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<!DOCTYPE TEI.2 SYSTEM "base.dtd">




<title>Cognitive science</title></titleStmt>

<publicationStmt><distributor>BASE and Oxford Text Archive</distributor>


<availability><p>The British Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading, under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Centre for English Language Teacher Education, Warwick) and Paul Thompson

(Department of Applied Linguistics, Reading), with funding from BALEAP,

EURALEX, the British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. The

original recordings are held at the Universities of Warwick and Reading, and

at the Oxford Text Archive and may be consulted by bona fide researchers

upon written application to any of the holding bodies.

The BASE corpus is freely available to researchers who agree to the

following conditions:</p>

<p>1. The recordings and transcriptions should not be modified in any


<p>2. The recordings and transcriptions should be used for research purposes

only; they should not be reproduced in teaching materials</p>

<p>3. The recordings and transcriptions should not be reproduced in full for

a wider audience/readership, although researchers are free to quote short

passages of text (up to 200 running words from any given speech event)</p>

<p>4. The corpus developers should be informed of all presentations or

publications arising from analysis of the corpus</p><p>

Researchers should acknowledge their use of the corpus using the following

form of words:

The recordings and transcriptions used in this study come from the British

Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus, which was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Warwick) and Paul Thompson (Reading). Corpus development was assisted by

funding from the Universities of Warwick and Reading, BALEAP, EURALEX, the

British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. </p></availability>




<recording dur="00:44:13" n="6317">


<respStmt><name>BASE team</name>



<langUsage><language id="en">English</language>



<person id="nm0140" role="main speaker" n="n" sex="m"><p>nm0140, main speaker, non-student, male</p></person>

<person id="sf0141" role="participant" n="s" sex="f"><p>sf0141, participant, student, female</p></person>

<person id="sm0142" role="participant" n="s" sex="m"><p>sm0142, participant, student, male</p></person>

<person id="sf0143" role="participant" n="s" sex="f"><p>sf0143, participant, student, female</p></person>

<person id="sf0144" role="participant" n="s" sex="f"><p>sf0144, participant, student, female</p></person>

<person id="sf0145" role="participant" n="s" sex="f"><p>sf0145, participant, student, female</p></person>

<personGrp id="ss" role="audience" size="l"><p>ss, audience, large group </p></personGrp>

<personGrp id="sl" role="all" size="l"><p>sl, all, large group</p></personGrp>

<personGrp role="speakers" size="8"><p>number of speakers: 8</p></personGrp>





<item n="speechevent">Lecture</item>

<item n="acaddept">Philosophy</item>

<item n="acaddiv">ah</item>

<item n="partlevel">UG1</item>

<item n="module">Searle</item>




<u who="nm0140"> the # <pause dur="0.3"/> handout <pause dur="0.7"/> i've got a new handout <unclear>on your</unclear> handout today <pause dur="1.5"/> last week i gave a a sort of supplementary <pause dur="0.4"/> handout for chapters two and three <pause dur="0.4"/> if you didn't get that then copies of those handouts are available in the Philosophy department <pause dur="0.2"/> office <pause dur="0.3"/> okay <pause dur="0.6"/> that's just to explain what's going on what i've got there are the new handouts which i'll give out in just a minute or two <pause dur="1.8"/> secondly just before we start apologies for the fact that as you can <pause dur="0.3"/> probably hear i'm <pause dur="0.3"/> suffering at the moment <pause dur="0.3"/> and # <pause dur="0.5"/> it's distorting my voice in a variety of ways and also <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> i'm not feeling too good so i hope i survive this lecture <pause dur="2.2"/> can you <pause dur="0.5"/> is the <pause dur="0.2"/> is # microphone on </u><pause dur="0.2"/> <u who="ss" trans="pause"> no </u><u who="nm0140" trans="overlap"> no i thought i <pause dur="0.3"/> thought i couldn't hear <unclear>anything there</unclear> <pause dur="0.6"/> it the red light is on here <pause dur="3.5"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> well there we are <pause dur="2.1"/><vocal desc="laughter" n="ss" iterated="y" dur="1"/> well <pause dur="0.4"/> typical isn't it on a day when i'm i'm losing my voice i haven't even got the microphone <pause dur="1.3"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> well <pause dur="0.9"/> got this flight console here maybe i can do something and see what happens </u><u who="sf0141" trans="latching"> yeah </u><u who="sm0142" trans="latching"> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> </u> <u who="nm0140" trans="overlap">

if i'm <unclear>bold</unclear> <pause dur="0.2"/> if i stand in this one place then it's going to be all right </u><u who="sf0143" trans="overlap"> yes </u><u who="nm0140" trans="overlap"> but as you already <pause dur="0.2"/> as you know i'm <pause dur="0.3"/> could actually even just like to wander around all the time <pause dur="0.3"/> i'm going to see if i can actually get the <pause dur="0.2"/> the remote mike to work <gap reason="inaudible due to background noise" extent="1 sec"/> </u><pause dur="0.7"/> <u who="sf0144" trans="pause"> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> </u><pause dur="0.4"/> <u who="nm0140" trans="pause"> oh <pause dur="16.5"/> <vocal desc="laughter" n="ss" iterated="y" dur="1"/> i'll just check whether this has worked i've got a <gap reason="inaudible due to background noise" extent="1 sec"/> these mikes to see if the <unclear>remote</unclear> mike is working so <pause dur="2.3"/> right is the is it working now </u><u who="ss" trans="latching"> no </u><u who="nm0140" trans="overlap"> no <pause dur="0.2"/> okay <pause dur="0.2"/><gap reason="inaudible due to background noise" extent="1 sec"/><pause dur="13.8"/> no <pause dur="1.1"/> one more try <pause dur="0.5"/> shh <pause dur="0.5"/> no <pause dur="0.2"/> no okay i'm going to abandon it and just speak loudly <pause dur="7.3"/> okay what we're going to do in the # the rest of these lectures today <pause dur="0.2"/> tomorrow and next week is to look at the <pause dur="0.5"/> chapters three four five and six we're going to spend one lecture on each of those chapters as i said at the very beginning <pause dur="0.7"/> we spent relatively more time on the earlier chapters because they contained a lot of # <pause dur="0.2"/> material in them and a lot of the kind of basis of what <trunc>s</trunc> <pause dur="0.3"/> Searle <pause dur="0.7"/> # Searle's arguments for

the later chapters are going to be <pause dur="1.6"/> what i'm going to do for these chapters <pause dur="0.2"/> three four five and six <pause dur="0.9"/> is to distribute to you <pause dur="0.2"/> notes <pause dur="0.2"/> quite specific notes on the content of those chapters <pause dur="0.5"/> and then in the lectures what i want to do is to try and get over to you what the point of the chapter is <pause dur="0.7"/> so there's going to be kind of more detailed summation in the handouts than there actually is <pause dur="0.5"/> # in the lecture <pause dur="0.2"/> so you'll need the handouts to fill out some of the <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>s</trunc> points the handouts form a kind of commentary on the text <pause dur="0.8"/> # whereas the lectures are going to try and <pause dur="0.2"/> get what the main point of it all is of each of those chapters <pause dur="0.2"/> okay <pause dur="0.3"/> so what i'm going to do now is to hand out <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> the <pause dur="0.2"/> notes on chapter three <pause dur="0.4"/> and tomorrow i'll hand out notes on chapter four next Wednesday on chapter five <pause dur="0.5"/> next Thursday on chapter six <pause dur="2.5"/> again just to repeat as always if there are previous handouts that you need <pause dur="0.5"/> then you can obtain those from the <pause dur="0.7"/> Philosophy department office <pause dur="22.5"/> okay <pause dur="4.0"/> you'll recall that <pause dur="0.2"/> Searle <pause dur="0.4"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.3"/>

