

THE ANALYSIS OF QUALITATIVE DATA

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The opposition between qualitative and quantitative is used to mark many different contrasts. Some of these that occurred in discussion at the SSRC Workshop are presented below.

Qualitative

soft
dry
flexible/fluid
grounded
descriptive/exploratory
pre-scientific
subjective
inductive
speculative/illustrative
political
non-rigorous
idiographic
holistic
interpretivist
exposes actors' meanings
phenomenological
relativistic
case-study
good
bad

Quantitative

hard
wet
fixed
abstract
explanatory
scientific
objective
deductive
hypothesis testing
value-free
rigorous
nomothetic
atomistic
positivist
imposes sociological theory
empiricist/behaviourist
universalistic
survey
bad
good

Given this variety of referents, it is essential to begin by making clear how the terms qualitative and quantitative will be used in this paper. Before discussing ways of analysing qualitative data, it is necessary to establish what is qualitative about it, and whether, being qualitative, it requires analysis in ways different from quantitative data.

But immediately a problem arises. Sociology is a pluralistic discipline, characterized by numerous alternative conceptions of theory, explanation and data, that is, by different sociological approaches (or perspectives or orientations or paradigms).¹ Each different approach has its own conception of what is qualitative about social data and what are the problems and possibilities for the analysis of qualitative data.

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799

Approaches to Sociology

Listing approaches to sociology is hazardous, since approaches can be endlessly differentiated and any particular definition or categorization of approaches is inevitably challenged for omitting or mis-identifying crucial boundaries and for associating authors with others considered to be their opponents. Furthermore, any definitional activity is fraught with philosophical difficulties concerning the ontological status of the definiendum and methodological difficulties concerning the means through which the categories are derived. No attempt is made to engage with these difficulties here for it is not the intention to provide an account of approaches that does anything other than locate the discussion of qualitative data analysis. Given that the major purpose of this paper is to illustrate problems for the analysis of data that are held to stem from their being qualitative, it will suffice to characterize, rather roughly, four broad types of approach as below. Other purposes might be better served by alternative classifications of approaches, more broadly or more narrowly specified than here, or even quite differently conceived.

1. Positivist (or empiricist) sociology takes as its data sets of values on sets of dimensions; its explanations consist of establishing Humean causal relations between variables; and its theory consists of interrelated sets of causal laws.²
2. Interpretivist (or phenomenological or hermeneutic) sociology takes as its data the intersubjective meaningfulness of actions; its explanations consist of descriptions of interactions in terms appropriate to the actors' culture; and its theory consists of the cultural rules or norms that constitute the meaningfulness of interaction.³
3. Ethnomethodology takes as its data intersubjectively meaningful actions; its explanations consist of explications of societal members' methods for assembling the sense of these meaningful actions; and its theory consists of the formal properties of these members' methods.⁴
4. Structuralist (or materialist or realist)⁵ sociology takes as its data various surface features of the social world; its explanations consist of transformations which map these features on to underlying real structures; and its theory consists of the underlying structural relations.⁶

Pluralism in sociology can be, and often is, denied. It is asserted that the various alternative conceptions of sociological theory, explanation and data, however categorized, are synthesizable into a new, all-embracing approach,⁷ or alternatively, that they are reducible to one of the existing approaches, with any remainder not synthesizable or reducible being said to lie beyond the bounds of sociology—e.g. being journalism or history or ideology.

Although there are several successful arguments to the effect that various existing approaches do not, on their own, exhaust the possibilities of theorizing about the social world, there is as yet no undisputed demonstration that any approach is entirely redundant.⁸ Reduction arguments tend to appeal, implicitly, to standards (e.g. conceptions of explanatory adequacy) internal to their favoured approach in finding alternative approaches deficient, with the result that such arguments are circular or at least that the arguments for approaches do not fully engage with each other. The advantage of adopting a pluralist view of sociology is that it alerts one to the possibility that features of the social world that are considered problems within one approach may be unproblematic or even considered advantageous within another approach. In this discussion, for example, it reveals that conceptions of what is qualitative about social data are approach-dependent. The pluralist view of sociology has the merit, then, of separating arguments about the reducibility of one sociological approach to another (and such arguments are sometimes cast in terms of the rival merits of alternative methods of data collection and analysis)¹⁰ or about their synthesizability from considerations, within a single approach, of appropriate methods for analysing (i.e. addressing the problems of or fully exploiting the potential of) qualitative data, as conceived within that approach.

Qualitative Data in Positivist Sociology

Positivists assume that physical events and people's behaviour occur as the law-governed result of a concatenation of many antecedent variables. They want to isolate the numerous laws whose operation in conjunction is observable as the flux of behaviours and events. The aim of their research is twofold: to establish Humean causal connections between variables, that is, to establish laws, and to link these laws into a deductively integrated theory. Ideally, their laws are formulated in mathematical or formal logical terms, for it

is these formal languages that facilitate all the analytic operations involved in the construction and test of positivist theory: establishing the existence and form of relationships between variables (correlation and regression), estimating the scope of operation of laws (sampling and inductive statistics), demonstrating the necessity of causal connections and the deductive validity of theoretical arguments.¹¹

Data are qualitative to the positivist, then, to the extent that they are not described in quantitative terms—are not expressed in a mathematical or formal language. (This language may have less structure than the real number system and still be 'formal'.) The qualitative-quantitative opposition is used to mark the contrast between data expressed in non-formal (ordinary or natural) language and data expressed in a formal language (e.g. mathematically). Qualitative data are a *problem*. Solutions to this problem lie in three directions. Qualitative data can be converted into quantitative data by developing procedures for mapping them into sets of values expressed in existing formal languages—the area traditionally discussed under the rubric of 'measurement problems', involving such matters as index construction and scaling, and as Blumer highlights, concept formation. Alternatively, new 'informal' techniques can be developed, through which qualitative data can be analysed in ways analogous to existing quantitative techniques. This is the area of non-parametric statistics, and also (under some interpretations of the technique) of analytic induction. Finally, new formal languages can be developed which are considered to be closer to and more capable of capturing the rich texture of ordinary (qualitative) language. This is the field of modal logics.

