

InFER: Inference For Epidemic related Risk


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InFER2011

28th March 2011

What is InFER?

- £600k grant from BBSRC
-  BBSRC
bioscience for the future
- Application-driven development of statistical methodology for epidemics
 - Computationally intensive **Bayesian methods** (eg MCMC, SMC)
 - Models for datasets with varying degrees of **missingness and resolution**
 - Development of developer- and user-level **software**
- Collaboration between Statistics and Life Sciences @ Warwick: Gareth Roberts, Laura Green, Matt Keeling, Chris Jewell, Judith Brown

Overview

- 1 Motivation
- 2 The Approach
- 3 Inference
- 4 Case Studies
 - UK foot and mouth disease, 2007
 - Bayesian risk prediction for HPAI in UK poultry
- 5 Road Map

Outline

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Motivation

Welfare and Economics

- **Foot and Mouth Disease**
 - 2001: £8 billion, 6.5 million slaughtered
 - 2007: £100 million, 2610 slaughtered
- **Avian Influenza**
 - worth >3.5 billion
 - 40% UK primary meat market (2004)
- **bTB?**
- Endemic diseases?
- Human diseases - **Influenza H1N1?**



Epidemic Control

Framework Response Plan for Exotic Animal Diseases:

- 1 Minimise the number of animals which need to be culled either to control the disease or on welfare grounds, and which keep animal welfare problems to a minimum.
- 2 Protect public health.
- 3 Cause the least possible disruption to the food, farming and tourism industries, to visitors to the countryside, and to rural communities in the wider economy.
- 4 Minimise damage to the environment.
- 5 Minimise the burden on taxpayers and the public.

Defra 2007

CRISM

Aims

- Model-based analysis aims to provide a prediction of the **RISK** posed by an epidemic in real-time
 - Who is likely to be **infected next**?
 - Who presents the **greatest risk** to the population if they get infected?
 - How many **occult** (undetected) infections are there?
 - Incorporate **parameter uncertainty** into any predictions
- What is the relative importance of each **parameter** in propagating the epidemic?
- Incorporate **PROBABILITY** to better inform **control** policies

A job for the statistician...?

- Results of **forward simulation** depend on model **parameters**
- A statistical approach provides **formal** estimates for parameters **given the model**
- Historically:
 - Estimation of R_0 is relatively easy
 - Relevance to heterogeneous populations?
 - Difficult to estimate infection and removal rates together
 - Due to **missing data**

References: Bailey (1975); Becker (1989)

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Available data


- **Covariate data**
 - Location, number and type of animals, contact networks
- **Epidemiological data**
 - **Detection** times
 - **Cull** times

Premises per km²

2.146611


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● IPs




The Approach

- 1 Define a model for disease transmission in the *population*
- 2 Take prior opinion and field data - make inference on transmission and removal parameters
- 3 Use the results with forward simulation to make fully quantitative predictions



The Model

The basic assumption




- Continuous time stochastic mechanistic model
- Individual = farm

The Model

Population structure

- Historical modelling treats all infectious contacts as **equally likely**: **homogeneous mixing** and often **deterministic**
 - eg. Anderson and May 1992
- In practice, populations are **heterogeneously mixing** and highly **stochastic**
 - **Contact networks**
 - **Spatial proximity**

Transmission



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The Problem

- **Missing data!**
 - **Infection times** are not directly observed
 - What about **occult** infections?
- We can write down a statistical likelihood function for the model **conditional** on the infection times
- We **cannot** explicitly write a likelihood function if we do not observe infection times
 - Require an **expectation** over all possible infection times and occult status


A solution....

