Frances Riley
Hidden in Plain Sight: 17 October 1961
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Disability Services
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This dissertation is dedicated to my dad, a man who has never complained about his residency as a long-suffering ‘proof-reader’. Now at the end of his illustrious career, I would like to pay tribute to some of his finer work. Dad, thank you for reading through everything I have ever written, but particularly for changing: ‘couscous’ to ‘concise’, ‘Swaziland’ to ‘Switzerland’, ‘secrete’ to ‘secret’, and ‘dogged’ to ‘dodged’. I honestly don’t know what I would be saying without you.

I have had a wonderful time during my MA. This project is undoubtedly the accumulation of all the wonderful hours I spent in G50. So let me get to the point.

Thank you.
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS


LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CNC  Le Centre national du cinéma et de l'image animée (National Centre for Cinema and the Moving Image)

FAC  Fonds d'aide et de Coopération (Assistance Funds and Cooperation)

FLN  Front de Libération National (National Liberation Front)

MNA  Mouvement National Algérien (The Algerian National Movement)

PCA  Parti Communiste Algérien (Algerian Communist Party)
INTRODUCTION

On 17 October 1961, Algerians who demonstrated for their right to independence were killed during a bloody repression. The Republic recognises lucidly this fact. Fifty-one years later, I pay homage to the memory of the victims

(Professor Hollande (2011) quoted in Hollis, 2015:137).

Though there is no question we should deny the events of October 1961 or forget its victims, it is intolerable that the Republican Police, and subsequently the entire Republic, should be called into question


On 17 October 1961, the streets of Paris witnessed Western Europe’s bloodiest act of state repression towards street protest in modern history (House & MacMaster, 2012:1). Despite the magnitude of the massacre (resulting in the deaths of 150-400 pro-FLN protestors) it went unrecognized in ‘official’ public discourse for five decades, creating a rift between official accounts and the historical reality. While I believe it is reasonable to assert 17 October has never been wholly ‘forgotten’, this does not displace the paradox that until 2011 it was never officially ‘remembered’.

In contrast to other massacres of the period, such as Charonne (1962), Stonewall (1969), and Kent State (1970) – all also the result of police brutality, 17 October “has no name other than its arbitrary date” (Cole, 2003:24), standing in reference to the site of an event that history has, as yet, been unable to characterize. The purpose of this project is to examine the processes by which original official accounts and the approximate reality of this event were bridged, with particular reference to the role of cinema in this process. The task is to examine the spaces, both figurative and literal, within which the collective memory of 17 October has

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1 Leaving aside situations of insurrection, revolution, and civil war in Europe, the number of instances in modern history where state forces have fired on and killed political street protestors has been relatively limited. For example, Peterloo, Manchester 16 August 1819, 11 killed; Paris 6 February 1934, 15 killed; Londonderry 30 January 1972, 14 killed (House & MacMaster, 2012:1-2).
come to be expressed or suppressed over time. As this project directly concerns the dynamics of collective memory, it is necessary to begin by outlining my understanding of this topic.

**Collective Memory**

I hold collective memory to be a socio-political construct, understood as a continuous and multidirectional process through which functional goals are expressed through the narrativization of the past. I see the functionality of collective memory as dependent upon the degree to which aspects of the past are concretized\(^2\), the structural components of which directly relate to the dynamics of cultural production, expressed through the relationship between narrative and authority (Neiger et al., 2011:1-16). The social function of collective memory is expressed through processes which reconstruct the past and legitimize the present, which I regard “as much a result of conscious manipulation as unconscious absorption” (Kansteiner, 2002:180). Accordingly, collective memory is not to be understood as, or confused with being, an abstract phenomenon; rather, the presence of collective memory is discernible through continuous (and evolving) public articulation (Neiger et al., 2011:2-7).

I do not regard an engagement with mnemonic practices or artefacts as being sufficient (in isolation) in the formation of ‘collective memory’ (Stone & Hirst, 2014:315). It follows that individual and collective memories should be assessed in accordance with each other when considering how the meaning of the past is constructed and modified over time\(^3\) (Olick, 1999; Hirst & Manier, 2008). I regard nationalism as being one of the most forceful agents in such processes, whereby “the producers of nationalism shape collective identity by the recovery, reconstruction, or invention of a collective national past” (Litvak, 2009:14). I see the framework within which nationhood is expressed as necessarily entailing the constitution of a ‘self’, whereby nations are required to “discover (or construct) a past, a collective memory” (Antze & Lambek, 1996:xxi). To this end, the evolution of collective memory provides a sense of a group’s sociological development, offering a system of periodization (and prioritization) – imposing order over the past through the establishment of basic images that articulate a particular ideological stance (Litvak, 2009:13-16). This project will consider two core aspects of collective memory, highlighted above. First, I wish to explore the socio-political construction at play within

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\(^2\) Publicly accessible materializations of the past take the form of physical objects and/or cultural artefacts i.e. statues, education, rituals, monuments, film.

\(^3\) Influencing a community’s identity.
the formation of collective memory and, secondly, examine the relationship between narrative and authority placed in relation to the social construction of meaning. There are of course numerous forms of public expression one could examine when assessing collective memory. However, the focus here lies primarily upon cinematic representation, which requires a preliminary clarification of my reasons for this decision.

Cinema/Memory

I believe it is reasonable to assert that the human consciousness has been profoundly affected by the temporal flux one experiences when viewing film (see Stiegler, 1998). In this sense, the emergence of cinema can be seen to constitute a historic shift in the history of memory exteriorization, ushering in a new phase of mnemotechnics, constitutional of “a transformation in the technology of memory itself” (Roberts, 2006:60). I regard the adoption of film’s time by the spectator’s consciousness as reflecting the process through which a form of flux occurs, whereby external tools of inscription become integrated within the human (2006:55-56). This dynamic relationship between ‘the human’ and filmic technology suggests the formulation (and/or constitution) of human life/memory as being epiphyllogenetic – evolving in accordance with the logic of prosthetic supplementation (Barker, 2009; Stiegler, 1998). Accordingly, film has a profound capacity to influence what we recall, serving as a vehicle for rendering the memorial legacies of temporal periods available for prosthetic attachment, explaining (in part) how individuals might develop a relationship to a particular traumatic history to which they otherwise have no biographical tie (Landsberg, 2004). Thus, I regard the filmic medium as having become (since approximately 1945,) the chief prosthetic technology of mediated memory (see Kilbourn, 2011), representing the pre-eminent “medium for carrying the stories our culture tells itself” (Rosenstone, 2006:3).

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4 Understood as the reflexive circulation of discourse within social space (Warner, 2002:62).
5 I believe it is reasonable to accept as axiomatic that while the categories of space and time are fundamental to both human perception and experience, they are far from immutable; indeed, such categories are undeniably subject to historical change (Huyssen, 2000:34).
6 Although I contend the human consciousness has been altered by media technologies, I do not wish to imply a technologically determined society. Rather, I believe such technologies more broadly relate to contemporary concerns, such as the ‘crisis in memory’ (an admittedly Eurocentric view,) – located in the breakdown of chronotopic convention, the systematic dismantlement of which sees memory fragments dislocated from their discursive contexts (Goodman & Parisi, 2010:343).
7 Suggesting memory may be generated through elective affiliations.
The field within which this project finds itself is that of media memory studies, which I understand to be “the systematic exploration of collective pasts, narrated by the media, through the media and about the media” (Neiger et al., 2011:1). I see this field as exploring the ritual function of cinema, seen through its capacity to create, maintain, repair, and transform reality (Carey, 1989), which sees memory (and history) supplemented and reconstituted through the medium’s diffusion. Accordingly, the following arguments are concerned with both the empirical qualities of filmic texts and the capacity of the medium to influence the national historical consciousness, shape collective memory, and reintroduce suppressed or marginalised histories (Carlsten & McGarry, 2015:1).

**Project Layout**

Owing to the nature of this discussion, the methodology followed relies primarily on published academic works, combined with an analysis of cinematic texts. Through such research methods I hope to demonstrate the existence of continuing contradictions present within French society, with regards to France’s approach to cultural assimilation. I see the memory of 17 October as embedded within discourses concerning national identity and therefore caught between the opposing and unequal forces of top-down ‘national’ (read as ‘official’) memory, and the resurgence of bottom-up (‘minority’) memories, which seek to propagate the inclusion of minority demands, memories, and histories into the national consciousness.

The first section of this project provides an overview of 17 October and the historical context. I believe it is necessary to understand the extent of the brutality that occurred and 17 October’s place within the period, which I hope will inform the reader’s awareness of the traumatic nature of this memory and degree of socio-political authority that was imposed over the narrativization of events. Chapter 2 examines cinematic representations of the Algeria conflict and provides an assessment of the relationship between narrative and authority, alongside concerns pertaining to national identity. This chapter argues that institutional suppression and the omission of details connected to 17 October represents the primary cause

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8 Limitations in approach: owing to the nature of this discussion I have necessarily made a judgment concerning ‘the’ collective memory of 17 October, as evolving over time. From a methodological and conceptual standpoint there exists a lack of empirical evidence I can utilise to demonstrate that a majority of the French public has shared central sets of memories (or silences) concerning the events of 17 October as expressed through official narrativization of events. Moreover, one must take care not to overstate the effects of cinematic representation on the national consciousness. After all, “many of the mass-marketed memories we consume are ‘imagined memories’ to begin with, and thus more easily forgotten than lived memories” (Huyssen, 2000:27).
of what has be referred to as the ‘collective amnesia’ associated with the event, impacted upon by factors such as memory activism (c.1980) and levels of cultural plurality. Chapter 3 explores the complex dynamics involved in discussions concerning collective memory, where I argue that previously held memories (specifically relating to Vichy France) have bled into and informed an awareness of 17 October and the Algerian conflict, placed in relation to cinematic representation and changing production contexts. Chapter 4 focuses on Michael Haneke’s 2005 thriller Caché. Through close textual analysis I shall assess notions of shame and guilt, connected to broader concerns regarding racial prejudice, where I argue the official handing of 17 October’s memory has hindered closure on the event. Owing to the level of detail that is required in such discussion, an extensive appendix has been provided for the reader’s benefit. Sections which may be of particular relevance include a discussion on possible directions for further research (specifically concerning the diffusions of new media technologies), synopsis of Caché, and an extended historical overview (should the read require one).
CHAPTER 1

17 October is undeniably exceptional within the context of the Algerian conflict. For France, it represented “the most public of their crimes; for Algerians it was the most distant and removed of their many traumas” (Cole, 2003:25). This conflicting (and arguably liminal) dichotomy complicates the memory of the event and attests, in part, to the complexity of its expression within the wider context of the period. With this being said, socio-political responses to (and indeed memories of) 17 October are inseparable from this broader context. I see the avoidance of discussion on the conflict at-large as not only reducing a complex period of history to a micro-historical instance, but tantamount to the imposition of a further injustice upon the memory of the protestors – ultimately marching for an independent Algeria.

Historical Overview

France ruled Algeria from 1839 to 1962. From 1848 Northern Algeria (where the vast majority of the population lived) was a département d'outre-mer, the political status of which was the same as the departments in European France. Until the 1950s, substantial numbers of Europeans (‘colons’ or ‘pieds-noirs’) emigrated to Algeria where they became the dominant force in political, administrative, and economic life. The resulting tensions with the indigenous, largely Muslim, populations manifested itself in a prolonged period of violence (now known as the Algerian war,) from 1954 until independence in 1962. During 1954-19629, war was never declared, leaving the Algerian conflict to be officially characterized by the French authorities as an overseas operation, the purpose of which being the ‘maintenance of law and order’. For the duration of the conflict (and numerous decades following), French officials enacted a policy of denial – it was denied that there was a war just as strongly as suggestions of torture and the creation of detention camps were refuted (House & MacMaster, 2012). To characterise the

9 Admittedly, these dates are somewhat arbitrary. Stora (2012) argues the Sétif massacres of May-June 1945 could be considered a more accurate starting point of war. This continued struggle to locate specific details connected to the decolonization of Algeria (i.e. dates/number of casualties,) attests to the complexity of representing the conflict and the ‘discrepant temporalities’ (see Clifford, 1997:263) of post-colonial groups – “for whom the key dates and events of French national history do not, will not, and cannot tell the whole story” (House & MacMaster, 2012:333).
conflict as ‘War’\(^\text{10}\) would have been tantamount to admitting a conflict between nations, thereby granting the nationalists legitimacy and accepting a ‘different history’ (Stora, 1993:211); rather, Algeria, politically speaking, was France.

