to be observed," he announced, with a surreal assurance that "you may go and hunt as formerly and need have no other regard to the French . . . then as they are our friends to do them no harm."[8] Similarly, the Dominion governor appealed for calm when he heard reports that French-allied refugees from King Philip's War had killed several English people on the upper Connecticut River. And when jumpy colonists and Wabanakis on the Maine frontier began capturing and shooting each other, he (rightly) laid most of the blame on the English. Andros then marched a six-hundred-strong army, dragooned from throughout southern New England to Maine, on what his critics called either a wild goose chase, an expedition too much inclined to talking with (rather than killing) Indians, or a fiendish plot to leave southern towns defenseless by taking their militiamen away from home. "We are again Briar'd in the Perplexities of another *Indian War;* how, or why, is a mystery too deep for us to unfold," the Boston revolutionaries wrote in the

printed justification of their actions. "The whole War hath been so managed, that we can't but suspect in it, a branch of the Plot, *to bring us Low.*"[9]

There was nothing happy, then, about the mood of the North Americans who carried out their own versions of the Glorious Revolution in 1689. The mood was not confined to the three colonies that erupted in open revolt. Restless Virginians, for instance, still recalling Berkeley's "french Despotick Methods," had endured even more from their governor, Francis Howard, Baron Howard of Effingham. He arrived in 1684 and enacted a Stuart agenda of personal control of appointments to office, government by royal proclamation, and rule without representative institutions; he dismissed the House of Burgesses in 1685. Virginians seem to have refrained from joining the uprisings only because Effingham happened to have sailed for England shortly before word of the revolution reached the colony, upon which the council ruling in his absence promptly proclaimed the province's loyalty to William and Mary.

In Boston, New York, and St. Mary's City, meanwhile, the revolutionaries claimed that they had risen up only under the direst of circumstances, and they explicitly linked their actions to those taking place across the Atlantic. "We did nothing against these Proceedings, but only cry to our God," said the Bostonians, until "informed that the rest of the English *America* . . . [was] Alarmed with just and great fears, that they may be attaqu'd by the *French*," and "(though the *Governour* has taken all imaginable care to keep us all ignorant thereof) that the Almighty God hath been pleased to prosper the noble undertaking of the Prince of *Orange*, to preserve the Three Kingdoms from the horrible brinks of Popery and Slavery."[10]

Even more fevered rhetoric came from Maryland, where the revolutionaries recalled their "great Grief and Consternation, upon the first News of the great Overture and happy Change in *England*." But instead of celebrating deliverance from arbitrary power,

> We found our selves surrounded with Strong and Violent Endeavours from our *Governours* here, being the Lord *Baltemore*'s Deputies and Representatives, to defeat us of the same.
> We still find all the means used by there very Persons and their Agents; *Jesuits, Priests,* and lay *Papists,* that Art or Malice can suggest, to divert the Obedience and Loyalty of the Inhabitants from Their Most Sacred *Maj-*

esties, to that height of Impudence, that solumn Masses and Prayers are used (*as we have very good Information*) in their *Chappels* and *Oratories* for the prosperous success of the *Popish* Forces in *Ireland,* and the *French* Designs against *England,* whereby they would involve us in the same Crime of Disloyalty with themselves, and render us Obnoxious to the Insupportable Displeasure of Their Majesties.[11]

Much of this language, of course, came from men desperate to ally themselves in print with the new regime across the Atlantic, in order to avoid being hanged as traitors. Yet the hope that the new monarchs would rescue their North American subjects from tyranny, popery, the French, and the Indians was genuine.

Everywhere, the broader target was the political and social order that had taken shape in the Restoration era—for which the shorthand phrase was "Popery and Arbitrary Power." *The Declaration, of the Gentlemen, Merchants, and Inhabitants of Boston, and the Countrey Adjacent,* written, probably by clergyman Cotton Mather, to justify the overthrow of Andros, reads like a conspiratorial critique of everything associated with Restoration imperialism—not just its Catholicism masquerading as religious toleration, but its disdain for representative assemblies, its imposition of the Navigation Acts, its schemes to enrich a well-connected few, its feudal dreams of a docile agricultural labor force, and its assaults on the privileges of small planters. The Bostonians traced all of these things to the same sources as the alleged Popish Plot to assassinate Charles II in 1678. In the spirit of that conspiracy, Edward Randolph ("a man for his *Malice* and *Fals-hood* well known unto us all") had engineered the repeal of the Massachusetts Bay charter, leaving the colony "without any liberty for an Assembly, which the other *American Plantations* have." Enforcement of the Navigation Acts served "to damp and spoyl" New England's trade, while in other ways "care was taken to load Preferments principally upon such Men as were strangers to, and haters of the People." Andros's minions allegedly believed "that the people in *New-England* were all *Slaves* and the only difference between them and *Slaves* is their not being bought and sold." And "because these things could not make us miserable fast enough, there was a notable Discovery made, of, we know not what *flaw* in all our *Titles to our Lands.*" Legal proceedings were "served on People; that after all their sweat and their cost upon their formerly purchased Lands, thought themselves *Free holders* of what they

had." Having thus seized choice real estate, "the Governour caused the Lands . . . to be measured out, for his Creatures to take possession of."[12]

Given all this, the New Englanders believed they "ought surely to follow the Patterns which the Nobility, Gentry and Commonalty in several parts of the Kingdom have set before us, though *they* therein have chiefly proposed to prevent what *we* already endure."[13] As in England and Scotland, the revolution in Boston involved a major show of military force; and, as in Bacon's Virginia, that force was in the form of militias self-mobilized in the name of the people. After months of rumors, in early April 1689 a ship from the West Indies brought news that William had invaded England. Andros, seemingly confirming every suspicion about him, arrested the bearer of the tidings on charges of sedition. Within two weeks, apparently spontaneously but clearly with careful planning, more than a thousand armed men appeared in the streets of the city. A self-designated "Council of Safety"—composed of representatives elected under the former charter, a group of Andros's appointed council members who had defected, and several prominent merchants and clergy—maintained order while Andros, Randolph, the commander of a royal navy ship in the harbor, and two dozen other officials sat in prison. Within two months, the pre-Dominion system of government was back in business, awaiting the royal pleasure. By midsummer, the previous regimes in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Plymouth had similarly reestablished themselves, though not always without internal controversy.

Whatever controversies there might have been in southern New England, they paled next to the bitter struggles that the Glorious Revolution spawned in New York, though the overthrow of James II's government occurred bloodlessly there as well. In New England, the form of government under the Dominion was an innovation that provoked virtually unanimous opposition among forces that otherwise were inclined to be at each other's throats. In New York, it grew organically from the conquest regime that Andros himself had created a decade and a half earlier. Much as Berkeley had previously done in Virginia, Andros and Thomas Dongan (who succeeded Andros before his return as governor of the Dominion and who was a professed Roman Catholic) had cultivated support among a sector of the local elite. This faction had profited from control of the fur trade, from a thriving market in other exports and imports, from land grants, from the perquisites of office, and from an economy more prosperous than it had been in the final days of the Dutch regime. Many of its members were recently arrived English-speakers, but some were longtime Dutch colonists who threw in their lot with the new regime. Opposing these "anglicizers" were others who considered themselves locked out of a political order dominated by English overlords. Like the general population of Nieu Nederlandt, this group included people from many different ethnic backgrounds. Among them were German-speakers such as the militia captain who emerged as the revolutionaries' leader, Jacob Leisler. But most identified with the Dutch language and the Calvinist Dutch Reformed Church, and thus felt a particular affinity with England's new Dutch Protestant king.

In June 1689, these "Leislerians" engineered New York's Glorious Revolution and, with a show of militia strength, forced Andros's lieutenant governor, Francis Nicholson, to surrender the government and the city's fort. While their actions resembled those of the Bostonians after whom they modeled themselves, the Leislerians encountered resistance at every step from anglicizer opponents, who came to be known by default as "Anti-Leislerians." New York's Glorious Revolution thus quickly turned into a struggle over which of two competing elites would win the new monarchs' approval. The terms of the struggle became clear when the anglicizers who controlled Albany refused to recognize the authority of Leisler's New York City Council of Safety. Calling themselves a "convention," the Albany leaders issued their own proclamation of loyalty to William and Mary and conducted their own diplomacy with the Haudenosaunee people, who were again vigorously fighting the common French enemy. Only in February 1690, when a French and allied Indian army destroyed the town of Schenectady a few miles away, were the Albany Anti-Leislerians frightened into a begrudging alliance with the Leislerians.

Maryland faced no such immediate French threat, despite wild rumors that the papists and the Seneca Iroquois were plotting an attack. Still, if there was anywhere that Protestant hatred of Catholics would seem to have a basis in reality, it was in this colony. Maryland's priests supposedly prayed for James's triumph, and its proprietary officials publicly refused to acknowledge the new monarchs even after William and Mary had been proclaimed king and queen in neighboring Virginia in April 1689. Maryland, chartered by Charles II in 1632 and in many ways the model for the proprietary colonies established after the Restoration, had never, strictly

speaking, been a Catholic colony. The Calvert family, the Lords Baltimore, were themselves Catholics and certainly intended their territory to be a refuge for their English coreligionists. Yet the majority of planters and servants who emigrated to the colony were indistinguishable from those who had settled next door in Virginia. The usual mix of moderate Church of England conformists and varied hot Protestant dissenters had no sympathy with the proprietor's religious convictions, and they looked with suspicion on the private chapels where priests practiced rites outlawed in the British Isles. Religious, political, and economic strife had reached a peak during a chaotic mid-1640s period known as the "plundering time" and during the Cromwell era, when control, such as it was, slipped in and out of the Calvert family's hands.

After 1660, the proprietorship (held by Cecilius Calvert, Second Baron Baltimore, until his death in 1675, and thereafter by Charles Calvert, Third Baron Baltimore) ruled with the usual tendencies of Restoration imperialism. Religious toleration was the official policy—which inevitably led the Protestant majority to argue that papists were favored. A monumental Catholic church, constructed of brick in the capital of St. Mary's City during the late 1660s, drove home the message. Meanwhile, the representativeness and authority of the colony's elected legislature receded. In 1670, free men who did not own property lost the right to vote, as they did in Virginia the same year. A few years later, Cecilius Calvert unilaterally declared that only two representatives, rather than four, should be elected from each county. The proprietors, their lieutenant governors, and a small circle of appointed councillors ignored laws passed by the assembly and asserted powers similar to those that James II claimed at home. Like the Green Spring faction in Virginia, like the anglicizers in New York, and, indeed, like the puritan proprietors of New England's towns, this group monopolized officeholding and manipulated land grants and other resources for their own benefit—in a context of depressed tobacco prices and general poverty. Religious hatreds merely gave a harder edge to the kind of elite stranglehold on power that was familiar almost everywhere in English North America on the eve of the Glorious Revolution.

Even when Cecilius Calvert, issuing edicts from England, tried to rule in what he considered the interests of ordinary colonists, the arbitrariness of the proprietary system came to the fore. In 1666, Virginia's Berkeley had convinced a reluctant Maryland assembly and Charles Calvert (then Cecilius's lieutenant governor on the scene) to agree that both Chesa-

peake colonies would stop growing tobacco for a year, in hopes of raising prices for the leaf. Cecilius promptly vetoed the agreement, "haveing duely considered the great Inconveniences which may follow from the same not onely to the *poorer* sorte of the planters within Our said Province, But alsoe to the Kings most Excellent Majestie in relation to his Majesties Customes." The pronouncement, "given under Our hand and Seale . . . in the 35th Yeare of Our Dominion over our said Province," led hypocritical members of Virginia's Green Spring faction to complain that the "absolute and Princely Tearmes" of Baltimore's Royal We language and Cecilius's "unlimited and (it appeares to us) Independent power and authority" left "his owne Province weithering and decaying in distresse and poverty."[14]

Against a background of many such episodes, hundreds of withered and distressed militiamen calling themselves "Protestant Associators" appeared in St. Mary's City in late July 1689. At their head, playing the role of Jacob Leisler or Nathaniel Bacon, was a longtime assembly representative and critic of the regime named John Coode. Playing the role of Edmund Andros—but emphatically not that of the trigger-happy William Berkeley—Charles Calvert's lieutenant governor William Joseph and his outnumbered troops surrendered without a shot. No one in the English-speaking world better articulated the contractual theory at the core of the transatlantic Glorious Revolution than the Maryland Associators, as they made their case in print. "Looking upon our selves, Discharged, Dissolved, and Free from all manner of Duty, Obligation, or Fidelity, to the Deputies, Governours, or Chief Magistrates here, . . . *They having Departed from their Allegiance* (upon which alone our said Duty and Fidelity to them depends) and by their Complices and Agents endeavoured the Destruction of our Religion, Lives, Liberties, and Properties, all which they are bound to Protect," Marylanders had been compelled "*to take up Arms, to Preserve, Vindicate, and Assert the Sovereign Dominion, and Right, of King* WILLIAM *and Queen* MARY."[15]

It was one thing for disaffected English Americans to rise up in the name of what they understood to be the principles of William and Mary. It was another to get those in power at the imperial center to accept the colonial rebels' assertions. And it was another thing entirely for a semblance of political stability to emerge out of the chaos in Boston, New York, and St.

Mary's City, or, for that matter, in London and Edinburgh. Little was certain in 1689 and early 1690, as the fragile new regimes in New York and Boston struggled to deal with the French and Indian attacks they had long feared, and as the silence remained deafening from an imperial center preoccupied with war and rebellion closer to home. Only after another chaotic quarter-century would the Revolution finally appear to be Glorious.

Nothing was more important in determining the fate of the transatlantic revolutions than the wars with the French empire that William III and II had begun on the European continent before invading England in 1688 and that the Haudenosaunee Iroquois had begun in North America several years earlier. William's War of the League of Augsburg (recalled in the colonies as "King William's War" and elsewhere as the "Nine Years War") continued until 1697. Five years later, and a few months after William died and the throne passed to Mary's sister Anne, England and the Netherlands again battled France in the War of the Spanish Succession ("Queen Anne's War"), which—provoked by the heirless death of Carlos II—did not end until 1714. On both sides of the Atlantic, the sheer length of these struggles between Protestant Britons and Catholic French burned the language of antipopery into Anglo-American consciousnesses, while the pressures of war forced quarreling factions to accept political arrangements that they otherwise might have resisted. In England, supporters and doubters of the Revolution alike—those who came to be called "Whigs" and Anglican Royalist-descended "Tories," respectively—had to compete for the titles of true patriots, true Protestants, true experts in managing the war, and, ultimately, true defenders of the political arrangements patched together in 1688 and 1689. In Ireland, war and revolution made a mockery of the liberties that the English so proudly proclaimed. In Scotland, the northern kingdom's parliament had to accept its own destruction and full union with England. And in the colonies, similarly, the pressures of war forced elites to acknowledge a degree of centralized imperial control that few could have anticipated in 1689.

As had been the case for centuries everywhere in Western Europe, the consolidation of state power became inseparable from the making of war. In England, conflicts at the turn of the eighteenth century strengthened the State in countless ways, while entrenching the regime created in 1688–1689. Most notable among these developments was an ever-stronger alliance between wealthy subjects and the government, epitomized by Parliament's creation of the Bank of England in 1694. In return for an initial loan to the king of £1.2 million, a group of urban merchants and landed aristocrats led by the Scots financier William Paterson received a royal charter as the "Governor and Company of the Banke of England."[16] The bank did not formally receive a monopoly on such activities as "dealeing in Bills of Exchange or in buying or selling Bullion Gold or Silver," and would not for many decades acquire the functions we today associate with a nation's central bank. Indeed, "monopoly" was becoming a bad word among merchants who had chafed under James's many royal proprietaries and companies. But the bank's titanic capitalization (the loan to the government counted as its stock) and its income from annual government interest payments of a near-usurious 8 percent, payable quarterly along with various management fees, gave it an economic power almost no other English entity could match. England at last had a financial equivalent to the Dutch East India and West India companies.