says that there are two <pause dur="0.2"/> claims which are typical of <pause dur="0.2"/> strong A-I strong artificial intelligence <pause dur="1.5"/> one of those claims <pause dur="0.2"/> is that <pause dur="0.2"/> computers put very <pause dur="0.2"/> very briefly that computers can think <pause dur="0.4"/> or that <pause dur="0.7"/> put it slightly less briefly <pause dur="0.2"/> a suitably programmed <pause dur="0.3"/> digital computer may at some time <pause dur="0.8"/> at in the future <pause dur="0.3"/> be said to be able to think <pause dur="1.4"/> there are of course people in A-I who think <pause dur="0.6"/> that the very strongest claim is true that computers already can think <pause dur="0.6"/> an example of such a person is the Professor of Cybernetics at this university Kevin Warwick <pause dur="0.8"/> who holds <pause dur="0.2"/> rather a controversial opinion and one of those is that already you can say that computers can think <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="1.5"/> the other claim <pause dur="0.2"/> second claim <pause dur="0.9"/> okay first claim <pause dur="0.2"/> computers can think <pause dur="0.4"/> the second claim is <pause dur="0.8"/> that <pause dur="1.7"/> a digital computer <pause dur="0.2"/> provides the suitable model <pause dur="0.4"/> for thinking about the human brain <pause dur="0.6"/> or put it more briefly <pause dur="0.2"/> the human brain is like a digital computer <pause dur="0.7"/> okay that's the second claim <pause dur="0.5"/> that second claim <pause dur="0.6"/> that a human brain is like a

digital computer <pause dur="0.4"/> is <pause dur="0.2"/> the claim which is discussed in chapter three <pause dur="0.4"/> on cognitive science <pause dur="1.0"/> okay <pause dur="1.1"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="3.4"/> Searle starts off by observing <pause dur="0.6"/> that <pause dur="1.0"/> we seem to have available to us two different ways of being able to explain human behaviour <pause dur="1.4"/> the first way of explaining human behaviour was the sort of <pause dur="0.2"/> way of explaining human behaviour that i was talking about last week <pause dur="0.5"/> when i said that as far as human beings are concerned <pause dur="0.4"/> we can explain human behaviour in terms of <pause dur="0.4"/> the purposes the ambitions the drives the wishes <pause dur="0.4"/> that people have <pause dur="0.5"/> those provide a sort of general background which makes it sensible to say <pause dur="0.8"/> # why somebody is doing something <pause dur="0.4"/> why is somebody doing something somebody somebody who's doing something absolutely bizarre <pause dur="0.7"/> you know they're standing on one leg like this and you see them <unclear>and say</unclear> why are they doing that <pause dur="0.7"/> and you say oh well <pause dur="0.2"/> one thing <pause dur="0.4"/> might <pause dur="0.5"/> you know they're being a <pause dur="0.2"/> street performer of some sort <pause dur="0.9"/> okay <pause dur="1.3"/> so that will be one way of explaining human behaviour <pause dur="1.6"/> now

there's another way of explaining human behaviour which might be open to us <pause dur="0.4"/> and that is a scientific explanation of human behaviour <pause dur="0.2"/> and in particular <pause dur="0.5"/> as it's a scientific explanation of human behaviour i mean <pause dur="0.2"/> science can explain all sorts of things # it can explain chemical reactions it can explain <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> you know the # <pause dur="0.5"/> way one billiard ball hits another billiard ball with mechanics and physics and so on <pause dur="0.4"/> but if we're explaining human behaviour there might be a sort of scientific explanation <pause dur="0.3"/> which addresses itself to explaining human behaviour <pause dur="0.4"/> why is somebody doing that <pause dur="0.2"/> well we produce an explanation in terms of science <pause dur="0.4"/> and that might be in terms of for example neurophysiology <pause dur="0.4"/> in terms of what's going on in a person's brain <pause dur="1.4"/> well the first sort of explanation by and large is concerned with <pause dur="0.7"/> explaining what's in the person's mind what their motive what their intention <pause dur="0.3"/> what their desires wishes purposes are <pause dur="0.2"/> the second sort of explanation <pause dur="0.2"/> in terms of

what's going on in their brain in the <pause dur="0.2"/> in the stuff in here <pause dur="0.4"/> in terms of their neurophysiology <pause dur="2.1"/> that first <pause dur="0.2"/> common thing for psychology the sort of explanation that we deploy all the time in everyday life in talking about other people <pause dur="0.5"/> is often talked about in the literature the literature of <pause dur="0.5"/> # psychology the literature of philosophy the literature of popular science is often referred to as folk psychology <pause dur="0.5"/> and what all the folk psychology <pause dur="0.2"/> come across it says <pause dur="0.3"/> all that folk psychology means is simply common sense approach <pause dur="0.4"/> okay <pause dur="1.5"/> now there's a problem <pause dur="0.9"/> Searle says i've taken his <pause dur="0.9"/> statement of the problem from page twenty-two of the book <pause dur="1.2"/> the problem is there's a sort of gap <pause dur="0.2"/> between these two sorts of explanation <pause dur="1.6"/> he says the first of these sorts of explanation works well enough in practice <pause dur="0.6"/> we explain other people's behaviour in terms of their desires their motivations their wishes their intentions and that seems to work in a certain sort of way <pause dur="0.7"/>

but it isn't scientific <pause dur="1.4"/> and the second sort of explanation is certainly scientific <pause dur="0.6"/> but we've no idea how to make it work in practice <pause dur="0.6"/> in other words if you do see somebody standing on a leg like this <pause dur="0.4"/> and you say why are they doing that <pause dur="0.4"/> then <pause dur="0.2"/> it's actually <pause dur="0.3"/> very very difficult to produce a <trunc>neuroph</trunc> neurophysiological explanation which satisfactorily explains <pause dur="0.4"/> why they're doing that <pause dur="1.5"/> and Searle says <pause dur="0.5"/> we've got no idea how to bring together these two sorts of explanations integrate them <pause dur="2.0"/> we've no idea how to integrate or unify common sense <pause dur="0.2"/> explanations with neuroscientific ones <pause dur="0.3"/> he says just to <trunc>con</trunc> <pause dur="0.3"/> continue that <pause dur="0.5"/> quotation at the bottom of the slide <pause dur="1.6"/> since we've no idea how to <pause dur="0.2"/> integrate <pause dur="0.9"/> or unify common sense explanations with the explanations of science pure scientific ones <pause dur="0.3"/> we are tempted to think that there's a gap <pause dur="0.4"/> between <pause dur="0.2"/> the mind and the brain <pause dur="0.5"/> now chapter three <pause dur="0.2"/> is concerned with attempts that people have made <pause dur="0.3"/> to fill this gap <pause dur="0.4"/> the gap between common sense

