Narrative Integration, Fragmented Selves, and Autonomy

CATRIONA MACKENZIE AND JACQUI POLTERA

In this paper we defend the notion of narrative identity against Galen Strawson's recent critique. With reference to Elyn Saks's memoir of her schizophrenia, we question the coherence of Strawson's conception of the Episodic self and show why the capacity for narrative integration is important for a flourishing life. We also argue that Saks's case and reflections on the therapeutic role of "illness narratives" put pressure on narrative theories that specify unduly restrictive constraints on self-constituting narratives, and clarify the need to distinguish identity from autonomy.

In her remarkable autobiography, *The Centre Cannot Hold: A Memoir of My Schizophrenia*, Elyn Saks recounts her struggle over several decades to construct a meaningful life while living with schizophrenia (Saks 2007). During the worst phases of her illness, Saks experiences florid psychotic delusions and hallucinations, which isolate her from others, alienate her from herself, and leave her cognitively and affectively impaired. In recounting the memory of her first psychotic episode, or what she has come to call "disorganization," Saks describes the experience in the following terms:

> Consciousness gradually loses its coherence. One's center gives way. . . . The "me" becomes a haze, and the solid center from which one experiences reality breaks up like a bad radio signal. There is no longer a sturdy vantage point from which to look out, take things in, assess what's happening. No core holds things together, providing the lens through which to see the world, to make judgements and comprehend risk. Random moments of time follow one another. Sights, sounds, thoughts and feelings don't go together. No organizing principle takes

Hypatia vol. 25, no. 1 (Winter, 2010) © by Hypatia, Inc.

> successive moments of time and puts them together in a coherent way from which sense can be made. And it's all taking place in slow motion. (Saks 2007, 12)

Narrative theorists argue that we constitute (and reconstitute) our self-identities through an ongoing and dynamic process of narrative self-interpretation that brings coherence and psychological intelligibility to the fragmentary nature of lived experience. Our self-narratives function as organizing principles that integrate experience, enabling us to make sense of ourselves, our actions, and the world with which we engage. What Saks describes is the terrifying experience of the disintegration of her self-narrative, the breaking up of the "center" or "core" that "holds things together." A central theme in Saks's description is the role of this center in organizing temporal experience; when the center breaks up, time becomes disjointed and disconnected, and she finds it difficult to make sense of her experience. This theme resonates with narrative approaches to identity, which hold that one of the central functions of narrative self-interpretation is to mediate the experience of living a human life in time and over time. Just as a narrative transforms mere temporal succession into a structured and meaningful unity, so the backward- and forward-looking activity of narrative self-interpretation enables us to make sense of our lives as temporally extended subjects.

Recently, however, the notion of narrative identity has come under fire from a range of quarters, the most influential critique being that of Galen Strawson (2004, 2007, 2008). Strawson takes narrative theorists to be committed to two claims: a descriptive claim to the effect that "human beings typically see or live or experience their lives as a narrative or story of some sort, or at least as a collection of stories"; and an ethical claim to the effect that narrative self-understanding is "essential to a well-lived life, to true and full personhood" (Strawson 2004, 428). Strawson claims that the descriptive thesis is false and the ethical thesis is destructive. His argument turns on a distinction between two kinds of persons with distinct dispositional types: "Diachronics" and "Episodics." To be "Diachronic" is to think of "oneself, the self or person one now experiences oneself to be, as something that was there in the (further) past and will be there in the (further) future," whereas to be "Episodic" is *not* to think of "oneself, the self or person one now experiences oneself to be, as something that was there in the (further) past and will be there in the (further) future" (Strawson 2007, 86).

Our aims in this paper are twofold. First, we argue that cases of disorganized experience, like that of Elyn Saks, show why, contra Strawson, the ethical narrative thesis is correct. The breakdown in mental illness of the capacity to integrate one's synchronic and diachronic self-experience into a coherent self-narrative not only results in a loss of agency, it is also a source of real suffering

for the person and those who care about her. While Strawson professes to be an "Episodic," the case of Saks shows what genuinely episodic self-experience is really like and why it is identity-undermining. Second, we argue that Saks's case and reflections on the therapeutic role of "illness narratives" (Phillips 2003b) put some pressure on narrative views. We focus specifically on Marya Schechtman's version of the narrative self-constitution view (Schechtman 1996, 2007), and argue first that Schechtman's constraints on self-constituting narratives are too restrictive, and second that illness narratives clarify the need to distinguish identity and autonomy, a distinction that we think is blurred in Schechtman's account. Although a relatively integrated self-narrative is important for a flourishing life and is a precondition for autonomy, the requirements for self-constituting narratives are much weaker than the requirements for autonomy.

In "Strawson on Narrative and the Episodic Self," we provide a brief outline of the central claims of narrative theories of identity and then outline Strawson's conception of the self and his distinction between Diachronic and Episodic selfhood, which underpins his critique of narrative. In "Disorganization and the Schizophrenic Self", we discuss Saks's autobiography in more detail. We argue that Saks's reflections on her illness call into question the coherence of Strawson's conception of the Episodic self. Drawing on James Phillips's account of illness narratives (Phillips 2003a, b), we also argue that Saks's reflections support the ethical narrative thesis. In "Narrative Self-Constitution, Illness Narratives, and Autonomy," we explain why Schechtman's account, and her recent response to Strawson, obscures the distinction between narrative self-constitution and autonomy.

Strawson on Narrative and the Episodic Self

Like traditional philosophical theories of personal identity, narrative approaches to identity are responsive to questions concerning the conditions for the persistence of persons over time. However, narrative theories reject the reductionist assumptions that frame much of the philosophical debate about personal identity: that a person's life can be decomposed into a series of discrete experiences, person-stages, time-slices, or temporal parts; that questions concerning the persistence of persons over time can be answered by identifying the unity relation, whether psychological or bodily, that constitutes the causal interrelations of those discrete experiences; and that these interrelations can be described in impersonal terms.[1] In contrast to this reductionism, narrative theorists insist that the experiences and events of a person's life are not discrete, nor can the continuity of a person's life over time be understood in purely causal terms or without reference to the person's first-person perspective. Rather, on the narrative view, the continuity of a person's life over time is

constituted by the person herself, through the exercise of her agency and via an ongoing process of narrative self-interpretation or self-constitution.

Underpinning the narrative self-constitution view is a conception of what it is to be a person that identifies the following constitutive characteristics of persons. First, to be a person is to be capable of reflexive self-awareness, to be able to conceive of oneself as a self. This involves complex capacities to conceptualize oneself from both a first-personal and a third-personal perspective.[2] Second, reflexive self-awareness is constituted intersubjectively, in and through our relations with other persons. To be capable of reflexive self-awareness is thus not only to be aware of oneself as having a subjective, first-personal point of view that is distinct from other points of view, but also to be aware of others as having their own distinctive subjective, first-personal points of view. Third, to be a person is to be an agent, that is, to be capable of reflection, deliberation, choice, and action, and to be responsive to reasons. Fourth, persons are embodied. Our bodies anchor our subjective, first-personal points of view, mediate our relations with others, and are the means by which we exercise our agency.[3] Fifth, as embodied, temporally extended beings, persons are subject to change over time, sometimes as a result of contingencies that are not within our control and sometimes as a result of the exercise of our own agency. As reflexive, self-aware beings who are responsive to reasons, not only are we aware of such change over time, we also need to make it intelligible to ourselves.

