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<!DOCTYPE TEI.2 SYSTEM "base.dtd">




<title>The Kulturkampf</title></titleStmt>

<publicationStmt><distributor>BASE and Oxford Text Archive</distributor>


<availability><p>The British Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading, under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Centre for English Language Teacher Education, Warwick) and Paul Thompson

(Department of Applied Linguistics, Reading), with funding from BALEAP,

EURALEX, the British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. The

original recordings are held at the Universities of Warwick and Reading, and

at the Oxford Text Archive and may be consulted by bona fide researchers

upon written application to any of the holding bodies.

The BASE corpus is freely available to researchers who agree to the

following conditions:</p>

<p>1. The recordings and transcriptions should not be modified in any


<p>2. The recordings and transcriptions should be used for research purposes

only; they should not be reproduced in teaching materials</p>

<p>3. The recordings and transcriptions should not be reproduced in full for

a wider audience/readership, although researchers are free to quote short

passages of text (up to 200 running words from any given speech event)</p>

<p>4. The corpus developers should be informed of all presentations or

publications arising from analysis of the corpus</p><p>

Researchers should acknowledge their use of the corpus using the following

form of words:

The recordings and transcriptions used in this study come from the British

Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus, which was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Warwick) and Paul Thompson (Reading). Corpus development was assisted by

funding from the Universities of Warwick and Reading, BALEAP, EURALEX, the

British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. </p></availability>




<recording dur="00:56:23" n="6400">


<respStmt><name>BASE team</name>



<langUsage><language id="en">English</language>

<language id="de">German</language>



<person id="nm0076" role="main speaker" n="n" sex="m"><p>nm0076, main speaker, non-student, male</p></person>

<person id="sm0077" role="participant" n="s" sex="m"><p>sm0077, participant, student, male</p></person>

<personGrp id="ss" role="audience" size="m"><p>ss, audience, medium group </p></personGrp>

<personGrp id="sl" role="all" size="m"><p>sl, all, medium group</p></personGrp>

<personGrp role="speakers" size="4"><p>number of speakers: 4</p></personGrp>





<item n="speechevent">Lecture</item>

<item n="acaddept">History</item>

<item n="acaddiv">ah</item>

<item n="partlevel">UG2</item>

<item n="module">Wilhelmine Germany</item>




<u who="nm0076"> okay <pause dur="2.1"/> what i want to talk to <pause dur="0.2"/> you about today <pause dur="0.2"/> is <pause dur="0.3"/> the <pause dur="0.2"/> so-called Kulturkampf <pause dur="0.6"/> the struggle for culture <pause dur="1.6"/> which </u><pause dur="0.6"/> <u who="sm0077" trans="pause"> we haven't got any handouts </u><pause dur="1.8"/> <u who="nm0076" trans="pause"> they should have been passed round there are lots <pause dur="6.4"/> would be helpful if people rather than sitting on a pile of them actually <pause dur="0.5"/> passed them round <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="3.1"/> so Kulturkampf the so-called struggle for culture <pause dur="0.4"/> in which <pause dur="1.3"/> Bismarck <pause dur="0.7"/> and the machinery of the newly <pause dur="1.1"/> united German state and in particular Prussia which remains <pause dur="0.6"/> the dominant partner within the newly united German state <pause dur="0.6"/> essentially persecute the Catholic Church <pause dur="1.6"/> now you might ask why <pause dur="0.5"/> this is <pause dur="0.3"/> important why it merits a lecture on its own right <pause dur="1.2"/> and <pause dur="0.4"/> in a sense in the general scheme of things it probably isn't as important as the <pause dur="0.4"/> outbreak of the First World War <pause dur="0.3"/> or the partitions of Poland <pause dur="0.6"/> or the <pause dur="0.4"/> Austro-Prussian war of eighteen-sixty-six or the Franco-Prussian war of eighteen-seventy seventy-one <pause dur="0.9"/> but i think it's very important to look at as a very good example <pause dur="0.6"/> of the sort of problems <pause dur="0.4"/> that were faced by

the newly united German state problems of shaping identity <pause dur="0.3"/> problems of dealing with what remains a very diverse population <pause dur="1.7"/> i also think it's <pause dur="0.8"/> an interesting subject as a very good example as a good case study <pause dur="1.1"/> highlighting the personality <pause dur="0.4"/> of <pause dur="0.2"/> Bismarck the dominant figure <pause dur="0.5"/> in the first twenty years of the united German state <pause dur="0.2"/> much as he'd been the dominant figure <pause dur="0.6"/> in <pause dur="0.7"/> the previous <pause dur="0.6"/> ten fifteen <pause dur="0.2"/> years <pause dur="0.4"/> in <pause dur="0.3"/> the Prussian state <pause dur="3.5"/> it <pause dur="0.4"/> is a good example of his ability to manoeuvre politically <pause dur="0.5"/> and of his <pause dur="0.5"/> tensions <pause dur="0.2"/> the tensions that exist in his mind <pause dur="0.3"/> between a basic ideological position <pause dur="0.8"/> and <pause dur="0.3"/> a position of political expedience <pause dur="2.0"/> i think it's also important because it locates problems of the new German state <pause dur="0.5"/> more broadly <pause dur="0.9"/> within <pause dur="1.3"/> debates that are going on <pause dur="0.4"/> not only in central Europe but across Europe as a whole <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="2.1"/> the issue of church-state relations <pause dur="0.2"/> is in my opinion more important in the late nineteenth century <pause dur="0.4"/> than any debates over <pause dur="0.3"/> class or the social question <pause dur="0.2"/> what determines people's

political views is first and foremost <pause dur="0.5"/> in the eighteen-seventies eighties probably eighteen-nineties <pause dur="0.2"/> still primarily <pause dur="0.2"/> religious <pause dur="0.2"/> views <pause dur="1.2"/> and i think the Kulturkampf this struggle between the Catholic Church and the Prussian state <pause dur="0.3"/> is a very clear example of this <pause dur="1.4"/> it shows that the problems faced by <pause dur="0.4"/> the newly united German state are problems that are shared by many other European countries <pause dur="1.4"/> and yet at the same time while it does reveal <pause dur="0.7"/> the similarities between Germany <pause dur="0.5"/> and the rest of the Europe <pause dur="1.0"/> it also can be used to highlight what two <pause dur="0.8"/> eminent historians in the nineteen-eighties described as the peculiarities of German history <pause dur="0.6"/> it highlights that there that Germany in some senses <pause dur="0.3"/> is rather different from other European states the solutions that are taken to deal <pause dur="0.2"/> with the Catholic question <pause dur="0.5"/> are <pause dur="0.4"/> specific <pause dur="0.3"/> to <pause dur="0.3"/> Prussia <pause dur="0.4"/> and <pause dur="1.0"/> to lesser extent Germany as a whole <pause dur="0.8"/> and reveal some of the problems that there are for example <pause dur="0.8"/> with <pause dur="0.6"/> liberalism <pause dur="0.7"/> in <pause dur="0.2"/> Germany <pause dur="0.4"/> that liberalism is a rather

different phenomenon in Germany from other European countries <pause dur="3.5"/> i'll begin by simply running through the <pause dur="0.3"/> key <pause dur="0.3"/> events <pause dur="0.7"/> of the so-called Kulturkampf the <pause dur="0.8"/> battle for civilization the battle for culture <pause dur="0.2"/> struggle for culture <pause dur="0.6"/> in <pause dur="2.5"/> Prussia and Germany <pause dur="0.5"/> during the eighteen-seventies <pause dur="2.4"/> it should be remembered that in eighteen-sixty-seven <pause dur="1.4"/> it was <pause dur="0.2"/> agreed <pause dur="1.5"/> that <pause dur="1.1"/> in the North German Confederation <pause dur="0.3"/> the newly created North German Confederation <pause dur="1.1"/> religious matters were the preserve of <pause dur="0.4"/> the individual states of the Confederation <pause dur="0.2"/> rather than the Confederation as a whole <pause dur="0.8"/> and this measure is extended <pause dur="0.5"/> to <pause dur="0.4"/> the German Reich when it comes into being in eighteen-seventy-one <pause dur="1.4"/> that the <pause dur="0.9"/> states of Bavaria <pause dur="1.1"/> or Württemburg <pause dur="0.7"/> or Prussia <pause dur="0.6"/> actually maintained their own religious policies there was not an imperial religious policy <pause dur="4.0"/> now in March eighteen-seventy-one <pause dur="1.5"/> the Centre Party <pause dur="0.6"/> which is a party that's emerged <pause dur="0.9"/> amongst <pause dur="0.2"/> Hanoverians <pause dur="0.7"/> after eighteen-sixty-six <pause dur="1.3"/> anxious to minimize the impact <pause dur="0.5"/> of Prussian dominance over the