explanations and scientific explanations <pause dur="0.9"/> okay <pause dur="2.4"/> this <pause dur="0.2"/> appearance of a gap <pause dur="0.2"/> has led philosophers and others and psychologists and a whole series of # <trunc>o</trunc> other sorts of scientists <pause dur="0.5"/> into thinking that the gap needs filling <pause dur="0.2"/> and that what we need when you fill a gap <pause dur="0.2"/> you use an intermediate level explanation <pause dur="0.6"/> you fill the gap by producing another level of explanation <pause dur="0.2"/> intermediate between common sense psychology and neuroscience <pause dur="1.5"/> an explanation which will <pause dur="0.3"/> explain how common sense psychological phenomena <pause dur="0.4"/> derive from goings on <pause dur="0.2"/> in the central <pause dur="0.2"/> nervous <pause dur="0.2"/> system <pause dur="0.9"/>

okay <pause dur="1.4"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="2.3"/> and <pause dur="0.3"/> he he says in a <pause dur="1.0"/> another place not in Minds Brains and Science but in a review he wrote <pause dur="0.5"/> he talked about filling this gap and he says <reading>couldn't there be <pause dur="0.7"/> a third possibility <pause dur="0.2"/> between common sense psychology and neuroscience <pause dur="0.4"/> a science of human beings that was not introspective common sense psychology <pause dur="0.4"/> but was not neurophysiology either <pause dur="0.8"/> this has been the great dream of the human sciences <pause dur="0.4"/> in the twentieth

century</reading> <pause dur="0.9"/> okay <pause dur="1.6"/> that's <pause dur="1.7"/> the background <pause dur="6.6"/> now <pause dur="2.1"/> Searle says that in the twentieth century <pause dur="0.6"/> there's been a whole series of attempts to try and <pause dur="0.2"/> fill <pause dur="0.3"/> the gap <pause dur="1.6"/> and <pause dur="0.9"/> he says <pause dur="0.3"/> look all of these <pause dur="0.3"/> attempts have been failures none of them have satisfactorily managed to fill the gap <pause dur="0.7"/> and he surveys what some of these attempts <pause dur="0.2"/> have been <pause dur="0.8"/> and we can just look <pause dur="0.5"/> briefly at <pause dur="1.1"/> some of those <pause dur="0.2"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.3"/> previous gap-filling efforts <pause dur="0.5"/> for example behaviourism <pause dur="1.0"/> behaviourism a highly influential psychological theory particularly just post-Second World War <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> surrounding in particular one <pause dur="0.6"/> figure <pause dur="0.2"/> B F Skinner <pause dur="0.5"/> and Skinner's <pause dur="0.7"/> behaviourist psychology <pause dur="0.7"/> was <pause dur="0.2"/> extremely influential as a <pause dur="0.3"/> way of trying to explain human behaviour <pause dur="2.8"/> then there was <pause dur="0.2"/> Gagne's theory <pause dur="0.4"/> again very influential <pause dur="0.2"/> actually in the fifties and sixties <pause dur="1.2"/> # cybernetics <pause dur="0.5"/> became extremely influential from about the fifties and sixties onwards <pause dur="0.6"/> through the works of people like Stafford Beer <pause dur="0.2"/> and others <pause dur="0.9"/> information theory <pause dur="0.2"/> highly influential particularly as

computer science developed <pause dur="0.9"/> structuralism <pause dur="0.4"/> became extremely influential through work in <pause dur="0.4"/> in linguistics <pause dur="1.5"/> and <vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.7"/> more recently <pause dur="0.5"/> we've seen sociobiology <pause dur="0.2"/> and a part of sociobiology evolutionary biology <pause dur="0.3"/> the work of people like Richard Dawkins say in particular The Selfish Gene and other books like that <pause dur="0.6"/> attempts to try and produce explanations of human behaviour <pause dur="0.3"/> which in some way or other fill the gap <pause dur="0.5"/> between the everyday explanations and <pause dur="0.5"/> the more <pause dur="0.2"/> as it were basic level biochemical neurophysiological explanations <pause dur="1.5"/> Searle claims that all of these attempts have failed <pause dur="0.2"/> which of course is a bold a bold claim <pause dur="0.6"/> since <pause dur="0.4"/> although some of them seem to have withered and died many of them still live in one form or another and there are plenty of people who still <pause dur="0.7"/> stake their reputation in one way or another on some of these theories <pause dur="4.0"/> now i # observe what is the on the rest of this slide is something which isn't in # <pause dur="1.0"/><vocal desc="cough" iterated="n"/> it isn't in Searle's

chapter but i'm just observing something about these sorts of modes of explanation <pause dur="0.9"/> very often when people try to produce large scale explanations of human behaviour <pause dur="0.2"/> large scale theories of which all of these are examples <pause dur="0.6"/> which large scale explanations of human behaviour are often based on some sort of <pause dur="0.5"/> reductionist idea <pause dur="1.1"/> a reductionist view of human behaviour <pause dur="1.2"/> and what i mean by a reductionist view of human behaviour <pause dur="0.8"/> is trying to explain <pause dur="0.2"/> all human behaviour <pause dur="0.9"/> by means of a single explanation <pause dur="0.9"/> a single motive <pause dur="0.6"/> a single explanation <pause dur="1.6"/> and i'll <trunc>ju</trunc> just two examples so that you have in mind the sort of thing that i'm getting at here <pause dur="0.6"/> Thomas Hobbes the <pause dur="0.3"/> extremely influential English moral and political philosopher <pause dur="0.6"/> who wrote the great <pause dur="0.3"/> book The Leviathan <pause dur="1.4"/> most famous i suppose for saying that <pause dur="0.2"/> if there were no human society <pause dur="0.6"/> then human life would be solitary poor nasty brutish and short <pause dur="0.6"/> his most famous sentence <pause dur="1.3"/> his view was that all human behaviour <pause dur="0.4"/> every act of every human being was

selfish <pause dur="0.5"/> okay <pause dur="0.8"/> okay <pause dur="0.3"/> the whole explanation of human behaviour <pause dur="0.3"/> was that it was selfish every single human act of every single human being <pause dur="0.2"/> was selfish <pause dur="0.7"/> and so you've got one explanation <pause dur="0.2"/> for all human behaviour <pause dur="1.3"/> okay <pause dur="1.5"/> another example would be a slightly simplified version <pause dur="0.3"/> of <pause dur="0.4"/> early Freud <pause dur="0.2"/> not necessarily later Freud <pause dur="0.2"/> but early Freud <pause dur="0.4"/> where we might say that all human action is motivated by sexual desire <pause dur="0.7"/> later Freud brought in a number of other possible <pause dur="0.2"/> principles as well but we might <pause dur="0.2"/> produce that as a kind of slightly caricatured version of what Freud said <pause dur="2.1"/> now such explanations have a greater appeal because they are so <pause dur="0.3"/> there are two reasons why they have great appeal one is that they provide an enormously strict explanation for everything <pause dur="0.7"/> one motives <pause dur="0.2"/> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> <pause dur="0.3"/> great simplicity of explanation <pause dur="0.9"/> and secondly they're very appealing because they kind of <pause dur="0.9"/> if we might put it <pause dur="0.2"/> deflate the pompous <pause dur="1.0"/> you know <pause dur="0.7"/> to say that all human actions are selfish <pause dur="0.4"/> is in one way appealing <pause dur="0.6"/>