Qualitative Data in Interpretivist Sociology

Interpretivists assume that people do things that are meaningful to each other in terms of cultural rules or norms. They want to identify the numerous rules that guide social actors in orienting their actions to the actions of others. The aim of their research is twofold: to grasp the meanings that actions have to the actors involved and describe those meanings in culturally appropriate terms, and to establish the patterns of interaction¹² that are understandable within the culture under study, i.e. to establish the essentially defeasible rules for interaction. These rules are not proto-laws in the positivist sense:

802

they do not determine behaviours, but constitute actions as the actions they are.

Data are qualitative to the interpretivist insofar as they are subjectively meaningful, which, interpretivists maintain, is an endemic feature of social data. The qualitative-quantitative opposition is used to mark the contrast between data that are meaningful to the actors or within the culture under study and those which lack such meaningfulness. Problems associated with qualitative data, then, do not stem from their being deficient with respect to some other type of data (as they are with the positivists), but arise in attempting to accord full importance in sociology to the meaningfulness of its data. As Dittton and Williams state: 'Qualitative data is *not* somehow incomplete quantitative data. The aim is not to somehow harden up soft data. It should be, instead, to treat qualitative data as authentic data in its own right.'¹³ The problems of qualitative data are problems of interpretation,¹⁴ and they concern such matters as the accessibility of other (sub)cultures, the relativity of actors' accounts of their social worlds and the relation between sociological descriptions and actors' conceptions of their actions. In response to these problems, interpretivists have developed procedures for establishing the congruence of accounts (e.g. cognitive anthropology, gossip analysis)¹⁵ or for demonstrating the existence of cultural universals (philosophical anthropology); and they have also developed ways of presenting the negotiation and modification of subjective meaningfulness amongst actors with different conceptions of their interaction (cf. the 'career' studies by symbolic interactionists).¹⁶

Qualitative Data in Ethnomethodology

Ethnomethodologists assume that all actions, including the actions of describing, explaining, etc., are dependent for their meaningfulness or sense on the contexts within which they occur. That is, all actions (and contexts) are indexical, and the relation between actions and contexts is one of mutual constitution or reflexivity. Despite the all-pervasiveness of indexicality, ethnomethodologists point out that people normally experience the world as ordered and intersubjectively meaningful. Ethnomethodologists want to identify the methods that members of society use to establish this shared sense of social reality. They aim to explicate (the formal properties of) the methods through which people, normally without effort or conscious attention,

803

make sense of their interactions.

Data are qualitative to the ethnomethodologist insofar as they are essentially and irremediably indexical, and since all social data are indexical, all social data are qualitative in this sense. The qualitative-quantitative opposition, though not explicitly used in ethnomethodological writings, makes the distinction between data whose indexicality is recognized, and those which are purportedly literal or scientifically objective, i.e. are claimed to have intrinsic or context-free sense. For the ethnomethodologist, the positivists' problems of measurement and the interpretivists' problems of interpretation evaporate. Interest turns from relating variables or describing the meaningfulness of actions to elucidating the sense-assembly procedures through which (accounts of) variables and meaningfulness are produced and recognized. The problems of qualitative data are the perennial problems faced by actors (or members) and sociologists (or analysts) alike—those of 'repairing' indexicality for the practical purpose at hand, i.e. of appropriately contextualizing actions so as to succeed in making sense together. Societal members' methods for managing problems associated with the indexical (qualitative) character of social data, which are the shared resources through which the intersubjective sense of social order is constructed and conveyed, are made the topic of ethnomethodological analyses. Members' solutions to the problem of indexicality constitute ethnomethodological findings.

Qualitative Data in Structuralist Sociology

Structuralists¹⁷ assume that physical events and people's behaviours are the surface manifestations of underlying mechanisms (which are not necessarily 'mechanistic' in a narrow sense). They want to construct theories which capture the real workings (deep structure) of the natural and social worlds. The aim of their research is to establish the existence and the powers of the relational structures whose operations produce the flux of observable events and actions.

Data are qualitative to the structuralist insofar as they describe only the variable and historically specific surface features of the world, and are not informed by coherent theory. The qualitative-quantitative opposition, though not explicitly employed by structuralists, marks the distinction between data which are merely experien-

tially available and those which are conceived as embodying a theory which mirrors the deep structure of the world. Since the structuralist must distinguish real structures from abstractions or conventions (e.g. science from ideology) the problem is to develop systematic transformation rules for mapping surface manifestations into underlying structures (or *vice versa*), or in another rhetoric, to demonstrate the meanings of their theories and show how they reflect the real world.

Qualitative Data in the Projects Presented at the Workshop

The discussion so far might be accused of paying 'overzealous attention to . . . reconstructed logics'.¹⁸ Indeed, it must be remembered that an empirical study does not necessarily conform to any one of a set of approaches and it is sterile to force abstract conceptions of approach on to reports of studies.¹⁹ Instead, the two should be carefully compared to see how they mutually illuminate each other.

In the following subsections, then, three contrasts made by reference to the qualitative-quantitative distinction that are common among the studies reported at the Workshop will be examined in relation to the ideas about sociological approaches that have informed the early part of this paper. In particular, these subsections explore how each of the three contrasts presents different issues for data analysis depending on the approach that provides the context for the research study.

Developing Concepts

A quotation from Spencer and Dale's paper encapsulates one common application of the term 'qualitative': 'qualitative' research . . . provides many opportunities for developing and refining concepts, rather than relying on the assumption that we know the relevant properties and categories in advance.²⁰ This idea, of qualitative research being exploratory and developmental rather than rigid and predetermined, is echoed by Faraday and Plummer when they write that 'the life history technique [the type of 'qualitative' research to which they confine their discussion] . . . is especially useful in areas in which the conceptualization of problems has been ill worked out' and that 'the most important rôle of the life history in theoretical work is the part it plays in the exploration and generation of theory'.

Indeed, directly challenging Glaser and Strauss's recommendations,²¹ they urge researchers to resist the temptation to move too quickly to the extraction of theoretical themes, which then place restrictions on further exploration, and encourage instead '*ad hoc* fumbling about' to gain thorough acquaintance with the field. Similarly, Flynn remarks that one way in which his research is qualitative is that the concepts are 'not operationalized in a formal and schematic way but are used and reformulated in the light of concrete observation and interpretation'. West too describes his study as 'exploratory and essentially descriptive'.