Hanoverian state <pause dur="1.4"/> and that has subsequently become a focus for Catholic <pause dur="0.3"/> opposition <pause dur="0.3"/> to the way in which Germany has been united <pause dur="1.3"/> in March eighteen-seventy-one the Centre Party <pause dur="0.2"/> the so-called Zentrum <pause dur="1.8"/> calls in the Imperial Diet <pause dur="0.5"/> that's the <pause dur="0.2"/> whole German Diet <pause dur="1.2"/> for the establishment <pause dur="0.5"/> of <pause dur="0.9"/> basic rights <pause dur="0.4"/> in the constitution <pause dur="2.2"/> now remember that in eighteen-forty-eight forty-nine the liberals in Frankfurt had established a Bill of Basic Rights <pause dur="0.9"/> and this includes <pause dur="0.2"/> the right <pause dur="0.4"/> to freedom of worship <pause dur="3.5"/> this <pause dur="0.9"/> call <pause dur="0.5"/> by the Centre Party <pause dur="0.8"/> for a Bill of Rights <pause dur="0.7"/> is significantly <pause dur="0.3"/> rejected by almost every other <pause dur="0.4"/> political party <pause dur="0.5"/> in the Imperial Diet <pause dur="1.3"/> the National Liberals <pause dur="0.2"/> and the Progressives <pause dur="1.5"/> side with the Conservatives <pause dur="0.7"/> and the two <pause dur="0.2"/> members of the S-P-D the Socialist Party the <trunc>n</trunc> the the nascent Socialist Party <pause dur="0.6"/> in <pause dur="0.2"/> rejecting <pause dur="0.3"/> a Bill of Rights <pause dur="1.5"/> so you have a broad spectrum from the extreme left to the extreme right who also we don't want a Bill of Basic Rights <pause dur="0.3"/> and the reason they do this <pause dur="0.3"/> is they

see it as special <pause dur="0.2"/> pleading <pause dur="0.5"/> for the interest of the Catholic Church <pause dur="1.0"/> they realize what the Centre Party really wants <pause dur="0.2"/> is a defence of the interests of Catholicism and they feel that this can best be done <pause dur="0.3"/> by defending individuals' rights <pause dur="0.2"/> therefore individuals can <trunc>c</trunc> choose <pause dur="0.3"/> their <trunc>re</trunc> religious affiliation <pause dur="0.2"/> and that can enable them to defend their own church's position within the German Reich <pause dur="1.8"/> so it's rejected by everyone <pause dur="1.0"/> they all gang up on the Catholics <pause dur="2.9"/> in June <pause dur="0.9"/> eighteen-seventy-two <pause dur="3.2"/> a guy named Adalbert Falk <pause dur="0.3"/> his name is on the <pause dur="0.5"/> handout <pause dur="0.8"/> was appointed as Prussian <pause dur="0.3"/> Minister of Culture <pause dur="0.3"/> Education and Church Affairs <pause dur="1.8"/> and the period <pause dur="0.3"/> that's known as <pause dur="0.2"/> the period of Kampfgesetze the period of the struggle <pause dur="1.2"/> against the Catholic Church is well and truly launched <pause dur="2.0"/> legislation <pause dur="0.2"/> aimed <pause dur="0.3"/> at reducing the power influence and autonomy <pause dur="0.2"/> of the Catholic Church <pause dur="0.9"/> is subsequently passed <pause dur="0.5"/> both in the Prussian Landtag <pause dur="1.0"/> both in the Prussian <pause dur="0.2"/> elect assembly <pause dur="0.4"/> and in the Reichstag <pause dur="0.9"/> of <pause dur="0.4"/> the whole of united

Germany <pause dur="3.6"/> in fact <pause dur="0.3"/> persecution <pause dur="0.3"/> of the Catholics <pause dur="0.4"/> had already begun in a sense <pause dur="1.5"/> the previous year <pause dur="2.3"/> in <pause dur="0.2"/> January eighteen-seventy-one <pause dur="2.0"/> the Catholic section <pause dur="0.6"/> of the Prussian Minister of <trunc>cul</trunc> Ministry of Culture <pause dur="1.4"/> which looked after <pause dur="0.2"/> the interests of the Catholic Church in Prussia remember that Prussia has a significant Catholic population <pause dur="0.2"/> particularly in the Rhineland <pause dur="1.0"/> was abolished <pause dur="0.7"/> in other words the <trunc>ins</trunc> the the section of the Minister of <pause dur="0.4"/> Culture <pause dur="1.0"/> that protects the interests of Prussia's Catholics <pause dur="1.1"/> is done away with <pause dur="3.8"/> the argument being <pause dur="1.0"/> that <pause dur="0.4"/> the <pause dur="3.0"/> Catholic section <pause dur="0.2"/> represented the interests of the church and not the state that it was a special <pause dur="0.3"/> it was a special body <pause dur="0.2"/> just representing <pause dur="0.5"/> a <trunc>mino</trunc> minority a religious minority of the <pause dur="1.6"/> Prussian population <pause dur="1.8"/> what possibly lay behind its <trunc>abol</trunc> abolition however <pause dur="0.6"/> was the fact that its leader obviously a Catholic <pause dur="0.5"/> Albert Krätzig <pause dur="1.4"/> was perceived as being pro-Polish <pause dur="1.3"/> and remember that the <pause dur="1.8"/> Minister-President of Prussia <pause dur="1.6"/> Chancellor of the

New Reich <pause dur="1.0"/> Bismarck <pause dur="0.4"/> is passionately anti-Polish he sees the Poles as a fundamental problem <pause dur="0.3"/> within <pause dur="0.3"/> the Prussian <pause dur="0.2"/> state <pause dur="0.2"/> and indeed within the new united Germany <pause dur="0.3"/> he sees the Poles as enemies of the state <pause dur="1.4"/> he also has a essentially racialist view <pause dur="0.4"/> that the Poles are subhuman remember this quotation that could almost come of the come out of Hitler <pause dur="0.4"/> that it's not the Poles' fault <pause dur="0.8"/> just as it's not the wolf's fault <pause dur="0.3"/> but we shoot the wolf nonetheless <pause dur="0.6"/> he somehow thinks they all are subhuman <pause dur="0.3"/> they're inferior <pause dur="0.3"/> but he sees them as a fundamental challenge <pause dur="0.2"/> to the integrity of the Reich <pause dur="0.3"/> and to the integrity of Prussia <pause dur="0.5"/> so <pause dur="0.2"/> the fact that the Catholic section <pause dur="0.4"/> is headed by someone who's sympathetic towards the Poles and the Poles are of course <pause dur="0.4"/> Catholic <pause dur="1.2"/> means that <pause dur="0.3"/> Bismarck is keen to do away with it <pause dur="2.2"/> but the more significant piece of legislation <pause dur="0.4"/> in November <pause dur="0.3"/> eighteen-seventy-one <pause dur="0.9"/> is the Pulpit Law <pause dur="1.8"/> which imposes <pause dur="0.2"/> criminal penalties <pause dur="0.6"/> on priests <pause dur="0.3"/> who are <pause dur="0.2"/> convicted <pause dur="0.4"/> of <pause dur="1.1"/> electioneering through the pulpit <pause dur="0.4"/> in other words priests <pause dur="0.3"/> who preach sermons <pause dur="0.2"/> which are perceived as having a political content <pause dur="0.5"/> can be fined <pause dur="0.4"/> and in extremis <pause dur="0.4"/> sacked or thrown into prison <pause dur="1.1"/>

and that's a very significant law which i will return to later <pause dur="2.6"/> in eighteen-seventy-two <pause dur="1.8"/> religious control of schools inspectors <pause dur="0.4"/> in Prussia <pause dur="0.5"/> is replaced <pause dur="0.4"/> by state <pause dur="0.7"/> inspectors <pause dur="2.5"/> Prussian schools in other words are removed entirely from clerical control <pause dur="1.2"/> the most powerful of all Catholic orders the Jesuits <pause dur="1.0"/> are banned from establishing institutions in Germany <pause dur="1.5"/> new institutions <pause dur="0.4"/> and individual states in Germany <pause dur="0.3"/> begin a policy of expulsion of the Jesuits <pause dur="2.4"/> almost all the states with Protestant majorities kicked the Jesuits out <pause dur="2.7"/> and then in eighteen-seventy-three the so-called May Laws are launched <pause dur="2.4"/> priests <pause dur="0.2"/> who had formerly Catholic priests who had formerly trained in seminaries <pause dur="1.8"/> are now forced to study <pause dur="0.2"/> first of all at a state Gymnasium a state grammar school and then <pause dur="0.2"/> at a <pause dur="0.3"/> state-run <pause dur="0.2"/> university <pause dur="1.3"/> in other words <pause dur="0.4"/> whereas

