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<?xml version="1.0"?>

<!DOCTYPE TEI.2 SYSTEM "base.dtd">





<publicationStmt><distributor>BASE and Oxford Text Archive</distributor>


<availability><p>The British Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading, under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Centre for English Language Teacher Education, Warwick) and Paul Thompson

(Department of Applied Linguistics, Reading), with funding from BALEAP,

EURALEX, the British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. The

original recordings are held at the Universities of Warwick and Reading, and

at the Oxford Text Archive and may be consulted by bona fide researchers

upon written application to any of the holding bodies.

The BASE corpus is freely available to researchers who agree to the

following conditions:</p>

<p>1. The recordings and transcriptions should not be modified in any


<p>2. The recordings and transcriptions should be used for research purposes

only; they should not be reproduced in teaching materials</p>

<p>3. The recordings and transcriptions should not be reproduced in full for

a wider audience/readership, although researchers are free to quote short

passages of text (up to 200 running words from any given speech event)</p>

<p>4. The corpus developers should be informed of all presentations or

publications arising from analysis of the corpus</p><p>

Researchers should acknowledge their use of the corpus using the following

form of words:

The recordings and transcriptions used in this study come from the British

Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus, which was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Warwick) and Paul Thompson (Reading). Corpus development was assisted by

funding from the Universities of Warwick and Reading, BALEAP, EURALEX, the

British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. </p></availability>




<recording dur="00:54:31" n="7122">


<respStmt><name>BASE team</name>



<langUsage><language id="en">English</language>

<language id="la">Latin</language>

<language id="ru">Russian</language>



<person id="nm0078" role="main speaker" n="n" sex="m"><p>nm0078, main speaker, non-student, male</p></person>

<personGrp id="ss" role="audience" size="l"><p>ss, audience, large group </p></personGrp>

<personGrp id="sl" role="all" size="l"><p>sl, all, large group</p></personGrp>

<personGrp role="speakers" size="3"><p>number of speakers: 3</p></personGrp>





<item n="speechevent">Lecture</item>

<item n="acaddept">History</item>

<item n="acaddiv">ah</item>

<item n="partlevel">Pre-sessional</item>

<item n="module">unknown</item>





<u who="nm0078"> <reading>when you're invited to give a guest lecture it's always important to think about who your audience will be <pause dur="0.9"/> they should be kept in mind when you're choosing your topic <pause dur="0.3"/> and deciding the best way to present it <pause dur="0.8"/> your audience will also want to know something about you <pause dur="0.9"/> who and what you are <pause dur="0.2"/> helps to explain why you've chosen a particular subject <pause dur="0.5"/> and what you make of it <pause dur="1.0"/> i'm a historian <pause dur="0.8"/> i spend my time studying the past <pause dur="0.8"/> the period of the past that i study most intensively <pause dur="0.5"/> is the nineteenth and twentieth centuries <pause dur="0.5"/> and the particular area of the world <pause dur="0.3"/> has been Africa <pause dur="0.4"/> and in particular the European impact on Africa <pause dur="0.4"/> during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries</reading> </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> many of you here today are not <pause dur="0.2"/> from Africa <pause dur="0.7"/> but you are many of you from parts of the world that have been affected by one of the great global <pause dur="0.5"/> forces at work <pause dur="0.5"/> in world history <pause dur="0.4"/> what we loosely call imperialism <pause dur="0.5"/> and that is why <pause dur="0.3"/> i thought what i should <pause dur="0.3"/> try to <pause dur="0.5"/> talk to you about today <pause dur="0.3"/> is this phenomenon <pause dur="0.3"/> of imperialism <pause dur="0.6"/> not just

in terms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries <pause dur="0.6"/> and as you will see <pause dur="0.3"/> not just in terms of the impact of Europe <pause dur="0.7"/> on the non-European world <pause dur="0.8"/> because what we are grappling with <pause dur="0.5"/> in the phenomenon of imperialism <pause dur="0.7"/> is a phenomenon that in various forms <pause dur="0.6"/> is as old as the formation of state systems <pause dur="0.4"/> by human beings <pause dur="0.5"/> so i'm going to # at considerable <pause dur="0.3"/><shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/> risk <pause dur="0.3"/> # to myself <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/><pause dur="0.3"/> try to set this phenomenon in a much wider <pause dur="0.5"/> # more global <pause dur="0.2"/> perspective <pause dur="0.5"/> i hope that might be of interest to many of you <pause dur="0.4"/> who have either been <pause dur="0.3"/> subjected to what you consider imperialism <pause dur="0.4"/> or indeed have been part of states and societies that have themselves <pause dur="0.4"/> been imperialistic <pause dur="0.4"/> or are still being so <pause dur="0.8"/> because whatever one says about <pause dur="0.5"/> the phase of European domination on a global scale <pause dur="0.6"/> which was such a feature <pause dur="0.5"/> of the <pause dur="0.2"/> late nineteenth <pause dur="0.3"/> and the <pause dur="0.3"/> first part of the twentieth century <pause dur="0.6"/> European colonial empires <pause dur="0.3"/> may come and go <pause dur="0.4"/> but the phenomenon <pause dur="0.2"/> of imperialism <pause dur="0.5"/> goes on <pause dur="0.5"/> and it goes on <pause dur="0.3"/> in different forms and in different

places <pause dur="0.4"/> all the time <pause dur="0.9"/> so what i'm going to try to talk to you about is <pause dur="0.5"/> this subject of what is imperialism <pause dur="0.6"/> and what can we say <pause dur="0.4"/> about some of its <pause dur="0.3"/> actual <pause dur="0.2"/> # record <pause dur="0.6"/> in the past <pause dur="0.5"/> and the recent past </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> i think <pause dur="0.2"/> we have to begin <pause dur="1.3"/> by <pause dur="0.4"/> facing up to the fact that today <pause dur="0.5"/> we live in an age of anti-imperialism <pause dur="1.3"/> all over the world there is a reaction <pause dur="0.5"/> against the things which we associate <pause dur="0.4"/> with the <pause dur="0.2"/> phenomenon of imperialism <pause dur="1.1"/> the domination <pause dur="0.6"/> of weak countries <pause dur="0.5"/> or societies <pause dur="0.7"/> by the strong <pause dur="1.5"/> the economic exploitation <pause dur="0.4"/> of the natural resources <pause dur="0.4"/> of often poorer countries <pause dur="0.7"/> # in the world <pause dur="0.5"/> by the rich <pause dur="0.2"/> industrialized <pause dur="0.3"/> parts of the world <pause dur="1.4"/> the gross <pause dur="0.5"/> and in many parts of the world <pause dur="0.6"/> the widening gap <pause dur="0.6"/> in terms of the political <pause dur="0.6"/> military <pause dur="0.4"/> and economic power <pause dur="0.5"/> and standards of living <pause dur="0.9"/> between the rich <pause dur="0.5"/> and the poor countries <pause dur="1.9"/> the belief <pause dur="0.6"/> <trunc>i</trunc> <pause dur="0.3"/> in one society <pause dur="0.8"/> of the absolute superiority <pause dur="0.3"/> of its culture <pause dur="0.7"/> its values <pause dur="0.5"/> and its beliefs <pause dur="0.9"/> and the attempt to impose these <pause dur="0.3"/> upon the people of other cultures <pause dur="0.6"/> and often of

different races <pause dur="1.3"/> today in Europe and America <pause dur="0.8"/> in the countries of the <pause dur="0.3"/> ex-Soviet Union <pause dur="0.7"/> and in Asia <pause dur="0.7"/> as well as in <pause dur="0.4"/> all those areas of the what used to be called <pause dur="0.4"/> the Third World <pause dur="0.7"/> which were until so recently <pause dur="0.5"/> under European influence <pause dur="0.4"/> or indeed <pause dur="0.3"/> colonial rule <pause dur="1.0"/> imperialism is regarded as a bad thing <pause dur="1.4"/> to call someone an imperialist <pause dur="0.7"/> is a term of abuse <pause dur="0.9"/> like calling them a racist <pause dur="0.9"/> or a fascist <pause dur="1.6"/> the very word imperialism i think you'll agree <pause dur="0.4"/> is loaded with emotional and ideological overtones <pause dur="1.6"/> if i <pause dur="0.2"/> say for instance that <pause dur="0.2"/> recently i have been studying and contributing to a new Oxford history of the British empire <pause dur="0.6"/> which i have <pause dur="1.1"/> that is a clear <pause dur="0.4"/> concrete and perfectly respectable <pause dur="0.2"/> historical subject <pause dur="0.5"/> to study <pause dur="0.5"/> it was indeed <pause dur="0.4"/> the most powerful and extensive empire <pause dur="0.4"/> in world history <pause dur="1.3"/> but if i say i'm studying and writing <pause dur="0.5"/> about the history of British imperialism <pause dur="0.8"/> that's already <pause dur="0.4"/> a somewhat different thing <pause dur="1.7"/> the kind of books that are written about it <pause dur="0.4"/> are different too <pause dur="1.4"/> the point i'm making is well