Perhaps more important, the creation of the Bank of England set a pattern that the British state would follow throughout the eighteenth century. Massive loans made military exploits and other governmental activities possible; by the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, the total government debt stood at roughly £40 million. Creditors received both substantial return on their investments and the right to buy and sell at a profit the securities that carried the debt. The government in turn paid the interest on its loans through earmarked taxes approved by representatives of the investors in Parliament. (In 1694, for example, this tax was a complicated levy on the tonnage of merchant vessels; more frequently, excise taxes on particular goods paid the bills.) An iron circle thus took shape: the government got the resources it needed through loans funded by taxes voted by its creditors, who had a vital interest in the survival of the government and its system of debt and taxation. James II had collected about 3 percent of the national income in taxes. By 1715 the regime was reaping nearly 9 percent, and, while many grumbled, few with real power seriously complained. The fiscal-military state had at last solved the problem of the *adelantados*: subjects' impersonal money and credit, rather than their unpredictable personal service and private loans, now did the bidding of the king, who could enforce his (and Parliament's) will through something resembling a professional bureaucracy. War, debt, and taxes—rather than King William's arms, patriotic subjects, and the blessings of the Protestant god—secured the fate of England's late happy revolution.

Elsewhere in the British Isles, external conflict with the French merged with internal war against opponents of the new regime to create less happy outcomes—outcomes that would create new outflows of immigrants to North America, once relative peace returned. The deposed King James invaded Ireland in March 1689, with hefty military and financial support from Louis XIV. In July 1690, William III and II personally led the army that defeated the Jacobites at the Battle of the Boyne, but not before a deepened legacy of religious and political hatreds had been bequeathed to the island. In an attempt to rally support, James had summoned an Irish parliament, in which Catholics, who had been barred from sitting in the body since 1652, passed legislation confiscating the lands of the Protestants who had confiscated Catholic lands after the Cromwellian conquests. After William's victory, a new parliament—with its membership once again restricted to Protestants—undid these measures and, over the next several decades, passed increasingly punitive "penal laws" restricting the political, legal, and economic rights of the three-quarters of the population who were Catholic.

Meantime, England's parliament, determined that Ireland should never again provide a base for French and Jacobite threats, chipped away at the independence of the western kingdom and its already unrepresentative legislature. Under these conditions, nothing like religious toleration even for dissenting Protestants took hold in Ireland. Local power rested with a small elite among the 10 percent of the population affiliated with the legally sanctioned Protestant bishops of the Church of Ireland. The tens of thousands of dissenting Presbyterians who constituted a majority of the population in the northern province of Ulster fared better than their Catholic neighbors, but still remained ineligible to serve in their kingdom's parliament and in other ways suffered political, economic, and social marginalization.

In Lowland Scotland, it was Presbyterians who seized the right to label all other Protestants dissenters. One of the northern kingdom's first acts after the revolution was to abolish the on-again, off-again system of bishops that had been so controversial since the days of James VI and I and to affirm the Calvinist Presbyterian Kirk as the state Church. Surviving Scottish bishops and a dwindling band of their followers in what later came to be called the "Church of Scotland" found themselves in a legal limbo compounded by the suspicion that their real sympathies were with the Jacobites and Catholics. Gaelic-speaking Highland Scots, most of whom, like their Gaelic Irish counterparts, actually were practicing Catholics, were a more reliable and more numerous threat to the Protestant monarchy because of ancient prejudices and oppression by Scots-speaking Lowlanders.

As with Ireland, then, Scotland remained a constant source of worry to the English elite, which was busily marrying its economic future to a Protestant fiscal-military state. Pressure mounted for a formal union of the two kingdoms that had shared a common monarch (when there was one) for a century. Understandably, the Scottish parliament resisted these efforts, but ultimately the northern kingdom's failure to develop the kind of fiscal order that was taking hold in England forced its leaders to submit. The crisis came in 1707, after the spectacular collapse of an effort to establish an independent Scottish Atlantic empire. Hundreds of thousands of pounds, including most of the capital of the Bank of Scotland (organized in 1695 by the same William Paterson who masterminded the Bank of England) flowed into a turn-of-the-century scheme to plant a colony in the Darien region of the Isthmus of Panama. Done in by disease and by instructions from King William that English ships and colonial governors were not to provide aid, the vast majority of the thousands of colonists shipped there perished, and the Scottish state found itself virtually bankrupt. English parliamentarians' promise to assume the debt—along with handsome personal bribes to key Scottish legislators—led to the Act of Union that created the United Kingdom. In exchange for financial benefits and a modest number of seats in the houses of Commons and Lords, Scotland lost its parliament (for nearly three centuries, as things turned out) but retained its distinctive religious and legal systems. Popular discontent with the union contributed to the excitement attending the invasion of Scotland by James's now-adult son, the Old Pretender James Francis Edward, in 1715—but the "Fifteen," as the uprising came to be known, was quickly subdued.

By then, the successor to Queen Anne—the reliably Protestant George I, who had been imported from the German electorate of Hanover under the terms of a parliamentary Act of Succession—seemed secure on the throne not only of his Three Kingdoms but of his many provinces in North America and the West Indies. In the colonies, few of the financial issues that were so determinative in England and Scotland had much relevance,

and nothing resembling a fiscal-military state would emerge before the twentieth century. Nonetheless, wars at the turn of the eighteenth century solidified a new political order in the western portion of Britain's Atlantic empire. After 1715, British North Americans too could look back on happy results of the Glorious Revolution. But only in blinkered hindsight could that possibly seem to be the case.

Whatever Leislerians, New Englanders, Associators, and other North Americans may have hoped for in 1689, those making decisions in the court of William and Mary approached the task of governing their empire in much the same way as had those at the courts of Charles II and James II. To a large degree, this was because many of the same people remained in charge, most notably William Blathwayt, longtime right-hand man of James as duke and king, the omnipresent Edward Randolph, and many members of the Lords of Trade, the committee that, since 1675, had held responsibility for advising the king on colonial affairs. Even the deposed Edmund Andros returned to North America, as governor of Virginia from 1692 to 1698 and of Maryland from 1693 to 1694. There was moderation in only two themes of Restoration imperialism—the disdain for elected assemblies and the penchant for handing out proprietary land grants to royal favorites—and these turned out to be important exceptions indeed. But on other matters, particularly increasing central control, strengthening the Navigation Acts, insisting on religious toleration, restraining colonial expropriation of Native lands, promoting enslaved African labor, and enriching royal coffers, the new regime was virtually indistinguishable from the old.

That the North American planters who rebelled in the name of William and Mary could hardly expect complete fulfillment of their dreams first became clear in New York. Among the three provinces that overthrew governors in 1689, this was the first to receive direct, if ambiguously interpreted, instructions from the imperial center. In December 1689, a packet dated nearly four months earlier arrived from the monarchs' privy council, addressed "to our loving friends Francis Nicholson Esquire their Majesty's Lieutenant Governor . . . And in his absence to such as for the time being take care for preserving the Peace and administring the Laws."[17] Leisler, fitting the latter description, opened the packet, followed its instructions to issue an official proclamation of allegiance to William and Mary, and took to calling himself their majesties' lieutenant governor.

That the packet was addressed to Andros's deposed underling should

have given some indication that those in the imperial center were disinclined to approve of Leisler's actions and leaned toward the views of the Anti-Leislerians. Nicholson reinforced that disinclination when he himself reached London and filled the ears of the Lords of Trade with the Anti-Leislerian side of the story. The man Leisler belatedly sent to court as his agent—a Dutch-speaking mere ensign and tavernkeeper named Joost Stoll, who was introduced with a letter remarkable even by seventeenth-century standards for its poor spelling and odd syntax—had no credibility as a counterweight. Several weeks before Leisler opened his packet in New York, and several days before Stoll delivered his written case in London, the Crown had already named a career military man named Henry Sloughter as the new governor of New York.

A host of problems, including a shipwreck, kept Sloughter from taking up his post until March 1691. In the long interim, Leisler and his counterparts in New England did their best to manage the war that had broken out with the French. In early 1689, the court of Louis XIV, understanding more quickly than its English counterparts the potential importance of North America to the international struggle, approved a request from the governor of La Nouvelle-France for an expedition intended not only to crush the Iroquois, but to destroy their supply base at Albany as well. As with Sloughter's voyage, however, the transport of royal troops under the command of former and now-reappointed governor Louis de Buade, comte de Frontenac, endured endless delays. When the troops finally arrived, they were too few in number and too late in the fall to do the job. The only things that could be managed over the winter and spring of 1690 were three raids by French and allied Native forces. The one that sacked Schenectady in February was followed by assaults on Salmon Falls, New Hampshire, and Falmouth, Maine.

In retaliation—and to demonstrate, both to their own people and to anyone paying attention in London, their zeal for the Protestant cause—Leisler and his New England revolutionary counterparts planned a grand two-pronged invasion of La Nouvelle-France. While a New England fleet sailed down the St. Lawrence, thousands of New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Iroquois forces were to march overland through the Lake Champlain Valley. The attempted invasion was nearly a complete disaster. A Massachusetts fleet captured Port Royal in Acadia from the French but bungled its assault on Québec, retreating with heavy losses. Meanwhile, fewer than half of the English troops pledged for the land assault reported

for duty, and a smallpox epidemic kept all but a handful of Iroquois at home as well. Apart from much finger pointing among revolutionaries and their domestic opponents, the only result was a raid that destroyed the French settlement of La Prairie, near Montréal.

Amid these fiascos, horror set in among colonial populations already primed to see devilish papists and hostile Indians around every corner. In the Massachusetts hamlet of Salem Village, the climate of fear, along with the absence of an effective central government to restrain zealous locals, helped unleash a flurry of witchcraft accusations that tore the community apart in late 1691 and early 1692. It was not the witchcraft accusations themselves that were unusual; throughout the seventeenth century and on both sides of the Atlantic, unexplained illnesses or other strange goings-on occasionally led to accusations of witchcraft against a party deemed responsible. Frequently this was an elderly woman known for her outspokenness, cantankerousness, or perhaps even her control of property coveted by enemies. Salem Village—an outlying district of the seaport of Salem Town with a particularly unfortunate history of economic impoverishment, political infighting, and, most recently, a high death rate among soldiers in Andros's ineffective war against the Wabanakis—was the kind of troubled community in which witchcraft accusations might almost be predicted. That the minister of the equally troubled local church, Samuel Parris, had been a failure in everything he had previously done and was inclined to make the omnipresence of the Devil the main theme of his sermons only increased the fears and suspicions of his parishioners. The first two alleged victims of witchcraft were Parris's daughter and his niece, and the first alleged witch was his slave Tituba, a Native American woman who had been captured and sold away from papist Spanish domains, perhaps in La Florida. With her combination of links to Catholicism and Indians, and her presumed skill in satanic arts, she was almost a too-perfect embodiment of everything the villagers feared.

What was less predictable was how, over the next weeks and months, the accusations of witchcraft spiraled wildly out of control, to target well over three hundred people, inside and outside Salem Village, high and low on the social scale—all somehow or other embodying someone's personification of blame for a world spinning out of control.

In equally fearful New York City, a besieged Leisler insisted ever more zealously that he did have things under control and was merely awaiting further instructions from William and Mary. Finally, in February 1692, a regiment of English redcoats commanded by Richard Ingoldesby, a vet-

eran of William's Irish campaign, arrived at Manhattan expecting to find the still-delayed Sloughter already in power. When Ingoldesby attempted to occupy the city's fort in the name of his governor and his monarch, Leisler demanded to see official instructions empowering him to do so. Ingoldesby refused, and, within a few weeks, his and Leisler's troops were shooting at each other—a situation that did not present a good first impression when Sloughter at last showed up. For two days after the governor's arrival, Leisler still refused to yield control of the fort unless he saw appropriate royal paperwork. When the surrender finally did take place, a hasty trial condemned Leisler and seven supporters to death as traitors. Sloughter—in a classic display of the mixture of mercy and terror by which European rulers asserted their authority—pardoned six of the condemned, but ensured that Leisler and his closest lieutenant, Jacob Milborne, dropped from the gallows. Before they died, they were cut down so they could be beheaded while still alive. Sloughter showed his mercy by not carrying out the court's full sentence, which stipulated disemboweling and burning the excised guts while the men were still alive and quartering their headless corpses.

Despite the Anti-Leislerian sympathies of the Lords of Trade, Sloughter had not been sent to mutilate traitors but to impose what would become the template for future governments throughout British North America. According to his official royal instructions, which carried the force of law, his rank was "Captain General and Governor in Chief." These military titles gave him supreme authority over all of the province's military forces—including the militias that had caused so much trouble elsewhere in recent years—but placed strict limits on how that power could be used. On his own initiative, a captain general could wage war only defensively, in response to aggression by Native peoples or foreign European powers. Offensive campaigns required explicit direction from the Crown. To assist him in his military as well as civil duties, Sloughter was to nominate a small group of the most prominent colonists to serve as his council, but the nominations had to be forwarded to the Lords of Trade and the Crown, which would make the actual appointments. "From time to time as need shall require," the governor was "to summon and call generall Assemblies of the Inhabitants being Freeholders," which was to say that property-owning males had the right to elect representatives to a legislature.[18]

Members of the assembly, the council, and all other office holders had

to take the two oaths prescribed by the English Bill of Rights, ensuring religious toleration for all Protestants as well as loyalty to the Protestant monarchy. Laws and taxes were to be passed by the assembly, council, and governor jointly, with the governor having the power to veto any legislation and with the provision that all laws must not only "be (as near as may be) agreeable unto the Lawes and Statutes of this our kingdome of England," but also be submitted within three months for approval or disapproval by the Crown. The governor had the right to appoint all judges, and the obligation to establish a court of admiralty with jurisdiction over crimes involving seagoing vessels, including piracy and violations of the Navigation Acts. Subjects, meanwhile, had the right to appeal judicial decisions to the Lords of Trade and the Crown, and to petition the monarch directly on any matter.[19] These latter provisions, of course, flew in the face of Sloughter's hasty execution of Leisler and Milborne, and, had the governor not died only a few months after taking office, he might have been fired. The Lords of Trade were soon responding to petitions from New York by urging reconciliation between Leislerians and Anti-Leislerians. By 1695, these efforts convinced Parliament to pass a bill posthumously reversing the treason convictions.

Such transatlantic politicking was also a part of the new imperial order. Unlike their counterparts in New York, the revolutionaries of Massachusetts and Maryland sent savvy representatives to plead their cases before the Lords of Trade and to counter the arguments of critics such as Randolph and Charles Calvert. Nonetheless, they received governments that looked very much like the one Sloughter brought to New York. In 1691, Increase Mather won several major concessions in the new royal charter that replaced the one revoked in 1684—most notably the right for the legislature (rather than the Crown) to choose the governor's council, and for the Bay Colony to absorb Plymouth and Maine. Still, what was now known as "Their Majesty's Province of the Massachusetts Bay in New England" had to accept a royally appointed governor with the limited military powers of a captain general. The new charter provided for royal disallowance or veto of legislation, a franchise based on property ownership rather than church membership, and—bitterest pill of all for puritans— religious toleration.

As in New York, controversial judicial proceedings were among the first things on the new government's agenda. Royal governor Sir William Phips appointed a special court of Oyer and Terminer to deal with the Salem witchcraft accusations, a court that quickly mired itself in the legal morass of determining what kind of evidence could be used to "prove" witchcraft. With Increase Mather and many other leading Massachusetts clergy agreeing that the legal problems were insurmountable—if the Devil is by nature a liar, how could anything associated with him be proven true?— Phips was finally able to shut the trials down and to pardon all the surviving accused in early 1693. The process was long and messy, but Salem Village's local troubles ultimately found their resolution in the transatlantic political revolution that brought Phips to power.

The transition to royal government went smoothest in Maryland. With Coode and Calvert personally arguing their cases before the Lords of Trade, the colony did not receive a charter but instead became, like New York, a royal province. Maryland received an appointed governor (whose instructions were much like Sloughter's), an appointed council, an assembly elected by property owners, and a brand of toleration that extended liberty of conscience, though not voting rights, to Catholics. Although the Calvert family thus lost the power to govern its neo-feudal domain, it retained its property rights and much of the revenue that went with them.

This, too, became standard practice. At one time or another between 1689 and 1729, the proprietors of Pennsylvania, the Jerseys, and the Carolinas all had to accept royal government. Only the Calvert family (in 1715) and the Penn family in Pennsylvania (in 1694) ever regained their rights of government—and then only by accepting strict supervision by the Lords of Trade. By the early eighteenth century, a younger generation of both families had safely converted to the Church of England from Catholicism and Quakerism, respectively. In all these waves of administrative reform, only Connecticut and Rhode Island, with prerevolutionary charters still intact, escaped the imposition of royally appointed governors—but they, too, lost much of their earlier independence.

