

# Isogeny-based Cryptography - Talk 0

Diana Mocanu



# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

- Method of securely exchanging a cryptographic key over a public channel


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- Earliest practical examples of public key exchange (published in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman)
- The key can then be used to encrypt subsequent communications using a symmetric-key cipher.

# Finite Field Diffie-Hellman



# Discrete log problem

## Definition

In its most standard form, the **discrete logarithm problem** in a finite group  $G$  can be stated as follows: given  $a \in G$  and  $b \in \langle a \rangle$ , find the least positive integer  $x$  such that  $a^x = b$ .

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## Example

In  $G = \mathbb{F}_{17}$ , the equation  $3^x = 13$  has an infinite number of solutions, namely  $x = 4 + 16n$ .



# The discrete logarithm problem

## Fact

If  $G = E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ , it turns out that the discrete logarithm problem is **very hard**  $\rightarrow$  Elliptic-Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH), a cryptosystem based on the hardness of this problem.

## Definition

An **elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{Q}$**  consists of solutions  $(x, y)$  to an equation of the form:

$$E : Y^2 = X^3 + aX + b$$

where  $a, b \in \mathbb{Q}$ . Moreover, we require that the following quantity, (called the **discriminant**) is non-zero  $\Delta = 4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$ .

We think of the elliptic curve  $E$  as having a distinguished point called the **point at infinity** and denoted by  $\infty$ .

# Elliptic Curves over $\mathbb{Q}$




Figure 1: Elliptic curves for various values of  $a$  and  $b$ .

# Group Law




Figure 2: The Group law on an elliptic curve.

# Elliptic Curves over finite fields

## Definition

An **elliptic curve over**  $\mathbb{F}_q$  with characteristic  $\neq 2, 3$  consists of solutions  $(x, y)$  to an equation of the form:

$$E : Y^2 = X^3 + aX + b$$

where  $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_q$ , with  $\Delta = 4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$ .

We think of the elliptic curve  $E$  as having a distinguished point called the **point at infinity** and denoted by  $\infty$ .

We define  $P = (x, y)$  to be an  $\mathbb{F}_q$ -**rational point** if  $P$  lies on  $E$  and  $x, y \in \mathbb{F}_q$  and take  $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$  to be the all of the  $\mathbb{F}_q$ -rational points, together with the point at infinity.

# Elliptic curves over finite fields




Figure 3:  $E : Y^2 = X^3 + 7$  over  $\mathbb{F}_{17}$

## Theorem (Hasse bound)

*Let  $E/\mathbb{F}_q$ . Then  $\#E(\mathbf{F}_q) = q + 1 - t$  where  $|t| \leq 2\sqrt{q}$ .*

# Elliptic curves over finite fields

## Theorem (Hasse bound)

*Let  $E/\mathbb{F}_q$ . Then  $\#E(\mathbf{F}_q) = q + 1 - t$  where  $|t| \leq 2\sqrt{q}$ .*

## Definition

An elliptic curve  $E$  defined over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}_q$  of characteristic  $p$  is **supersingular** if and only if  $p$  divides  $t$ . The opposite of supersingular is **ordinary**.



# Group Law over finite fields





Figure 4: Here  $P = (2, 10)$ ,  $Q = (5, 9)$  and  $P + Q = (12, 16)$  and  $E$  as in Figure 12

# ECDH

**Initialisation:**  $E : Y^2 = X^3 + AX + B$  over a fixed field  $\mathbb{F}_p$ , where  $p$  is a prime, a fixed point  $G \in E(\mathbb{F}_p)$  and  $n$  the order of  $G$ .



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# Post Quantum Cryptography

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- Examples: RSA, FFDH, ECDH → not quantum-safe → Schor’s Algorithm

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- SIDH= supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman



## Definition

An **isogeny**  $\varphi$  between two elliptic curves  $E_1/\mathbb{F}_{p^n}$  and  $E_2/\mathbb{F}_{p^n}$  is a non-constant rational function that maps points from  $E_1$  to points on  $E_2$  and is compatible with the group law. For this talk, the **degree** of an isogeny is defined to be  $|\text{Ker}(\varphi)|$ .


From now on, we only work with elliptic curves over finite fields.

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## Example

Multiplication by  $l$  map denoted  $[l]_E: E/\mathbb{F} \rightarrow E/\mathbb{F}$  is an isogeny of degree  $1, l$  or  $l^2$  if  $l$  is prime and coprime with  $\text{char}(\mathbb{F})$ .



## Initialisations:

- $E$  a supersingular elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  such that  $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2}) = (p + 1)^2$ ;
- $p + 1 = l_A^a l_B^b$ ;

## Secret Data:

- Alice: the isogeny  $\phi_A$  of degree  $l_A^a$
- Bob: the isogeny  $\phi_B$  of degree  $l_B^b$

The graph of isogenies of prime degree  $l \neq p$

Fix a finite field  $\mathbb{F}$  and a prime  $l \neq \text{char}(\mathbb{F})$ . We look at the graph with **vertices** isomorphism classes of elliptic curves and **edges** isogenies of degree  $l$  between them, up to isomorphism.