illustrated <pause dur="0.4"/> if one looks up the word for one aspect of imperialism <pause dur="0.7"/> colonialism <pause dur="0.8"/> in two <pause dur="0.3"/> different <pause dur="0.2"/> dictionaries <pause dur="1.5"/> in Webster's American Dictionary <pause dur="0.8"/> colonialism <pause dur="0.5"/> is simply defined as <pause dur="1.1"/> <reading>the system in which <pause dur="0.2"/> a country maintains foreign colonies</reading> <pause dur="2.1"/> but if you take the <pause dur="0.4"/> dictionary produced in the Soviet Union of foreign <trunc>s</trunc> words and look up the word <pause dur="0.4"/> <distinct lang="ru">kolonizatsiya</distinct> <pause dur="1.0"/> you find it defined as <pause dur="0.7"/> <reading>the seizure of a country or region by imperialists <pause dur="0.3"/> accompanied by the subjection <pause dur="0.3"/> brutal exploitation <pause dur="0.3"/> and sometimes the annihilation <pause dur="0.3"/> of the local population</reading> <pause dur="1.6"/> you see what i mean about the ideological <pause dur="0.4"/> and emotional overtones that almost inevitably <pause dur="0.4"/> creep into discussions <pause dur="0.4"/> about the phenomenon <pause dur="0.3"/> we are addressing </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> now as a historian i believe that if history teaches us anything <pause dur="0.8"/> it should teach us to take the long term view <pause dur="0.9"/> of what happens <pause dur="0.8"/> and has happened <pause dur="0.6"/> in the past <pause dur="0.4"/> seeing ourselves in the long <pause dur="0.4"/> perspective of time <pause dur="1.0"/> and not just <pause dur="0.4"/> in terms of the

present <pause dur="0.7"/> and its very particular attitudes <pause dur="0.4"/> values <pause dur="0.3"/> and preoccupations <pause dur="0.6"/> that i'd say is <pause dur="0.2"/> one of the <pause dur="0.2"/> key <pause dur="0.3"/> things that the study of history <pause dur="0.6"/> can give us <pause dur="1.5"/> and in any long view <pause dur="0.7"/> empires <pause dur="0.5"/> and what today we mean by imperialism <pause dur="1.4"/> are a perennial feature <pause dur="0.4"/> of history <pause dur="1.4"/> indeed until very recently <pause dur="1.2"/> until <pause dur="0.5"/> almost the twentieth century in fact <pause dur="0.9"/> that impulse to expansion <pause dur="0.2"/> by powerful states <pause dur="0.6"/> usually at the expense of the weak <pause dur="0.7"/> has been regarded not only as a part of the natural order of things <pause dur="0.9"/> but also as a force for good <pause dur="1.5"/> a movement which was bound up with the progress <pause dur="0.3"/> of the world <pause dur="0.4"/> as a whole <pause dur="1.1"/> and certainly <pause dur="0.4"/> of its more backward <pause dur="0.2"/> regions <pause dur="1.5"/> it's in this context that i think <pause dur="0.2"/> probably the history of the British empire will eventually in the long run <pause dur="0.5"/> come to be set <pause dur="0.5"/> in perspective <pause dur="1.1"/> after all <pause dur="0.5"/> that is certainly what has happened <pause dur="0.3"/> to the history of the ancient Roman empire <pause dur="1.1"/> it was the conquest <pause dur="0.4"/> colonization <pause dur="0.5"/> and incorporation into the Roman empire <pause dur="0.5"/> of the backward areas <pause dur="0.2"/> like the British Isles <pause dur="0.4"/> and France <pause dur="1.1"/> which

first drew these areas into the mainstream of European history <pause dur="1.5"/> certainly <pause dur="0.6"/> in Europe as a whole <pause dur="0.2"/> it's a fact <pause dur="0.4"/> that after the collapse of the Roman empire <pause dur="0.5"/> in the fifth century <pause dur="0.4"/> A-D <pause dur="1.0"/> the memory of that empire <pause dur="0.2"/> haunted and encouraged <pause dur="0.4"/> the attempts of later generations <pause dur="0.4"/> to recreate it <pause dur="1.3"/> Charlemagne <pause dur="0.7"/> the Hohenstaufen kings of Germany <pause dur="0.6"/> the Habsburgs <pause dur="0.5"/> and the long history of the Holy Roman Empire <pause dur="0.2"/> as it was called <pause dur="0.4"/> right down to <pause dur="0.2"/> its disappearance in eighteen-o-six <pause dur="0.7"/> all these <pause dur="0.4"/> in one way or another <pause dur="0.6"/> drew some of their inspiration <pause dur="0.9"/> from the dignity <pause dur="0.7"/> glory <pause dur="0.6"/> grandeur and <pause dur="0.2"/> power <pause dur="0.7"/> associated with Rome <pause dur="1.6"/> the very term imperialism <pause dur="1.5"/> deriving as it does from the Latin word <pause dur="0.2"/> <distinct lang="la">imperator</distinct> <pause dur="0.9"/> has clearly <pause dur="0.3"/> Roman associations <pause dur="1.9"/> and if we look outside Europe <pause dur="0.5"/> as i think one should encourage <pause dur="0.2"/> everybody <pause dur="0.2"/> to do <pause dur="0.4"/> in terms of this term <pause dur="1.2"/> to the world at large <pause dur="0.7"/> then again we find that in the world at large empires <pause dur="0.3"/> and imperial systems <pause dur="0.4"/> are a perennial feature of history <pause dur="1.7"/> the Ming <pause dur="0.4"/> and Manchu empires in China <pause dur="0.9"/> from the

fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries <pause dur="1.3"/> the Ottoman empire <pause dur="0.4"/> in the Middle East <pause dur="1.3"/> the Mogul empire <pause dur="0.2"/> in India <pause dur="1.4"/> the Aztec and Inca empires <pause dur="0.2"/> in Central and South America <pause dur="1.3"/> the Egyptian <pause dur="0.6"/> and Fulani <pause dur="0.5"/> and Zulu empires <pause dur="0.3"/> in Africa <pause dur="1.3"/> the Japanese empire <pause dur="0.8"/> in Korea <pause dur="0.6"/> Manchuria <pause dur="0.7"/> and China <pause dur="1.5"/> wherever we look <pause dur="0.5"/> it would seem <pause dur="0.2"/> that empires <pause dur="0.8"/> and what we today would regard as imperial situations <pause dur="0.6"/> are as old <pause dur="0.4"/> and continuous <pause dur="0.4"/> as the formation of state systems <pause dur="0.4"/> by humankind </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> the term <pause dur="0.2"/> imperialism is <pause dur="0.3"/> as i've said such a loose and loaded word <pause dur="0.3"/> today <pause dur="0.8"/> that in any discussion it's necessary to define <pause dur="0.2"/> what you mean <pause dur="1.8"/> and <pause dur="0.2"/> in this <pause dur="1.0"/> terms <pause dur="0.5"/> by what one means quite carefully <pause dur="0.8"/> because one of the reasons <pause dur="0.4"/> why <pause dur="0.3"/> so many of the books about imperialism are so unsatisfactory <pause dur="0.8"/> is that different writers use the term <pause dur="0.3"/> to mean quite different things <pause dur="1.3"/> now since i'm painting with a very broad indeed a global brush <pause dur="0.4"/> this morning <pause dur="0.6"/> and i <pause dur="0.2"/> still stand by the point that the question of definitions

is always important <pause dur="0.7"/> # let me suggest that there are broadly speaking two different meanings <pause dur="0.4"/> of the term imperialism <pause dur="1.6"/> firstly <pause dur="0.3"/> there is the meaning <pause dur="0.2"/> as i've already been using <pause dur="0.4"/> the term <pause dur="0.4"/> that is <pause dur="0.7"/> to mean any effective <pause dur="0.5"/> <sic corr="domination"> dominalation</sic> or <pause dur="0.3"/> relationship of control <pause dur="1.1"/> by one society <pause dur="0.4"/> over another <pause dur="1.4"/> that control <pause dur="0.5"/> need not be direct <pause dur="0.3"/> and <pause dur="0.2"/> political <pause dur="1.1"/> or involve military conquest or rule <pause dur="1.1"/> that control can be indirect <pause dur="0.6"/> or informal <pause dur="0.8"/> between two independent countries <pause dur="1.0"/> and take any of the forms <pause dur="0.4"/> of economic <pause dur="0.5"/> military <pause dur="0.5"/> social <pause dur="0.5"/> or cultural <pause dur="0.4"/> domination <pause dur="0.7"/> rather than <pause dur="0.2"/> outright <pause dur="0.2"/> political rule <pause dur="2.0"/> now defined like that <pause dur="0.5"/> it's clear that imperialism is a perennial feature of history <pause dur="0.7"/> and is to be found in all periods <pause dur="0.3"/> and in very different parts <pause dur="0.4"/> of the world <pause dur="1.4"/> it's not making <pause dur="0.8"/> imperialism <pause dur="0.2"/> something peculiar <pause dur="0.4"/> to Europeans <pause dur="0.3"/> or Americans <pause dur="0.4"/> in the nineteenth <pause dur="0.3"/> and twentieth centuries </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> secondly <pause dur="1.0"/> there is the loosely Marxist definition <pause dur="0.6"/> given <pause dur="0.3"/> not by Karl Marx himself <pause dur="0.4"/> he never uses the term <pause dur="0.4"/>

imperialism <pause dur="0.9"/> but by Lenin <pause dur="0.7"/> in his highly influential booklet <pause dur="0.5"/> Imperialism <pause dur="0.4"/> the Highest State of Capitalism <pause dur="0.4"/> published <pause dur="0.3"/> when Lenin seemed to be a no hope <pause dur="0.4"/> revolutionary in exile <pause dur="0.4"/> in nineteen-sixteen <pause dur="1.5"/> there Lenin defined imperialism in terms of a particular stage <pause dur="0.7"/> what he called <pause dur="0.4"/> the highest stage <pause dur="0.4"/> in the development of capitalism <pause dur="1.8"/> this is a much narrower definition <pause dur="0.3"/> of imperialism <pause dur="0.5"/> than my first one <pause dur="1.1"/> but it has been extraordinarily influential <pause dur="1.4"/> i find amongst <pause dur="0.3"/> African students in African universities <pause dur="0.4"/> what mine one might loosely call the Leninist definition of imperialism is simply taken <pause dur="0.4"/> for granted <pause dur="2.5"/> defined in Leninist terms <pause dur="0.2"/> imperialism becomes a function <pause dur="0.9"/> an inevitable result in his view <pause dur="0.9"/> of the economic history <pause dur="0.2"/> of certain <pause dur="0.9"/> mainly western <pause dur="0.6"/> societies <pause dur="1.3"/> in terms of this definition imperialism didn't appear anywhere in the world <pause dur="0.6"/> until the late nineteenth century <pause dur="0.9"/> and in the twentieth century its main focus <pause dur="0.3"/> has moved <pause dur="0.2"/> from Europe <pause dur="0.5"/> to the United States <pause dur="0.5"/> but also to include