previously the church had very considerable influence <pause dur="0.2"/> over <pause dur="1.6"/> the <pause dur="0.8"/> educational establishment <pause dur="0.2"/> of the schooling <pause dur="0.2"/> of people in Prussia particularly in Catholic areas <pause dur="0.4"/> you now have the state <pause dur="0.3"/> controlling <pause dur="0.2"/> the education of priests <pause dur="0.4"/> the positions have been reversed <pause dur="2.3"/> priests <pause dur="0.4"/> have their <pause dur="1.3"/> young impressionable minds <pause dur="0.3"/> controlled <pause dur="0.3"/> by <pause dur="1.0"/> state officials state employers <pause dur="2.5"/> and not only that just in case <pause dur="1.5"/> clergy <pause dur="0.4"/> come out <pause dur="0.5"/> still thinking independently <pause dur="0.9"/> the state is given the right of veto <pause dur="0.3"/> over all appointments <pause dur="0.4"/> to church positions <pause dur="1.6"/> in other words the power of the state over the church is beefed up immeasurably <pause dur="2.7"/> the following year in eighteen-seventy-four <pause dur="1.0"/> civil marriage <pause dur="0.2"/> is introduced <pause dur="2.2"/> and all states <pause dur="0.4"/> in the German Confederation are empowered <pause dur="0.2"/> to expel clergy who they perceive as troublesome <pause dur="6.1"/> the following year <pause dur="0.2"/> the Prussian Landtag <pause dur="1.6"/> suspends <pause dur="0.4"/> subsidies <pause dur="0.2"/> to the church <pause dur="2.3"/> in any diocese <pause dur="0.2"/> where <pause dur="0.2"/> the clergy <pause dur="0.3"/> have been found to criticize the state's legislation <pause dur="1.9"/> and religious orders <pause dur="0.9"/> communities of nuns and friars and monks <pause dur="0.8"/>

are dissolved <pause dur="0.7"/> except when they're involved in nursing so contemplative and teaching orders <pause dur="1.7"/> get closed down <pause dur="3.3"/> the response to this is widespread Catholic agitation <pause dur="0.2"/> and resistance <pause dur="1.0"/> which leads to <pause dur="0.3"/> the sacking the expulsion and the imprisonment of clergy <pause dur="0.4"/> across the Catholic regions of Prussia <pause dur="1.2"/> and to a lesser extent in some of the other German states <pause dur="0.6"/> by eighteen-seventy-six <pause dur="1.2"/> one-thousand-four-hundred parishes <pause dur="0.3"/> in Prussia had no priests <pause dur="1.1"/> and between eighteen-seventy-six and eighteen-seventy-nine <pause dur="0.7"/> there is a state of <pause dur="0.5"/> to say it's war would be exaggeration but there is a <trunc>s</trunc> a state of <pause dur="0.5"/> incredible <pause dur="0.2"/> hostility <pause dur="0.6"/> between the Catholic Church and Catholic believers on the one hand <pause dur="0.8"/> and the mechanisms of the Prussian state and the Prussian bureaucracy on the other <pause dur="1.3"/> civil disobedience <pause dur="0.3"/> protests <pause dur="0.5"/> widespread hostility <pause dur="5.6"/> suddenly <pause dur="0.5"/> in eighteen-seventy-nine <pause dur="0.8"/> Bismarck <pause dur="0.9"/> changes his position <pause dur="1.3"/> and relents <pause dur="1.0"/> and the vast majority of this legislation <pause dur="0.4"/> is done away with and jettisoned <pause dur="1.4"/> and members of the Catholic Centre

Party <pause dur="0.8"/> are allowed <pause dur="0.2"/> into government posts <pause dur="1.6"/> so this begs two questions first of all <pause dur="0.3"/> why between eighteen-seventy-one and eighteen-seventy-eight seventy-nine <pause dur="0.6"/> does Bismarck and the new Prussian state <pause dur="0.7"/> basically put the boot in fairly bloody seriously <pause dur="0.5"/> on the Catholic Church <pause dur="0.4"/> and why <pause dur="0.7"/> having <pause dur="0.4"/> attacked the Catholic Church <pause dur="0.3"/> labelled Catholics as enemies both of the Prussian state and the New Reich <pause dur="0.6"/> is there this sudden volte-face <pause dur="1.0"/> this turnaround <pause dur="0.6"/> and this <trunc>abi</trunc> this desire <pause dur="0.2"/> to <pause dur="0.6"/> pacify the Catholics <pause dur="0.2"/> do deals with them <pause dur="0.4"/> even let them into government <pause dur="0.5"/> what's going on here <pause dur="2.2"/> well i think there are a number of ways of looking at the Kulturkampf <pause dur="1.7"/> and one way to see it <pause dur="0.5"/> is simply as part of a <pause dur="0.2"/> historical conflict <pause dur="2.9"/> since the Reformation <pause dur="2.3"/> since the early fifteen-hundreds since Luther first starts causing trouble in fifteen-seventeen <pause dur="1.0"/> Germany <pause dur="0.2"/> had been divided religiously <pause dur="3.6"/> between fifteen-twenty and fifteen-fifty-five <pause dur="0.2"/> scarcely a year went past without some form of religious conflict and

when i say religious conflict this involves bloodshed <pause dur="0.4"/> this involves major wars <pause dur="1.9"/> by fifteen-fifty-five <pause dur="0.2"/> an uneasy modus vivendi had been established <pause dur="0.9"/> in which basically it's decided that the rulers of Germany's various <pause dur="0.4"/> petty princedoms <pause dur="0.7"/> can decide what religion they want to be whether they want to be Lutheran or Catholic <pause dur="0.4"/> and then unless you live in in in <pause dur="0.2"/> an imperial free city <pause dur="0.5"/> you have to <pause dur="0.9"/> follow the religion <pause dur="0.7"/> of your ruler <pause dur="0.2"/> or get the hell out of the state <pause dur="1.8"/> i mean this does occasionally lead to oddities in which a <trunc>r</trunc> in in which a <pause dur="0.2"/> successor to the throne suddenly says well <pause dur="0.8"/> i think i'm turning Lutheran <pause dur="1.2"/> and the population that's been happily Catholic for the previous <pause dur="0.3"/> twenty thirty years suddenly think <pause dur="0.3"/> oh Christ you know <pause dur="0.4"/> what do we do now do we get out do we stay do we turn Lutheran so there's quite a lot of notional changes <pause dur="0.3"/> where people actually <pause dur="0.2"/> retain <pause dur="1.1"/> basically old religious beliefs and make a sort of <trunc>s</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="1.6"/> a façade <pause dur="0.3"/> of <pause dur="0.4"/> holding <pause dur="0.5"/> # a different religious creed <pause dur="0.6"/>

but essentially by fifteen-fifty-five by the Peace of Augsburg <pause dur="0.4"/> there is <pause dur="0.3"/> an uneasy <pause dur="1.7"/> # modus vivendi in the German states <pause dur="1.8"/> during the Thirty Years War <pause dur="0.6"/> of <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>s</trunc> sixteen-eighteen to forty-eight <pause dur="0.8"/> that breaks down <pause dur="0.3"/> largely because of the rise of Calvinism <pause dur="0.7"/> so there are two sorts of Protestant faiths <pause dur="0.6"/> the Calvinists and the Lutherans who don't see eye to eye <pause dur="0.3"/> about the one thing the Lutherans do agree with the Catholics over <pause dur="0.2"/> is hating Calvinists <pause dur="0.6"/> and so there is a breakdown <pause dur="0.2"/> in church-state <pause dur="0.3"/> # there's again a breakdown in religious relations <pause dur="0.3"/> and although you'll find Catholics <pause dur="0.5"/> in alliance with Protestants during the Thirty Years War on occasion <pause dur="0.3"/> there is a strong undercurrent of religious hostility <pause dur="0.5"/> that lasts <pause dur="0.3"/> during the seventeenth century <pause dur="1.6"/> by the eighteenth century <pause dur="0.3"/> there are clear there are no religious wars <pause dur="0.3"/> in Germany any more <pause dur="2.2"/> nevertheless <pause dur="0.2"/> tensions <pause dur="0.5"/> still exist <pause dur="0.2"/> and run very deep <pause dur="0.2"/> between Catholic and Protestant <pause dur="0.5"/> and indeed between different <pause dur="0.3"/> Protestant believers <pause dur="1.4"/> when <pause dur="0.4"/> the <pause dur="0.2"/> two