Such governmental arrangements sometimes intentionally, sometimes by happenstance, corrected many of the structural flaws that had produced so much trouble since the Restoration. The militias and private armies that started Indian wars and overthrew governments fell (at least in theory) under centralized discipline in the name of the monarch. The entrenched, narrowly based elites that everywhere monopolized power in mid-seventeenth-century English America were not tamed, but their ranks were opened a bit and, more important, alternative centers of power emerged to hear the voices of formerly excluded opponents. Governors

who owed their (usually short-term) status to the Lords of Trade were far less likely than Berkeley, Andros, or an elected Massachusetts executive to identify with a single faction. If they did, they were likely soon to be replaced by someone charged with cleaning things up—and inclined to side with the previous administration's local opponents. Council appointments that required transatlantic political connections as well as the ear of the governor similarly broadened access to power. That these appointments were usually for life provided a serious counterweight to both governors and assemblies. Meanwhile, toleration for all Protestants and frequent elections under a franchise determined by property qualifications expanded basic political participation in Massachusetts, stabilized it in Maryland and Virginia, and reliably established it for the first time in New York. Everywhere, planters of small means secured a voice in colonial assemblies, which resumed control over powers of lawmaking and taxation that had so often been challenged in previous years. The potential for royal disallowance of legislation, and for appeals and petitions to the Crown, on the one hand checked the power of entrenched elites and on the other provided a back channel for the aggrieved to be heard.

By 1699, New York's governor already bore witness to the cumulative effect of all these reforms. In a letter to the Lords of Trade that was full of complaints about squabbling between Leislerians and Anti-Leislerians in the provincial assembly, he noted one incident in particular. "Upon reading a bill where were the words 'late happy Revolution,'" one representative "moved that the word 'happy' might be left out, for he said he did not conceive the Revolution to be happy."[20] Yet the critic voiced his complaint openly, without fear of reprisal, as an elected member of his majesty's assembly. A decade earlier, he probably would have had to take up a gun to make his point—and would have feared hanging or worse as a consequence.

Still, the disgruntled New Yorker rightly found nothing much to be happy about in the way the new governmental arrangements had taken hold. In every case, the imposition of royal rule was justified—and colonials were forced to acquiesce—by the need for strong military leadership against the French and their Native allies. Perhaps the most important key to the public acceptance of royal government in Massachusetts, for example, was the fact that the first appointee was Phips, hero of the one bona fide colo-

nial victory in the revolutionary interregnum, the assault on Acadia's Port Royal. Although not a member of an old planter family, he was a longtime resident of Massachusetts and, while critical of the puritan regime in the days of Edward Randolph, he had recently converted to Congregationalism. Military issues took on particular urgency because of the general ineptitude of colonial militias and the mere handful of royal troops that governors were sometimes able to muster. Even Phips, after all, despite his victory at Port Royal, had not been able to conquer Québec and Montréal.

In northeastern North America, the War of the League of Augsburg was almost entirely a conflict fought by Native Americans. Backed by English arms and encouragement, the Haudenosaunee Iroquois continued their struggle against La Nouvelle-France and the many Indian peoples of the Great Lakes who had been carefully mobilized by French imperial expansion since the 1660s. Backed by French arms and encouragement, those Indian peoples meantime carried on their own long-term struggle against the Haudenosaunee nations, while in the east others—refugees and descendants of refugees from King Philip's War—resumed their struggle against New Englanders.

As English colonists feared the next Native raid, papered over their internal differences, and hoped that their new Protestant monarchs and governors would save them from the papist hordes, the war turned relentlessly against the outnumbered Haudenosaunee people. In 1701, at a grand conference in Montréal attended by nearly a thousand men, women, and children from more than a dozen Indian nations allied to the French, the Iroquois made a final peace with all their ancient enemies to the north, west, and east and pledged their neutrality in future wars between France and England. In exchange, the French guaranteed Iroquois rights to hunt for furs in the Great Lakes lands of their former foes. About a month earlier, another delegation of Haudenosaunee leaders had attended a council in Albany at which they reaffirmed their Covenant Chain alliance with the government of New York, while presenting the English Crown with a deed to the same lands in which the French Crown had promised to protect their hunting rights. In their befuddlement at this unexpected gift, the English never quite grasped that the Haudenosaunee people and La Nouvelle-France really were at peace and that the Iroquois, through their simultaneous negotiations with both European powers, had imposed upon the Great Lakes a regime of neutrality between the empires.

During the War of the Spanish Succession, as a result, governors and planters who understood the need somehow to convince the Iroquois to abandon neutrality and fight for them finally began to understand the value of centralized diplomacy in the hands of strong royal government, a lesson Andros had preached as early as the 1670s. Paradoxically, the lesson might not have sunk in quite so deeply if New York had in fact *had* strong royal government during these years. From 1701 to 1710, ten different men ruled as governor, lieutenant governor, or, in the death or absence of both, senior member of the royal council. The hope of royal military and diplomatic salvation thrived in part precisely because military execution was so weak, easing colonial acceptance of what might otherwise have seemed tyrannical royal authority.

The tangled threads came together in the later years of the War of the Spanish Succession. Twice, in 1709 and 1711, Anglo-American leaders attempted what they labeled the "Glorious Enterprise," a recycling of Leisler's plan for a land and naval conquest of La Nouvelle-France. Unlike Leisler's 1690 debacle, however, this was to be a genuinely imperial, transatlantic effort, utilizing Native and English troops from North America and a fleet from Great Britain, all under the full authority of Her Majesty's captains general and under the command of none other than Francis Nicholson, the lieutenant governor deposed by Leisler in 1689. In 1709, fifteen hundred New York, New England, and Iroquois troops (who had temporarily abandoned their neutrality because they believed the French were not upholding their commitments under the 1701 peace) massed north of Albany. They sat there for weeks, awaiting arrival of the British fleet, which, they finally learned, had long since been diverted to fighting off the coast of the Iberian Peninsula.

The next year, in hopes of trying again, Nicholson and New Yorker Peter Schuyler took four young Native men to London to carry out the most grandiose transatlantic political lobbying effort ever attempted. Passed off as the "Four Indian Kings" (although only one had any claim to hereditary title), the visitors were the toast of the town and of Queen Anne's court, where the "Glorious Enterprise" was enthusiastically embraced. Nearly sixty royal navy ships and a regiment of redcoats followed the delegation back to North America. That the fleet foundered on the rocks of the Gulf of St. Lawrence and that Nicholson was again left waiting at his land base (legend says he tore off his wig and stomped on it when he heard the news that the fleet had failed) confirmed British and colonial military incompe-

tence. That so many political, military, and financial resources could be mobilized across thousands of miles of ocean and factional divides confirmed just as strongly how integrated British North America had become in the Atlantic empire created by the Glorious Revolution and a generation of warfare.

The interaction between warfare and the new Atlantic imperial order was even more convoluted in the southeast, where the feudal dreams of *The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina* had long since produced little but chaos. Two distinct population centers, separated by some two hundred fifty miles of coast, had developed in the vast tract claimed by the Carolina proprietors. Immigration to what ultimately became the separate province of North Carolina came mostly from England's oldest surviving colony, Virginia. The much larger number who settled in and around the port city of Charles Town came primarily from England's most fully developed slave-based society, Barbados. Claiming supreme power over both regions were the rivalrous descendants of the eight original proprietors. Most of them resided in England, but, at varying times, some lived in Barbados, in the colony itself, and elsewhere. There was no established procedure for appointing an on-site governor to act in the proprietors' name. The results were not only rapid turnover in the office, but constant suspicions that whoever held the post had no certain right to it. Carolina's elected Commons House of Assembly was no clearer about the extent of its powers, but missed no opportunity to try to obstruct whatever those who claimed to speak for the proprietors wanted.

This was a society with politics too disorganized even to permit a proper Glorious Revolution in 1689. In 1686, a Spanish naval attack, a devastating hurricane, and the apparently unauthorized retirement of governor James West, who abruptly moved to New York, had left a power vacuum filled by James Colleton, a descendant of the founding proprietor Sir John Colleton of Barbados. James Colleton arrived in the colony with his household the same year that James West left. Bearing the second-level *Fundamental Constitutions* title of "landgrave," he had the highest feudal rank of anyone on the scene and started acting as governor. When the assembly refused to pass legislation that Colleton deemed necessary for defense against the Spanish, he declared martial law. The populace seethed until 1691, when a proprietary heir named Seth Sothell moved to the colony

and evoked his higher rank as full proprietor and "palatine" to displace Colleton, who did not go quietly. Nor did Sothell when, a few months later, his fellow proprietors in London declared him a traitor and suspended his privileges.

This climate of virtual lawlessness shaped the kind of society that emerged in what became South Carolina. Whatever the other proprietors thought, the Colleton family always intended the region to be an extension of Barbados, a "colony of a colony" in which the sugar plantation regime they were perfecting there could be replicated on a much larger scale.[21] But as with every other orderly colonial feudal dream of Restoration imperialism, things did not quite turn out as planned. Wealthy Barbadans and their connections—who came to be known as "Goose Creek Men," for the location of their plantations—squared off against men of small means who had been pushed out of the Barbados economy as the great slaveowning planters consolidated their power.

Whatever these planters hoped to gain from relocating to Carolina, and whatever they thought of manorial grandees, they agreed with the Goose Creek Men that the enslavement of others was the key to their future prosperity. Stuck too far north to grow sugar, and confronted with the same difficulty in acquiring enslaved Africans that Virginians and other English mainlanders faced in the era when most of the Royal African Company's human cargoes went to the West Indies, the South Carolinians seized a lucrative, if—according to the high-minded declarations of the ineffectual proprietors—highly illegal, opportunity. They began to enslave and export Native people captured in wars among the region's Indians. Salem's Tituba may have been one of them.

Because the trade in Indian slaves was illegal, few records survive to document its scale, but the best estimates are that, between 1670 and 1715, thirty thousand to fifty thousand men, women, and children were shipped out of Charles Town to toil, and usually die, not only on Barbadian sugar plantations but in homes and farms in New England and the middle colonies. Unknown thousands more went to plantations in the Chesapeake and Carolina, where they constituted as much as a quarter of the enslaved population in the first decade of the eighteenth century. From a Native American perspective, what began as a profitable sideline to traditional patterns of wartime captivity evolved into regularized patterns of slave raiding for the market of Charles Town. The metal goods, cloth, and firearms that Indian people elsewhere on the continent re-

ceived in exchange for animal furs and hides here were purchased with the living bodies of vanquished Native enemies. And no wonder, for the sale of one slave could earn the same return as two hundred deerskins.[22]

A grim pattern emerged in which one decade's Native victors became the next decade's victims, and Carolinians themselves seldom had to fire a shot. The Westos, the Great Lakes Iroquoian-speaking group forced southward during the conflicts in the continental interior at midcentury, appear to have been the first to sell large numbers of their war captives to the English. By the 1660s, the Westos were already battling the Carolina region's coastal Cusabos and selling the captives they took to Virginians. By the 1670s, as English immigrants arrived from Barbados, the Carolina newcomers joined in buying the people the Westos had to sell. With such a thriving market, by the 1680s only a handful of Cusabos survived, and the Westos were the next to be enslaved—by another group recently transplanted from the north, the Algonquian-speaking Savannahs, also known as Shawnees. In the 1690s, the Shawnees in turn fell victim to Siouan-speaking groups from the Carolina Piedmont. Meantime, the mission towns of La Florida also began to be raided for slaves, by the varied Muskogean-speaking peoples later known to the English as Yamasees and Creeks, both of whom had apparently long been resisting incorporation into the *pax hispanica* in the south just as the Iroquois had been resisting the *pax gallica* in the north.

At the same moment that the Haudenosaunee Iroquois disengaged from their disastrous involvement in European imperial wars, then, many Yamasees and Creeks leaped wholeheartedly into an alliance with South Carolinians in the War of the Spanish Succession. Spain had been on England's side during the War of the League of Augsburg, but in the new conflict the Spanish regal successor in question was allied with France's Louis XIV, and so Spain and La Florida became the open foe of England and of its colonies. The Creeks gained the first victory in this war, slaughtering and enslaving roughly half of a seven-hundred-man Spanish-Apalachee army sent against them in early 1702.

Later that year, Carolina's current governor of suspect credentials, James Moore, sought to bolster his position in the colony and in the imperial center—and to profit from slave raiding—by setting off to conquer Spanish San Agustín. This was precisely the kind of freelance campaign that the imposition of captains general on other colonies and schemes such as the Glorious Enterprise in the north were designed to prevent.

Piling a few dozen Englishmen and perhaps thirteen hundred Native allies into a small fleet of boats, Moore pillaged the Guale mission towns along the coast before trying to lay siege to the stone fortress that defended the capital of La Florida. Unfortunately, he brought no mortars or other equipment suited to the task, and, eight weeks later, he scuttled his ships and returned home overland, having impoverished the colony treasury but enriched his Native allies (and presumably himself) with many Indian slaves. In 1704, Moore led a second expedition to the captive-rich mission towns of Apalachee. Creek and Yamasee attacks continued in the meantime, and, by the end of the war of the Spanish Succession in 1713, none of the towns of La Florida's *república de indios* survived. Thousands of its former residents had been killed or enslaved, while others retreated into the interior.

By that time, too, the Indian wars that Moore and other Carolinians had so cleverly profited from had come home to roost. In 1711, one of the Yamasees' other slave-raiding targets, the Tuscaroras of present-day interior North Carolina, responded to the intrusion of European settlers on their lands by capturing and killing Carolina's provincial surveyor and then conducting raids in which a hundred or more of the intruders perished. The Carolina government coordinated retaliatory expeditions with the Yamasees and other Indian rivals of the Tuscaroras. By 1713, most of the Tuscarora villages had been burned, perhaps one thousand men, women, and children had been killed, and seven hundred others had been enslaved. Nearly all of the twenty-five hundred Tuscaroras who survived moved north to join the Haudenosaunee peoples as the Sixth Nation of the Iroquois League.

But if the Yamasees thought their service in the Florida and Tuscarora campaigns would secure their position in the Carolina trading universe, they quickly learned otherwise. Among the many things that failed to emerge in chaotic Carolina was an effective system of diplomacy with Native Americans. Despite the deep economic ties between colonists and Indians—which had expanded to include a sizable trade for deerskins as well as for human beings—few of the ritual trappings that made exchange and alliance comprehensible elsewhere on the continent took hold, except on an individual level involving many private traders who established sexual alliances with Native women and who in other ways adapted to local customs. The destruction of the last mission villages of La Florida, in a period when the trade of La Louisiane (French Louisiana) remained at a rudi-

mentary level, suddenly left not just the Yamasees but all of the Native peoples of the southeast solely dependent on Carolinian officials who had not bothered to learn much about the politics of prestige goods and material alliance. Until 1707, for example, it had apparently been the norm that governors simply pocketed any diplomatic gifts they received from Native chiefs. Realizing that an exploitative system based on slave raiding for profit was inherently dangerous, the elected Carolina Commons House began passing statutes to impose some order. In 1707, a licensing act tried to regulate traders by placing them under the supervision of a full-time government agent. In 1710, a Board of Commissioners of the Indian Trade added a further layer of supervision. As always in Carolina, however, the result was further confusion, as two rivalrous characters, Thomas Nairne and John Wright, claimed the title of agent.

All of these developments—aimed exclusively at restraining the behavior of Carolina traders (and consolidating the economic benefits of trade in fewer hands), rather than at broadening diplomatic relations—seem to have been perceived by Native people as money-grubbing neglect of the cultural side of exchange relations. Many were deeply in debt to Carolina traders, who regularly enslaved defaulters. The cycle of debt worsened as the War of the Spanish Succession interrupted the international trade in deerskins and as changing fashions in Europe dried up the market for furs of all sorts, depriving Indians of salable nonhuman commodities. At the same time, Indians saw their lands on the Savannah River being overrun by planters and their free-ranging cattle.

