

# Personal injury and medico-legal issues in civil litigation: draft report

University of Edinburgh (27th June 2024)  
and  
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# Introduction

This workshop brought together statisticians, lawyers, advocates and barristers. The first day was held at the University of Edinburgh, and the second at the Faculty of Advocates, as a physical expression of cross-professional collaboration. Twenty two participants attended the workshop. A list of attendees is presented in the Appendix.

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## 1 Overview

The workshop began with participants briefly introducing themselves.

*His Honour Judge Thomas Teague KC (Chief Coroner for England and Wales, 2020-2024)* presented an overview of a case which highlighted the interaction between statistical and judicial reasoning, and the common practice of using medical experts' opinions on statistical matters. The reasoning which doctors use in making predictions or treatment decisions is not well suited to reverse engineering to determine whether what has happened caused the observations.

The illustrative case was that of Mrs Johns who had died from mesothelioma, a form of cancer associated with exposure to asbestos. Mrs Johns had lived in a council property in which asbestos removal work had been carried out. During the removal an item of equipment malfunctioned and on her return, Mrs Johns found dust on some of her possessions. In the pathologist's evidence it was noted that there was an extremely strong correlation between asbestos dust exposure and malignant mesothelioma, and that it was reasonable to assume that exposure to asbestos at Mrs Johns' home had led to and caused the malignant mesothelioma. This was selected as an example of an expert making statements outside their area of expertise, as well as conflating correlation and causation. In the summary of Mrs Johns' case, the coroner concluded that her malignant mesothelioma was caused by exposure to asbestos and that this occurred while she was resident at the council property.

On appeal, the conclusion of Mrs Johns' inquest was revised to malignant mesothelioma. Tommy stated that the role of the coroner is investigative rather than inquisitorial. The legal context in which an expert's evidence is used is critical. The coroner's role is to establish, essentially, four facts: who has died, when, where and how they died. The Coroner's Service is not resourced to undertake an exhaustive inquiry of the type which may be required in adversarial litigation. In the case of Mrs Johns, there was no need for the coroner to comment on causation of the mesothelioma; the coroner does not have to attribute responsibility. The existence of a strong causal link may mean that little other evidence is needed, but there should be some evidence specific to the index case in order to infer a causal link. A more than minimal contribution is required, and the combined evidence used to decide whether it was more likely than not that X made a non-negligible contribution.

*Michaela Guthrie (Partner, Balfour + Manson LLP)* gave a solicitor's view of statistical experts in personal injury cases. In this she noted that

an expert can provide comment, but facts are for the Court to decide. An expert is not necessary if the conclusion is obvious: a report does not help the Court. The solicitor decides whether a person has the relevant skills, and whether expert involvement is justified. Links to resources on the duties of experts were provided. The principal duty is to the court. An expert must also write a report so that a judge and jury, with no prior knowledge of their field, can follow it. The importance of a report summary was emphasised: a judge may not see an expert report until less than 24 hours before the expert gives evidence and so may only have time to read the conclusion.

Michaela recommended that as well as giving clear instructions and specifying the relevant legal standard, solicitors should give an expert all of the evidence, rather than being selective. She then presented an overview of some cases from practice where there had been a conflict of interest or experts had not fulfilled their duties to the Court.

*Astrid Smart KC (Advocate, Compass chambers)*

discussed advocates' use of statistical expert evidence in personal injury cases. As proof is to a standard of "balance of probabilities" (BoP), she discussed whether BoP has anything in common with statistical probability. The essential facts must be proven on the balance of probabilities, not every small piece of evidence. Astrid used judgments given between 1987 and 2023 to illustrate the difference between academic standards and the tasks of advocates and judges. A judge must decide whether the elements of a case have been established on the balance of probabilities. The role of counsel is to convince the court that her interpretation of expert evidence is better than the interpretation of the opposing advocate. The aim is to persuade the judge regarding the interpretation, not the truth. Advocates need to understand the limitations of academic papers relied on in expert evidence, though often Counsel will not have read articles on which an expert relies.

Two common challenges were highlighted by recent pelvic mesh litigation: finding a suitable research comparator group which can be generalised for the individuals involved in litigation; and finding experts who had not been involved in industry-funded research. A valid review of the performance of a medical product requires data on the particular product and suitable competitor products or alternative treatments. In the pelvic mesh case, routinely collected or registry data was not relevant because the subject of the litigation was use of mesh compared to pre-mesh surgery research. This meant arguments relied on older research papers. In specialist areas, finding an expert who has never had any links with a company or its subsidiaries might be difficult.