because it enables us to think in some way or other <pause dur="0.3"/> that even the most saintly person <pause dur="0.4"/> is motivated by the same base <pause dur="0.4"/> motivation <pause dur="0.3"/> as <pause dur="0.2"/> we are <pause dur="0.7"/> and deflates the pompous <pause dur="0.2"/> or <pause dur="0.3"/> in the case of Freud <pause dur="0.4"/> it's attractive because <pause dur="0.2"/> you know <pause dur="0.3"/> even the most puritanical uptight person is being motivated by sexual desire <pause dur="0.2"/> and that kind of tactic is a <pause dur="0.5"/> you know kind of <pause dur="0.2"/> deflates them in some way or other <pause dur="0.6"/> so there's a great appeal <pause dur="0.4"/> because of the simplicity of explanation <pause dur="1.5"/> but at the same time of course if you hold such a theory a reductionist view of human behaviour in which all human behaviour is explained by <pause dur="0.2"/> just one motive <pause dur="0.4"/> you've got work to do <pause dur="0.8"/> because you've got to explain how it is <pause dur="0.4"/> that the most saintly action is really selfish <pause dur="0.5"/> or <pause dur="0.2"/> that the most puritanical person is really motivated by sexual desire <pause dur="0.8"/> you've got to explain away all the apparent <pause dur="0.2"/> counter-examples to your theory <pause dur="1.1"/> and so what such <pause dur="0.2"/> reductionist accounts will do <pause dur="0.8"/> will be to produce an enormously elaborate <pause dur="0.2"/> structure of human

behaviour <pause dur="0.4"/> an enormously elaborate account <pause dur="0.4"/> in which there will be for example in Freud <pause dur="0.2"/> repression the ego the id the conscious mind the unconscious mind drives and so on <pause dur="0.2"/> a whole enormous kind of hydraulic scheme <pause dur="0.4"/> <unclear>representing</unclear> his world <pause dur="0.3"/> in order to be to be able to explain why it is that every single action <pause dur="0.6"/> # is motivated by sexual desire <pause dur="1.5"/> so combined with great simplicity of explanation <pause dur="0.3"/> is a hugely elaborate structure of human behaviour <pause dur="0.8"/> but that's appealing too <pause dur="0.7"/> because although the simplicity of explanation appeals to us <pause dur="0.4"/> we also want to think that human beings are <pause dur="0.5"/> mysterious and deep and complicated <pause dur="0.6"/> # the <pause dur="0.5"/> complicated explanation which is necessary for Hobbes or Freud to produce <pause dur="0.4"/> again appeals to us <pause dur="0.3"/> so these reductionist accounts <pause dur="0.2"/> appeal for two quite contradictory reasons <pause dur="0.6"/> one is they appeal because of the simplicity of explanation <pause dur="0.5"/> and the other is they appeal because of the complexity of theory which goes with it <pause dur="0.5"/> so it provides us with

two things both of which you want to like <pause dur="0.5"/> simplicity and complexity <pause dur="1.1"/> okay <pause dur="1.7"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="5.1"/> <trunc>th</trunc> okay i'm sorry that the <trunc>quota</trunc> the what i've said at the bottom there is just cut off a bit what i what i was saying there <pause dur="0.6"/> is to <trunc>a</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> to attempt to produce a simple explanation of human behaviour <pause dur="0.3"/> will actually involve a highly elaborate theory <pause dur="0.4"/> for which there will be <pause dur="0.4"/> frequently no empirical evidence <pause dur="0.5"/> # to explain <pause dur="0.2"/> apparent <pause dur="0.5"/> counter-examples in other words the rest of that sentence was just what i've been saying to you <pause dur="0.2"/> okay <pause dur="1.2"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="6.8"/> now <pause dur="2.5"/> previous attempts <pause dur="0.2"/> having failed <pause dur="0.7"/> there's <pause dur="0.3"/> a new attempt in town <pause dur="0.3"/> Searle says <pause dur="0.6"/> and a new attempt to fill the gap <pause dur="0.2"/> is <pause dur="0.2"/> cognitivism <pause dur="0.8"/> and it's cognitivism which is then Searle's main <pause dur="0.3"/> target <pause dur="0.2"/> in this chapter <pause dur="0.7"/> so what is cognitivism <pause dur="1.2"/> well cognitivism and cognitive science are terms which have been <pause dur="0.2"/> used in the last thirty years or so <pause dur="0.4"/> to cover a wide variety of different <pause dur="1.0"/> areas and disciplines in philosophy of mind in <pause dur="0.4"/> linguistics in psychology in

computer science cybernetics and in <pause dur="0.3"/> strong artificial intelligence and so on <pause dur="0.5"/> these are the term cognitivism cognitive science those terms <pause dur="0.4"/> have been used quite widely <pause dur="0.7"/> so what does Searle mean <pause dur="0.3"/> by <pause dur="0.5"/> cognitivism <pause dur="1.1"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="3.5"/> basically <pause dur="1.1"/> the view <pause dur="0.8"/> is <pause dur="1.0"/> as i said at the beginning of the lecture <pause dur="0.6"/> the view of cognitivism <pause dur="0.2"/> that he's concerned with <pause dur="0.3"/> is that the mind ought to be thought of <pause dur="0.6"/> on the model <pause dur="0.2"/> of a computer <pause dur="0.6"/> that's the theory which <pause dur="0.7"/> he thinks is the essence of cognitivism <pause dur="0.4"/> and which is his target of attack <pause dur="1.0"/> because that view <pause dur="0.4"/> like the previous <pause dur="0.4"/> gap-filling <pause dur="0.3"/> theories <pause dur="0.4"/> is one <pause dur="0.3"/> which Searle thinks is wrong <pause dur="0.8"/> so <pause dur="0.5"/> first important point is that Searle is going to be attacking cognitivism <pause dur="0.9"/> so in red there is a summary from page forty-three of the book of what Searle thinks cognitivism is <pause dur="0.4"/> but remember this is a theory which he's going to be attacking <pause dur="0.6"/> so what it says in red is a quotation from Searle <pause dur="0.2"/> but it's the theory which is his <unclear>target</unclear> <pause dur="0.4"/> which he's going to attack <pause dur="0.8"/> okay <pause dur="0.6"/> please remember that this is