Qualitative research in this sense is concerned with developing concepts²² rather than applying pre-existing concepts. It is just this issue, the problem of developing concepts in sociological research, that Bulmer addresses in his paper, arguing that it has been neglected by methodologists of social science relative to other methodological issues. He takes it that solutions to this problem consist of describing those processes whereby investigators decide which concepts most appropriately capture any particular area of social reality. He shares the view common among other contributors to this symposium that data are qualitative to the extent that they have not yet been categorized in theoretically and empirically justified concepts and the analysis of qualitative data revolves around the careful definition of concepts.

The argument of this paper is that what are considered problems, and potentialities for the analysis of qualitative data, depend on the sociological approach within which that research is located. What approach(es), then, do the authors of the studies reported adopt, and as a result what rôle do they assign to the development of concepts, to exploration?

Although Bulmer suggests that it might be better to talk of 'interpretative research' rather than 'qualitative' data, this would be a misnomer in the terms of this paper, for his discussion is informed by the view that social science aims at the production of causal explanations (which is here taken as the characteristic feature of the positivist approach). This is apparent from his desire to 'distinguish clearly between concepts and explanatory propositions' where 'concepts are means of organizing data, propositions or hypotheses means of stating relationships between concepts'. One consequence of this is that where Bulmer does note that general sociological orientations

influence research, he suggests that that influence operates at the level of determining which particular set of concepts (or variables) are selected to explain something. An example of this is provided by Flynn, who notes that 'there are two alternative and contrasting frames of reference for [his] research'—the urban managerialist and the Marxist—which hypothesize that different sets of independent variables determine patterns of urban development. This should be contrasted with the conception of sociological approaches adopted in this paper, where the suggestion is that the influence of approach is more fundamental, in that conceptions of the very nature of sociological theory, explanation and data vary from approach to approach.

Some of the other authors who use the term qualitative to refer to research concerned with the development of concepts also lean towards the positivist approach. Flynn says of his study that 'insofar as its findings may be used to assess the utility of theoretical concepts, it can perhaps be loosely described as hypothesis-testing'. Faraday and Plummer write that 'through the life-history technique one is able to build up miniature sensitizing concepts, and small scale hypotheses which can subsequently be transferred to a statistical deductive method'.²³

Like Faraday and Plummer, West too is concerned with problems of collecting and analysing life history material. But while Faraday and Plummer largely locate their survey of the criticisms of the life history method within the positivist approach, where it is considered a means, ultimately, of generating hypotheses for subsequent test, West locates his discussion within an interpretivist approach. Within interpretivism, the problem of developing concepts is the problem of interpretation—the problem of penetrating the respondents' culture so as to apprehend correctly the culturally appropriate descriptions of actions and interactions. It is the problem of *Verstehen* or hermeneutic understanding, not as a preliminary to the construction and test of causal hypotheses, but as an explanatory end in itself. All interpretivist research is exploratory and developmental insofar as those terms describe the process of immersion in a strange field in the attempt to identify natives' conceptions of their social world. Thus West, in one part of his research, 'was concerned to break through what might be called a presented reality and approximate the status of a courtesy member to families with an epileptic child which would get [him] closer to their own sub-

jective reality', and he goes on to describe the procedures he used to check that he was obtaining 'family' accounts rather than 'patient-to-doctor' or 'patient-to-official' accounts. (West, however, remained acutely sensitive to potential deficiencies in his accounts, and his doubts will prove instructive in the discussion of actors' meanings below.)

Thus, in contrast with the sharp distinction drawn between concepts and explanatory hypotheses within the positivist approach, in the interpretivist approach 'understanding' the actions and intentions of respondents by virtue of grasping and comprehending the culturally appropriate concepts through which they conduct their social life is the way in which explanation is achieved. Bulmer recognizes that some of the studies considered at the Workshop are (at least in part) oriented to the interpretivist approach when he writes that they 'appear to be satisfied with description, or conveying a sense of "understanding"'. However, he makes the complaint, which is essentially a positivist argument against interpretivism, that 'justifications for the logic of interpretive research in terms of analytic induction or grounded theory tend to blur the distinction (between concepts and explanatory propositions) and even lead to premature crystallization at the stage of concept-formation, rather than going on to produce explanatory theory.' He treats the various sociological attempts to describe means of developing concepts (analytic induction, etc.) as means of remedying initially qualitative data so as to prepare the ground for the construction and test of causal explanations, whereas for interpretivist oriented authors, they are attempts to grapple with *Verstehen*, to solve the problems of interpretation.

Ditton's research²⁴ illustrates the use of analytic induction within the interpretivist approach. His study was based on a 'commitment to Maiza's naturalistic or 'appreciative' approach to the study of social life, coupled with and activated by the logic and philosophy of induction.²⁵ In other words, the aim of the research was to induce natural categories from qualitative (as yet uncategorized) data.

In summary: research that is qualitative in the sense of being concerned with developing concepts is, in the context of the positivist approach, merely the first step in the measurement process leading on to the construction and test of explanatory hypotheses, whereas it is, in the context of the interpretivist approach, at the very core of the explanatory enterprise, involving as it does grasping

the meanings through which the people under study conduct their social interactions.

Case Studies

A second common application of the term 'qualitative' is identified by Spencer and Dale when they suggest 'as more useful [than the dichotomy quantitative and qualitative research] the contrast between statistical research (based on samples of populations or universes) and the study of single cases (that is, of one case as a universe itself)'. This view, of qualitative research being the study of single cases, appears in several of the other studies. Faraday and Plummer recognize that arguments about the value of life histories in sociology have hinged on the question of 'the value of sociologists describing one case'. Flynn described his research as a case study, West constructed a biography of a single family, and MacFarlane studied one community—although, of course, the usual caveat in describing research as a one-case study is required here: any study is of one case at some level of analysis.

Again, remembering that the argument of this paper is that what are considered advantages and disadvantages of qualitative research depend on the sociological approach that provides the context of the research, it is appropriate to ask how research that is qualitative in the sense of investigating a single case is viewed by these researchers.