There was violent hostility to independence among the pieds-noirs throughout the conflict, which was shared by many members of the upper echelons of the French military and security apparatus. Many pied-noirs moved to France during the war\(^\text{11}\). Not surprisingly, their presence, together with that of a large number of pro-independence Algerians, created a combustible situation on the mainland. It is in this context that the massacre of 17 October occurred, as France engaged in a war it refused to characterise and Algeria was divided by opposing ideologies\(^\text{12}\), leaving both societies to come to terms with ‘the events’ of \emph{a la guerre sans nom}.

17 October

Amidst a climate of Algerian nationalism, ghettoization, state terror, and the imposition of an unlawful night-time curfew, on 17 October 1961, approximately 30,000 Algerian protestors, organized by Fédération de France of the Front de Libération National (FLN), attempted to occupy central spaces of the \emph{colonial metropole}, in a protest initially characterized by the French press as the ‘North African Invasion’ (Bernard, 2000:234). What transpired over the course of that night was a bloody confrontation with 7,000-8,000 police and members of special Republican Security companies, acting under the orders of Prefect of Paris Police, Maurice Papon\(^\text{13}\) (Napoli, 2015). Anticipating the protest (having been made aware of FLN movements by informers and Harkis), blockades were established at central bridges, including Neuilly and Bezons, where police opened machinegun fire on unarmed civilians\(^\text{14}\), disposing of

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\(^{10}\) French Parliament recognized the ‘Algerian war’ in 1999.

\(^{11}\) In 1961 the number of Algerians fighting alongside the French totalled 210,000, outnumbering the 37,000 FLN troops 6:1. At independence, (facing reprisal from the FLN who broke the Evian Accords c.1962,) many Algerian allies of the French (‘harkis’) and their families fled to France (Cohen, 2000:497).

\(^{12}\) Specifically between the FLN and MNA.

\(^{13}\) Who many years later would become the only member of the Vichy regime to be charged for collaborating in the Nazi genocide; significantly, no charges were ever brought forward concerning his involvement in 17 October (see Golsan, 2000:1-34).

\(^{14}\) On 16 October, FLN operatives residing in Paris received a clear order – protestors should not “even [carry] a pocketknife” (Kader quoted in Cole, 2003:21), instead demonstrators, consisting of men, women, and children, should peacefully march wearing their ‘Sunday clothes’.


numerous bodies into the Seine. Below is a depiction of the main movements of demonstrators, moving in from key locations across the suburbs into central Paris.

![Diagram of direction of protest]

**Fig.1.: Direction of Protest (Napoli, 2015)**

The humanitarian worker Monique Hervo, one of only a handful of non-Algerian marchers, recounts her experience of the massacre. Advancing alongside a group of Algerian mothers, some of whom held children in their arms, she “could clearly see lower down a barrier of dark police uniforms. The barrels of rifles or machine-guns moved in a raking action, aimed at the front line of demonstrators. Bullets were fired towards our procession. The shots increased [as]...panic set in among the ranks of women and children” (Hervo quoted in House & MacMaster, 2008:212). Such horrific scenes are corroborated by the testimony of Raoul Letard, a French police officer on duty the night of the massacre. Letard recollects witnessing police officers, stationed on Neuilly bridge, hurling themselves “into what we called a ‘bit of a hunting’ [entering into adjacent apartment buildings]...in order to see better, [shooting]...at everything that moved...for two hours it was a real manhunt, terrible, terrible, terrible!” (quoted in Cole, 2003:22).

The violence of that night reached as far as the walls of the presidential Élysée Palace, the National Assembly, and Senate, leaving a trail of victims history has thus far been unable to

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15 The excessive reaction of police can be partly located in the misinformation that was broadcast over police radio channels, claiming ‘armed’ FLN operatives had murdered officers, while the words of Papon claiming “for every blow we receive, we will give them ten in return” (Papon quoted in Cole, 2003:24) echoed through the night.
number. Despite an absence of official figures, estimates put the number of dead between 150-400 (50 of whom are believed to have been shot or bludgeoned to death in the courtyard of the Paris police headquarters,) with thousands more injured, detained, and extradited¹⁶ (House & MacMaster, 2012:113-136). The chart below maps the locations of the police round-up’s, which resulted in the detention of over 12,000 protestors, held in appalling conditions for 1-12 days.

![Map of Arrestands Du 17 Octobre 1961](image)

**Fig.2.:** Arrests (Napoli, 2015)

Uncertainty, concerning the exact number of victims, is a common concern of massacres. However, in relation to the magnitude of 17 October, the discrepancy in accounts is so vast I see the fundamental meaning of the event placed in jeopardy (Jaccomard, 2012:259). Connected to the loss of life and contradictory accounts is the degree to which the French state “used all the means at its disposal to silence those who sought to publicize the extent of the repression”¹⁷ (Cole, 2003:25). I read this cover-up as an *acte forclos* – an action deliberately

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¹⁶ Medical reports show the admittance of over 1,000 Algerians on 17-18 October, while the numbers of those too scared to seek medical treatment can only be speculated upon (House & MacMaster, 2012:115-120). Police records indicate over 12,000 arrests were made, increasing by week’s end to 14,000 – demonstrators were held in stadiums, amphitheatres, and prisons across Paris. Furthermore, the fate of 500-1500 marchers summarily deported to Algeria remains unclear (Cole, 2003:24-25).

¹⁷ Pressurising news outlets to report the deaths of 2 Algerian protestors. For intellectuals, such as Beauvoir, these ‘bare-faced lies’ claiming “two dead, when we already know of more than fifty” (Beauvoir, 1963:626),
placed beyond the realm of official history by institutional silence\(^\text{18}\) (Mortimer, 2008:xiv). The official response to 17 October reflects the political approach to the conflict-at-large, as in both instances the French state “strove to ‘leave no traces’—which is to say, to immobilize time, or to function as an ahistorical structural system” (Ross, 1996:122). Indeed, as Jean Tiberi, the ex-mayor of Paris has stated, we ‘still don’t know exactly’ what transpired on that fateful night (quoted in Cole, 2003:23), such was the extent of the repression, suggesting how official authority over the narrativization of 17 October has cultivated an aura of ambiguity.

Regardless of the confusion which surrounds the event, it is now an indisputable fact on definitional, legal, and historical grounds that on 17 October 1961 a massacre occurred (Golsan, 2000:226-243). While numbering the victims is of course of both moral and historical significance, I do not believe such an endeavour is capable of providing enhanced insight into our discussion. Indeed, I see a fixation on the numbering of victims (or detailed reconstruction of events) as impinging upon attempts to reveal the socio-political frameworks at play in the suppression and narrativization of 17 October. As such, the focus of this project does not directly relate to the victims who lost their lives – rather, focus here relates to the representation of their memory, which, despite being connected, represents a distinct endeavour. Before moving into the following chapters, I believe it is prudent to offer some preliminary clarifications concerning my overall approach to this project.

The arguments in this project are aligned with those of numerous scholars (Cohen, 2000; Stora, 1993), who argue contemporary French reactions to Franco-Algerians and memories of the Algerian conflict are caught in a paradoxical continuum, between the act of remembering and the act of forgetting (Dauncey & Tinker, 2015:137-139). From this perspective, the physical presence of Algerians in France can be seen to evoke memories of defeat and loss of prestige, manifesting in racial prejudice. Although I find myself in agreement with many of these conclusions, I must stipulate that unlike scholars, such as Stora (1993), I do not believe that the memory of the Algerian conflict (inclusive of 17 October) has been repressed within the French collective consciousness. While I agree there is sufficient evidence to suggest racial prejudice is present within French society\(^\text{19}\), I disagree with the summation that repression represents the

\[\text{recalled the actions of the French authorities during German occupation (Docker, 2012:12). Photographs, taken by Elie Kagan (see Appendix), demonstrate why 17 October reopened old wounds concerning the complicity of the Vichy regime.}\]

\[\text{18 Being aware of the power of public circulation, the French state sought to limit the address, temporality, and citational field of resistant discourses (Warner, 2002:82).}\]

\[\text{19 Recent work conducted by political scientists suggests it is 2.5 times harder for Muslims in France to find employment than Christians (Adida et al., 2015). Moreover, recent polls suggest the French are increasingly}\]
primary cause of this situation\textsuperscript{20}. Indeed, as this project argues, notions of guilt and shame are arguably more prominent components in such processes, which coalesce in relation to specific public policies concerning assimilation. Accordingly, a more beneficial position may be reached if we consider the central difficulty to be one rooted in a failure of ‘expression’, rather than as a by-product of ‘repression’.

hostile towards people from other countries. 66% claim there are too many ‘foreigners’ in France, while 59% agree ‘immigrants don’t try hard enough to integrate’. A rejection of Islam is also widespread, with 63% believing the religion is incompatible ‘with French values’ (France24, 2014).

\textsuperscript{20} While I accept repression may be present in relation to individual trauma, I reject the assertion this psychological process can be applied to a (national) collective – indeed, a poll of 1990 reported over half of the respondents felt the Algerian war represented the most important event in French history since liberation in 1944 (Cohen, 2000:491). (See Appendix for a comprehensive rebuttal.)
CHAPTER 2

There is a greater volume of filmic texts worthy of exploration than can be examined within the scope of this project. However, I believe there are specific examples, which, when reflected upon, can illuminate trends in regards to the relationship between cinematic representation, the Algerian conflict, and French collective memory. In this chapter I will access the dynamics of socio-political construction, in relation to the collective memory of 17 October, combined with an assessment of the relationship between national identity and concepts such as ‘collective amnesia’. To begin, I shall briefly contrast cinematic representations of trauma in American and French cinema to illuminate specific trends.

Neutral soil

Despite certain failings, American cinema, when ‘playing out’ the memory of the Vietnam War (c.1965-1973), has predominantly foregrounded Vietnam on both a visual and conceptual level. A plethora of texts have engaged with the subject, including: *Apocalypse Now* (Coppola, 1979), *Platoon* (Stone, 1986), *The Deer Hunter* (Cimino, 1978), *Full Metal Jacket* (Kubrick, 1987), and *Good Morning Vietnam* (Levinson, 1987). Such texts place Vietnam as the central space of their narratives, thereby locating a central site of memory and trauma. I see this presentation of ‘space’ as functioning in contrast to the indirect depiction of the Algerian conflict in French cinema. Indeed, unlike American texts, such as *The Green Berets* (Kellogg et al., 1968), shot during the course of the Vietnam War, no French film was ever released directly evoking the Algerian War during its course (Stora, 1991:41). If we accept powerful filmic representations of trauma display “a seeing and a listening from the site of trauma” (Caruth, 2006:214), we can subsequently infer the inability of French cinema to locate this reflects, in part, the liminal composition of the conflict within French memory – complicating public expression.\(^\text{21}\)

The phantom presence of Algeria within French cinema is exemplified by Godard’s 1963 film *Le petit soldat*. Set in Geneva, *Le petit soldat* literally places the narrative on neutral soil,

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\(^{21}\) Comparable forms of public expression can be found in memorials commemorating conflicts. The Vietnam memorial in Washington DC was erected in 1982. In France, the monument to the Algerian war was not erected until 1996 – rather than standing in a central location (as the Vietnam memorial does,) it is situated in the Butte du Chapeau Rouge Park in the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) arrondissement of Paris, supporting notions pertaining to the marginalization (not repression,) of the conflict within France’s collective consciousness.
allowing connotations of neutrality to confuse notions of complicity, accountability, and guilt. On a narrative level, the text sees FLN operatives assume the position of antagonist, torturer, and tormentor – contorting the dynamics between aggressor and victim. The text crafts a carnivalesque representation (and distorted memory,) of the conflict, as Godard systematically neutralises the accountability of his ‘little solider’ – unable to rescue himself from the brutality of the FLN, or injustices of the French government. Within the text, accountability is relegated to a liminal plane, caught between two opposing forces – the only figure who emerges free of objective guilt is the lone Frenchman, victim of both governmental and ‘terrorist’ action – thereby separating the actions of state from individual culpability22.

