Optimal stopping: monotonicity in y

Game of stopping and control 00000

Conclusion

# On a zero-sum game of stopping and control

Adriana Ocejo Joint work with S. Assing and S.D. Jacka University of Warwick

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Optimal stopping: monotonicity in *y* 

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Motivation • O O • O O Optimal stopping: monotonicity in y

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# Optimal stopping with regime switching volatility

• Dynamics:

$$dX_t = X_t (Y_t dB_t + \mu dt),$$

with  $\mu \in \mathbb{R}$ ; *Y* is a continuous time MC with finite state space  $S = \{1, 2, ..., d\}.$ 

Consider the value function

$$v(x,y) = \sup_{\tau} \mathbb{E}_{x,y} e^{-\alpha \tau} g(X_{\tau}),$$

where  $\alpha > 0$  and *g* is measurable.

- Typical examples in American option pricing:
  - Put option,  $g(x) = \max{K x, 0}$
  - Call option,  $g(x) = \max\{x K, 0\}$





Guo and Zhang (2004), Jobert and Rogers (2006): Perpetual American put option.

• The optimal strategy is of the form

 $\tau^* = \inf\{t \ge 0 : X_t \le b[Y_t]\}$ 

- The *thresholds* b[i],  $1 \le i \le d$ , are unknown in principle.
- An algebraic algorithm is given to compute v(x, y), assuming that the b[i]'s are given and in a specific order. But there are d! possible orderings!
- Numerical examples in these papers suggest that the thresholds *may be monotone*.

Question 1: can we show that the thresholds are monotone? YES!... To the extent that Y is skip-free.





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Intuitive fact:

The faster X moves (due to larger Y), the sooner X reaches the high values of g.

#### Theorem

Suppose Y is a skip-free MC and  $g \ge 0$  and measurable. If either  $\mu = 0$  or g is non-increasing, then  $v(x, \cdot)$  is non-decreasing.

This in turn yields the unique order

 $b[1] \geq b[2] \geq \ldots \geq b[d].$ 

Otherwise,  $\exists x : b[i] < x \le b[i+1]$  for some *i*, leading to the contradiction:

$$v(x,i) > g(x) = v(x,i+1).$$

<u>Question 2:</u> if *Y* is a diffusion, is  $y \mapsto v(x, y)$  monotone? YESI... under suitable assumptions, but same intuition.





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### Parameter uncertainty

• Dynamics:

$$dX_t = \sigma(X_t) Y_t^{\pi} dB_t,$$
  
$$dY_t^{\pi} = \eta(Y_t^{\pi}) dB_t^{Y} + \pi_t dt.$$

 Parameter π is only known to be in the class A of predictable processes π = (π<sub>t</sub>)<sub>t≥0</sub> such that

$$0 \leq a(Y_t) \leq \pi_t \leq b(Y_t).$$

 $\sigma, \eta, a, b$  are real-valued continuous functions and  $a(\cdot) \leq b(\cdot)$ .

• Description of the game:







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#### Question 3: does the game have a value? That is, is it true that

$$\sup_{\tau} \inf_{\pi} E_{x,y} e^{-\alpha \tau} g(X_{\tau}^{\pi}) = \inf_{\pi} \sup_{\tau} E_{x,y} e^{-\alpha \tau} g(X_{\tau}^{\pi})?$$

• We show the existence of a saddle point  $(\hat{\tau}, \hat{\pi})$ , that is,

$$\mathbb{E}_{x,y}[e^{-\alpha\tau}g(X^{\hat{\pi}}_{\tau})] \leq \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{x,y}[e^{-\alpha\hat{\tau}}g(X^{\hat{\pi}}_{\hat{\tau}})]}_{\text{value}} \leq \mathbb{E}_{x,y}[e^{-\alpha\hat{\tau}}g(X^{\pi}_{\hat{\tau}})]$$

for all stopping rules  $\tau$  and controls  $\pi$ .