Faraday and Plummer highlight the deficiencies of case studies within the positivist approach: 'since social science purportedly aims at a nomothetic generalizable goal, a case history is thoroughly flawed.' However, although they find that the life history technique has no contribution to make towards verifying existing hypotheses, they do find one rôle for case studies in the context of justification in a Popperian version of positivist research, namely that 'life history may be used as a means of falsifying existing theory'.²⁶ Although it had, apparently, been in Faraday and Plummer's original plans to use their life history material in this way, i.e. as a test of existing theories about sexual deviance (by applying their data in the context of justification), this aim came into conflict with, and was abandoned in favour of, an alternative use of case material (in the context of discovery) generating hypotheses in an unresearched area where 'there are no preformed concepts, theories or even hypotheses to be drawn upon and tested'.²⁷ Nevertheless, even though they favour

using data that are qualitative in the sense of being about a single case (an individual life) to generate hypotheses, they do note that from the positivist point of view, the hypotheses generated must eventually be tested and incorporated into theory conceived in the positivist manner as a set of interrelated nomic universals.

Faraday and Plummer's discussion reveals that, within positivism, case study material can be used either to generate hypotheses (i.e. specify relations between the concepts developed in research that is qualitative in the sense discussed in the previous subsection) or to test existing hypotheses (though not both at once). In its hypothesis-generating rôle, however, the case study remains a problem to the positivist because of uncertainty about the generalizability of laws based upon it. It is a question of sampling: only if the typicality of the case can be assessed can researchers estimate the degree of confidence with which they can generalize about some population on the basis of investigating just the one case.

Spencer and Dale pay attention to the problem of generalization in the conclusion to their paper. They note that 'one of the major criticisms of the case-study approach is that even if it can provide internally coherent and plausible explanations of individual cases, generalizations cannot be made and, therefore, there is no contribution to a body of scientific knowledge.' They counter this criticism by arguing that 'generalizing from case studies is possible but not in the same way as from comparative statistical studies', (i.e. quantitative studies in the terms of this subsection). Comparative statistical studies generate only hypotheses suggesting that the many units studied share some of the same properties, whereas case studies have the advantage that they permit researchers to hypothesize generalizations about the structural relations between different properties of the one case and between properties of the case and properties of its context.²⁸

Interestingly, Spencer and Dale recognize that by studying a small number of cases, they are restricted to enumeratively inducing generalizations about structural relations between the properties of the cases. A different research design, involving a sample of organizations and the use of inductive statistics, would be required to generalize to some population: 'we would *not* attempt to generalize our hypotheses and explanations to other theatre companies . . . We are not attempting a comparative study of theatres as organizations.

Had this been our intention, we would have adopted a completely different approach.'

On turning to the case studies informed by the interpretivist approach, what is striking is the relative lack of concern generated by the fact that only one case is studied. This can be traced to the nature of interpretivist sociology. The aim of interpretivist enquiry is to explain actions and interactions by conveying a culturally appropriate understanding of them, and so interpretivist studies are necessarily case studies—studies of one culture, one conceptual framework, one frame of meaning. Collins is aware of this when he notes the impossibility, within an interpretivist approach, of understanding two conflicting cultures at the same time, though he reports that he and his co-investigator 'could change our beliefs and perceptions by exposing ourselves to the appropriate influences (i.e. culture) for long enough . . . We really did experience changes in the content of what we took for granted as a matter of course.'

So, whereas in the context of the positivist approach, case studies pose the problem of generalizability, in the context of the interpretivist approach, the problems involve establishing what are the relevant cultural boundaries—what are the limits of the case—for the people under study, and coping with the potential incommensurability of different cultures or cases. These problems will be explored further in the next subsection.

In summary: data that are qualitative in the sense of being case study material are, in the context of the positivist approach, useful in generating hypotheses, especially about structural relations between the elements of the case, and in testing (i.e. attempting to refute) Popperian conjectures, though they are deficient in that they fail to justify inductive generalizations of greater scope of application than the case studied. In the context of the interpretivist approach, data that authentically capture the meanings of actions and interactions current among the people under study are essentially case study material insofar as meanings are not transcultural, so that within this approach the problem of case studies is the problem of understanding more than one culture or of comparing cultures.

Meanings of Actions

A third common application of the term 'qualitative' is to data that take account of the meanings of their actions to the actors under


study. Faraday and Plummer remark that 'the focus of the life history is paramently concerned with the subjective meanings of individuals'. They espouse a symbolic interactionist orientation because 'it is concerned with depicting the immediate lived experiences as actual members in everyday society grasp them'. Flynn adopted a method 'which situated the immediate lived experiences and attitudes in an organizational context' and in his study 'attention is focussed on factors affecting planners' "definition of the situation". West thought it 'important to examine the source and manner by which meanings of epilepsy were constructed', i.e. constructed by doctors, by parents with epileptic children, etc. Macintyre 'felt it to be crucial to take into account the meanings that actors themselves attributed to events and circumstances'. Collins's project is entirely devoted to 'frames of meaning'. And finally, Bulmer endorses Lazarsfeld and Barton's recommendation 'to adapt the respondent's frame of reference, to present as clearly as possible the respondent's own definition of the situation'.

Data that are qualitative in the sense of recording actors' meanings, definitions of the situation, frames of reference, understandings, perceptions, etc. are commonly taken to be peculiar to the social world and are contrasted with 'quantitative' data recording the objects and happenings of the physical world, which are assumed to be devoid of such meanings. But again, the significance accorded to social data that is particularly meaningful in this way depends upon the sociological approach that forms the context of the research.

For the positivist, the meaningfulness which pervades the social world is located in the consciousness of the individuals who populate that world, and is expressed in mentalistic predicates, i.e. in terms of actors' goals, motives, reasons, etc. The hard-nosed empiricist must take either an identity theory or philosophical behaviourist view of these mentalistic terms, reducing them in effect to descriptions of micro or molar properties, respectively, of physical bodies.²⁹ The less radical empiricist, however, can accept that mentalistic terms refer to mental states that intervene between the stimuli that impinge on people and their behaviours that result. This view seems characteristic of positivist oriented sociologists. In this view, actions are distinguished from physical events by having as their immediate antecedents mental states or events, rather than other physical events. Actions have meaning because they are caused by wants, beliefs,

The Analysis of Qualitative Data


reasons, etc. Thus, whereas physical laws might be represented as in I, the laws of social science might be represented as in II. (The




question of whether there are restrictions on the type of events that determine mental events need not be addressed here.) An example of the positivist view on the meanings of actions can be constructed from hypotheses described by Roberts³⁰ that the doctor's perception of a patient's gender would vary in relation to his age, sex and medical training, his social class background and practice experience, and would affect his diagnosis and treatment—though these hypotheses were not subject to test in the positivist manner in Roberts's study, but used as orienting devices to guide interpretivist inquiry.