Originally scheduled for cinematic release in 1960, Le petit soldat was censored in France until 1963, despite Godard’s status. State censorship reflects the taboo nature of the conflict and degree of narrative authority that was structurally imposed during the period23. Aware of censorship and being commercial (often state subsidised) products, the majority of mainstream cinematic texts produced during the 1960s adopted official rhetoric used to characterized the Algerian conflict. The musical, Les parapluies de Cherbourg (1963), references the ‘over there’ in which a soldier has fought – never mentioning Algeria by name, mimicking political expressions of denial and omission, (Cohen, 2000:489). Accordingly, formal processes can be seen to impact upon cinematic representation (and therefore collective and prosthetic memories) highlighting the degree to which narrative authority and collective memory are intertwined, which, in relation to the conflict, can be usefully explored through a comparative analysis of the Algerian film industry.

Over Here

Algerian cinema was not only born out of the war of independence but also ‘served that war’ (Salmane et al., 1976:5). Unsurprisingly, this introduced alternate representations of trauma – emphasising the centrality of Algerian ‘space’, countering French cinema’s fantasy “of

22 I see Godard’s representation of collective guilt as representative of attitudes of the time, distorting the relationship between power and government. Indeed, when we discuss those ‘in power’ (enacting the actions of a democratic state), we refer to those who have been ‘empowered’ by their citizens. Power therefore represents the essence of all governments, which appears as the property of a group and remains “in existence only so long as the group keeps together” (Arendt, 1970:44). I see the displacement of collective guilt as comparable to the actions of many French citizens following liberation in 1944, which shall be explored in the following chapters.

23 Rare attempts to cinematically represent 17 October were frustrated by official censorship. For example, when Panijel attempted to screen his documentary Octobre à Paris (1962) it was seized by the Paris police (and banned until 1973), whereupon it did not enter public consciousness. Octobre was not exhibited until 2011.
the ‘nothing’ that there was to see in Algeria” (Austin, 2007:195). Following independence in 1962, Algerian cinema was rapidly nationalised (c.1964), quickly becoming dominated by *cinema moudjahid*\(^{24}\), moving away from the initial focus on trauma in the aftermath of war (i.e. *The Winds of the Aures*\(^{25}\) (Lakhdar-Hamina, 1967) and *The Battle of Algiers*\(^{26}\) (Pontecorvo, 1966)) to propagating the triumphant victory of the FLN, later becoming “ossified into a schematic and triumphalist official version” (Austin, 2009:20). Cinematic representations of the conflict often mimicked ‘official’ policies relating to the construction of national identity, suggesting when national identity is at stake heritage will often supplant history (see Lowenthal, 1994). In this respect, history, when co-opted by heritage, underwrites a founding myth for the purposes of excluding others (Litvak, 2009:18), which I would suggest is exemplified by the actions of the FLN following the removal of Ben Bella from office in 1965. The extent to which Algeria cinema was informed by official (FLN) discourse can be demonstrated by the absence of: female fighters, Ben Bella, the PCA, and MNA from cinematic representation and the official narrative of the conflict (taught in schools and preserved in state archives).

Processes of official mythologizing meant “the war had to be seen as a shared effort without internal schisms, contradictions or personal motivations” (Austin, 2007:186). Accordingly, the prosthetic memories brought forth by numerous cinematic representations came to substantiate (and to a certain extent validate,) the official memory of the conflict. Indeed, many such representations stand in contrast to the history (and presumably individual memory) of the period. During the struggle for independence, Algerian fighters were never constituted by unity as *cinema moudjahid* would suggest. Rather, the period was marked by continuous conflict between the FLN and MNA – the absence of which from cinematic representation demonstrates the officially imposed policy of ‘forgetting’, that was cloaked over the conflict’s memory. Within this context, I read ‘forgetting’ as an active process – creating a shared identity in a new setting (see Carsten, 1996), suggesting new sets of memories are frequently accompanied by tacitly shared silences (Connerton, 2008:63).

**Quiet Please**

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\(^{24}\) *Freedom Fighter Cinema.*

\(^{25}\) Despite being shown at Cannes in 1967 and representing the first important work in Algerian cinema, *Aures* was poorly received domestically, possibly owing to the complex portrayal of French and Algerian soldiers, which resisted simplistic/binary configurations of ‘good’/‘evil’ (Austin, 2007:186-194).

\(^{26}\) Based on the memoirs of Yacef Saadi, a leading figure in the FLN – not exhibited in France until 1971 (see Bignari, 2000).
If we understand collective memory as a foundation upon which collective identity is established, then what is excluded from the national narrative also plays a critical role in the process of identity formation (Stone & Hirst, 2014:315). Understood in these terms, an interesting comparison can be made between French and Algerian cinema. Owing in part to the conflicting proximity in which 17 October occurred (removed from the wider context of Algerian trauma and the most present of all French traumas,) the event found itself marginalized in both nations. During the decades following the war’s ‘resolution’, cinematic representations which challenged official constructions of the period were continuously censored in both nations. The desire to reduce the internal contradictions the memory of the war evoked is arguably the primary reason for an absence of extensive representation on 17 October within the cannon of cinema moujahid. Indeed, Algerian cinema seemed unconcerned with offering representations of 17 October, less a matter of economic and practical restrictions, than ideological concern and complexity, as the state strove to frame Algeria as the unifying site of trauma, rebellion, and victory. For France, to represent 17 October would arguably be to ‘bring home’ a central site of defeat and violence. In both cases, I see the marginalization of 17 October as directly connected to discourses concerning national identity and the dynamics of public silence.

Concepts, such as ‘public silence’ or ‘collective forgetting’, arguably relate more to situations of inaccessibility than absence, whereby official silence (taken in conjunction with what is (re)articulated,) is understood as that which impairs certain memories, while simultaneously (re)enforcing others (Stone & Hirst, 2014:314-321). For Algeria and France, the ‘forgetting’ of 17 October was facilitated by numerous means, such as the passing of amnesties, closure of archives, media censorship, and the implementation of official policies of denial and/or omission (McCormack, 2010:5). A psychoanalytical approach to the memory of 17 October, suggests the central concern relates less a matter of having ‘forgotten’ the event “than of never really seeing what we commemorate in the patterns we repeat” (Antze & Lambek, 1996:xxvii). Accordingly, I regard modes of institutional suppression27 as representing a root cause of what is commonly referred to as the ‘collective amnesia’ associated with 17 October (see Berghahn, 2013:40-46) – opposition to which begins with processes which seek to ‘break the silence’ (Zerubavel, 2006).

Public silence is experienced by a mnemonic community, constituting a common characteristic of societal discourse, which I understand as being prevalent (for the most part,)

27 And processes of communicative boundary maintenance.
within minority communities (Zerubavel, 2004). As per the Republican tradition, cultural specificities in French culture are not regard as politically determining. The insistence that immigrants shed their ‘otherness’ can therefore be read as an attempt to depoliticize difference by endeavouring to erase it. Accordingly, minority communities have historically struggled to become influential political actors, the results of which hinder the inclusion of minority demands into the national political agenda, and assertion of past memories into the national consciousness. These Republican attitudes towards integration take the form of specific public policies, which initiate “an ambiguous blame game whereby the latter have to want to integrate, and have to demonstrate this desire endlessly through their words and actions” (Durmelat & Swamy, 2011:9). Within France there is a pronounced insistence upon applying these monocultural principles to a multicultural society, exacerbating the degree of alienation and differentiation between migrant identities and the notion of a monolithic ‘French’ culture. Consequently, minority groups, such as those of Algerian descent, have encountered resistance when attempting to (re)integrate memories, such as 17 October, into the historical consciousness. It is my contention that resistance to the inclusion of minority demands has resulted in the reappropriation of specific memories, accompanied by a demand “that the nation recognise that history” (Nora, 2002:7).

The work of memory activists, who effectively encouraged the State to recognize 17 October in 2011, forced the recognition of the discrimination Algerians had suffered, thereby exposing the failings of the Republic, presenting a significant challenge to France’s ‘national identity’. Memory activism played an important role in the increased assertion of minority memories from the late 1980s onwards, whereby the memory of 17 October has been mobilized by groups, such as the children of demonstrators, to solicit a “wider recognition of their parents’ role as historical actors [and assert]...their place within French History and society” (House & MacMaster, 2012:325). Accordingly, the assertion of minority (often traumatic) memories contains an implicit aim, which looks “to transform the cruelties of the present by working with and through the cruelties of the past” (Rothberg, 2006:171). Responding to minority grievances therefore opens a space for the questioning of Republican values, seen in relation to the ways the memory of 17 October has been mobilised as part of a wider discourse concerning processes of identity construction (House & MacMaster, 2012:290).

To apprehend the collective memory of 17 October as the dualistic combination of individual and collectivised understandings of the past, is to suggest its constitution to be social
and political, involving “the coordination of individual and group memories, whose results may appear consensual when they are in fact the product of processes of intense contest, struggle, and...annihilation” (Gillis, 1994:5). Accordingly, if we are to accept “control of a society’s memory largely conditions the hierarchy of power” (Connerton, 1989:1), resistance to ‘bottom-up’ alterations in the memory of 17 October is representative of the strength/weakness of hierarchical (most likely political/’official’) power. I see the strength of ‘official’ power expressed via numerous means, with the most visible being media censorship and levels of public access to archives. Resistance to modification in collective memory can subsequently be read as a consorted effort to retain favourable conditions of power, manifesting as opposition to the reconstitution of (hegemonic) cultural values and situations of racial prejudice. Understood in these terms, what has been dubbed the contemporary ‘crisis in memory’ arguably appears as a relational phenomenon, connected to the velocity of social change – whereby “today’s fragmented subjects [and collective memories are]...not unrelated to the complexities of transnational links, cultural pluralism, and the weakening of the state” (Antze & Lambek, 1996:xxii). These dynamics shall be explored in further detail in the following chapter which considers continuing trends and alterations in French cinema, in relation to filmic technology, public policies, and multidirectional memory.

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28 For example, on 19 October 1998, French police, acting under state orders, seized editions of the Algerian daily publication Liberté, which included the article ‘35 years ago: The Battle of Paris’ (Sadek).
29 State archives were opened in 1998, however the historians who were granted access to materials relating to 17 October were chosen by the state, including Brunet, whose research took on ‘good faith’ the ‘impeachable’ accounts of police (see House & MacMaster, 2008:205-214).
30 In this respect, the outcry of traumatic memory (associated with memory activism) necessarily stands in need of an authority of reconciliation. What this reveals is that “the stakes of the current debate exceed the status of an academic discipline and involve rather the relationships between identity, memory, and the state” (Routhberg, 2009:269). As such, what appears as a central issue is the “crisis in the state’s mechanisms of recognition and reconciliation” (2009:270), whereby the ‘crisis in memory’ can be (partly) located as having arisen out of specific challenges to the ‘official’ sovereignty over memory.
I believe that ‘official’ versions of 17 October (and policies relating to the Algerian conflict) reflect the Establishment’s top-down definition of French identity, in a comparable manner to how fragmented bottom-up memories embody the emerging divisions surrounding the notion of a homogeneous French identity (Cohen, 2000). These complex configurations reflect the multidirectional elements at play in discussions concerning national identity and collective memory, and represent a key dialectic through which divergences between original official accounts and the reality of 17 October have been bridged over time. This chapter argues the traumatic memory of 17 October has been informed and expressed through narratives of resistance, which draw on other traumatic memories (specifically the Holocaust and German occupation c.1940-1944). Accordingly, these arguments are predicated upon what I believe to be the reasonable assumption that collective memory is embedded within a broader historical consciousness. Consequently, this chapter will examine the correlations between the narrativization of the Vichy past and the Republics handling of 17 October, placed in relation to changing production contexts. To begin, I shall signal to continuing trends present in French cinema in relation to representations of the Algerian conflict.

