Constructivism, Social Psychology, and Elite Attitude Change: Lessons from an Exhausted Research Program

Mark A. Pollack
Assistant Professor
University of Wisconsin
110 North Hall
1050 Bascom Mall
Madison, WI 53706
e-mail: pollack@polisci.wisc.edu

Paper prepared for presentation at the Conference of Europeanists, Baltimore, MD, 26 February-1 March 1998.

Over the past decade, constructivist students of international relations have argued that "national preferences"--which are generally taken by realists as a function of states' position in the international system, and by liberals as a function of domestic politics--are shaped at least in part by intersubjective, socially constructed norms and understandings at the international level (Wendt 1987, 1992, 1994; Katzenstein 1996). Even more recently, EU scholars such as Wayne Sandholtz have argued that membership in the European Union "matters," in the sense that EU membership becomes a prior factor in states' conceptions of their own preferences (Sandholtz 1993, 1996). In this view, EU membership may, and indeed has, fundamentally altered the nature of international relations by reconstituting nation-states as member states of the Union. Finally, in the past few years, rising scholars in the field of EU studies--including those on presenting research in this panel--have set out to test these constructivist hypotheses using rich and varied studies of COREPER, Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the making of French EU policy (Lewis, Smith, and Parsons, respectively).

The aim of this paper is simply to serve as a sort of prologue--and a warning--to this new generation of empirical researchers. In the paper, I argue that the study of European integration passed through a similar, and largely forgotten, phase some three decades ago, which today's constructivist scholars ignore at their peril. More specifically, I demonstrate how, four decades before constructivist analyses became well known in international relations, students of social psychology predicted that participants in international organizations like the United Nations and the European Community would become socialized into new international roles, and as a result would experience cognitive and affective attitude changes making them more "international" or "European" in outlook. These same predictions and categories of analysis were then adopted by early students of European integration, who predicted a transfer of loyalties to the nascent European Community among the political elites who worked closely with it. In the 1960s and 1970s, these social psychologists and integration theorists undertook a collective, decades-long research program, extensively surverying participants in both global and regional organizations. Yet these scholars, in spite of the range and sophistication of their empirical research methods, found little or no evidence of the predicted attitude changes, and their collective efforts have been largely forgotten by today's students of international relations and European integration.

In this paper, I survey these earlier literatures, searching for theoretical, empirical and methodological lessons for the current generation of constructivist researchers. The paper is divided into three parts. In the first, I examine the early social-psychology and regional integration literatures, in order to examine their hypotheses about elite preference formation and elite attitude change in international organizations like the EU. In the second part, I survey at some length the plethora of studies undertaken in the 1960s and 1970s of elite attitude change as the result of international travel, service in international parliamentary assemblies, and exposure to both the European Community and the United Nations. In doing so, I argue that these studies found little if any evidence of attitude change among participants in international organizations, and that the positive attitudes found among many such participants can be attributed to self-selection rather than socialization in international organizations. Finally, in section three, I very briefly compare the hypotheses and methodologies of constructivist theorists today with the social-psychologists and integration theorists of the 1960s and 1970s, and draw lessons from that earlier literature for students of European integration today.

1. Social Theory and Attitude Change

In this first part of the paper, I survey the four primary theories which, in the 1950s and 1960s, predicted attitude change among political elites as a result of exposure to international experiences, including membership in the European Community. The first section will examine the early social-psychological approach to the study of attitudes, which, although concerned primarily with attitudes

toward other nations and peoples rather than towards international organizations, nevertheless produced a number of influential concepts and methodological approaches. The next three sections deal with the discussion of elite attitudes in three different schools of integration theory--Deutsch's transactionalist or pluralist school, Mitrany's functionalism, and the neofunctionalist school of Haas, Lindberg and others.

1.1 The Social-Psychological Approach

Although seldom specifically concerned with international organizations per se, the field of social psychology produced much of the early theoretical and empirical work on the question of attitudes and behavior toward other nations and, by extension, toward international and supranational organizations. Herbert C. Kelman, one of the pioneers of the approach, provides a useful definition in his introduction to the most influential text of the school:

> Social psychology--which is a subfield of psychology as well as of sociology--is concerned with the intersection between individual behavior and societal-institutional processes... (p. 22) Two interrelated foci for social-psychological conceptualization thus emerge: (a) national and international images; and (b) processes of interaction in international relations." (1966a, p. 24)

Let us consider each of these two foci in turn.

The first aspect of the approach is its emphasis on the "images" an individual holds of her own and other nations, or, more relevant to our purposes, of an international organization. Once again, Kelman provides a useful set of definitions:

> The term image, as used in this volume, refers to the organized representation of an object in an individual's cognitive system... (A)ssociated with the image of the object, would be various specific memories and expectations, various generalized beliefs and opinions regarding the object.... Moreover, images can be characterized in terms of the affect toward the object that they carry--the degree to which the individual tends to approach or avoid, to like or dislike, to favor or oppose this object. This general affective orientation toward an object is what the term <u>attitude</u> usually refers to... (pp. 24-5)

Hence, according to social psychologists, an individual's image of any object, including an international organization, could be broken down into two parts, namely, (a) "the cognitive attributes by which the person understands the object in an intellectual way," and (b) "an affective component, representing a liking or disliking for the focal object" (Scott 1966, p. 72). This distinction between cognitive and affective dimensions of elite attitudes, proved tremendously influential to both integration theorists and empirical students of elite attitude change, as we shall see below.

The second major focus of the social-psychological approach is the attempt to determine the effect of international interaction on the images and attitudes discussed in the previous section, the usual hypothesis being that interaction across national borders would produce images of other nations which were cognitively more <u>complex</u> and affectively more <u>favorable</u> than those which had prevailed prior to the interaction. During the 1950s and 1960s, social-psychological researchers conducted dozens of pioneering empirical studies, including laboratory experiments as well as surveys of students and scholars in exchange programs (for a survey see Mishler, 1966), traveling businessmen (Pool et al. 1956), Peace Corps volunteers, UN experts in the field (Galtung 1966), and representatives to international organizations (Alger 1963). Indeed, as Kelman and others have noted, the distinction between theoretical and empirical work is essentially artificial in a field which relies so heavily on laboratory experimentation

and survey work. The studies by Pool et al. and Alger will be discussed in detail is a later section. The remainder of this section will therefore be devoted to general comments by Scott, Mishler, and Kelman on international interactions and their effects on participant attitudes, and should provide a general impression of the varieties of social-psychological approach, some of which (like Mishler) stress psychological elements, while others stress the sociological or organizational setting of the interactions (Kelman).

Many of the empirical studies of the social-psychological school deal with the experiences of students and scholars in international exchange programs--at least in part because of their easy accessibility to the academic researcher. Anita Mishler provides a useful review of these studies' findings, suggesting that they identify four primary factors antecedent to the trip itself which determine exchange students' interactions with local contacts and any resultant attitude change toward their host countries: "(1) the sojourner's perception of the relative positions of his nation and the host nation; (2) cultural differences between the two countries; (3) the sojourner's commitment to his own country; and (4) the goals with which he comes to the experience." (p. 552) Note here that two of these four factors are exclusively psychological; that none of them is very policy-sensitive, excepting the possibility of recruiting exchange candidates with the appropriate psychological predispositions; and that the emphasis is on the prior psychological state of the individual, rather than on the nature of the international experience.

By contrast, Kelman's own work most often stresses the nature of the international experience itself as the most important determinant of attitude change. Thus, in an early paper, Kelman examined four "international activities"--international communication, exchange of persons, foreign aid projects and cooperative international ventures--to determine the conditions under which these activities would be most likely to foster favorable attitude change toward the "sending" country among nationals of the "recipient" country. Put briefly, Kelman argued that those interactions would be most like to succeed in fostering favorable attitude change which (a) provided genuinely new information about the sending country and its people in (b) the context of a positive and friendly interaction with the people of that country (Kelman, 1962, p. 85).

Finally, Kelman's comments on the development of transnational networks are worth citing at some length, because they reveal an important dichotomy in much of the theory and many of the surveys we will examine below:

> The most important source of the political relevance of international exchange and cooperation, in my opinion, is its contribution to the development of human networks that cut across national boundaries.... These relationships have functional significance for the individuals in the sense that they are directly relevant to their professional interests and the effective performance of their professional roles. Thus, individuals and groups from different countries become committed to international cooperation not as an abstract value, but as a concrete vehicle for carrying out personally important activities and pursuing their intermediate and long-range goals. They become involved in a network of interdependent individuals and groups, without references to national differences, and are likely to develop a sense of loyalty to it. What is crucial here is that this loyalty cut across national lines; it need not be antagonistic to or competitive with national loyalty, but simply independent of it." (Kelman 1966b, p. 575)

In short, Kelman and other social psychologists predicted that, as a result of participation in such international networks, individuals would develop both a greater cognitive knowledge of other countries and international organizations, as well as an affective sense of loyalties to this broader international

community. This general prediction, and categories of cognitive and affective components of individual attitudes, were subsequently adopted by both integration theorists and later empirical researchers, as we shall see presently.

1.2 Transactionalism.

Unlike the social-psychological theorists cited above, the work of Karl Deutsch constitutes an explicit theory of regional integration, which however shares a number of ideas in common with the social-psychological approach. As elsewhere in this paper, I will limit myself to those aspects of the theory relevant to the problem of attitudes and attitude change. In Political Community in the North Atlantic, Deutsch et al. are concerned with the problem of security communities. As they define the term,

> A SECURITY-COMMUNITY is a group of people which has become "integrated."
>
> By INTEGRATION mean the attainment, with a territory, of a "sense of community" and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a "long" time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population.
>
> By SENSE OF COMMUNITY we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of "peaceful change."
>
> By PEACEFUL CHANGE we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force.

Security-communities, therefore, are defined in terms of integration, and integration is defined in terms of a "sense of community." The authors' description of this sense of community, and its development, proceeds inductively from the examination of a number of historical case studies:

> We found that a "sense of community" was much more than simply verbal attachment to any number of similar or identical values. Rather, it was a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of "we-feeling," trust, and consideration; of at least partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of ability to predict each other's behavior and ability to act in accordance with that prediction. In short, it was a matter of perpetual attention, perception of needs, and responsiveness. It was not a condition of static agreement, but a dynamic process--a process of social learning.
>
> This finding brings out the need for constant communication, which is the requirement basic to all the others in this cluster which adds up to "responsiveness." "Peaceful change" does not seem assured without a continuous learning process, together with a continuous process of keeping in touch to prevent unlearning. This means the transmission of messages, personal contact through travel and foreign residence, and the exchange of ideas, goods, and services (p.).