Proving causation is difficult in science and law. A limited role for statistics has been asserted: "statistical evidence may be an inadequate basis on which to prove causation" (*Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) 2011 UKSC 10 Lord Philips*). Courts have also pronounced that clinicians, not statisticians or demographers are experts on life expectancy.

In response, the lack of agreed alternatives to direct application of epidemiological evidence to an individual person was raised. Clinicians usually rely on statistical publications in predicting life expectancy, but might not be able to critically assess the quality of the data and the analyses. A more reasonable approach is to allow clinicians and statisticians to provide joint reports, or to refer to one another's reports. The guidelines proposed by Sir Austin Bradford Hill in 1965 to assess whether an association between two variables should be interpreted as a causal relationship were recommended (Hill, 1965).

*Professor Richard Goldberg (Professor of Law, Durham University)*

provided a view of how the risk-benefit balance of medical devices and vaccines are currently evaluated by regulatory agencies. The expression “safety a user is entitled to expect” is circular and “reasonable expected use” implies considering the benefits of contemplated action in context of safety, with comparison of different actions allowed. He used recent litigation (metal-on-metal hip and seroxat) to show how risk-benefit analysis including public interest has been the basis of judgments (Wilkes v DePuy International [2016], Gee and other v DePuy International [2018]). Consideration should be given not only to risks, but also the ease with which risks can be eliminated. Developing a new product involves risks, and the challenge of assessing long-term risks.

Many lawyers have eschewed risk-benefit in the context of determining defectiveness in vaccine liability, and failed to address wider public interest concerns about vaccine confidence, and herd immunity. The risk-benefit balance can vary with age, virus mutation and context. If a vaccine is needed rapidly, lack of time and data ensure that evaluation of risks is challenging, and governments might offer immunity to developers. When compensation for vaccine attributed injury depends on civil litigation, the presumptions made by courts on what provides evidence of causation, and when that evidence was first established and available, will control access to recompense for large populations. The European Union’s revision of the product liability directive which allows claimants to claim it is excessively difficult to prove causation undermines the need to establish proof of defectiveness and causation in the context of vaccines. Instead of requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate causation and defect with a “sound underlying scientific or statistical basis”, the defendant has to demonstrate that the vaccine was not defective.

An issue arising from this talk is the failure to distinguish between vaccines administered with social and government pressure, and people’s decisions about the use of medical devices.

*Professor Tim Cole (UCL Great Ormond Street Institute of Child Health)*

presented biological methods used for assessing the age of unaccompanied asylum seeking children (UASC). These included comparison of hand and wrist x-ray with an atlas of x-rays of known age, dental x-ray to ascertain appearance of wisdom teeth, knee MRI and clavicle MRI. An approach previously used in Australia provided a clear demonstration of the assumptions made and the errors in those assumptions. In the UK, an age assessment based on interviews provides an “assigned age” for a UASC to compare with the UASC’s “claimed age”. Examples of logistic regression models using bone age data and chronological age were used to demonstrate the limited accuracy of wrist x-rays in assessing chronological age. Combinations of two or more age assessment markers, assuming conditional independence were then used to reduce maturity misclassification. For example, using knee x-rays 25% of minors (age <18 years) were categorised as mature ( $\geq 18$  years); using dental x-rays, 11% of minors were deemed to be mature; using both knee and dental x-rays only 3% of minors would be misclassified as mature. Plots of maturity from combined biological markers can be used to determine whether claimed or assigned age has higher probability and a likelihood ratio determined from probabilities of separate plots where the biological markers both indicate maturity or both indicate immaturity. Tim’s research has been used by the UK Home Office.

*Michael Rawlinson KC (12 King’s Bench Walk Chambers)*

discussed the role of epidemiology in proving causation, using a number of cases involving occupational disease. Law, epidemiology and statistics all use different concepts of causa-

tion. Mike would like to see more interaction between these fields, as he regards the legal version of causation as entirely artificial due to the need to reach a decision. The aim is to stop negligence, especially when there is an imbalance of power, not to justify medical interventions or prevent criminal behaviour. The claimant needs to demonstrate cause on balance of probability, but not balance of improbability. Lack of evidence of alternative causes is not an argument for the alleged cause. A judge has to decide whether they are persuaded by the evidence.