The left-wing documentary *La guerre sans nom* (Tavernier, 1991), is arguably a continuation of implicit trends relating to the memory of the Algerian conflict as expressed in French cinema. *La guerre* introduces themes of resistance to the Algerian war, focusing on the May 1956 demonstration in Grenoble, when 2,000 demonstrators attempted to block transport trains carrying French troops bound for Algeria, signalling heroic mass resistance. The documentary (containing similar ideological implications as *Cher Frangin* (Mordillat, 1988), and *R.A.S.* (Boisset, 1973),) articulates a somewhat misleading memory of events. During 1954-1962, a minimal amount of individuals (in comparison to the some 2 million French troops who fought in Algeria) are reported to have dodged the draft or deserted, while even fewer individuals directly intervened in the conflict (see Talbott, 1980). Indeed, protests in May 1956, rather than embodying the spirit of the war years, represents somewhat of an anomaly, being the single largest protest by French nationals during the period. Significantly, the documentary portrays trauma as shifting spatially from Algeria to France, as interviews are given on ‘home soil’, while the site of trauma to which the documentary refers remains largely absent from the text (Austin, 2009:19).
During the handful of occasions Algeria does appear onscreen, we are shown “only French soldiers or empty landscapes [creating]...a precise space of memory and fantasy: Algeria without Algerians” (Austin, 2007:185). In these fleeting moments the landscape is permitted to linger ‘Un jour, tu verras’ imposes itself over the land, effectively colonizing what this ‘space’ can articulate. By prioritizing the testimonies of individuals who dodged the draft (claiming moral principle as their primary motivation) the documentary evokes a similar sentiment to that which arose in the wake of the Vichy regime. I would suggest that, similarly to the ways France appropriated the actions of the Resistance as the true character of the nation during occupation, these cinematic depictions, stemming from the political left, serve as “projections of what France today wishes its soldiers had done” (Cohen, 2000:490), rather than unbiased representation.

The Dynamics of Resistance

Historians, in particular Stora (1991;2002), have suggested there exists a ‘hierarchy of commemorations’ in French memory, where WWII often eclipses the Algerian conflict, as the two jostle for recognition in contemporary memory. However, I believe a more dynamic interaction between the two is at play, whereby the memory of WWII and Vichy France are often evoked in relation to cinematic representations of the Algerian conflict. Texts which evoke comparison with Vichy France are often able to capitalize upon “the widespread knowledge and ready recognition of the first in order to propel the second to a location of greater importance in our [French] collective memory” (Rice, 2014:91). Such an assertion suggests each crisis in French history (and arguably memory,) “has fed upon its predecessors: the Dreyfus Affair on the French Revolution, Vichy on the Dreyfus Affair, the Algerian War on Vichy, and so on” (Rousso, 1994:4).

I disagree with the position of scholars, such as Austin (2007), who see the national obsession with Resistance as distracting from cinematic engagement with the Algerian conflict. A position which assumes the inherent separateness of such memories can risk marginalizing the “multiple forms of cross-referencing between decolonization and Nazi genocide” that

31 A popular French song.
32 Universalization of the Holocaust (as the embodiment of human suffering) has seen traumatic memories (i.e. 17 October) engage with it in a symbiotic fashion, latching onto a specific arrangement that is “historically distant and politically distant from the original event” (Huyssen, 2000:24). Indeed, as the Holocaust reflects a failure of Western civilization in the practice of anamnesis and embodies a socio-political inability to accept difference and otherness and “to draw the consequences from the insidious relationship between enlightened modernity, racial oppression, and organized violence” (2000:24) it can be used to elevate (and illuminate) the plight of other victims.
characterize the 1950s and 1960s in France and elsewhere” (Rothberg, 2006:161). I believe a more nuanced understanding of cinematic texts and collective memory may be derived if we move from a competitive to multidirectional model of memory, capable of demonstrating, amongst other factors, how the emergence of 17 October as a legitimate topic of historical research owes much of the intensified academic attention to influences outside the discipline of history (Rothberg 2009:229-233). Accordingly, a multidirectional approach to collective memory allows events, such as French Resistance and 17 October, to exist in relation, not opposition, in the process of recollection. Such a position appears concurrent with a survey of 1991, asking young people (17-30) if they saw the actions of Porteurs as comparable to members of the French Resistance, finding 85.5% of respondents in agreement with this statement, while only 3% viewed these actions as disloyal (Coulon, quoted in Cohen, 2000:496).

Recent filmic works, such as Hors la loi (Bouchareb, 2010), invite comparison between FLN actions and the French Resistance. After being forcibly removed from their family’s land, Hors sees three brothers relocate from Algeria to Paris, where two subsequently join a violent faction of the FLN. The text follows the brothers, as they fight for their nation’s right to freedom, battling the forces of racism, oppression, and state terror – mirroring familiar cinematic narratives of resistance, such as those found in L’armée des ombres (Melville, 1969) and La bataille du rail (Clément, 1946). Such work underscores the complex dynamics at play in the narrativization and composition of the past, while an understanding of multidirectional memory arguably explains how “the non-identical, yet overlapping and equally conflictual legacies of the Nazi occupation and the unravelling project of colonialism” (Rothberg, 2006:168) can mutually reinforce a wider memory of the period. From this perspective, the legacies of occupation and

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33 Understood as “the interference, overlap, and mutual constitution of seemingly distinct collective memories that define the post-war era and the workings of memory more generally” (Rothberg, 2006:162).

34 Outside of the media attention generated by the Papon affair, one of the most significant factors in generating scholarly attention to 17 October arguably comes from Caché, studied in Universities around the world (i.e. England, Germany, America, Sweden, Italy). Moreover, television texts such as Nuit noire, 17 Octobre 2006 (2005) and Secret History: Drowning by Bullets (1992) have contributed to an increased awareness of 17 October within popular culture, while music i.e. ‘When The Stars Fall From The Sky’ by the Irish punk group Stiff Little Fingers and ‘17 Octobre’ by hip-hop artist Médine (see Appendix) have garnered attention. Unsurprisingly, literature has proved an invaluable discipline in generating academic attention, works include: The Stone Face (Gardner, 1963), Meurtres pour Mémoire (Daeninckx, 1984), and La Seine était Rouge (Paris, Octobre 1961) (Sebbar, 2008). Accordingly, representations of the massacre in novels, films, and other art forms has aided in ‘keeping alive’ the memory of the event, and redefining its significance within alternate temporal contexts (Hargreaves, 2005:3-6).

35 FLN supporters.

36 I regard memory studies as having become increasingly embedded within accounts of trauma, to the extent that on an increasing scale “memory worth talking about – worth remembering – is memory of trauma” (Antze & Lambek, 1996:xii), a situation I would contend is connected to the dynamics of memory activism.
the Algerian conflict are understood through each other, whereby tensions surrounding “social cohesion in France constitute one of the sites of transfer between the memory of the Second World War...on the one hand, and the process of decolonization, on the other” (2006:168). From this perspective, prosthetic memories should not be understood as the property of a single group; rather, they bestow “the possibility for collective horizons of experience and pave the way for unexpected political alliances” (Landsberg, 2003:149), arguably derived from the ability to evoke the knowledge of previously held memories (i.e. Resistance) in the service of others (i.e. 17 October/decolonization). With this in mind, I believe an analysis of changing production contexts is required – specifically considering how minority memories began to be presented in filmic texts in order to assess the relationship between the social construction of meaning and narrative authority.

Welcome to the Machine

If we are to accept filmic technology to be an expression of socio-cultural techniques, performances and utterances, which “bear the impress of social values” (Webster, 2006:12), then the ambiguous conditions separating filmic technology from society becomes apparent. An understanding of this technology as a mediating interface, essentially “store[ing] information or symbolic content” (Thompson, 1995:19), suggests filmic technology can never be conceived of as a ‘neutral’ component in the circulation, production, and appropriation of the past (Fickers, 2014:45-46). If we acknowledge technology to be an intrinsic sociological component, then any discussion which considers the role of cinema, in relation to collective memory, must, out of necessity, consider “the power of the social structures within which they are imbedded and utilized” (Cana, 2003:1). Hence, I regard media systems (and to an extent audience configurations) as representative of the “direct and indirect result of explicit public policies” (McChesney, 2003:28).

Cinema policies and production contexts have, of course, changed over time, thereby effecting the politics of representation in France. The 1990s marked a significant period in French cinema, as Maghrebi-French filmmakers began to benefit from the commercial support of production companies, such as Canal+. In 1997, Yamina Benguigui released Mémoires d’immigrés: l’héritage maghrébin (1997), a three part documentary chronicling North African immigration to France, the funding for which was largely derived from Canal+ and, significantly, the state-funded institutions of the CNC and FAC (Durmelat & Swamy, 2011:2). Benguigui’s work filled “a major gap in the French cinematographic landscape by devoting space to first
generation immigrants from the Maghreb, whose story had rarely been seen or heard before” (Tarr & Rollet, 2001:51). The period which followed marked an increase in scholarly attention to Beur and Banlieue filmmaking practices, engaging with mainstream discourses on ‘Frenchness’, which sought to negotiate the relationship between French republican values and complex questions regarding social (particularly ethnic) on-screen difference (Tarr, 2005:3-11). As such, the artistic sensibilities of Maghrebi-French filmmakers appeared to shift away from the activist (arguably marginal) cinema of the 1980s after gaining (limited) access to the mainstream French film industry in the 1990s.

Beur and Banlieue filmmaking came to represent the ‘separateness’ which descendants of Maghrebi immigrants perceived within French society. These filmmaking practices presented ethnicity and ethnic difference as a relational, malleable notion, informed by the historical legacy of colonialism, and sets of social relations and discourses experienced by cultural producers in France – the direct result of this specific history (Durmelat & Swamy, 2011:5). Accordingly, the work of such cinema, predicated upon the expression and exploration of difference and cultural ‘otherness’, is arguably connected to the dynamics of memory activism, exploring new modes of defining and inhabiting specific forms of ‘Frenchness’ and history, as both left-wing movements, with their focus on plurality, move away from essentialist differences.

From Left to Right

Cinematic texts which engage with left-wing sentiment are of course not the only manifestations of the conflict. Right-wing narratives, such as L’honneur d’un capitaine (Schoendoerffer, 1982) and Le coup de Sirocco (Arcady, 1979), articulate themes of bravery and integrity, championing the heroic actions of French soldiers during the conflict (in a similar manner to depictions of French soldiers during WWII). Such texts now stand in opposition to not only numerous accounts and testimonies, but also majority public opinion. For example, a 1991

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37 Directors include: Mehdi Charef, Farida Belghoul.
38 A provocative law, passed in 2005 suggested schools would be required to teach the ‘positive aspects of colonialism’, representing the clearest indication of the gap between ‘official’ French history and the positions of many left-wing memory activists (House & MacMaster, 2012:329). Fearing the imposition of “an official lie on massacres...and on the racism that France has inherited” (Henley, 2005:1) more than 1,000 intellectuals signed a petition demanding the law be repealed, rejecting the imposition of “an official version of history, in defiance of educational neutrality” (Noiriel quoted in Henley, 2005:1), which stood in direct opposition to the policy of integration the state claimed to be implementing.
39 Changing production contexts have seen a renewed ability to engage with 17 October; indeed, films such as Ici on noie les Algériens: 17 Octobre, 1961 (Adi, 2011), could arguably not have been made a decade or two ago.
representative poll of 17-30 year olds found 95% of respondents to be of the belief that France was guilty of torture in Algeria (Coulon in Cohen, 2000:492). In contrast, a poll of 1979 found only 59% of respondents to be of the belief that torture had been employed in Algeria, while 81% stated, regardless of the case, torture was ‘inadmissible’ (Cohen, 2001:83-84). As with France’s collaborationist record, it would appear “younger respondents tend to be sterner in judging the past” (2001:84), highlighting the generational factors attached to the evolution of collective memory.