the direct quotation from Searle <pause dur="0.5"/> these are not thoughts to be attributed to him <pause dur="0.4"/> these are thoughts he's going to attack <pause dur="0.5"/> okay <pause dur="1.0"/> so <pause dur="1.5"/> what he's going to attack is the idea that thinking <pause dur="0.3"/> is <pause dur="0.2"/> processing information <pause dur="1.2"/> but information processing is just <pause dur="0.3"/> symbol manipulation <pause dur="1.4"/> remember in the Chinese room example <pause dur="0.6"/> Searle wants to draw a very <pause dur="0.2"/> strong distinction <pause dur="0.5"/> between mere symbol manipulation <pause dur="0.4"/> which is what the computer does although man in the Chinese room who doesn't understand Chinese <pause dur="0.2"/> does <pause dur="0.5"/> from <pause dur="0.7"/> real <pause dur="0.2"/> thinking <pause dur="0.5"/> okay <pause dur="1.5"/>

so <pause dur="0.2"/> again thinking is processing information but information processing is just symbol manipulation <pause dur="0.2"/> computers do symbol <trunc>manipu</trunc> manipulation <pause dur="0.6"/> so the best way to study thinking <pause dur="0.7"/> or cognition <pause dur="0.4"/> is to study computational symbol manipulation <pause dur="0.2"/> programs <pause dur="0.3"/> symbol manipulating programs <pause dur="0.4"/> whether they're in computers or in the brains <pause dur="0.6"/> on this view the view he's attacking <pause dur="0.6"/> the task of cognitive science is to characterize the brain <pause dur="0.5"/> not at the level of nerve cells the

neurophysiological level <pause dur="0.7"/> nor at the level of conscious mental states <pause dur="0.2"/> the common sense psychology level <pause dur="0.6"/> but rather at the level of its functioning <pause dur="0.3"/> a sort of information processing system <pause dur="0.5"/> and that's where the gap gets filled <pause dur="1.0"/> it's alleged <pause dur="0.4"/> Searle disagrees with that <pause dur="0.3"/> <unclear>doesn't mean that he does agree with that</unclear> <pause dur="0.4"/> okay <pause dur="1.4"/> so the cognitivist's <pause dur="0.2"/> big idea <pause dur="1.1"/> is that we can fill the gap <pause dur="0.3"/> between the mind and the brain <pause dur="0.4"/> by focusing on an intermediate level <pause dur="0.8"/> the level of information processing <pause dur="1.1"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/></u><pause dur="57.8"/> <u who="nm0140" trans="pause"> i was just searching for a <pause dur="0.9"/> actually was round here for a minute or two <pause dur="0.4"/> i was just searching for a a <gap reason="inaudible due to background noise" extent="1 sec"/> <unclear>after slide</unclear> which i couldn't find <pause dur="0.8"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.9"/> what i wanted to say was this that <pause dur="4.9"/> throughout history <pause dur="1.3"/> human beings have tried to <pause dur="1.4"/> understand what goes on <pause dur="0.4"/> in the human brain in the mind <pause dur="0.9"/> by means of various different models or analogies <pause dur="0.3"/> i mean Searle discusses this is in the chapter <pause dur="2.6"/> and it's interesting to look at what <pause dur="0.5"/> some of those previous models or analogies have been <pause dur="1.8"/> # for instance the <pause dur="0.3"/> the Greeks <pause dur="0.9"/> compared

the human mind to <pause dur="0.2"/> a catapult <pause dur="1.8"/> which sounds to the class to be rather <pause dur="0.7"/> odd <pause dur="1.4"/> it's interesting that <pause dur="0.8"/> that in different societies at different times the model which has been used to try and explain the workings of the human mind or human brain <pause dur="0.4"/> has often been to do with the lastest technology available <pause dur="0.6"/> and of course the catapults had formed a part of <pause dur="0.2"/> military technology for the Greeks <pause dur="1.4"/> later <pause dur="0.2"/> Leibniz the great <pause dur="0.4"/> German philosopher <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> whom Searle quotes from talks about a bit later in the chapter as well <pause dur="0.6"/> saw the human mind as being like a mill <pause dur="0.5"/> you know a flour mill <pause dur="0.2"/> grinding <pause dur="0.4"/> separating the wheat from the chaff making flour <pause dur="0.8"/> and again that's a kind of technological <pause dur="0.6"/> analogy <pause dur="1.3"/> model of the human mind <pause dur="1.6"/> later in the # nineteenth century <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> people compared this <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/><pause dur="0.4"/> compared the human mind to the telegraph system <pause dur="0.6"/> remember that the the telegraph system was developed in the <pause dur="0.4"/> early to mid-<pause dur="0.4"/>nineteenth century <pause dur="0.2"/> it's quite an early piece a quite remarkable piece of technology <pause dur="1.2"/> #

the telegraph which predated <pause dur="0.2"/> the telephone <pause dur="0.6"/> enabled people to communicate with each other over long distances <pause dur="0.3"/> got the first telegraph cable between England and America was for example the <pause dur="0.3"/> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> first telephone cable <pause dur="1.0"/> and # <pause dur="0.2"/> do any of you know the book about the telegraph system which <pause dur="0.2"/> calls it the Victorian internet system <pause dur="0.3"/> <unclear>no</unclear> any of you read that book <pause dur="0.5"/> it's a it's a really extraordinary book published about two or three years ago <pause dur="0.2"/> about the early development of the <pause dur="0.5"/> of the telegraph <pause dur="0.2"/> and there are extraordinary comparisons between <pause dur="0.2"/> the mid-nineteenth century telegraph system and the Internet <pause dur="0.6"/> people had their own private accounts people communicated with each other privately <pause dur="0.2"/> over the telegraph people used various sorts of abbreviation and code and <pause dur="0.5"/> there were worries about you know pornography on the telegraph <vocal desc="laughter" n="ss" iterated="y" dur="2"/> things like that extraordinary set of <pause dur="0.7"/> # comparisons between the <pause dur="0.5"/> you know late twentieth century internet and the <pause dur="0.3"/>

mid-<pause dur="0.5"/>nineteenth century telegraph system <pause dur="0.8"/> actually you might just see that book in <pause dur="0.3"/> the science areas of libraries or book shops you might look at it <pause dur="0.3"/> can't remember the exact title but it's <pause dur="0.6"/> i think in the title there's some reference to the Victorian internet system <pause dur="0.3"/> okay <pause dur="2.1"/> # then later <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> for instance in my childhood a very common analogy <pause dur="0.2"/> for the human brain <pause dur="0.4"/> was <pause dur="0.4"/> the telephone system <pause dur="0.3"/> and that's to say the old-fashioned telephone system not a modern telephone system <pause dur="0.3"/> but the old-fashioned telephone system where you have an operator <pause dur="0.2"/> sitting <pause dur="0.3"/> you know at a board <pause dur="0.2"/> you know saying oh hello Mrs Baker you want to be put through to Mrs Jones okay <pause dur="1.6"/> and that kind of idea you know <pause dur="0.2"/> pulling out plugs and then pulling in putting in plugs <pause dur="0.3"/> was used for a long time as an analogy for what goes on <pause dur="0.4"/> in the brain <pause dur="1.4"/> for <pause dur="0.2"/> Freud <pause dur="0.5"/> as i already <pause dur="0.2"/> partly indicated as a kind of analogy to what goes on in the brain as a kind of hydraulic system <pause dur="0.7"/> Freud in a way thought of the human brain # brain as being a