Protestant Churches the Lutheran and Calvinist Church are united <pause dur="1.2"/> in <pause dur="0.6"/> Prussia <pause dur="2.0"/> in the eighteen-twenties <pause dur="0.9"/> there is a very marked hostility amongst a lot of Lutherans and Calvinists and many actually leave to set up new communities in the new world because they can't bear to see these two states <pause dur="0.2"/> these two <pause dur="0.3"/> religious <pause dur="1.3"/> sets of beliefs united in a single church <pause dur="0.6"/> but the real tensions by the nineteenth century are basically between Catholic and Protestant <pause dur="3.4"/> so there's a long term <pause dur="1.0"/> historical conflict <pause dur="0.8"/> there's also a shorter term historical conflict which i'll return to in a minute <pause dur="2.6"/> but there's also a tradition of a clash between <pause dur="0.3"/> church and state <pause dur="2.0"/> in Germany <pause dur="0.3"/> in the Middle Ages there'd been a clash between the so-called Guelphs the pro-papal faction <pause dur="0.3"/> and the so-called Ghibellines the pro-imperial faction <pause dur="0.4"/> even before there was a Reformation <pause dur="1.7"/> the civil authorities often resented the power <pause dur="0.6"/> of the ecclesiastical authorities <pause dur="2.9"/> by the eighteenth century <pause dur="0.2"/> there was a new onslaught against

the church per se <pause dur="0.9"/> the ideas of the Enlightenment of what the Germans called the <distinct lang="de">Aufklärung</distinct> <pause dur="0.9"/> challenged <pause dur="0.3"/> the role of <trunc>chu</trunc> the church in society <pause dur="1.1"/> challenged superstition <pause dur="0.5"/> challenged intolerance <pause dur="0.4"/> challenged the desire of the church to control education <pause dur="2.1"/> and many <pause dur="0.3"/> reforming princes <pause dur="0.6"/> Joseph the Second <pause dur="0.4"/> and Frederick the Great are good examples <pause dur="1.7"/> decide to take on <pause dur="0.2"/> the church <pause dur="0.4"/> even someone like Maria Theresia who is a good Catholic girl <pause dur="0.5"/> decides that it is important to reduce the power of the church <pause dur="0.3"/> within her <pause dur="1.2"/> dominions <pause dur="1.2"/> to seize some of the wealth of the church for redistribution <pause dur="1.0"/> and indeed to reduce things like the numbers of religious holidays which mean that you know there are about a hundred-and-<pause dur="0.3"/>twenty days a year when people theoretically don't have to work it's not very good for the economy <pause dur="0.3"/> when people just think oh religious holiday <pause dur="0.3"/> go to church and get pissed afterwards this is basically what religious holidays were for <pause dur="0.8"/> # the consumption of <pause dur="0.2"/> disgraceful quantities of

alcohol <pause dur="0.9"/> but <pause dur="0.9"/> the idea that somehow the church is a dead weight on society it prevents efficient bureaucracy it <trunc>even</trunc> # prevents <pause dur="0.3"/> efficient education <pause dur="0.2"/> it prevents scientific progress <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> and it <pause dur="0.2"/> saps the economic strength of the country <pause dur="1.1"/> the idea that the church is somehow <pause dur="0.3"/> needs to be tamed and controlled is something that is fairly deep-seated <pause dur="1.4"/>

in the courts of <pause dur="0.3"/> central Europe <pause dur="0.8"/> by <pause dur="0.3"/> the mid to late eighteenth century <pause dur="2.3"/> and so there is a tradition of a clash between church and state and if you actually look at the extracts i've given <pause dur="2.7"/> you'll see that Bismarck <pause dur="0.2"/> in eighteen-seventy-three actually decides to <pause dur="0.2"/> legitimate what he's doing <pause dur="1.1"/> he's not telling the truth incidentally <pause dur="0.2"/> but he decides to legitimate what he's doing by saying <pause dur="0.2"/> <reading>it is not a matter of an attack by a Protestant dynasty upon the Catholic Church <pause dur="0.3"/> as our Catholic fellow citizens are being told <pause dur="0.6"/> it is a not a a matter of <pause dur="0.2"/> the struggle between </reading><pause dur="0.3"/> or betweem because i've <trunc>misprin</trunc> mistyped it <pause dur="0.3"/> <reading>between faith and

unbelief <pause dur="0.5"/> what we have here is an age-old struggle for power <pause dur="0.2"/> as old as the human race itself <pause dur="0.3"/> between kingship and the priestly caste </reading><pause dur="1.0"/> and there is a little bit of truth <pause dur="0.3"/> in this <pause dur="0.6"/> and certainly there is a tradition of church-state tension <pause dur="0.4"/> that <pause dur="0.4"/> runs <pause dur="0.5"/> throughout many of the regimes in central Europe <pause dur="0.5"/> and certainly predates the unification of Germany <pause dur="2.8"/> but i think if you want a real <pause dur="0.4"/> clue <pause dur="0.2"/> to understanding <pause dur="0.2"/> what is going on <pause dur="1.3"/> with the Kulturkampf you need to look at recent <pause dur="0.2"/> historical <pause dur="0.3"/> conflict <pause dur="2.7"/> some historians and an example of this is William Carr in his standard textbook <pause dur="0.2"/> on <pause dur="1.7"/> Germany <pause dur="0.5"/> Modern Germany <pause dur="0.8"/> suggests that eighteen-seventy-two <pause dur="1.1"/> was a new departure <pause dur="0.4"/> that the Kulturkampf was somehow a new <pause dur="0.8"/> trend <pause dur="0.4"/> in politics <pause dur="1.1"/> and in fact <pause dur="0.2"/> this is <pause dur="0.6"/> rubbish <pause dur="1.1"/> it is quite clear <pause dur="0.7"/> that the biggest divisions <pause dur="0.2"/> in German society and politics <pause dur="1.5"/> in the nineteenth century <pause dur="1.4"/> are based along religious <pause dur="0.2"/> lines <pause dur="3.0"/> if you look for example <pause dur="0.3"/> at the voting <pause dur="0.2"/> in the Frankfurt Assembly in eighteen-forty-eight forty-nine <pause dur="1.1"/> the <trunc>didid</trunc>

the division <pause dur="0.2"/> between people who support a Kleindeutschland a lesser Germany <pause dur="1.5"/> focused on Prussia <pause dur="0.9"/> and people who support a Grossdeutschland <pause dur="1.0"/> a greater Germany <pause dur="0.8"/> with <pause dur="0.2"/> its <pause dur="0.2"/> centre in Vienna <pause dur="2.6"/> very largely <pause dur="0.7"/> it's not an absolute rule <pause dur="0.2"/> you get exceptions like von Radowitz who is a Catholic and <pause dur="0.2"/> a Prussian <pause dur="1.2"/> expansionist <pause dur="0.7"/> but very <pause dur="0.7"/> crudely <pause dur="0.3"/> the big division is between Catholics <pause dur="0.6"/> and non-Catholics <pause dur="1.2"/> Catholics want to include Austria <pause dur="1.6"/> Protestants want to exclude <pause dur="0.2"/> Austria <pause dur="3.5"/> if you look at the population of the German Confederation <pause dur="0.5"/> you'll see why <pause dur="2.2"/> in eighteen-fifty-five <pause dur="0.3"/> the population of the German Confederation <pause dur="0.6"/> was forty-three-million <pause dur="0.2"/> strong <pause dur="1.3"/> of which twenty-three-million <pause dur="0.2"/> were Catholics <pause dur="2.1"/> however of those twenty-three-million <pause dur="0.7"/> twelve-million <pause dur="0.9"/> are Habsburg subjects <pause dur="1.1"/> if you take <pause dur="0.4"/> out <pause dur="0.4"/> the Habsburg subjects <pause dur="0.4"/> from the equation <pause dur="0.7"/> Germany is predominantly Protestant <pause dur="0.4"/> if you leave in <pause dur="0.2"/> the Habsburg subjects <pause dur="0.2"/> Germany is predominantly Catholic <pause dur="1.2"/> Catholics in order to defend their own religious

dominance <pause dur="0.3"/> need <pause dur="0.5"/> Austria to be <pause dur="0.2"/> included <pause dur="1.6"/> the Roman Catholics of Germany have no desire to turn themselves wilfully <pause dur="0.2"/> into <pause dur="0.4"/> a <pause dur="0.2"/> minority <pause dur="7.3"/> Catholics knew what it was like to be <pause dur="0.3"/> a minority <pause dur="1.2"/> in Prussia <pause dur="1.5"/> after eighteen-fifty <pause dur="0.8"/> the Catholics <pause dur="0.2"/> began to develop <pause dur="0.8"/> a into being a clearly confessional <pause dur="0.2"/> party <pause dur="2.9"/> although Prussia was predominantly Protestant there was a massive Catholic minority <pause dur="0.6"/> focused primarily <pause dur="0.3"/> amongst <pause dur="0.2"/> the population of the Rhineland <pause dur="0.4"/> acquired <pause dur="0.3"/> after <pause dur="0.5"/> the Napoleonic Wars <pause dur="0.9"/> and in Poland <pause dur="1.0"/> Prussian Poland <pause dur="4.1"/> they were <pause dur="0.2"/> weak enough in numbers to feel threatened <pause dur="0.3"/> but strong enough <pause dur="0.4"/> in order to feel that they could defend themselves <pause dur="1.8"/> and <pause dur="1.6"/> because of the <pause dur="0.2"/> constitution <pause dur="0.2"/> retained in Prussia after eighteen-fifty <pause dur="1.2"/> the Catholics <pause dur="0.2"/> were able to establish a parliamentary voice <pause dur="0.6"/> were able to establish <pause dur="0.6"/> a <pause dur="0.4"/> body <pause dur="0.4"/> that could defend their interests <pause dur="4.0"/> they did not <pause dur="0.3"/> blindly follow <pause dur="0.2"/> the Pope <pause dur="1.4"/> by eighteen-fifty-eight the Prussian Catholic Fraktion as it was called the <trunc>ca</trunc> the Fraktion <pause dur="0.3"/> it's what they call parties <pause dur="1.3"/> was <pause dur="0.5"/>