Alterations in France’s collective memory of the Algerian conflict are reflected in more recent texts, such as L’ennemi intime (Siri, 2007). Set almost exclusively in Algeria, L’ennemi intime follows a French platoon battling against a group of FLN fighters. The text depicts events which drive soldiers, on both sides, to committing horrific acts. I would suggest the emergence of mainstream cinematic texts which disturb binary distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’, demonstrate that in the same manner images of WWII have, over time, acquired greater dimensions than previous clean (but simplistic) distinctions between us (victims) and them (perpetrators), so to have representations of the Algerian conflict. Accordingly, cinematic texts appear to embody changes in social values and can be used as a means of demonstrating the evolution of collective memory, whereby varied representations arise within alternate temporal and production contexts.

While changing production contexts and an engagement with other culturally familiar memories have, among other factors, contributed to an increase in cinematic plurality, there remains a persistent inconsistency in ideological positions. Accordingly, I believe it is reasonable to assert that French cinema has thus far been unable to locate a consensual or unified narrative, regarding the Algerian conflict, whereby conflicting sentiments have meant that “no dominant memory could satisfactorily emerge” (Lorcin, 2006:xxv). Accordingly, if we are to accept that the ultimate result of ‘working through’ trauma is acceptance – derived through collective or artistic means (LaCapra, 1998:40; 2000:1-22), then a failure to achieve such a situation is arguably evidenced in conflicting accounts, representations, and public expressions. These dynamics shall be explored in further detail in the final chapter, in relation to Caché, used as a means of exploring the impact of shame and guilt on the collective memory of 17 October.
CHAPTER 4

While it is true that, in France, 17 October is now an official day of remembrance, “a large part of what is now remembered is the forgetting of 17 October 1961 – the disappearance from public discourse of a massacre that occurred in plain sight” (Cole, 2003:24). *Caché*, as the title suggests, is about that which escapes our vision. The text follows a wealthy bourgeois couple Georges and Anne as they are confronted by hidden truths, provoked by the arrival of mysterious surveillance tapes. While 17 October is used to frame the narrative of *Caché*, on a more personal level, it is “a story of guilt and the denial of guilt that faces every one of us” (Haneke quoted in Sharett, 2005:61).

Haneke casts the media as the ultimate perpetrator of his text, bearing “obstinate witness to the everyday denial of intolerable realities and memories” (Beugnet, 2007:228). This ‘body without organs’ (in a Deleuzian sense (1989)), unlocks Georges’ supressed memories, invading the private sphere of the home, revealing the “hidden territorializations of colonial violence” (Gallagher, 2008:19), which have lain dormant within French society. The dynamics of the ‘private realm’, historically understood as “a privately owned place to hide in” (Arendt, 1958:71), are contorted by the text, as the enclosed and concealed spaces of private life and memory are exposed by the filmic image, used as a means of exploring psychological sites of trauma. Certain critics, such as Beugnet, have proposed that *Caché* exhibits an “inscription of trauma, via the video image” (2007:228). Such a summation is, in my mind, a misrepresentation of Haneke’s intent – less concerned with inscription than he is with revelation – illuminating the omnipresence of trauma, permeating even the most banal and overlooked spaces. From this perspective, Haneke does not attempt to ‘write’ trauma; rather, he removes the obstacles which hinder our ability to read trauma – representative of an inherently personal process, as Haneke ‘brings home’ the reality of traumatic (colonial) memory.

The Lone Frenchman

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40 See Appendix for full synopsis.
41 I reject the assertion of critics, such as Cousins, who suggest the colonial guilt present in *Caché* “is so French [it does not provide a]...connection between ‘their’ crimes and ‘ours’” (2007:225). While the colonial guilt which resurfaces is indeed a French guilt, the connection between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is not what guilt is present, but that guilt is present, and the unhealthy cultural symptoms that manifest from its suppression. Accordingly, the revelation of trauma exposes the social structures that facilitate collective amnesia, therefore applicable to other national wrongdoings – from America’s use of the slave trade, to Austria’s support of Nazism.
In regards to the relationship between reality and representation, Haneke draws attention to cinema’s subversive potential, whose texts are capable of mediating (and manipulating) truth and history in the popular memory – resulting in forms of tertiary memory (see Foucault, 1989). From this perspective, the cinematic medium can be directed for the purposes of showing people “not what they were, but what they must remember having been” (1989:93). In this respect, the question of narrative authority in relation to the social construction of meaning arguably transcends notions of accuracy or objectivity, as “the way the past is perceived to have taken place is often as important – if not more – than the actual history of the period” (Camino, 2015:98). Accordingly, Haneke’s engagement with the functional capacity of the cinematic medium, able to mediate between the unstable territories of history and memory, is directed for the purposes of exposing the frameworks which (selectively) compose collective memory. By drawing the spectator’s attention to Georges’ discombobulated memories, Haneke reveals the processes which construct fallible ‘truths’ and incomplete histories – placed in relation to the contested memory of 17 October.

In contrast to earlier cinematic works, such as Le petit soldat, which distances the state from the individual, Haneke fuses one within the other, as Georges incarnates postcolonial France, “guilty, in denial, fearful, yet also powerful and violently assertive” (Austin, 2007:531). In an equivocal manner to Plato’s consideration of the construction of justice in both the structure of society and the individual, Haneke conveys the ways in which “accounts of the state or polity and of the individual cannot help but be mutually legitimating allegories of each other” (Antze & Lambek, 1996: xxii). Understood in these terms, Caché assumes a site of memory, which, generally speaking, is “also a site of trauma, and the extent to which it remains invested with trauma marks the extent to which memory has not been effective in coming to terms with it” (LaCapra, 1998:10). In this respect, Georges embodies the collective amnesia associated with 17 October, seen through his failure to ‘come to terms’ with traumatic memory. Accordingly, the dialectic Haneke establishes between Georges and the nation state is conducive to an understanding of trauma theory, whereby (past) national wrongdoings evidence themselves “in

\[ If we accept that traumatic memories often prioritize bodily and visual sensation over verbal narrative and context, the use of non-linearity, nonsynchronous sound, repetition, and rapid editing within Caché, arguably mirror the mixture of emotional affect and metonymic symbolism of traumatic memory (Walker, 2001:214) which appears “all the more ‘true’ for its reinstatement of fiction and forgetting to the historical record” (2001:216). \]

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the form of ‘cultural symptoms’ analogous to those in individuals” (Kaplan, 2005:68), which is of particular relevance when considering concepts such as guilt.

To be Guilty

If we are to except ‘guilt’ as having two readings – that of culpability (having committed a specific offence – an objective meaning) and secondly, the feeling of guilt (a subjective experience) – one is able to surmise ‘guilt’ and ‘guilty’ to be positively correlated yet distinct phenomena (i.e. one may be guilty yet feel no guilt). It is this semantic distinction between the noun ‘guilt’ and adjective ‘guilty’ that Haneke explores, provoking from his audience an awareness between guilt as an objective responsibility, and feelings of guilt as a subjective emotion (Wheatley, 2009:156-157).

Georges’ objective guilt is the most prominent within the text, while his lack of (and attack upon) subjective feelings of guilt serve as the central site of conflict within the narrative. In Kantian terms, Georges’ objective guilt is inherently forgivable having committed the transgression in childhood, whereby his infantile understanding of ethics is that which existed in a state of nature, only truly comprehended in adulthood, when the morality of his actions can be both felt and understood (see Bordum, 2005). In relation to 17 October, Caché is not directly concerned with the objective culpability of specific individuals (for a crime which occurred while the Fifth Republic was in its infancy); rather, the text calls for an engagement with, and assimilation of, subjective guilt – an inherently ethical act. Accordingly, it is not the objective guilt of a child as much an adults rejection of subjective guilt which produces the purest manifestation of shame within the text. In this respect, Haneke explores the paradox of ‘guilty nations’, whereby despite admitting collective responsibility, collective guilt can often remain largely unapparent (see Fleischer, 2003:105). Indeed, when François Hollande became the first French head of state to recognise 17 October (2011), his lucid evocation of the ‘bloody repression’ was expressed in a “passive construction that sidesteps guilt” (Knox, 2014:381),

43 In this respect, Haneke’s work encourages rational consideration as opposed to psychological interpretation, presenting psychological elucidation as inadequate when placed in conjunction with social critique.

44 Moreover, Papon’s trial in the late 1990s reflected the collective culpability of the Vichy regime in Nazi war crimes, yet the fixation on individual guilt negated an assessment of collective guilt – a claim I believe is evidenced in the decision to rewrite Article 6 (c) of 1964. Until Papon’s trial, ‘crimes against humanity’ had been defined in French municipal law as actions committed under a hegemonic (read as ‘totalitarian’) state. In rewriting the law, France was able to prosecute Papon while maintaining the fiction that Vichy itself was not implicated by his prosecution (Sadat, 2000:131-148).
evading the moral question which surfaced in the wake of official recognition, asking France “how to deal with this question of guilt” (Haneke quoted in Sharett, 2005:61).

From an official perspective, the question of guilt regarding 17 October has been considered closed since 1962. On 22 March and 14 April 1962, legislation was passed pardoning acts committed during the French ‘defence’ against Algerian insurrection (in both France and Algeria). The significance of the amnesty effectively eliminated the possibility of retroactive punishment for crimes committed over the course of the Algerian conflict, suggesting a refusal to re-engage with the consequence of past action. Following the amnesty of 1962, the events of 17 October and the Algerian conflict were, from a judicial perspective, considered closed, leaving French identity (and historical consciousness) to be moulded around ‘official’ version of events, free of objective guilt. While both France and Georges’ crimes/guilt may be considered ‘closed’ from an objective perspective, I believe it is reasonable to assert that there has been no subjective ‘closure’ on events – which I believe can be found within the distinction between amnesty (exemption from prosecution) and forgiveness (a personal act on the part of a victim). Indeed, the ‘pardoning’ of atrocity by way of law does not imply the act of ‘forgiveness’ – which, in many ways, is the antithesis to the work of amnesty, having to reveal itself free from power – “unconditional but without sovereignty” (Derrida, 2001:59) and thus, inherently personal (2001:41).

The notion of forgiveness is, for Derrida, directly comparable to the role of the archive, within which there exists a perverse desire to forget (2001:25-60). In relation to the archive’s memory work, I believe it is reasonable to assert that “there is no demand for the work of memory any longer once the archive exists. Thus, the archive further entangles forgiveness and forgetting” (Hennlich, 2015:115). Indeed, to say that something has been stored (i.e. in an archive,) is tantamount to declaring that though it is in principle always retrievable – we can afford to forget it (Connerton, 2008:65; Derrida, 1998). It is the position of this project that the exclusion, censorship, and/or falsification of documents relating to 17 October from ‘official’

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45 I disagree with Branche (2011), who argues the amnesty represents the signal largest factor forcing Algerians to forget the events of 17 October as I do not believe one may reasonably infer “the fact of forgetting from the fact of silence” (Connerton, 2008:68).