Data that are qualitative in this sense of being concerned with the meanings of actions present the positivist with the problem of obtaining an independent and intersubjectively reliable measure of attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, definitions of the situation etc., i.e. of the mentalistic variable *M*. Mental states and events are usually assumed to be available to the possessor of the mind in which they occur through introspection, and to observers of the resultant behaviours through a process of introspection and argument by analogy. (This process is identified by positivists as *Verstehen*, though interpretivists understand the process of *Verstehen* quite differently³¹). But a measure of the mentalistic variable that is independent of the behaviour it causes is required. As Macintyre notes: 'The problem with theories attributing social action to culturally held values is that they often provide no evidence for hypothetical values other than the observed behaviour they seek to explain.' Researchers commonly turn to actors' accounts—e.g. actors' own descriptions of their own motives, definitions of the situation, beliefs etc.—for an independent measure of *M*. But most

positivist orientated researchers are sufficiently sensitive to interviewer effect to be aware that such accounts *A* are not only a function of *M*, but also of other factors *F*, which include other *M*, external constraints and stimuli, etc. That is, the production of actors' accounts is viewed as in IV, not III.



III



IV

The operation of different *F* on different occasions and in different situations explains the production of alternative accounts *A*. Thus for example, Spencer and Dale 'are careful to analyse separately "triggered" and "natural" evidence' since they found that the official morality affected formal interviews (triggered) but not conversations (natural). Actors often gave us *different* accounts in these two situations.' It has become fashionable to invoke Denzin's 'triangulation' to solve this problem: 'because each method reveals different aspects of empirical reality, multiple methods of observation must be employed. This is termed triangulation and I now offer as a final methodological rule the principle that multiple methods must be used in every investigation, since no method is ever free of rival causal factors.'²² Flynn, for example, writes of his research 'the problem of validity is being tackled by a limited attempt at "multiple triangulation", that is by using a mixture of methods and a variety of data sources.' He also states that 'direct observation, interviews and documentary analysis are being used concurrently to avoid dependence on informants' accounts alone, and as a means of checking the validity of observations.' A valid observation, within the positivist approach, is one that corresponds to the mental state or event within the actor's mind, that causes his/her behaviour. West's two sub-studies were motivated by the principle of triangulation. Although Macintyre does not refer to triangulation, she adopted an analogous procedure in using 'quasi-statistics': 'If many items of in-

formation, and information from many sources bore on the proposition under consideration, then I granted it more credibility.'

The aim of validation is to obtain a number of 'accounts' of attitudes, beliefs, meanings etc.—that is a number of necessarily biased measures of *M*—and compare them so that the influence of the biasing factors *F* can be eliminated. (Triangulators may be optimistic about eliminating errors of measurement from *M*, since the series of equations $A_i = f(M + F_i)$ can be solved for *M* only if at least one independent measure of *F* is available.)

West's two sub-studies were motivated by the principle of triangulation. He conducted the doctor-patient observation study because he considered it 'important to examine the relationship between what parents said occurred with what actually happened in clinics in order that their validity be checked.' West concludes his discussion of this sub-study with the statement that 'much of the substance of parental accounts then appears validated by this method of triangulation'. Here, if it is assumed that West's study is informed by a positivist approach, it appears to be his view that because the measure of the patients' perceptions of doctors obtained by interview corresponds with the measures obtained by observation, then the measures are unbiased by other factors (i.e., $F = O$). However, as will transpire below, if West's study is located, instead, within an interpretivist approach, a different understanding of his results obtains.

In summary: from the perspective provided by the positivist approach, data that are qualitative in the sense of describing actors' meanings are data about the mental states or events that cause the people under study to behave the way they do. The problem that data thus conceived present for positivists is that of obtaining reliable measures of these states or events, and the solution frequently offered is triangulation.

The interpretivist conception of the meaning of action is quite different. Within interpretivism, actions are intrinsically meaningful. The meaning is what the action does or intends or is about. Actions embody meaningfulness or intentionality. Bodily movements that do not express meaning are mere behaviours, physiological or physical events. The meaning of an action is not the thought or what is in the mind of the actor performing the action (although the thought might be about the meaning of the action). Thus one can

perform the action of, for example, waving without thinking 'I am waving' or without being motivated to or desiring to wave. Meanings of actions are not the same as the mental states of the actors.

Within the interpretivist approach, all social data are qualitative in the sense of describing actions that are intrinsically meaningful within the cultures of the actors under study. The problems this poses are problems of *Verstehen*.

Adherence to the interpretivist approach is often signalled by appeals to construct a sociology that accords full importance to the intrinsic meaningfulness of the actions which are its data. For example, West states that he believes that 'it is only by moving away from too rigid an adherence to a theoretical framework, with its corollaries of hypotheses-testing, operationalization and so on [i.e. the positivist approach] that we can begin to understand the empirical world which is sociology's topic. That is, unless we start with the stuff of everyday life, we run the risk of violating the integrity of subjective experience.' As noted above, however, one interpretation of West's study is that he is drawn back towards the positivist approach where he triangulates to validate his measure of actors' perceptions of doctors. Moreover, immediately after the passage from which the quotation above is drawn, West writes that 'while it seems crucial to begin with the point of view of the actor, to go no further means that one simply presents one particular version of reality without attempting to explain how it came to be seen that way or what relationship such theories might have to action', which seems to suggest that having established *M*, one must investigate both its determinants and the behaviour it causes.³³

Nevertheless, if West's study is located within the interpretivist approach, then the 'validation' that he sought through his triangulation sub-studies takes on a quite different meaning from that which it has when located within the positivist approach. From an interpretivist perspective, the doctor-patient observation study does not provide confirmation that West's measures of patients' parents' perceptions of doctors are unbiased, but instead increases the plausibility of the parents' interpretations of what goes on in the clinic. 'Triangulation becomes a means by which plausibility is constructed—what the parents say has added weight by comparison with official (doctors') versions of the same situation. Within a 'hierarchy of credibility', to use Becker's term, parents' accounts may simply be

accredited as wrong, stupid or whatever. So too, of course, may [West's] methods deviate from what constitutes 'science'. In cognitive of the political context in which [his] account of the parents' interpretations is likely to be received by an audience (doctors), it therefore became important [for him] to develop a means by which the charge 'implausible' is less easily sustained. The reasons for the doctor-patient sub-study can in this sense be expressed as increasing [the plausibility and thereby] the power of subordinates' (parents) definitions of the situation compared with that of officials (doctors), instead of a validation of their accounts [in the positivist sense of demonstrating the truth of West's measures of the parents' perceptions].³⁴