After months of complaints from Native people, and months of no diplomatic initiatives whatever, Nairne and Wright held a council at the main Yamasee town in April 1715, where they apparently gave the assembled chiefs incompatible messages regarding English intentions. Both were gruesomely assassinated, and Native people from throughout the region began destroying Carolina plantations and killing English traders throughout the trading paths of the interior. "Mr. Wright said that the white men would come and . . . hang four of their head men and take all the rest of them for Slaves . . . , for he said that the men of the Yamasees were like women," explained a note the Yamasee leader known as the Huspaw King left for the English to find. "What he said vex'd the great Warrier's, and this made them begin the war, . . . and the Indians are all comeing to take all the Country."[23]

What has since been called the Yamasee War—misnamed, because it

involved not just the Huspaw King's nation but Native people from towns throughout the region—reached a turning point when Carolinians persuaded many Cherokees, who primarily traded with Virginians and were seeking stronger ties with an alternative source of European goods, to attack the anti-English coalition. By early 1715, when the fighting subsided, vast areas of the Indian southeast were depopulated, some 7 percent of British Carolinians had perished, and the regional economy, including its Native American slave trade, was shattered.

The Tuscarora and Yamasee wars were Carolina's equivalent of Bacon's Rebellion and King Philip's War and led, finally, to its much-belated version of the Glorious Revolution. Writing from the ruins of their plantations, Carolinians flooded London with pleas to revoke the proprietors' charter and give the colony direct royal government. Equally fed up with the ineptitude of the proprietors, the imperial government had already been considering *quo warranto* proceedings for the better part of a decade, but faced vexing issues of how to disentangle the financial and political interests of the eight proprietary families. Sick of delays and panicked by rumors of a Spanish attack, in late 1719 militiamen appeared in the streets of Charles Town, bloodlessly deposed governor Robert Johnson, declared themselves a convention, and elected as interim governor (pending an appointment by King George) James Moore Jr., an architect of the Carolina victory over the Tuscaroras and the son of the elder Moore who had led the expeditions against La Florida in 1702 and 1704. The next year, in 1720, Moore Jr. yielded his place when the same Francis Nicholson who had been deposed in New York's Glorious Revolution and frustrated in the Glorious Enterprise arrived to preside as royal governor. From that point, although the proprietors' charter would not be formally revoked until 1729, South Carolina and the now separate government of North Carolina fully joined the eighteenth-century English Atlantic empire of Protestants united against Popery and Arbitrary Power.

56

Amsterdam receiving the tribute of four continents.

Producing and Consuming in
an Atlantic Empire

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1688–1689 came to appear glorious—and the rights and liberties they proclaimed took hold—because an epoch of prosperity emerged from the tumultuous quarter-century that William III and II brought to the British Empire. Between 1715 and the middle years of the eighteenth century, the descendants of Native and English progenitors alike found themselves ever more bound not just to the imperial center of London but to places, things, and people throughout the North Atlantic basin. None of these people would have described themselves as "Atlantean," a term that referred to the mythical figure of Atlas, who bore the weight of the heavens on his shoulders and, having been turned to stone, survived in the form of Mount Atlas in North Africa. ("Atlantic" thus became the name of the western ocean off Africa's coast.) Still, the weighty global dimensions of the word "Atlantean" capture something of the lives of the peoples who lived in North America after the Glorious Revolution. Ships plying the ancient unifying winds and currents of the North Atlantic brought people from Europe, Africa, the West Indies, and America together. The consumer goods, agricultural products, and intellectual fashions that the vessels carried made the look and feel of daily life ever more similar from London to Boston, from Barbados to Philadelphia, from Creek country to Wabanakia.

The British Atlantean Empire may have begun in revolts against Popery and Arbitrary Power, but it always was, most fundamentally, an empire of

commerce. In this respect, the empire had deep roots in the earlier historical stratum of traders. For North America's Native and European peoples alike, the structure of that commerce, and the relative peace and prosperity it brought, stemmed, like so much else, from decisions made in the imperial capital during and after the Glorious Revolution. The same alliance of financial and governmental forces that produced the Bank of England led Parliament to pass a revised Navigation Act in 1696. As with most imperial developments of the period, the act evolved, rather than departed, from Restoration programs to enrich the State through efficient collection of customs revenue and to enrich English merchants through control of commodities circulating in the Atlantic shipping lanes. Nonetheless, it brought unanticipated benefits to North Americans, many of whom settled prosperously into its restraints during the early eighteenth century. In a way few could have anticipated in 1660, the Navigation Acts made North America prosper.

Heavily influenced by the ubiquitous Edward Randolph, the Navigation Act of 1696 aimed primarily to strengthen existing regulations. It required governors to take solemn oaths to enforce all of the previous Navigation Acts, with a penalty of £1,000 for failure to do so. It placed colonial customs inspectors on a centralized royal payroll and gave them sweeping powers to collect taxes. It created colonial vice-admiralty courts, juryless institutions using military rules of justice to punish violators. It encouraged prosecutions by dividing fines collected from offenders equally among the whistleblower, the royal governor, and the Crown.

Shortly after King William approved the new Navigation Act, he enhanced enforcement by replacing the Lords of Trade with a new body, variously known as the Committee for Trade and Plantations, the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, or simply the Board of Trade. On paper, it had less authority than its predecessor, because it was no longer composed of members of the Privy Council and became merely an advisor to the cabinet minister who held the title of Secretary of State for the Southern Department. If information was power, however, the Board of Trade far outmatched its predecessor. Eight of its sixteen members remained courtiers who attended meetings only when they felt like it. But the other eight were chosen for their expertise in colonial affairs more than for their political connections. Each was paid the princely sum of £1,000 per year, and they included people such as longtime Stuart servant William Blathwayt. Although it would be too much to call them professional bureaucrats, by early eighteenth-century standards they came close. They collected and processed information of many kinds, drafted all-important instructions for royal governors, reviewed colonial legislation, coordinated the establishment of vice-admiralty courts and customs collectors, instigated a crackdown on piracy around the world, regularized a system by which colonies could appoint formal agents to represent them in London, and recommended legislation to Parliament and courses of action to the Crown. Negotiating interests from all sides of the Atlantic, the Board of Trade, more than anything else, made the early eighteenth-century British Empire work.

And particularly in time of peace, the name said it all: Board of Trade. For what the Navigation Acts had done was to create a transatlantic protected commercial zone, in which diverse merchants, producers, and consumers could thrive. Decades of political upheaval and international warfare obscured what became clear once peace took hold in the 1720s. Most North Americans were now better off under the Navigation Acts than their grandparents had been when the Dutch carried the bulk of their trade. The English imperial system had always been most burdensome to the planters of Virginia and Maryland, whose tobacco was not just on the list of Enumerated Goods but was the only item that the Navigation Acts taxed to raise revenue rather than just to corner a market. (The other entries on the short original list of enumerated items that could be shipped only to England had little effect on North Americans; sugar and cotton grew only in the West Indies, and dyestuffs came from exotic locales mostly not even under English control.) Yet in the new century, even the restrictions on the tobacco trade came to seem less onerous. After the War of the Spanish Succession, prices earned by planters rose slightly from their Bacon-era nadir to about two pence per pound of leaf. Moreover, demand at last seemed to synchronize with supply, particularly because of a booming reexport trade from Britain to the European continent.[1]

While this most distressed of commodities became modestly profitable under the Navigation Acts, other colonial products thrived. In 1700, the value of North American exports to England was approximately £302,000. By 1754, it had nearly tripled to £891,000; including exports to Scotland (absorbed into the system after the 1707 Act of Union), the figure rises to £1,076,000. The gains were real, although the statistics are somewhat misleading, as the European population of North America increased even faster, from 234,000 in 1700 to nearly one million in 1754.[2]

Yet the keys to eighteenth-century prosperity lay less in the commodities that North Americans exported to the British Isles than in other activities that the Navigation Acts made possible. The same provisions that prohibited colonists from trading with the Dutch or French created a sheltered environment in which they could trade with each other for goods that they might otherwise have purchased from foreigners. All of the North American mainland colonies found strong trading partners in the British Caribbean. By far the most valuable of enumerated commodities was West Indian sugar. A seemingly insatiable transatlantic British sweet tooth accompanied voracious tastes for the Asian tea, and later the West Indian coffee, that the sugar sweetened. Well before the end of the seventeenth century, this demand completed the transformation of Barbados and other islands into virtual monocultures, dependent on North Americans for most of the food and other things needed to support sugar processing and to minimally feed and clothe the enslaved people the endless work drove to early deaths.

Meantime, cattle, horses, fish, whale products, wheat flour, maize, rice, salted beef and pork, butter and cheese, lumber, barrel staves, and countless other mundane items moved from North American small farms, pastures, and woods to Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, Charles Town, and thence to the West Indies. New Englanders also exchanged their various commodities for a byproduct of sugar production, molasses, which they distilled into potent, often nasty rum, a drink even more ubiquitous in the eighteenth-century Atlantic world than tea, although not nearly as profitable to those who sold (or drank) it. Similar trades in everyday items tied the various North American ports to one another as well, and indeed to non-British islands and the European and African continents. With the exception of rice, added to the enumerated list in 1704, North American foodstuffs were exempt from commercial restrictions and so could be shipped anywhere in the Atlantic basin, including continental Europe. This trade became so important that Thomas Paine could later quip that American farmers would "always have a market while eating is the custom of Europe."[3]

By 1720, the majority of colonial shippers employed small coastal vessels built and owned in North America. By 1750, these craft were joined by larger ships that carried transatlantic commerce. Here was the greatest opportunity that the Navigation Acts opened for British North Americans, who had the right to build, own, and sail their own ships on an equal basis with subjects in the British Isles. But in fact there was nothing equal about the situation, for North American shipbuilders had a major advantage over their British counterparts: an apparently limitless supply of oak timbers, pine masts, pine tar, pitch, and all the other "naval stores" that were the raw materials of the age of sail. (Only sailcloth usually had to be imported from England.) Because many of the American-built craft were small and never docked in the British Isles, statistics on their number are hard to come by, but shipbuilding's impact on the colonial economies—and on the ability of New Englanders, New Yorkers, and Pennsylvanians to seize control of their own carrying trades—was vast. By about 1760, at least a third of all of the ships registered with the insurer Lloyds of London had been manufactured in North America. The addition of naval stores to the enumerated list in 1705 did nothing to slow any of these developments; it only increased the market for a valuable colonial export. In effect, the colonists themselves were the ones who replaced the Dutch in carrying goods to and from North America and the West Indies, and they reaped the profits. As one eighteenth-century Philadelphian put it, "Carriage is an amazing Revenue."[4]

No one in England seems to have anticipated this explosion of colonial shipping. But in an age when expanding trade required all the vessels that could be set afloat, few complained, especially when American ships carried home the goods of British merchants. In part, this reflected one of the few major departures from the Restoration-era approach to imperial trade after the Glorious Revolution. Those who controlled Parliament, the Board of Trade, and the apparatus of the Crown tended to be hostile to great chartered trading companies, and particularly to the court-connected monopolies beloved of the Stuart monarchs. For all its economic might, the Bank of England proved the rule, for its charter granted it no formal monopolies. Great men of landed wealth and powerful merchant families held most of the levers of power. Yet by design as well as chance, the eighteenth-century British imperial economy belonged to thousands of smaller-scale traders and family networks, pooling their resources in varied ways to seek the main chance. Protected markets defined by the Navigation Acts, regularized transatlantic and global trade routes created by more than a century of experience, the ability of the British navy to provide protection from pirate and foreign attacks on commercial shipping, and increasingly sophisticated financial mechanisms made it all possible.

Those mechanisms appear to modern eyes incomprehensible in their primitive intricacy: a bewildering array of gold and silver coins issued by many nations; private bills of exchange, resembling paper money, that were drawn on the accounts of merchants thousands of miles away and traded many times before their final redemption; personal credit and debt arrangements of staggering complexity; connections among consignees, factors, and agents maintained by slow-motion letters trying to predict supply and demand; shipping insurance contracts that made underwriters somehow wealthy, shipowners and merchants somehow feel secure, and clients somehow complacent with endless lawsuits when insurers failed to pay for a loss. In all of these convoluted transactions, merchants and shipowners in Boston, New York, Newport, Philadelphia, and smaller ports may have been small fry compared to their counterparts in the trading houses of London, Bristol, or Glasgow. Yet apart from large-scale dealers in a few commodities such as tobacco and sugar, small fry were everywhere the norm. British North Americans had as good a chance to make a killing, or at least a living, as nearly anyone else.

Merchants, large and small, could profit only if they had something to trade, and sea captains only if they had something to carry. By the mid-eighteenth century, nearly every living person in eastern North America produced for the ever-expanding Atlantic market. That large-scale Chesapeake tobacco planters and their enslaved workers did so is obvious. That New England and Newfoundland fishermen fed much of Europe is clear. That South Carolina planters who turned their enslaved workforce to growing rice also did so is plain: production, which began only in the 1690s, reached 1.5 million pounds annually by 1710 and 20 million by 1730.[5] (Cotton would not become Carolina's main crop until nearly a century later.) Involvement with Atlantic markets is also obvious for the roughly 5 percent of British North Americans who lived in such port cities (or rather such large towns) as Philadelphia (its 1760 population was about 17,000), Boston (16,000), New York (13,000), Charles Town (8,000), or Newport, Rhode Island (7,500).[6] Most residents in these places and smaller ports made their living in crafts and other occupations directly or indirectly associated with shipping and trading. More easily overlooked are the efforts of men of small means everywhere, from the Carolinas to Maine, to work themselves, their children, their servants, and their slaves a bit harder to produce a small surplus of wheat, corn, or whatever else could, through many intermediaries, find its way to an oceangoing ship. The women who lived with those small planters churned butter, brewed beer, or spun textiles to be sold in local markets that ultimately fed into the Atlantic commercial maw.

Also easily overlooked is the great extent to which Native Americans produced for the Atlantic market. From the Ohio Valley northward, the main product continued to be beaver and other furs (added to Britain's enumerated list in 1721). The fact that oversupply on the one hand and overhunting on the other led to periodic economic hardship only emphasizes the deep interdependence of the Native American and Atlantic economies. From the Ohio Valley southward, the main Native product was deerskin, for which the appetite seemed infinite. On the eve of the Yamasee War, a wave of epidemics happened to decimate the cattle herds of continental Europe. The plagues returned repeatedly during the next few decades, creating voracious demand for alternative sources of leather. As diverse peoples resettled to become the Indian nations known as Creeks, Cherokees, and Chickasaws and reestablished relations with Carolina traders—whose royal governors now struggled to master the diplomatic niceties necessary for commerce to flourish—the regional economy shifted from slave raiding to deer hunting in order to meet the global demand. By the 1760s, perhaps a million does and bucks were falling victim annually to an operation of near-industrial scale.[7]

Just as the British replaced the Dutch as carriers of their own colonial products, then, they also replaced the Dutch as the primary trading partners of eighteenth-century Native Americans. Still, bitter experiences stretching from the Pequot War, through King Philip's War, through the disastrous entanglement of the Iroquois in King William's War, to the horrors of the Yamasee War had taught Native leaders the dangers of becoming solely dependent on English colonists for their economic livelihoods. The geo-strategic concerns of British governors seeking allies against the French and the Spanish mitigated the dangers somewhat, but every independent Native nation now kept its options open. In the far northeast, Wabanakis in the French orbit continued to trade with hated New Englanders. Haudenosaunee people traded with Albany but always maintained access to alternate markets in La Nouvelle-France; as an exasperated New York official explained, "To preserve the balance between us and the French is the great ruling principle of the modern Indian poli-

North America. c. 1730

PACIFIC

ATLANTIC

Gulf of Mexico

HUDSON'S BAY

CREES

ASSINIBOINE

BLACKFEET

MANDAN

SIOUX

SHOSHONES

UTES

PAIUTES

NAVAJOS PUEBLOS

Colorado

Albuquerque • Santa Fe

NUEVO MÉXICO (Sp.)

APACHES COMANCHES

YAQUI

El Paso

Río Grande

NUEVO VIZCAYA (Sp.)

COAHULA (Sp.)

NUEVO SANTANDER (Sp.)

NUEVO LEÓN (Sp.)

Missouri

Arkansas

Red

CADDOS

TEXAS (Sp.)

• San Antonio

ANISHANABE

L. Superior

Mississippi

Michilimackinac

L. Michigan

L. Huron

OTTAWAS

PAYS D'EN HAUT

Détroit

L. Erie

POTAWA-TOMIS

WYANDOTS

MIAMIS

OHIO COUNTRY

SHAWNEES

DELAWARES

Ohio

ILLINOIS

ILLINOIS (Fr.)

Cahokia

OSAGE QUAPAWS

CHICKASAWS

SOUTHEAST

CHOCTAWS

LA LOUSIANE (Fr.)