46 In a Derridean sense, the archive represents an inherently juridical concept – not so much discursive as it is ontological – interpreting “the site of the law as vested authority [and]...hermeneutic power” (Shetty & Bellamy, 2000:28), whereby control (over the social) is derived from the ability to interpret texts. Admittedly, the archive has undergone dramatic changes over the last three decades, directly related to the diffusion of specific media technologies, contributing to a radical shift in the distribution of invested authority, the significance of artefacts, and even scholarly validity (Smith, 2014). Indeed, the collecting and storing of archival material is no longer the specialized practice of the ruling elite (see Directions for further research).
archives has necessitates the enactment of memory via other means in order to keep memory alive, whereby a ‘duty to remember’ is connected more to the notion of ‘loss’ than ‘debt’ (Nora, 2002). Thus, subjective closure (‘forgiveness and forgetting’,) becomes further estranged, which I propose has manifested within the collective consciousness as a site of shame, affecting both the historic victims and perpetrators.

What a Shame

As I have previously stated, I regard the official handling of 17 October’s memory as connected to the structures of shame and guilt, which I believe have been commonly mischaracterized as ‘repressed’ within the national consciousness (see Stora, 1993). Accordingly, I believe it is possible to demonstrate the occurrence of institutional suppression regarding the memory of 17 October through an analysis of shames phenomenology (read in this context as something caused by a conflict with identity), which I shall place in relation to Caché and the actions of the French state. Tangey and Dearing (2004) suggest individuals will enact two common behavioural responses to shame. First, it is suggested that individuals, when confronted with shame, will systematically attempt to withdraw. In relation to Caché, this is seen at the end of the text when Georges takes two Cachets of sleeping pills, retreating into the oblivion of sleep. In relation to the actions of state, the removal from archives of incriminating evidence relating to 17 October suggests a desire to block the event from memory. Moreover, the wording of legislation passed in 1962 and 1964, indicates authorities were not prepared to alter their interpretations or express regret for the treatment of Algerians during the War, using official (i.e. judicial) ‘closure’ as a means of establishing silence (Cohen, 2000). In this respect, Georges’ refusal to call what happen to Majid a ‘tragedy’ reflects the mind-set of France – unable adequately characterise the conflict. By refusing to give words to reality and name the trauma, Haneke positions the memory of 17 October as that which “has lain dormant and unmourned by those most affected by it” (Virtue, 2011:285).

47 Shame can also be felt by the victims of trauma. For Morrison, shame represents the primary factor leading one to commit (or attempt) suicide (1996:184-186). Accordingly, suicide can be read as the definitive resolution of shame, whereby humiliation and mortification become manifest in the individual, whose suicide represents both an ultimate withdrawal strategy and expression of anger (1996:178-194). Understood in these terms, Majid’s suicide does not represent an immediate impulse; rather, it reflects the accumulation of colonialist violence that has been systematically and structurally imposed upon him since childhood (Gallagher, 2008:30). Understood in these terms, shame within French society cannot be understood as that which emulates form a singular vector – rather, experiences of shame will differ dramatically – relative to a variety of factors.
A second behavioural response to shame is often exhibited in the need to shift blame outwards, placing it on the individual or situation which has evoked such feelings, understood as an ego-protective function, which often manifests as self-righteous anger. In *Caché*, this is evident in Georges’ confrontation of Majid, as Georges accuses him of sending the surveillance tapes, demonstrating how “suspicion always haunts the guilty mind” (Shakespeare, 2005:548). In France, I believe it is possible to demonstrate manifestations of self-righteous anger via an analysis of socio-political frameworks of oppression, which I believe can be most readily perceived through an analysis of prison statistics.

Muslims in Paris account for around 12-13% of the Parisian population, yet make up between 60-70% of Paris’ prison population (Alexander, 2015). I see shame, not repression, as contributing to such situations, whereby the moral anxiety produced in the wake of crimes, such as 17 October, arguably sees a displacement of blame onto individuals who evoke such feelings, manifesting as racial prejudice. As shame shifts to anger, the capacity for empathy is impaired in the face of a ‘disapproving other’, as shame’s phenomenology produces an increased awareness of the presumed evaluations of others and a reduction in empathetic awareness regarding the results of individual behaviour (Tangey & Dearing, 2004:93). As such, experiences of shame often manifest in modes of self-protection, whereby the avoidance of self-blame is seen through various attempts at denial (Wheatley, 2009:168). I read the hyper-criminalization of Muslim and minority communities as a manifestation of such denial, which in “a world configured by the colonizer, [always sees] the colonized subject...presumed guilty” (Fanon, 2004:16).

I read a hyper-fixation on Islam as indicative of concerns regarding assimilation and immigration. In France, when asked to estimate the percentage of the general population believed to be Muslim, the public estimated approximately 31% – standing in contrast to the national average of 8% (The Economist, 2015). I would suggest the inflation of such estimates within the national consciousness exposes the centrality of the ‘issue’ that is assimilation, which is clearly not being repressed. Indeed, the space it occupies exceeds that of the reality – tying in right wing rhetoric that would have you believe ‘by 2020 France will be a Muslim nation’.

48 Stirred-up “to drown the voice of guilt within us” (Hoffer, 2009:96).
49 Despite such statistics being the most pronounced in Europe, they are representative of an increasing trend. In Britain, 13% of prisoners are Muslim in contrast to 4% of the general population (Berman & Dar, 2013:11). In the Netherlands 26% of all juvenile offenders are Muslim, in a country with a general population of 5.5% – in Belgium, Muslims represent 2% of the general populace, compared with 16% of the prison population (Moore, 2008).
50 Roman Catholicism is the dominant religion, comprising 85%-88% of the population.
Although I do not intend to argue that shame, in isolation, is the root cause of all sociological imbalance, it does offer a partial explanation as to why institutional racism and socio-economic disparity in France is so pronounced. France, in the spirit of *egalité*, likes to think of itself as a colour-blind society; in reality, France has blinded itself to colour. Indeed, insecurity, social upheavals, and the rise of political extremism can be interpreted as proof of the failure of integration – rooted in the fact that French identity negates minority cultures (Cohen, 2000).
CONCLUSION

Within the constraints of this essay there have evidently been arguments I would have wished to develop further, particularly the dialectic between the official handling of 17 October’s memory and narrativization of Vichy France (see Paxton, 1972). Connected to this, I would have liked to explore in greater detail the dynamics of the Papon affair, assessing his respective roles in the Vichy government, Morocco, Algeria, and Paris (see Golsan, 2000; House & MacMaster, 2012:33-60). I recognise that some of the arguments contained in this project are contentious, specifically those concerning my understanding of the relationship between shame and the collective memory of 17 October. From my research I found myself drawing many of the same conclusions as those who have come before me – I regard the forces effecting the collective memory of 17 October as nuanced, multidirectional, and at times, ambiguous.

I see the national historical consciousness as being (primarily,) a reflection of the relationship between the polity and the past (Renan, 1992) (although I see this dynamic as changing in-line with the diffusion of specific media technologies). Chapter 1 assessed this specific dynamic, demonstrating the ways filmic representations in France and Algerian both initially marginalized cinematic representations of 17 October (for differing reasons) – thereby reinforcing the official narrativization of events through the dynamics of public silence. The relationship between narrative and authority, as explored in this project, would appear to suggest that while there exist no means through which the past can be literally constructed, there would appear an abundance of means by which it can be selectively exploited. In this respect, I understand collective memory to be a continuous process, marked by various stages of (re)negotiation; indeed, as the old Eastern European joke goes: ‘there is nothing so difficult to predict as the past’. Accordingly, I see the collective memory of 17 October as hard to define for the simple (yet highly problematic) reason that the past means different things for different people in different times.

This project has positioned itself in opposition to scholars, such as Stora (1993) and McCormack (2010), who argue the renewed focus on the memory of 17 October and Algerian conflict need to be seen “as a ‘return of repressed memories’” (McCormack, 2010:8). Chapter 3

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51 Understood in these terms, there is a disenable connection between Chirac’s repeated attempts at symbolic recognition towards 17 October and France’s collective re-evaluation of the event (see Ahearne, 2014:90-120).
has argued such a view reduces the complexity of memory dramatically, seen through cinematic engagement with other culturally familiar themes of resistance. I have argued it is more reasonable to assert that a resurgence of collective memory is related more to levels of institutional suppression, which have decreased over time, seen through changing production contexts. Moreover, I have argued that collective memory has been impacted upon by increasing levels of cultural plurality within France. Connected to this, movements, such as memory activism, have opened a space for the questioning of Republican values, (re)appropriating and (re)articulating the traumatic memory of 17 October (and those associated with decolonization) for the purposes of socio-political change and reform. Many of the conclusions drawn from this project suggest that “when...identity is not in question, neither is memory” (Antze & Lambek, 1996: xxii). Indeed, chapter 4 has demonstrated the links between behavioural responses to traumatic memories and notions of identity, where I suggested an analysis of guilt and shame can inform understanding regarding the official handling and narrativization of 17 October.

Don’t let me Forget

Memory is not a historical reality, it is a relative, evolving construct. Indeed, “memory is not only unreliable and highly mediated, it is unstable, and in this instability lies the potential for the making of new histories” (Carlsten & McGarry, 2015:10), which underlies the protean nature of collective memory – evidenced through numerous cinematic representations and conflicting ideological accounts. Nora’s (1989) suggestion that memory can be most accurately conceived of as a ‘site’, rather than a specific context, alludes to the construction and (to an extent) creation, which occurs in the formation of memory, which this project has attempted to trace. It is within in this nuanced space that I have explored collective memory, “buried beneath the present, or if we turn the perspective ninety degrees, hidden behind the screen” (Antze & Lambek, 1996: xii). Accordingly, this project has argued that cinematic representations of the Algerian conflict, found within French national cinema, are of particular relevance for multiple reasons, especially if we accept no colony to be “more important to the process of identity formation in modern France than Algeria” (Lorcin, 2006:xix).

I would like to conclude with a final observation. I believe it is reasonable to assert that after the generation directly involved in the events of 17 October departs, the quality of

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52 Algerians represent the largest nationality group amongst France’s immigrant population.
remembrance will increasingly (and at a point exclusively,) come to depend upon a mixture of education and media representation (Fleischer, 2003:105). Accordingly, the significance of cinematic representations of the Algerian conflict will only increase with time, which, I believe, stresses the need for further research and continued moral engagement with questions of guilt the memory of 17 October demands.
APPENDIX

SYNOPSIS - CACHE

The film follows the story of a bourgeois couple, whose lives are turned upside down by the arrival of mysterious surveillance tapes (filming the outside of their home amongst various locations of personal significance to Georges). Georges Laurent (Daniel Auteuil) is the successful presenter of a literary television programme, while his wife Anne (Juliette Binoche) is a publishing editor (the couple also have a teenage son Pierrot (Lester Makedonsky)). Despite being perplexed by the tapes, the couple do not initially appear overly concerned; however, as more arrive (concealed in a child-like drawing of a child stained with blood) they become increasingly agitated.

The arrival of these tapes awaken hidden memories within Georges, which are shown to the spectator via foggy and distorted dream-like-sequences. Subsequent tapes show the estate where Georges grew up, while a later one allows George to track down the address of the man he believe to be behind the tapes, leading him to the home of Majid (Maurice Bénichou), who Georges at first fails to recognise. We learn that Majid, a man of Algerian descent, had grown up with Georges until he was forcibly removed from the family’s estate in 1961. Majid’s parents (who worked as servants for the Laurent family,) attended the protest on 17 October 1961; similarly to hundreds of other Algerian protestors, they were never to return. Following this tragedy, Georges’ parents planned to adopt the young Majid, and have him live permanently on their estate. Acting as a jealous child, George tricked Majid into cutting off the head of a chicken, a violent act he used to convince his parents Majid was aggressive and a threat to the safety of their son. These actions resulted in Majid being removed from the estate and sent to an orphanage where he subsequently experienced tremendous amounts of sadness, which continued on into later life.