fed up <pause dur="0.4"/> with <pause dur="0.3"/> Pius <pause dur="0.5"/> the Ninth the Pope <pause dur="0.7"/> who in the aftermath of the eighteen-forty-eight forty-nine <pause dur="0.2"/> revolutions became extremely reactionary <pause dur="0.5"/> and they actually dropped <pause dur="0.3"/> the element <pause dur="0.2"/> Catholic <pause dur="0.3"/> from their title <pause dur="1.1"/> and they for the first time <pause dur="0.2"/> adopt the name <pause dur="1.0"/> Fraktion <pause dur="0.3"/> des Zentrums <pause dur="0.7"/> this <trunc>th</trunc> <trunc>th</trunc> the <trunc>f</trunc> the Party of the Centre <pause dur="0.6"/> and it's this party that together with the Hanoverian <pause dur="1.7"/> anti-Prussians becomes the Centre Party <pause dur="0.3"/> after <pause dur="0.4"/> eighteen-<pause dur="0.3"/>sixty-six sixty-seven <pause dur="4.3"/> they are not <pause dur="0.9"/> actively anti-Prussian <pause dur="1.1"/> but they become disillusioned with Prussia <pause dur="0.4"/> by the late eighteen-fifties <pause dur="1.3"/> in eighteen-fifty-nine remember the Austrians go to war <pause dur="0.4"/> in <pause dur="0.4"/> Italy against the French <pause dur="1.3"/> and the <pause dur="0.4"/> Prussian Catholic Party <pause dur="0.9"/> is outraged <pause dur="1.4"/> that the <pause dur="0.5"/> Prussians don't go to the assistance of the Austrians <pause dur="0.4"/> against the French <pause dur="0.7"/> the reason for this is not German nationalism <pause dur="0.7"/> the reason for this is that they see the French <pause dur="0.5"/> as destabilizing Italy <pause dur="0.7"/> and undermining the security of the Pope <pause dur="0.7"/> in <pause dur="0.4"/> the Italian peninsula <pause dur="1.0"/> it's paradoxical that this is the

case since the French actually keep a garrison in Rome to defend the Pope <pause dur="1.9"/> but they are <pause dur="2.0"/> very angry <pause dur="0.4"/> that the <pause dur="0.4"/> Prussians <pause dur="0.3"/> don't fight against the French <pause dur="1.2"/> and <pause dur="0.7"/> in eighteen-sixty <pause dur="0.9"/> they're very disillusioned when <pause dur="0.3"/> areas of the papal state <pause dur="0.3"/> are annexed by the new Italy <pause dur="1.1"/> that the Prussians <pause dur="0.3"/> don't give the Austrians military backing so that they can go into Italy and restore the old order <pause dur="3.3"/> they also <pause dur="1.6"/> are <pause dur="0.4"/> passionate adherents <pause dur="1.2"/> to the # notion <pause dur="0.4"/> that <pause dur="0.9"/> Austria <pause dur="0.2"/> must remain within <pause dur="0.2"/> the <pause dur="1.4"/> German Confederation <pause dur="5.9"/> and indeed <pause dur="0.4"/> Catholics <pause dur="0.2"/> in general throughout Germany whether in Prussia or not <pause dur="1.2"/> remain <pause dur="0.6"/> almost to a man <pause dur="0.5"/> and woman <pause dur="0.5"/> hostile to a Kleindeutschland solution that's focused on Prussia <pause dur="1.6"/> it is significant <pause dur="0.7"/> that <pause dur="0.6"/> in eighteen-sixty-six <pause dur="1.2"/> the Rhinelanders <pause dur="1.0"/> the Catholic Prussians <pause dur="2.5"/> largely refused to mobilize in the war against Austria <pause dur="1.7"/> now think what Prussian military discipline is like <pause dur="0.3"/> you do not disobey orders in the Prussian army <pause dur="0.7"/> but Rhineland regiments en masse were saying <pause dur="0.3"/> we are not <pause dur="0.2"/> going to fight against

fellow Catholic Germans <pause dur="0.2"/> which is how they perceived the Austrians <pause dur="3.7"/> in <pause dur="0.7"/> the eighteen-sixties <pause dur="0.3"/> the Catholic Bishop of Mainz <pause dur="2.4"/> guy named Ketteler <pause dur="0.3"/> his name is on the <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="1.5"/> the the the handout or it should be <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="4.2"/> yeah <pause dur="0.3"/> the second name on the handout <pause dur="2.5"/> Ketteler who <pause dur="0.2"/> had been a deputy in the Frankfurt Assembly <pause dur="0.8"/> and who knew Bismarck <pause dur="0.8"/> quite well began to establish <pause dur="0.2"/> what <pause dur="0.2"/> a an active <pause dur="0.7"/> party <pause dur="1.3"/> seeking a Grossdeutschland <pause dur="0.8"/> seeking German nationalism within a greater Germany <pause dur="0.8"/> condemning <pause dur="0.9"/> the <pause dur="0.5"/> Kleindeutsch pressure group the Nationalverein <pause dur="1.3"/> as <distinct lang="de">ein antikatholische Verein</distinct> an anti-Catholic organization an anti-Catholic organ <pause dur="3.9"/> however <pause dur="1.2"/> by <pause dur="0.3"/> eighteen-<pause dur="0.2"/>sixty-<pause dur="0.2"/>six sixty-seven <pause dur="0.7"/> after the defeat of the Austrians <pause dur="1.1"/> Catholics begin to recognize <pause dur="0.4"/> that <pause dur="0.3"/> they can no longer look to Vienna for help <pause dur="1.2"/> Ketteler who had been perhaps the most <pause dur="1.0"/> outspoken <pause dur="0.4"/> critic #<pause dur="0.7"/> of <pause dur="1.7"/> Prussian expansionism <pause dur="0.8"/> of a Kleindeutschland solution to the German question <pause dur="1.6"/> in eighteen-sixty-seven writes a book <pause dur="0.6"/> called <pause dur="0.4"/> Germany after the War of Eighteen-sixty-six <pause dur="0.5"/>

in which he says Catholics must reconcile themselves to the new order <pause dur="0.3"/> there is no point being nostalgic <pause dur="0.5"/> for the old days when the Habsburgs defended Catholic interests <pause dur="1.7"/> German Roman Catholics <pause dur="0.6"/> must work within the new Reich <pause dur="0.3"/> for the benefit of the Catholic Church <pause dur="0.8"/> and must seek <pause dur="0.2"/> reconciliation <pause dur="1.3"/> on condition <pause dur="0.2"/> that Roman Catholicism <pause dur="0.3"/> is respected <pause dur="4.2"/> now <pause dur="0.3"/> it's at this point that i want to stress that <pause dur="0.3"/> relationships with the Catholic Church <pause dur="1.6"/> are problematic <pause dur="1.5"/> across the whole of Europe in this period <pause dur="3.8"/> Roman <trunc>cath</trunc> # Catholicism rested uneasily <pause dur="0.4"/> with the modern state <pause dur="1.2"/> with liberalism <pause dur="0.8"/> with progress <pause dur="0.6"/> and with nationalism <pause dur="0.5"/> remember that the Catholic Church itself its very name <pause dur="0.2"/> means the universal church <pause dur="0.9"/> so in a period <pause dur="0.5"/> in which nation states are being created <pause dur="1.4"/> the idea of stressing the nation <pause dur="0.5"/> is <pause dur="0.2"/> anathema <pause dur="0.4"/> to Catholicism <pause dur="3.0"/> and the Catholic Church <pause dur="0.4"/> in the late nineteenth century <pause dur="0.7"/> becomes engaged <pause dur="0.6"/> with <pause dur="1.4"/> in struggles <pause dur="0.2"/> with the state <pause dur="0.4"/> across Europe <pause dur="2.0"/> in France in the early eighteen-seventies there's what the great historian of the French church <pause dur="0.5"/> Dansette <pause dur="3.5"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="5"/>

calls the honeymoon of the clericals there's a brief period when the <pause dur="0.5"/> clericals get on quite well with the church <pause dur="1.0"/> but from the late <trunc>eight</trunc> # <trunc>f</trunc> # sorry when when the establishment gets on quite well with the church but from the late eighteen-seventies until <trunc>ni</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> nineteen-o-five when church and state are separated in France <pause dur="0.5"/> the single <pause dur="1.6"/> biggest <pause dur="0.2"/> rallying point of all left wing politicians <pause dur="0.3"/> is hostility to the church <pause dur="1.9"/> your political position <pause dur="0.5"/> is defined <pause dur="0.4"/> basically in terms of whether you're pro-Pope or anti-Pope <pause dur="1.2"/> if you're a conservative reactionary <pause dur="0.2"/> you're pro-clerical <pause dur="1.2"/> if you're a left-winger and that doesn't matter if you're a radical who believes in low taxation and the small businessman <pause dur="0.9"/> or a Communist who believes in <pause dur="0.4"/> high taxation <pause dur="0.4"/> and <pause dur="0.6"/> the nationalization of the means of production it doesn't matter what makes you a left-winger is hating the church <pause dur="3.5"/> the vast majority of political debates in France from the late eighteen-seventies until the early twentieth century <pause dur="0.3"/> focus <pause dur="0.2"/> on the role of <trunc>ch</trunc> the church <pause dur="0.7"/> key political <pause dur="0.4"/> clashes <pause dur="0.4"/> are almost all about the church <pause dur="2.8"/> in Austria <pause dur="2.0"/> in