It is Collins who is most explicit in his adoption of the interpretivist approach, as indicated by his leaning toward 'the Winchian/Wittgensteinian notion of "Form of Life"': He is also acutely aware of the first problem of interpretation faced by interpretivist oriented researchers—the problem of penetrating the culture under study: 'the research problem . . . is that of gaining access to, and developing sufficient understanding of, the esoteric culture of the sciences to recognize the . . . alternative perceptions'—that is, the alternative perceptions provided by alternative Forms of Life or frames of meaning or Kuhnian paradigms. Collins notes that the task of grasping the meanings of actions that make actions the actions they are is particularly difficult because 'the same behaviour may represent different actions. Thus in many respects external appearances will give no clue to underlying changes' (in cultural meanings). He suggests that this problem of penetrating the culture under study can be solved by sufficient exposure to it.

Even if the culture can be penetrated, there remain other problems of interpretation that revolve around the relation between sociological and actors' accounts. What is at issue is whether or not sociologists' interests in and reports on alien cultures can reproduce the understandings of the members of those cultures. Faraday and Plummer devote the section of their paper headed 'the analysis of data' to this problem. They note that moving from qualitative data to final research report presents serious difficulties, and ask: 'How does one transform thousands of pages of typed scripts, interviews, biographies, diaries, dreams, observational notes and so forth, into a coherent, valid and analytically sound "account"?' Although they do

not provide any general answer to this question, they do show that there is a range of alternative solutions depending on 'the extent to which the sociologist imposes his or her own analytic devices upon the subject, or the extent to which the subject's own world is allowed to stand uncontaminated.'

To the radical interpretivist, only the last alternative is acceptable: it is the understandings of the actors under study that must be displayed in the sociological account of their actions and interactions. But this raises the most severe problem of interpretation: how is it possible for sociologists to share cultural understandings with their respondents? Collins poses the problem starkly: the 'sociologist who remains a sociologist is not a proper native member . . . and this may prevent him from understanding native members by virtue of his untypical array of competences and by virtue of his position as sociologist/outsider with regard to the native community.' Bitner³⁵, raising this problem, argues that participant observers are in a very unusual situation of always attempting to suspend their belief in the social reality they encounter as naturally given (as encountered from within their own culture) so as better to grasp someone else's sense of social reality (or culture). The difficulty is illustrated by Collins. He and his co-worker 'were able to skip easily (and inauthentically) into our sociologist-participant identity [out of their para-psychologist identity] . . . thus the degree of professional risk and threat of ridicule was far less in our case than it would be for a fully authentic researcher in the field.'

Another aspect of this problem is raised by Faraday and Plummer when they note that, expecting to find ambiguity and flux in people's lives, researchers might produce it when it is not normally there (i.e. when the people being researched normally experience their lives as orderly) as an artefact of, e.g., non-directive questions. Conversely, sociologists might find people's conceptions of their social world more structured than they are.

How do interpretivist sociologists solve this problem? How can they convey that they have understood the actions and interactions in culturally appropriate ways? They obviously cannot validate their data in the positivist sense of attempting to demonstrate correspondence between actions and their descriptions of the meanings of those actions, because the two are not independent in the way that mental states and the behaviours they cause are within the

positivist approach. As Collins remarks 'there is no objective index of success in understanding'. What interpretivists have to rely on is their normal social competence. There is no measure of success in penetrating the respondents' culture beyond those interactional mechanisms normally used to check social competence—being able to interact successfully. Interpretation and re-interpretation proceed as sociologists 'try out' their understandings in interaction to see if they 'work' by allowing interaction to proceed 'normally'. Gradually, the initially unnatural becomes routine—the most rational thing in the circumstances, 'a necessary phenomenon in the world of ideas inhabited at the time'. The researcher becomes able to pass as a native. Interpretivist theory 'is validated by our ability to predict how these people would expect us to behave if we were members of their culture'.³⁶ Collins says that he and his collaborator 'seemed to be able to interact successfully—ask sensible and sometimes thought-provoking questions of, elicit favourable and thoughtful comments from, hold comprehensible conversations with, nearly all of our respondents.'

In summary: from the perspective provided by the interpretivist approach, all social data are qualitative insofar as they describe actions which are intrinsically meaningful to the members of the culture within which they are performed. The problem that such data pose for interpretivists is that of interpretation—of penetrating the culture and grasping and describing the culturally appropriate meanings of actions—and the solutions are those that we ordinarily employ in our everyday interactions.

Before terminating this section on data that are qualitative in the sense of paying attention to the meanings of actions, it is interesting to review some features of West's paper, for West is almost exclusively concerned with the meanings of actions, and yet is reluctant to accept actors' accounts of the actions. For example, at one point in his discussion, after describing the checks he employed to exclude distorted responses, he writes that 'I was uncomfortably close to simply accepting parental accounts at face value'. West is concerned to validate parents' accounts of their perceptions of doctors by triangulation: he both interviews the child patients' parents and observes doctor-parent interactions in out-patient clinics. Here, from a positivist perspective, West seems concerned to establish an accurate measure of the parents' mental images of doctors, that

is, the beliefs that determine their actions. Instead of simply taking parents' accounts of those beliefs 'at face value', he checks their truth by using another method—observation—of measuring the same beliefs.

But West's work can also be seen to be informed by the interpretivist approach. From the interpretivist perspective, doubts about accepting accounts at face value are due, firstly, to recognizing that the parties to an interaction have differential power to enforce their definition of the situation at the expense of the definitions of other parties. It is here that triangulation becomes relevant within the interpretivist approach, as a means of sustaining the plausibility and thereby increasing the credibility of the definitions of the situation of the less powerful. Also, within the perspective of the interpretivist approach, doubts about accepting accounts at face value are, secondly, doubts about having grasped the culturally appropriate meanings of the actions under study. In other words, locating behaviours in different cultures can lead to their being understood as different actions. Thus, in interpretivist terms, West's discussion of doctor-patient consultation can be cast as follows: located within the patient culture, informed by such rules as 'politeness between strangers', 'doctors offer patients treatment and support' etc., the doctor's actions were interpreted by the parents to be rude or irrational or evasive, whereas located within the medical culture, informed by such rules as 'do not offer diagnosis until certain', 'do not alarm or stigmatize the patient', etc., the doctors understood their actions to be proper or rational.