When confronted by Georges, Majid denies all knowledge of the tapes. The next day Anne receives a tape revealing Georges’ aggressive confrontation of Majid, shot from an angle that would have been impossible to miss – the tape reveals Majid to have sat and cried for over an hour after Georges left his small, run-down apartment, yet Georges claims to feel no
sympathy for this man or express any regret for his actions. This tape, depicting Georges’ aggressive confrontation with Majid is also sent his boss (Bernard Le Coq). His boss expresses his concern (and a small level of distain) regarding Georges behaviour, but explains the tape has been destroyed as it violates Georges’ privacy and he doesn’t want to create a scandal. Later that day, Georges returns home, only to find that his son Pierrot is missing. Fearing the worst, the police are contacted and quickly go to Majid’s apartment. When the police arrive, Majid’s son (Walid Afkir) answers the door. Both father and son are escorted to the police station, only for it to be revealed that Pierrot has been round a friend’s house all along.

As the film progresses, the memories which are returning to Georges become more visceral, as he in turn tries harder to suppress and exclude them – openly lying to his wife (and himself) about numerous details from his past – particularly those concerning Majid. Georges is not the only one aware of the event who has attempted to suppress its memory. When Georges tries to ask his mother about the incident, she refuses to engage with the subject, claiming that it is ‘not a happy memory’.

Towards the end of the film, Majid calls George, asking him to come to his home. Begrudgingly, George agrees. Upon arriving at Majid’s apartment he informs Georges that he wanted him ‘to be present’, as he suddenly slits his throat, committing suicide in Georges presence. Georges stands in shock, as he looks in horror at Majids corpse; dejected, he leaves the apartment, wondering aimlessly into a cinema (where a poster shows that the film ‘Two Brothers’ is playing). After hours have passed, Georges phones the police. Despite having left the scene and waiting a substantial period of time before informing the authorities, his account of events are immediately accepted. The next day, Majid’s son confronts Georges, saying he wants nothing more than to see the guilt present on Georges’ face. Evidently exhausted, Georges retreats back to his apartment, where he takes some sleeping pills and sinks into sleep. In his dreams, we watch as a young Majid is forcibly taken away in the back of a van to the orphanage, screaming and pleading to stay.

The final scene of the film takes place on the stepps outside Pierrots’ secondary school. From a distance, one can (barely) make-out a friendly exchange between Pierrot and Majid’s son (whose real name is never revealed); the two boys seem relaxed in each other’s company, shaking hands before they both depart, as the credits begin to roll.
MORAL THOUGHT IN CACHE

Within the context of Caché, I do not indent to argue Haneke encourages or even endeavours to promote moral action on the part of the spectator (in this respect Haneke deviates from a Kantian understanding in relation to the effects of guilt); rather, Haneke seeks to place a focus upon moral deliberation, within the context of cinematic spectatorship, allowing one to contrast Haneke’s moral spectator to Kant’s moral agent, thereby “aimed not at inciting moral action, but rather moral thought” (Wheatley, 2009:177). The propagation of moral though in Haneke’s text is comparable to our understanding prosthetic memory – entailing an empathetic process. Prosthetic memory, such as those fostered by cinematic representation, allows the spectator to adopt a traumatic legacy based on their responses to external forms of memory, in a process which I believe can contribute towards progressive activism – which Haneke hopes to inspire (Landsberg, 2003:151-159). As such, Caché locates an inherently (self-)reflective mode of morality, devoid of a singular action or idea (thus deviating significantly from Kantian ethics). In so doing, Haneke frees the morality of any given situation from a specific action, thereby engaging with notions of ‘moral perfectionism’.

For Cavell (2005), moral perfectionism acknowledges the systematic differences between ‘knowing’ and ‘thinking’ of something in moral terms. Cavell suggests it is a distinct impossibility for one to know something morally; as such, understanding (and therefore self-awareness and enlightenment,) cannot be derived from conclusions of right from wrong (2005:319-332). Therefore, one must strive for moral deliberation, running parallel to an awareness that there exists no moral absolutes (2005:324). As such, Haneke does not presume to be capable of expressing morality with regards to a fixed world outlook53; rather, he looks engage the spectator in moral deliberation, thereby producing an individualised response.

While critics, such as Gilroy, suggest Caché provides little more than an invitation for the “audience to become resigned to its shame, discomfort and melancholia” (2007:234), I would suggest the absence of a definitive (ethical) resolution provides space for a far more meaningful response to occur. Moreover, Haneke displays the ways in which cinema can be utilized for the purposes of enabling ethical thought, whereby we may read Caché “as an allegory for the power

53 Indeed, Haneke himself has stated that his film “isn’t a thriller and who am I to presume to give anyone an answer on how they should deal with their own guilty conscience?” (Haneke quoted in Solomons, 2006:1).
of the mass media to create experiences and to implant memories, the experience of which we have never lived” (Landsberg, 1995:176), thereby highlighting the power of prosthetic memories forged within cinematic representation, capable of encouraging individualised moral action. Thus, what is at play throughout the text is an encouragement of ethnical spectatorship, not the propagation of a specific moral agenda (Virtue, 2011:285).

To say that one is capable of ‘understanding’ trauma is to understand the suffering of ‘others’, which I have argued the introversion of shame prevents. In contrast, guilt refers to a past action, and is thus inherently social, requiring a rational awareness of both the implications of one’s actions and of the ‘other’. Accordingly, distinctions between shame and guilt are found in relation to psychological and rational self-awareness. In this respect, guilt is a responsible emotion (or a ‘moral sentiment’ in Kantian terms), conducive to self-betterment seen through an implicit recognition of one’s responsibility towards others, demonstrating the ways guilt is felt somatically and subjectively (Wheatley, 2009:168-172). I regard the narrative authority imposed over the collective memory of 17 October as exhibiting pronounced responses to various forms of shame (and arguably connected to wider memories associated with Vichy France), which necessitates further moral engagement and deliberation with notions concerning collective guilt and responsibility.
When discussing cinematic texts we must acknowledge the importance of seeing films within their historical context; indeed, on an economic level we must remember that the cost associated with film production has decreased dramatically over time. Technological development, specifically digital film/filmmaking, has substantially lowered the cost of filmic technology, whereby the monopoly over technologies of production is declining in line with technological development. Prior to the 1990s, “film was not cheap. The people who controlled it controlled either the means of production or the State” (Eisenberg quoted in Guerin, 2012:115). Indeed, in the history of moving images we now occupy a very different space, which, amongst other factors, sees history be partly recorded and documented by mobile phones and left to be archived in public hosting platforms, such as YouTube and BitTorrent.

Owing to the diffusion of interactive media technologies, audiences (acting as authors,) increasingly operate as “active participant[s] in a virtual world” (Livingston, 2003:338). Citizens are now better able (to varying degrees,) to exert/express individual and collective narratives, which I regard as examples of narrative memory. Narrative memory involves participants revisiting sites of the past, whilst carrying the full weight of the present. As such, present knowledge and ambiguities subtly reconfigure past narratives, in a manner relative to present contexts. I see the distinctions between official memory and vernacular particulars of remembrance (singular memory,) as receding in line with increase in, and access to, certain media technologies54 (Robinson et al., 2014:434). Indeed, just as emerging digital technologies provide new venues for (and sites of) memory construction beyond traditional and elite media platforms (Neiger et al., 2011), they also introduces new modes/tools of narrativization, which I believe represent an increasingly important area for further research.

Example

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54 For Le Goff (1992), such engagement with new media technologies is comparable to the differing writing systems visible across various societies, whereby new means of recording and archiving are seen as techniques of memory – a social practice (inclusive of individual cognitive processes).
Produced by the urban artists of RaspouTeam and in collaboration with Agat films, the webdocumentary, shown below, can be seen to “manipulate new technology for a political and cultural end” (RaspouTeam quoted in Hollis, 2015:136). The site maps areas of violence that erupted on 17 October, using witness testimonies, archival material, filmic re-enactment, and interactive space to reframe and rearticulate the event, in a manner which allows the user choose areas of the narrative they wish to explore and investigate.

Fig. 3.: Screenshot – 17.10.61 Homepage.

One must of course be wary of simplistically equating audience participation with socio-political empowerment (Jenkins et al., 2013:165). Nevertheless, the activities performed by the ‘active’ audience within such sites of narrative memory, need no longer be viewed as wholly responsive, but can be read as symbiotic and interactive. The interactive webdocumentary was initially launched in 2011, accessible via QR codes placed in specific locations across Paris (i.e. Pont de Neuilly, Pont de Clichy, Montreuil), left to be found spontaneously by people navigating the city streets. The site reconfigures the space of Paris, using the city as the principle means of retracing the event, as eight individual memories are used to graft a collective narrative of 17 October\(^{55}\). There a multiplicity of messages within the webdocumentary, whereby the use of

\(^{55}\) In the formation of unofficial, subaltern, or counter-memories of 17 October, media representations of the event are of course not the only means by which memory can be mobilised. Conversations can often serve as a
aural superpositions combine – in order to confirm – “the truth of this past, all the while reminding us of the nature of this transmission and the difficulty of obtaining absolute truth about these events” (Rice, 2014:100). Below is another example of an online archive of 17 October, mixing alternate mediums in the retelling of the event:

![Screenshot – 17 Octobre 1961, La nuit oubliée Homepage.](image)

Part webdocumentary, part archive, the example shown above creatively mixes mediums, memory, art, historical documents, and witness testimony – creating a dynamic site of engagement with the past, arguably embodying Malraux’s notion of a museum ‘without walls’ (1953). I believe future research is required in order to access the extent to which one may argue that mediated (or prosthetic) memory and traumatic memory are interconnected both historically and conceptually, owing to the diffusion of specific media technologies (Pinchevski, 2011:253). With the expansion of inclusive multimedia archives we are witnessing a radicalization in “the tendency of trauma to form ad hoc communities of bereavement”

vehicle, driving the spread of memories across a community, becoming a means by which memory is permitted to travel (Fentress & Wickham, 1992).

56 However, we must not overlook the often politicized and highly fragmented nature of many such sites of narrative memory.

57 With this being said, I believe it is imperative that whatever direction future research takes, one must acknowledge that each subsystem, such as that of the postcolonial or digital archive, inherits “the inertia of the installed base of systems that have come before” (Smith, 2014:407).
(Pinchevski, 2011:262), which, through future research, may provide insight into the reasons why the memory of 17 October has expanded in line with technological development.

I see such work as being connected to the dynamics of activist, rather than ritual memory, whereby the mobilisation and availability of personal and narrated memory contains implicit moral-activist goals, “demanding attention and calling for public debate and social accountability” (Katriel & Shavit, 2011:80). The act of recounting trauma marks the experience as ‘unfinished business’, as narratives express something of the past which cannot be left behind (Millar, 2006:108). In the absence of official records that sufficiently document the events of 17 October, unofficial sites of memory and archives are compelled to contain, document, and record such events, which I read as an inherently ethical act (Steedman, 1998). These ‘think’ relations “marked by ethical ties...hope to turn them into communities of memory” (Katriel & Shavit, 2011:81), for whom the oppositional narratives offered to the official accounts of 17 October can become interwoven within France’s broader historical consciousness. Moreover, the very fact that the commemorated past events bleed into present lives informing discourses on oppression and racism “turns them into a community of memory sharing a moral commitment to effect change” (2011:81). The focus of such work arguably constitutes a shift from epistemological to moral questioning, thereby necessitating further avenues of research (Cianci & Schutt, 2014:20). Indeed, what appears to be at stake within both webdocumentary’s is more than the solitary memory of 17 October. These public and collaborative projects also look to prevent the future omission of ‘incompatible’, ‘shameful’, or ‘uncomfortable’ memories from the national consciousness and fulfil a “demand for a truth more ‘truthful’ than that of history, the truth of personal experience and individual memory” (Nora, 2002:6).