eighteen-fifty-five there is a concordat <pause dur="1.3"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> the church was given by Francis Joseph massive powers over education <pause dur="1.3"/> and church lands that had been seized in the eighteenth century by Maria Theresia <pause dur="0.2"/> and Joseph the Second <pause dur="0.4"/> are returned <pause dur="3.1"/> after until eighteen-seventy-five <pause dur="1.3"/> a <pause dur="0.9"/> statesman named Rauscher <pause dur="4.2"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="3"/> is responsible very much for a <pause dur="0.3"/> a Catholic <pause dur="0.2"/> reaction <pause dur="3.3"/> but from the late eighteen-fifties onwards the definition of a liberal <pause dur="0.5"/> in the Habsburg empire <pause dur="1.4"/> is someone who basically <pause dur="0.2"/> resents the authority of the church <pause dur="2.7"/> anti-militarism <pause dur="0.3"/> and anticlericalism <pause dur="0.2"/> go hand in hand <pause dur="0.7"/> with liberal <pause dur="0.2"/> beliefs <pause dur="2.0"/> and the liberals have some victories <pause dur="1.1"/> in eighteen-seventy <pause dur="2.8"/> a marriage law <pause dur="0.6"/> and an education law are adopted both limiting church authority <pause dur="1.1"/> and eighteen-sixty-eight to seventy-three saw repeated <pause dur="0.3"/> success <pause dur="0.2"/> amongst the liberals <pause dur="0.2"/> in introducing anticlerical legislation <pause dur="5.4"/> nationalists <pause dur="0.2"/> also <pause dur="1.2"/> feared the Catholic Church <pause dur="0.5"/> nationalists from the smaller <pause dur="0.4"/> <trunc>minorit</trunc> the smaller ethnic groups

in the Habsburg empire <pause dur="0.4"/> because they saw Catholicism as universal and transcending <pause dur="1.7"/> national boundaries <pause dur="0.7"/> so you'll find that nationalists also the the Czech or <pause dur="1.0"/> even Polish nationalists are sometimes hostile to the Catholic Church <pause dur="0.4"/> despite <pause dur="0.2"/> Catholicism being such an integral part of Polish nationalism <pause dur="2.8"/> in Italy <pause dur="0.8"/> which has understandably <pause dur="1.3"/> got very difficult relationships with the church since the new Italian state had seized <pause dur="0.4"/> the Pope's temporal <trunc>t</trunc> <pause dur="0.7"/> territories <pause dur="2.1"/> in Italy again <pause dur="0.5"/> the issue of church-state relations <pause dur="0.6"/> is extremely painful <pause dur="1.8"/> Roman Catholics <pause dur="0.3"/> are supposed to boycott elections <pause dur="2.5"/> bearing in mind that the vast majority of the population are practising Catholics this is somewhat problematic for the new Italian state <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="2.0"/> but anticlericalism becomes again the touchstone by which left wing views are <pause dur="0.8"/> judged <pause dur="1.7"/> and the <pause dur="0.2"/> problematic relationship between the Pope <pause dur="0.6"/> and <pause dur="0.8"/> the Italian state <pause dur="0.9"/> is not <pause dur="0.2"/> properly reconciled <pause dur="1.2"/> until Mussolini basically buys the Pope off with very large sums of

money <pause dur="0.8"/> in the Lateran Treaties the Lateran Pacts of nineteen-twenty-nine <pause dur="2.6"/> # <pause dur="3.0"/> in Britain <pause dur="1.9"/> there is <pause dur="0.9"/> strong residual <pause dur="0.3"/> anti-Catholicism which is largely tied up <pause dur="0.2"/> with the <pause dur="0.7"/> Irish question <pause dur="1.4"/> right across Europe <pause dur="1.1"/> liberals <pause dur="1.6"/> tend <pause dur="0.2"/> to be <pause dur="0.6"/> anti-Catholic <pause dur="4.9"/> in Germany it's even more marked <pause dur="2.8"/> why <pause dur="0.6"/> is there such a problem <pause dur="3.6"/> well <pause dur="0.8"/> as i've already said <pause dur="0.7"/> the tradition of both the Holy Roman Empire and Habsburg dominance <pause dur="1.3"/> premised on a close alliance with the Catholic Church <pause dur="1.0"/> means that until eighteen-sixty-six <pause dur="0.3"/> Catholicism is seen <pause dur="0.3"/> as the enemy <pause dur="0.4"/> of Kleindeutschland German nationalism <pause dur="1.0"/> but in a sense as Ketteler says after eighteen-sixty-six you can't carry on being <pause dur="0.3"/> nostalgic <pause dur="0.2"/> for the old order <pause dur="0.4"/> and that ceases to be such a big problem <pause dur="3.8"/> the Pope <pause dur="0.4"/> is <pause dur="1.6"/> unquestionably <pause dur="0.6"/> hostile <pause dur="0.3"/> to the very idea of nationalism <pause dur="1.7"/> not only by virtue of the universalism of Catholicism by the brothership of man <pause dur="2.5"/> but also <pause dur="0.5"/> by virtue of the fact <pause dur="0.3"/> that it is nationalism Italian nationalism that is <trunc>br</trunc> lost him his temporal power <pause dur="0.8"/> and

therefore he sees nationalism per se as rather a a dodgy political <pause dur="0.4"/> creed <pause dur="5.3"/> but the big problem i think really lies <pause dur="0.2"/> in the very nature of the Pope himself <pause dur="1.2"/> Pius the Ninth <pause dur="0.2"/> was elected in eighteen-forty-six <pause dur="0.6"/> as <pause dur="0.5"/> apparently <pause dur="0.6"/> a liberal <pause dur="0.2"/> reforming Pope <pause dur="2.4"/> however <pause dur="1.0"/> as a consequence of <pause dur="0.3"/> the revolutions of eighteen-forty-eight forty-nine he's turned into a born-again reactionary <pause dur="1.2"/> this is the man who <pause dur="0.5"/> bans gaslights as a sign of nasty modernity <pause dur="0.6"/> who chucks the Jews of Rome back into the ghetto <pause dur="1.0"/> in eighteen-sixty-four he is responsible for the Syllabus of Errors <pause dur="0.5"/> in which he basically lists <pause dur="0.5"/> anything that's progressive and most things <pause dur="0.2"/> that are fun <pause dur="0.4"/> and says that they are evil <pause dur="1.2"/> almost any ism <pause dur="1.3"/> and most <pause dur="0.6"/> aspects of scientific progress <pause dur="0.6"/> are vilified <pause dur="2.2"/> and in eighteen-seventy he goes a step further <pause dur="1.6"/> in <pause dur="0.6"/> issuing <pause dur="0.3"/> the decree of papal infallibility <pause dur="0.9"/> the Pope <pause dur="0.3"/> cannot be wrong <pause dur="0.2"/> on anything <pause dur="3.4"/> the Pope becomes a symbol <pause dur="0.5"/> of <pause dur="2.4"/> unquestioning <pause dur="2.1"/> reaction <pause dur="1.6"/> of hostility to progress <pause dur="2.6"/> but was the Kulturkampf <pause dur="1.0"/> simply a

struggle against the anti-modernism <pause dur="0.4"/> the anti-nationalism and the obscurantism of the church <pause dur="0.4"/> is it trying to limit <pause dur="0.4"/> the <pause dur="0.5"/> influence <pause dur="0.2"/> of this extremely reactionary <pause dur="0.6"/> church <pause dur="2.6"/> well <pause dur="0.3"/> in part <pause dur="0.2"/> yes <pause dur="1.5"/> most German liberals <pause dur="0.2"/> disliked <pause dur="0.2"/> everything the Catholic Church stood for <pause dur="1.5"/> they believed in progress <pause dur="2.6"/> they believed in science <pause dur="0.4"/> they believed in nationalism <pause dur="1.3"/> and the Pope stands in the way of all of these things <pause dur="2.4"/> there is a whole wave of literature <pause dur="1.7"/> produced not simply in the new German state but also in <pause dur="0.7"/> the Habsburg empire <pause dur="0.3"/> amongst German liberals <pause dur="0.3"/> and in German-speaking Switzerland <pause dur="1.4"/> that attacks <pause dur="1.1"/> the role of the church <pause dur="1.3"/> men like Busch <pause dur="0.6"/> Böcklin <pause dur="1.3"/> Anzengruber <pause dur="0.8"/> their names are on the list <pause dur="0.5"/> are extremely contemptuous of the role of the church in society <pause dur="3.1"/> there is also the danger <pause dur="2.7"/> that <pause dur="0.2"/> the church <pause dur="0.5"/> would educate <pause dur="0.2"/> the future leadership <pause dur="0.2"/> church schools are extremely good Jesuit schools are so good <pause dur="0.4"/> that Protestants are known to send their kids to <pause dur="0.4"/> the Jesuits <pause dur="2.1"/> to get decent education <pause dur="1.9"/> and there is the fear <pause dur="0.2"/> and this has been