- Construct a **likelihood** describing the continuous-time stochastic epidemic
- **Bayesian** approach allows:
 - 1 Natural framework to include unobserved data by data augmentation MCMC methodology
 - Unobserved infection times
 - Occult infections
 - 2 Coherent inclusion of **Prior** information
 - Expert opinion
 - Previous disease outbreaks
- **MCMC** allows us to work in high dimensions

$$d = \dim(\beta) + [I] + [occults]$$

Infectious pressure – continuous time

- At any time t , susceptible j has **infectious pressure** exerted on it by
 - all infected farms i
 - “Background” - eg wildlife



In a small time interval Δt :

$$P(j \text{ infected}) \approx T_j \cdot \Delta t$$

$$T_j = \beta_0 + \sum_{i \in \{I_i < I_j < N_i\}} \beta_{ij}(t) + \sum_{i \in \{N_i < I_j < R_i\}} \beta_{ij}^*$$

The Model

Infection times

- **Infection times** are not directly observed
- Require data **imputation** through data augmentation
- **Notification** time is observed
 - Assume a distribution for **Infection** to **Notification** time

I → N time

$$F_D(d) = \exp[-a \cdot \exp(b \cdot d) - 1] \quad d \geq 0$$

The model

The Likelihood

- Likelihood uses a **continuous time** model:


$$f(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{N}, \mathbf{R} | \beta, a, b) = \prod_{l=1, l \neq k}^{[I]} (T_l) \cdot \exp \left[- \int_{I_k}^{T_{obs}} \left(\sum_{j=1}^{[S]} T_j \right) dt \right] \\ \times \prod_{j=1, j \neq k}^{[I]} f_D(N_j - I_j)$$

- Order $[I]^2 + [I][S]$ for update **any** β
- Order $[I] + [S]$ for updating an infection time

Statistical Inference

Inference on:

- d -dimensional vector of **transmission parameters**, β
- Unobserved data:
 - **Infection** times are never directly observed
 - **Occult** infections are individuals who are infected, but not yet detected (notified)



Prior distributions

- **Gamma** for rates ($\beta \geq 0$)
 - **Beta** for probabilities ($0 \leq p \leq 1$)
 - **Uniform** for occult status (0 or 1)
 - **Wide** range of choices for infection times (or infectious period)
-
- Priors chosen to agree with expert opinion and previous knowledge of epidemics

MCMC scheme

Repeat the following steps

- ① Model parameters β
 - ① Propose $\tilde{\beta}$ en-bloc using $MVN(\beta^{(q)}, \Sigma)$
 - ② Calculate likelihood
 - ③ Calculate acceptance probability, and accept or reject $\tilde{\beta}$ accordingly.
- ② Infection times - repeat s times:
 - ① Propose a move, add, or delete
 - ② Update likelihood
 - ③ Calculate acceptance probability, and accept or reject $I_i^{(q+1)}$ accordingly

Parallel regions in red

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Foot and Mouth 2007

- 2007 outbreak in Surrey comprising 9 'known' infected premises
- 21 farms slaughtered as Dangerous Contacts
 - Identified by Contact Tracing
- Can we identify undetected **infected** premises statistically?



UK foot and mouth disease, 2007

Foot and Mouth 2007

Data and priors

- Covariate Data
 - Location - OS Grid coords
 - Number of cattle and sheep on farm (treat pigs as sheep)
- Priors
 - Based on posteriors of Kypraios 2007

• Epidemiological Data

Premises	N	R
IP1	0	2
IP2	4	5
IP3a	40	42
IP3b	40	42
IP4	41	41.5
IP5	45	45.5
IP6	49	50
IP7	52	52.5
IP8	58	58.5

UK foot and mouth disease, 2007

Foot and Mouth 2007

Transmission model

- Use the model of Keeling et al (2001)
 - Spatial location (x,y)
 - Number of cattle
 - Number of sheep

Transmission model

$$\beta_{ij} = \left(\beta_1 n_i^{c\psi} + n_i^{s\psi} \right) \left(\beta_2 n_j^{c\psi} + n_j^{s\psi} \right) \cdot \beta_3 \cdot \frac{\delta^2}{\rho_{ij}^2 + \delta^2} \quad i \in \mathbf{I}, j \in \mathbf{S}$$


$$\beta_{ij}^* = \left(\beta_1 n_i^{c\psi} + n_i^{s\psi} \right) \left(\beta_2 n_j^{c\psi} + n_j^{s\psi} \right) \cdot \beta_4 \cdot \frac{\delta^2}{\rho_{ij}^2 + \delta^2} \quad i \in \mathbf{N}, j \in \mathbf{S}$$

UK foot and mouth disease, 2007

Foot and Mouth 2007


Infectivity and Infectious period functions

Infectivity function



(fixed - equiv to SEINR model)