Narrative enables this kind of intelligibility because narrative understanding is holistic and interpretive; it is an organizing structure that explains actions and events by integrating them into meaningful and intelligible temporal patterns or sequences. A successful literary narrative, for example, orders the different events recounted in the narrative into a meaningful temporal structure and enables the reader to make sense of the actions and emotions of the characters, their inner lives, and their relationships to one another.[4] Narrative theorists hold that we constitute ourselves as persons over time by exercising these same capacities for narrative understanding. Our narrative self-conceptions (or self-narratives) function as implicit organizing structures through which we interpret and make sense of our past histories; project ourselves into the future via plans and intentions; and make sense of our actions, emotions, desires, beliefs, character traits, and relations to others.

Strawson interprets narrative views to be committed to a cluster of claims, all of which he rejects: (i) that the self-experience of persons is diachronically structured (the descriptive narrative thesis); (ii) that having a self-narrative is essential for a flourishing life (the ethical narrative thesis); (iii) that self-understanding requires actively and self-consciously seeking patterns of coherence in one's life as a whole, or at least significant parts of it (form-finding); (iv) that self-interpretation involves thinking of "oneself and one's life as fitting the form of some recognized narrative genre" (Strawson 2004, 442)

(story-telling);[5] and (v) that self-interpretation is a reconstructive process (revision). Some narrative views are committed to some or all of these claims. However, we reject the story-telling claim. We do not think a narrative view needs to be committed to the claim that "The person whose life it is must see or feel it as a narrative, construe it as a narrative, live it as a narrative" (Strawson 2004, 440). We also reject Strawson's interpretation of the notion of narrative coherence as a highly self-conscious process that aims to unify one's whole life. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that some versions of the narrative view seem to be committed to something like these two claims. Dennett, for example, talks of making "all our material cohere into a *single* good story" (Dennett 1992, 114).[6] Furthermore, although we accept a version of the ethical narrativity thesis, we do not accept that this commits us to the view that in order to lead a flourishing life a person must conceive of her life "as some sort of ethical–historical–characterological developmental unity, or in terms of a story, a *Bildung* or 'quest'" (Strawson 2004, 441). Finally, although we accept that the self-experience of persons is diachronically structured, we do not think it follows from this that persons must be constantly reliving, dwelling on, or recollecting the past.

Strawson rejects the descriptive thesis as false because he rejects the claim that our self-experience is diachronically structured, arguing that persons can be distinguished into one or other of two broad dispositional types whom he labels "Diachronics" and "Episodics." Diachronics experience a strong sense of continuity between past, present, and future selves, so Strawson concedes that the narrative self-constitution view may quite aptly characterize their temporally extended self-experience (Strawson 2004, 430). However, he argues that this view does not aptly characterize the self-experience of Episodics, among whom he counts himself. Episodics are aware that, qua human beings, they are continuous entities, but as far as selfhood is concerned, they do not consider themselves as "something that was there in the (further) past and will be there in the (further) future" (Strawson 2007, 86).

Strawson's analysis of Episodic self-experience turns on a distinction between the "human being taken as a whole" and the self. Strawson acknowledges that the human being is a social, embodied creature located in a physical environment and subject to the usual processes of development, maturation, and eventual decline over the course of a human life. The duration of the human being is thus coextensive with the duration of the life of that being. However, he defines the term "self" as referring to "an internal mental presence, a mental entity" (Strawson 1999, 99) and argues that the experience of oneself as such an entity is "the central or fundamental way . . . in which human beings experience themselves" (105). Strawson uses asterisks—self*, I*, me*—to represent our experience of ourselves when we are apprehending ourselves as an inner mental presence or self, as distinct from a human being.

Strawson distinguishes two questions about the self, so understood: metaphysical and phenomenological. The metaphysical question is whether selves exist. The phenomenological question concerns the nature of our experience of the self. Strawson claims that, in our ordinary human self-experience,

> the self tends to be figured as
> [1] a *subject of experience*, a conscious feeler and thinker
> [2] a *thing*, in some interestingly robust sense
> [3] a *mental* thing, in some sense
> [4] a thing that is *single* at any given time, and during any unified or hiatus-free period of experience
> [5] a *persisting* thing, a thing that continues to exist across hiatuses in experience
> [6] an *agent*
> [7] as something that has a certain character or *personality*. (Strawson 1999, 106)

Strawson's response to the phenomenological question involves a commitment to what he calls the "minimal form of Self-experience." He argues that the self is "a subject of experience that is a mental thing that is single at any given time and during any unified or hiatus-free period of experience" (118), thus any form of self-experience must involve items [1]–[4]. However, he rejects items [5]–[7]—persistence, agency, and personality—as necessary components of self-experience, claiming that we need not experience the self "as an agent that has long-term Diachronic continuity and personality" (118). In rejecting agency and diachronic continuity as necessary components of self-experience, Strawson invokes what he purports to be certain great "dividing facts about humanity." These are first, that while some people experience their mental lives as a product of their own agency, for others it is experienced "almost entirely as something that just happens to them" (108); and second, that some people's self-experience is Episodic while others is Diachronic.

Strawson's answer to the phenomenological question intersects with his answer to the metaphysical question, which he variously calls the Pearl View (Strawson 1997, 424) or the Transience View (Strawson 1999, 129) of the self. This is the view that although there is no *persisting* metaphysical entity—the self—in any human life, there is a succession of selves, each of which persists only so long as a hiatus-free stretch of consciousness, or about three seconds. Strawson refers to these as SESMETs: "Subjects of Experience that are Single Mental Things" (Strawson 1999, 118). He argues that self-referring terms, such as "I," refer to two different things, the human being that I am and the SESMET that I am at a given time, and that the relationship between the SESMET and the human being is a straightforward part–whole relation (Strawson 1999, 131).

Strawson's metaphysical thesis is relevant to the argument of this paper only insofar as it informs his claims about the phenomenology of self-experience and his critique of narrativity. We do not intend to assess his claims that SESMETs are metaphysically real physical entities and that they are related to the human being as parts to the whole. However, we want to make two brief points. First, as will emerge in the remainder of the paper, we disagree with Strawson's conception of the self as a "Single Mental Thing" and with his claim that "these short-term selves are what most people are really talking about when they talk about *the* self" (Strawson 1999, 132). These claims are fundamentally at odds with the conception of the self at stake in narrative views. Second, although Strawson distinguishes his metaphysical claims about the SESMET from his phenomenological claims about Episodic selfhood, the distinction between them often seems blurred because both are underpinned by Strawson's conception of the self as an inner mental presence that does not persist over time. With regard to the duration of the self* he says: "it seems that some Episodics experience their* duration as the same as that of the specious present, around a second; for others, perhaps, it is experienced as considerably longer, extending, perhaps for a few minutes, or half an hour, or a day, or for some much longer indeterminate period of time" (Strawson 2007, 89).