seen in France <pause dur="0.6"/> under Napoleon the Third there was the fear <pause dur="0.4"/> that <pause dur="0.5"/> the Catholic Church will end # end up educating future elites <pause dur="0.3"/> who will then <pause dur="0.6"/> manage to <pause dur="0.4"/> impose their Catholicism on German society <pause dur="1.0"/> so there's a desire to prevent the <pause dur="0.2"/> Church's <pause dur="0.2"/> role in education <pause dur="1.4"/> and it is quite clear that not only the liberals recognize this but Bismarck <pause dur="0.8"/> who is a fierce Protestant in his religious beliefs <pause dur="2.7"/> is also aware <pause dur="0.2"/> of the need to move with the times <pause dur="0.2"/> and prevent <pause dur="0.4"/> obscurantism in the field of sciences <pause dur="1.4"/> so <pause dur="0.4"/> that partially explains it <pause dur="0.2"/> but <pause dur="0.2"/> i think <pause dur="1.0"/> the real explanation <pause dur="1.7"/> comes from looking at the first key piece of legislation <pause dur="0.7"/> the Pulpit Law <pause dur="2.0"/> the law <pause dur="0.4"/> that forbids <pause dur="0.8"/> Catholic priests <pause dur="2.2"/> on pain of quite heavy penalties in terms of fines or exile or imprisonment <pause dur="1.1"/> forbids them <pause dur="0.6"/> from using the pulpit <pause dur="0.2"/> for electoral purposes <pause dur="0.6"/> for <pause dur="0.3"/> forbids them from <pause dur="0.2"/> discussing <pause dur="1.1"/> political matters <pause dur="0.2"/> when they're sermonizing <pause dur="3.5"/> Margaret Lavinia Anderson <pause dur="1.3"/> in her brilliant <pause dur="0.2"/> biography <pause dur="0.4"/> of the <pause dur="0.6"/> leader of the Centre Party Ludwig Windthorst

whose name is on the list <pause dur="1.4"/> writes of the Pulpit Law <pause dur="1.9"/> and the Kulturkampf in general <pause dur="1.7"/> the following <pause dur="1.9"/> <reading>that the legislative attack <pause dur="0.7"/> on the position of the Catholic Church <pause dur="0.7"/> followed immediately on the heels of the declaration of papal infallibility <pause dur="0.3"/> and the founding of the German Empire is often noted <pause dur="1.1"/> what is less often <pause dur="0.2"/> remarked <pause dur="0.5"/> is that it also followed very swiftly <pause dur="0.2"/> after the introduction in Germany <pause dur="0.6"/> of a democratic franchise <pause dur="0.2"/> on the widest scale <pause dur="1.2"/> of any <pause dur="0.3"/> great <pause dur="0.2"/> power <pause dur="0.2"/> in Europe </reading><pause dur="2.8"/> the clue <pause dur="0.4"/> to anti-Catholic legislation <pause dur="0.9"/> lies <pause dur="0.8"/> principally <pause dur="1.1"/> in the fact that Bismarck decides to use universal male suffrage for the elections to the Reichstag <pause dur="7.7"/>

the Liberals <pause dur="1.2"/> claimed <pause dur="0.4"/> to represent <pause dur="0.2"/> the <distinct lang="de">Volk</distinct> <pause dur="0.5"/> claimed to represent the German nation <pause dur="4.2"/> but if you actually look at who the Liberals really represent <pause dur="0.7"/> they represent a very narrow elite <pause dur="0.3"/> of middle class professionals <pause dur="0.9"/> your average German does not give a toss <pause dur="0.2"/> about what the National Liberals and Progressives want <pause dur="1.7"/> they're interested about <pause dur="0.3"/> feeding their families <pause dur="0.7"/> they're interested in local politics <pause dur="0.6"/> they might be interested in hammering the French on the battlefield <pause dur="0.9"/> but they are not interested <pause dur="0.7"/> in <pause dur="0.4"/> what the likes of Treitschke <pause dur="0.4"/> or <pause dur="0.2"/> Lasker or Bamberger <pause dur="0.7"/> have to say about <pause dur="0.3"/> legal reform <pause dur="1.0"/> and they certainly don't see <pause dur="0.5"/> the National Liberal Party <pause dur="0.5"/> as <pause dur="0.5"/> their natural party of representation <pause dur="1.9"/> the Liberals had <pause dur="0.2"/> no grassroots support <pause dur="2.5"/> Roman Catholics however <pause dur="0.9"/> can mobilize <pause dur="0.3"/> mass <pause dur="0.2"/> support <pause dur="1.3"/> often anti-national support <pause dur="3.1"/> the Catholic Church <pause dur="0.2"/> has the ability to mobilize <pause dur="0.6"/> huge numbers of voters <pause dur="2.8"/> and the Liberals <pause dur="0.4"/> are quite <pause dur="0.2"/> simply <pause dur="0.4"/> terrified <pause dur="0.4"/> of doing very badly in the elections <pause dur="0.2"/> they claim to be the natural representatives <pause dur="0.4"/> of the new state of the new order <pause dur="0.7"/> but

in fact in a Germany that is still largely particularist <pause dur="0.9"/> and which is not persuaded by the rhetoric of Prussian domination <pause dur="0.7"/> the Liberals <pause dur="0.7"/> are in a very weak <pause dur="0.2"/> position <pause dur="1.2"/> in terms of how well they'll do <pause dur="0.2"/> in elections <pause dur="2.1"/> Bismarck <pause dur="1.0"/> who wants <pause dur="0.2"/> parliamentary <pause dur="0.3"/> backing <pause dur="1.1"/> in order to legitimate <pause dur="0.7"/> his rather <pause dur="0.3"/> authoritarian style of rule <pause dur="1.8"/> is aware <pause dur="1.2"/> first and foremost <pause dur="0.4"/> that he can use the Kulturkampf he can use the persecution of the Catholics <pause dur="0.3"/> as a way of keeping the Liberals sweet <pause dur="1.8"/> and here you get one of the paradoxes of <pause dur="0.7"/> the nature of <pause dur="0.7"/> German history <pause dur="0.5"/> and that is that the most marked characteristic <pause dur="0.9"/> of <pause dur="0.2"/> German Liberals is a fundamental illiberalism <pause dur="2.0"/> that they are not prepared to let people hold <pause dur="0.3"/> beliefs freely <pause dur="1.4"/> if people have beliefs that they don't find congenial <pause dur="0.3"/> they're prepared to persecute them <pause dur="0.5"/> Bismarck realizes that the Liberals see the Catholics as a threat <pause dur="0.2"/> that the Liberals see the Catholics as obscurantist <pause dur="0.2"/> as medievalist as backward looking <pause dur="0.2"/> and therefore he's prepared to persecute them <pause dur="0.2"/> to

guarantee Liberal support <pause dur="0.3"/> in <pause dur="1.1"/> Parliament <pause dur="0.2"/> and note <pause dur="0.6"/> not only the Conservatives but the National Liberals and the Progressives <pause dur="0.2"/> and the Socialists <pause dur="0.2"/> all back <pause dur="0.8"/> anti-Catholic legislation <pause dur="2.9"/> he distracts those people from facing other issues <pause dur="0.3"/> by <pause dur="0.2"/> persecuting Catholicism <pause dur="1.8"/> but Bismarck is sharper even than that because he realizes <pause dur="0.4"/> that Catholicism <pause dur="0.8"/> can be <pause dur="0.4"/> a rallying point for discontent <pause dur="4.0"/> the Zentrum <pause dur="3.7"/> is backed by Hanoverian Guelphs by Hanoverians who don't like Prussian rule <pause dur="1.1"/> it's backed by the newly acquired French population of Alsace-Lorraine <pause dur="1.2"/> who have been annexed <pause dur="0.2"/> in the eighteen-seventy seventy-one war <pause dur="1.4"/> they're backed by the Poles <pause dur="0.4"/> and they're backed <pause dur="0.2"/> by <pause dur="0.2"/> Danish <pause dur="0.2"/> secessionists <pause dur="0.3"/> in other words the <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>s</trunc> Catholic Centre party <pause dur="0.3"/> becomes the rallying point the focus point <pause dur="0.3"/> for anti-national anti-Prussian sentiment <pause dur="4.7"/> Bismarck <pause dur="0.2"/> also fears <pause dur="1.2"/> that <pause dur="0.8"/> most of the likely enemies of the new German state <pause dur="0.5"/> the Habsburg empire <pause dur="0.6"/> France <pause dur="1.4"/> are actually Catholic powers and that Catholicism might become a

