

of a ballot box (Clarke 2000, 168). Benton (2011) calculates that a strong majority (418 of 570) of Oaxacan municipios have adopted the usos y costumbres model of governance and argues that the popularity of the shift can be linked to a desire to maintain social stability with the deterioration of the authority of the PRI party-state.

31. Sánchez Prado (2015) has written forcefully of the “impossibility of the political” in Mexico, arguing that “that the very question of the future of radical politics in Mexico must start with a substantial reimagining of a future that would disrupt the role of the rule of law as master signifier and the liberal matrix that supports it.” On the limits of settler liberalism, see also Burke 2002; Povinelli 2002; Simpson 2014; Veracini 2010.

32. Ahmed 2014; see also Ahmed’s FeministKilljoys blog post, “Against Students,” June 25, 2015, <https://feministkilljoys.com/2015/06/25/against-students/>.

33. Stevenson 2012 was perhaps the most widely circulated piece.

34. See Guerrero 2013.

35. Simpson writes extensively of the conflation of indigeneity with criminality and “lawless savagery” in the context of settler colonialism in part because settler law is intrinsically “precarious and fragile” because of its violent imposition and legacy. For this reason, settler law is determined to extinguish presettler indigeneity at all costs (2014, 2016).

36. The new governor, Alejandro Murat Hinojosa, is the son of former governor José Murat Casab, who was instrumental in supporting the early stages of Oaxacan wind development.

4. DISTRITO FEDERAL

1. See the *Ecologics* volume.

2. Raúl Salinas de Gortari is the elder brother of former Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–94), and he is infamous in Mexico for political corruption, money laundering, and drug trafficking. Raúl Salinas spent ten years in prison for homicide before being acquitted in 2005. In July 2013 the last remaining charge of “unlawful enrichment” against him was dismissed, allowing him to recover a substantial portion of his former fortune. This landed him on *Forbes*’s list of “The 10 Most Corrupt Mexicans of 2013.”

3. The energy-reform process in 2013 did not fail to offer a spectacular watershed in the history of the Mexican petrostate. For a relatively balanced accounting of the reform process and its outcomes, see Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy, <https://energypolicy.columbia.edu/research/global-energy-dialogue/mexican-energy-reform-prospects-and-challenges>.

4. Webber 2014.

5. See, e.g., Appel, Mason and Watts 2015; Behrends, Reyna, and Schlee 2011; McNeish and Logan 2012; Reyna and Behrends 2008; Sawyer 2004, 2007; Sawyer and Gomez 2012.

6. Doug Rogers (2015) analyzes similar dynamics in his study of Lukoil’s culture industry in Russia.

7. See Campbell (2014) on narco-propaganda and van Dun (2014) on narco-sovereignty, for example. See also Kruijt 2012.

8. The particular story in this case was SENER's claim that a refinery would be fully operational in 2015 when the building had scarcely been started in 2013. Laurence explained to us that even once completed, a refinery takes three to five years to "fine tune" in order to ensure its stable operation.

9. In an interview with us in 2014, former president Calderón admitted that the figure had been as high as 43 percent during his administration.

10. This is precisely what happened when international oil prices fell sharply in the fourth quarter of 2014, from a high of \$112 per barrel in June to \$62 per barrel in December. A series of political and financial crises followed for Peña Nieto's administration in 2015 and 2016, including a requirement that they remove subsidies on the domestic use of gas, leaving him with a 17 percent approval rating in early 2017. See, e.g., Tillman 2017.

11. This claim—that Mexico offered extraordinary subsidies to its poorest citizens, offset in part by higher electricity prices for industry—was one we heard relatively often, including from CFE employees themselves. It has a kernel of truth in that Mexico has a tiered pricing system for electricity usage that favors less use of electricity in nominal terms. And industrial electricity tariffs are about 70 percent higher in Mexico than they are, for example, across the border in the United States. A World Bank study (Komives et al. 2009) concluded, however, that "Mexico's electricity tariff structures are among the most complex in the world, by design and by natural accretion" (45), and that its subsidies are also among the world's largest (an estimated \$9 billion in 2006), with two-thirds of those subsidies going to residential consumers (vii) while "disproportionately benefit[ing] large-volume consumers" (20).

12. Wionczek 1965, 542.

13. The years when Porfirio Díaz and his allies ruled, 1876–1911, are generally referred to as the Porfiriato.

14. The last chairman of MexLight, Maxwell Taylor, commented in his memoir, "MexLight was about as international as a business enterprise could be, having its headquarters in Toronto, its principal stockholders in Belgium, the source of most of its capital in Wall Street and the market for its product in Mexico. Its staff was made up largely of Mexicans but with a considerable sprinkling of Americans and Europeans among the officers and technicians. Like most utilities its growth was fettered by the power rates which in our case were set by the Mexican government; the latter was not inclined toward generosity to a corporation which was popularly regarded as a symbol of Yankee industrial penetration. Because of the low rate schedule, the company was having great difficulty in expanding its capacity to meet the population and industrial growth in its area of responsibility, and consequently it often incurred the ire of its customers for inadequate service" (M. Taylor 1972); see also Hausman and Neufeld 1997; Niblo 1999.

15. The aforementioned World Bank report (Komives et al. 2009) estimates Luz y Fuera's distribution losses as "very high, exceeding 30%" (13).

16. See Belmont 2012 for a close analysis of the conflict between the SME and the government. For international coverage of the Luz y Fuerza closure, see de Córdoba 2009; Lacey 2009.