Strawson's phenomenological thesis about the nature of Episodic self-experience seems to involve two central claims. First, that one's self-experience as an inner mental entity refers to the present self* and its intentions and that "the remoter past or future" of oneself as a human being is not experienced as one's* own past or future. He thinks this claim is quite consistent with acknowledging that, *qua* human being, one's present bodily, mental, and affective dispositions are shaped by one's past, and that one's past has a special emotional and moral import for one's present self*. It is also consistent with acknowledging that one has autobiographical memories of past events that have occurred in one's history as a human being and that one may even remember some of these events "from-the-inside." But, he claims, "I have no sense that I* was there in the past, and I think it is obvious that I* was not there, as a matter of metaphysical fact" and "I have no sense that I* will be there in the future" (Strawson 2004, 434).

The second claim is that Episodics generally do not care much about their past or future selves and feel little affective identification with the past subjects of experience who are nevertheless subjects within the life of the same human being. He argues that this lack of affective identification is nevertheless quite consistent with feeling morally responsible for one's past actions as a human being, obliged to fulfill one's promises in the future, and capable of being loyal, faithful, and loving toward other persons (Strawson 2007).[7] One reason he thinks the ethical narrative thesis is destructive is because it implies that the lives of Episodics are deficient or empty in certain ways—that Episodics lead

less richly emotional and moral lives, and are not capable of sustained relationships.

Strawson is surely correct that we can sometimes feel affectively disconnected, even alienated, from the actions and experiences of our past selves, especially in the remoter past. Thus many of us may quite easily identify with the following quotation from Henry James, which Strawson cites in support of the human being/self distinction: "'I think of . . . the masterpiece in question . . . as the work of quite another person than myself'" (Strawson 2004, 429). Strawson is also correct that one's remoter future does not engage one's self-concern in quite the same way as tomorrow does. However, these claims are not inconsistent with narrative approaches to selfhood.

On the narrative view, it is precisely because of such experiences of discontinuity that the integration of selfhood across time is both practically necessary and fragile, an achievement of agency rather than a given of experience. As Christine Korsgaard argues, the practical necessity of synchronic and diachronic self-integration arises from the fact that we live a single embodied human life: "You normally think you lead one continuing life because you are one person, but according to this argument the truth is the reverse. You are one continuing person because you have one life to lead" (Korsgaard 1996, 372). Genevieve Lloyd echoes this theme: "We are in time not as disembodied consciousness but as awareness of living bodies, which set limits to what we can be and do" (Lloyd 1993, 164). On these views, narrative integration mediates the relations among our human embodiment, our inner mental life, the world, and our relations with others, thereby enabling us to make sense of continuities and discontinuities within the self.

In the following section of the paper we argue that Saks's reflections on the experience of schizophrenia lend support to the narrative view of the self. We also suggest that Saks's account of the loss of self in schizophrenia raises pressing questions for Strawson's conception of the Episodic self. Strawson states that, "the strongly Episodic life is one normal, non-pathological form of life for human beings, and indeed one good form of life for human beings, one way to flourish" (Strawson 2004, 433). However, other than citing his own case as an example, Strawson provides no further argument for the claim that a normal, non-pathological human life can be both strongly Episodic and flourishing. Nor does he provide any criteria for distinguishing pathological from non-pathological forms of Episodic self-experience. Moreover, he presents no other argument that might preempt the legitimacy of using a pathological case to question the coherence of the claim that a genuinely Episodic life can be a flourishing life.[8] It is now widely accepted in cognitive neuropsychology that the study of cognitive deficits in pathological or abnormal cases helps illuminate the processes involved in normal cognitive functioning. For these reasons, we would argue that Saks's self-authored case study of the Episodic self-expe-

rience caused by schizophrenic delusions is highly instructive in showing first, why self-experience, if it is to be coherent, necessarily involves having a sense of diachronic connection between one's past, present, and future, and second, why the capacity to integrate one's experience into a self-narrative is necessary for a flourishing life.

Disorganization and the Schizophrenic Self

Saks suffers from paranoid schizophrenia. Her autobiography recounts her struggle to accept that she is mentally ill and requires ongoing medication and intensive psychiatric care. It also describes how, at various periods in her life, her disorder has alienated her from herself and others. Saks's story is remarkable because, on the one hand, she is wholly overwhelmed by the terror of her delusions and hallucinations, described as "physically and mentally retarded" (Saks 2007, 72) on her psychiatric records, and destined to live her entire life on exceptionally high doses of psychiatric medication. Yet, on the other hand, she is a highly successful academic who gained a Masters in Philosophy from Oxford and a law degree from Yale, earning both degrees while in and out of psychiatric hospitals. Saks is now a professor of law and psychiatry at the University of Southern California.

Saks's psychotic episodes are characterized by the dissolution of her narrative self-conception, which she has come to call "disorganization." When suffering "disorganization," Saks is unable to make sense of either her synchronic or diachronic self-experience. She describes the experience of psychosis as follows:

> the regulator that funnels certain information to you and filters out other information suddenly shuts off. Immediately, every sight, every sound, every smell coming at you carries equal weight; every thought, feeling, memory, and idea presents itself to you with an equally strong and demanding intensity. (Saks 2007, 212)

When her narrative sense of self fragments, Saks is unable to "filter out" other stimuli in the same way a mentally well person can; she feels assaulted by thoughts, visions, and feelings; and she is unable to separate reality from delusion. Although Saks experiences her psychotic episodes from a particular point of view, she does not identify this point of view as her own. Rather, during a psychotic episode, her sense of authorship over her life and actions are obliterated, and her agency is impaired, leaving her with only a minimal, residual self. Saks's life has been a series of deluded and lucid spells, varying in severity, frequency, and duration. Saks's delusions are genuinely "Episodic" insofar as when she is delusional she loses the capacity to order her experience into a

coherent temporal structure. She has little if any sense of the past or the future and is literally trapped in a "stagnant present."[9]

Like other agents who suffer from psychopathology,[10] Saks also experiences severe and distressing inner conflict about her identity and feels like a "different" person to her delusional, schizoid self. When she consents to commit herself as an inpatient during her studies for her master's in philosophy, she describes this sense of self-fragmentation as follows: "Was I a mental patient or a student? Where did I really belong, at Oxford, or at the Warnerford? Should I spend my days in the library or in group therapy?" (Saks 2007, 62). She also struggled to accept that she could not overcome her illness with strength of will and perseverance alone and that, to keep well, she needed to take high doses of medication. As she says: "More than anything I wanted to be healthy and whole; I wanted to exist in the world as my *authentic self*—and I deeply believed that the drugs undermined that" (Saks 2007, 226). Part of Saks's revelation in the autobiography was coming to realize that managing her illness required appropriating it as an aspect of herself first, even though she felt estranged from her delusional self. By appropriating her illness as part of her self, she was then able to accept that taking medication is not inauthentic. Rather, it enables her to be the self she wants to be. But this requires accepting that her "authentic" self is significantly defined by schizophrenia.