For Deutsch and his coauthors, therefore, "integration" itself was measured in terms of of the attitudes--"we-feeling," "mutual sympathy and loyalties," etc.--held among the relevant populations, which were themselves the result of constant social interactions among the societies of the relevant countries. Finally, Deutch's sense of community would arise organically as a result of horizontal intersocietal transactions, and not as a result of the vertical interaction between individuals and supranational institutions emphasized by David Mitrany.

1.3 Functionalism.

Once again, a full exposition of functionalist integration theory is beyond the scope of this paper, but we can nonetheless provide a brief description of the broad outlines of Mitrany's functionalism, which will lead to a more detailed discussion of the role of attitudes and attitude change in the theory. Like the realist theorists who dominated international relations theory at the time, Mitrany begins with the contrasting reality of political division among nation-states and the possibility of functional cooperation among those states. This distinction between the "political"--understood essentially in terms of the "high politics" of defense and foreign policy--and the "non-political" or "functional" is central to Mitrany's theory. Existing political division could be overcome, not by a frontal political assault against that division, but through a functional approach, "which would rather overlay political divisions with a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and the life of all the nations would gradually be integrated." (1966, p. 38) This web of functional agencies, with structures and memberships determined strictly according to their functions, would serve a dual purpose: It would provide for the new social "needs" which had arisen throughout the world in the wake of the Second World War and which nation-states alone could no longer provide, and it would create patterns of non-political functional cooperation which would gradually mitigate political divisions and tensions.

Central to this process is Mitrany's conception that "functional loyalties" would arise from this experience of international cooperation. "Each of us," he writes, "is in fact a bundle of functional loyalties; so that to build a world community upon such a conception is merely to extend and consolidate it also between national societies and groups." (p. 204) As in Deutsch's theory, then, Mitrany predicts a transfer of loyalties from a national level to a higher, central, level. The mechanism, however, is quite different: Whereas Deutsch predicted the development of a horizontal, inter-societal sense of mutual loyalty among peoples as the result of constant interaction, Mitrany predicts a gradual change in vertical, institutional loyalties from national-political governments to international-functional agencies. As Charles Pentland notes, this view implies a certain view of human nature and the sources of loyalty:

> The simple proposition underlying functionalist theories of integration is that men's loyalties focus naturally on those institutions which gratify their basic material and social needs. Linked to this are two further assumptions. One is that political loyalties can be "fractionated" (or divided between the national and supranational levels)...
>
> The second assumption, closely related to the first, is that since political attitudes are primarily rational and instrumental, to change men's loyalties really means to change their expectations as to where material satisfaction is to be found. Political attitudes, then, are almost entirely cognitive; the emotional components are taken to be small, secondary, and atavistic (p).

As we shall see in the next section, this rather cool conception of loyalty as following the provision of material services was taken up explicitly by Haas' neofunctionalism.

Mitrany also discusses in greater detail than Deutsch the role of national elites in this process. For our purposes, two points deserve mention. First, national technical elites, unlike mass publics, are brought together by functional cooperation and thus have the direct experience of working together with their international counterparts to solve common problems, and this experience may be expected "helps to develop a healthy international sense among those national civil services" (p. 135). In a similar vein, Mitrany also refers to the tendency of the functional method "to breed a new conscience in all those concerned with international activities" (p. 79).

A second point regarding elites is that this "new conscience" should be strongest among the international civil service, which should act in the common interest away from national political

influence, and among international assemblies. Mitrany implies furthermore that this international sense will arise partly from the experience of cooperation itself, and in part from selective recruitment: for example, Mitrany argues, "A fair European consciousness has been achieved at Strasbourg by the simple device of keeping the anti-Europeans out." (p. 197) This conception of selective recruiting for internationalist attitudes, or of self-selection in recruitment, will recur throughout the discussion below, and will present us with the persistent problem of differentiating the effects of attitude change from that of selective recruitment for certain types of attitudes.

1.4 Neofunctionalism.

Like Mitrany and Deutsch, Ernst Haas' neofunctionalist theory defines political integration in terms of political community, i.e. as the transfer of expectations, demands and loyalties from national governments to a new decision-making center:

> "The process of attaining this condition among nation-states we call integration, the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new and larger center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states." (Haas 1961, p. 230)

A number of features, however, distinguish Haas' neofunctinalism from both Mitrany's functionalism and Deutsch's transactionalist analysis. First, unlike Mitrany, Haas makes no distinction between functional and political organizations, recognizing instead a pattern of pluralist interest-group politics operating even in nominally non-political organizations. Second, like Mitrany but unlike Deutsch, Haas stresses the importance of central political institutions, which may act as a magnet for the transfer of expectations, demands and loyalties. Third, Haas' conception of loyalty is similar to that of Mitrany, in that people are assumed to direct their loyalties toward the political institutions which meet their demands and expectations:

> A population may be said to be loyal to a set of symbols and institutions when it habitually and predictably over long periods obeys the injunctions of their authority and turns to them for the satisfaction of important expectations.... (Haas 1958, p. 3) Implied in this development is a proportional diminution of loyalty to and expectations from the former separate national governments.
>
> Shifts in the focus of loyalty need not necessarily imply the immediate repudiation of the national state or government. Multiple loyalties have been empirically demonstrated to exist, either because no conflict is involved or because the political actor manages psychologically to ignore or sublimate a conflict even if it does exist `objectively.' In fact, some psychologists suggest that... new loyalties... grow haphazardly in their function as intermediary means to some ultimate end, perhaps the same end also fought for in the context of the established national loyalties. Groups and individuals uncertain of their ability to realise political or economic values in the national framework may thus turn to supranational agencies and procedures, without being attracted by `Europeanism' as such (p. 14).

Transfers of loyalty, in other words, will be instrumental and piecemeal. Fourth, and for our purposes most important, Haas, although a pluralist, regards national elites--interest groups, political parties, and governments--as the relevant actors in international integration, and it is among these elites that Haas

looks for attitude change. Regarding public opinion, Haas argues that

> It is as impracticable as it is unnecessary to have recourse to general public opinion and attitude surveys, or even to surveys of specific interested groups, such as business or labor. It suffices to single out and define the political elites in the participating countries, to study their reactions to integration and to assess changes in attitude on their part. In our scheme of integration, `elites' are the leaders of all relevant political groups who habitually participate in the making of public decisions, whether as policy-makers in government, as lobbyists or as spokesmen of political parties. The include the spokesmen of organized labour, higher civil servants, and active politicians.
>
> The emphasis on elites in the study of integration derives its justification from the bureaucratized nature of European organizations of long standing, in which basic decisions are made by the leadership, sometimes over the opposition and usually over the indifference of the general membership (Haas 1958, p. 17).

As a pluralist, however, Haas insists on looking at the importance of all three elite groups, rather than simply, say, governmental elites.

In this context, the attitude changes predicted by the theory--the transfer of expectations, demands, loyalties--have a three-fold importance. First, and most obviously, they provide the substance and the measure of integration itself, since central political institutions are unlikely to succeed and supplant the nation-state if national elites do not work with them and comply with their regulations. Second, the development of these new attitudes also engenders a certain type of decision-making style within the Community's Council of Ministers, which Haas refers to as "upgrading the Common interest," and which Leon Lindberg (1965) calls the "Community code." Third, and perhaps most importantly, the transfer of demands, expectations and loyalties is one of the primary motors of the dynamic process of further integration, which Haas refers to as "sectoral spillover."

It goes without saying that Haas' own ideas about European integration changed over time, and that other neofunctionalist theorists put forward different predictions based on different theoretical approaches and assumptions. Once again, a complete survey is beyond the scope of this paper, but the work of Leon Lindberg is worth particular attention. Lindberg's early work, like that of Haas, stressed the political socialization of participants in the EC policy process, leading to the development of a "systems attitude" or "community-mindedness" among national civil servants and members of the European Parliament (1963, p. 84; 1965, p. 203; 1966).

In Lindberg's later work, however, the discussion of attitudes and attitude change becomes more discriminating, informed largely by David Easton's systems theory. In their detailed examination of support for the European Community, Lindberg and Scheingold disaggregate the concept of support in terms of two theoretical distinctions. The first distinction, between "identitive" and "systemic" support, attempts to distinguish between the inter-societal ties emphasized by Deutsch and the institutional loyalties emphasized by Mitrany and Haas. The second distinction, between utilitarian and affective support, attempts to distinguish support "based on some perceived and relatively concrete interest" from support "which seems to indicate a diffuse and perhaps emotional response to some of the vague ideals embodied in the notion of European unity." (p. 40)

Having disaggregated the concept of support, Lindberg and Scheingold apply the concept not only to elites but to mass publics as well, testing the various dimensions of public support through poll and other statistical data. Testing their two-by-two matrix of support types--affective-identitive, utilitarian-identitive, utilitarian-systemic and affective-systemic--among public opinion, Lindberg and Scheingold produce two primary findings. First, utilitarian support for the Community was generally

greater than affective support, and systemic support greater than identitive support. As Pentland succinctly summarized these results, "the leading edge of attitude change seems to lie in individuals' cognitions about the sources of benefits in the system, rather than in their emotions toward the system or each other" (p. 127). Lindberg and Scheingold's second finding is that European public opinion about the Community can be regarded as a "permissive consensus," in which public support, although widespread, is not intensely held and is based on little substantive knowledge of the Community and its institutions and policies. Like Haas, therefore, they return to an elitist view of the integration process:

> Policy-making initiatives come from official and nongovernmental elites and authoritative decisions are the province of Community institutions. The support available tends simply to establish parameters for this decision-making process, but it is the institutions that are the real engines of the Community system...

Summing up this section, it is clear that neofunctionalists differ in their specification of the attitudes in question, but agree in general that elite attitude change is likely in response to participation in the EC system, and indeed that such attitude changes are a central cause of the integration process. Regarding the type of attitudes predicted, Haas clearly suggests that the operation of central institutions will lead to a shift of demands, expectations and (thereby) loyalties from the national to the central or federal level. By contrast, Lindberg and Scheingold disaggregate Haas' "demands, expectations and loyalties" into a number of discrete dimensions, but in the end they too conclude that attitudes of increased support are and will be determined largely by individual's rational, self-interested assessment of the policy outputs of Community institutions. This is true of both elites and mass publics, but for the most part neofunctionalists concentrate on the latter, on the assumption that the Community's constituency is a narrowly confined elite group. Regarding the mechanism of attitude change among these elites, we find both references to socialization into a certain Community "code" as a result of prolonged experience of cooperation.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that the basic hypotheses of neofunctionalist theorists bear a striking similarity, an owe an intellectual debt, to social psychologists such as Kelman and Scott. All of these theorists, regardless of their empirical interests, focused on the attitudes of political elites; all of them disaggregated attitudes into cognitive and affective dimensions; and all of them predicted that the attitudes of political elites would become more favorable toward international organizations as a result of participation in those organizations.