17. As of the end of 2015, the percentage of electricity on the Mexican national grid produced by CFE had dropped to 57.2 percent (Melgar, Díaz de Leon, and Luque 2015, 26).

18. The energy reform incentivized independent power production as well as private sector investment. In 2015, SENER proudly projected \$116 billion of new investment opportunities in generation, transmission, and distribution across the national grid between 2015 and 2030 (Melgar, Díaz de Leon, and Luque 2015, 28). The SENER plan has a strong emphasis on natural gas and renewable energy sources with a target of 50 percent clean electricity by 2050. Speaking at Rice University in September 2016, Mexican energy secretary Pedro Joaquín Coldwell stated that Mexico has already received \$22.4 billion in investment commitments from fifty-nine private companies since the energy-reform process began. However, \$19.5 billion of that investment has been focused on oil and gas exploration and pipelines (Hunn 2016).

19. Iliff 2015.

20. SENER's current five-year plan (2014–19) calls for ten new strategic gas pipelines and seven interconnections with the United States (Melgar, Díaz de Leon, and Luque 2015, 19).

21. Arguments concerning baseload have recently become a front line in the struggle for decarbonizing energy in the United States as well with fossil fuel lobbyists and political actors like US energy secretary Rick Perry declaring their commitment to defend baseload with others, notably renewable energy financier and advocate Jigar Shah, declaring, "There is no such thing as baseload." See Shah 2015; Joyce 2016.

22. Boyer 2015. Cf. Bakke 2016; Hughes 1983.

23. Özden-Schilling (2015) argues, however, that the unique materiality of electricity challenges conventional political-economic models of commodities and markets.

24. Popular imaginaries of electricity, including those expressed to us by some CFE employees, tend to conceptualize electricity in terms of "flow," as though electrons flow through wires like water through pipes, surfacing the hydropolitics of water and sewage that have historically informed public understanding of other critical infrastructures of modernity. Other electric administrators and engineers were quick to note that the more accurate analogy is to think about electricity supply in terms of "load," hence "baseload" as an "essential, constant supply."

25. See, e.g., NERC 2014.

26. The Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty based on the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in which the signatories have committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

27. See Comisión Reguladora de Energía 2012.

28. As of the time of this writing, Peña Nieto's government has maintained Calderón's commitment to 35 percent electricity from non-fossil-fueled sources by 2024.

29. In 2016, as part of the energy reform process, management of the grid was transferred from CFE to a former subunit, CENACE, Centro Nacional de Control de Energía, which is now organized as the independent system operator for the whole national power grid. The commission's power generation assets were meanwhile divided into four subsidiary generation companies, which will sell electricity into a new wholesale market. See Manzagol and Hodge 2016.

30. Calderón changed the step-like tariff system where a single extra kilowatt-hour would boost people into a higher bracket and replaced it with a line-like tariff system with fewer “discontinuities.” Villagómez explained how, in old stepped system, at five hundred kilowatt-hours of consumption for two months, an electricity bill would be around nine hundred pesos but at 501 kilowatt-hours, it would jump to 2,500 pesos. This was again a “political” rather than “technical” decision, according to Villagómez, but “since most people don’t follow their electricity usage very carefully, the system was not clear to people and created a lot of anger that CFE seemed to be setting arbitrary prices.”

31. We later learned that the governor who approached her was Diódoro Carrasco.

32. Including the Ministry of the Interior (SEGOB), the Environment Ministry (SEMARNAT), and the National Commission for the Development of Indigenous Peoples (CDI).

33. See Secretaría de Energía 2015.

34. See Anaya 2015.

35. See chapter 3 of the *Ecologics* volume.

36. See Derrida 1976.

37. This “ecological” dimension of enablement is, I would submit, an enduring lesson of the anthropology of infrastructure, something that numerous studies have explored and revealed in their own fashion. See, e.g., Anand 2012; Appel, Anand, and Gupta 2015; Barry 2013; Bowker 2010; Harvey, Bruun Jensen, and Morita 2017; Harvey and Knox 2015; Larkin 2013; Mitchell 2011; Star and Ruhleder 1996; Star 1999; von Schnitzler 2013.

5. GUIDXIGUIE’ (JUCHITÁN DE ZARAGOZA)

1. For a study of the APPJ, see Ortiz Rubén et al. 2014.

2. Martínez López (1966) offers a detailed account of the battle itself.

3. The Gas Natural Fenosa park eventually became operational despite the resistance. To date, the only wind park project that has been successfully blocked by the antieólico resistance has been the Mareña Renovables project in San Dionisio del Mar (see the *Ecologics* volume of the duograph).

4. Radio Totopo is a locally celebrated station that has been broadcasting in diidxazá (Zapotec) from the Séptima Sección of Juchitán since 2005 (Nava Morales 2015). Since 2008, the station has been actively involved in organizing and publicizing resistance against wind development in the isthmus. See, e.g., “Pronunciamiento de la asamblea de radios libres y comunitarias de Oaxaca,” Radio Totopo, August 31, 2008, <http://alimentandolaresistenciaradiototopo.blogspot.com>. On the importance of community and indigenous radio in Oaxaca, see Stephen 2012. On the politics of indigenous linguistic revival in Mexico, see Faudree 2013, 2015.

5. #YoSoy132 was a mass student and youth protest movement in Mexico that developed in response to the 2012 presidential campaign and, in particular, in opposition to the return to power of the PRI party and their controversial candidate Enrique Peña Nieto (see Favela 2015). #YoSoy132 made exceptional use of social media (Bacallao-