Japan </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> the trouble with this definition of imperialism <pause dur="0.3"/> is that even within the narrow restrictions <pause dur="0.3"/> of nineteenth of twentieth century history <pause dur="0.7"/> it raises very awkward questions <pause dur="1.7"/> i can only <pause dur="0.3"/> pause to <pause dur="0.7"/> raise a few of these awkward questions here but you can perhaps <pause dur="0.3"/> think about <pause dur="0.2"/> some others yourself <pause dur="1.2"/> firstly <pause dur="0.4"/> if you've got # # a definition of imperialism that equates it as a certain stage <pause dur="0.4"/> an inevitable stage in Lenin's view <pause dur="0.4"/> in the development of capitalism <pause dur="0.7"/> can <pause dur="0.2"/> supposedly non-capitalist economies <pause dur="0.4"/> and societies <pause dur="0.4"/> be imperialistic <pause dur="1.4"/> how else would we describe <pause dur="0.5"/> the <pause dur="0.3"/> activities of the ex-Soviet Union <pause dur="0.7"/> or <pause dur="0.4"/> some would say <pause dur="0.2"/> to this day <pause dur="0.5"/> of China <pause dur="1.9"/> but how else would we describe <pause dur="0.3"/> many other societies which have <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>ex</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> exhibited <pause dur="0.5"/> that tendency to <pause dur="0.3"/> expansionism <pause dur="0.6"/> and domination of weaker <pause dur="0.5"/> smaller <pause dur="0.4"/> societies or states <pause dur="0.3"/> that i've mentioned <pause dur="1.2"/> if <pause dur="0.2"/> one can think of cases of American <pause dur="0.3"/> imperialism which fit that bill <pause dur="0.8"/> what about the relationship <pause dur="0.4"/> of <pause dur="0.5"/> the # of <pause dur="0.3"/> the Soviet Union <pause dur="0.4"/> with the <pause dur="0.2"/> states of eastern

Europe <pause dur="0.4"/> in the <pause dur="0.2"/> half-century or so <pause dur="0.3"/> after the Second World War <pause dur="0.7"/> or about the relationship to be provocative <pause dur="0.5"/> between China and Tibet <pause dur="0.4"/> to this day <pause dur="1.8"/> so there's that first objection can so-called non-capitalist societies be imperialistic <pause dur="0.6"/> the answer seems to be yes <pause dur="1.6"/> secondly why is it that only some capitalist societies <pause dur="0.3"/> become imperialistic <pause dur="0.9"/> Portugal for instance <pause dur="0.5"/> one of the <pause dur="0.2"/> least developed <pause dur="0.3"/> capitalist <pause dur="0.3"/> societies <pause dur="0.3"/> in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had a large <pause dur="0.2"/> colonial empire and was one of the last <pause dur="0.5"/> # European <pause dur="0.3"/> colonial powers to decolonize <pause dur="1.7"/> Switzerland <pause dur="0.6"/> far more developed capitalist society <pause dur="1.4"/> Belgium <pause dur="0.4"/> with its huge colony <pause dur="0.4"/> in the Congo <pause dur="1.3"/> but not Denmark <pause dur="0.6"/> again <pause dur="0.2"/> a small but <pause dur="0.4"/> highly developed highly capitalist <pause dur="0.3"/> society <pause dur="1.5"/> so # <pause dur="0.8"/> if <pause dur="0.5"/> imperialism is a stage an inevitable stage in the development of capitalism why is it that only certain states <pause dur="0.4"/> seem to <pause dur="0.3"/> # become imperialistic or <pause dur="0.2"/> more so than others and why is it that many states which are <pause dur="0.3"/> or societies which

are not capitalistic <pause dur="0.3"/> in their organization <pause dur="0.3"/> <trunc>w</trunc> can become amongst the most expansionist <pause dur="0.3"/> and imperialist <pause dur="0.2"/> in modern history <pause dur="1.4"/> the straight <pause dur="0.5"/> Marxist-Leninist particularly Leninist definition of imperialism of proves so obviously unsatisfactory <pause dur="0.4"/> that very few historians today <pause dur="0.4"/> in fact adopt it <pause dur="1.2"/> but many <pause dur="0.2"/> more <pause dur="0.3"/> have <pause dur="0.4"/> utilized and worked with what might be called a looser <pause dur="0.6"/> # Marxist definition <pause dur="1.5"/> and i would say that some of the aspects <pause dur="0.3"/> of the Marxist definition of <pause dur="0.3"/> # imperialism have been by far the most <pause dur="0.2"/> influential and are nearly always brought in <pause dur="0.7"/> if as we've time for some questions and discussion afterwards i'm sure some of you will bring in this crucial if you like <pause dur="0.3"/> economic <pause dur="0.2"/> dimension <pause dur="0.8"/> to <pause dur="0.3"/> imperialism at least <pause dur="0.3"/> in the world <pause dur="0.4"/> in modern centuries </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> much of the literature <pause dur="0.8"/> about <pause dur="0.2"/> imperialism <pause dur="0.4"/> is not only ideologically charged as i said earlier <pause dur="0.5"/> but it's often been rather heavily theoretical <pause dur="0.4"/> and full of grand assertions and a bit light <pause dur="0.4"/> on concrete examples <pause dur="0.7"/> many of which are taken

very selectively <pause dur="1.3"/> now you can <pause dur="0.3"/> see at once how if you've got a grand general theory <pause dur="0.4"/> about a phenomenon like imperialism <pause dur="0.6"/> it's got to be able to stand up against the test <pause dur="0.2"/> of all sorts of empirical <pause dur="0.2"/> actual <pause dur="0.4"/> examples in history <pause dur="0.5"/> if it fails that test <pause dur="0.4"/> # against <pause dur="0.2"/> the the actual empirical evidence from the past <pause dur="0.2"/> of a whole number <pause dur="0.4"/> of cases then that undermines <pause dur="0.3"/> the validity <pause dur="0.4"/> of <pause dur="0.2"/> the general theory <pause dur="1.1"/> and i suppose where we are today is that some of the Marxist-Leninist <pause dur="0.2"/> dimensions <pause dur="0.4"/> of what goes into the making of imperialism <pause dur="0.5"/> has become <pause dur="0.2"/> what G N Sanderson has called a background <pause dur="0.3"/> theory <pause dur="0.8"/> # the trouble with <pause dur="0.2"/> background theories is they do remain in the background and they often become rather ineffective <pause dur="0.4"/> for actually <pause dur="0.2"/> explaining why particular societies at particular times <pause dur="0.4"/> became as expansionist <pause dur="0.4"/> as they did </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> just a further word about the danger of selectivity i said general theories about anything <pause dur="0.4"/> have to stand up <pause dur="0.5"/> against the test of a wide range of empirical examples <pause dur="0.6"/> to

take the African continent for example <pause dur="0.7"/> it's no good selecting South Africa <pause dur="0.6"/> the only <pause dur="0.5"/> major industrialized country <pause dur="0.2"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/> in Africa <pause dur="0.4"/> and a key world producer of gold <pause dur="0.3"/> and a whole series of other <pause dur="0.2"/> strategic minerals <pause dur="0.4"/> and ignoring all the other <pause dur="0.4"/> African examples <pause dur="0.4"/> which don't have minerals and which don't fit <pause dur="0.2"/> the theory <pause dur="0.3"/> you see what i mean about the danger of using <pause dur="0.2"/> selective <pause dur="0.3"/> examples simply to support a theory <pause dur="0.3"/> which you've decided beforehand <pause dur="0.3"/> # explains the phenomenon you're doing good historians <pause dur="0.3"/> are more sceptical than that <pause dur="0.5"/> the theory has to be <pause dur="0.4"/> stand the test <pause dur="0.3"/> across a very wide range <pause dur="0.3"/> of examples if it's to stand up <pause dur="0.5"/> as a general theory </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> now i'm using the term imperialism in this lecture <pause dur="0.3"/> in accordance with really the first definition i gave <pause dur="0.9"/> i would simply define imperialism as <reading>the tendency of a state <pause dur="0.7"/> to expand within the confines set <pause dur="0.8"/> by its economic <pause dur="0.5"/> and political strength <pause dur="1.0"/> and military and naval power</reading> <pause dur="0.4"/> let me repeat that <pause dur="0.2"/> i can see you all