Two related and recurring themes in Saks's autobiography are the profound isolation brought about by her illness—the sense of being alone with one's thoughts and unable to communicate them to others—and the importance of psychotherapy and the social support of friends and colleagues in enabling her to manage her illness. She describes her relationship with her first psychoanalyst, Mrs. Jones, in the following terms: Mrs. Jones's "steady and calm presence contained me, as if she were the glue that held me together. I was falling apart, flying apart, exploding—and she gathered my pieces and held them for me" (Saks 2007, 93).

We see Saks's account of her psychotic experiences as a description of genuinely Episodic selfhood. With the breakdown of her self-narrative, Saks experiences a loss of self: a sense of being trapped in an endless present and disconnected from her own past and future; emotional disconnection from others; and an inability to distinguish reality from delusion and to make sense of her experiences. We want to suggest that Saks's account raises serious questions for Strawson. First, it raises questions about the coherence of Strawson's conception of the self* as the presently experienced self, with no subjective sense of diachronic connection to past and future selves. In our view, a self so conceived would be unable to make sense of either its synchronic or its diachronic experience. As Shaun Gallagher has argued, the capacity to order our experience into a basic temporal structure is a necessary condition for the pre-reflective sense of self or *ipseity* ("mineness") that grounds capacities for

self-reference, metacognition, and autobiographical memory (Gallagher 2003, 2007). Self-reference involves the capacity to refer to oneself using the first-person pronoun, to distinguish oneself from others, and to have a sense of one's own agency. Metacognition involves the capacity to reflect on and interpret one's experience. Functioning autobiographical memory requires that one is able to appropriate past experiences as one's own. As Saks's account illustrates, schizophrenia can impair all these capacities, leading to fragmentation of the self. Yet such capacities must be presupposed by any conception of phenomenological self-experience, including Strawson's conception of Episodic self-experience, since Strawson's Episodic is perfectly able to refer to his experiences as his own, form and act on intentions, both short and longer-term, and remember past experiences in his life. But if Strawson's conception of Episodic self-experience must presuppose such capacities, it is hard to make sense of his claim that "some Episodics experience their* duration as the same as that of the specious present, around a second" (Strawson 2007, 89).

Second, Strawson claims that Episodics are just as capable of sustaining relationships of friendship, love, and loyalty as are so-called Diachronics. He states:

> Enduring love of a person is, at any moment, a matter of present disposition. Its manners and customs may be shaped by the past, but it does not require any tendency to engage in explicit recollection of the past, nor any trace of any Diachronic sense that one*—or the one* one loves—was there in the past. . . . A gift for friendship doesn't require any ability to recall past shared experiences in any detail, nor any tendency to value them. It is shown in how one is in the present. (Strawson 2007, 109)

These remarks reflect one of Strawson's persistent misunderstandings of narrative views, namely that it follows from the claim that experience is diachronic that we must be constantly reliving and recollecting the past. However, this is a misinterpretation. The point is rather that relationships of friendship and love do not make sense without a temporal or "historical" structure (Schechtman 2007; Jones 2008; Rudd 2009). As the Saks case illustrates, friendship *is* relational and historical, and part of the reason Saks battled to make and sustain friendships was because she often felt disconnected from her own past, and her delusions and anxiety interfered with her ability to connect with others.

Third, Saks's case provides support for the ethical narrative thesis, the claim that narrative self-understanding is essential for a flourishing life. Strawson rejects this claim on the grounds that it may "needlessly and wrongly distress" persons whose self-experience is Episodic (Strawson 2004, 429). An implication of Strawson's critique is that fragmented selves like Saks can have as good

and fulfilled a life as any person can despite their episodicity. However, Saks's experiences illustrate that being episodic diminishes the overall quality of her life. Strawson also claims that the ethical narrative view could be "potentially destructive in psychotherapeutic contexts" (Strawson 2004, 429). Saks's case, however, suggests that the opposite is true, as we explain in the remainder of this section.

James Phillips uses the term "illness narratives" to refer to the narratives of psychopathological agents like Saks (Phillips 2003b, 316).[11] The illness narratives of disordered agents differ from ordinary self-narratives in a number of respects. They typically lack the coherence and intelligibility of ordinary self-narratives due to the frequency of dissociation and the corresponding struggle for self-integration and self-definition experienced by disordered agents. As Phillips explains, typically, disordered agents with illness narratives struggle

> to experience their lives as unified, coherent wholes. Their sense of agency is challenged, their goals are interrupted, and any sense of basic coherence is threatened. . . . [T]he threat to narrative unity often impels them to a degree of reflection that the ordinary man need not bother with. (Phillips 2003b, 324)

Further, because capacities for temporal ordering and self-understanding are often impaired, illness narratives may not have a coherent temporal structure:

> With the dissociated patient, the narrator is there in fits and starts, often trying to account for missing presents and the absence of a continuity of flow through lived time. The paranoid patient interprets from a present, but the perspective is one in which the mundane world is transformed into a world of plots and schemes. . . . [I]n the case of the deteriorated, chronic schizophrenic, it barely makes sense to speak of historicity. The patient exists in a stagnant present . . . minimally related to a past and future. (Phillips 2003b, 324)

Illness narratives are also characterized by suffering and often express significant emotional distress and turmoil.

Phillips argues that, despite their disordered, fragmentary nature, illness narratives nevertheless have clear therapeutic functions for persons suffering from various psychopathologies, as they enable such persons to give expression to their suffering and some kind of meaning to their disordered experience. Saks's reflections on the role of psychotherapy in enabling her to manage her illness lend strong support to this argument. Despite his critique of the ethical narrativity thesis, Strawson nevertheless seems to acknowledge that "certain sorts of self-understanding are necessary for a good human life," and he cites psychotherapy as an example (Strawson 2004, 448). However, Strawson

disputes the suggestion that psychotherapeutic intervention and the kind of self-understanding it can bring about is narrative in form. What emerges from his brief remarks on psychotherapy is that underlying his critique of narrative is a commitment to the reductionist idea that when it comes to understanding persons, causal explanation is exhaustive. Thus Strawson understands psychotherapeutic explanation purely as causal explanation, as a matter of explaining the causal relations between past episodes in one's life as a human being and one's present self, similar in kind to "when one discovers as an adult that a (physical) scar was caused by one's falling out of a pram" (Strawson 2008, 206). We do not wish to deny that causal explanation plays an important role in psychotherapeutic contexts, for example in explaining how certain symptoms manifest an underlying disorder, or in explaining how particular medications target specific sites in the brain. However, if causal explanation is to bring about any therapeutic benefits it must have some first-personal import for the self. For that reason, if it is to be effective, psychotherapy must also focus on how the person understands herself, on the meanings she attributes to her experiences and her relationships with others, both in the past and in the present (Phillips 2006). In fact, as Phillips argues, both causal explanation and narrative understanding are deeply interpenetrated in psychotherapeutic intervention (Phillips 2006, 184). Again, this claim is supported by Saks's reflections on the role of both medication and talk therapy in enabling her to manage her illness and achieve an understanding of herself.