2. Previous Studies of Elite Attitude Change

Thus far we have cited a number of hypotheses generated by social-psychological theory, by regional integration theory, and by theories of bureaucracy and organizations, regarding the attitudes of national officials toward international organizations. Fortunately, there have also been a number of systematic surveys of national elite attitudes towards international organizations, many of which were undertaken specifically to test the social-psychological, functional and neofunctional theories we have just reviewed. The following sections will review this literature in some detail, both to analyze the substantive findings of these studies--which as we shall see are not unambiguous--and to identify some of the major methodological problems encountered by previous researchers, and their efforts to solve these problems. We begin, however, with a brief note on research designs.

2.0 A note on research designs

With the exception of a single case study (Matecki), all the studies cited below use one of two

basic research designs, which merit a brief discussion here. The most common research design for elite attitude studies, and in many ways the easiest to administer, is the cross-sectional, or what Campbell and Stanley (1966) refer to as the "static-group comparison,... a design in which a group which has experienced X is compared with one which has not, for the purpose of establishing the effect of X. (p. 12) In such a design, one measures a given dependent variable or outcome O: If the value of O differs between the two groups, the difference is ascribed to the effect of X. In many of the studies cited below, stimulus X is exposure to or participation in the activities of a foreign country or an international organization, and outcome O represents the attitudes of individuals toward those countries or organizations. If the group which has participated in international activities demonstrates different attitudes from those who have not, the observed differences are typically attributed to the effects of participation.

Such cross-sectional designs have a number of advantages in terms of ease of application, but they also present a number of problems, according to Campbell and Stanley, since they provide

> ...no formal means of certifying that the groups would have been equivalent had it not been for X.... If O1 and O2 differ, this different could well have come about through the differential recruitment of persons making up the groups: the groups might have differed anyway, without the occurrence of X... particularly in those instances in which the persons in the "experimental groups" have sought out exposure to the X (p. 12).

In short, because the static-group comparison is not a "true" experiment, we cannot confidently control for variables other than X which might be the actual causes of the observed outcomes. Among these possible other variables, selective recruitment and self-selection in recruitment are among the most troubling, and the most difficult to control for.

Surprisingly, many of the cross-sectional studies cited below make no effort to control for self-selection. Bonham and Kerr, however, make diligent and ingenious attempts to control for self-selection, and conclude that such selection does indeed take place and that much of the observed variation between the "experimental" and "control" groups disappears when controls are applied to the data. I shall describe their control mechanisms in more detail in the relevant section below. When no mention is made of recruitment or self-selection, this can usually be taken to mean that no such control was attempted.

The second major type of study undertaken is the "before-and-after" study, which Campbell and Stanley consider a type of "quasi-experiment," which measures outcome O for a given individual both before the application of stimulus X (the pre-test), and once again after the stimulus (the post-test). In the studies cited below, this typically means measuring individual attitudes before participation in an international organization, and once again after participation. Any differences in the respodent's attitudes are attributed to the effect of participation in the organization. Such a design is still not a "true" experiment in Campbell and Stanley's terms, since it is always possible that other stimuli may have coincided with the individual's participation, but confidence in the causal role of participation is nevertheless enhanced relative to the static-group comparison design.

Regarding self-selection, we may note that a before-and-after study does not in and of itself control for self-selection, because the test group may well consist of self-selected individuals who were more (or less) likely to experience the observed changes in attitude as a result of participation. However, Gareau's research design, described below, combines a before-and-after measure of a test group with another measure of a control group, and Gareau finds that his test group differed considerably from the control group, even before the test group's exposure to the participation--that they were, in other words, self-selecting.

The primary problem with before-and-after studies, of course, is the logistical and financial

difficulty of following a test group across any significant period of time. We therefore find that all of the before-and-after studies cited below survey delegates to international parliamentary assemblies, whose relatively short duration simplifies the act of taking before-and-after measurements. The use of parliamentarians may also provide a useful post-hoc set of measurements through recorded votes or speeches, which can be used by the researcher to reconstruct before-and-after attitudes many years after the original stimulus. Civil servants, unfortunately, possess neither of these advantages, serving typically for long stretches in contact with international organizations, and leaving no "paper trail" of public votes or speeches. It is not surprising, therefore, that the few existing studies of national civil servants are all static-group comparisons--and this dissertation will be no exception.

2.1 Early studies: From national exchanges to international organizations.

By and large, the studies generated by the social-psychological school attempted to determine the effect of international activities of all sorts--educational exchange programs, foreign travel, foreign aid programs, etc.--on the attitudes of the participants. Most of these studies, however, attempted to measure participant attitudes toward other states (usually the state in which one lived or with whose nationals one interacted), rather than with international organizations or international cooperation per se. The general tenor of such studies was suggested in section 1.1 above, so in this section I will limit myself to a much-cited study of businessmen by Pool et al., before moving on to the pioneering studies of participation in international organizations by Matecki, Alger, and Jacobson.

The study by Pool et al. of the effect of foreign travel on American businessmen is of interest both substantively, since their results seemed to belie facile notions that well-traveled businessmen would adopt internationalist or cosmopolitan ideas, and historically for its influence on later studies. The authors conducted systematic interviews with 903 American businessmen, asking them about the extent of their foreign travels and their attitudes on various political questions so as to determine the effect of extensive travel on political attitudes. The research design, therefore, is cross-sectional: the stimulus is foreign travel, and the outcome is political attitudes, as measured by the respondents' views on U.S. tariff policy.

Surprisingly, when they asked the respondents about tariff policies, the authors found no increase in free-trade liberalism at the expense of protectionism, but rather a convergence of attitudes toward the mean: "Extensive travel does not make businessmen in general adopt a more liberal attitude towards foreign trade. Rather, each group modifies its original stand: the protectionists become less protectionist while the liberal traders become less extreme in their view too. Those who travel extensively come to resemble each other...." (p. 165)

The authors explain this convergence, and the lack of any "internationalist" direction in the responses, in terms of the new roles into which foreign travel places businessmen, and the new, broader, reference groups they encounter there:

> A plausible explanation of these data would be that travel introduces international-political problems and America's relationship to them into the businessman's frame of reference. He plays at being Secretary of State for the country, not his firm... (167) In summary: travel did seem to broaden, to expand the businessman's range of awareness as regards economic and political matters. However, it did this not by liberalizing as such but by forcing the traveler into a new role, by orienting him to a new reference group... (173)

Regarding the last point, note that this new, enlarged reference group is nevertheless a domestic group, the American business community. Well-traveled businessmen become broader in their considerations,

but not cosmopolitan. We shall see this same pattern--convergence of extreme views, explained by increased attention to a domestic reference group--in several UN studies cited below.

In addition, the authors note that although foreign travel has little net effect on the political attitudes (since the net effect of convergence is small or zero), the arguments put forward by well-traveled businessmen tend to feature more international considerations than those put forward by non-traveling businessmen. They conclude that "travel is related to breadth of perspective far more than to any substantive conclusion." (171) This would seem to be an example of what Scott (1966) would later call cognitive attitude change.

Another much-cited work, and to my knowledge the first empirical study to claim that contact with international organization produces favorable attitudes toward the organization and toward international cooperation, is B.E. Matecki's (1957) case study of the establishment of the International Finance Corporation. Relying primarily on informal interviews with U.S. representatives to the United Nations and on archival research, Matecki finds "profound changes that the personal contact of members of the United States delegations to international institutions has wrought in their thinking and outlook." (p. 143) American representatives' participation, he argues, "imparted a sympathetic attitude to the problem of economic development... to those who previously had not had such an attitude. It also reinforced such sympathetic feelings among those who had not had them before." Matecki argues further that these officials then prevailed upon their superiors in Washington to change U.S. policy toward the IFC. In short, he finds not only attitude change, but demonstrates that, for this specific case, these changes made a direct difference to policy outcomes.

Unfortunately, Matecki's single case study provides no systematic data on attitudes, and as with any single case study there remains the possibility that this case is idiosyncratic. Finally, we may note that the attitudes Matecki discusses have more to do with questions of economic development than with support for international cooperation or an international organization per se. Matecki's study is therefore suggestive, but by no means definitive proof of socialization in international organizations.

Chadwick Alger's pioneering study of attitude change among national delegates to the United Nations General Assembly in 1959 attempted to establish Matecki's point through systemic survey interviewing. Alger and a colleague interviewed some 25 first-time delegates from 25 member states before their participation in UN activities, and again two months later, in order to test a number of broad propositions about the effects of participation on delegates' attitudes and behavior. Alger hypothesizes that participation in the United Nations changes: (1) notions about how the United Nations actually operates, (2) notions about how the United Nations should operate, (3) attitudes on particular issues, (4) attitudes toward particular nations. Finally, he further predicts that participation in UN activities influences (5) the subsequent behavior of the participants as well.

Alger's before-and-after study demonstrates both the strengths and the limitations of this research design. On the one hand, the use of longitudinal data allows Alger to trace the increase in cognitive knowledge of the UN for each respondent in some detail, leaving little doubt that cognitive learning about the organization did take place. There was also an impressive increase in suggestions for procedural reform in the General Assembly between the two tests. Scott's "cognitive attitude change," in other words, clearly did take place.

On the other hand, the remarkable ignorance of delegates about the UN in the pre-test limits the comparability of the before-and-after results. Many of Alger's questions, for example, are issue-specific--but only a small minority in the pre-test identified any single issue of interest to them. Furthermore, even respondents who could identify an issue of importance were often unable or unwilling to identify states which they expected to oppose them on this issue--thereby drastically limiting Alger's ability to measure changes in attitude toward particular nations. A total of 13 citations of opponents were made among all the respondents in the pre-test, increasing to only 20 in the post-test (newly cited opponents included the

U.S., the United Kingdom, Arabs, Israelis, East and new nations, and the UN Secretariat). From these rather weak findings apparently comes Alger's often-cited conclusion that

> Participation in the United Nations changes the delegate's affective map of the world--i.e. alters his designation of which nations are the `good guys' and which are the `bad guys.' (p. 425)

In short, Alger's test of a rather small sample points strongly to the cognitive learning suggested by Scott, but the evidence of affective change regarding issues, nations, and the organization itself are at best weakly supported, as is the claim that these changed attitudes had any effect on subsequent behavior.