scribbling it down <pause dur="1.6"/><vocal desc="laughter" iterated="y" n="ss" dur="1"/> imperialism as <reading>the tendency of a state <pause dur="0.7"/> to expand within the confines set <pause dur="0.6"/> by its economic <pause dur="0.3"/> and political strength <pause dur="0.7"/> and military <pause dur="0.4"/> and naval <pause dur="0.4"/> power</reading> <pause dur="0.7"/> of course i include <pause dur="0.3"/> air power in that <pause dur="0.5"/> and nuclear power <pause dur="0.4"/> in the <pause dur="0.2"/> twentieth century <pause dur="1.0"/> this seems to me as useful <pause dur="0.5"/> a definition <pause dur="0.2"/> for studying the phenomenon of imperialism <pause dur="0.5"/> as in <pause dur="0.5"/> the present age as in past ages <pause dur="1.6"/> but <pause dur="0.5"/> i'd like first to emphasize # <trunc>f</trunc> three very important contributions <pause dur="0.4"/> to the debate about what imperialism is <pause dur="0.5"/> that i think Marxist writing or loosely Marxist writing has made <pause dur="0.5"/> because of course <pause dur="0.3"/> # it remains true you don't have to be a <pause dur="0.2"/><shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/> a Marxist <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/> or a Leninist <pause dur="0.3"/> to <pause dur="0.2"/> take on board some of the valid points <pause dur="0.3"/> that both writers have made <pause dur="0.4"/> about the phenomenon of imperialism <pause dur="0.4"/> in the modern world </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> first there is the point i made just a minute or two ago <pause dur="0.3"/> that following the general Marxist approach to history <pause dur="0.5"/> the theory of imperialism in Marxist terms is after all <pause dur="0.4"/> part of a materialist <pause dur="0.2"/> explanation of history

generally <pause dur="1.1"/> the subject of imperialism <pause dur="0.4"/> has <pause dur="0.7"/> got to bring in i think a discussion about the importance of <pause dur="0.4"/> economic <pause dur="0.2"/> factors <pause dur="0.6"/> in imperialistic relationships <pause dur="0.5"/> not <pause dur="0.3"/> purely <pause dur="0.4"/> political factors <pause dur="0.2"/> of course economics and politics can <pause dur="0.3"/> become <pause dur="0.2"/> closely together <pause dur="0.5"/> but you can't leave out <pause dur="0.4"/> examining the economic dimension <pause dur="0.4"/> to imperialistic relationships now <pause dur="1.1"/> i think <pause dur="0.7"/> as often is true <pause dur="0.5"/> the <pause dur="0.3"/> perhaps exaggerated <pause dur="0.2"/> emphasis indeed making <trunc>ec</trunc> the economic dimension the be all and end all <pause dur="0.4"/> of imperialism in the sort of narrower <pause dur="0.5"/> Leninist view of imperialism <pause dur="0.4"/> has actually been beneficial <pause dur="0.3"/> to non-Leninist non-Marxist historians <pause dur="0.3"/> in making them <pause dur="0.2"/> ask <trunc>th</trunc> questions about the economic dimension of imperialism wherever that <pause dur="0.5"/> phenomenon <pause dur="0.6"/> is studied </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> secondly <pause dur="0.4"/> i think the whole debate about what is imperialism <pause dur="0.4"/> from <pause dur="0.2"/> a <pause dur="0.3"/> Marxist-Leninist perspective <pause dur="0.7"/> has stressed that <pause dur="0.2"/> informal <pause dur="0.3"/> empire <pause dur="0.7"/> as opposed to formal empire <pause dur="0.3"/> formal empire being the empire formal political rule <pause dur="0.5"/> areas <pause dur="0.2"/> that the British liked to

think of as painted red on the map <pause dur="0.6"/> in the <pause dur="0.3"/> British empire case <pause dur="0.5"/> as opposed to areas you simply traded with <pause dur="0.3"/> but didn't rule over directly <pause dur="0.2"/> had informal relationships <pause dur="0.3"/> with <pause dur="0.7"/> i think there's been a great # usefulness <pause dur="0.2"/> in pointing to <pause dur="0.5"/> informal relationships between states <pause dur="0.3"/> which can be very imperialistic <pause dur="0.3"/> even where there isn't outright military conquest <pause dur="0.3"/> or political rule <pause dur="0.5"/> or <trunc>suggestio</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> or or subjection <pause dur="1.9"/> in the case of the United States in the twentieth century <pause dur="0.6"/> this <pause dur="0.2"/> informal <pause dur="0.7"/> imperial rule <pause dur="0.8"/> or role <pause dur="0.6"/> is what a large part of the discussion <pause dur="0.5"/> about the imperialistic nature <pause dur="0.4"/> of the United States is actually <pause dur="0.4"/> # about <pause dur="0.6"/> the formal part <pause dur="0.4"/> of an American empire <pause dur="0.3"/> which at the very end of the <pause dur="0.2"/> nineteenth century included areas like Cuba <pause dur="0.5"/> and # the Philippines <pause dur="0.3"/> it was of course but the tip of the iceberg <pause dur="0.3"/> had a far far larger <pause dur="0.5"/> informal <pause dur="0.4"/> American <pause dur="0.4"/> # influence <pause dur="0.7"/> not just economic but with strong economic aspects to it <pause dur="1.2"/> so <pause dur="0.4"/> that <pause dur="0.2"/> difference between <pause dur="0.3"/> informal imperialism as opposed to formal

imperialism is i think again something we all <pause dur="0.3"/> at the end of the twentieth century <pause dur="0.4"/> # take for granted as part of the debate it certainly is a <pause dur="0.3"/> large <pause dur="0.2"/> part of it </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> thirdly <pause dur="0.3"/> the focus of many <pause dur="0.2"/> Marxist writers <pause dur="0.5"/> was on the central dynamic role of the industrial revolution <pause dur="0.9"/> and the continually <pause dur="0.4"/> transforming effects <pause dur="0.5"/> of industrialization <pause dur="0.6"/> and the what this has brought about <pause dur="0.5"/> in not just in terms of the economic development <pause dur="0.3"/> of individual <pause dur="0.2"/> countries <pause dur="0.6"/> but in terms of the establishment of a world economy <pause dur="1.0"/> the bringing <pause dur="0.4"/> into being <pause dur="0.6"/> of an international <pause dur="0.4"/> world <pause dur="0.5"/> trading economy <pause dur="1.2"/> run <pause dur="0.5"/> on <pause dur="0.3"/> basically capitalist principles <pause dur="0.6"/> to which different parts of the world <pause dur="0.4"/> became increasingly <pause dur="0.2"/> linked <pause dur="0.4"/> or tied in <pause dur="0.6"/> often as a direct result <pause dur="0.4"/> of <pause dur="0.4"/> being colonized <pause dur="0.3"/> and of a period of colonial rule <pause dur="0.6"/> in other words <pause dur="0.3"/> colonialism <pause dur="0.2"/> one form of imperialism <pause dur="0.5"/> acted as a means by which all sorts of <pause dur="0.4"/> previously often rather undeveloped rather isolated parts of the world <pause dur="0.4"/> became tied in linked in <pause dur="0.4"/> to a worldwide trading system <pause dur="0.5"/> which

really has only come into being <pause dur="0.3"/> in the course of the last century <pause dur="0.3"/> in its full <pause dur="0.4"/> respect <pause dur="0.5"/> now we at the end of the twentieth century are acutely aware <pause dur="0.5"/> of the truth of this <pause dur="0.4"/> in terms of <pause dur="0.2"/> globalization <pause dur="0.7"/> # in the buzz phrase <pause dur="0.4"/> of the <pause dur="0.2"/> current # <pause dur="0.5"/> time <pause dur="0.5"/> the way in which more <unclear>and more</unclear> parts of the world are not <pause dur="0.3"/> autonomous <pause dur="0.3"/> not <pause dur="0.2"/> self-sufficient <pause dur="0.2"/> are inevitably irretrievably and <pause dur="0.5"/> in many cases <pause dur="0.3"/> for <pause dur="0.3"/> in their own interests <pause dur="0.3"/> # actually tied in to a worldwide <pause dur="0.3"/> # trading <pause dur="0.3"/> system <pause dur="1.1"/> now this again i think <pause dur="0.4"/> # the development of this worldwide trading system <pause dur="0.3"/> has again <trunc>b</trunc> <pause dur="0.3"/> been a large <pause dur="0.4"/> element that writing <pause dur="0.4"/> on <pause dur="0.6"/> the left <sic corr="if">is</sic> one can call it that <pause dur="0.4"/> has focused as one of the <pause dur="0.6"/> legacies <pause dur="0.2"/> if you like <pause dur="0.4"/> of the era of high imperialism or the new imperialism <pause dur="0.4"/> in which the West played such a strong and <trunc>im</trunc> <pause dur="0.4"/> dominant role <pause dur="0.4"/> from the late nineteenth century on into the mid <pause dur="0.4"/> # twentieth century <pause dur="2.1"/> thus in all sorts of <pause dur="0.3"/> fundamental ways <pause dur="0.5"/> # many of which i <pause dur="0.2"/> haven't time to go into here but you're very free to

ask questions about it at the end <pause dur="1.0"/> but <pause dur="0.4"/> in all sorts of ways in the questions that this second Marxist-Leninist definition of imperialism has raised <pause dur="0.5"/> it seems to me that it's actually been beneficial <pause dur="0.7"/> to historians of all <pause dur="0.3"/> kinds <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="1.2"/> by and large in other words <pause dur="0.7"/> it's been <trunc>fr</trunc> most fruitful i would say <pause dur="0.4"/> when this <pause dur="0.3"/> these dimensions have been taken out of the ideological straitjacket <pause dur="0.5"/> of Marxism or Leninism <pause dur="0.2"/> per se <pause dur="0.6"/> and been applied specifically <pause dur="0.3"/> and empirically <pause dur="0.4"/> in all sorts of <pause dur="0.3"/> situations <pause dur="0.4"/> # in <pause dur="0.2"/> the modern world </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> so <pause dur="0.6"/> to conclude the first part of my lecture <pause dur="1.1"/> on about this question what is imperialism <pause dur="0.2"/> definitions of it <pause dur="1.1"/> i regard imperialism as a perennial phenomenon <pause dur="0.2"/> in history <pause dur="1.1"/> taking all sorts of different forms <pause dur="0.9"/> in all <pause dur="0.2"/> parts of the world <pause dur="0.6"/> in different places <pause dur="0.4"/> at different times <pause dur="0.3"/> the forms may change <pause dur="0.5"/> but the phenomenon <pause dur="0.5"/> of imperialism <pause dur="0.5"/> goes on <pause dur="1.4"/> and i would say that is just as true <pause dur="0.4"/> in the <pause dur="0.3"/> post-<pause dur="0.2"/>decolonization of the European colonial empires <pause dur="0.3"/> era <pause dur="0.2"/> in which we