The problem of interpretation becomes particularly severe for West, because he is also drawn towards the ethnomethodological approach, within which attention turns from retrieving and displaying culturally appropriate understandings of actions toward an awareness of the situated or indexical character of action meanings. Reluctance to accept accounts at face value results from the realization that many different 'face values' are possible depending on how the action is situated, the context within which it is placed, the practical purposes which provide for its repair, so as to reflexively constitute its sense. Thus within his street survey sub-study, West performs a modest "garfinkel", the results of which lead him to observe that 'quite different interpretations (of actions) are equally reasonable. This emphasizes the enormous problem of "reading" accounts at

face value without considering what the talker is doing in particular contexts.' Thus West, when leaning toward the ethnomethodological approach, reveals how verbal actions, which at 'face value' are describing what happened, also have illocutionary force, e.g. they may be strategic in keeping going the interaction in which they occur, or in demonstrating to an interviewer that one is not fooled by doctors. It is in the face of the multiplicity of meanings that an action can have—the multiplicity of repairs of an indexical that are possible—that ethnomethodologists turn from retrieving what really happened, to analysing how, whatever is understood to have happened, that understanding is constructed and conveyed.

Conclusion

The argument of this paper has been that sociology is a pluralistic discipline, characterized by a number of different approaches which are informed by different conceptions of data, explanation and theory. Conceptions of what constitutes qualitative data vary from approach to approach, as do views of the problems and potentialities in analysing qualitative data. The qualitative-quantitative distinction is used to mark many different contrasts in sociology. Three contrasts that are common among the studies reported in the other papers in this volume are reviewed in relation to the approach-dependent conceptions of qualitative data and their analysis.

The exercise in the previous three sections of this paper is itself an analysis of qualitative data—the data being the other papers in this volume. The analysis faces the same problems and possibilities provided by qualitative data that the other authors have faced in their research work. Consequently, some comments on the analysis provided in this paper are in order here.

This paper is rather similar to Collins's research project. It attempts an empirical investigation of a situation where a number of approaches are juxtaposed within sociology. For example, it compares the positivist frame of meaning where no data are inherently qualitative (in the positivist sense of qualitative), with the interpretivist frame of meaning where all social data are essentially qualitative (in the interpretivist sense of qualitative). This mode of analysis is informed by the interpretivist approach, and so the major problem in the analysis of the qualitative data is that of interpretation. Do the analyses in the previous sections render culturally appropriate

understandings of the authors' research activities? The test is, as discussed above, whether successful interaction is possible on the basis of the analyses. This paper has been submitted to all the authors whose research has been discussed, and after some negotiation it appears that it is.

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¹ On the pluralistic nature of sociology, see, e.g., R. Hagedorn & S. Labovitz: *An Introduction to Sociological Orientations*, Wiley, 1973; G. Ritzer: *Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science*, Allyn & Bacon, 1975; T. M. Kando: *Social Interaction*, Mosby, 1977; and N. C. Mullins: *Theories and Theory Groups in Contemporary American Sociology*, Harper & Row, 1973.

² Accounts of the positivist approach abound. Typical statements are contained in A. L. Stinchcombe: *Constructing Social Theories*, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968, and in P. Abell: *Model Building in Sociology*, Schocken, 1971.

³ The roots of what is here described as the interpretivist approach are perhaps too diverse for any one source to typify the approach, but its flavour is conveyed by H. Blumer: *Symbolic Interactionism*, Prentice-Hall, 1969; A. Schutz: *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, Heinemann, 1972; and Z. Bauman: *Hermeneutics and Social Science*, Hutchinson, 1978.

⁴ The foundational statement of the nature of ethnomethodology is in H. Garfinkel: *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, Prentice-Hall, 1967.

⁵ What is referred to here is scientific realism, and not the realism of interpretivist sociologists, such as Bitner, who states that he uses 'the term "realism" to refer to the fieldworkers' efforts to discover and describe the full complexity and actual import of the features of settings as they are appreciated by persons to whom these settings are the circumstances of their lives'. (E. Bitner: 'Objectivity and Realism in Sociology', in G. Peathas, (ed.): *Phenomenological Sociology*, Wiley, 1973, pp. 109-125. The quotation is taken from footnote 13 on p. 125).

The difference between (scientific) realism and empiricism is that the latter accords semantic privilege to observational language, whereas the former does not. Realism treats observational and theoretical languages as at least semantically symmetrical.

⁶ The structuralist approach is briefly described in M. Lane: 'Introduction' in M. Lane, (ed.): *Structuralism: A Reader*, Cape, 1970. A fuller account is given in M. Glucksmann: *Structuralist Analysis in Contemporary Social Thought: A Comparison of the Theories of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Louis Althusser*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974.

⁷ Two notable recent attempts at synthesis are R. J. Bernstein: *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory*, Blackwell, 1976; and A. Giddens: *New Rules of Sociological Method*, Hutchinson, 1976.

⁸ Most approach programmatic also present, at least implicitly, arguments for the reduction of other approaches to the one being advocated. More explicit reductionist cases are expounded in the following; (1) reduction to the positivist approach: Q. Gibson: *The Logic of Social Enquiry*, Routledge

& Kegan Paul, 1960; and R. S. Rudner: *Philosophy of Social Science*, Prentice-Hall, 1966. (2) to interpretivism: P. Winch: *The Idea of a Social Science*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958; and A. R. Louch: *Explanation and Human Action*, Blackwell, 1966. (3) to ethnomethodology: H. Garfinkel: op. cit., (note 5). (4) to structuralism: T. Benton: *Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977.

⁹ That such attempted demonstrations of redundancy are not undisputed is apparent from even a quick perusal of the current philosophy of social science literature, and from the fact that empirical studies informed by the full range of sociological approaches are still being produced.