vast system of <pause dur="0.3"/> pipes that were connected together through which fluids <pause dur="0.3"/> pass <pause dur="0.5"/> and if you push the fluid from one part to <trunc>a</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> another it would come to erupt somewhere else <pause dur="1.0"/> and # <pause dur="0.2"/> he also Freud sometimes used a kind of electromagnetic <pause dur="0.3"/> # analogy for the human brain <pause dur="0.6"/> and now there's the idea of the digital <pause dur="0.3"/> computer <pause dur="0.9"/> as the model for the human brain <pause dur="0.6"/> so <pause dur="0.5"/> what i'm pointing out is there's been a constant series of attempts to try to explain what goes on in the human brain <pause dur="0.3"/> by means of invoking the lastest bit of technology <pause dur="2.2"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="2.4"/> now there are all sorts of reasons why people have found cognitivism attractive <pause dur="0.6"/> and Searle lists these in the chapter <pause dur="0.2"/> and in the notes that i've handed out i've gone through <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> some of the reasons why cognitivism might be thought to be attractive <pause dur="0.4"/> i'm not going to go through <pause dur="0.3"/> those <pause dur="0.4"/> now <pause dur="0.2"/> you can read those in the book itself <pause dur="0.4"/> you can read the sort of summary the comment that i've made about those <pause dur="0.4"/> reasons why <trunc>con</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> cognitivism might be

thought attractive <pause dur="0.4"/> # in the handout there are various sorts of pieces of psychological evidence <pause dur="0.3"/> which might be thought to support the idea that the human brain is information processing <pause dur="2.6"/> what i want to do <pause dur="0.7"/> is to as it were <pause dur="0.7"/> get to the very <pause dur="0.2"/> nub of the matter <pause dur="0.5"/> and to consider <pause dur="0.2"/> the sort of claim that cognitivism makes and the reason why Searle thinks it to be <pause dur="0.3"/> wrong <pause dur="1.7"/> okay <pause dur="9.1"/> here's one example <pause dur="2.7"/> i saw a programme on # television a few years ago <pause dur="0.5"/> now <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="1.6"/> it was a a science <pause dur="0.2"/> in one of a science series called Big Science <pause dur="1.6"/> on B-B-C-two <pause dur="0.6"/> in the early evening it was one of those <pause dur="0.2"/> one of those television programmes where they thought it necessary in order to present science to <pause dur="0.5"/> have a kind of mode of presentation which i found highly irritating so you had <pause dur="0.2"/> for example <pause dur="0.2"/> you know the face of somebody on the screen speaking and behind them you had a whole series of kind of flashing lights and moving # <pause dur="0.2"/> you know amoeba-like things and <pause dur="0.2"/> streaming across underneath there was you know bits of text and

you know <pause dur="0.2"/> there's all kind of <pause dur="0.6"/> somehow or other the producers <pause dur="0.5"/> it seemed to me <pause dur="0.4"/> there was something fundamentally wrong here the producers were thinking <pause dur="1.0"/> you know at some level they were thinking look science is so boring <pause dur="0.2"/> we're going to have to make this attractive by producing lots of big visual effects <pause dur="0.3"/> and that seemed to be a terribly <pause dur="0.4"/> you know patronizing view <pause dur="0.7"/> anyway <pause dur="1.0"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> sorry about that <pause dur="1.5"/> in Big Science there was an Oxford <pause dur="0.4"/> scientist an Oxford psychologist <pause dur="0.6"/> who had just discovered something very important he thought <pause dur="1.1"/> he'd discovered how it was that cricketers managed to catch cricket balls <pause dur="0.7"/> okay <pause dur="0.4"/> he'd done a lot of research on this <pause dur="0.8"/> and # <pause dur="0.2"/> he had filmed a lot of cricketers catching cricket balls <pause dur="0.4"/> and he'd used in particular <pause dur="0.2"/> Mark Ramprakash <pause dur="0.3"/> the <pause dur="0.7"/> England cricketer in the news this week because he's just <pause dur="0.2"/> transferred from Middlesex to Surrey <pause dur="2.1"/> and # <pause dur="0.7"/> what <pause dur="0.6"/> this scientist said <pause dur="10.0"/> i've got the <pause dur="0.4"/> yeah <pause dur="0.9"/> okay nineteen-ninety-four <pause dur="1.1"/> he says this <pause dur="2.0"/> <reading>in order to catch a ball <pause dur="0.2"/> your mind your

subconscious mind <pause dur="0.4"/> calculates the second order differential equation of the sort A-level students struggle with</reading> <pause dur="0.8"/> i think he's got an optimistic view of A-level students actually but still <vocal desc="laughter" n="ss" iterated="y" dur="1"/><pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> a sort of <pause dur="0.5"/> <trunc>s</trunc> <trunc>seco</trunc> second order differential equation sort of thing that <pause dur="0.7"/> undergraduate <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/>maths students struggle with <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/>anyway <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> <reading>it calculates that the second differential of the tangent of the angle of gaze is zero</reading> <pause dur="0.8"/> so in other words what you do you know the ball's in the air and you're running to catch it <pause dur="0.2"/> and your mind is working out the second order differential <trunc>eca</trunc> equation so that the <pause dur="0.2"/> you know the <vocal desc="laughter" n="sf0144" iterated="y" dur="1"/> <pause dur="0.5"/> tangent of the angle of gaze is zero <pause dur="0.4"/> and then when it's successfully worked out that <pause dur="0.3"/> you know it tells you stand there <vocal desc="whoop" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.3"/> like that <pause dur="2.8"/> it shows <pause dur="0.6"/> Dr McLeod <pause dur="0.6"/> said <pause dur="0.4"/> how powerful the subconscious mind is <pause dur="0.5"/> and Mark Ramprakash <pause dur="0.8"/> <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/>on <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/> the programme was asked <pause dur="0.3"/><vocal desc="laughter" n="sf0145" iterated="y" dur="1"/> how do you <pause dur="0.4"/> how

do you catch the ball and he said i just try to catch it <pause dur="0.4"/><vocal desc="laughter" n="ss" iterated="y" dur="1"/> okay <pause dur="1.6"/> now look <pause dur="0.5"/> <vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><vocal desc="laughter" n="sf0145" iterated="y" dur="1"/> <pause dur="1.5"/> this <trunc>a</trunc> in this quotation in this programme <pause dur="1.1"/> i think we have revealed <pause dur="0.3"/> something <pause dur="0.9"/> about <pause dur="0.7"/> the cognitive <pause dur="0.8"/> cognitive science approach <pause dur="0.5"/> but something why it seems <pause dur="0.2"/> weird <pause dur="0.8"/> because the sort of claim <pause dur="0.3"/> that Dr McLeod is making <pause dur="0.3"/> is just the sort of claim <pause dur="0.5"/> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> cognitivism is making <pause dur="1.0"/> but what our brains do <pause dur="0.2"/> is complicated information processing <pause dur="1.0"/> okay <pause dur="1.0"/> and so when we catch a ball <pause dur="0.8"/> we've gone through a complicated process <pause dur="0.4"/> of <pause dur="0.3"/> information processing <pause dur="2.7"/> now what's <pause dur="0.7"/> you might say well what's wrong with that <pause dur="0.4"/> i mean who's to say <pause dur="0.5"/> that our unconscious mind doesn't <gap reason="inaudible due to backgroud noise" extent="1 sec"/> up the process <pause dur="1.3"/> now Searle admits in the chapter that he doesn't have <pause dur="0.7"/> a knock-down argument against cognitivism <pause dur="0.4"/> he doesn't have an absolutely decisive argument against cognitive cognitivism <pause dur="0.5"/> as he thinks he does <pause dur="0.5"/> against <pause dur="0.6"/> the first claim of A-I he Searle thinks <pause dur="0.2"/> the Chinese room

