

PART I a


SUBJECTIVE PROBA

Elicitation through bets

$P(A) = m(A, 1)$

Dutch book thm:
Rational being has
coherent proba

AXIOMATIC PROBA
(SE, F, P) P(A)
E[X], P(A|C)



Part I b

UTILITY

Elicitation through bets

$b(p, s; t)$

$CME m(p), U(y) = m^*(y)$

DECISION MAKING: EMV

$d^* = \operatorname{argmin}_{d \in D} E[U(d, X)]$

or $d^* = \operatorname{argmax}_{d \in D} E[R(d, X)]$

Modification to account for subjective non-linear value of money

EUP

$d^* = \operatorname{argmax}_{d \in D} E[U(d, X)]$

PREFERENCES
(B, X)

Neumann-Morgenstern theory

Modeling:
- describing means, var, etc

Preferences between actions (lots, lotteries etc)

Outcomes: $\Omega = \{\omega_1, \omega_2, \dots, \omega_n\}$

PMF $(p_i)_{i=1, \dots, n}$
Action: x (with uncertain outcomes)
 $x = b(p_1, \omega_1; p_2, \omega_2, \dots; p_n, \omega_n)$

\mathcal{A} = action space

Use bivariate relation on \mathcal{A} for (subjective) preferences

$x, y \in \mathcal{A}$

$x \succ y$ "x preferred to y"

$x \sim y$ "x indifferent to y"

$x \succeq y$ "x weakly preferred to y", also \preceq, \leq

$\alpha \geq 0$

$\alpha x + (1-\alpha)y$ combined action

Properties of bivariate relations:

What do these properties mean for preferences between actions?

Representation theorem

Peter: vN-M theory: More properties Refined repr theorem

Properties of bivariate relations

(B, \succ) also \sim, \prec

\wedge means AND
 \vee means OR
 \neg means NOT

$$(C) \forall x, y \in B \quad x \succ y \vee x \sim y \vee x \prec y$$

Completeness:

$$(A) \text{ Asymmetry: } \forall x, y \in B \quad x \succ y \Rightarrow \neg y \succ x$$

$$(T) \text{ Transitivity: } \forall x, y, z \in B \\ x \succ y \wedge y \succ z \Rightarrow x \succ z$$

$$(NT) \text{ Negative transitivity: } \forall x, y, z \in B \\ \neg x \succ y \wedge \neg y \succ z \Rightarrow \neg x \succ z$$

Properties of preferences as bivariate relations and discussion

(C) Completeness:

- Forces people to "make up their minds".
Often appropriate, but sometimes not realistic.

e.g. choose between

x_1 = "be stupid and satisfied"

x_2 = "be smart and dissatisfied"

(Original example by Savage is more dramatic: Choose whether you are hung until your health suffers or your reputation is damaged.)

The choices in these examples are

incommensurable.

An assumption necessary to achieve completeness is that the actions in B are sufficiently commensurable.

See www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/commensurable

(Can also demonstrate how to pronounce it!)

Check also Wiki pages for this term under economics, philosophy of science and mathematics.

(C) (ct)

- Another assumption on A is that the choices are available at the same time in the same place.

E.g.: x_1 = "eat foie gras" x_2 = "eat hotdog"

Surely, there will be a restaurant in NYC that offers both French haute cuisine and street food, but that is unusual!

(T) Transitivity:

- What do you want in your coffee?

People tend to be indifferent between small differences, e.g.

no sugar \sim 1 grain sugar \sim 2 grains sugar \sim ... \sim 1 spoon sugar

But this does not imply

no sugar \sim 1 spoon sugar

(Similar issue to the fact that the world is locally flat, but still not globally flat.)

(T) (ct)

- Transitivity means "no cycles".

A cycle would be this:



How realistic is the no-cycles-assumption?

Dutch book type argument says that a rational person should not have cycles in their preferences, because otherwise one could exploit this by constructing a money pump as follows:

Assume Julia's preferences are

$$x \succ y \wedge y \succ z \wedge z \succ x$$

Then she would be happy to pay some amount $\alpha_1 > 0$ to swap z for x . She would also be willing to pay then $\alpha_2 > 0$ to swap z for y , and then $\alpha_3 > 0$ to swap y for x . So she is back to x and has lost $\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha_3$! Continue this and she will end up losing any arbitrary amount of money.

(T) (ct)

An example for how this can be exploited by sellers of whatever goods is this:

Purchase of a smart phone

Evaluate preferences using ranks (1 best)

	Design	Function	Price
iphone	1	2	3
jphone	2	3	1
kphone	3	1	2

and say $x \succ y$ iff majority of criteria in x is better than in y . This yields

$$i \succ j \wedge j \succ k \wedge k \succ i$$

which is cyclic.

Hence, smart phone preferences may not be transitive.

This explains why (most) people buying smart phones can be exploited using money pump techniques explained above.