Mike's first example involved exposure to asbestos: a strong link between asbestos exposure at work and mesothelioma has been established for men. As Hodgson and Darnton (2000), the main research study, largely used self-reported asbestos exposure in males working in industrial occupations, it is inappropriate to simply apply the results to women. It is difficult to assess what the impact of very low doses is, or decide whether there is a threshold exposure required for injury. Additionally approximately two-thirds of women who develop mesothelioma have "spontaneous" mesothelioma, where no obvious occupational cause is identified.

Mike went on to describe three legal aspects of proof: 'but for' proof - the disease would not have happened without exposure; material increase in risk, where the claimant has to show that due to exposure there has been a material increase in risk, although this is not frequently used; and material contribution in fact (MCIF) where the claimant has to show that on the balance of probabilities exposure caused a material contribution. The last, MCIF, was established in 1866 in relation to six mills polluting river water. The defence of each mill, of merely adding to pollution from other mills, was rejected as unfair to the plaintiff. This is a loosening of causation and means that a claimant is only required to show that each party has made a material contribution; there can be multiple lines of causation. This can be important in asbestos exposure litigation where a claimant may have worked for several employers with exposure to asbestos. If the defendant can prove the injury would have happened regardless of exposure, MCIF does not apply. Epidemiology contributes estimates of the level of risk, and knowledge of possible causal mechanisms.

Mike discussed what he considers when evaluating expert witnesses. Experts need to be able to translate effectively from science to lay terms, deal with hostile cross-examination, and have the integrity to say early on if the evidence does not support the case which is proposed. Other comments were that lawyers like to follow precedents, and can be led astray by the apparent esteem of experts.

*Professor Jane Hutton (University of Warwick)*

gave an overview of the main statistical issues she has noted in personal injury and medical product litigation. When a statistical expert is consulted, she must ensure that both instructing solicitor and the expert are addressing the same question. It is often necessary to clarify and refine the questions. This can involve establishing definitions. For example, in cerebral palsy literature, there has been confusion between diagnosis of cerebral palsy and the common classifications of types of cerebral palsy. "Adverse Reactions to Metal Debris" were diagnosed without any adverse reaction to the metal-on-metal hip prostheses. The next step is to determine what data are available to answer the question, as original data or in research publications, and assess the quality of these data. The quality and availability of data may limit the questions which can be answered or the accuracy with which they can be answered. Large, self-selected datasets were shown not to be better than a small simple

random sample. The quality and completeness of health data varies with the social contract of different countries and the expected level of personal privacy. Results from Nordic countries might be more reliable than those using UK or USA data. Hence Nordic research might be more relevant than UK research, even for British citizens. The quality of research articles also influences the validity of conclusions about cause. The role of the Equator Network reporting guidelines<sup>1</sup>, which are widely used in health care research, in assessing the quality of research articles was discussed.

*Professor Niamh Nic Daéid FRSE (University of Dundee)*

presented the Royal Society and Royal Society of Edinburgh judicial primer on the use of statistics in legal proceedings. Lord Thomas, then the Lord Chief Justice for England and Wales, had the idea for a series of guidance documents in simple language to enable and inform regarding scientific data. The use of forensic science has exploded in recent years and far more forensic information is presented as evidence in courts. Seven judicial primers have been published and three more primers are in progress. The primers cover various areas of forensics including fire investigation, ballistics, DNA and gait analysis, and copies of each primer are sent to every judge in the country. In addition some of the primers have been produced in comic form aimed at encouraging school children and students to study science subjects.

*Dr Amy Wilson (University of Edinburgh)*

presented an overview of the Royal Statistical Society (RSS) guides to Statistics and the Law. The role and activities of the RRS Statistics and Law section were outlined. Four law practitioner guides and the joint publication between RSS and Inns of Court College of Advocates (ICCA) publication were discussed in particular. The RSS-ICCA publication is due for revision.

## 2 Discussions

The opportunities for discussion during breaks and the evening meal were appreciated and well used. As Judge Teague commented on current insufficient engagement between statisticians and the judiciary, we will attempt to achieve more attendance by judges at the future workshops.

### 2.1 Conflicts of Interest

There was discussion on the interpretation of conflicts of interest.

