



DEPARTMENT OF  
STATISTICS

**NIHR** Health Protection Research  
Unit in Emerging and Zoonotic  
Infections at University of Liverpool



MRC Centre for  
Global Infectious  
Disease Analysis

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# Communicating modelling results to non-technical audiences

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***Department of Statistics, University of Oxford***

***NIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Emerging and Zoonotic Infections***

# Overview




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


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# Introduction





Figure 2 Impact of interventions lasting 12 weeks

## Example 2

Disease transmission and  
control modelling at the  
science-policy interface

(<https://doi.org/10.1098/rsfs.2021.0013>)

Communicating  
uncertainty in  
epidemic models

(<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.epidem.2021.100520>)

Public awareness  
and opinions on the  
use of mathematical  
transmission  
modelling to inform  
public health policy  
in the United  
Kingdom

(<https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2023.0456>)

*Example 1*

*Example 3*

# Overview




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


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
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
# Example 1: uncertainty



*(a) Deterministic model with different parameters per simulation*




*(b) Stochastic model with fixed parameters across simulations*




*(c) Stochastic model with different parameters per simulation*

# Example 1: uncertainty







# Example 1: uncertainty





# Example 1: uncertainty

*Scheduled strategy*



*Reactive strategy*



# Overview




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# Example 2: science communication experts



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
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Research articles

## Disease transmission and control modelling at the science–policy interface

Ruth McCabe  and Christl A. Donnelly

Published: 12 October 2021 | <https://doi.org/10.1098/rsfs.2021.0013>



# Example 2: science communication experts

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*Evidence informing policy must be communicated to the public*

# Example 2: science communication experts

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*Evidence informing policy must be communicated to the public*



*Strike a balance between understandable but also noting the caveats of the results*

# Example 2: science communication experts



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*Evidence informing policy must be communicated to the public*



*Strike a balance between understandable but also noting the caveats of the results*



*Broad messages: "cases will rise next week" rather than "we expect an increase of 127 cases by next week"*

# Example 2: science communication experts



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*Evidence informing policy must be communicated to the public*



*Strike a balance between understandable but also noting the caveats of the results*



*Broad messages: "cases will rise next week" rather than "we expect an increase of 127 cases by next week"*



*Communication of modelling results should come from scientists and scientific advisors*



# Example 2: science communication experts



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*Professor Jason Leitch, National Clinical Director for the Scottish Government 2015 - 2024*



<https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0079mcc>

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


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# Example 3: Public opinion



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
**Online panel sample**  
using Prolific Academic



**Social media sample**  
using Twitter




# Example 3: Public opinion




	Online panel	Social media
Too little	233 (46%)	60 (30%)
About right	257 (51%)	122 (60%)
Too much	10 (2%)	17 (8%)
Did not answer	4 (1%)	3 (1%)

# Example 3: Public opinion

- 92% online panel (462 respondents)
- 91% social media (183 respondents)




# Example 3: Public opinion



*Newspapers*



*News shows*



*Social media*

# Overview




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# Example 4: modelling in the media



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
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## Expert Report to the Infected Blood Inquiry: Statistics

Communicating Uncertainty .....	ii
Executive Summary .....	1
Introduction .....	6
Chapter 1 Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infections in people with bleeding disorders.....	8
Chapter 2 Hepatitis C Virus (HCV) infections in people with bleeding disorders.....	19
Chapter 3 HIV infections in transfusion recipients.....	33
Chapter 4 Hepatitis C Virus (HCV) in transfusion recipients.....	38
Chapter 5 Information from funds .....	84
Chapter 6 Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (vCJD) infections from blood and blood products.....	91
Chapter 7 Hepatitis B Virus (HBV) infections from blood and blood products.....	95
Acknowledgements.....	99
Authors .....	101
Verifying Statements.....	103
Appendix.....	104



# Example 4: modelling in the media



Over 750 distinct scenarios considered

**Core results:**  
26800 (95% UI 21300 – 38800) infections of which 1820 (95% UI 650 – 3320) died due to their infection.

# Example 4: modelling in the media

## Top Stories



## Infected blood victims await report into biggest ever NHS disaster

More than 30,000 people were infected with HIV and hepatitis C in the infected blood scandal - and 3,000 have since died.

**UK's infected blood scandal that killed 3,000 was covered up: Report**

**More than 30,000 infected and 3,000 dead: The shocking numbers behind the infected blood scandal**

## Explainer

## What is the UK's infected blood scandal?

More than 3,000 people died and many others were left with lifelong health problems after being given contaminated blood

Sunak set to apologise for infected blood scandal which killed 3,000 as inquiry publishes report

**Government covered up infected blood scandal that left 3,000 dead**

# Example 4: modelling in the media

## Top Stories



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
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


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# Summary



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*How do we balance technical details with understandable messages?*

# Summary



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


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


*How can we ensure that uncertainty is being reported and understood as a key modelling result?*

# Summary



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


*How do we ensure that scientists are well-prepared to communicate their modelling?*

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
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


*Can we make better use of interactive modelling tools to help us with the above?*

# Summary



*How do we balance technical details with understandable messages?*



*How can we ensure that uncertainty is being reported and understood as a key modelling result?*



*How do we ensure that scientists are well-prepared to communicate their modelling?*



*Can we make better use of the news media and social media to communicate modelling?*



*Can we make better use of interactive modelling tools to help us with the above?*



*Understanding your audience and what you want to get across will go a long way*



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