¹⁰ The debate between Becker and Geer on one side and Trow on the other over the rival merits of participant observation and interviewing is probably an example of an inter-approach argument about the difference between interpretivism and positivism. The relevant papers originally appeared in *Human Organisation*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1957, pp. 28-35 and Vol. 17, No. 2, 1958, pp. 39-40 and are reprinted in G. J. McCall and J. L. Simmons (eds.): *Issues in Participant Observation*, Addison-Wesley, 1969, pp. 322-341.

¹¹ These are the standard topics of texts on statistics for the behavioural sciences or of primers in logic.

¹² On the pattern model of explanation, see A. Kaplan: *The Conduct of Inquiry*, Chandler, 1964; P. Diesing: *Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972, and R. Williams: 'Symbolic Interactionism: The Fusion of Theory and Research?', in D. C. Thorns (ed.): *New Directions in Sociology*, David & Charles, 1976, pp. 115-138.

¹³ J. Ditton and R. Williams: 'The Fundable vs. the Doable: on the Logical and Administrative Disability of Official Funding Bodies to Buy Authentic Qualitative Research'. Paper presented at Symposium.

¹⁴ Problems of interpretations for the interpretivist are analogous to problems of measurement for the positivist. The interpretivist analogue of what was described in the previous subsection as the positivists' problem of qualitative data would be the interpretivists' problem of *quantitative* data.

¹⁵ On cognitive anthropology, see S. A. Tyler, (ed.): *Cognitive Anthropology*, Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1969. Gossip analysis was discussed in the paper presented at the Symposium, G. MacFarlane: 'Gossiping in a Northern Irish Village: Gossip Performances as Texts'.

¹⁶ E.g. J. Roth: *Timetables*, Bobbs-Merrill, 1963; E. Goffman: 'The Moral Career of the Mental Patient', in his *Asylums*, Anchor, 1961, pp. 125-170.

¹⁷ This section attempts to describe a version of sociology that would include Althusserian Marxism and Lévi-Strauss's structuralism, and also be compatible with the recent realist philosophy of science. Perhaps the differences between these are more important than the similarities (though see Glucksmann: op. cit., (note 7) and Benton: op. cit., (note 9)). It is however, unnecessary for present purposes to divide this category 'structuralist sociology' since none of the studies reported in this volume seem to be informed by that approach or by any possible sub-divisions of it.

¹⁸ Ditton and Williams: op. cit., (note 13.)

¹⁹ This point must be remembered, particularly, where quotations are selected from the other papers in this volume to illustrate points under discussion in this paper. That a passage is used to illustrate some feature of

qualitative data within, say, the positivist approach does not entail that the study from which the passage is drawn is informed solely by the positivist approach.

²⁰ Spencet and Dale take their research to be qualitative in other respects too, which become relevant in the discussion below. In Appendix A to their paper they suggest that the qualitative-quantitative opposition is used to mark a number of contrasts that are logically independent, such that a single research project might be qualitative on some dimensions and quantitative on others.

²¹ These recommendations are presented in their *Discovery of Grounded Theory*, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1967.

²² Some authors extend the developmental interpretation of 'qualitative' research to include developing hypotheses or theories, possibly because they also take qualitative to mean 'case study', as discussed in the next sub-section.

²³ Part of Faraday and Plummer's paper consists of a consideration of standard objections to life histories, many of which are raised from within the positivist approach, so their paper does indicate a theoretical sympathy to positivism which in practice they would not endorse—their empirical work, they believe, is informed by the interpretivist approach.

²⁴ J. Dittton: *Part-time Crime: An Ethnography of Fiddling and Puffering*, Macmillan, 1977.

²⁵ Dittton and Williams: op. cit., (note 13.)

²⁶ Although a life history cannot verify an hypothesis, if the attempted falsification fails, it does thereby corroborate the hypothesis.

²⁷ It is here that, within the positivist approach, problems of analysing data that are qualitative in the sense of being exploratory (see previous sub-section) link up with problems of analysing data that are qualitative in the sense of being about a single case. In the former, the difficulty is developing concepts that are empirically and theoretically justified; in the latter, the problem is to hypothesize relations between concepts. In practice, the two problems are often addressed simultaneously. Both, however, remain preliminary and subsidiary to the major *explanatory* exercise—testing hypotheses.

²⁸ Although Spencer and Dale counter positivist oriented criticisms of case studies it must be stressed that this does not entail that their empirical work was informed solely by the positivist approach.

²⁹ On the identity theory, see J. I. C. Smart: 'Sensations and Brain Processes', *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 68, 1959, pp. 141-156. On philosophical behaviourism, see G. Kyle: *The Concept of Mind*, Penguin, 1963. Both are discussed in J. A. Shaffer: *Philosophy of Mind*, Prentice-Hall, 1968, and in P. Halfpenny: *Explanations in Sociology: Positivist and Interpretivist Models*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Essex, 1976.

³⁰ Helen Roberts: 'Women and their Doctors: A Sociological Analysis of Consulting Rates': paper presented at the symposium.

³¹ The classical statement of the positivist interpretation of *Verstehen* is T. Abel: 'The Operation Called *Verstehen*', *Am. J. Sociol.*, Vol. 59, 1948, pp. 211-218. Kaplan: op. cit., (note 12), pp. 32-33, 136-144, 358-369, adopts the same positivist interpretation. Consequently what he describes as semantic explanations achieved through interpreting act meanings consist in identifying *M.* and what he describes as scientific explanations achieved through

interpreting action meanings consist in identifying the antecedents and consequents of *M.* The interpretivist interpretation of *Verstehen* is available in M. L. Wax: 'On Misunderstanding "Verstehen": A Reply to Abel', *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 51, 1967, pp. 323-333. The two different interpretations of *Verstehen* are discussed in Halfpenny: op. cit., (note 29).

³² N. K. Denzin: *The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods*, Aldine, 1970, p. 26. Denzin's triangulation is critically reviewed by Williams: op. cit., (note 12).

³³ Here West seems very close to Kaplan, discussed in note 31 above.

³⁴ This quotation is from a letter dated 5.10.78 in which West commented on the first draft of this chapter. I am indebted to him for drawing to my attention this use of triangulation and this meaning of 'validation' appropriate to interpretivist research.

³⁵ Bittner: op. cit., (note 5).

³⁶ Tyler: op. cit., (note 15).