One reason why Strawson seems to be so resistant to the notion of narrative self-interpretation is that he thinks both the notion of narrative coherence and the reconstructive and revisionary dimensions of narrative are inevitably falsifying of experience. He claims that "the more you recall, retell, narrate yourself, the further you risk moving away from accurate self-understanding, from the truth of your being" (Strawson 2004, 447). However, this claim relies on a simplistic opposition between discovering the truth of the past and merely inventing fictions, and assumes that we can somehow have access to our past and present experience unmediated by interpretation. We would dispute this view. We think that our present experience is always mediated by self-interpretation and that our access to past experiences is always subject to reconstructive interpretation. Reconstructive theories of memory have highlighted the dynamic nature of memory, the way that what we remember (whether voluntarily or involuntarily) is affected by the circumstances in which we remember, by the events that intervene between the present and the remembered past, by the purposes for which we are remembering, and by our changing self-conceptions.[12] This does not mean that there are no criteria for distinguishing accurate from falsifying memory—we think there are—but the idea that the "truth of our being" can be accessed without interpretation is just false.

In this section we have argued that personal and theoretical reflection on the breakdown of the self-narrative in schizophrenia calls into question the coherence of Strawson's notion of the Episodic self. We have also argued that the suffering caused by such breakdown provides evidence for the view that narrative self-understanding is essential for a flourishing life. In the following section we argue that Saks's case, and reflections on the therapeutic role of illness narratives, nevertheless puts pressure on at least some versions of the narrative self-constitution view.

Narrative Self-Constitution, Illness Narratives, and Autonomy

One of the criticisms frequently raised against narrative approaches to identity is that people are prone to confabulation, exaggeration, self-deception, and bias in their own favor, and thus a person's self-narrative may be quite falsifying. Strawson's complaint, discussed above, that narrative self-interpretation undermines accurate self-understanding, is an example of such criticisms. Narrative theorists are of course aware that there must be constraints on which narratives can count as self-constituting. The need for such constraints seems particularly important in the context of a disorder such as schizophrenia, since the person's self-narrative may include delusions and gross distortions. One of Saks's recurring delusions, for example, was that she was a mass murderer who could kill, and had killed, thousands of people with her thoughts alone. It was clearly important that her friends, family, and colleagues were able to recognize these ravings as symptoms of the disorder rather than as confessions of criminality. Nevertheless, the complexity of illness narratives and their therapeutic role puts some pressure on narrative theories to ensure that the constraints on self-constituting narratives are sufficiently flexible to explain how some illness narratives might nevertheless be self-constituting.

Our argument in this section focuses primarily on Schechtman's version of the narrative self-constitution view. In brief, we argue that Schechtman's constraints on what counts as a self-constituting narrative, and her coherence requirements on such narratives, are too stringent. We also argue that it is crucial to distinguish narrative self-constitution from autonomy, a distinction that we think is blurred in Schechtman's account.

In *The Constitution of Selves* (1996), Schechtman proposes two constraints on what can count as a self-constituting narrative: the "reality" and "articulation" constraints. The reality constraint specifies that for a narrative to be self-constituting it must cohere with reality; it cannot be delusional, psychotic, or paranoid, based on gross factual errors about the world, or resistant to revision in light of contrary evidence. This constraint enables Schechtman's view to avoid the charge that, since the mass-murderer delusion is part of Saks's subjective self-experience, it must count as a self-constituting narrative. Thus,

Schechtman argues that the reality constraint enables us to "dismiss the elements of psychotics' narratives that are out of touch with reality, and to recognize that their delusions interfere with personhood and diminish it" (Schechtman 1996, 127).

We agree with the need for a reality constraint on what can count as a self-constituting narrative. But we think that, in order to account for the role of illness narratives in self-constitution, it is important to distinguish between the *content* of psychotic delusions and the *fact* that the person suffers from such delusions. As far as its *content* is concerned, the mass-murderer delusion should not count as a self-constituting narrative. However, given that this and other delusions are central to Saks's subjective experience when she is unwell, the *fact* that she suffers from such delusions must be incorporated into her narrative self-conception, if it is to be accurate and genuinely self-constituting. It was only when Saks came to terms with the fact that she suffers from schizophrenia and that, when unwell, she experiences delusions—in other words, when she accepted that her illness is part of who she is—that she was able to form an accurate narrative self-conception. For this reason, Saks's delusions cannot simply be dismissed as external to her self, even if Saks feels alienated from herself when she is experiencing delusions. Further, although Saks's delusions impair her global autonomy, for reasons we discuss later, incorporating the fact that she experiences delusions into her narrative self-conception is a condition for her being able to exercise autonomy to the extent that she does.

Schechtman's second constraint, the "articulation" constraint, specifies that for a narrative to be self-constituting it must be capable of at least local articulation by the person: "the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels" (Schechtman 1996, 114). In other words, although self-narratives need not be self-consciously reflected on and articulated by the person, they must at least be capable of being articulated as an explanation of the person's reasons for action. In this context, Schechtman draws a distinction between a person's *explicit* and *implicit* self-narrative. Whereas an *explicit* self-narrative is capable of articulation, an *implicit* self-narrative is one of which the person is unaware and that cannot be consciously articulated but that nevertheless influences her behavior. Schechtman argues that those strands of a person's self-narrative that are *implicit* in this sense should be considered less part of the person's identity, less attributable to them, than those strands that are explicit and therefore capable of articulation. She gives the example of a man whose behavior and emotional responses toward his brother evidences an implicit narrative of hostility, of which he fails to be aware (Schechtman 1996, 115–16). While this implicit script does influence and explain the man's motivations and behavior, and therefore must be considered part of his self-narrative, because it is not intelligible to him, and perhaps not even noticed by him, it is less identity-constituting than his *explicit*

self-narrative. Now although we agree with Schechtman that our self-narratives must be articulable to some degree, this constraint is far too strong. First, as Hilde Nelson has argued, "Schechtman fails to acknowledge that one's identity isn't simply a function of one's self-knowledge" (Nelson 2001, 91). Second, Schechtman conflates identity and autonomy. It is certainly true that this man is not autonomous with respect to his emotions of hostility toward his brother, since these emotions are not accessible to reflection. But these emotions are nevertheless central to his identity, whether or not he is aware of them or autonomous with respect to them. We return to this distinction later.