- Intuitive guess:
  - $\hat{\pi}_t = a(Y_t),$
  - $\hat{\tau}$  the optimal stopping rule for the problem  $\sup_{\tau} \mathbb{E}_{x,y} e^{-\alpha \tau} g(X_{\tau}^{\hat{\pi}})$ .
- The value of the game may be interpreted as the price of an American-type option in the
  - worst-case scenario for the writer (seller), or
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# Monotonicity: diffusion case

• Let (X, Y) have dynamics (weakly unique solution)

$$X_t = X_0 + \int_0^t \sigma(X_s) Y_s dB_s, \qquad Y_t = Y_0 + \int_0^t \eta(Y_s) dB_s^Y + \int_0^t \theta(Y_s) ds.$$

with values in  $\mathbb{R} \times S$ , where  $S \subseteq (0, \infty)$ .

• Consider 
$$v(x,y) = \sup_{\tau} E_{x,y} e^{-\alpha \tau} g(X_{\tau}),$$

g is only assumed to be non-negative and measurable.

• We apply time-change and coupling techniques to show that

 $y \mapsto v(x, y)$  is monotone.

- Method of proof inspired by (amongst others)
  - E. Ekström (2004),
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### Time-change heuristics

• We can rewrite

$$X_t = x + \int_0^t \sigma(X_s) dM_s,$$
 where  $M_t = \int_0^t Y_s dB_s.$ 

- *M* defines a time-change  $\Gamma = \langle M \rangle^{-1}$ .
- Assuming  $\langle M \rangle_{\infty} = \infty$ ,  $G = X \circ \Gamma$ ,  $\xi = Y \circ \Gamma$  satisfy

$$G_t = x + \int_0^t \sigma(G_s) \, dW_s, \qquad \xi_t = y + \int_0^t \eta(\xi_s) \, \xi_s^{-1} \, dW_s^{\xi} + \int_0^t \pi(\xi_s) \, \xi_s^{-2} \, ds.$$

• Heuristically, set  $A = \Gamma^{-1}$  and  $\rho = A_{\tau}$  so that

 $E_{x,y} e^{-\alpha \tau} g(X_{\tau}) \longleftrightarrow E_{x,y} e^{-\alpha \Gamma_{A_{\tau}}} g(G_{A_{\tau}}) \longleftrightarrow E_{x,y} e^{-\alpha \Gamma_{\rho}} g(G_{\rho})$ 

• Advantage: G does NOT depend on Y.



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# Time-change

- Assume that there is a unique non-exploding strong solution in  $\mathbb{R}\times\mathcal{S}$  for:

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on some  $(\tilde{\Omega}, \tilde{\mathcal{F}}, \tilde{P})$  carrying  $(W, W^{\xi})$  with natural, augmented filtration  $(\tilde{\mathcal{F}}_t)$ .

• Simple path-comparison: for  $0 < y \le y'$ ,

$$0 < \xi_t \leq \xi_t', \quad t \geq 0$$
 a.s.

by strong uniqueness.

• Define  $\Gamma_t = \int_0^t \xi_s^{-2} ds$ ,  $\Gamma'_t = \int_0^t (\xi'_s)^{-2} ds$  so that  $\Gamma_t \ge \Gamma'_t$  and also define

$$ilde{X} = G \circ A, \ ilde{Y} = \xi \circ A; \qquad ilde{X}' = G \circ A', \ ilde{Y}' = \xi' \circ A$$

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# Coupling

• We constructed  $(\tilde{X}, \tilde{Y})$  and  $(\tilde{X}', \tilde{Y}')$  on  $(\tilde{\Omega}, \tilde{\mathcal{F}}, \tilde{P})$  such that

$$(\tilde{X}, \tilde{Y}) \stackrel{law}{=} \underbrace{(X, Y)}_{\text{under } P_{x,y}}$$
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It remains to establish

$$v(x,y) = \sup_{
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where  $\mathcal{M}$  is the class of stopping times  $\rho$  w.r.t.  $(\tilde{\mathcal{F}}_t)_{t\geq 0}$ . Similarly for v(x, y').

• Since  $\Gamma_t \geq \Gamma'_t$ , for all  $t \geq 0$ ,

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Game of stopping and control

# "Back to the game"

We show the existence of a saddle point  $(\hat{\tau}, \hat{\pi})$ , that is,

$$\mathbb{E}_{x,y}[e^{-\alpha\tau}g(X^{\hat{\pi}}_{\tau})] \leq \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{x,y}[e^{-\alpha\hat{\tau}}g(X^{\hat{\pi}}_{\hat{\tau}})]}_{\text{value}} \leq \mathbb{E}_{x,y}[e^{-\alpha\hat{\tau}}g(X^{\pi}_{\hat{\tau}})]$$

for all stopping rules  $\tau$  and controls  $\pi$ .