rallying point for anti-<pause dur="0.6"/>German <pause dur="0.2"/> feeling <pause dur="4.7"/> so he aims to <pause dur="0.2"/> break a potential centre of opposition <pause dur="2.3"/> he acts from the belief that it's necessary to act <pause dur="0.3"/> in a dynamic and aggressive way <pause dur="3.3"/> and he also acts for one other reason <pause dur="1.0"/> Windthorst <pause dur="0.3"/> the leader of the Catholic Centre Party <pause dur="0.8"/> is a man <pause dur="0.7"/> who Bismarck <pause dur="0.6"/> personally <pause dur="0.5"/> hates <pause dur="1.1"/> Bismarck famously said that he could live for any one of three people <pause dur="1.1"/> his king <pause dur="1.0"/> because he honoured <pause dur="0.2"/> and respected <pause dur="0.4"/> and worked for him as <pause dur="0.7"/> his natural ruler <pause dur="0.9"/> his wife because he loved her so much <pause dur="1.2"/> and Ludwig Windthorst because he hated him with such utter passion <pause dur="0.4"/> that that loathing alone <pause dur="0.4"/> would give him enough to live for <pause dur="1.2"/> Windthorst is the anathema of Bismarck <pause dur="0.9"/> Windthorst <pause dur="0.4"/> is <pause dur="0.5"/> a hunchbacked <pause dur="1.0"/> almost blind <pause dur="0.6"/> intellectual <pause dur="0.7"/> Catholic <pause dur="0.4"/> anti-nationalist <pause dur="1.3"/> Bismarck is this man he's this big <pause dur="0.7"/> anti-intellectual <pause dur="0.3"/> hard-drinking <pause dur="0.4"/> hard-eating hard-living huge <distinct lang="de">Junker</distinct> <pause dur="0.8"/> they're chalk and cheese they just don't get on with one another <pause dur="0.8"/> also Windthorst's cousin i believe it is and i can't quite

remember whether it's a cousin or a brother <pause dur="0.2"/> is the only person to have ever beaten <pause dur="0.3"/> Bismarck in a duel <pause dur="0.5"/> it just adds a little <pause dur="0.5"/> frisson to the relationship <pause dur="1.5"/> but the personal hostility between the two of them <pause dur="0.8"/> increases <pause dur="0.6"/> Bismarck's <pause dur="0.8"/> desire <pause dur="0.3"/> to persecute the Catholics <pause dur="3.5"/> and yet <pause dur="0.8"/> what is the upshot of the persecution of the Catholics <pause dur="2.2"/> rather than destroying them <pause dur="0.3"/> it simply strengthens them <pause dur="0.7"/> in the face of adversity <pause dur="0.4"/> the Catholic vote <pause dur="0.3"/> doubles <pause dur="0.6"/> in eighteen-seventy-four <pause dur="1.4"/> and by eighteen-eighty-one the Catholics control <pause dur="0.4"/> a hundred seats in the Reichstag <pause dur="2.8"/> for the next fifty years <pause dur="0.2"/> they often hold the balance of power <pause dur="0.3"/> and are involved in almost every single parliamentary majority <pause dur="1.1"/> they are the last <pause dur="0.2"/> German <pause dur="0.2"/> party to exist under the Third Reich <pause dur="0.2"/> except for the Nazis <pause dur="0.7"/> they and they they develop a <trunc>ren</trunc> remarkable political durability <pause dur="2.8"/> by eighteen-seventy-six <pause dur="0.8"/> their two chief enemies <pause dur="0.6"/> are Bismarck <pause dur="0.5"/> and the National Liberals all the National Liberals hate <pause dur="0.2"/> the Catholic Party <pause dur="0.3"/> with the exception of two <pause dur="0.4"/>

Lasker <pause dur="0.3"/> and Bamberger <pause dur="0.8"/> two two of <pause dur="0.2"/> the leadership Lasker and Bamberger <pause dur="0.3"/> can anyone tell me why Lasker and Bamberger alone might have been <pause dur="2.7"/> less reluctant to persecute the Catholics <pause dur="3.8"/> they're both Jews <pause dur="1.8"/> and they realize that persecution of religious minorities is probably not a good thing for Jews to advocate <pause dur="3.5"/> the irony is that <pause dur="0.2"/> in eighteen-seventy-nine Bismarck suddenly backs down <pause dur="1.1"/> why <pause dur="2.3"/> it's quite simple <pause dur="0.8"/> Bismarck begins to get fed up with the National Liberals <pause dur="0.8"/> they won't grant him the money wants he wants <pause dur="0.3"/> to carry on bolstering <pause dur="0.3"/> the Prussian and German armies <pause dur="2.5"/> they are free traders <pause dur="0.4"/> who won't allow him to institute protectionist tariff barriers <pause dur="1.5"/> and moreover <pause dur="0.2"/> by not allowing him to introduce tariff barriers <pause dur="0.6"/> they deny him the possibility of raising revenue <pause dur="0.4"/> from tariff<pause dur="0.9"/>s on the borders of Germany <pause dur="0.3"/> which he can use without parliamentary consent to spend on the army <pause dur="2.5"/> his fiscal policy coupled with his hostility to the anti-militarism of the National Liberals <pause dur="0.4"/> means he begins

to think i want to be shot <pause dur="0.2"/> of this political group <pause dur="2.2"/> so he has to start looking around for another party to back him <pause dur="0.2"/> in Parliament <pause dur="1.1"/> the Conservatives are there <pause dur="0.7"/> always more or less loyal because they're <distinct lang="de">Junkers</distinct> but <pause dur="0.4"/> not very effectively organized in political terms <pause dur="0.7"/> he needs to maintain the parliamentary majority <pause dur="1.1"/> who's got a quarter of the seats <pause dur="0.4"/> the Centre Party <pause dur="1.6"/> Bismarck's extreme political opportunism <pause dur="1.5"/> means that <pause dur="0.5"/> people who have been the vilified enemies of the German state <pause dur="1.5"/> for the last eight or nine years <pause dur="0.5"/> suddenly become his friends <pause dur="1.9"/> if the Centre Party <pause dur="0.2"/> will back his tariff reform <pause dur="2.0"/> fine <pause dur="0.6"/> he'll do a deal with them <pause dur="1.4"/> he sacks Falk <pause dur="0.5"/> the <pause dur="0.9"/> arch anti-Catholic Minister of Culture <pause dur="0.3"/> and religion <pause dur="2.2"/> he <pause dur="0.6"/> allows exiled clergy <pause dur="0.2"/> to return <pause dur="0.7"/> at a stroke of a pen he gets rid of the May Laws <pause dur="0.4"/> he does keep civil marriage he does not let the Jesuits back in <pause dur="2.3"/> but <pause dur="0.5"/> married to the fact <pause dur="0.9"/> that <pause dur="0.3"/> in eighteen-seventy-eight Pius the Ninth has <pause dur="0.2"/> finally <pause dur="1.3"/> and much to the relief of Catholics as well as non-Catholics

died <pause dur="0.6"/> and been replaced by the more conciliatory Leo the Thirteenth <pause dur="1.5"/> he <pause dur="1.1"/> suddenly jettisons anti-Catholicism <pause dur="1.3"/> and embarks <pause dur="0.4"/> on <pause dur="0.2"/> a road of conciliation <pause dur="0.5"/> with <pause dur="0.2"/> the Catholic Party <pause dur="1.1"/> i think this gives a remarkable insight into the operations of Bismarck <pause dur="0.2"/> as <pause dur="0.2"/> a <pause dur="1.0"/> politician <pause dur="1.1"/> Bismarck is a man who has <pause dur="0.9"/> broad <pause dur="1.7"/> strategic goals <pause dur="0.7"/> Prussian strength <pause dur="1.2"/> German strength <pause dur="0.9"/> a basically conservative order <pause dur="2.1"/> but in terms of short term strategies <pause dur="0.3"/> he's prepared <pause dur="0.4"/> to <pause dur="0.5"/> move with the wind <pause dur="1.7"/> and it is this readiness <pause dur="0.3"/> to <pause dur="0.6"/> switch his allies <pause dur="0.9"/> change his policies <pause dur="1.0"/> alter his position <pause dur="1.7"/> in order to achieve broader <trunc>g</trunc> goals <pause dur="0.5"/> that actually <pause dur="0.2"/> lies at the heart <pause dur="0.2"/> of his political <pause dur="0.2"/> durability <pause dur="1.5"/> and next week we will <pause dur="0.3"/> actually when we look at Wilhelmine Germany we'll see very much more how <pause dur="0.4"/> Bismarck <pause dur="0.4"/> manages to retain <pause dur="0.6"/> control <pause dur="0.5"/> of the new <pause dur="0.3"/> Reich <pause dur="0.2"/> for so long <pause dur="0.6"/> and creates a legacy <pause dur="0.8"/> that <pause dur="1.1"/> causes major problems for Wilhelmine Germany <pause dur="0.3"/> in the lead-up <pause dur="0.2"/> to the First World War <pause dur="1.0"/> okay remember tomorrow <pause dur="0.2"/> there's a change of room <pause dur="0.8"/> see you all then