are now living <pause dur="0.5"/> as in <pause dur="0.2"/> eras before <pause dur="0.3"/> that great expansion of the European colonial empires <pause dur="0.4"/> at the end of the nineteenth century <pause dur="0.6"/> in other words imperialism <pause dur="0.4"/> goes on but its forms change <pause dur="0.3"/> and the focus <pause dur="0.2"/> of where it's going on most intensively <pause dur="0.3"/> changes from time to time as well <pause dur="1.3"/> and it is to do with that <pause dur="0.2"/> tendency of <pause dur="0.2"/> strong states <pause dur="0.2"/> or societies to expand <pause dur="0.4"/> beyond their quote national boundaries <pause dur="0.7"/> and to dominate militarily politically <pause dur="0.5"/> economically <pause dur="0.4"/> or culturally <pause dur="1.2"/> weaker states <pause dur="0.5"/> or societies <pause dur="0.8"/> which may be even adjacent to them <pause dur="0.6"/> in the same <pause dur="0.3"/> part of the world <pause dur="0.7"/> or situated overseas <pause dur="0.3"/> imperialism is by no means <pause dur="0.4"/> necessarily <pause dur="0.3"/> an overseas <pause dur="0.3"/> # phenomenon </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> i want in the second part of my talk to turn to <pause dur="0.6"/> the consideration of this phenomenon in imperialism <pause dur="0.2"/> in the twentieth century <pause dur="0.3"/> since that is probably <pause dur="0.3"/> # what most # <pause dur="0.6"/> interests <pause dur="0.4"/> # many of you <pause dur="2.2"/> i actually specialize in the nineteenth century but i also study <pause dur="0.5"/> the # <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> phenomenon of colonial empires <pause dur="0.4"/> in the <pause dur="0.2"/> twentieth century and their dissolution <pause dur="0.5"/> in the

second half of the twentieth century <pause dur="0.4"/> which itself raises very interesting questions about our times <pause dur="0.6"/> the second half of the twentieth century has been very <pause dur="0.5"/> bad for empires of all kinds <pause dur="0.3"/> not just the European colonial empires <pause dur="0.4"/> but more recently the dissolution <pause dur="0.4"/> of the Soviet <pause dur="0.3"/> empire <pause dur="0.3"/> one of the last and <pause dur="0.2"/> largest <pause dur="0.3"/> empires <pause dur="0.4"/> of the <pause dur="0.2"/> twentieth century <pause dur="0.6"/> so what i began by saying that we live in an era of anti-imperialism <pause dur="0.8"/> i'm <pause dur="0.2"/> concluding this section by saying <pause dur="0.4"/> means that the phenomenon of imperialism <pause dur="0.2"/> and the driver wheels which drive it <pause dur="0.2"/> have certainly not disappeared <pause dur="0.4"/> from the world <pause dur="0.4"/> as we all know <pause dur="0.6"/> but the actual forms <pause dur="0.3"/> that it takes <pause dur="0.3"/> and the actual areas of the world <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> change <pause dur="0.2"/> and are changing <pause dur="0.6"/> where colonialism ends <pause dur="0.2"/> neo-colonialism and other forms of imperialism <pause dur="0.4"/> begin <pause dur="0.4"/> if you like </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> the classical phase <pause dur="0.2"/> of nineteenth century imperialism <pause dur="0.4"/> one might say began to be brought to an end <pause dur="0.4"/> by the First World War <pause dur="1.0"/> although it's true <pause dur="0.4"/> that the <pause dur="0.3"/> greatest of the nineteenth century colonial

empires the British <pause dur="0.5"/> only reached its greatest territorial extent after the First World <trunc>worl</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> War <pause dur="0.8"/> with the redistribution <pause dur="0.4"/> of the ex-German and ex-Ottoman <pause dur="0.4"/> # territories <pause dur="1.4"/> this <pause dur="0.4"/> British empire which <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> Oxford University Press is producing <pause dur="0.5"/> in the next <pause dur="0.2"/> two years <trunc>f</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> five volumes <pause dur="0.3"/> over its sort of four-hundred year history the British empire <pause dur="0.8"/> brought a total of something like six-hundred-million people <pause dur="0.6"/> under British rule <pause dur="0.8"/> about a quarter <pause dur="0.5"/> of the world's population <pause dur="1.2"/> # so it's no wonder that # <pause dur="0.4"/> some British historians like myself are interested in it how did it come into being how was it sustained why did it come to an end <pause dur="0.4"/> these questions are very live <pause dur="0.4"/> in historical debates today <pause dur="2.4"/> nonetheless <pause dur="0.2"/> i would say <pause dur="0.2"/> that <pause dur="0.5"/> already in the nineteen-twenties and thirties <pause dur="0.5"/> the British empire like all the other European colonial empires some of them of very recent creation <pause dur="0.6"/> was already weakening <pause dur="1.0"/> by the end of the Second World War <pause dur="0.6"/> it was in a state of disintegration <pause dur="1.0"/> today <pause dur="0.6"/> it has gone <pause dur="0.6"/> and many

would <trunc>f</trunc> <pause dur="0.3"/> put the sort of full stop <pause dur="0.6"/> on <pause dur="0.2"/> the British <pause dur="0.3"/> empire <pause dur="0.6"/> in terms of its exercises in decolonization <pause dur="0.4"/> with # the <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> the <pause dur="0.3"/> # end of British rule in Hong Kong <pause dur="0.5"/> in <pause dur="0.2"/> # nineteen-ninety-seven <pause dur="1.2"/> yet we know <pause dur="0.8"/> imperialism is alive and well <pause dur="0.4"/> and living <pause dur="0.4"/> in almost all parts of the world <pause dur="0.4"/> today </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> but whereas in the past <pause dur="0.4"/> imperialism was usually seen in terms of an imbalance of power <pause dur="0.6"/> in the political and military relationship <pause dur="0.5"/> between states <pause dur="1.0"/> in the twentieth century and partly as a result of that <pause dur="0.3"/> Marxist influence <pause dur="0.3"/> that i emphasized earlier <pause dur="0.4"/> there's been increasing emphasis upon <pause dur="0.3"/> the <pause dur="0.2"/> informal relationships <pause dur="0.4"/> of <pause dur="0.3"/> an imperialistic nature <pause dur="0.4"/> and the economic dimensions <pause dur="0.3"/> to those relationships <pause dur="0.6"/> on the economic motives and means <pause dur="0.4"/> at work <pause dur="0.4"/> in the relationship <pause dur="0.4"/> between two states <pause dur="0.4"/> and of course crucially at the great imbalance <pause dur="0.3"/> in economic <pause dur="0.2"/> power <pause dur="0.5"/> between <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> trading partners <pause dur="0.4"/> investing partners <pause dur="0.3"/> those exporting raw materials <pause dur="0.3"/> those acquiring <pause dur="0.4"/> those raw materials <pause dur="0.3"/> themselves a crucial

part <pause dur="0.3"/> of the continuing process <pause dur="0.2"/> of industrialization <pause dur="0.4"/> which i mentioned earlier </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> colonialism <pause dur="0.6"/> certainly colonialism in the sense of the European colonial <pause dur="0.4"/> empires <pause dur="0.3"/> in Africa <pause dur="0.5"/> and Asia <pause dur="0.8"/> we can now see was only one form <pause dur="0.6"/> of imperialism <pause dur="1.0"/> which can be replaced by other forms of dominance <pause dur="0.4"/> influence <pause dur="0.3"/> or control <pause dur="1.8"/> colonial empires may have disappeared <pause dur="0.9"/> but imperialistic relationships <pause dur="0.4"/> continue <pause dur="1.4"/> as Kwame Nkrumah <pause dur="0.4"/> the first <pause dur="0.3"/> # leader of an independent <pause dur="0.3"/> Ghana <pause dur="1.2"/> said <pause dur="0.9"/> where colonialism ends <pause dur="0.5"/> neo-colonialism begins <pause dur="0.7"/> the essence of neo-colonialism he said <pause dur="0.5"/> is that the state which is subject to it <pause dur="0.4"/> is in theory independent <pause dur="0.5"/> and has all the outward trappings <pause dur="0.2"/> of international sovereignty <pause dur="0.8"/> but in reality <pause dur="0.5"/> its economic system <pause dur="0.4"/> and thus its internal policy <pause dur="0.5"/> is directed <pause dur="0.4"/> from outside <pause dur="1.8"/> now this emphasis on the economic aspect is typical <pause dur="0.3"/> of a great deal of writing <pause dur="0.4"/> on twentieth century <pause dur="0.5"/> imperialism <pause dur="1.4"/> Michael Barrett Brown actually defines imperialism in the late twentieth century as <pause dur="0.5"/> <reading>a