Assume

- g is continuous, non-negative and bounded (for convenience).
- $(X^{\hat{\pi}}, Y^{\hat{\pi}})$  is a strong solution of

$$dX_t = \sigma(X_t) Y_t dB_s, \qquad dY_t = \eta(Y_t) dB_t^Y + \hat{\pi}(Y_t) dt.$$

Recall. Intuitive guess:

 $- \hat{\pi}_t = a(Y_t),$ 

-  $\hat{\tau}$  the optimal stopping rule for  $\hat{v}(x,y) = \sup_{\tau} \mathbb{E}_{x,y} e^{-\alpha \tau} g(X_{\tau}^{\hat{\pi}})$ :

 $\hat{\tau} = \hat{\tau}^{x,y,\pi} = \inf\{t \ge \mathbf{0} : (X_t^{\pi}, Y_t^{\pi}) \notin \mathcal{C}\}$ 



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Game of stopping and control

# "Back to the game"

We show the existence of a saddle point  $(\hat{\tau}, \hat{\pi})$ , that is,

$$\mathbb{E}_{x,y}[e^{-\alpha\tau}g(X^{\hat{\pi}}_{\tau})] \leq \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{x,y}[e^{-\alpha\hat{\tau}}g(X^{\hat{\pi}}_{\hat{\tau}})]}_{\text{value}} \leq \mathbb{E}_{x,y}[e^{-\alpha\hat{\tau}}g(X^{\pi}_{\hat{\tau}})]$$

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## Bellman's principle

#### Define

$$u(x,y):=\inf_{\pi}E_{x,y}e^{-\alpha\hat{\tau}}g(X_{\hat{\tau}}^{\pi}).$$

Bellman's principle:

 $e^{-\alpha \hat{\tau} \wedge t} u(X_{\hat{\tau} \wedge t}^{\pi}, Y_{\hat{\tau} \wedge t}^{\pi})$  is a submartingale for arbitrary  $\pi$  and a martingale for the optimal.

Candidate value function is

$$w(x,y) := E_{x,y} e^{-\alpha \hat{\tau}} g(X_{\hat{\tau}}).$$



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# Optimality of $\hat{\pi} = a$

Recall that  $\pi \in \mathcal{A}$  satisfies  $0 \leq a(Y_t) \leq \pi_t \leq b(Y_t)$ .

- Note that  $w(x,y) \equiv \sup_{\tau} E_{x,y} e^{-\alpha \tau} g(X_{\tau}^{\hat{\pi}})$  and so
  - $w(x, \cdot)$  is non-decreasing.

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$$(\mathbb{L}^{\hat{\pi}} w - \alpha w)(x, y) = 0$$
 for  $(x, y) \in \mathcal{C}$  where

$$\mathbb{L}^{\hat{\pi}} w(x,y) = \frac{1}{2} w_{xx}(x,y) \sigma^2(x) y^2 + \frac{1}{2} w_{yy}(x,y) \eta(y)^2 + w_y(x,y) \hat{\pi}(y).$$

• Since  $\pi_t \geq \hat{\pi}_t$  and  $w_y \geq 0$  we have

$$(L_t^{\pi} w - \alpha w) \ge (\mathbb{L}^{\hat{\pi}} w - \alpha w) = 0$$
 in  $\mathcal{C}$ .

Using a localization argument, the process

$$N_t(\pi) := e^{-\alpha \hat{\tau} \wedge t} w(X_{\hat{\tau} \wedge t}^{\pi}, Y_{\hat{\tau} \wedge t}^{\pi})$$

stopped at  $\tau_R$  = first exit from the open ball of radius *R*, is a submartingale.

• Dominated convergence (g is bounded) yields, as  $R \to \infty$ ,

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# Conclusion

- 1. Value function v(x, y) of the optimal stopping problem associated to  $\hat{\pi}$  is monotone in *y*.
- 2. By time-change we transfer
  - dependance of X on  $y \longrightarrow$  dependance of  $\Gamma$  on y
- 3. By coupling we compare the time-changes  $\Gamma$  pathwise.
- 4. Bellman's principle establishes the existence of a saddle point.

### THANK YOU!



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