Biloxi • Pensacola • San Marcos

• La Nouvelle Orléans

CHEROKEES

CREEKS

• Ft. Toulouse

LA NOUVELLE-FRANCE (Fr.) • Québec

St. Lawrence

Montréal

Ft. Frontenac

L. Ontario Albany

HAUDENO-SAUNEE

Hudson

MI'KMAQ

NOVA SCOTIA

WABANAKIS

MAINE (MASS.)

N.H.

MASS. • Boston

R.I.

CONN. • Newport

N.Y.

• New York

PA. N.J.

• Philadelphia

MD. DEL.

VIRGINIA

• Williamsburg

NORTH CAROLINA

SOUTH CAROLINA

• Charles Town

San Marcos • San Agustín

LA FLORIDA (Sp.)

BAHAMAS

CUBA (Sp.)

SANTO DOMINGO (Sp.)

SAINT-DOMINGUE (Fr.)

0   500 miles

tics."[8] The same principle applied in the Great Lakes region, where trading partners of La Nouvelle-France flirted with New York, and in the southeast, where Cherokees, Creeks, and Chickasaws kept Carolinians guessing about their dealings with La Louisiane, French-allied Choctaws did the reverse, and all kept hoping that La Florida might somehow also become an alternative to British economic dominance.

That dominance never stretched as far west as Nuevo México. There, too, however, a complicated balance of European and Native powers defined trading relationships spanning continents and oceans. The establishment of La Louisiane, and the activities of French traders up and down the Mississippi, brought Atlantic trade goods and firearms to a variety of peoples on the Great Plains and ultimately to the enemies of the Pueblos. Raids by well-armed Comanches and others, meanwhile, became an increasing threat to the Spanish of northern México. In the early 1690s, colonial authorities responded by establishing a series of presidios and missions across Texas and by dispatching troops under the command of an experienced administrator named Diego de Vargas to reconquer Nuevo México.

There, Pop'ay had died shortly after the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, and old divides of language and community had reemerged among the peoples he had briefly and imperfectly unified. Many Pueblos seem genuinely, if warily, to have welcomed the return of the Spanish in hopes of military protection and access to trade goods. Still, the reconquest was brutal; Vargas's standard tactic was to line up resisters, instruct a Franciscan friar to pronounce a hasty absolution over them, and order them to be shot. By 1698, the bloodshed was mostly over. Thereafter, Vargas's successors ruled with a lighter touch, and with less influence from the Franciscans, than had their predecessors. While never truly prosperous or entirely peaceful, eighteenth-century Nuevo México found its place on the fringe of the Atlantean world. A small population of criollos and mestizos raised cattle and horses on ranches scattered along the Río Grande. The Pueblos meanwhile became centers for a far-flung commerce. Utes, Comanches, and others came to annual trade fairs at Taos and other pueblos, where *nuevos mexicanos* and Natives bartered guns, ammunition, horses, and crops for meat, buffalo hides, furs, and Indian slaves.

Elsewhere, however, the British controlled much of the trade with Native Americans, primarily because of the quality, quantity, and low price of the goods that England's Atlantic empire could supply. From north to south, and all points between, Native consumers purchased from English, or more often Scottish, traders a similar store of items, most of them specifically manufactured to Indian specifications. The brass kettles and iron axes that for more than a century had been vital to everyday life now came in sizes and shapes finely tuned to their users' tastes. Textile workers in Gloucestershire produced a specific kind of woolen cloth known as "strouds" in precise shades of blue, red, and gray for the Indian market. Gunsmiths similarly created lightweight trade muskets with advanced flintlock mechanisms that Native hunters demanded. Less specialized items of every sort—from needles, scissors, spoons, and hoes to linen shirts, glass beads, jewelry, and rum—became integral parts of a pan-Indian material culture. And all depended upon trade connections with Britons who turned them out more plentifully and cheaply than their French or Spanish competitors. These consumer goods integrated eighteenth-century Native people with the broader Atlantic imperial world. As a colonial official observed, "A modern Indian cannot subsist without Europeans."[9]

Nor could a modern British North American planter or city dweller. The motive behind all the small-scale producing, the scrambling to find something to sell, and the hustling for coin or credit was to be able to purchase an array of consumer goods that previous generations on either side of the Atlantic could hardly have imagined. In 1660, the households of even the wealthiest Virginians and New Englanders had been remarkably empty of material possessions—not because of puritanical self-restraint but because no one below the aristocracy could afford to live in any other way. A brightly painted chest protected linens handed down from mother to daughter as a form of wealth. These would not be used as table cloths, because the majority of households *had* no tables, and only about half owned even one chair on which to sit. Meals were served, if that was the word for it, on makeshift boards placed on movable trestles, while people relaxed on chests, on crude stools, or around the huge walk-in fireplace that dominated one end of the room and served as the kitchen. A few bowls probably made of wood or simple ceramic earthenware, a large wooden platter called a trencher, some metal spoons, one all-purpose knife, and a shared mug completed the eating equipment.

The main item of furniture would have been the bed on which the mas-

ter of the house and his wife slept. In the eighteen-by-twenty-foot one-room houses in which a third to a half of the population lived, there would have been space for little else. If there were two rooms, doubling the floor space, the bed would take pride of place in the chamber called the "parlor," where what passed for peace and quiet could be found and where honored guests could be entertained, while seated, if anywhere, on the edge of the bed. All other activities took place in the "hall," a combination of kitchen, dining room, living room, and workspace, where some members of the household were also likely to sleep at night; others would place their mattresses on the floor of the loft above. Few surfaces inside or out were painted or whitewashed. Windows were few and small, and unlikely to be equipped with expensive glass panes.

Only part of this scarcity stemmed from the expense of importing manufactured goods from Europe and the undeveloped state of colonial economies. By some measures, material conditions were better in English North America than in the British Isles. Meat was an everyday staple rather than an occasional luxury; wood fires that no one in tree-poor England could afford kept people reasonably warm; and the same excess of lumber allowed common folk's houses to be built more sturdily, if less often of brick, than those across the ocean. But on the whole, conditions were not that different on the two shores of the mid-seventeenth-century Atlantic. In rural England, Scotland, and Ireland, the majority of the population—including many in the middling ranks—lived much the way their North American counterparts did, and much as their medieval ancestors had done.

Through a process that remains somewhat mysterious, all this began to change in England after the Restoration. The transformations began with the elite, who had always been able to afford households stocked with more material goods of better quality—but often not of fundamentally different nature—than could ordinary folk. At the time, at least some English people must have thought it was all part of the great popish plot, because many of the new fashions came from Catholic Italy and France and were somehow associated with the opulent courts of Charles II and James VII and II. But things were far more complicated than that. One of the most important new fashions, and one of the first to spread from the aristocracy to more common homes, arrived from the Protestant Netherlands in the form of Delftware, the bright blue-and-white ceramics that came in many forms, from wall tiles to large platters meant for display to indi-

vidual plates, cups, and saucers. By the early eighteenth century, English craftspeople were making their own contributions to new household clutter with high-quality and relatively cheap salt-glazed Staffordshire ware and imitations of far more expensive Chinese porcelain.

Yet elite houses were not cluttered at all, because families with sufficient wealth were building a new style of dwelling, much larger and far differently laid out than the traditional hall-and-parlor model. Later and anachronistically called "Georgian," the house plan that spread rapidly across the British Isles and North America beginning in the reigns of William and Anne featured four symmetrical rooms on each of at least two floors, paired on either side of a central hall way and grand staircase. Every interior surface was plastered or paneled, painted or wallpapered. With cooking facilities banished to a separate kitchen in the basement or to an outbuilding, fireplaces shrank in size to heat rooms more efficiently and to display more effectively their elaborate mantelpieces. To illuminate these interior spaces, huge sashed multipaned windows replaced small leaded casements or wooden panels. These windows were symmetrically placed so that, from the exterior, two per story graced each side of the central door opening. The opulence of such a structure was obvious, but there had always been ways in which powerful men could display their prosperity through older cramped designs; Governor Berkeley's Green Spring was a controversial example. What was new, in addition to the particular fashion, was the number of nonaristocrats who had sufficient wealth from the new Atlantic trades to engage in similar display.

In the North American colonies, wealthy men connected with royal government and merchants and great planters profiting from the Atlantic trades started building Georgian houses only a few years after the style swept the British Isles. A handful of examples sprang up in New England in the closing years of the seventeenth century, but the spread of the new fashion is usually traced to the building of Virginia's new capital city of Williamsburg. Named for the Glorious Revolution's monarch, and laid out in 1699 as a deliberate symbol of imperial power (and a repudiation of the nightmares that had occurred a few miles away at largely abandoned Jamestown), Williamsburg was a proud expression of Virginia's integration into the British Empire. Its capitol building, begun in 1701, featured twin ground-floor wings, one each for the burgesses sitting as the legislative assembly and the Royal Council sitting as the provincial high court. A bridging upper story provided space where the governor and council sat

together. This layout of separate spaces for what Britons called the "democratical," the "aristocratical," and the "monarchical" elements of the polity—the many (the assembly), the few (the council), and the one (the governor)—embodied the balanced constitution that protected British liberties. Meantime, Williamsburg's handsome Bruton Parish Church symbolized the power and stability of the Book-of-Common-Prayer order. Its College of William and Mary evoked both the heroes of the Glorious Revolution and the legacy of European learning. But its governor's palace, the finest example of Georgian architecture yet seen in North America, was its most influential structure of all. Within a few years, similar buildings were going up on plantations throughout Tidewater Virginia. By the 1730s, Georgian houses were becoming familiar sights throughout the colonies—visible examples of the common culture, and common wealth, that united the British Atlantean world.

Beyond its opulence, what would have struck everyone as most novel about a Georgian house was the size, openness, and brightness of its interior spaces. Although these spaces contained far more stuff than ever before—including dozens of the formerly rare chairs to sit on—it was possible to walk through the rooms without tripping over a bed, a linen chest, or a child napping on the floor. Indeed, a whole array of indoor behaviors suddenly became conceivable, and quickly became essential if one was to be deemed a respectable member of society. A visitor to a seventeenth-century house might have been ushered past the bustle of the hall into the sanctity of the dark parlor. There he might have perched on the side of a bed and perhaps chatted over a common cup of small beer before making a hasty exit to the outdoors or to the nearest tavern. By contrast, Georgian spaces were designed for entertaining guests, for ostentatious display, for visual enjoyment, for remaining delightfully indoors.

And especially for eating and drinking. Chairs, tables, chests, highboys, and lowboys filled the perimeters of the indoor spaces, but the most culturally important of the material goods in a Georgian house were food-related ceramics from Delft, Staffordshire, or China. Guests and family members seated in fine chairs at well-appointed tables discovered that they needed things that even the aristocracy had not deemed necessary a century before: an individual plate, bowl, cup, saucer, glass, knife, spoon, and fork (an ancient invention recently reintroduced to Britons from Italy). To use all of these tools properly, one had to learn a novel set of table manners, codified in countless advice books and now drummed into the heads of children and young men and women. Grand interior spaces required all sorts of rules of etiquette and manners for which there literally had been no room in the older living spaces. Men and women of refinement had to stand a certain way, move a certain way, dance a certain way, maintain a certain facial expression. All of it could be learned by buying the right books, hiring the right tutors. And of course one also had to dress the part, which required further expenditures. This spiral of material needs and desires—this insatiable urge to buy domestic and personal things no commoner had ever before needed—is what historians call the eighteenth-century consumer revolution.

A full Georgian house was beyond the means of the vast majority of Britons on either side of the Atlantic, but the consumer revolution that such buildings housed spread rapidly down in the social order, most notably through the purchase of ceramics. Benjamin Franklin, in one of the many perhaps apocryphal tales that populate his *Autobiography*, claimed to recall the exact moment when the consumer revolution struck his hitherto simple Philadelphia household in the 1730s:

We have an English Proverb that says,

> He that would thrive
> Must ask his Wife;

it was lucky for me that I had one as much dispos'd to Industry and Frugality as my self. . . . We kept no idle Servants, our Table was plain and simple, our Furniture of the cheapest. For instance my Breakfast was a long time Bread and Milk, (no Tea) and I ate it out of a twopenny earthen Porringer with a Pewter Spoon. But mark how Luxury will enter Families, and make a Progress, in Spite of Principle. Being call'd one Morning to Breakfast, I found it in a China Bowl with a Spoon of Silver. They had been bought for me without my Knowledge by my Wife, and had cost her the enormous Sum of three and twenty Shillings, for which she had no other Excuse or Apology to make, but that she thought *her* Husband deserv'd a Silver Spoon and China Bowl as well as any of his Neighbours. This was the first Appearance of Plate and China in our House, which afterwards in a Course of Years as our Wealth encreas'd augmented gradually to several Hundred Pounds in Value.[10]

For Franklin, it all began with a china bowl. But the vanguard of the consumer revolution in most ordinary eighteenth-century British Ameri-

can households was tea, or rather the complicated ceramic paraphernalia necessary to prepare, sweeten, and serve it in the proper way in the proper sort of room, even if that room could not be part of a full-scale Georgian house. Tea could not simply be slopped down like a bowl of morning porridge. It was a luxury item that cost twenty-four shillings per pound in Boston in 1720, and it had to be served in appropriate style. The necessary equipment included not just a teapot but containers for tea, cream, and sugar, a strainer, sugar tongs, special small spoons, cups and saucers for everyone likely to be present, and an elegant table on which to display it all. In 1722, one of the omnipresent sources of printed advice that taught manners to the British Atlantic world estimated that "a Tea Table worth its Equipage" could easily set one back £257, roughly ten times the annual wage of an urban laborer.[11]

Clearly, most women got by with a considerably smaller investment, but the combined pressures of emulation, status, and consumer desire were among the most compelling forces that pulled British North Americans into the imperial world of royal governors, Navigation Acts, and freedom from Popery and Arbitrary Power. And, as Franklin observed of his breakfast bowl, women were often in the forefront of the consumer revolution. Tea and its rituals were a distinctly gendered affair, the focal point of women-only early-evening gatherings, as well as of mixed assemblies in which a household's wealth, taste, and manners could be put on display.

Yet caffeine and crockery and all the other consumer delights were by no means confined to a female realm or to the domestic household. On the whole, exports from England and Scotland to North America and the West Indies nearly quadrupled between 1700 and 1750, from an estimated value of £364,000 to £1,374,000, comprising about 95 percent of all new exports during this period. For all the cultural importance of ceramics, textiles accounted for about half the value, and the array of other consumer items was vast. "Ships coming from afar bring all kinds of goods," including "various wines (Spanish, Portuguese, and German)" and "spices, sugar, tea, coffee, rice, rum (a spirit distilled from sugar and molasses), fine china vessels, Dutch and English cloth, leather, linen cloth, fabrics, silks, damask, velvet, etc.," marveled German sojourner Gottlieb Mittelberger when he first saw Philadelphia in 1750. "Already it is really possible to obtain all the things one can get in Europe in Pennsylvania."[12]

Items other than material goods were also obtainable. Books, ideas, fashions, and information of all kinds traveled in the many ships that sailed the Atlantic, tying Britons everywhere into a single cultural as well as material world. When Benjamin Franklin and his book-starved compatriots pooled their resources in 1731 to create the Library Company of Philadelphia, their initial order from London included editions of the classics and works on mathematics, chemistry, architecture, history, and other fields, but also the collected essays of London authors of the previous generation. Among these were Joseph Addison and Richard Steele's periodicals the *Tatler,* the *Spectator,* and the *Guardian,* and John Trenchard and Richard Gordon's series of essays entitled *Cato's Letters,* on such topics as liberty of conscience and freedom of speech. The subscription library that the Philadelphians created—like those soon founded elsewhere in North America—comprised the slightly-out-of date provincial version of the reading list of a British gentleman, or rather a citizen of the Atlantean world. With the establishment of the Library Company, "reading became fashionable," Franklin recalled in his *Autobiography,* "and our People having no public Amusements to divert their Attention from Study became better acquainted with Books, and in a few Years were observ'd by Strangers to be better instructed and more intelligent than People of the same Rank generally are in other Countries."[13]

Perhaps more important than books on the provincial reading list were the weekly newspapers that proliferated in the first half of the eighteenth century. Beginning with the Boston *News-Letter* in 1704 and the Philadelphia *American Weekly Mercury* and the *Boston Gazette* in 1719, they proliferated to include dozens of short-lived ventures. Among longer-lasting publications were the *New England Courant* (which Franklin left in order to escape his older brother's tyranny, afterward moving to Philadelphia and founding the *Pennsylvania Gazette* by 1729) and the *New York Weekly Journal,* which John Peter Zenger began in 1733. Usually printed on one large sheet folded to make four pages, these papers were stuffed with advertisements, lists of prices for items in diverse locales, and notes of the arrivals and departures of ships—the everyday diaries of the comings and goings of the goods that knit together the Atlantic world. But filling every additional inch of space were reprints of political essays and gossip from London, retreads of old pieces by Addison, Steele, or Trenchard and Gordon, and writings by local essayists aping the metropolitan style.