We suggest that Schechtman interprets these constraints unduly inflexibly because she assumes that to be self-constituting a self-narrative must be coherent and unified and the person must identify fully with all elements of it. This assumption seems to lie behind a distinction Schechtman draws in her recent response to Strawson, between a narrative account of *persons* and a narrative account of *selves* (Schechtman 2007). This distinction is an attempt to clarify and revise the articulation constraint. Schechtman argues that she takes the term "person" to refer to persons *qua* moral agents, reasoning creatures, and social beings, and the term "self" to refer to the first-personal subject of experience. She suggests that the persistence conditions for selves and persons are different and that there may be "a succession of many different self-narratives within the life of a single person" (Schechtman 2007, 176). To constitute oneself as a *person*, "one must recognize oneself as continuing, see past actions and experiences as having implications for one's current rights and responsibilities, and recognize a future that will be impacted by the past and present" (170). However, one need feel no affective identification with the past selves or specific concern for the future selves in one's person-narrative. Constituting oneself as a *self*, on the other hand, involves "unifying consciousness over time through affective connections and identification" (171). To have a self-narrative in this sense requires "empathic access" to one's past actions and experience and that one experiences one's past selves as strongly connected to one's present self.[13] Thus, "actions and experiences from which I am alienated, or in which I have none of the interest that I have in my current life, are not part of my narrative" (171).

Having distinguished these two kinds of narrative, Schechtman nevertheless suggests two reasons for thinking that it is usually desirable that one's self-narratives coincide with one's person-narrative. First, given the practical connections between one's present self and one's life as a person—for example, the present self inherits the responsibilities and obligations that have arisen in one's life as a person however affectively disconnected from them one may feel—a life in which one's self-narrative coincides with one's person-narrative is likely to be less alienated. Second, she argues that selves are not as discrete and disconnected from each other as Strawson suggests. Contra Strawson's

metaphor of selves as separate pearls strung together on the string of a human life, Schechtman argues that selves overlap in complex ways within one's life as a person: "This means it is not always obvious what is really no longer part of the self and what is, in some respects at least, a part of the self that is lying dormant or unexpressed" (Schechtman 2007, 178).

We agree with this second claim and with a similar view expressed by Lloyd: "The reality of a life lived in time is a perpetual weaving of fresh threads which link events and lives—threads that are crossed and rewound, doubled and redoubled to thicken the web" (Lloyd 1993, 144). However, we think this more complex conception of temporally extended selfhood effectively undermines the distinction between person-narratives and self-narratives, and in particular the view that only those aspects of one's past self that are strongly affectively connected to one's present self can constitute one's self-narrative. The problem with this view is that it imposes overly stringent conditions on diachronic integration. It also seems to assume that the present self is an entirely coherent unity, overlooking the fact that internal conflict, self-estrangement, and affective distance from one's attachments can characterize synchronic, not just diachronic self-experience.[14]

In contrast, we propose loosening the coherence requirements on self-narratives and giving up the idea that a self-narrative must be a seamless, coherent unity. Lloyd suggests we should think of the process of narrative self-constitution as "like the multiple-perspective narratives of modern novels—respecting the fragments while making of them a satisfying unity" (Lloyd 1993, 165). Nelson suggests we should think of a self-narrative as a "hodgepodge of narrative fragments," "a tissue of stories," or an "accumulation of 'overlapping fibers'" (Nelson 2001, 76). These overlapping fragments may be quite different, even deeply conflicted. Gallagher argues that "the self is a complex narrative product that is not fully unified—a product of incomplete summation and selective subtraction, imperfect memories and multiple reiterations" (Gallagher 2003, 338). We endorse these models of narrative self-constitution and agree with Gallagher that "the self so conceived can provide a good model to explain the various equivocations, contradictions and struggles that find expression within an individual's personal life" (338). However, we would add that, in order to lead flourishing lives, as agents we need to find ways to narratively integrate the different fragments of selfhood, both synchronically and diachronically.

Applying this looser conception of narrative self-constitution to illness narratives, we follow Phillips in arguing that while there is a point at which an agent's sense of self may be so fractured and diminished that her narrative self is lost, self-narratives can nevertheless be severely diminished while still being self-constituting. In our view, the illness narratives of persons who suffer from psychopathology can be self-constituting despite their fragmentation, if they

restore (or maintain) the agent's sense of her own agency and of herself as a temporally extended subject, and if they enable her to make sense of her experiences, including her experience of her illness. In cases involving psychopathology, the process of narrative integration will be exponentially more complex and fraught than it is for most. In Saks's case, narrative integration required accepting that her delusional self is part of herself. Her autobiography documents the difficult struggle involved in this process. Similarly, Phillips's patient Mrs. M—who, like Saks, suffers from schizophrenia, has florid delusions, and has been intermittently hospitalized—struggles to develop a balanced illness narrative; a "narrative that combines a realistic acknowledgement of her condition with an assurance that there is more to her than the schizophrenia" (Phillips 2003a, 332). Phillips compares this struggle as similar in kind to that involved in the acceptance of a physical illness, while also acknowledging that "the illness narratives of the chronic psychiatric conditions tend to be totalizing in a way that physical illness narratives are not" (Phillips 2003a, 332).

This looser conception of narrative self-constitution enables a clear distinction to be drawn between identity and autonomy. Schechtman's account blurs this distinction because it places overly restrictive requirements of coherence, affective identification, and self-knowledge on self-constituting narratives. In our view, having a temporally extended self-narrative is necessary for autonomy, but it is not sufficient. Thus we want to argue that although some illness narratives can be self-constituting, agents such as Saks who suffer from psychopathology are at best only partially autonomous.

Theorists of autonomy identify two broad sets of conditions necessary for autonomy: competency and authenticity conditions. *Competency* conditions specify the competences and capacities necessary for autonomous reflection. Minimally specified, these include rationality, capacities for self-control, and motivational effectiveness (not being weak-willed, impulsive, or deluded). *Authenticity* conditions specify that, to be autonomous, an agent's desires, beliefs, commitments, and values must be her own, which requires that she has critically evaluated them in some way. There is considerable debate in the literature about how these conditions should be understood. We cannot engage with this debate here. However, we endorse a relational account of both conditions and a historical account of the authenticity condition.[15]

Relational theorists of autonomy argue that notions of authenticity and critical reflection cannot be understood individualistically, as requiring that to be self-determining, autonomous agents must somehow act and reflect free from social influence. Rather, an adequate conception of autonomy must start from a recognition that both the process of reflection and agents' practical identities are shaped by complex, intersecting social determinants and are constituted in the context of interpersonal relationships. John Christman has also

argued that the authenticity conditions for autonomy must be understood historically.[16] Christman proposes that a desire, value, belief, or commitment counts as a person's own if, were she to reflect on the historical process of its formation, she would not repudiate or feel alienated from it. Further, to be autonomous a person must be able to revise desires, beliefs, values, or commitments that she repudiates, or from which she feels alienated, having reflected on the processes by which she acquired them. In terms of the competences necessary for autonomy, relational theorists argue that these are more extensive than the minimally specified capacities outlined above and include complex self-interpretive skills, emotional and interpersonal capacities (for care, empathy, intimacy, and social cooperation), and imaginative capacities.[17] Some relational theorists also propose more substantive constraints on autonomy, such as having certain affective attitudes toward oneself, for example of self-respect, self-esteem, and self-trust.[18]