argument <pause dur="0.5"/> disposes of the first claim <pause dur="1.1"/> but he admits that he hasn't got such a knock-down argument for this <pause dur="1.0"/> and he wants to show us <pause dur="0.2"/> how implausible such a claim is <pause dur="1.0"/> now i think actually <pause dur="0.2"/> just by showing that sort of claim to you <pause dur="0.5"/> some of you already felt that that was just kind of implausible <pause dur="0.6"/> but let me emphasize let me produce a <trunc>se</trunc> a second example <pause dur="1.8"/> and this example is taken from Searle but not i think from the chapter <pause dur="0.6"/> but from <pause dur="0.2"/> # Searle on many other occasions <pause dur="0.5"/> for example Searle when he was standing <pause dur="0.3"/> right here <pause dur="1.1"/> # four-and-a-half years ago <pause dur="0.4"/> Searle came to a conference at <gap reason="name" extent="1 word"/> University <pause dur="0.5"/> and he gave a lecture just where i'm giving <pause dur="0.4"/> the lecture now <pause dur="0.3"/> that he produced <pause dur="0.2"/> this example which i'm now going to produce for you <pause dur="1.7"/> he said he had a <pause dur="0.3"/> dog <pause dur="1.1"/> and a dog called Ludwig <pause dur="1.7"/> and he says that the dog loves to <pause dur="0.3"/> as <pause dur="0.3"/> many dogs do loves to <pause dur="0.2"/> fetch things catch things bring them to him and so on <pause dur="0.7"/> and a game that he often plays with Ludwig <pause dur="0.4"/> is that Searle will <pause dur="0.4"/> throw a tennis ball against a wall <pause dur="0.4"/> and then <pause dur="0.2"/> Ludwig will go on and catch the tennis ball in its mouth <pause dur="0.9"/> okay <pause dur="1.0"/>

now <pause dur="1.0"/> think <pause dur="0.2"/> what Ludwig has to do <pause dur="0.6"/> think what Ludwig has to do <pause dur="0.7"/> first of all <pause dur="0.7"/> Searle throws the tennis ball against the wall <pause dur="0.9"/> so in order for Ludwig to calculate <pause dur="0.3"/> where to go to catch the ball <pause dur="1.0"/> first of all <pause dur="0.2"/> Ludwig must know the angle of incidence is equal to the angle of reflection <pause dur="0.6"/> okay going sort of <pause dur="0.2"/> if Searle <pause dur="0.2"/> throws the ball like that then the ball's going to go up like that <pause dur="1.1"/> then the dog has got to calculate what the initial velocity <pause dur="0.3"/> of Searle throwing the ball is <pause dur="0.6"/> and then what the effect of <pause dur="0.2"/> friction <pause dur="0.2"/> of the of air <pause dur="0.4"/> will do and the effect of gravity <pause dur="0.5"/> on decreasing the speed of the tennis ball <pause dur="0.9"/> and then what the effect of the actual surface of the wall will be <pause dur="0.2"/> the coefficient of friction of the wall and various other factors which may <pause dur="0.2"/> slow down the rate of the ball <pause dur="0.6"/> okay <pause dur="0.2"/> and then you take into account wind speed and so on <pause dur="0.9"/> and that's not going to be it <pause dur="0.3"/> because then Ludwig has got to calculate <pause dur="0.4"/> what amount of energy to release in its legs that'll push it <pause dur="0.2"/> you know <pause dur="0.2"/> to it's got to calculate

all of these things <pause dur="0.2"/> it's a miracle Ludwig ever gets that <pause dur="0.8"/> but he does every time <pause dur="0.8"/> okay <pause dur="2.0"/> now <vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.6"/> one thing that Dr McLeod didn't say <pause dur="0.3"/> but i heard other people talking about cognitivism say <pause dur="1.0"/> one thing he didn't say <pause dur="0.4"/> was <pause dur="1.3"/> <trunc>h</trunc> <pause dur="0.4"/> he didn't say it shows how powerful the human mind is <pause dur="0.3"/> he just said subconscious mind <pause dur="0.4"/> if he had said human mind then the Ludwig example be would be even more <pause dur="0.2"/> pertinent <pause dur="0.4"/> because of course it isn't just Mark Ramprakash that manages to catch a ball dogs do it too <pause dur="0.8"/> but anyway <pause dur="1.3"/> is it <pause dur="0.2"/> plausible to suppose <pause dur="0.4"/> that the dog <pause dur="0.3"/> actually <pause dur="0.2"/> calculates all of those things <pause dur="0.6"/> what if there were another type of explanation which as it were disposes of the need <pause dur="0.6"/> for giving such an explanation <pause dur="0.9"/> i mean <pause dur="1.5"/> we don't have to disagree with Dr McLeod's <pause dur="0.6"/> physics <pause dur="0.4"/> it may very well be <pause dur="0.8"/> that in order to calculate <pause dur="0.2"/> where a ball is going to land <pause dur="0.2"/> you're going to calculate it <pause dur="0.2"/><vocal desc="sniff" iterated="n"/> it may be true <pause dur="0.3"/> i'm <pause dur="0.2"/> i take it <pause dur="0.4"/> from him that it is true <pause dur="0.3"/> that the second differential of the angle of gaze <pause dur="0.7"/> of the tangent

of the angle of gaze has to be zero i take that as being true if you're going to calculate it <pause dur="1.0"/> but isn't there another way <pause dur="0.3"/> isn't it just that human beings like dogs <pause dur="0.3"/> learn how to do things <pause dur="0.6"/> they learn how to do things by trial and error <pause dur="0.6"/> dogs and human beings are not very good at catching balls to begin with <pause dur="0.5"/> you know watch a three year old trying to catch a ball you know <pause dur="0.4"/> misses it it's <unclear>fine</unclear> we gradually get better at it <pause dur="0.8"/> now is that because we're getting more sophisticated at differential equations <pause dur="1.1"/> or is it because somehow or other our body is learning how to do a particular task <pause dur="2.0"/> because we have to come back to a point that i've made so many times now in the last few lectures <pause dur="0.5"/> we have bodies of a particular sort <pause dur="0.3"/> bodies which are adapted to perform particular sorts of tasks <pause dur="0.7"/> those tasks that we've described in mathematical terms <pause dur="1.1"/> but that doesn't mean that we have to perform that mathematics <pause dur="0.3"/> in order for our body to perform <pause dur="1.1"/> okay <pause dur="0.9"/> any more than you have to suppose