A reader who picked up the *New-York Weekly Journal* for April 14, 1740, for instance, would first see some imported "Verses occasion'd by the late united Address of the Lords and Commons to his Majesty" and,

before encountering an onslaught of ads, stumble through a locally pro-duced poem entitled "Against Ambition." Stuffed between these political-literary efforts were a letter from a reader describing a method of reviving victims of suffocation, some four-month-old dispatches from Rome and Madrid, a six-month-old report from Paris, and several breathless week-old bulletins from elsewhere in North America that war had broken out with Spain and that a copy of the royal declaration to that effect had just arrived in Philadelphia. Three days later, a reader in Boston could read the entire text of the king's war proclamation in her city's *Weekly News-Letter,* along with more war-related reports from up and down the coast, more months-old dispatches from Paris, and an account of the travels of evange-list George Whitefield in Georgia. The same day in Philadelphia, the *Pennsylvania Gazette* led with a long letter from Whitefield criticizing slavery, followed by the text of the war proclamation and a note that, in re-sponse to its public reading, "the People express'd their Joy in loud Huz-zas; And the Cannon from the Hill, and the Ships in the Harbour, were discharged." While toasts were raised to the monarch and assorted wor-thies, "plenty of Liquor was given to the Populace; and in the Evening they had a Bonfire on the Hill."[14]

Through such marvels of seemingly random printed eclecticism—passed from hand to hand and read aloud in taverns, coffeehouses, and homes—British North Americans participated in a shared transatlantic world. Although people in New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Charles Town, London, Bristol, Glasgow, and Barbados lived in very different natural en-vironments, spoke in more or less differing accents, and engaged in of-ten strikingly different kinds of work, they read similar compilations of what newspaper printers liked to call "the freshest advices, foreign and domestick." And everywhere, British people drank the same tea, enjoyed the same sugar, used the same crockery, read the same books, paid hom-age to the same monarch, gloried in the same tolerant Protestantism, hated the same papists, and understood that their interdependent far-flung locales were the joint sources of the material wonders they all en-joyed, or hoped to enjoy. They considered themselves Britons. But it would be better to call them Atlanteans, for the Atlantic was the world in which they lived, read, produced, and consumed.

The interconnectedness of the Atlantean world, the centrality of shipping, trade, and the printed word to its existence, and the ways these reinforced

the British national patriotism forged during the Glorious Revolution crys-tallized in an odd scene in Britain's House of Commons in 1738. A sea captain named Robert Jenkins testified that, several years earlier in the West Indies, the Spanish coast guard had boarded his vessel, pillaged it of all its goods, and set it adrift. That the Spanish were entirely within their rights, and that the British would have done much the same had a Spanish ship violated the Navigation Acts by trading in Boston Harbor, made no difference. For Jenkins bore vivid evidence that the perfidious Spanish pa-pists did more than just interfere with Atlantic commerce: he displayed for all to see a pickled human ear he claimed to have carried with him ever since the coast guard commander had cruelly sliced it from his head. As a Boston newspaper reported it, the Spaniard had "threatned to burn the Ship, and him and his People in it, for that they were obstinate Hereticks," and then "took hold of his Left Ear, and with his Cutlass slit it down; and then another of the Spaniards took hold of it and tore it off, but gave him the Piece of his Ear again, bidding him carry it to his Majesty King George."[15] War fever, fueled by Protestant bigotry and commercial greed, swept Parliament and public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic.

"The War of Jenkins's Ear" that began a year later—and of which re-ports officially reached American newspaper readers on those April days in 1740—was, if anything, a worse debacle than Cromwell's Western De-sign. Still, it revived a crusading spirit throughout Britain's Atlantic posses-sions, whose inhabitants saw themselves at the center, rather than on the periphery, of great imperial events. Hundreds of North American volun-teers enlisted to sail with Admiral Edward Vernon in a grand effort to seize Spain's gold and trade routes, inspired by a royal proclamation that the Protestant monarch had "determined, by GOD's Assistance in so just a Cause, to vindicate the Honour of his Imperial Crown, to revenge the In-juries done to His Subjects, to assert their undoubted Rights of Com-merce and Navigation, and by all possible Means to attack, annoy and distress a Nation that has treated his People with such Insolence and Bar-barity."[16] In 1741, almost twenty-four thousand men in nearly two hun-dred vessels—by far the largest British fleet yet assembled—assaulted Cartagena, in what is now Colombia, a prize eyed ever since the days of Cromwell. Two months later, Vernon's fleet withdrew in defeat, having lost eighteen thousand men, most of them to disease. Among those who made it back to North America barely alive was a Virginia planter named Law-rence Washington. As he remodeled his version of a Georgian house, he patriotically named it "Mount Vernon," in honor of his commander.

FOURTEEN

❧

People in Motion, Enslaved and Free

"RULE BRITANNIA! Britannia rule the waves," crowed a patriotic song first heard during the War of Jenkins's Ear; "Britons never, never, never shall be slaves!" Yet millions of Atlanteans *always* would be slaves. The prosperity of the Atlantic world rested squarely on the backs of enslaved Africans and their descendants, who came to constitute 20 percent of the population of British North America in general, and 40 percent or more in Virginia and the Carolinas. Even these workers could not satisfy a demand for labor that merged with the lure of eventual land ownership to draw tens of thousands of immigrants from continental Europe and the non-English parts of the British Isles. The movement of peoples created an ever more diverse, and ever more unequal, population. The mixture of peoples, cultures, and religions—which seems to us today so fully and completely American—was a measure of how thoroughly British North America focused the multiple energies of the eighteenth-century Atlantean world. Yet much of what many would now describe proudly as multicultural seemed deeply troubling to those who lived in that Atlantean world, Natives and immigrants alike.

Africans had toiled in North America since the earliest days of La Florida, but plantation regimes that relied primarily on slave labor were a phenomenon of the eighteenth century. A few numbers begin to tell the story. In 1680, shortly after Bacon's Rebellion, the African population of Virginia and Maryland—enslaved and free—was approximately 4,300, or about

7 percent of all non-Native Americans. By 1700 the number had nearly tripled, to about 13,000 (13 percent), but the number of free African Americans had shrunk to near invisibility, and non-African servants had become a minority in the tobacco fields. By 1730, enslaved Africans in the Chesapeake totaled more than 53,000 (27 percent of all non-Native Americans); and by 1750, nearly 151,000 (40 percent). South Carolina barely existed in 1670, but by 1700 its enslaved African population was nearly 2,400; by 1730, nearly 23,000; and by 1750 almost 40,000, representing a constant proportion of about 40 percent of the colonial population.[1]

Particularly in the Chesapeake and especially after 1730, much of the growth came from children born to mothers already in bondage, but forced immigration from Africa accelerated dramatically throughout the period as well. Only about 10,000 enslaved people arrived in all of British North America from 1676 to 1700; 37,000, from 1701 to 1725, and 97,000, from 1726 to 1750. All but about 10,000 of those imported from 1701 to 1750 went, in nearly equal numbers, to the Chesapeake and South Carolina. Large as these migration streams were, they were dwarfed by those funneling people to the sugar plantations of the British West Indies, where deaths from overwork, poor nutrition, and disease always substantially exceeded births. Roughly 182,000 African slaves went to the islands from 1675 to 1700 (95 percent of all British imports); 267,000, from 1701 to 1725 (87 percent); and 342,000, from 1726 to 1750 (77 percent). In any given year, Barbados, mother of British slavery, was in itself likely to absorb slightly more Africans than all of continental North America. Jamaica, the eighteenth-century British Empire's leading producer of sugar and coffee, chewed up twice as many.[2]

Several factors account for the rapid expansion of slavery in the eighteenth century. After the restoration of the British monarchy, for a number of reasons it became increasingly difficult to recruit English indentured servants. In the south and east of England, from which most early seventeenth-century servants had emigrated, the unemployment, low wages, and other distresses that had previously driven desperate English men and women to take their chances in North America fields had been replaced by relative prosperity. Population growth also slowed, and, after the Glorious Revolution, religious persecution eased. Yet there remained distress aplenty in the north of England, in Scotland, and in wretched Ireland, and indeed thousands did emigrate from those areas to other parts of the British Empire in the eighteenth century. A scarcity of European ser-

vants cannot entirely explain the shift to slave labor in the Chesapeake and South Carolina. Nor can the rapid decline in new British enslavement of Native Americans after the end of the Yamasee War.

More relevant is the increased supply of enslaved Africans that became available to planters everywhere in the Atlantic world. Within a decade of the formation of the Royal African Company, the English had already become the leading purveyors of enslaved people in Atlantic markets. The trade was so lucrative that the company could never keep up with the demand or enforce its legal monopoly. Even though it sold licenses to private traders to expand capacity, illegal operators carried up to a quarter of the slaves who left Africa in English ships before 1700. In 1698, the evident failure to meet demand, along with the era's general antipathy to monopolies, led Parliament to break the company's sole right to deal in slaves. Until 1712, any British trader willing to pay a 10 percent duty to the company could participate. Thereafter, the commerce was thrown open to all comers, under the general provisions of the Navigation Acts. Further incentive for British merchants and ship captains to enter the trade came in the 1713 peace treaty that ended the War of the Spanish Succession. For a term of thirty years, Spain granted Britain the *asiento de negros,* a contract to supply slaves to its empire. This right formerly had been held by the French Guinea Company, and before that by Dutch and Portuguese merchants.

The varied incentives for British subjects to expand their slaving ventures underlay the enormous growth in the supply of Africans available to North American and West Indian planters after 1700. But they do not entirely explain the metastasizing of slavery, which seems to have been driven less by mechanical supply and demand than by conscious choices made everywhere, from the highest levels of government to the households of elite, and would-be-elite, colonial North Americans. The British government's—and the royal family's—direct involvement in promoting slave labor continued unabated from the Restoration through the era of the Glorious Revolution. The official instructions that the Board of Trade drafted in the name of Queen Anne for New York governor Robert Hunter in 1709, for example, required him "to give all due encouragement and invitation to Merchants and others, who shall bring trade unto our said province . . . and in particular to the Royal African Company of England." Moreover, the instructions continued, "as we are willing to recom-

mend unto the said Company that the said Province may have a constant and sufficient supply of Merchantable Negroes at moderate prices . . . so you are to take Especial care that Payment be duly made, and within a competent time."[3]

Everywhere, elite planters and elite town dwellers were making their payments on time, and those payments were steep. For most of the first half of the eighteenth century, the price for a young adult or teenage male freshly arrived from Africa—such prime hands made up about 60 percent of those purchased—averaged something like £35 sterling in New York or Philadelphia, £30 in the Chesapeake, £25 in South Carolina, and £20 in the West Indies. Prices for women and young children were somewhat lower, but it is clear that planters of truly small means could not participate in the shift to slave labor, for, to them, the cost of a single worker would amount to nearly an entire year's income.[4] Ownership of the bodies of enslaved people, then, became a mark of class privilege. Before Bacon's Rebellion, Virginia's elite—members of the Green Spring faction and their counterparts among Bacon's followers—had already fully committed themselves to slavery. After the rebellion they also committed themselves to removing the white "giddy-headed multitude" from the picture, primarily by ceasing to import unskilled European indentured servants who would gain their freedom, demand access to land, and challenge the rule of the few. Whatever economies of scale the shift to slave labor may have provided for the Chesapeake's great planters, the political advantages were even more substantial.

The transition took a long generation, but by the 1730s, when a handful of great planter families began to enjoy the liberty and prosperity of the British Atlantic empire and set their dozens of enslaved people to work building and staffing their new Georgian mansions, their power was secure. Among the greatest of Virginia's great planters was William Byrd II, who already in 1726 fancied himself "like one of the patriarchs." "I have," he declared,

my flocks and my herds, my bond-men and bond-women, and every soart of trade amongst my own servants, so that I live in a kind of independence on every one, but Providence. However tho' this soart of life is without expence yet it is attended with a great deal of trouble. I must take care to keep all my people to their duty, to set all the springs in motion, and to

make every one draw his equal share to carry the machine forward. But then tis an amusement in this silent country, and a continual exercise of our patience and oeconomy.[5]

The desire for power, status, and authority—fantasies of becoming a modern-day patriarch—as much as sheer love of profitmaking, undergirded the vast expansion of slavery in the eighteenth century. The power that great men gained from owning large numbers of African people extended over lesser British people as well. In Virginia, for example, the elite used debt and credit to dominate the economic lives of the half of the white population of moderate means—those who owned a mere one to three slaves and a couple of hundred acres of land—and the remaining men of small means who could afford no slaves at all to work their common-socage plots or tenant holdings. In ways that would have been comprehensible to a medieval European lord, the great planters used their control of land and labor to dominate their society as well as to validate their manhood.

The political and social dimensions of enslavement become even more evident the farther one looks from the tobacco plantations of the Chesapeake. The Barbadians who dominated the early colonization of South Carolina created a society in which 40 percent of the population was enslaved *before* planters discovered a profitable crop to occupy the laborer's time; the colonists' social vision, perhaps more than their economic vision, was of a future in which the great displayed their power by enslaving others. North of Maryland, meanwhile, though enslaved people toiled in all sorts of occupations, a large percentage were domestics in the households of elite merchants, clergymen, and wealthy landowners. When such mighty men had their portraits painted, they sometimes made sure that the artist inserted a well-dressed black attendant among the accoutrements of wealth. When gentlemen died, their human possessions were often listed in wills and estate inventories alongside such other expensive items as race horses, clocks, and carriages. For such white Atlanteans, ownership of a slave was primarily a symbol of power—the ultimate consumer item that could be purchased in the markets of the Atlantic world.

Asserting humanity in a world where people were purchased as things was the central fact of black Atlanteans' everyday lives. Few would have been surprised at their enslaved condition, or at their masters' obsession with ownership as a measure of power. In most of West Africa's diverse so-cieties, elite men owned slaves as private property and reckoned them as their primary source of wealth. By the early 1700s, the international slaving business in Africa was already two centuries old and, despite the brutality at its core, highly regularized. Slave raiders from African states near the coast captured people from weaker groups in the interior. The enslaved might change hands several times before an African broker brought them to fortified European trading posts on the shore. Principal among the British stations was Cape Coast Castle, a few miles east of the venerable Dutch stronghold of Elmina, on the Gold Coast of what is now Ghana. There, the same kinds of Atlantic world commodities familiar to North Americans changed hands: textiles, cooking utensils, firearms, gunpowder, alcohol. The typical total cost for acquiring a young man was about £6. Even given the substantial costs of transport and of the large crews needed to prevent rebellion during the Middle Passage, the profit from resale at three to five times that price in Barbados or Boston was substantial.[6]

Six distinct zones along the West African coast, from today's Senegal to Angola, shipped people to Atlantic markets. As a result, the diverse captives spoke hundreds of languages, came from centralized states as well as egalitarian village societies, and worshiped Catholic, Muslim, and indigenous deities. Yet the trading patterns that brought the same ships repeatedly to the same ports on both sides of the ocean tended to impose some homogeneity on the enslaved population of any given colony. West Africans from anywhere could be found anywhere in the Americas, but often people from a single region clustered in specific locales. The majority of people imported to South Carolina, for instance, were Angolans. Roughly half of those who went to tidewater Virginia were Igbos who sailed from the Bight of Biafra, and another quarter were Bantu-speaking people from West Central Africa.[7]

This ethnic clustering, and the intense bonds of friendship and fictive kinship forged in the miseries of the Middle Passage, provided the building material for human community among the enslaved. Those who were sold in a way that broke such connections suffered from the isolation. "I now totally lost the small remains of comfort I had enjoyed in conversing with my countrymen," wrote Olaudah Equiano, whose published life narrative preserves one of the few black voices to come down to us from the

mid-eighteenth century. "The women too, who used to wash and take care of me were all gone different ways, and I never saw one of them afterwards." When he finally reached an isolated Virginia plantation, he "saw few or none of our native Africans, and not one soul who could talk to me."[8]

Equiano, whose story may draw on the experiences of other Igbos he knew, said that he spent only a few weeks in Virginia before being sold to a sea captain on whose ship he served for the next three years. Had he remained in the Chesapeake, he might well have continued his isolation indefinitely, for there were many small plantations with only a handful of slaves. More likely, however, is that he would have found himself in a dispersed network of people on neighboring plantations who spoke enough Igbo to communicate with him and teach him enough English to get by. From the 1720s on, a majority of these people were likely to have been born in Virginia and to have grown up speaking a creole dialect that mixed Igbo grammar with English vocabulary. The households that they grew up in of course enjoyed none of the fine Atlantic consumer goods that their labor allowed masters to enjoy. But in both the Chesapeake and South Carolina, roughly half of those who grew up on plantations with fifteen or more enslaved workers seem to have done so under the same roof as both of their parents. Most other children lived with their mothers.