Lawyers worry about how vulnerable their case is to suggestions that an expert has conflicts of interest. The caution expressed by some of the lawyers was considered to imply a lack of trust in the ability of scientists to address questions fairly. In specialist areas, there might be very few people with relevant qualifications and experience, and many of them will have met and perhaps worked together. Finding an expert who has never had any links with a company or its subsidiaries might be difficult, particularly as companies merge and split.

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<sup>1</sup><https://www.equator-network.org/reporting-guidelines/>

In Scotland an expert cannot provide reports to both claimant and defendant. It is thus possible for all experts world-wide (two, for cerebral palsy life expectancy) to be instructed by one solicitors' firm. The other side is then left without a trusted scientific expert.

Scientists might be willing to provide what they regard as impartial reports, regardless of various collaborations. Many experts state what their assumptions are, are willing to discuss alternative approaches, and to comply with a court's request for a joint report with other experts on agreements and disagreements. Those who work to establish a reputation for being trustworthy, and focussed on their duty to the court regard overstating possible conflicts of interest as disrespectful. The absence of reasons to doubt the integrity of UK experts in general was noted.

Further, from an expert's point of view, what a lawyer regards as blindingly obvious might be comprehensively wrong. Statisticians often regret the assumption that non-statisticians, for example medical doctors, are assumed to be expert in statistics, and reports used without statistical scrutiny. Rigorous statistical reasoning can often explain seemingly rare coincidences, or show that the data underlying conclusions is seriously biased.

Excessive concern about possible conflicts or distrust of experts might result in the best experts being excluded and hence degrade justice.

## **2.2 Critique of example expert witness reports**

Four mock expert witness reports were provided and discussed in small groups. Very useful advice for scientific experts emerged, as well as enthusiasm for a guide for lawyers who have to read expert reports.

### **Advice for scientific experts:**

An expert should make clear to solicitors what can and what cannot be established by their expertise. Limited time and resources mean that it might not be possible for an expert to review all of the evidence. An expert might give an instructing solicitor the choice between providing selected evidence, or paying the expert for hundreds of hours of reading.

Specific advice on the structure, content, referencing and formatting of expert reports was agreed. Small changes, such as numbering every line or paragraph, and an executive summary, can make report much easier to read and use.

### **Reading guide for lawyers:**

In the criminal context, an assessment template exists which relates to the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI). The idea of a similar set of questions contained within two pages, with a supplementary guide to explain the importance of the questions, was well received.

## **2.3 Evaluation of statistical guidance**

The discussion of the Royal Society and Royal Society of Edinburgh, and the RSS-ICCA guides considered how feedback could be collected from the intended readers, and changes

in the law as well as further publications could be used in revising the guides. Guidance on statistical issues in personal injury issues could be provided within the original guides, or as linked publications with some overlap of material. Other suggestions included publishing an interactive format as well as paper; additional partnerships with legal organisations such as the Personal Injury Bar Association (PIBA) for the civil law version, combining issue of the primer with training events, and production of a massive open online course (MOOC) or video.

## **3 Conclusion and future projects**

### **3.1 Feedback themes**

The workshop successfully brought together professionals from different disciplines and institutions. Three suggestions from the first workshop were implemented: more time for discussion, group work on actual case reports and presentations by lawyers with different roles (judge, advocate, solicitor) on what they perceive to be the strengths & weaknesses of how forensic evidence is presented & communicated.

The presentations were deemed to be of a very high standard, and useful for both lawyers and statisticians. The informality and flexibility was appreciated. Discussions, on the case studies and presentations were enjoyable and useful for generating ideas and specific aims.

The lawyers found Tim Cole's presentation of incorrect statistics, followed by discussion of appropriate approaches, particularly helpful.

The main suggestion for improvement was access to the presentations (in progress) and full lists of legal cases cited.

### **3.2 Future projects**

1. The revision of the RSS-ICCA guide to probability and statistics will be informed by the discussions. Amy Wilson has applied for funding for this work, and Jane Hutton will provide input for the personal injury aspects.
2. Statisticians can contribute to civil law suits by finding evidence relevant to the particular case, evaluating it, and then presenting the information. Jane Hutton will lead on writing a guide for statisticians who consider providing expert witness reports. This will include discussion of conflicts of interest, and communication of risk as well as the advice on the structure and content of reports. Jane Hutton is a mentor for a personal injury case study at the September 2024 UK Graduate Mathematicians Modelling camp, and she aims to test the guide at the camp. This might help to recruit statisticians to the role of expert witness.
3. Jane Hutton will lead on writing a guide for lawyers to use when reading expert witness reports.