It should be clear why having a temporally extended self-narrative is necessary for autonomy, so understood. To be autonomous is to be self-determining and self-governing; to be capable of critically reflecting on and evaluating one's psychological motivations, character traits, beliefs, commitments, and values, and acting on the basis of that reflection. The activities of self-interpretation involved in autonomous reflection require that a person conceives of herself as a temporally extended agent who projects herself into the future through her intentions, decisions, and actions, and whose present options, decisions, character, and relations with others have been shaped by her history.[19] This history will include elements with respect to which she is passive—certain features of her embodiment and her genetic inheritance; the social, cultural, and linguistic practices through which her identity has been constituted; her historical and geographical circumstances; non-chosen relationships; contingent events in her life; and so on. It will also include elements that have arisen through the exercise of her agency. As we have seen, a self-narrative is an organizing structure, the "lens," as Schechtman describes it, through which we interpret and make sense of this history and of our future possibilities (Schechtman 1996, 113).

We have argued that the illness narratives of persons such as Saks who suffer from psychopathology can be self-constituting despite their fragmentation if they enable the person to make sense of her history, rather than being caught in a terrifying "stagnant present," and if they restore her sense of herself as an agent, acting for her own reasons, rather than at the behest of uncontrollable, alien forces within herself. The relational approach to autonomy outlined above can help to explain how such agents may exercise some degree of autonomy if, with appropriate medication, psychiatric care, and the assistance of others, they can manage their illness sufficiently to regain a sense of authorship over some aspects of their lives. However, we would argue that while persons

who suffer from a psychopathology such as schizophrenia may be able to exercise what Meyers calls episodic and narrowly programmatic autonomy (Meyers 1989),[20] their capacity to exercise programmatic or global autonomy is seriously compromised by their illness, for a number of reasons.

First, even schizophrenia sufferers who have been able to manage their illness are nevertheless vulnerable to the fact that the illness can resurface, seriously compromising their capacity to exercise authorship over their lives. For example, Saks found programmatic autonomy exceptionally difficult. Even when she was relatively stable and had been awarded two professorial positions, she describes how deciding to get married tipped her into psychosis once more and how programmatic life-decisions remain something she finds challenging, even though she is clearly sufficiently autonomous to make episodic and narrowly programmatic decisions. Second, there will always be significant aspects of the person's self with respect to which she cannot be autonomous and from which she may always feel alienated, even if through an illness narrative she is able to make some sense of these aspects of the self. Third, psychopathology typically impairs many of the emotional and interpersonal competences necessary for autonomy. Finally, psychopathological disorders, and other people's responses to these disorders, can seriously undermine the affective attitudes of self-trust, self-esteem, and self-respect that we think are necessary for autonomy. Appropriate medication and psychiatric care, and supportive relationships, can help rebuild some of these attitudes, but the agent's vulnerability to the illness and its disabling effects are likely to mean that these attitudes remain fragile.

We have argued that Saks's reflections on her illness raise serious questions for Strawson's critique of narrativity and for his notion of the Episodic self. We have also argued that Saks's case, and illness narratives more generally, pose challenges for conceptions of narrative self-constitution, such as Schechtman's, that impose overly stringent coherence constraints on self-constituting narratives. We have urged a twofold strategy to respond to this challenge: first, loosening the coherence constraints on self-constituting narratives and acknowledging that self-narration is a complex process of interpretation and re-interpretation that is neither unified nor complete; second, clearly distinguishing narrative self-constitution from autonomy and acknowledging that while illness narratives may be self-constituting, they may nevertheless enable only partial autonomy.

Notes

Thanks to Peter Menzies, Diana Meyers, Thomas Nys, Beate Roessler, and several anonymous reviewers for this journal for their very helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. Thanks also to participants at the Persons by Convention conference,

University of Sydney, December 2008, for helpful comments on a shorter version of this article.

1. For such critiques of reductionist assumptions in the personal identity debate, see especially Wollheim 1984, Ricoeur 1992, Korsgaard 1996, and Schechtman 1996.

2. The relationship between first-personal self-awareness and third-person self-reference is discussed especially in Ricoeur 1992, Zahavi 2005, and Velleman 2006.

3. The focus on embodiment characterizes narrative theories informed by the phenomenological tradition. See especially Ricoeur 1992 and Zahavi 2005. Zahavi distinguishes between the narrative self and the primordially embodied, pre-reflective, experiential self (Zahavi 2007). He argues that the narrative self presupposes this pre-reflective self; nevertheless, it is the narrative self that enables us to make sense of ourselves as persons.

4. For detailed discussion see especially Ricoeur 1992 and Goldie 2003.

5. Samantha Vice also criticizes narrative views for being committed to the story-telling claim (Vice 2003). John Christman develops a related critique of the form-finding and story-telling claims, arguing that the events and experiences of a person's life do not take the form of neat causal sequences, nor does a life have the teleological structure of a plot (Christman 2004).

6. Jerome Bruner also seems to be committed to these two claims (Bruner 2003).

7. This aspect of Strawson's argument is a response to Wilkes's critique of Strawson's metaphysical conception of the self (Wilkes 1998). Wilkes argues that Strawson's three-second self would not be capable of morally responsible agency or relationships of friendship and love, which presuppose a temporally extended, diachronic self.

8. Recently, Strawson has conceded that there may be an "association between Episodicity and depression or dissociation" (Strawson 2007, 115). This concession seems to be a response to the suggestion that depressed and dissociated patients evidence "Episodicity" and "Diachronic disunity" (see Lampinen, Odegard, and Leding 2004 for a version of this view; see also Kircher and David 2003). However, having made this concession, Strawson goes on to claim that while Episodicity may be a feature of depression and dissociation in Diachronic agents, "the reverse is true in the case of Episodics—in whom greater Diachronicity could be a form of dissociation" (Strawson 2007, 115, n. 45). In the absence of any further argument to support this claim, we do not think it poses a problem for our argument in this paper.

9. This is a term James Phillips uses to describe the sense of time characteristic of schizophrenic experience (Phillips 2003b, 324).

10. For further discussion, see Gallagher 2003, Phillips 2003b, Wells 2003, Woody 2004, and Gallagher 2007.

11. Phillips's analysis draws on Wells's discussion of four patients, each with a different psychopathology (dramatic mood fluctuations, depression and severe anxiety, Dissociative Identity Disorder, and schizophrenia) (Wells 2003).