Infection to Notification time




(modified by data)

UK foot and mouth disease, 2007


Parameter learning

As the epidemic progresses, parameters information grows



HPAI in UK Poultry

- Extract from **Great Britain Poultry Register** (May 2006)
- **8363** registered poultry premises after data cleaning
 - Production stock only (**10 types**)
- **3 contact networks** identified
 - Feed lorries
 - Slaughterhouse lorries
 - Company association
- OS National Grid **coordinates** for each premises



The Model

Infection rate

Inter-farm transmission rate

$$\beta_{ij} = \eta_{sp,j} \left(\beta_1 C_{ij}^{FM} + \beta_2 C_{ij}^{SH} + \beta_3 C_{ij}^{CP} + \beta_4 e^{-\beta_6 \cdot \rho[i,j]} \right) \quad i \in \mathbf{I}, j \in \mathbf{S}$$


$$\beta_{ij}^* = \eta_{sp,j} \left(\beta_5 e^{-\beta_6 \cdot \rho[i,j]} \right) \quad i \in \mathbf{N}, j \in \mathbf{S}$$

- $\eta_{sp,j}$ = susceptibility of major species on farm j
- $\beta_1 C_{ij}^{FM}$ = feedmill infection rate
- $\beta_2 C_{ij}^{SH}$ = slaughterhouse infection rate
- $\beta_3 C_{ij}^{CP}$ = company infection rate
- $\beta_{\{4,5\}} e^{-\beta_6 \cdot \rho[i,j]}$ = spatial rate between farms $\rho[i,j]$ km apart

Simulated epidemic


- **No HPAI epidemic** in the UK yet!
- **Simulate** epidemic on our dataset

Time/days	Infections
0	1
14	10
25	61
50	290
76	375




Risk Maps


“The probability of farms becoming infected given the current situation”



14 days



25 days



50 days





Table: Risk Maps

Bayesian risk prediction for HPAI in UK poultry

Bayesian guided surveillance

Speculative!

- **Active surveillance scenarios:** how should a limited active surveillance resource be targetted?
- If used: 15 farms surveyed per day, 10km radius of IPs
- Perfect on farm test, depopulated within 24h



Strategy	culled
Reactive	74.9 (723)
Random	42.7 (666)
Bayes	18.7 (417)
Bayes CT	7.04 (186)

(Brackets: upper 95% HPD)

Conclusions

- We have constructed a robust flexible likelihood-based **Bayesian approach** for real-time **parameter inference**
- Solves the problem of **censored** data in epidemics
- In conjunction with forward simulation, this provides a **powerful risk assessment resource** for use during a disease epidemic in the UK
 - **Bayesian predictive risk** easily calculated using forward simulation.
- Evidence to suggest **highly effective** for optimising allocation of limited control resource.
- Such an approach can be **easily** adopted for **other model structures** as well.

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Software development


- Developer:
 - C++ API for rapid development of application-specific analysis of epidemics
 - Modular design separates model, data, parameters, and algorithm engines (simulation, MCMC etc)
 - Open source!

- User:
 - Frontend: Flash-based web application
 - Backend: Web server, relational database server, high-performance cluster

 - User concentrates on data and outputs
 - Statistician monitors usage, MCMC mixing, intervenes if necessary
 - Software updates automatic, controlled centrally

Frontend

- Web app written using Adobe Flex (open source)
- Concept stage - input/ideas/feature requests welcome!



Road map

- How does a farm's **infectivity** build during its infection?
- Methods for coping with **uncertainty** in covariate data
- Effective models for **different data resolutions** (Spatial and Spatio-temporal Epidemiology, in print)
- Formal methods for **model diagnostics**
 - Behaviour of DIC? Sellke construction + methods from survival analysis?
- HPC - development of more effective **parallel** algorithms
- R-package BERP: Bayesian inference for Epidemic Risk Prediction

Acknowledgments

- Warwick
 - Matt Keeling
 - Mike Tildesley
 - Gareth Roberts
- Nottingham
 - Theo Kypraios
- Massey University
 - Nigel French
 - Phan Minh
 - Mark Stevenson
- Defra
- BBSRC