Against all odds, then, enslaved people created family bonds, bonds always under assault from the threat that parents or children might be sold to a distant locale, that a planter would prevent a husband from visiting his wife and children on a neighboring plantation, that a master or a master's son would exercise the patriarchal privilege of raping his human property. The everyday struggle to maintain family ties, to find space to assert humanity in a society that labeled an individual a species of real estate, was the fundamental way that people resisted their enslavement—an everyday, every-hourly form of rebellion far more significant than the occasional violent outburst or desperate act of escape. When people did try to escape, they most often did so because they were searching for kin who had been sold away. That people did not run more often is less a testimony to the effectiveness of militia patrols and newspaper advertisements than to the power of kinship ties and familial obligations to keep an individual close to loved ones and to spare others the whippings and additional harsh collective punishments sure to follow an escape that was likely to fail. In some ways, the most courageous thing was to stay and fight quietly. "It is

not that we would give less respect to . . . the many thousands who 'voted with their feet' for freedom," the most eloquent modern historian of slavery explained. "Rather, it is . . . to reach for the heart of a people whose courage was in their refusal to be brutes, in their insistence on holding themselves together, on acting, speaking, and singing as men and women."[9]

Nonetheless, runaways and individual outbursts of violence were commonplace, particularly among young men just arrived from Africa. But large-scale revolts were remarkably rare in British North America. The two most significant occurred in the 1730s, just as importations of African young men were reaching unprecedented proportions. In Virginia in 1730, after what appeared to be careful preparation, approximately three hundred enslaved men escaped from their masters and gathered in the Great Dismal Swamp on the border with North Carolina. The affair is poorly documented, and its scale may have been magnified by the fears of panicked masters, but it was ruthlessly suppressed, with at least twenty-four alleged conspirators hanged. The rebels seem to have believed a wild rumor that King George had issued an edict that Christian slaves must be freed, and many of them may have been Catholics from the Kingdom of Kongo.

The link between Christianity and freedom was clearer in a South Carolina uprising in 1739. Six years earlier, the Spanish Crown had devised a brilliant, if belated, response to the Carolina-inspired slave raiding that had destroyed the Indian missions of La Florida and rolled back effective Spanish control to little more than the immediate neighborhood of San Agustín. A royal decree offered liberty to any enslaved Africans who could escape from the English and reach the Spanish capital, and who would convert to Roman Catholicism. In 1738, several dozen escapees who appealed to Governor Manuel de Montiano for their freedom received grants of land, material assistance, and the offer of instruction by a Catholic priest at a new village called Pueblo de Gracia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose, a strategic spot two and a half miles north of San Agustín. In September 1739, when word of the existence of "Moosa" (and of the declaration of war against Spain) reached a group of about sixty enslaved men, they made a violent break for it, during which about twenty British Carolinians died along the Stono River, twenty miles from Charles Town. Over the next few months, a Carolina mop-up operation captured and executed nearly all the rebels, while a new Negro Act dramatically re-

duced the ability of enslaved people to move about on their own or hope for legal emancipation. Although nothing like the Stono Rebellion would be tried again, for decades, Moosa would continue to attract individual escapees.

Brave patriarchal words of men like Byrd to the contrary, masters everywhere feared that their slaves would rebel, and they lost many a night's sleep as a result. When a conspiracy was sensed, black people were killed, whether or not the rumors had any substance. White fears played out with particular brutality in New York City in 1741. The family and community networks that sustained enslaved people in urban areas were quite different from those of the Chesapeake or the Carolinas. Among the roughly 15 percent of New York's population who were black, the vast majority were enslaved but lived alone in the houses of their masters. The kinds of work they did—in craft shops and merchant stores, on the docks, as domestic servants, porters, and general laborers—took them out of those houses and allowed them to mingle with one another in public spaces and in the kind of low-end taverns that attracted white servants, day laborers, and others who were, in the eyes of the elite, the dangerous urban version of a giddy-headed multitude.

In February 1741, three enslaved people broke into a small shop and stole some snuffboxes, jewelry, and other imported consumer goods, which they apparently fenced at a nearby tavern that they frequented. While this crime was being investigated, the city's fort and the residence of the province's royal governor caught fire and burned to the ground. Several other blazes followed and were blamed, rightly or wrongly, on arson. In at least one case, a black man was said to have been seen running from an inferno. Somehow, all these events wound together to produce a fantastic theory that slaves conspired to burn down the city, that the tavern where the stolen goods were fenced was the epicenter of the plot, and that somehow the Spanish papists whom some five hundred New Yorkers had sailed off to fight at Cartagena were behind it all. A frenzy of kangaroo court judicial proceedings, extorted confessions, and hasty executions followed. When it was over, thirteen slaves had been burned at the stake, seventeen others along with four whites had been hanged after torture, and more than seventy others had been sold to the West Indies and elsewhere.

"That a plot there was, and as to the Parties and bloody Purpose of it, we presume there can scarce be a Doubt amongst us at this Time," wrote

one of the judges who presided over the bloodletting. "The Ruins of his Majesty's House in the Fort, are the daily Evidence and Momento." In language that once could have been used to describe the Glorious Revolution, he proposed that

we ought once a Year at least, to pay our Tribute of Praise and Thanksgiving to the Divine BEING, that through his merciful Providence and infinite Goodness, caused this inhuman horrible Enterprize to be detected . . . where by a Check has been put to the execrable Malice, and bloody Purposes of our Foreign and Domestick Enemies, though we have not been able entirely to unravel the Mystery of this Iniquity; for 'twas a dark Design, and the Veil is in some Measure still upon it![10]

Like all Britons, slaveowning New Yorkers would have been most familiar with the word "Atlantean" from their reading of John Milton's *Paradise Lost*, the epic poem that was never out of print in the eighteenth century and that, beyond the Bible, was one of a few works likely to be on the bookshelf of a prosperous family. Expelled from Paradise to Hell, Milton's fallen angels schemed

To found this nether Empire, which might rise
By pollicy, and long process of time,
In emulation opposite to Heav'n.
Which when *Bëëlzebub* perceiv'd, then whom,
Satan except, none higher sat, with grave
Aspect he rose, and in his rising seem'd
A Pillar of State; deep on his Front engraven
Deliberation sat and publick care;
And Princely counsel in his face yet shon,
Majestick though in ruin: sage he stood
With *Atlantean* shoulders fit to bear
The weight of mightiest Monarchies.[11]

No wonder masters, proclaiming the liberties that their monarch defended in their nether empire, seldom thought it was a good thing for the enslaved to be taught to read.

Britons were supposed never to be slaves, but at least one Englishman who arrived in Philadelphia in 1729 called himself exactly that. "Our

Cargo consisting chiefly of Voluntary Slaves, who are the least to be pitied, I saw all my Companions sold of[f] before me," wrote William Moraley, an impoverished onetime law student and apprentice watchmaker from Newcastle-upon-Tyne who had signed an indenture before boarding ship in London. "My turn came last, when I was sold for eleven Pounds."[12] Moraley was one of thousands of immigrants who accepted temporary bondage to pay for their passage across the Atlantic, although he was not exactly a typical case. A smooth talker and self-styled ladies' man, he somehow convinced the Burlington, New Jersey, farmer who bought him to shorten his contract from five years to three, despite the fact that he had run away and been caught, a crime for which the punishment normally was additional months or years of servitude. Moraley was also not typical—or perhaps he was more typical than we think—in that he was less interested in working hard, acquiring his own farm, and settling into modest prosperity than he was in finding a rich widow who could support him in the style to which he wanted to become accustomed. When things failed to work out, he went back to England and published his memoirs.

Moraley's book summed up the relationship between servitude, slavery, and agricultural prosperity for substantial planters who lived north of Maryland. "The first settlers," he asserted,

> not being sufficient of themselves to improve those Lands, were not only obliged to purchase a great Number of *English* Servants to assist them, to whom they granted great Immunities, and at the Expiration of their Servitude, Land was given to encourage them to continue there; but were likewise obliged to purchase Multitudes of Negro Slaves from *Africa*, by which Means they are become the richest Farmers in the World, paying no Rent, nor giving Wages either to purchased Servants or Negro Slaves; so that . . you will taste of their Liberality, they living in Affluence and Plenty."[13]

Moraley exaggerated, but his point is valid nonetheless, and nowhere more than for Pennsylvania. With Delaware and neighboring West Jersey, that province seems to have absorbed about half of the 111,000 or so people who emigrated as servants or paid their own way to North America as free people from 1700 to 1750. Chartered in 1681 as the last of the Restoration-era proprietaries, Pennsylvania was the great receiver of eighteenth-century immigrants, but this role was not necessarily foreordained. William Penn, like other colonial proprietors of his day, mixed utopian feudal fantasies with dreams of great wealth. Like them, he encountered

immediate resistance from actual settlers unwilling to submit to his pretensions to govern as "True and Absolute Proprietary"—pretensions that did not survive the Glorious Revolution and his brief loss of his charter in the 1690s. And like other proprietors, Penn failed to reap great wealth; instead, he died deeply in debt. But unlike the others, he was astonishingly effective in recruiting people to migrate to his colony, and in ensuring that it bore some resemblance to his dream of a place where religious toleration would be taken to its logical extreme. According to the Quaker doctrine of the Inward Light, if souls were kept free of coercion from church and government authority, the divine spirit that lived within every man and woman would lead all to the same Truth and the same salvation. The Holy Experiment of Pennsylvania (named, Penn always insisted, in honor of his father and not himself) would be open to all who wanted to join.

Penn was a relentless salesman, and not just among fellow members of the Religious Society of Friends, as the Quakers preferred to be called. Within a year of receiving his charter, he persuaded six hundred "First Purchasers" to invest in land in his colony, and by 1684 some four thousand new emigrants had joined the thousand or so Swedes, Dutch, and English already living in what had been southwestern Nieu Nederlandt. The recruits were not just from England but from Wales, which had a substantial Quaker population, and from areas on the European continent that had become part of an international Quaker movement, particularly the Netherlands and German-speaking regions of what are now Switzerland and southwestern Germany. By 1700, a diverse lot of eighteen thousand people—most but not all Quakers and, even among Friends, nowhere near agreement on a single Truth, religious or otherwise—inhabited the colony. Three thousand of them clustered in the already thriving port of Philadelphia, where Quaker merchants maintained commercial relationships with their coreligionists throughout the Atlantic world.[14]

Surely these people flocked to Pennsylvania for its religious toleration, though for many it must have seemed an intolerant sort of liberty dominated by the consensual uniformity that Friends insisted upon. But just as surely the immigrants came for Pennsylvania's cheap and readily available land, carefully purchased—at least during William Penn's lifetime—by treaty from Lenape chiefs who ceded acreage that their disease-depleted populations no longer needed. Before 1720, prices were well below one shilling per acre, and real estate was remarkably easy to acquire, despite the fact that, in a system where all lands legally were held from a propri-

etor to whom quit-rents were due annually, free and common socage technically did not exist.

The ease of access stemmed from two fundamental problems that bedeviled the Penn family. First was the burden of debt; the Founder and his successors needed to throw open the doors to immigrants in hopes of somehow balancing the books. Second was the struggle among the Founder's heirs after his death in 1718. For years, the legal troubles virtually closed the colony's land office and made the collection of quit-rents almost impossible. This encouraged immigrants to take up lands on a more informal basis and to develop non-taxpaying habits that proved difficult to break even after Penn's sons Thomas, John, and Richard gained clear control over the family property. In 1732, Thomas Penn reorganized the land office, with elaborate plans to raise prices and quit-rents and reserve substantial tracts as Penn family manors. Eight years later, four thousand people had taken warrants to survey lands, but only five hundred of them bothered to file formal patents and thus pay all the appropriate fees.[15] If there was a Pennsylvania way, this was it: the scramble for land on the cheap.

And the cheap-to-free land in question was perhaps the richest on earth for growing the crops demanded by the British Atlantic world. "They have a saying there," groused Mittelberger: "Pennsylvania is heaven for farmers, paradise for artisans, and hell for officials and preachers."[16] Flax for Irish linenmakers, rye, wheat, barley, and oats to feed enslaved West Indians, cattle and hogs to feed the world, naval stores to help carry everything, and countless other products thrived in the soils of Penn's Woods and ensured the prosperity of those who could put a few hands to work growing them. "This Country produces not only almost every Fruit, Herb, and Root as grows in *Great Britain,* but divers Sorts unknown to us," Moraley wrote, echoing virtually every author who wrote about the province. "In short, it is the best poor Man's Country in the World; and, I believe, if this was sufficiently known by the miserable Objects we have in our [English] Streets, Multitudes would be induced to go thither."[17]

To appreciate the extraordinary attractiveness of Pennsylvania, one need only compare it to Georgia, chartered in 1732 specifically to be a poor man's country. Brainchild of a group led by the military officer, member of Parliament, and philanthropist James Oglethorpe, the colony fulfilled long-standing imperialist schemes to carve additional land out of La Florida and fill the gap left by the obliteration of Spanish mission villages during the wars of the early eighteenth century. But the project was also and primarily a charitable endeavor. "In America there are fertile Lands sufficient to subsist all the useless Poor in *England,* and distressed Protestants in *Europe;* yet Thousands starve for want of mere Sustenance," an early promotional tract explained. "The same Want that renders Men useless here, prevents their paying their Passage; and if others pay it for them, they become Servants, or rather Slaves for Years to those who have defrayed that Charge." With ample funding from Parliament— the only direct financial support it ever voted to establish a colony— Georgia's chartered trustees had a mandate to transport impoverished immigrants free of charge and "give them Necessaries, Cattle, Land, and Subsistence till such Time as they can build their Houses and clear some of their Land."[18] Unlike the proprietary lords of the previous century, Oglethorpe and the nineteen other trustees were forbidden to own any real estate in the colony themselves, and their regime would be strictly temporary, with the province reverting to a standard form of royal government after twenty-one years.

Yet like their predecessors, the trustees had a utopian vision for their colony. Impoverished immigrants would be carefully selected for their moral qualities. Settlement would be compact and defensible, beginning with the planned city of Savannah. Land grants would be no larger than five hundred acres, and could not be bought and sold. Slavery would be prohibited. All political decisions would be made in London, without an elected assembly on the ground. Offering no free and common socage, no easily exploitable labor force, and no vehicle for local planters to run their own affairs, the trustees unsurprisingly found few takers for their generous deal. Despite progressive weakening of restrictions, including permission for limited importation of enslaved labor, only a few thousand Europeans had populated the colony by 1752, when the trustees yielded their charter, a year early. Thereafter, under a standard form of royal government, and with all restrictions on property and slaveowning removed, the colony quickly prospered, replicating the plantation-based economy of its neighbor South Carolina.