complex of economic political and military relations by which the less economically developed lands <pause dur="0.4"/> are subjected to the more economically developed <pause dur="0.4"/> imperialism remains the best word <pause dur="0.3"/> for the general system of <pause dur="0.2"/> unequal <pause dur="0.3"/> world <pause dur="0.3"/> economic <pause dur="0.4"/> relations</reading> <pause dur="1.9"/> so <pause dur="1.0"/> this emphasis on the economic aspect of imperialism is a very striking feature <pause dur="0.6"/> at the debate about what imperialism is <pause dur="0.4"/> at the end of the twentieth century </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> but whereas earlier imperialism tended to be considered in terms of relationships between governments <pause dur="0.7"/> and between states <pause dur="1.0"/> modern imperialism is also seen in terms of informal relations <pause dur="0.5"/> between societies <pause dur="0.4"/> and of all sorts of groups of people <pause dur="0.4"/> and institutions <pause dur="0.3"/> within and beyond those individual <pause dur="0.3"/> states or societies <pause dur="0.3"/> in a world made up <pause dur="0.3"/> of sovereign nation states <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> under the United Nations <pause dur="0.9"/> businessmen <pause dur="0.7"/> banks <pause dur="0.6"/> missionaries <pause dur="0.5"/> United Nations organizations <pause dur="0.4"/> and multinational corporations <pause dur="0.4"/> are now seen as the new arenas <pause dur="0.2"/> if you like <pause dur="0.3"/> in which imperialism can be

exhibited <pause dur="1.4"/> above all at the end of the twentieth century there is perhaps an awareness of the framework set by the international economy <pause dur="0.6"/> that has come into being <pause dur="0.6"/> the terms of trade <pause dur="1.2"/> for instance especially between primary producing countries <pause dur="0.5"/> and industrialized countries <pause dur="0.5"/> which in so many respects seem disadvantageous <pause dur="0.4"/> to the poor <pause dur="0.3"/> and weak <pause dur="0.6"/> and to the advantage <pause dur="0.4"/> of the rich <pause dur="0.5"/> and strong <pause dur="2.2"/> so that's a second <pause dur="0.4"/> # feature of imperialism in the <pause dur="0.4"/> present age </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> thirdly <pause dur="1.2"/> the instruments of imperialism in the twentieth century have also changed <pause dur="0.3"/> and diversified <pause dur="0.7"/> where in the past <pause dur="0.3"/> what was called gunboat diplomacy <pause dur="1.4"/> and a fairly crude use <pause dur="0.3"/> of political <pause dur="0.2"/> naval or military power <pause dur="0.5"/> often sufficed <pause dur="0.9"/> today <pause dur="0.5"/> the instruments of imperialism are more likely to be the granting or withholding of economic aid <pause dur="0.8"/> loans <pause dur="0.3"/> or other forms <pause dur="0.2"/> of technical or economic assistance <pause dur="0.4"/> which <pause dur="0.4"/> there should be no doubt about it <pause dur="0.3"/> can amount to the difference between whether a political regime in some fairly

fragile <pause dur="0.7"/> ex-Third World state <pause dur="0.5"/> falls <pause dur="0.4"/> or stays in power <pause dur="1.5"/> and a system <pause dur="0.2"/> of what was <pause dur="0.8"/> rightly called client states <pause dur="0.4"/> has developed <pause dur="0.5"/> in which many such regimes are kept in place <pause dur="0.3"/> as clients of some larger <pause dur="0.2"/> great <pause dur="0.3"/> power <pause dur="0.4"/> in the world <pause dur="0.5"/> and you if you think that's purely an American phenomenon <pause dur="0.4"/> you're wrong <pause dur="0.4"/> other states in the twentieth century have proved very adept <pause dur="0.3"/> at the system of clientage <pause dur="0.4"/> if one could call it that <pause dur="0.3"/> # as well </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> the aims behind all this <pause dur="0.4"/> remain largely what they always have been <pause dur="1.4"/> they may be in economic <pause dur="0.8"/> the pursuit of markets <pause dur="0.8"/> the search for <pause dur="0.3"/> raw materials <pause dur="0.7"/> or oil <pause dur="0.7"/> or energy supplies <pause dur="1.3"/> or they may be strategic <pause dur="1.0"/> the defence <pause dur="0.2"/> of <pause dur="0.5"/> territory or of <pause dur="0.4"/> interests <pause dur="0.5"/> including economic interests elsewhere <pause dur="0.3"/> in other words one area becomes important for its strategic importance <pause dur="0.3"/> in relation to somewhere else <pause dur="0.3"/> not for anything <pause dur="0.3"/> particularly valuable economically <pause dur="0.4"/> in itself <pause dur="1.4"/> the pursuit of political power <pause dur="1.1"/> and an influential <pause dur="0.7"/> international role <pause dur="2.1"/> it can also be to do with ideology <pause dur="1.3"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> the

twentieth century is a highly ideologically charged era <pause dur="1.6"/> saving a small country from domination by communism <pause dur="0.4"/> was a hardy perennial <pause dur="0.6"/> in the ideological vocabulary of the West <pause dur="0.8"/> and it had its <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> equivalent <pause dur="0.6"/> in the East <pause dur="0.4"/> in the years <pause dur="0.4"/> of the Cold War <pause dur="0.5"/> which we have all <pause dur="0.2"/> just <pause dur="0.4"/> emerged from or are emerging from </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> quite clearly i would argue <pause dur="0.2"/> imperialism in the twentieth century has not been limited <pause dur="0.6"/> to societies with capitalistic <pause dur="0.4"/> economic systems <pause dur="0.9"/> nor has it been limited <pause dur="0.4"/> to relations with countries <pause dur="0.2"/> far away overseas <pause dur="1.2"/> both the United States <pause dur="0.5"/> and the Soviet Union <pause dur="0.8"/> spent most of the nineteenth century expanding into adjacent land areas on a huge scale <pause dur="0.8"/> in the <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> # Soviet case <pause dur="0.3"/> it was # a Russian <pause dur="0.2"/> expansionism right across to the <pause dur="0.2"/> Pacific <pause dur="0.4"/> at Vladivostok and down <pause dur="0.3"/> to the Middle East to the Caucasus <pause dur="0.8"/> in the case of the United States it was right across from the Atlantic <pause dur="0.4"/> to <pause dur="0.2"/> the Pacific <pause dur="0.7"/> though one should not antedate <pause dur="0.4"/> the <pause dur="0.8"/> period before which <pause dur="0.3"/> the United States emerged as a

world power this was only <pause dur="0.5"/> in <pause dur="0.2"/> the twentieth century <pause dur="1.1"/> so in other words expanding into adjacent areas <pause dur="0.4"/> can be <pause dur="0.3"/> # seen to have been a major feature of the <pause dur="0.6"/> two of the great <pause dur="0.2"/> powers of the twentieth century <pause dur="0.9"/> Russian expansion into eastern Europe <pause dur="0.4"/> during and after the Second World War <pause dur="0.8"/> took the form of indirect <pause dur="0.4"/> rather than direct political rule <pause dur="0.9"/> but it was a system of what i call clientage <pause dur="0.2"/> client states <pause dur="0.4"/> as the military interventions in East Germany <pause dur="0.4"/> in Hungary nineteen-fifty-six in Czechoslovakia <pause dur="0.4"/> in nineteen-sixty-eight <pause dur="0.3"/> and the threat of intervention in Poland in nineteen-eighty-one <pause dur="0.5"/> all demonstrate <pause dur="1.2"/> Russian <pause dur="0.2"/> dominance <pause dur="0.8"/> in all these areas <pause dur="0.4"/> of <pause dur="0.2"/> # eastern Europe therefore remain imperialistic <pause dur="0.6"/> and <pause dur="0.2"/> as effective in many ways <pause dur="0.5"/> for being indirect <pause dur="0.3"/> # probably more effective than for being direct <pause dur="0.7"/> and certainly it could and was backed up by military power <pause dur="0.5"/> # when necessary <pause dur="1.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> the Brezhnev doctrine as it was called in the years of the Cold War <pause dur="0.5"/> whereby <pause dur="0.3"/> the destabilization

of any part <pause dur="0.4"/> of the Soviet <pause dur="0.2"/> bloc <pause dur="0.3"/> was regarded as a threat to the whole <pause dur="0.5"/> was in some ways <pause dur="0.3"/> a corresponding <pause dur="0.4"/> # equivalent <pause dur="0.5"/> to the American Monroe doctrine <pause dur="0.4"/> which goes right back to the first <pause dur="0.2"/> third of the nineteenth century <pause dur="1.0"/> but the United States also <pause dur="0.4"/> has adopted a system in the twentieth century of what i call <pause dur="0.7"/> client states <pause dur="0.3"/> in the Caribbean <pause dur="0.4"/> and Central and South America <pause dur="0.6"/> and the United States on occasion has not hesitated to send in the Marines <pause dur="0.4"/> to Caribbean countries <pause dur="0.4"/> within the American sphere of interest <pause dur="0.4"/> whenever necessary <pause dur="0.9"/> Santo Domingo in nineteen-sixty-five and Grenada <pause dur="0.4"/> in the early nineteen-eighties <pause dur="0.3"/> are just two very <pause dur="0.3"/> obvious examples in a fairly long series <pause dur="0.4"/> of United States interventions <pause dur="0.3"/> in that area <pause dur="0.7"/> usually justified <pause dur="0.3"/> ideologically <pause dur="0.4"/> in terms of preserving law and order <pause dur="0.4"/> or democracy <pause dur="0.5"/> or a capitalist <pause dur="0.4"/> free trading <pause dur="0.5"/> system </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> in other words the fact is that the Cold War era the second half of the twentieth century was the heyday <pause dur="0.4"/> of a <pause dur="0.3"/> superpower <pause dur="0.5"/> # forms of