Jacobson's (1967) study of delegates to three international assemblies--the International Telegraph Union, the International Labor Organization, and the World Health Organization--does not explicitly set out to test theory, but is clearly relevant to our purposes. Like Alger, Jacobson surveys delegates to international assemblies, but his research design is a static- group comparison, with first-time delegates serving as the control group and experienced delegates as the test group. Biographical data collected on both groups reveals no obvious demographic differences, although the possibility remains that return delegates were self-selecting. And whereas Alger used personal interviews as his instrument of measurement, Jacobson sent out over 1,000 questionnaires to delegates at each of the three assemblies. Unfortunately, response rates varied from only 10% for the ILO sample to a maximum of 16% for the ITU sample, decreasing confidence in the data.

Jacobson measures a number of attitudes, including support for strengthening the authority of the organization, view of the secretariat, and the importance of the organization to one's own state. Only among the ITU delegates does he distinguish any significant differences between first-time and experienced delegates. The differences are interesting, and not particularly positive: experienced delegates were <u>less</u> likely too consider the ITU as very important to their state, and considerably <u>more</u> likely to view the ITU secretariat as biased. From these findings, Jacobson concludes that "increased familiarity beings increased sophistication," in other words, cognitive change. As with Alger, however, he finds no sign of increased support for the organization among experienced delegates. If anything, the finding that experienced delegates consider the ITU less important to their state than the first-time delegates might be interpreted to suggest the opposite.

2.2 Parliamentary Assemblies and Self-Selection

In the early 1970s, several scholars turned to delegates to European parliamentary assemblies such as the European Parliament, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the Nordic Council, in order to test hypotheses about elite attitude change as a result of international experience. Observers had long noted the tendency of European Parliament delegates to be self-selecting for pro-integrationist views. As Haas observed of the ECSC Common Assembly,

> ...very few, if any, individual members were persuaded to the federalist creed as a result of their work in Strasbourg. With the exception of perhaps fifteen members, the bulk was more or less in favour of integration before they ever took up their international mandate (Haas 1958, p. 437, quoted in Kerr 1973, p. 55).

Given this anecdotal evidence of self-selection of international parliamentary deputies, researchers studying attitude change in the European Parliament and other assemblies were forced to devise a number of quite sophisticated methods for controlling for self-selection and selective recruitment.

In one early study, Bonham (1970) interviewed some 84 Swedish, Norwegian and Danish

national parliamentarians, to test the hypothesis that experience in international parliamentary assemblies leads to more favorable attitudes toward European integration. The research design is cross-sectional, with test groups consisting of 21 parliamentary delegates to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, 21 delegates to the Nordic Council assembly, and a control group of 45 parliamentarians who had attended no international parliamentary meetings. Each respondent was then interviewed and attitudes measured along 4 indices measuring support for EEC membership, European unification, Nordic integration, and support for the Nordic Council.

Bonham's findings were initially quite suprising. On all four indices, the Consultative Assembly delegates scored the highest, but the Nordic Council group scored lower than the control group. Inexplicably, experience with the Consultative Assembly seemed to foster positive attitudes, while experience in the Nordic Council correlated with negative attitudes by comparison with the control group. In an effort to solve this puzzle, Bonham examined the recruitment process. He first examined biographical data on each of the various groups, finding that the Nordic Council participants tended to be older than members of the other two groups. Next, he looked at responses to a question asking each respondent why she had been chosen as a delegate. Seventy-two percent of the Consultative Assembly group responded that they were chosen because of an interest in Europe, while a majority of the Nordic Council group were clearly party recruits, chosen because of their senior positions in their respective parties (this also explains their tendency to be older). Clearly, therefore, recruitment processes differed for delegates to the two organizations, with Consultative Assembly delegates tending to be self-recruits and Nordic Council delegates party-recruits. Finally, Bonham asked each respondent in what ways, if any, her participation had affected her outlook on European affairs. Only 11% indicated that their experiences had had any affect on their views at all. His conclusion:

> The results of this research do not support the hypothesis that participation in international assemblies alters the attitudes of the delegates. For both the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Nordic Council, no relationship between attitudes and participation could be inferred. Delegates to the Consultative Assembly supported political integration more strongly than non-participants, but it is likely that this difference was a consequence of their more favorable initial attitude towards integration than their experiences in the Assembly. Delegates to the Nordic Council were less positive toward political integration than were non-participants, but this was discovered to be the result of age differences between the delegates and the other parliamentarians. Hence, in Scandinavia, recruitment, rather than participation, is a better explanation for the attitudes held by those who participate in regional assemblies (pp. 335-36).

Henry H. Kerr's (1973) study of French and German delegates to the European Parliament encountered similar problems, and his controls for self-selection are even more elaborate than Bonham's. Kerr predicted two types of attitude change resulting from participation in the EP, following Scott: cognitive change, as MEPs' "cognitions of European integration may become more complex and differentiated as a result of this experience," and affective change, i.e. increased support for integration. His research design, like Bonham's, was cross-sectional, including a test group of 29 German and 24 French MEPs, and a control group of 73 randomly drawn national legislators who had never been members of any international parliamentary assembly.

Kerr employs three independent controls for self-selection, which merit description at some length here. First, Kerr argues that "if the magnitude of effects increases with the length of membership in the test group, then it is likely that these effects are the results of participation and not self-selection....

Thus, length of membership is a major independent variable." (p.56-7) Kerr seems to have overlooked, however, the possibility of selective exiting, by which those delegates who stay on for multiple terms as MEPs (as opposed to those who leave after a single or a few terms) are self-selecting for the certain kinds of views, usually pro-integration. If so, then length of membership might also be explicable in terms of self-selection, and the usefulness of this first control called into question.

Kerr's second control relates more directly to the question of recruitment. Kerr asked each respondent in the test group (i.e. the MEPs) how and why she was nominated to the parliament, and divided his responses into volunteers or self-recruits (60%) on the one hand, and non-volunteers or party-recruits (40%) on the other. If attitudes resulted from self-selection, Kerr argues, we should expect the volunteers to demonstrate the most favorable attitudes, and the non-volunteers to demonstrate attitudes comparable to those of the test group. If, on the other hand, attitudes were the result of participation, we should expect both self-recruits and party-recruits to show significantly more favorable attitudes than the control group.

Third, within the control group, Kerr asked each respondent whether she was interested in being nominated to the European Parliament. Those who gave affirmative responses were termed potential volunteers, those who gave negative responses, non-volunteers. Kerr's findings showed that the potential-volunteer group was considerably more interested in the Parliament's activities than the non-volunteer group, as we might expect of self-selected respondents. Using these sub-groups within each of the control and test groups, Kerr was then able to make useful comparisons between the self-recruits (test group) and the potential volunteers (control group), on the one hand, and the party-recruits (test group) and non-volunteers (control group) on the other. If self-selection were responsible for change, the results for each pairing should be similar, whereas if participation were responsible, we should expect the MEP subgroups to demonstrate more favorable attitudes than the corresponding control subgroups which hadn't been exposed the EP stimulus.

Using these controls for self-selection, Kerr then asked each respondent more than 20 questions about their positions regarding political and economic union, the role of the Commission, direct election of MEPs, and so on. A factor analysis of the responses revealed five distinct dimensions underlying the responses: (1) democratic reform of EEC institutions, (2) economic integration, (3) creation of a common defense force, (4) external relations of the Community, and (5) political unification. Constructing indices for each of these dimensions, Kerr then correlated the responses with EP membership, and found that in the areas of political unification, common external policy and democratic reform, non-Gaullist members of the EP were considerably more positive than their counterparts in national legislatures.

After controlling for self-selection, however, such differences in support virtually disappeared. Levels of support were nearly identical for self-recruits and potential volunteers, on the one hand, and for party-recruits and non-volunteers on the other, suggesting that the greater aggregate support for integration among MEPs is due entirely to self-selection. Furthermore, when length of membership was tabulated against support, only a weak, statistically insignificant increase could be detected. Like Bonham, therefore, Kerr concludes that EP membership does not lead to greater affective support for European integration, but he does find some cognitive change, in terms of members' increased knowledge of Community institutions and their increased reliance on international sources of information. Finally, Kerr determines the correlation coefficients of party affiliation, age, length of membership, and degree of voluntarism to all five measures of support. The latter three show no significant correlation, but party membership emerges as a powerful predictor of support.

Finally, Feld and Wildgen's (1975b) study of national legislators, despite the lack of any controls for self-selection, offers some interesting insights into parliamentarian's views of the EC and European integration. Feld and Wildgen interviewed a weighted sample of 82 national legislators from nine Community member states, of whom 18 had served as members of the European Parliament, to determine

(a) the effect of EP membership on attitudes (b) the effect of material benefits from integration on attitudes, and (c) politicization or electoral importance of EC issues.

All 18 MEPs were asked whether their experience had changed their views, and nine, or one-half, responded affirmatively. Only four, however, said their views had changed in a more "European" direction. Support for the socialization hypothesis is therefore, once again, weak. Among the larger sample of national legislators, the authors found that material gains from unification were rare, and that the perceived electoral importance of European unification was low, suggesting that national parliamentarians above all are the "losers" from the process of European integration, by contrast with national civil servants, who may be more active participants in the EC policy process.

2.3 National Civil Servants and the EC

Clearly, the most relevant studies for our purposes are those dealing directly with national civil servants' attitudes toward the European Community. Unfortunately, the few studies that exist are not among the most methodologically sophisticated, and their results are at best ambiguous. All these studies use the static-group comparison design, and none utilizes controls for self-selection except Smith's study of EC Commission officials.

The earliest study of which I am aware is Feld and Scheinman's (1972) preliminary survey of 23 national and Commission civil servants, who were interviewed to test the hypothesis that both secondment to the Commission and bureaucratic interpenetration contribute to a socialization process leading bureaucrats to favor European integration. The respondents were asked directly about their willingness to transfer national competences to the Commission. Not surprisingly, Scheinman and Feld found that over half of the respondents opposed any transfer of competence to the Commission. Those who supported such transfers usually considered that integration would have little impact on the allocation of bureaucratic activity in the near future--i.e., that integration would not threaten their own positions. Although not surprising, this finding does confirm the basic intergovernmentalist intuition that national officials' interest in bureaucratic survival will lead them to oppose the direct transfer of their own responsibilities to Brussels. It is, however, a rather blunt measuring instrument, and may conceal measures of support short of transfers of sovereignty.