Meanwhile, Pennsylvania and other northern destinations remained the overwhelmingly more popular destination for the poor and not so poor, both those who could afford to pay their own way and migrate as families and those who bound themselves as servants to work the land. Among the latter, William Moraley was atypical in more ways than one: only a minority of the indentured servants who made small planters affluent were En-

glish like him. Because of improved conditions at home, just 16,000 or so of the 111,000 Europeans who emigrated to British North America in the years between 1700 and 1750 came from England and 11,000 from Wales. Among the English and Welsh, perhaps as many as 80 percent migrated as servants, either with indentures or because they had been convicted of a crime.[19] As had been the case a century earlier, most of these, like Moraley, were young men down on their luck who had come to London from elsewhere and then moved on to the colonies. And like Moraley, many of them seemingly made the choice during a drunken conversation with a newfound alleged friend. "After we had drank two Pints of Beer, he paid the Reckning," Moraley recalled of his fresh acquaintance. "I absolutely agreed to go, and to that Intent we went before Sir *Robert Bailis*, Lord Mayor, where I was sworn as not being a married Person, or an Apprentice by Indenture." Having thus verified that no legal obligations bound Moraley to England, the recruiter took him to a stationer's shop, where he had him sign an indenture and then personally escorted him to a ship that had "on board 20 Persons, all Men, bound to the same Place, and on the same Account."[20]

Similar stories could have been told in different accents by many of the nearly forty thousand people who migrated from Ireland to North America between 1700 and 1750. More than half sailed from Dublin, Cork, and other ports in the overwhelmingly Catholic and perennially impoverished south of the island. Although there were no legal restrictions on Catholic emigration—like all subjects of the British empire, the Irish could move among its various provinces at will—there was little incentive for one to advertise one's status as a papist anywhere in a virulently Protestant Atlantic empire. It is difficult to know, then, how many desperate Catholics were able to escape Ireland in hopes of a better post-servitude life in North America or how many kept their religious beliefs hidden once they arrived; the best guess is that they made up about 30 percent of the total. More certain is that the vast majority of those who left southern Ireland were impoverished young men who, like Moraley, sold themselves into bondage to pay their fare and sailed in small groups on ships that primarily carried Irish linens and other consumer goods to the colonies. With frequent and cheap transport on established trade routes, there was always room for ten or twenty servants to complete a cargo.

For the largely Protestant north of Ireland, the story is more complicated. There, too, many young men, both Catholic and Presbyterian, sold themselves into servitude in order to emigrate. But perhaps 80 percent of migrants—upwards of fifteen thousand people—paid their own way and traveled in family groups, replicating the pattern set by puritan planters a century earlier. As in that earlier period, a mix of religious and economic factors was at work. In the late 1710s and 1720s, controversies ripped Presbyterian congregations in Ulster. A faction called "New Lights" embraced the ideas of personal freedom and religious toleration sweeping the British Empire as a whole, and hoped that appeals to liberty of conscience would win them exemption from the Test Act, which, in Ireland as in England, barred all but communicants in the established Church from officeholding. Their opponents, the "Old Lights," who clung ever more tightly to congregational supervision of personal morality and to formal assertions of Calvinist orthodoxy, focused on a campaign to require that all Presbyterians subscribe to the Cromwell-era Westminster Confession of Faith. They argued that the orthodoxy of this creed, shared with many Dissenters in England, was the best hope for relief from the Test Act. Neither viewpoint prevailed with the parliaments of Ireland or England, although the Old Lights managed to defeat the New Lights for control of the regional presbyteries that governed their churches. Bitter feelings and disillusionment from the internal struggle and the failure of the campaigns against the Test Act led thousands of people to consider a fresh start in Pennsylvania, renowned not only for its toleration but also as the only North American province that already had a presbytery, established a generation earlier by missionaries from Ireland.

But few would have actually boarded ships, had the religious controversies not coincided with economic distress. In the 1690s, after the defeat of James VII and II and his Catholic supporters, many Ulster Presbyterians—whether native to the region or relatively recent immigrants from Scotland and the north of England—had settled on lands vacated by Catholic tenants and leased by desperate landlords under attractive twenty-one-year terms. In the late 1710s, the leases began to expire and landlords began raising, or "racking," rents. These developments coincided with three years of disastrous harvests and a depression in the linen trade. More bad harvests—outright famines—struck both the north and south of Ireland in the late 1720s and in 1741, a horrific year when disease combined with hunger to kill upwards of three hundred thousand people.

Against this background, it is little wonder that families with sufficient means to pay their fare boarded boats for the "Best Poor Man's Country," often settling near friends, neighbors, and fellow church members they had known at home.

In Pennsylvania they were joined, a few miles down or up the road or just over the next ridge, by equally clannish enclaves of German-speaking immigrants from continental Europe. Nearly thirty-seven thousand arrived between 1700 and 1750, the vast majority after 1730. These, too, largely emigrated as intact families. Their individual stories varied greatly, but the broad forces that pushed them from their homes and attracted them to Pennsylvania—where about three-quarters of them settled—were similar to those of the northern Irelanders: in Europe, economic distress, the legacy of warfare, and religious controversies and persecutions; in America, religious toleration, cheap land, well-established trade routes, and welcoming kin and coreligionists who had already made the trip. About 90 percent of the German-speakers were members of one of the Lutheran or Reformed churches established according to the affiliation of local princes in the Holy Roman Empire. The remainder belonged to small Protestant sects—Anabaptists, and countless others with such colorful names as "Dunkers" and "Schwenkfelders"—who found in tolerant Pennsylvania the answer to their dreams of simply being left alone to worship their god as they saw fit. All of the Germans found further reason to see North America as the promised land after 1740, when the British Parliament passed legislation that regularized the process for non-British immigrants to gain the right to own land and vote; they needed only to reside in a British province for seven years, certify that they had received Communion in a Protestant church within the past three months, and take a version of the oaths required by the 1689 Toleration Act. (These provisions were soon revised to allow Quakers and Jews to enjoy the same benefits.)

The attractions of Pennsylvania, particularly once a handful of German-speakers from a particular principality or sect established a beachhead, were clear. But what made large-scale migration possible was a distinctive combination of recruiting, transportation, and financing arrangements that took shape by the 1720s. By then, the publicity campaign that William Penn had begun among German-speaking Quakers had exploded into a nonstop campaign of books, broadsides, and word of mouth, touting the wonders of Pennsylvania throughout the Rhine Valley, or, as it was often known, the "Palatinate." The campaign was managed by a small group of merchants who specialized in transporting Palatine Germans to North America from Rotterdam and Amsterdam, the Dutch seaports to which the Rhine flowed. Unlike the diversified shippers who included a handful of servants or families on merchant vessels sailing from the British Isles, the Dutch brokers popularly (or unpopularly) known as "Neuländer" packed one hundred fifty to two hundred emigrants at a time onto what resembled nothing so much as slave ships.

Their major innovation was to find a way for families who often had spent most of their savings simply traveling to the Netherlands to finance the remainder of their passage to Pennsylvania. Instead of forcing people to sell themselves into servitude before boarding ship, the Neuländer allowed them to travel on credit, with a fixed payment due within a short time after arrival at the destination. Emigrant families could then hope that kin already prospering in Pennsylvania might either pay the fare or arrange favorable terms of servitude for children to work off the debt, liberating the parents to make their way as free people. Many of these "redemptioners" thus still had to become bound laborers to pay for their transportation, but did so with far more freedom of action than Irish or English servants who were simply sold to the highest bidder.

Germans, Irish from north and south, and, in smaller numbers, Lowland Scots, Welsh, French Protestant Huguenots, and others joined many more enslaved Africans to make what had been English North America not only British but promiscuously Atlantean by the middle of the eighteenth century. Nowhere was this more true than in Pennsylvania and neighboring parts of New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia. By 1750, not just Quakers but people of English descent in general were a distinct minority in the Penns' Province.

All of these immigrant peoples brought with them their diverse religious beliefs and disputes—disputes deepened by the wave of religious revivals that swept the European continent, the British Isles, and North America during what came to be known as the "Great Awakening" of the 1730s and 1740s. With university-trained clergy few and far between, the anarchic tendencies of Protestantism exploded in a cacophony of zealotry and pious experimentation. Outbreaks of enthusiastic religious conversion among local congregations of a kind long familiar to the hotter sort of Protestants combined in eighteenth-century minds to become a single

"remarkable Revival of Religion" throughout the Atlantic world. Newspapers and other forms of widely circulated print created the story and centered much of it on the exploits of a charismatic handful of itinerant evangelists.

No itinerant was more famous than George Whitefield, who attracted tumultuous crowds wherever he went during North American tours in 1738, 1739–1741, 1751, 1754, and 1763. Throngs estimated at twenty thousand heard him in Boston and Philadelphia; a thousand or more heard him on at least sixty occasions.[21] A New England farmer named Nathan Cole captured the excitement:

> Now it pleased God to send Mr. Whitefield into this land; and my hearing of his preaching at Philadelphia, like one of the Old apostles, and many thousands flocking to hear him preach the Gospel; and great numbers were converted to Christ; I felt the Spirit of God drawing me by conviction; I longed to see and hear him, and wished he would come this way. . . . Then on a Sudden, in the morning about 8 or 9 of the Clock there came a messenger and said Mr. Whitfield preached at Hartford and Weathersfield yesterday and is to preach at Middletown this morning at ten of the Clock, I was in my field at Work, I dropt my tool that I had in my hand and ran home to my wife telling her to make ready quickly to go. . . . I with my wife soon mounted the horse and went forward as fast as I thought the horse could bear, and when my horse got much out of breath I would get down and put my wife on the Saddle and bid her ride as fast as she could and not Stop or Slack for me except I bad her . . . ; we improved every moment to get along as if we were fleeing for our lives; all the while fearing we should be too late to hear the Sermon, for we had twelve miles to ride double in little more than an hour. . . . On high land I saw before me a Cloud or fogg rising . . . [and] heard a noise something like a low rumbling thunder and presently found it was the noise of Horses feet coming down the Road and this Cloud was a cloud of dust made by the Horses feet; . . . and when I came within about 20 rods of the Road, I could see men and horses Slip[p]ing along in the Cloud like shadows and as I drew nearer it seemed like a steady Stream of horses and their riders, scarcely a horse more than his length behind another, all of a Lather and foam with sweat, their breath rolling out of their nostrils every Jump; every horse seemed to go with all his might to carry his rider to hear news from heaven for the saving of Souls.

Part entertainment, part spectacle, and so emotion-filled that even beasts of burden seemed to be moved by the spirit, Whitefield's appearances led many, at least temporarily, to encounter the divine. "When I saw Mr. Whitfield . . . he lookt almost Angelical," said Cole. "My hearing him preach, gave me a heart wound; By Gods blessing . . . I saw that my righteousness would not save me."[22]

When Whitefield moved on, others moved in, each leaving new traces of spiritual fervor and new divisions among followers of various doctrines. Meantime, those whose faiths were more conventionally orthodox or casually borne noted Whitefield's unangelical crossed eyes and mocked him as the "Reverend Dr. Squintum."[23] Especially in the mid-Atlantic region, the result of these many controversies and enthusiasms was a jostling patchwork of communities and beliefs, in which no group could impose its will on any other. Pennsylvania "offers people more freedom than the other English colonies, since all religious sects are tolerated there," the good Lutheran Mittelberger concluded in 1750 with considerable horror. "One can encounter Lutherans, members of the Reformed Church, Catholics, Quakers, Mennonites or Anabaptists, Herrenhüter or Moravian Brothers, Pietists, Seventh-Day Adventists, Dunkers, Presbyterians, New-born, Freemasons, Separatists, Freethinkers, Jews, Mohammedans, Pagans, Negroes, and Indians." Worse, "there are several hundred unbaptized people who don't even wish to be baptized."[24]

Mittelberger was not the only one who was worried about the great Atlantean mixing of peoples. In 1751, two men who lived a little over one hundred miles apart reflected on the migrants flooding the interior of North America. The name of the first is lost to us, but his words are recorded in the diary of Presbyterian missionary John Brainerd. Hoping to spread the Presbyterian gospel to Native people, Brainerd visited the Wyoming Valley—on the Susquehanna River near present-day Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania—where he encountered multiple obstacles. On the night he arrived, a Haudenosaunee war party passing through on its way south occasioned a "martial dance" that the clergyman found "terrible to behold." No sooner did the Iroquois leave, than preparations began for a council of Native people from miles around to discuss a young woman's recent prophetic message that "it was the mind of the Great Power that they should destroy the poison from among them." What that poison was, and what ex-

actly the young seer said about it, remained obscure, largely because the Indians refused to discuss the details with outsiders. But a further difficulty was that Brainerd's interpreter—probably the Presbyterian Delaware Moses Tatamy—did not speak the principal local dialect. Most of the residents seem to have been Nanticokes, who had only recently relocated to Wyoming after British colonists had forced them from their homes on the Delmarva Peninsula. These and other displaced groups settling in the Susquehanna watershed were all too familiar with Europeans, their religions, and their languages. Brainerd observed that "there is but one in the town that can speak English well, though sundry others can do considerable at it, and the most of them understood some."[25]

After Brainerd talked his way into the council convened to discuss the young woman's prophecy, it was presumably that fluent English-speaker who told him bluntly

that the great God first made three men and three women, viz.: The Indian, the negro, and the white man. That the white man was the youngest brother, and therefore the white people ought not to think themselves better than the Indians. That God gave the white man a book, and told him that he must worship him by that; but gave none either to the Indian or negro, and therefore it could not be fit for them to have a book, or be any way concerned with that way of worship. And, furthermore, they understood that the white people were contriving a method to deprive them of their country in those parts, as they had done by the sea-side, and to make slaves of them and their children, as they did of the negroes; that I was sent on purpose to accomplish that design, and, if I succeeded and managed my business well, I was to be chief ruler in those parts, or, as they termed it, king of all their country, etc. They made all the objections they could, and raked up all the ill treatment they could think of that ever their brethren had received from the white people; and two or three of them seemed to have resentment enough to have slain me on the spot.

Over the next few days, other Native people told Brainerd's interpreter that Native American Christians were welcome to join them at Wyoming and practice their faith, but that their "minister must not come, because he was a white man; that, if one white man came, another would desire it, etc., and so by-and-by they should lose their country." The Wyoming Indians were convinced that "the great men in [New] York, Philadelphia, etc. have laid a scheme to deprive the Indians of all their lands in those parts,

and to enslave them and their posterity; that the ministers are sent among them purely to accomplish that design."[26]

The Wyoming residents would have found little reassurance in the words of the second man who contemplated the mixing of peoples in 1751. In an essay called "Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries, etc.," Philadelphian Benjamin Franklin noted that "America is chiefly occupied by Indians," and that, "these having large Tracks, were easily prevail'd on to part with Portions of Territory to the new Comers, who did not much interfere with the Natives in Hunting, and furnish'd them with many Things they wanted." Yet, as Franklin saw it, something was wrong with the kinds of immigrants who were taking the Indians' place. "Why should the Palatine Boors be suffered to swarm into our Settlements, and by herding together establish their Language and Manners to the Exclusion of ours?" the Philadelphian asked. "Why should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a Colony of Aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them, and will never adopt our Language or Customs, any more than they can acquire our Complexion?" Consideration of the relative merits of Native people and British and German Atlantic immigrants led Franklin

to add one Remark: That the Number of purely white People in the World is proportionably very small. All Africa is black or tawny. Asia chiefly tawny. America (exclusive of the new Comers) wholly so. And in Europe, the Spaniards, Italians, French, Russians and Swedes, are generally of what we call a swarthy Complexion; as are the Germans also, the Saxons only excepted, who with the English, make the principal Body of White People on the Face of the Earth. I could wish their Numbers were increased. And while we are, as I may call it, Scouring our Planet, by clearing America of Woods, and so making this Side of our Globe reflect a brighter Light to the Eyes of Inhabitants in Mars or Venus, why should we in the Sight of Superior Beings, darken its People? Why increase the Sons of Africa, by Planting them in America, where we have so fair an Opportunity, by excluding all Blacks and Tawneys, of increasing the lovely White and Red? But perhaps I am partial to the Complexion of my Country, for such Kind of Partiality is natural to Mankind.[27]

Naturally or not, Franklin lumped people together as abstractions— "Palatine Boors," "Sons of Africa," "purely white people." Similarly, in Brainerd's account, none of the Native Americans—not even the inter-

preter with whom the missionary shared an arduous journey—merited a personal name. Nor, apparently, did the Wyoming residents distinguish among the nameless "minister," the "white people," and the provincial "great men." All, it would seem, had ceased being individuals and instead become stereotypes, faceless threatening competitors for the lands and resources of the continent. Once such thinking began to erase ambiguity and personal circumstances, murderous violence against those labeled enemies could easily come to the surface, as it did for the "two or three" Indians who wanted to kill Brainerd at Wyoming in 1751. By the middle of the decade, Indian rage at white land-grabbing would become nearly universal, and bloodshed on a scale the continent had not seen since the Tuscarora War would convulse the uneasy polyglot of Atlantean peoples.