4. There is an informal agreement with Hugh Olson of the Faculty of Advocates to hold an afternoon session for advocates, with the talks by Tim Cole and Jane Hutton, followed by discussion. The following day would be more formal training, with trainee advocates reading mock expert witness reports, evaluating the reports using the lawyers reading guide, and then presenting the evidence in a moot court.
5. A further informal agreement with Hugh Olson, Amy Wilson will explore options of providing shorter statistics training sessions for the College of Advocates.
6. Informal discussions have started with Mike Rawlinson and David Green on a similar event for several English chambers.
7. A presentation for the mandatory continuation training of judges will be offered to the Judicial College, as suggested by Tommy Teague.
8. A larger project would involve preparing statistical critical appraisal of several judgements in personal injury cases, and perhaps consumer protection cases. Margaret Eames has expressed interest in this.

It would be interesting to begin to address the following questions:

What is the range of use of statistical evidence in civil cases?

What is the quality of the evidence?

Who gives statistical evidence?



Professor J L Hutton,  
Department of Statistics,  
University of Warwick  
September 10, 2024

## 4 Appendices: attendees, programme, feedback

### 4.1 Attendees

Table 1: List of attendees

Name	Role	Institution
Mrs Carrie Burrows	Senior Associate	Drummond Miller LLP
Professor Tim Cole	Medical Statistician	UCL Great Ormond Street Institute of Child Health
Ms Margaret Eames	Statistician	The Acorns Public Health Research
Professor Richard Goldberg	Professor of law	Durham University
Mr David Green	Barrister	12 King's Bench Walk Chambers
Ms Michaela Guthrie	Partner	Balfour + Manson LLP
Professor Neil Hawkins	Health Economist Statistician	University of Glasgow
Professor Jane Hutton	Professor of Statistics	University of Warwick
Mr Euan Mackenzie KC	Advocate	Faculty of Advocates
Dr Dougall McCorry	Neurologist	The Gyrus Group
Ms Elaine McCulloch	Associate	Digby Brown Solicitors
Ms Patricia McFadden	Partner	Digby Brown Solicitors
Mr Neil Mackenzie KC	Advocate	Arnot Manderson Advocates
Professor Niamh Nic Daeid	Professor of Forensic Science	Leverhulme Research Centre for Forensic Science, University of Dundee
Dr Linda Nichols	Assistant Professor	University of Warwick
Mr Hugh Olson, Advocate	Director of Training and Education	Faculty of Advocates
Mr Gerard Porter	Lecturer	Edinburgh Law School, University of Edinburgh
Mr Michael Rawlinson KC	Barrister	12 King's Bench Walk Chambers
Ms Astrid Smart KC	Advocate	Compass Chambers, Faculty of Advocates
Ms Liesa Spiller	Partner	Drummond Miller LLP
Judge Thomas Teague KC	Retired Circuit judge	Chief Coroner, 2020 - 2024
Dr Amy Wilson	Industrial Mathematics	University of Edinburgh

## 4.2 Programme

Table 2: UK civil law: epidemiology and statistics in personal injury cases: outline

Speaker	Association	Topic
Hugh Olson	Faculty of Advocates	Welcome
Professor Jane Hutton	Warwick Statistics	Welcome
All	<i>One minute on background and most important topic</i>	
His Honour Judge Teague, KC	Former Chief Coroner, England and Wales	Interactions between statistical and judicial reasoning
Michaela Guthrie	Balfour + Manson LLP, Edinburgh	A solicitor's view of statistical experts in personal injury cases
Astrid Smart, KC	Compass Chambers, Edinburgh	Statistical Expert Evidence in Personal Injury Cases
Professor Richard Goldberg	Durham Law School	Vaccine Liability: weighing risks and benefits
All	<i>Compile the main issues arising from first talks</i>	
Four groups	<i>Critique of example expert witness reports</i>	
Four nominees	<i>Feedback on expert reports, suggested improvements</i>	
Professor Tim Cole FMedSci	UCL Great Ormond Street Institute of Child Health	Age assessment in unaccompanied asylum-seeking children
Michael Rawlinson, KC	12 King's Bench Walk Chambers	Filling the void: the role of epidemiology in helping to prove causation in law
Professor Jane L Hutton	Warwick Statistics	Statistical concerns: data sources, quality & analysis; communication
All	<i>Topics arising from case studies and further talks</i>	
Professor Niamh Nic Daéid FRSE	Leverhulme Research Centre for Forensic Science, University of Dundee	Overview of Judicial Primers, Royal Society & Royal Society of Edinburgh
Dr Amy Wilson	School of Mathematics, University of Edinburgh	RSS guides to Statistics and the Law
<i>All Evaluation of primers, recommendations for updates, workshop review</i>		