In response the the Feld-Scheinman article, Keith A. Smith (1973) presents data he had collected from interviews with 36 Dutch former Commission officials to study whether participation in the Eurocracy leads to (a) socialization and (b) multiple and conflicting loyalties. Unlike Feld and Scheinman, however, Smith did employ some controls for self-selection. He asked each respondent two relevant questions: (1) her reason for working in the Communities, and (2) how she was recruited into the Commission. He found that a majority of respondents was indeed self-selecting for "Europeanism." Regarding socialization, therefore, Smith found that any socialization took the form, not of "Europeanization"--the respondents were already good Europeans upon recruitment--but rather increased "realism" about the prospects of integration in the near future. Regarding loyalties, Smith found that his Dutch Eurocrats did indeed possess multiple loyalties--which are unfortunately not ranked--but that the respondents perceived no conflict between their Dutch and European loyalties, largely because they saw the interests of the Netherlands and the Community as closely interlinked.

Feld and Wildgen's (1975a) study of national high civil servants is the largest and most ambitious such study to date, comprising interviews with 82 respondents from all nine member states (and the West German Länder) to test the hypothesis that administrative elites in national governments resist European political integration. They therefore asked each respondent about her attitudes toward European integration, as measured by two different questions: One question asked whether the current scope and level of integration was adequate or inadequate, in the respondent's view, and the other asked about her support for political, economic, and monetary union, respectively. These results were then correlated

with a number of independent variables, including (a) nationality, (b) demographic information, notably age and education, and (c) bureaucratic environment, which included both participation in Community activites and career concerns.

Answers to these questions revealed a polarization of opinion between supporters of political union on the one hand, and supporters of economic and monetary union on the other. Although not mutually exclusive, support did seem to cluster around one or the other of these poles, with a majority of respondents against political union. Regarding the correlates of support for political union, the authors found that such support varied negatively with participation in EC working groups, positively with age, and negatively with a feeling that integration threatens one's own position. This last finding is no suprise, but the first two are suprising. The finding of a slightly negative correlation between support and participation, of course, directly contradicts the functionalist and neofunctionalist hypothesis.

The most recent study of national officials in the EC of which I am aware is Pendergast's (1976) survey of 24 officials from the French and Italian Permanent Representations to the Community in Brussels, in an attempt to test the neofunctionalist "socialization" hypothesis. Despite his restrictively small sample size, Pendergast's study is quite sophisticated, disaggregating attitudes into five separate dimensions: (1) a normative "support" dimension, (2) an idealism/realism dimension, (3) an "optimism" dimension, (4) a cognitive dimension, and (5) an institutional preference dimension (i.e. support for European union, abolition of the Council veto and direct election of the European Parliament). Against these attitudes he correlates a number of independent variables, including (a) nationality, (b) frequency of interaction, (c) duration of tenure, (d) age, (e), ministerial affiliation, and (f) quality of the experience as rewarding or disappointing. Pendergast does not control directly for self-selection, but he does include a question asking respondents to assess their own change in attitudes, if any.

Pendergast's findings show strong support along the cognitive and realism dimensions: 85% of respondents said they were more realistic as a result of their experience, and 100% claimed to be more knowledgeable. Some 58% said they were more pessimistic about the prospects for European union. Regarding institutional preferences, simple majorities supported European union, abolition of the Council veto and EP direct election. The primary hypothesis, however--that participation would lead to increased support for integration--is not supported by the data. Eighty percent of the participants reported no change in their support for integration, while 10% were more supportive and the other 10% less so. As in the case of Smith's findings, however, this may also reflect self-selection for the Brussels post, in which case the lack of change would be due, not to the inefficacy of the socialization process, but to the fact that it was "wasted" on the "already-converted."

Correlating with other independent, or control, variables proved difficult, since the small sample size of Pendergast's study provided little variation, and very few cases in each cell even where variation did occur. Nationality emerges as an obvious factor, with the Italians more likely to support European union, but other important variables--such as quality of experience and frequency and duration of participation--showed too little variation to account for any observed variation. In short, Pendergast's findings suggest the neutral effect of participation, but his small sample size precludes speculation as to the other possible determinants of respondent attitudes.

Once again, therefore, the most solid results of the studies cited in this section are also the least interesting: Both Smith and Pendergast suggest that civil servants become more knowledgeable and more realistic as a result of their experience, and Feld and Wildgen demonstrate that a large majority of respondents oppose the transfer of competences to the Commission in such a way as to endanger their own positions. None of the authors report significant increases in support for integration as a response to participation, and Feld and Wildgen's data suggest a slightly negative response.

2.4 UN Studies

The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a proliferation of UN studies, which utilized a wide variety of research designs and measuring instruments to determine the attitudes of national officials at the UN, and the effect of UN participation on those attitudes. The results are, once again, ambiguous, but the greater methodological sophistication of these studies, and the multidimensional nature of the attitudes measured, begin to offer some clues about the nature of participant attitudes and the determinants of those attitudes.

For example, both Riggs (1977) and Karns (1977) study Congressional delegates to meetings of the UN General Assembly to determine the effect of participation on attitudes. Both utilize a befofe-and-after study, but with different instruments of measurement. Riggs (1977) conducted a before-and-after content analyses of speeches appearing in the Congressional Record of 43 Representatives and Senators who had served as U.S. delegates to the General Assembly between 1950 and 1971. Coders were instructed to measure both frequency of references to the UN (to measure cognitive change) and to code whether the references were favorable, neutral, or unfavorable (to measure affective changes in support). Results, although not overwhelming, are positive on both measures:

> At the cognitive level, Congressmen tend to pay more attention to the UN than before. The majority also experience positive change in affect toward the UN. In addition, the data provide evidence of convergence toward a mean value as participants initially holding the more extreme views (positive or negative) generally express more moderate opinions as a result of the UN experience. (p.)

This finding of convergence of extreme views towards a mean recalls Smith's comments about increased realism. That is, skeptics do indeed show some favorable attitude change, but self-selecting pro-integrationists may simultaneously become more realistic or less supportive as a result of experience. It therefore seems that the effects of participation are not unidirectional, but depend on the prior attitudes of respondents.

Karns conducts a similar before-and-after study of U.S. Congressional delegates to the General Assembly, using as his instrument of measurement foreign-policy roll-call votes, which are classified according to an internationalism-isolationism index. (Karns is therefore testing internationalist attitudes, rather than UN support per se.) Analyzing the results, he finds only a very slight positive change towards internationalism overall. Breaking down the sample into subgroups based on previous voting record, party and ideology, however, he finds once again a pattern of convergence, with both Democratic and Republican isolationists becoming more internationalist, while Republican internationalists become more isolationist (Democratic internationalists show no significant change). Karns explains this partisan pattern of responses, not in terms of increased realism, but in terms of cognitive dissonance theory, which would predict that in response to the stimulus of participation, participants reorient their views upon their return to resemble the views of their domestic reference group, i.e. their party. Thus extreme Republican views are moderated at both ends, while Democratic isolationists are drawn further toward the internationalist norm of the party. Regardless of whether we accept Karns' explanation of these data, the finding of convergence is once again signficant, suggesting that the effect of participation on the attitudes of an individual depends largely on the individual's prior attitudes. Put simply, participation appears to moderate extreme attitudes at both extremes.

Confusingly, however, Gareau (1977) obtains quite different results using a very similar research design, which examines the voting patterns of 38 Senators and Representatives who had served as UN delegates. His findings are three-fold, and all interesting. First, he finds that the means scores of UN delegates actually declined somewhat after their experience, in direct contradiction to Karns' results. This difference is difficult to interpret confidently, although it may be due to the fact that Karns measured

internationalist attitudes, whereas Gareau measures attitudes toward the UN itself. It may therefore be that both results are valid, and participation produces more internationalist attitudes, but less favorable attitudes toward the UN as an organization. Gareau's second finding is that UN delegates from both Houses scored 10-15 points higher in their UN voting records than their non-participating colleagues, both before and after their UN service. Compared to non-participating Congressmen, therefore, UN delegates are clearly self-selecting for favorable views of the UN. Those favorable views do not, however, become more favorable as a result of participation. Third, Gareau finds a significant temporal difference in the results, whereby the earlier (pre-1960) delegates improved their scores by an average of six points, while post-1960 delegates' voting scores declined by an average of 5.8 points after UN service. The implication of this finding--surprisingly ignored by several subsequent studies--is that the nature of the UN experience matters and that in fact the nature of the experience changed for the worse, from the perspective of Western participants, in the years around 1960. Put simply, the United Nations General Assembly became for U.S. delegates in the late 1960s and early 1970s the "dangerous place" described by Daniel Patrick Moynihan in his memoirs. As Third World delegates became both more numerous and more aggressive in pursuing a New International Economic Order, the nature of the experience for U.S. delegates accordingly declined. In short, the UN of the 1970s seems a bizarre place to look for the positive effects of socialization on Western delegates, a point to keep in mind as we review the rest of the UN studies.

Riggs (1978), in response to Gareau's article, employs two independent measures of attitudes in an attempt to account for the differences between the positive findings of his own study and the null findings of Gareau's. For the same group of Congressional delegates, that is, he uses a similar, but somewhat broader, set of roll-call votes, as well as the content analysis of speeches from his earlier study. Like Gareau, Riggs finds that a majority of delegates demonstrate less favorable voting patterns after UN service than before it, contradicting both the functionalist hypothesis and his own content-analysis data.

This poses a substantive and methodological puzzle: Why does a content analysis show positive attitude change, while analysis of voting patterns shows negative change? Riggs offers two possible explanations. The first is the difference in time span, since his content analysis is carried out for only one year after UN service for each delegate, while the voting analysis is cumulative over the period 1950-1971. The observed difference may therefore mean that positive attitude change is short-lived, and is therefore captured by the year-after data, but not by long-term voting patterns. Riggs' second explanation is that voting is a rather blunt, binary measure of support, and more importantly that other factors besides attitudes, such as pressure from party groups or from constituencies, enter into the voting decisions of Representatives and Senators. In short, he speculates that even if positive attitude changes are lasting, they may not translate directly into legislative behavior, which is determined at least in part by other considerations. In any event, Riggs is quite correct in pointing to the multidimensional nature of elite attitudes and the importance of multidimensional measures of those attitudes, and his own work after this paper moves in that direction.

The same cannot be said, unfortunately, of Ernst's (1978) study of 37 UN General Assembly delegates, each of whom was asked to evaluate the UN along a "feeling thermometer" on which a score of zero represents strong dislike and a score of 100 strong liking for the object in question. Armed with this rather crude measure, Ernst attempts to test the familiar functionalist hypothesis that length of service with the organization leads to positive attitudes, and a second hypothesis that persons who play formal roles within an organization, such as the chairman, vice-chairman or rapporteur of a General Assembly committee, will develop more favorable attitudes as a result of this role-playing. His findings are negative for the first hypothesis, but positive for the second, since the roles of both chair and vice-chair correlat positively with evaluation.