imperialism <pause dur="0.4"/> in which both of the blocs <pause dur="0.3"/> Soviet <pause dur="0.2"/> and <pause dur="0.4"/> # that <pause dur="0.2"/> under the United States the West <pause dur="0.5"/> managed <pause dur="0.3"/> client states <pause dur="0.4"/> and what they called spheres of interest <pause dur="0.5"/> what in the nineteenth century have been called spheres of influence <pause dur="0.7"/> in which <pause dur="0.6"/> we can only <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> say that the relationships were imperialistic <pause dur="1.7"/> in this activity there were losses as well as gains <pause dur="0.6"/> Iran for instance after nineteen-seventy-nine <pause dur="0.4"/> was a loss <pause dur="0.3"/> to the United States it became a <pause dur="0.4"/> not only an important <pause dur="0.3"/> oil producer but it ceased to be a client state <pause dur="0.4"/> in the way it had been <pause dur="0.4"/> and the <pause dur="0.3"/> last years of the shah <pause dur="1.0"/> and one might say that Afghanistan if ever it was a very effective <pause dur="0.4"/> client state <pause dur="0.2"/> ceased to be so <pause dur="0.3"/> after the withdrawal <pause dur="0.3"/> of the Soviet Union <pause dur="0.5"/> from Afghanistan <pause dur="0.5"/> and the sorry state <pause dur="0.2"/> of civil war and collapse <pause dur="0.3"/> which Afghanistan has been in <pause dur="0.4"/> # since <pause dur="1.1"/> certain <pause dur="0.3"/> countries have been remarkably effective <pause dur="0.5"/> in the <pause dur="0.4"/> height <pause dur="0.2"/> of the Cold War years the nineteen-fifties <pause dur="0.4"/> at playing off <pause dur="0.4"/> one <pause dur="0.4"/> bloc <pause dur="0.3"/> against the other <pause dur="0.4"/> i think particularly of Egypt <pause dur="0.2"/>

for instance <pause dur="0.4"/> under <pause dur="0.3"/> General Abdul <pause dur="0.3"/> Nasser <pause dur="0.5"/> very effective at in a way seeking to get <pause dur="0.2"/> # gain <pause dur="0.3"/> something <pause dur="0.3"/> from relations with both blocs without being totally subservient <pause dur="0.4"/> to either one of them </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> all this <pause dur="0.4"/> leads me on to suggest that modern imperialism <pause dur="0.7"/> tends to operate informally <pause dur="0.3"/> through a wide range <pause dur="0.5"/> of economic <pause dur="0.3"/> and political forms of influence and pressure <pause dur="1.1"/> rather than <pause dur="0.3"/> as in the <pause dur="0.7"/> old days of imperialism <pause dur="0.6"/> through outright territorial annexation <pause dur="0.5"/> military conquest <pause dur="0.4"/> or formal <pause dur="0.3"/> colonial <pause dur="0.3"/> rule <pause dur="1.7"/> investment <pause dur="0.6"/> or not investing <pause dur="0.9"/> trade <pause dur="0.9"/> arms sales <pause dur="0.4"/> loans <pause dur="0.6"/> raw materials <pause dur="0.4"/> aid programmes <pause dur="0.4"/> the export of modern technology <pause dur="0.6"/> these are the new means <pause dur="0.3"/> by which influence <pause dur="0.4"/> is exerted <pause dur="1.1"/> but aircraft carrier diplomacy <pause dur="0.6"/> and outright military invasion <pause dur="0.8"/> can be resorted to <pause dur="0.4"/> on occasion <pause dur="0.7"/> and still are <pause dur="3.1"/> the basic accusation <pause dur="0.4"/> against imperialism in the modern age <pause dur="0.3"/> is that it is by definition exploitative <pause dur="1.4"/> and what one means by exploitation <pause dur="0.8"/> is that the terms of the relationship between the two parties or two

countries <pause dur="0.9"/> are grossly unequal <pause dur="1.0"/> with most of the gains <pause dur="0.3"/> going to the richer <pause dur="0.5"/> or stronger <pause dur="0.6"/> partner <pause dur="3.1"/> there is i think no doubt <pause dur="0.5"/> that trade <pause dur="0.6"/> and investment <pause dur="0.6"/> and purchase of raw materials and all those other things are important <pause dur="0.7"/> # to certain developed industrialized <pause dur="0.3"/> countries <pause dur="1.1"/> and that without these economic connections <pause dur="0.4"/> and leverage <pause dur="0.4"/> the profits of some industries would be lower <pause dur="0.8"/> the costs higher <pause dur="0.7"/> the goods scarcer <pause dur="0.8"/> and more expensive <pause dur="1.2"/> but we need to look a <trunc>f</trunc> at a few <pause dur="0.6"/> of the basic underlying <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> truths facts <pause dur="0.6"/> # i think before we <pause dur="0.6"/> easily fall back on # the assumption that all imperialistic relations <pause dur="0.5"/> are exploitative </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> first <pause dur="0.3"/> exports <pause dur="1.8"/> if we take the most powerful country in the world today the United States <pause dur="1.2"/> we have to face the fact <pause dur="0.2"/> that the markets <pause dur="0.4"/> of the poorer countries of the world <pause dur="0.6"/> are relatively unimportant <pause dur="1.2"/> little more than about one per cent <pause dur="0.5"/> of the gross national product <pause dur="1.6"/> as markets for all the richer countries <pause dur="0.7"/> the poorer countries of the world <pause dur="0.5"/> have been declining <pause dur="0.5"/> in

relative importance <pause dur="0.3"/> during the last thirty <pause dur="0.4"/> or forty years <pause dur="1.2"/> poorer countries <pause dur="0.7"/> amounted to about thirty per cent of world trade <pause dur="0.4"/> in the nineteen-fifties <pause dur="0.8"/> twenty per cent <pause dur="0.3"/> in the nineteen-sixties <pause dur="0.4"/> and the gap in the nineteen-seventies and eighties as we all know <pause dur="0.3"/> between the rich and the poor <pause dur="0.3"/> has increased <pause dur="1.0"/> meanwhile <pause dur="0.5"/> the markets <pause dur="0.3"/> for manufactured goods and so on <pause dur="0.3"/> of the richer countries have been growing much <trunc>m</trunc> faster <pause dur="0.7"/> than those of the poorer countries <pause dur="1.0"/> because that <pause dur="0.4"/> the richer countries is where the purchasing power <pause dur="0.5"/> is <pause dur="1.2"/> as in the nineteenth century <pause dur="0.3"/> so in the twentieth century <pause dur="0.5"/> trade follows demand <pause dur="0.9"/> and trade between the richer countries <pause dur="0.5"/> that is trade between <pause dur="0.2"/> richer countries <pause dur="0.4"/> within what has come <pause dur="0.4"/> by some economists to be called a metropolitan centre <pause dur="0.5"/> of the world trading system <pause dur="0.5"/> is increasingly as we all know <pause dur="0.2"/> the real source of growth <pause dur="0.4"/> in the capitalist economies <pause dur="0.6"/> it's not the trade <pause dur="0.3"/> between the rich <pause dur="0.4"/> and the poor <pause dur="0.8"/> the rich at the centre <pause dur="0.2"/> the poor countries at the periphery <pause dur="1.6"/>

so in terms of this first category exports <pause dur="1.1"/> the rich countries <pause dur="0.2"/> carry out the most important part of their trade <pause dur="0.4"/> with each other <pause dur="0.4"/> overwhelmingly so <pause dur="1.4"/> for the economic growth of the centre <pause dur="1.0"/> trade with the periphery <pause dur="0.6"/> it's therefore <pause dur="0.3"/> peripheral <pause dur="1.0"/> and much less important <pause dur="0.5"/> than the trade of the richer countries <pause dur="0.7"/> with each other <pause dur="0.9"/> that's one hard <pause dur="0.6"/> fact </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> second <pause dur="0.6"/> investment <pause dur="1.8"/> as sources for investment <pause dur="0.5"/> the poor countries are also declining in importance <pause dur="1.2"/> large scale capital investment <pause dur="0.7"/> goes to areas under a capitalist international <pause dur="0.5"/> economy <pause dur="0.7"/> with the most profitable <pause dur="0.5"/> and rapidly growing <pause dur="0.3"/> markets <pause dur="1.2"/> not the poor countries <pause dur="1.3"/> more than two-thirds of all United States foreign investment <pause dur="0.5"/> is with mature <pause dur="0.3"/> developed <pause dur="0.2"/> countries <pause dur="0.9"/> in Europe <pause dur="0.5"/> Canada <pause dur="0.4"/> and elsewhere <pause dur="1.3"/> in other words also under the heading investment <pause dur="0.8"/> the <pause dur="0.3"/> rich countries <pause dur="0.6"/> therefore <pause dur="0.2"/> need each other <pause dur="1.0"/> much more <pause dur="0.5"/> than they need the poor countries <pause dur="0.6"/> there are certain <pause dur="0.4"/> exceptions <pause dur="0.2"/> oil rich <pause dur="0.4"/> Arab countries in the Middle East <pause dur="0.3"/> are one obvious one which i shall come to in

just a minute <pause dur="1.3"/> but this point about the rich economies needing each other more far far more <pause dur="0.5"/> than they need the poor countries is the terrible truth we live with <pause dur="0.5"/> at the end of the twentieth century <pause dur="0.8"/> it's a very grim conclusion <pause dur="0.7"/> with grim implications for the poorer countries <pause dur="0.5"/> in the coming <pause dur="0.3"/> twenty-first century <pause dur="1.1"/> Gunnar Myrdal <pause dur="0.2"/> one of the great historians of Asia and of Europe's <pause dur="0.4"/> # interaction with Asia <pause dur="0.6"/> put the point <pause dur="0.2"/> quite a long time ago unforgettably <pause dur="0.5"/> in one of his books <pause dur="0.7"/> when he said that <reading>the entire Indian subcontinent could sink beneath the waves of the Indian Ocean <pause dur="0.6"/> without this causing so much as a ripple <pause dur="0.6"/> on the economies <pause dur="0.3"/> of the developed countries of the world</reading> </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> after <pause dur="0.2"/> trade <pause dur="0.5"/> and investment <pause dur="0.5"/> thirdly <pause dur="0.3"/> raw materials <pause dur="1.4"/> this clearly <pause dur="0.5"/> is the area where poor countries <pause dur="0.3"/> surely possess <pause dur="0.2"/> their chief importance <pause dur="0.3"/> in relation to the rich countries <pause dur="0.7"/> most industrialized countries are very dependent <pause dur="0.4"/> on imports of minerals <pause dur="0.3"/> fuels <pause dur="0.3"/> raw materials and