12. For reconstructive approaches to memory, see, for example, Neisser and Fivush 1994 and Schachter 1996. For related philosophical approaches to memory, see Wollheim 1984 and Schechtman 1994.

13. Schechtman argues that "empathic access" is a necessary condition for personal persistence (Schechtman 2001).

14. This issue is discussed in the feminist literature on both narrative identity and autonomy. See, for example, Meyers 2000 and Nelson 2001.

15. For relational theories see, for example, Meyers 1989, Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000, and Friedman 2003.

16. The historical constraint on authenticity conditions is first articulated in Christman 1991. It is re-articulated as the non-alienation constraint in Christman 2001.

17. For an analysis of the self-interpretive and emotional competences necessary for autonomy, see Meyers 1989. For an analysis of the imaginative competences necessary for autonomy, see Mackenzie 2000.

18. See, for example, Benson 1994, Anderson and Honneth 2005, and Benson 2005.

19. For a more extended discussion of the claim that a temporally extended self-narrative is a necessary condition for autonomy, see Christman 2008.

20. "Episodic" autonomy refers to the capacity to exercise autonomy with respect to a particular action or decision. "Narrowly programmatic" autonomy refers to the capacity to exercise autonomy with respect to a series of actions and decisions. For example, Saks exercises narrowly programmatic autonomy with respect to her academic career and the deadlines she has to meet. "Programmatic" autonomy refers to the capacity to exercise autonomy with respect to a range of long-term life plans and goals.

References

Anderson, Joel, and Axel Honneth. 2005. Autonomy, vulnerability, recognition, and justice. In *Autonomy and the challenges to liberalism: New essays*, ed. John Christman and Joel Anderson. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Benson, Paul. 1994. Free agency and self-worth. *Journal of Philosophy* 91:650–68.

———. 2005. Taking ownership: Authority and voice in autonomous agency. In *Autonomy and the challenges to liberalism: New essays*, ed. John Christman and Joel Anderson. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Bruner, Jerome. 2003. Self-making narratives. In *Autobiographical memory and the construction of a narrative self: Developmental and cultural perspectives*, ed. Robyn Fivush and Catherine A. Haden. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Christman, John. 1991. Autonomy and personal history. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 21:1–24.

———. 2001. Liberalism, autonomy, and self-transformation. *Social Theory and Practice* 27 (2): 185–206.

———. 2004. Narrative unity as a condition of personhood. *Metaphilosophy* 35 (5): 695–713.

———. 2008. Memory, autonomy and practical reason. In *Practical identity and narrative agency*, ed. Kim Atkins and Catriona Mackenzie. London and New York: Routledge.

Dennett, Daniel. 1992. The self as the center of narrative gravity. In *Self and consciousness: Multiple perspectives*, ed. F.S. Kessel, P.M. Cole, and D.L. Johnson. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc.

Friedman, Marilyn. 2003. *Autonomy, gender, politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gallagher, Shaun. 2003. Self-narratives in schizophrenia. In *The self in neuroscience and philosophy*, ed. Tilo Kircher and Anthony David. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2007. Pathologies in narrative structures. In *Narrative and understanding persons*, ed. Daniel Hutto. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Goldie, Peter. 2003. One's remembered past: Narrative thinking, emotion, and the external perspective. *Philosophical Papers* 32 (3): 301–19.

Jones, Karen. 2008. How to change the past. In *Practical identity and narrative agency*, ed. Kim Atkins and Catriona Mackenzie. London and New York: Routledge.

Kircher, Tilo, and Anthony David, eds. 2003. *The self in neuroscience and philosophy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit. In *Creating the kingdom of ends*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 127–49.

Lampinen, James M., Timothy N. Odegard, and Juliana K. Leding. 2004. Diachronic disunity. In *The self and memory*, ed. D. Beike, J. Lampinen, and D. Behrend. New York: Psychology Press.

Lloyd, Genevieve. 1993. *Being in time: Selves and narrators in philosophy and literature*. London: Routledge.

Mackenzie, Catriona. 2000. Imagining oneself otherwise. In *Relational autonomy: Feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency, and the social self*, ed. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mackenzie, Catriona, and Natalie Stoljar, eds. 2000. *Relational autonomy: Feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency, and the social self*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Meyers, Diana T. 1989. *Self, society, and personal choice*. New York: Columbia University Press.

———. 2000. Intersectional identity and the authentic self?: Opposites attract. In *Relational autonomy: Feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency, and the social self*, ed. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar. New York: Oxford University Press.

Neisser, Ulrich, and Robyn Fivush, eds. 1994. *The remembering self: Construction and accuracy in the self-narrative*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Nelson, Hilde Lindemann. 2001. *Damaged identities, narrative repair*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Phillips, James. 2003a. Schizophrenia and the narrative self. In *The self in neuroscience and philosophy*, ed. Tilo Kircher and Anthony David. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2003b. Psychopathology and the narrative self. *Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology* 10 (4): 313–28.

———. 2006. Understanding/explanation. In *The philosophy of psychiatry*, ed. Jennifer Radden. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ricoeur, Paul. 1992. *Oneself as another*, Trans. Kathleen Blamey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rudd, A. 2009. In defence of narrative. *European Journal of Philosophy* 17 (1): 60–75.

Saks, Elyn. 2007. *The centre cannot hold: A memoir of my schizophrenia*. London: Virago Books.

Schachter, Daniel L. 1996. *Searching for memory: The brain, the mind, and the past*. New York: Harper Collins.

Schechtman, Marya. 1994. The truth about memory. *Philosophical Psychology* 7 (1): 3–18.

———. 1996. *The constitution of selves*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

———. 2001. Empathic access: The missing ingredient in personal persistence. *Philosophical Explorations* 2:94–110.

———. 2007. Stories, lives, and basic survival: A refinement and defence of the narrative view. In *Narrative and understanding persons*, ed. Daniel D. Hutto. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Strawson, Galen. 1997. The self. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 4:405–28.

———. 1999. The Self and the SESMET. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 6:99–135.

———. 2004. Against narrativity. *Ratio* 17 (4): 428–52.

———. 2007. Episodic ethics. In *Narrative and understanding persons*, ed. Daniel D. Hutto. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2008. *Real materialism and other essays*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Velleman, J. David. 2006. *Self to self*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Vice, Samantha. 2003. Literature and the narrative self. *Philosophy* 78 (1): 93–108.

Wells, Lloyd A. 2003. Discontinuity in personal narrative: Some perspectives of patients. *Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology* 10 (4): 297–303.

Wilkes 1998. GNOTHE SEAUTON (Know Thyself). *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 5:153–65.

Wollheim, Richard. 1984. *The thread of life*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Woody, J. Melvin. 2004. When narrative fails. *Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology* 10 (4): 329–45.

Zahavi, Dan. 2005. *Subjectivity and selfhood: Investigating the first-person perspective*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

———. 2007. Self and other: The limits of narrative understanding. In *Narrative and understanding persons*, ed. Daniel Hutto. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.