Ernst's findings can be criticized, however, on at least two counts. First, as already mentioned,

his measure of respondents' evaluation is a rather crude measure of like or dislike, and tells us little about the specific preferences or grievances of the respondents. Second, Ernst utilizes no controls for self-selection whatsoever. Yet it may be--indeed it seems likely--that chairmen and vice-chairmen of committees are chosen largely for their pre-existing favorable views toward the organization. Thus, it is quite likely that Ernst's positive findings on attitude change are in fact the result of self-selection.

By contrast with Ernst, the study by Riggs and Mykletun (1979), and follow-up studies by Riggs (1980a, 1980b, 1981), constitute the most ambitious effort to test the functionalist prediction that particpation in international organization activities leads to favorable attitude change. The authors regard the UN as a "critical case," since as a "political" organization it is less likely to foster attitude change than purely "functional" organization. If positive attitude change is found in such a political organization, they argue, other more purely functional agencies probably foster the same types of changes.

The sample population, which included both civil servants and legislators of two different countries, Norway and the United States, was surveyed by mailed questionnaire. Response rates were excellent for the Norwegian sample, somewhat less so for the American sample. Participation in UN activities is measured in two ways: one question about the percentage of the respondent's work-time devoted to international organization activities, and a second question about the number of UN meetings attended. A third question asks whether the respondents' previous position also involved an international organization--a rather bizarre way to measure duration of exposure.

Riggs and Mykletun conceptually disaggregate attitudes into three components: (1) generally favorable attitudes toward the organization, (2) willingness to have one's government take steps toward further international coooperation, and (3) willingness to have portions of national sovereignty transfered to international organizations. Each of the first two components is measured by multiple questions, the third by a single question.

Following Kerr, they employ three controls for self-selection. First, they measure both the magnitude and duration of exposure, reasoning as did Kerr that if favorable attitudes increase with exposure, the result can be attributed to the experience and not to self-selection. Second, they conduct a general study of the recruitment process in each country, arguing that in the case of Norway at least self-selection of delegates is "minimal," although it is somewhat more common in the U.S. However, as we shall see presently, the observed differences in attitude are also minimal, thus the Norwegian data may well be the result of self-selection. No effort was made to measure self-selection directly in the questionnaires for the Norwegian delegates. Third, and most effectively, they include an item on the questionnaire sent to U.S. Congressmen reading, "I would welcome an appointment to serve as a U.S. delegate to a session of the UN General Assembly." This is roughly equivalent to Kerr's use of potential volunteers in his EP study.

Riggs and Mykletun's results lend little support to the functionalist hypotheses they set out to test. For both countries and for both groups, the correlation between participation (as measured by both work-time and number of meetings) and their three measures of support was generally quite weak, and the strongest correlations directly contradict the functionalist hypothesis. On the first measure, general evaluation of the UN, both American and Norwegian groups showed a very slight positive correlation, as predicted by theory. On the second measure, the Norwegian respondents demonstrated a significant positive correlation, but U.S. respondents showed a mild negative correlation. The difference may be explicable in terms of the traditional Scandinavian emphasis on foreign aid, which was emphasized heavily in the questions for this measure. On the third measure, however, regarding transfer of sovereignty, both Norwegian and especially American respondents showed a strong negative correlation between participation and support for transfer of sovereignty: Put simply, the greater their experience with the UN, the less willing respondents were to transfer national sovereignty to the organization.

How do we explain these results, which are rather discouraging from the standpoint of

functionalist theory? Riggs and Mykletun offer several observations. First, they point out, correctly, that participation in UN activities is only one of many determinants of attitudes toward the United Nations, with party affiliation the most evident. The impact of participation, even if real, need not be exaggerated. Second, they reemphasize that attitudes are multidimensional, and that different dimensions appear to respond differently to the stimulus of participation. That is to say, something in the respondents' experience led them to be slightly more supportive of the organization as a whole, but also less willing to transfer sovereignty to the organization. Thirdly, they again point out that the UN, as a "political" organization, was the least favorable organization on which to test the functionalist hypothesis, which might therefore accurately predict attitudes in other organizations.

Finally, they cite a number of factors which, while not included in the questionnaire, might account for the results--and more particularly for the variation in responses among individuals. First, they discuss the interests of the individual respondent and her governmental unit:

> Inferences from the questionnaire data, supplemented by extensive personal interviews, suggest that attitudinal differences are intimately related to individual perceptions of where self-interest lies. `Interest' in this case may mean personal interests of the respondent, but it also includes interests of the governmental unit or sub-unit with which he identifies, and the interests of his country as a whole. Specifically, we found evidence that attitudinal response to participation in international organization varied with the norms and goals of the domestic organizational unit, the perceived effectiveness of the international agency, and the substantive nature of the function it performed.... Differences associated with the respondent's organizational unit give substantial support to Allison's maxim, developed in the context of intergovernmental bureaucratic politics, "Where you stand depends on where you sit." (p. 170)

Second, they point to the effectiveness of the international agency, including most notably the perceived quality and competence of the secretariat, and the intrusion of politics into the work of the organization. "Usually the reference to `politics' meant organizational catering to the demands of lesser developed countries." Here they acknowledge, obliquely, that the UN is a doubly critical case, since the organization is not only political, but was at the time of the survey (1974) subject to an unprecedented and highly confrontational effort by the LDCs to use their numerical superiority to push an agenda through the General Assembly over the opposition of the developed states. Given the historical context, the unwillingness of developed states such as Norway and the U.S. to support transfers of sovereignty to the organization is understandable. Third and finally, they point to the effect of pre-existing attitudes:

> To the extent that participants in European regional assemblies are recruited by self-selection, they are likely to have a high opinion of European integration. In that event, the convergence effect found by Pool, by Keller and Bauer, by Karns, and in our own study of U.S. Congressmen, could explain the absence of a significant increase in support for integration among the Kerr and Bonham interviewees (p. 174).

Note that there are two claims being made here. One is that the lack of net change among participants in most studies may be due to the fact that they are self-selected and are therefore unlikely to become more supportive. The second, more subtle, point is that if participants are overwhelmingly self-selecting--as they are in the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly--then these participants may become less favorable (more realistic, etc.), thus masking an otherwise real improvement in attitudes among other participants. In short, the U.S. delegates are a triply unfavorable sample since they are attending (1) a

political organization, (2) at a time of unprecedented conflict, and (3) the respondents' own initial attitudes had essentially nowhere to go but down. A different sample--of non-self-selected delegates to an efficient, functional organization--might have shown quite different results.

In a few follow-up studies, Riggs addresses three important issues suggested by the previous study: (1) the effect of level of the level of national economic development on attitudes; (2) the importance of the political/functional distinction for attitude change; and (3) the importance of governmental subunit. Let us consider each in turn.

In a 1981 study, Riggs sent a questionnaire similar to the one used in the U.S.-Norway study to a sample of Guatemalan civil servants from four different ministries to determine the effect of economic development on attitudes. Using the same techniques (but no controls for self-selection), Riggs finds that level of development appears to make little difference: Guatemalan respondents were no more favorable to the UN than Norwegian respondents, except on two development-related items. Once again, he finds only a weak correlation between participation and favorable attitudes among Guatemalan respondents.

In two other studies (1980a, 1980b), Riggs measures the attitudes of American civil servants toward specifically "functional" agencies, including the World Health Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Food and Agricultural Organization, using questions adapted from the UN studies. With the exception of the FAO (see below), participants in all these organizations demonstrate mixed responses strikingly similar to those of the UN participants of the earlier study. As in the earlier study, age and education also fail to show any significant correlation with support. Riggs argues that these findings support the neofunctionalist critique of Mitrany's theory, and particularly the failure of functionalist theory "to cope with the hard fact of politicization in functional agencies." The weakness of the theoretical distinction between functional and political is thus reflected in the empirical fact that political and functional agencies appear to have similar--or similarly minimal--effects on participant attitudes.

As noted above, however, the FAO respondents presented an exception to this general pattern (Riggs 1980b). Initial results indicated that the attitudes of American civil servants toward the FAO were <u>less</u> favorable than those toward the UN, directly contradicting the functionalist hypothesis. Breaking down the respondents by administrative unit, however, Riggs discovered that unusually negative attitudes toward the FAO were registered in a single organizational unit within the USDA, the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). If these respondents were left out, the differences between the two organizations largely disappear.

This left the intriguing question of why FAS respondents were so overwhelmingly negative toward the FAO. The answer, according to Riggs, was not hard to find:

> Personal interviews with USDA officials revealed a rather broad consensus on the matter. The organizational mission of the FAS has been conceived primarily in terms of promoting the export of U.S. agricultural commodities. At best, FAO is seen as irrelevant to this process. More typically, the FAO is perceived as assisting foreign agriculture (through technical assistance and related programs) to compete more effectively with U.S. exports... The "FAO as competitor" view is held by many FAS officials and is also prevalent among the private interest groups with which the FAS is regularly in contact." (327-28)

A non-FAS respondent made the point more bluntly:

> FAS has more of an anti-international organization bias. We recognize they are negative on some things AID and FAO are trying to do. They work with vested interest groups--

cotton, tobacco, etc.--who think we're giving competition to them. (328)

Here, Riggs demonstrates, both statistically and with rich personal interviews, that one's attitude toward an international organization depends not only on experience and one's ministry or sector, but on the organizational subunit within a given sector. Not all USDA officials have the same organizational goals, and their views toward international organizations differ accordingly.

Finally, Peck's study of socialization of Permanent Representatives to the UN is methodologically one of the most interesting of the studies. Peck's research design is essentially a static-group comparison of a relatively small number (47) of respondents with no control for self-selection, but Peck introduces three new methodological elements in his study, all of which enhance his results and his interpretation of them.

First, Peck's conceptualization and operationalization of respondent attitudes is unusually complex, and his results, if ambiguous, are correspondingly rich. In a long interview schedule, Peck attempts to measure three different sets of attitudes: (1) images of world politics, (2) supranationalism, and (3) role orientation. For our purposes the second and third are most interesting, so let us examine each for a moment.