### 4.3 Feedback from participants

**Euan Mackenzie** I thought the presentations were of a very high standard and extremely useful in helping to bridge the gap between law and statistics. I particularly enjoyed the workshop format, whereby questions and discussion could take place during the presentations (much better and more stimulating than simply sitting back and listening to a talk).

In terms of what I learned from the workshop, I particularly took on board Jane's points about the need to interrogate the reliability of statistical studies (including that big is not necessarily better) and the sort of questions to ask to do that. I consider that a better understanding of statistics is essential for any lawyer specialising in personal injury work and I very much hope that there can be further collaboration in the future with a view to further educating lawyers in Scotland in this important area.

I also appreciated the fact that everyone made the effort to come to Scotland - thank you for that!

**Amy Wilson** I thought it went well and there was a good balance of presentations and discussion. Although it was quite a small group this meant we were able to have quite a focussed discussion. I was particularly happy with the discussion on the ICCA guide as I came away with quite a few ideas for next steps on that.

**Tim Cole** I liked the informal way in which the workshop was run, with a fluid timetable that coped equally well with missing speakers and overrunning lectures.

In terms of the preparation for the workshop, I would have liked to have received more information about how it was progressing, rather than relying on – for example - an allstat entry about the workshop that I happened to spot.

My experience of statistics and the law has exclusively involved the age assessment of minors, so the main aim of the workshop, personal injury, was outside my experience. Nevertheless I found the discussions between the lawyers and statisticians fascinating, not least because I have not had such discussions in my own work. The case studies on expert witness reports were also of great interest, and highly relevant to my own experience.

**Trish McFadden** thought there was a good variety of excellent speakers. She was surprised there were not more people in attendance, but wasn't sure if the workshop was widely publicised and it is the start of the school summer holidays in Scotland!

**Neil Hawkins** I thought the workshop was interesting and useful. If possible, it would be useful to have copies of presentations. It would also be useful to have a list of the cases cited (although I appreciate it may be difficult to gather this).

The aspect I found most interesting were the definitions of causation and likely cause as used in the legal context. I think as well as explaining stats to lawyers there is scope to further explain law to statisticians.

**Tommy Teague** I enjoyed the meeting and thought the workshop was well run, although the attendance was rather smaller than I had expected. My only comment on the structure is that the division into small groups or syndicates, while perfect for a larger

event, was possibly not really necessary for a relatively small and intimate workshop of this kind. That is not a criticism, but I think it would have worked just as well, and possibly even better, with everything taking place in plenary session.

From my perspective, the main ‘lesson’ was that there is currently insufficient engagement between statisticians and the judiciary. As I think I mentioned on Wednesday evening, one remedy is for the RSS to offer to give some kind of presentation at the mandatory continuation training organised by the Judicial College. Such a presentation would have to be fairly basic and geared towards alerting judges to the potential practical value of statistical evidence and helping them to distinguish between those cases (the vast majority) where it will be unnecessary and the small minority where it may be of very profound significance.

**Mike Rawlinson** Both David Green and I found this a really fascinating 2 days. I’m away on holiday now but I will attend to this and also how we can strengthen ties between your society/university and the bar more generally next week on my return.

**Richard Goldberg** thought the workshop was well run. There were a couple of gaps in speakers but we adapted well to the changes. I learned a lot from having a practice contribution. I particularly enjoyed the presentation on statistical expert evidence in personal injury cases.

**Niamh Nic Daéid** Absolutely wonderful to take part and thanks so much for inviting me. For feedback, I thought the sessions I attended were excellent, the venue was perfect and AV/speakers all worked really well. The discussion in particular were very thought provoking.

## References

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- John T. Hodgson and Andrew J. Darnton. The quantitative risks of mesothelioma and lung cancer in relation to asbestos exposure. *The Annals Occ. Hygiene*, 44:565–601, 2000.