58 The aim of such projects are to authenticate individual testimony, thereby distorting distinctions between archival and enacted memory, mobilising personal memory for the purpose of activist work.
59 There is an inherent danger to such ‘archive of conscience’ which is yet to be significantly explored, whereby they may struggle to “resist being turned into gigabytes of information” (Hartman, 2001:119).
17.10.61 Project

Link: http://www.politis.fr/17octobre1961/home.html

Fig. 12.: Screenshot 1: 17.10.61 Project (2015).

Fig. 13.: Screenshot 2: 17.10.61 Project (2015).

Fig. 14.: Screenshot 3: 17.10.61 Project (2015).
Fig. 15.: Screenshot 4: 17.10.61 Project (2015).

Fig. 16.: Screenshot 5: 17.10.61 Project (2015).

Fig. 17.: Screenshot 6: 17.10.61 Project (2015).
17 Octobre 1961, La nuit oubliée Project

Link: http://s1.lemde.fr/webdocs_contenu/fichiers/la-nuit-oubliée/67.sequence.html

Fig. 18.: Screenshot 1: 17 Octobre 1961, La nuit oubliée (2015).

Fig. 19.: Screenshot 2: 17 Octobre 1961, La nuit oubliée (2015).

Fig. 20.: Screenshot 3: 17 Octobre 1961, La nuit oubliée (2015).
Fig. 21. : Screenshot 4: 17 Octobre 1961, La nuit oubliée (2015).

Fig. 22. : Screenshot 5: 17 Octobre 1961, La nuit oubliée (2015).

Fig. 23. : Screenshot 6: 17 Octobre 1961, La nuit oubliée (2015).
17 OCTOBER: Music

Stiff Little fingers: ‘When the stars fall from the sky’

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ravoh8zrBJk

Lyrics:

“Mid-October, sixty one, the French police were having fun
Cutting down Algerians, breaking heads all over town
Yet no one saw, no one knew
And no one dared to speak the truth
200 dead became just two, sweep them in the river...” (Foxton & Burns, 1994).


Médine: ‘17 Octobre’

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0XAIHLNEcO0

Lyrics:

“...17 jour du mois d'octobre, le FLN a décidé de mettre fin à l'approbre
En effet, le journal de la veille titrait:
‘Couvrefeu recommandé pour les immigrés’
Non! La réaction ne s'est pas faite attendre
Algériens de France dans les rues nous allons descendre
Protester contre leurs lois discriminatoires
Investissons leurs ponts et leurs centres giratoires
Embarqué dans un cortège pacifique, nous réclamons justice pour nos droits civiques
Mais la police ne l'entend pas de cette oreille...” (Médine, 2006).

Collective Memory

I understand collective memory as consisting of two distinct yet interrelated components. First, collective memory contains our surrounding mnemonic signifiers - the space where memorial sites, museums, and media coverage (Kligler-Vilenchik et al., 2014:485). Secondly, I hold collective memory as signifying individualised perceptions and knowledge of the past by individuals within a society. The ‘politics of memory’ which subsequently arises includes different manifestations of memory, grounded in both lived experience and symbols and representations. Memory function relies on an array of social frameworks (as both obtaining and recollecting memory occurs within highly dynamic socio-cultural contexts), whereby it is prudent not to lose sight of the fact that it is always individuals who recollect (Halbwach, 1992:182). As Halbwachs notes, individuals have the ability to remember, yet they do so through social delimited parameters, it is in this respect that “while the collective memory endures and draws strength from its base in a coherent body of people...every collective memory [requires support from]...a group delimited in space and time” (1992:22). As such, a nation’s memory is shaped by many sources, transmitting memories and representations between individuals, groups, and the nation (Rousso, 1994:219). Consequently, the nature of collective memory permits individuals to ‘remember’ events they did not directly experience by relating an awareness of specific occurrences to a wider historical consciousness (McCormack, 2010:3). Thus, tensions between representations of memory, such as those publically expressed via cinema, and memories of individuals, exist in dynamic tension - a notion which must never be overlooked.

60 If we are to accept people carry layers of mental programming, ranging from factors pertaining to gender and ethnicity, to creed and generation (Hofstede, 1991:10), collective memory (in relation to national consciousness,) therefore represents a distinct cultural form, found within (and can be carried across) a specific region. Moreover, if collective memory is to be understood as grounded in both lived experience and shared/disseminated symbols and representations, then the notion of hegemonic memory can be argued a definitional impossibility. Hegemony should be regarded as a continuous historical process, incapable as a social order of enveloping the entirety of human experience, comprised of traditional, institutional, and formational processes (see Williams, 1979). As such, I do not hold collective memory to be a homogenous force, nor do I see it as being free from internal paradoxes and contradictions. Therefore, any semblance of collective memory that exists today cannot be perceived as an exact replica of that which has preceded it, nor reasonably envisioned as remaining the same through time. Accordingly, collective memory requires constant monitoring, owing to the continuous processes involved.

61 Understood to be “any source that proposes a deliberate reconstruction of an event for a social purpose” (Rousso, 1994:219).
Agenda Setting Theory

Agenda-setting theory suggests “news does not tell us what to think [but rather,]...what to think about” (Meikle & Young, 2012:50). As such, I understand power in media (inclusive of any medium which transmits symbolic content,) as residing in the ability to define, allocate, and display this resource (Carey, 1989:87). In relation cinema’s effects on public memory, the medium is often conceptualized in two ways. First, cinematic texts can highlight or marginalize what is remembered – the setting of memory-agenda (whereby media is capable of illuminating correlations between public and media agendas,) and, secondly, can shape the character of these memories (Kligler-Vilenchik et al., 2014:488).

Stora on Repression

Stora (1991; 1993) interprets the omission of memories (or alternatively, an ineptitude in engaging with past actions,) as triggering a neurosis in the French consciousness. Although I see use in Stora’s argument, I find difficulty in accepting his engagement with a Freudian model of repression on two counts. First, theories on repression and neurosis are hardly scientifically sound, whereby the premise appears inherently contestable. Secondly, despite French official policy (and archives) arguably exhibiting selective amnesia and an unwillingness to engage with 17 October, official memory is not the only form of memory at play within French culture. As such, a focus on unofficial memory (literature, press, cinema, conversation, unofficial archives etc.) reveals a more nuanced engagement with the memory of the Algerian war and events of 17 October. Indeed, one only need to such for books written on the Algerian conflict to find an excess of some 2,400 texts, or search for films (however contentious their narratives may be,) to see a continuous engagement with the conflict at play.
17 October in Historical Context

Stora (1993) remind us of the importance of seeing the massacre within historical context, noting the murder of six Algerians (and the wounding of fifty others) on July 14, 1953, during a celebration commemorating the French Revolution at the Place de la Nation. Further instances of police brutality can also be seen during protests by Algerian nationalists in reaction to the special powers (a legislative decision requiring young conscripts to fight in Algeria) on the March 9, 1956. These instances of brutality, which occurred while the political left was in power, demonstrate the continuity of repression which marked the period; while the reduced visibility of these events call into question the motivation of the political left’s fixation on 17 October (see Bernard, 2000:234).

Purpose of 17 October

In contrast to the position of Stora, who locates the imposition of the night-time curfew as “root cause of the tragic demonstration” (1993:215), I believe it is reasonable to assert that there were far more complex dynamics involved. The FLN, who “called for the demonstration, was worried about being forgotten and also wanted to make its presence felt in the negotiations” (Bernard, 2000:233). El Moudjahid, the mouthpiece for the FLN, suggested the protest was (in part) designed to attract the attention of both international and French public opinion (See Gordon, 2000). As such, attracting the attention of the international community represented a significant dimension of the protest, which I believe is a reasonable assertion given the timing of the demonstration - coinciding with Algerian preparations to come before the UNs decolonisation committee in November of 1961.

International Media Coverage in the Wake of 17 October

Solidarity with the Algerian protestors came through media outlets in nations such as India, where the publication Link concluded, in an article from November 1961, that there was sufficient evidence to “condemn the conduct of the Paris police in the eyes of the civilised world” (quoted in Gordon, 2000:3). Moreover, in Ghana, Accra, Pakistan, and Cairo, media outlets publically condemned the actions of the French police, organized protests in response
the massacre and specifically highlighted the unlawful deportation of thousands of Algerians (Gordon, 2000).

In Britain, The Times denounced the violence from both ‘French’ and ‘Muslim’ communities, suggesting there were “plenty of people in both camps spoiling for a fight” (1961:13). The mood of the British press is perhaps best captured by the Guardian foreign correspondent Peter Lennon, who notes the means by which “British papers reported the October slaughter mechanically in terms of an Algerian demonstration that had turned into a riot, put down, perhaps a bit too brutally, by the police” (1995:121). In America, the response to 17 October were notably more condescending; TIME magazine recounted the ways “Algerians came swarming from slums and shantytowns to protest” (1961:37), forming a ‘mob’ which violently confronted French police, as a ‘rabble’ of Algerians moved through Paris, ‘overturning cars’ and ‘smashing’ shop windows (1961:37). The massacre of 17 October thus found its way into media outlets throughout the world; however, the extent of the coverage in Western nations was both modest and ill-informed.

The international coverage surrounding 17 October was highly polarizing. In the absence of substantial Western condemnation of the massacre, intellectual, such as Karol, expressed regret regarding Western responses to 17 October, noting “the West as a whole will ultimately have to pay the price for the Paris Pogrom” (quoted in Gordon, 2000:3). Thus, the international impact of the event varied according to diverse sets of ideological considerations and demonstrated a clear trend regarding the passive acceptance of French official accounts in the West.

Changing Attitudes in Historical Context

In an attempt to demonstrate historical attitudes towards les Pieds-Noirs, Fiona Barclay (2012), in her review of national print coverage concerning the European population in Algeria across 50 years, notes the existence of alternate media representations, moving from ‘foreign’ depictions in the 1960s, to forms of commemorative journalism in the late 1990s to early 2000s. The analysis suggests the late 1990s marked an era of commemoration in French culture,

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62 I take issue with Barclay’s assertion that this trend began in the 1990s. The move towards an age of ardent memorialism (also read as an age of commemoration) in Western Europe arguably began in France, seeping-out of the remains of WWII, converging in the mid-1970s (Nora, 2002). With the death of de Gaulle in 1970, the prevailing rhetoric which characterised the actions of the French Resistance began to corrode. I would like to draw attention to three significant factors which contributed towards this shift. Firstly, the outraged caused in the wake of Touvier pardon (1971), secondly, Ophuls’ 1971 documentary The Sorrow and the Pity and,
which I regard as that which seeks to reaffirm, rather than inform – functioning under the aim of solidifying identity (Britten, 2013). Indeed, anniversaries not only concern the past, they also (and perhaps more directly,) concern the present. Barclay’s analysis illuminates the ways media can organise memory, engaging with the past on its own terms, by prioritizing current interests and requirements. As such, whether represented through print coverage or cinematic depiction, media co-opts memory, for the purposes of informing specific sets of coherent social identities.

finally, the release in France of Paxton’s book, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order (1972) - which all stood in opposition to the official narrativization of the period. Moreover, public interest in memory has arguably grown in line with the rise of multiculturalism, the fall of Communism, and a politics of victimization and regret (see Olick & Robbins, 1998:105-140).
Photographs taken by Elie Kagan on 17 October 1961

Fig. 5.: Paris Massacre (Kagan, 1961).

Fig. 6.: Paris Massacre (Kagan, 1961).
Fig. 7.: Paris Massacre (Kagan, 1961).

Fig. 8.: Paris Massacre (Kagan, 1961).
Fig. 9.: Paris Massacre (Kagan, 1961).

Fig. 10.: Paris Massacre (Kagan, 1961).
Fig. 11.: Paris Match – 1961 (Elie Kagan in House & MacMaster, 2012:112).
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