Regarding supranationalism, Peck correctly argues that support for supranational organizations is multidimensional. To find its components, he turns to factor analysis to derive three separate components of supranationalism: (a) UN support, i.e. general support for the organization; (b) UN expansionism, i.e. support for expanding scope and magnitude of UN activities; and (c) economic support nationalism, i.e., support for economic aid programs and organizational independence. The first two components are self-explanatory, and the distinction between general support and support of expansion of activities seems useful. The third component groups together support for economic aid programs and financial independence of the UN. Here, it seems to me, Peck goes wrong by using a strictly inductive category which neither he nor the original researchers can adequately explain. In fact, it seems likely that this component measures a desire among LDC representatives to increase economic aid while decreasing Western donor nations' control over revenues, an interpretation supported by the fact that this component increases with UN tenure among LDC delegates, but not among western delegates (p. 374). Nevertheless, the disaggregation of supranationalism proves useful in Peck's results.

Regarding role orientation, Peck once again disaggregates the concept into three components, guided this time by sociological theories of "latent roles": (a) the delegate's career orientation, i.e. her expectation of a further career with either her UN mission or the UN secretariat; (b) her reference group orientation, whether predominantly national or UN-oriented, and (c) her goal identification. The aim here is to measure whether increased tenure leads delegates to pursue (a) a career in the UN, with (b) increased importance of (b) supranational UN reference groups and (c) UN goals.

Second, in discussing his findings, Peck disaggregates his sample into two sub-groups: Western industrial nations on the one hand, and LDCs on the other. He finds that the two groups differ starkly in the degree and kind of supranationalism they display. Among western respondents, tenure at the United Nations correlates with both frustration at UN ineffectiveness (a negative finding) and a greater willingness to see reforms such as a more active Secretary General (a positive finding). He finds, however, no increased support for either UN expansionism or economic support supranationalism. In short, the Western delegates show a mixed response of frustration along with a desire to see the organization reformed and strengthened. Among LDC respondents, on the other hand, increased tenure shows little or no correlation with general UN support. On the second and third components, LDC respondents demonstrate increased support for economic aid programs and economic support nationalism, but also an increased protectiveness of the nation-state and opposition to UN autonomy. Once again, the responses demonstrate an unanticipated mix of support and opposition, which Peck interprets (correctly in

my view) as a tendency for LDC representatives increasingly to view the UN above all as a forum for pressing national demands.

Regarding role orientation, Peck finds no discernible change in primary reference group among any of the respondents: All respondents indicated that their reputations with their own national governments remained of paramount importance, and other reference groups seemed to be valued primarily for their usefulness in carrying out national policy--a disappointing finding for functionalist and neofunctionalist theory.

Third and finally, Peck addresses not only the problem of self-selection in recruitment, but also of "selective exiting," the presumed tendency of dissatisfied or anti-UN officials to quit their posts at a greater rate than other officials. If such selective exiting does indeed take place, Peck admits, a cross-sectional analysis may mistake attrition of unfavorable officials for socialization of officials as a result of their UN experience. Curiously, but ingeniously, Peck suggests that such selective exiting does indeed call into question any positive correlation between tenure and support for the UN, but that negative findings would be relatively unaffected (or even strengthened) by selective exiting.

2.5 Discussion

Thus far in Section 2, I have reviewed several dozen empirical studies, all of which tested for attitude change among governmental elites who participated in international organizations. The findings of these various studies have been diverse and often contradictory, as have their methods, and any summary is therefore difficult. Nevertheless, this section offers a few general points regarding substantive findings and methods, respectively.

2.5.1 Substantive Findings

The studies I have reviewed above agree on two basic points. First, all studies which attempted to measure cognitive change found that, indeed, officials participating in the activities of international organizations learned about, or became "more realistic" about, those organizations. As Peck (p. 366) notes, however, this finding, if the best supported in the literature, is also the least interesting.

At the other extreme of attitude change, transfer of loyalties, only Smith found any suggestion of multiple loyalties, among Dutch Commission officials, and his respondents were not asked to rank the two sets of loyalties. Peck's study, by contrast, suggests that the national reference group retains overwhelming importance to national representatives to the United Nations. None of the other studies cited found any evidence of such transfers of loyalty from the national to the supranational level.

Between cognitive change and loyalty, however, lie a number of affective attitudes toward international organizations, their activities, and the extension of their scope and authority. It is these attitudes which are most relevant to the theories examined above, and it is with regard to these attitudes that the results cited above are most ambiguous. For most of the studies, the hypothesized independent variable was participation in international organizations, which was expected to produce more favorable attitudes toward those organizations. The results of these studies, however, were generally weak, and contradictory. As we have seen above, some studies have detected favorable attitude change (Alger; Riggs and Mykletun on general evaluation), while other studies have shown convergence toward a mean (Pool et al. 1956; Karns; Riggs 1977), no net effect (Bonham; Kerr; Smith; Pendergast; Ernst), or a net negative effect (Feld and Wildgen 1975a; Gareau; Riggs and Mykletun on transfer of sovereignty). Taken together, therefore, the dozens of studies on elite attitude change undertaken between the 1960s and the early 1980s provide no support for the view that national officials become socialized into international norms, and thus adopt attitudes more favorable to international organizations.

Besides this negative finding, however, the studies also suggest a number of factors that might explain variation in elite attitudes toward international organizations. I mention four in particular, very

briefly:

* **Self-selection for pre-existing attitudes.** A number of the studies mentioned above point to the importance of pre-existing attitudes as a key determinant of the effects of attitude change. Thus, both Karns and Riggs suggest that both extremely favorable and extremely unfavorable views are moderated by experience; and Smith and others suggest that the tendency to self-selection in certain organizations (the EC Commission, the European Parliament, the U.S. delegation to the UN, etc.) may minimize the effect of participation by creating a "control group" with disproportionately favorable prior attitudes that are therefore likely to change either not at all or in the direction of less favorable attitudes.

* **Party affiliation.** Several studies, including Kerr and Riggs and Mykletun, have found party affilation to be a strong predictor of attitudes among parliamentarians, and in most cases a stronger predictor than the presence or absence of participation. Karns goes even further, arguing that parties are an important intermediate variable determining the ultimate effect of participation, since it is the attitudes of the domestic reference group which ultimately determine the post-participation attitudes of the participants. No studies appear to have asked similar questions about the party affiliations of civil servants.

* **The IO itself, and the period in its history.** In theory, as Riggs and Mykletun note, the nature and the efficiency of the IO itself might be expected to affect the attitudes of participants toward the organization. Thus those authors see the UN as a particularly unfavorable candidate for attitude change because of its evident politicization. In fact, however, none of the organizations surveyed above appears to have been particularly conducive to the development of favorable attitudes. The UN studies show both positive and negative attitude change, while the EC studies show either no change or a slightly negative change in the case of Feld and Wildgen. It remains possible, however, that other periods in EU and UN history might be more amenable to positive attitude change among national participants.

* **Nationality.** Unfortunately, many of the studies mentioned above survey respondents from a single country, or as in Feld and Wildgen's case from several countries but with a sample too small to detect systematic differences. The study by Riggs and Mykletun, however, points to more favorable attitudes among Norwegian than among U.S. respondents, and Pendergast finds some differences between French and Italian members of their respective Permanent Representations in Brussels. In each case, however, the authors provide only speculation as to why nationality might matter--be it political culture, level of socioeconomic development, specific national interests, or some other factors.

* **Bureaucratic or ministerial interest.** Once again, only a few of the studies surveyed above made an effort to include systematic variation across various ministries and/or bureaucratic sub-units, while others (e.g. Feld and Wildgen 1975a) included too many different ministries in too small a sample to establish any systematic correlations. Using mail questionnaires, however, Riggs and Mykletun and Rigg's later studies did obtain substantial variation across departments and departmental sub-units. The first study did

not find any substantial effects of bureaucratic interest on behavior, but Riggs' (1981b) study of USDA civil servants' attitudes toward the FAO reveals a glaring example of a group of respondents reacting negatively toward an international organization which they regard to be at cross-purposes with their own department or sug-unit. In theory, we can also imagine that strong agreement between ministerial/bureaucratic goals and the goals of the international organization will lead to increased support for the organization in that ministry or bureau.

In sum, while the various studies reviewed here suggest little or no support for the socialization hypothesis, they do suggest some additional hypotheses about other determinants of elite attitudes towards IOs, including party affiliation, the nature of the IO, the nationality of the individual, the nature of her governmental unit, and the possibility of self-selection or selective recruitment of individuals with specific pre-existing attitudes toward international organizations.

2.5.2. Methodological Issues

In this section, finally, I survey the various approaches to four important methodological questions--the disaggregation of attitudes, the measurement of attitudes, the choice of research design, and the effort to control for self-selection, in an effort to derive some lessons for future studies.

* **Defining--and disaggregating--attitudes.** Some of the studies examined above define and measure attitudes with blunt imprecision, as in the case of Ernst's "feeling thermometer," while others disaggregate elite attitudes into various components, such as Scott's distinction between cognitive and affective attitude change, or the detailed, policy-specific questions that Peck posed to his subjects. Generally speaking, the strongest and most interesting results appear to be those of the scholars who disaggregate attitudes into multiple components--and measure with with care.

* **Measuring attitudes.** Even if we take the conceptualization and operationalization of attitudes as a given, it is possible that the large variety of instruments used to measure these attitudes account for the observed differences in results. Among the studies we have reviewed, researchers have used interviews (Alger, Kerr, Feld and Scheinman, Smith, Feld and Wildgen, Pendergast, Ernst), mailed questionnaires (Galtung, Jacobson, Riggs, Riggs and Mykletun), voting analyses (Gareau, Riggs 1978), and content analyses of speeches (Riggs, 1977). Looking across the various studies, what is most striking is that none of the above methods appears to produce striking evidence of elite attitude change. With regard to interview and survey methods, however, it is worth noting that the wording of specific questions is vitally important, so that the various questions actually measure the attitudes that the researchers wish to examine. This is particular problem in Riggs and Mykleton's UN study, but arises in other studies as well.

* **Research design: Dynamic/longitudinal vs. static/cross-sectional studies.** Given the obvious difficulties of longitudinal (before-and-after) studies, most of the studies cited above have used a static group comparison, or cross-sectional research design. Alger (1963), however, did carry out before-and-after interviews, and other longitudinal studies were carried out using before-and-after voting patterns (Karns, Gareau, Riggs 1978), and content analyses of speeches in the Congressional Record (Riggs 1977). Once again, the most striking finding is that neither research design has produced strong evidence of elite

attitude change, and that both designs have produced conflicting results across and even within studies.