# Isogeny Graphs

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In our case: Supersingular case (algebraic closure)

The graph is **1 + 1 regular**.

There is a **unique (finite) connected component made of all supersingular curves** with the same number of points.

# The SIDH System




Figure 5: Vertices: Supersingular elliptic curves  $\mathbb{F}_{419^2}$ , edges are 2 and 3 isogenies.

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- For SIDH an attacker is confronted with the problem of finding  $E_{AB}$  knowing  $E_A$ ,  $E_B$  and some torsion information.
- This is equivalent to finding one of the specific isogenies  $\phi_A$  or  $\phi_B$  by knowing their value at some torsion points. The isogeny finding problem is up to date believed to be quantum-hard.
- The additional points have raised some concern but no attack has managed to break the security of SIDH yet  $\rightarrow$  we are going to study torsion-points attacks as given in Christophe Petit's paper.

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- KLPT algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm to solve a quaternion ideal analog of the path problem in supersingular  $l$ -isogeny graphs.
- The Deuring correspondence gives a bijection between supersingular isomorphism classes of elliptic curves and maximal orders in quaternion algebras.
- KLPT gives a polynomial-time algorithm to solve the equivalent problem (under Deuring correspondence) of finding an isogeny between two elliptic curves.

|   |   |
|---|---|
| Supersingular $j$ -invariants over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$   | Maximal orders in $\mathcal{B}_{p,\infty}$                                      |
| $j(E)$ (up to galois conjugacy)                         | $\mathcal{O} \cong \text{End}(E)$ (up to isomorphism)                           |
| $(E_1, \varphi)$ with $\varphi : E \rightarrow E_1$     | $I_\varphi$ integral left $\mathcal{O}$ -ideal and right $\mathcal{O}_1$ -ideal |
| $\theta \in \text{End}(E_0)$                            | Principal ideal $\mathcal{O}\theta$   |
| $\text{deg}(\varphi)$                                   | $n(I_\varphi)$  |
| $\hat{\varphi}$   | $I_\varphi$   |
| $\varphi : E \rightarrow E_1, \psi : E \rightarrow E_1$ | Equivalent Ideals $I_\varphi \sim I_\psi$                                       |
| Supersingular $j$ -invariants over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$   | $\text{Cl}(\mathcal{O})$  |
| $\tau \circ \rho : E \rightarrow E_1 \rightarrow E_2$   | $I_{\tau \circ \rho} = I_\rho \cdot I_\tau$                                     |

**Table 1.** The Deuring correspondence, a summary.

- A **digital signature** is a mathematical scheme for verifying the authenticity of digital messages or documents.




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- Many signature algorithms are based on **sigma protocols**. A sigma protocol is a type of proof of knowledge protocol between a prover  $\mathcal{P}$  and a verifier  $\mathcal{V}$ , where the prover wants to convince the verifier that for some statement  $x$ , he knows a witness  $w$ , such that  $(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}$ , for some relation  $\mathcal{R}$ .

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- Challenge: Design a SIDH-based sigma protocol for proving knowledge of the secret key.

## Genus 2 group law

Addition  $D \oplus D' = D''$




$$C/K : y^2 = x^5 + \dots$$

$$\begin{aligned} D &= (P_1) + (P_2) - 2(\infty) \\ D' &= (P_1') + (P_2') - 2(\infty) \\ D'' &= (P_1'') + (P_2'') - 2(\infty) \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{div}(\ell) = (P_1) + (P_2) + (P_1') + (P_2') + (i(P_1'')) + (i(P_2'')) - 6(\infty)$$

Doubling  $[2]D = D''$



$$\text{div}(\ell) = 2(P_1) + 2(P_2) + (i(P_1'')) + (i(P_2'')) - 6(\infty)$$

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- Why stop at genus 2?

# Plan of the talks

We will follow the isogeny-based cryptography school organized in 2020 by Christophe Petite and Chloe Martindale.

Most of the materials can be found on the school's website:

<https://isogenyschool2020.co.uk/>.

# Plan of the talks

**Talk 1:** Elliptic Curves over finite fields

**Talk 2:** CSIDH & SIDH

**Talk 3:** Class Groups

**Talk 4:** Quaternion Algebras

**Talk 5:** KLPT - D. Kohel, K. Lauter, C. Petit, and J.-P. Tignol. *On the quaternion  $l$ -isogeny path problem*

**Talk 6:** Torsion Point Attacks on SIDH - C. Petite *Faster Algorithms for Isogeny Problems using Torsion Point Images*

**Talk 7:** Signature schemes

**Talk 8:** Hyperelliptic curves and Jacobian varieties

**Talk 9:** Hyperelliptic isogeny-based cryptography - E.V. Flynn and Yan Bo Ti *Genus Two Isogeny Cryptography*



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**Thank you**