other <pause dur="0.2"/> primary products <pause dur="0.2"/> from less <pause dur="0.3"/> developed <pause dur="0.4"/> countries <pause dur="0.8"/> and some of those <pause dur="0.2"/> producers of these <pause dur="0.2"/> crucial <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> commodities <pause dur="0.5"/> are on occasion <pause dur="0.2"/> able to combine <pause dur="0.3"/> to extract a better deal <pause dur="0.4"/> from the rich countries <pause dur="0.3"/> whose trade they are dependent on i'm thinking of <pause dur="0.3"/> the temporary cartel of the OPEC <pause dur="0.3"/> producers for instance <pause dur="0.2"/> which caused such an oil price rise <pause dur="0.3"/> in the nineteen-seventies <pause dur="1.3"/> but <pause dur="0.7"/> too often <pause dur="0.7"/> the question of price <pause dur="0.7"/> and the question of alternatives <pause dur="0.4"/> to these imports <pause dur="0.4"/> are forgotten <pause dur="1.1"/> but both of these questions price <pause dur="0.4"/> and are there alternatives are crucial <pause dur="1.2"/> so long as a raw material or so long as many raw materials this isn't true of all <pause dur="0.4"/> oil is <pause dur="0.3"/> an exception in various ways <pause dur="0.6"/> but so long as a raw material can be extracted <pause dur="1.1"/> plentifully <pause dur="0.7"/> and imported <pause dur="0.5"/> relatively <pause dur="0.2"/> cheaply <pause dur="0.6"/> it will be imported <pause dur="1.2"/> but if difficulties occur <pause dur="0.4"/> in relation to extraction <pause dur="0.6"/> or the price <pause dur="0.2"/> is dramatically increased <pause dur="0.5"/> this stimulates <pause dur="0.2"/> a search for alternatives <pause dur="0.9"/> one only has to look <pause dur="0.3"/> at the way in which the development of

synthetics <pause dur="0.5"/> in the last half-century <pause dur="0.4"/> has replaced <pause dur="0.4"/> what were previously <pause dur="0.4"/> # goods manufactured with raw materials like rubber <pause dur="0.4"/> for instance to see the <pause dur="0.3"/> truth of what i'm saying <pause dur="0.8"/> in other words where a particular primary product <pause dur="0.3"/> becomes very expensive or difficult to obtain in sufficient quantities <pause dur="0.4"/> this stimulates <pause dur="0.2"/> a search out for a development <pause dur="0.4"/> # of a synthetic replacement <pause dur="0.4"/> and the huge growth of plastics and synthetics of all kinds there's a very interesting <pause dur="0.4"/> case <pause dur="0.3"/> in the twentieth century of precisely that <pause dur="1.2"/> the same <pause dur="0.4"/> can be seen in certain regional areas i haven't time to go into that <pause dur="0.4"/> in terms of # certain <pause dur="0.2"/> topics like # fuel <pause dur="0.4"/> as well <pause dur="0.8"/> # coal for instance the rise and fall <pause dur="0.3"/> and sometimes revival <pause dur="0.4"/> of coal as a <trunc>f</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> a fossil fuel resource over and against <pause dur="0.3"/> that of alternatives <pause dur="0.3"/> is again crucially affected by price <pause dur="0.3"/> as well as <pause dur="0.3"/> readily and <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>near</trunc> nearby <pause dur="0.4"/> # availability <pause dur="2.6"/> i've watched this myself in southern Africa <pause dur="0.2"/> where mineral extraction has been absolutely crucial <pause dur="0.5"/> to the relatively

successful <pause dur="0.3"/> # development <pause dur="0.4"/> of one or <pause dur="0.2"/> two of the other positive cases in the African continent Botswana <pause dur="0.4"/> for instance a <pause dur="0.2"/> poor very poor country <pause dur="0.4"/> in terms of rainfall <pause dur="0.4"/> and # natural resources apart from <pause dur="0.3"/> its minerals <pause dur="0.6"/> or South Africa itself <pause dur="0.3"/> with its astonishing <pause dur="0.4"/> # <trunc>ly</trunc> rich endowment not just of gold <pause dur="0.5"/> but of other minerals <pause dur="0.6"/> the development <pause dur="0.3"/> of gold mining has been absolutely crucial <pause dur="0.3"/> of course to the take-off <pause dur="0.3"/> of the <pause dur="0.2"/> southern African economies <pause dur="0.3"/> into industrialized developed <pause dur="0.3"/> form <pause dur="0.8"/> but # the actual <pause dur="0.2"/> price of gold <pause dur="0.4"/> # became highly destabilized <pause dur="0.3"/> i can just remember in the nineteen early nineteen-eighties <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> no late seventies actually early eighties <pause dur="0.4"/> when the price of gold rocketed up to eight-hundred dollars an ounce <pause dur="0.4"/> this led to all sorts of mining tips <pause dur="0.3"/> in southern Africa <pause dur="0.3"/> it becoming viable to reprocess them to extract the remaining gold in them <pause dur="0.4"/> because the price of gold <pause dur="0.3"/> made this viable whereas in a <pause dur="0.2"/> earlier period where the price of gold had been lower <pause dur="0.3"/> it simply wasn't

economically viable <pause dur="0.5"/> to do it so these things can change <pause dur="2.3"/> and # many other # <pause dur="0.4"/> subjects i could show about how <pause dur="0.4"/> things can change <pause dur="0.4"/> if the actual # price changes the extractability <pause dur="0.4"/> changes <pause dur="0.3"/> the demand for it changes <pause dur="1.4"/> so the actual # <pause dur="0.2"/> situation <pause dur="0.5"/> vis-à-vis <pause dur="0.3"/> these <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> questions <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="1.3"/> changes </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm0078" trans="pause"> i also # <pause dur="1.3"/> think we should take in one other aspect of imperialism having spent some time on the economic side of it <pause dur="0.9"/> and that is cultural <pause dur="0.3"/> imperialism <pause dur="1.1"/> because we are far more sensitive at the end of the twentieth century <pause dur="0.6"/> than many people in many parts of the world were at the beginning of this century <pause dur="0.5"/> about the whole cultural <trunc>a</trunc> dimension <pause dur="0.5"/> to imperialism <pause dur="0.6"/> in the way that rich countries export their tastes <pause dur="0.5"/> their preferences <pause dur="0.6"/> their salary structures <pause dur="0.5"/> and their values <pause dur="0.3"/> to poorer countries <pause dur="0.3"/> through a process <pause dur="0.3"/> that the economists often like to call trickle-down marketing <pause dur="1.9"/> poor countries <pause dur="0.5"/> of the peripheral <pause dur="0.2"/> parts of the world <pause dur="0.6"/> are thereby robbed of their chance to develop tastes <pause dur="0.3"/> and lifestyles

autonomously <pause dur="0.8"/> instead <pause dur="0.4"/> they become imitative <pause dur="0.6"/> artificially stimulated <pause dur="0.4"/> in their tastes <pause dur="0.4"/> values <pause dur="0.4"/> aspirations <pause dur="0.3"/> by outside models <pause dur="0.6"/> and processes <pause dur="0.8"/> this is a process <pause dur="0.2"/> nicely known as Coca-cola imperialism <pause dur="0.8"/><vocal desc="laughter" iterated="y" n="ss" dur="1"/> but it could easily be taken to # imply that from MacDonalds <pause dur="0.3"/> or any of the other <pause dur="0.3"/> # huge and very # <pause dur="0.3"/> pervasive <pause dur="0.3"/> # forms <pause dur="0.3"/> of if you like in this case <pause dur="0.2"/> western or American <pause dur="1.0"/> # culture <pause dur="1.9"/> now it's quite true that in many parts of Africa Asia Latin America <pause dur="0.9"/> the new elites do tend to imitate <pause dur="0.3"/> the tastes <pause dur="0.2"/> and lifestyles of those in foreign <pause dur="0.4"/> rich <pause dur="0.2"/> countries <pause dur="0.8"/> the need of what is often a poor developing country <pause dur="0.6"/> to save and live modestly <pause dur="0.5"/> to <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> aid <pause dur="0.3"/> its national <pause dur="0.2"/>

progress <pause dur="0.2"/> and development <pause dur="0.5"/> instead gets diverted <pause dur="0.8"/> into conspicuous consumption <pause dur="0.5"/> by the elite <pause dur="0.3"/> often with the accompaniment of what's now called <pause dur="0.4"/> in <pause dur="0.4"/> the light of the Russian case crony capitalism <pause dur="0.6"/> and elsewhere is <pause dur="0.4"/> rife with <pause dur="0.3"/> corruption <pause dur="0.4"/> of various kinds <pause dur="1.2"/> i remember <pause dur="0.5"/> when i was about your age spending some time in Tanzania <pause dur="0.6"/> where Julius Nyerere the <pause dur="0.3"/> leader of independent Tanzania <pause dur="0.4"/> gave a notable lead against this trend in a series of speeches in his doctrine of Ujamaa <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> the poorer people <pause dur="0.4"/> he # well knew in Tanzania had a word to describe <pause dur="0.5"/> any of the elite in their country <pause dur="0.4"/> who started driving around in large cars