*** Selective recruiting, selective exiting, and self-selection.** In the course of the literature review, I have discussed three distinct phenomena that might affect the outcomes of elite attitude studies: (1) selecting recruiting, in which those in charge of recruiting officials to serve at an international organization select recruits according to certain criteria; (2) self-selection in recruiting, which can in turn be thought of as a subset of selective recruitment; and (3) selective exiting, in which certain types of officials are removed from or quit their posts at a greater rate than other types of officials. Selective recruiting, and especially self-selection in recruiting, seem quite common, according to the studies, in the EC Commission (Smith), the European Parliament (Kerr), the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (Bonham), and the UN General Assembly (Gareau, Riggs and Mykletun). Whether national civil servants are self-selecting for IO-related national positions has not been established by previous studies, but given the evidence of self-selection in other positions, it is at least possible, and controls on self-selection therefore seem advisable.

The importance of controlling for self-selection is made evident by several of the studies. For example, Kerr's initial findings suggested a significant positive impact of EP participation on delegate attitudes, but, controlling for self-selection, he found the relation to be spurious: initial positive attitudes seemed to determine membership in the EP, rather than vice-versa. Other studies (Bonham, Smith, Karns, Riggs, Peck) also find that self-selection or selective recruitment to international organizations is commonplace, and suggest that attitude change among such actors may even be negative, since extreme internationalist views are moderated by the frustrations of everyday dealings with international organizations.

The studies cited above have devised at least six methods of controlling for self-selection in a cross-sectional study, listed here from least to most effective:

1. Controlling for demographic data among the respondents, to determine whether a certain demographic type is selectively recruited to the organization.
2. Post-hoc studies of the recruitment process.
3. The use of direct questions asking respondents to characterize their own changes in attitude as a result of participation.
4. Use of longitudinal research designs which allow the researcher to measure before-and-after attitudes without regard to the nature of the recruitment process.
5. The use of direct questions about recruitment to the test group of participants.
6. The use of direct questions to both test and control groups asking whether they would be interested in a position working more closely with international organizations, to test for "voluntarism" among both groups.

Summing up, the various studies surveyed above suggest a number of methodological lessons for future studies, including the importance of disaggregating and carefully measuring attitudes, and in particular the importance of controlling for self-selection among elite participants in international organizations.

3. Conclusions

At this point, the constructivist--or at least the patient constructivist who has made it this far--may

ask, "So what? The social psychologists and integration theorists of the 1960s and 1970s may indeed have failed to find affective attitude changes in the EU and the UN, but this has little if any bearing on the constructivist research program of the 1990s. Constructivism, unlike social psychology, is interested less in whether individual participants `like' or `dislike' the European Union, than in the nature of the intersubjective norms and understandings fostered by the EU, and the ways in which those norms and understandings reshape the national preferences of the member states. Furthermore, the methodologies of the two approaches are also different, with social psychologists relying heavily on surveys of individual participants, while constructivists tend to rely on other methodologies such as case studies, narratives, and discourse analyses to determine the nature and effects of intersubjective understandings. Thus the failure of the earlier research program in no way prejudices the contemporary resarch program of constructivists."

To a certain extent, I would agree with this view. The theoretical approach of constructivism is indeed distinct from that of social psychologists, particularly in its focus on EU norms and the ways in which those norms reshape identities and interests--regardless of whether one "likes" the European Union or not. And the methodologies employed by the two shools are indeed different.

Nevertheless, the weakness of the social-psychology findings of the 1960s and 1970s suggests that constructivists should proceed with considerable methodological caution. Constructivist scholars of the European Union are, after all, making extraordinary claims about the constitutive effect of EU norms to literally remake EU member states and their preferences. To the extent that these claims are justified, we would expect to see <u>some</u> changes in the cognitive and affective attitudes of individuals who make up those member states--and yet the studies mentioned above found little or no evidence of such change. Thus, if they want to test rather than simply assert their hypotheses, it is vitally important that, within their respective methodological traditions, constructivists make a careful effort to:

* construct falsifiable hypotheses about the conditions under which EU norms might lead to changes in national interests and identities;

* specify with precision their notion of national preferences (just as earlier scholars specified and disaggregated "attitudes"), and operationalize and measure these preferences with equal precision; and finally,

* pay particular attention to the effects of self-selection that might otherwise convey the false impression that the EU does indeed shape national officials in its own image.

This is, of course, a tall theoretical and methodological order, but it is one that offers the promise of demonstrating--even to diehard rationalists--the ability of European norms to transform nation-states into member-states.

References

Adler, Emanuel, 1997. "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," <u>European Journal of International Relations</u>, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 319-363.

Alger, Chadwick F., 1963. "United Nations Participation as a Learning Experience," <u>Public Opinion Quarterly</u>, vol. 27, no. 3 (Fall), pp. 411-426.

Alger, Chadwick F., 1966. "Personal Contact in Inter-governmental Organizations," in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston), pp. 523-47.

Bonham, G. Matthew, 1970. "Participation in Regional Parliamentary Assemblies: Effects on Attitudes of Scandinavian Parliamentarians," Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 8, no. 4 (June), pp. 325-336.

Campbell, Donald T. and Stanley, Julian C., 1966. Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally).

Deutsch, Karl W. et al., 1957. Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Deutsch, Karl W. et al., 1967. France, Germany and the Western Alliance (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons).

Ernst, Manfred, 1978. "Attitudes of Diplomats at the United Nations: The Effects of Organizational Participation on the Evaluation of the Organization," International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn), pp. 1037-44.

Feld, W.J., and Wildgen, J.K, 1975a. "National Administrative Elites and European Integration: Saboteurs at Work?" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. XIII, No. 3 (March), pp. 244-65.

Feld, Werner J., and Wildgen, John K., 1975b. "Electoral Ambitions and European Integration," IO, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Spring), pp. 447-468.

Feld, Werner J., and Wildgen, John K., 1976. Domestic Political Realities and European Unification: A Study of Mass Publics and Elites in the European Community Countries (Boulder: Westview Press).

Galtung, Ingrid Eide, 1966. "The Status of the Technical Assistance Expert: A Study of UN Experts in Latin America," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 3, pp. 359-79.

Gareau, Frederick H., 1978. "Congressional Representatives to the UN General Assembly: `Corruption' by Foreign Gentry," Orbis, Vol. 21 (Fall), ppp. 701-24.

Haas, Ernst B., 1958. The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

Haas, Ersnt B., 1961. "International Integration: The European and Universal Process," International Organization (Summer); reprinted in Dale J. Hekius, Charles G. McClintock and Arthur L. Burns, eds., International Security (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), pp. 229-60 (page citations are from the 1964 version.

Inglehart, Ronald, 1967. "An End to European Integration?" American Political Science Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (March), pp. 91-105.

Jacobson, Harold K., 1967. "Deriving Data from Delegates to International Assemblies," International Organization, vol. 21, no. 3 (Summer), pp. 592-613.

Karns, David A., 1977. "The Effect of Interparliamentary Meetings on the Foreign Policy Attitudes of United States Congressmen," International Organization, vol. 31, no. 3 (Summer), pp. 497-513.

Katzenstein, Peter J., ed., 1996. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press).

Kelman, Herbert C., 1962. "Changing Attitudes through International Activities," Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 67-87.

Kelman, Herbert C., 1966a. "Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations: Definition of Scope," in Kelman, ed., International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston), pp. 3-39.

Kelman, Herbert C., 1966b. "Social-Psychological Approaches to Study of International Relations: The Questions of Relevance," in Kelman, ed., International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston), pp. 565-607.

Kerr, Henry H., 1973. "Changing Attitudes Though International Participation: European Parliamentarians and Integration," International Organization, vol. 27, no. 1 (Winter), pp. 45-83.

Lindberg, Leon, N., 1963. The Political Dynamics of European Integration ().

Lindberg, Leon N., 1965. "Decision Making and Integration in the European Community," in International Political Communities, reprinted from International Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter).

Lindberg, Leon N., 1966. "The Role of the European Parliament in an Emerging European Community," in Elke Frank, ed., Lawyers in a Changing World (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall), pp. 101-28.

Lindberg, Leon N., and Scheingold, Stuart A., 1970. Europe's Would-Be Polity (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall).

Matecki, B.E., 1957. Establishment of the International Finance Corporation and United States Policy: A Case Study in International Organization (New York: Praeger).

Mishler, Anita, 1966. "Personal Contact in International Exchanges," in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston), pp. 550-61.

Mitrany, David, 1966. A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quandrangle Books).

Peck, Richard, 1979. "Socialization of Permanent Representatives in the United Nations: Some Evidence," International Organization, Vol. 33 (Summer), pp. 365-90.

Pendergast, William R., 1976. "Roles and Attitudes of French and Italian Delegates to the European Community," International Organization, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Autumn), pp. 669-77.

Pentland, Charles, 1973. International Theory and European Integration (New York: The Free Press, 1973).

Pool, Ithiel de Sola, Keller, Suzanne, and Bauer, Raymond, 1956. "The Influence of Foreign Travel on Political Attitudes of American Businessmen," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 20 (Spring).

Putnam, Robert D., 1982. "Comment," Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 90-91.

Riggs, Robert E., 1977. "One Small Step for Functionalism: UN Participation and Congressional Attitude Change," International Organization, vol. 31, no. 3 (Summer), pp. 515-39.

Riggs, Robert E., 1978. "More on `Corruption' by Foreign Gentry," Orbis, Vol. 22 (Fall), pp. 737-45.

Riggs, Robert E., and Mykletun, I. Jostein, 1979. Beyond Functionalism: Attitudes toward International Organization in Norway and the United States (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979).

Riggs, Robert E., 1980a. "The Bank, the IMF and WHO: More Data on Functionalist Learning," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24 (June), pp. 513-44.

Riggs, Robert E., 1980b. "The FAO and the USDA: Implications for Functionalist Learning," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 33 (September), pp. 314-29.

Riggs, Robert E., 1981. "Civil Servant Attitudes Toward the U.N. in Guatemala, Norway, and the United States," International Organization, vol. 35, no. 2 (Spring), pp. 395-405.

Sandholtz, Wayne, 1993. "Choosing union: monetary politics and Maastricht," International Organization, Vol. 47 (Winter), pp. 1-39.

Sandholtz, Wayne, 1996.

Scheinman, Lawrence, and Feld, Werner, 1972. "The European Economic Community and National Civil Servants of the Member States," International Organization, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter), pp. 121-135.

Scott, William A., 1966. "Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images," in Kelman, ed., International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston), pp. 71-103.

Smith, Keith A., 1973. "The European Economic Community and National Civil Servants of the Member States: A Comment," IO, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Autumn 1973), pp. 563-68.

Wendt, Alex, 1987. "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International Organization, Vol. 41, pp. 335-70.

Wendt, Alex, 1992. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization, Vol. 46, pp. 391-425.

Wendt, Alex, 1994. "Collective Identity-Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June), pp. 384-96.