

# Learning a Social Network by Influencing Opinions

Dmitry Chistikov, Luisa Estrada, Mike Paterson and Paolo Turrini

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# **INFLUENCING OPINION DYNAMICS**

Suppose you are a campaigner who wants to promote a new ...

law product technology initiative initial opinion about it  $(\bigcap, \bigcap)$ 

- ✓ You can persuade some members to support your campaign.
- ✓ You know how "people talk" across the social network.

Want to target the members with the strongest influence.



# **INFLUENCING OPINION DYNAMICS**

Suppose you are a campaigner who wants to promote a new ...

law product technology initiative on a social network where each member has an initial opinion about it  $(\bigcap, \bigodot)$ 

- ✓ You can persuade some members to support your campaign.
- ✓ You know how "people talk" across the social network.
  - **‡** Knowing who talks to whom.

Want to target the members with the strongest influence.



# **PROBLEM SETUP**



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# **PROBLEM SETUP**





- ✓ Allow the campaigner to intervene on the agents' opinions and observe the result.
- $\checkmark$  Stop once there is only one feasible network.
- Opinions diffuse following majority dynamics.



### Game rules

### **x** Connections between agents are hidden.

# **PROBLEM SETUP: AN EXAMPLE**

Task: To learn the underlying network.

Observations and Budget: (人)

interventions £



Underlying network

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### Campaigner's view

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Underlying network

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### Campaigner's view

Task: To learn the underlying network.

Observations and Budget: ( し)

interventions £



Hidden Underlying network

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### Campaigner's view

Learning task	Observation budget	Intervention budget
Identify an even clique	$\mathcal{O}(n)$	$\mathcal{O}(n)$
Identify an odd clique	$\mathcal{O}(n)$	$\mathcal{O}(n^2)$
Learn any network $G\in \mathcal{H}$	$\mathcal{O}(n^2)$	$\mathcal{O}(n^3)$



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Learning a Social Network

### How can we identify **any** network?

### Theorem:

A campaigner who observes a social network with n agents can learn the underlying graph exactly by using  $O(n^2)$  of her observation budget and  $O(n^3)$  of her intervention budget.

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Proof (sketch)

Stage 1: Find the pivot

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Same number of influencers on LHS and RHS

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Proof (sketch) Stage 1: Find the pivot Budget:  $( l ) \leq n$ 



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Proof (sketch)

Stage 2: Find all other influencers

Budget:







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Proof (sketch)

Stage 2: Find all other influencers

Budget:

$$\bigcirc \le n + 1$$

$$\mathbf{E} \leq n^2 + n$$



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Budget:

$$\bigcirc \le n + 1$$

$$\epsilon \le n^2 + 2n$$



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Budget:

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$$\mathbf{E} \leq n^2 + \mathbf{3}n$$



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Proof (sketch)

Budget:

$$\bigcirc \leq n+3$$

$$\mathbf{E} \leq n^2 + 3n$$

### Stage 2: Find all other influencers



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Proof (sketch)

Budget:

$$\bigcirc \le n + (n-2)$$

$$\mathbf{E} \le n^2 + (n-2)n$$

Stage 2: Find all other influencers



## Only consistent influencers for



# **SOME FOOD FOR THOUGHT**

- What would happen if we had a threshold other than the majority?
- Can we efficiently learn the correct network probably approximately (PAC)?
- What would happen if we add dynamic rules to our network?
  (eg. partner selection, rich get richer, ...)
- How can we scale our approach so it can handle inputs from real-world data?