that even something quite inanimate <pause dur="0.5"/> has to perform <pause dur="0.3"/> a particular <pause dur="0.2"/> task to behave as it does <pause dur="0.8"/> the cricket ball <pause dur="0.6"/> the cricket ball <pause dur="0.7"/> you throw the cricket ball in the air <pause dur="0.8"/> how does the cricket ball know where to land <pause dur="0.6"/> does it have to calculate the second order differential of blah blah blah blah blah <pause dur="0.3"/> no <pause dur="0.3"/> it is just <trunc>pe</trunc> <pause dur="0.3"/> it's just as it were obeying laws of physics doesn't have to calculate <pause dur="1.0"/> and our bodies too behave in certain ways <pause dur="0.4"/> which can be explained <pause dur="0.3"/> in certain sorts of mathematical terms <pause dur="0.3"/> but that isn't <pause dur="0.2"/> to say that those are the causes of the way in which they behave <pause dur="0.2"/> okay <pause dur="2.2"/> an example from the chapter <pause dur="1.8"/> is walking okay here i am walking around <pause dur="0.7"/> and every now and then getting slightly unbalanced <pause dur="0.7"/> but i manage to correct myself <pause dur="0.5"/> how do i do that <pause dur="0.4"/> okay <pause dur="0.7"/> well <pause dur="1.2"/> we know <pause dur="0.7"/> that there's a way in which human beings manage to maintain their balance <pause dur="0.6"/> we know in some sort of <pause dur="0.3"/> rough <pause dur="0.2"/> degree of detail or <pause dur="0.2"/> relatively good detail depending on how much we know about physiology <pause dur="0.7"/> and unfortunately i know

rather little about <trunc>physiolo</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> physiology <pause dur="0.5"/> but <pause dur="0.2"/> i <pause dur="0.6"/> know something like this that there are these semicircular canals in the ear in which there <pause dur="0.4"/> is some sort of fluid and that as we <pause dur="0.3"/> you know <pause dur="0.2"/> tip our <pause dur="0.3"/> head <pause dur="0.2"/> around the place then <pause dur="0.4"/> different levels of the fluid in the inner ear will <pause dur="0.3"/> enable them to <pause dur="0.2"/> keep ourselves upright and there are people who have <pause dur="0.6"/> various sorts of # malfunction of those semicircular canals find it very difficult to maintain their balance <pause dur="0.4"/> as often happens in old people <pause dur="1.2"/> Searle discusses that particular example <pause dur="0.4"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="9.7"/> and the point that he's making <pause dur="0.4"/> is <pause dur="1.6"/><vocal desc="cough" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.5"/> that in behaving as we do <pause dur="2.1"/> in a lot of the tasks that we perform <pause dur="0.6"/> we are not following rules <pause dur="1.4"/> and therefore it's wrong to suppose that there's some sorts of unconscious calculation going on <pause dur="1.4"/> when i <pause dur="0.2"/> when i walk along and maintain my balance <pause dur="0.3"/> i'm not <pause dur="0.3"/> following a rule <pause dur="0.6"/> although there are in me as it were scientific laws that apply <pause dur="0.5"/> to my behaviour <pause dur="10.0"/> how does the brain <pause dur="0.5"/>

manage to enable me <pause dur="0.2"/> to keep my balance <pause dur="1.3"/> Searle says the brain just does it <pause dur="2.2"/> he says there's no particular answer for how does the brain perform a task <pause dur="0.2"/> it just does it <pause dur="1.4"/> in particular he says there's no answer like this <pause dur="0.5"/> this isn't the way <pause dur="0.2"/> it goes <pause dur="1.7"/> so the bit in red again is Searle saying what doesn't happen <pause dur="0.4"/> okay <pause dur="0.8"/> the brain <pause dur="0.3"/> does it by assuming that gravity is constant assessing how the internal fluids are distributed and calculating the angle at which the head is inclined to the body <pause dur="0.3"/> then calculating that the body needs to lean over to the right to the tune of five degrees in order to remain upright <pause dur="0.9"/> no such calculation takes place <pause dur="0.5"/> it simply is the case that as i <pause dur="0.3"/> start to <pause dur="0.3"/> lean over <pause dur="0.2"/> then <pause dur="0.3"/> i adjust myself to go back <pause dur="0.5"/> now <pause dur="2.8"/> although many people <pause dur="0.5"/> would agree <pause dur="1.0"/> that the <pause dur="0.4"/> Mark <pause dur="0.2"/> Ramprakash <pause dur="0.2"/> Dr McLeod <pause dur="0.5"/> explanation the Dr McLeod explanation of catching a cricket ball seemed implausible and it seemed implausible to suggest <pause dur="0.5"/> that a cricketer does go through that calculation <unclear>as to</unclear> even unconsciously <pause dur="0.5"/> but

although many people would agree that it does seem implausible to suggest that Searle's dog Ludwig goes through <pause dur="0.2"/> a massive series of physical and mathematical calculations <pause dur="0.2"/> even if unconsciously <pause dur="0.6"/> and although many people would agree that it does seem implausible to say <pause dur="0.6"/> that the brain <pause dur="0.2"/> goes through a series of calculations like that <pause dur="0.5"/> nevertheless <pause dur="0.3"/> a number of people <pause dur="0.2"/> find it kind of # unsatisfactory when Searle says that the brain <pause dur="0.3"/> just does it <pause dur="0.4"/> that's a phrase that he uses quite a lot i've heard him use it again and again <pause dur="0.7"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.2"/> how is it that i catch a cricket ball <pause dur="0.3"/> well Mark Ramprakash <pause dur="0.2"/> i'm sure in complete ignorance of Searle <pause dur="0.2"/> did answer i just try and catch it <pause dur="0.6"/> and it so happens <pause dur="0.7"/> and <pause dur="0.5"/> <trunc>w</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> i don't i mean <trunc>s</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> the point here i don't think Searle <pause dur="0.5"/> i don't think Searle is saying <pause dur="0.7"/> that there's nothing to be explained in here <pause dur="1.0"/> i think what he's what he's pointing out and if <pause dur="0.2"/> if you look in the chapter it's quite clear <pause dur="0.3"/> what he's pointing out <pause dur="0.4"/> is that <pause dur="0.6"/> because we are the sorts of

creatures that we are because we've got the sorts of bodies that we have <pause dur="0.4"/> because those bodies have evolved in a certain sort of way <pause dur="0.6"/> they are particularly good at performing certain sorts of tasks <pause dur="0.5"/> tasks they learn to perform <pause dur="0.4"/> over a period of time <pause dur="0.6"/> children learn to do things <pause dur="0.3"/> and they learn to do things by very simple processes of trial and error <pause dur="0.3"/> and all of that all of that provides a perfectly satisfactory explanation <pause dur="0.5"/> of how they manage to do it <pause dur="0.9"/> okay <pause dur="1.7"/> there are other ways in which their behaviour could be described <pause dur="0.5"/> we can talk about the physics of catching a cricket ball <pause dur="0.4"/> and that's a perfectly <trunc>gi</trunc> legitimate area <pause dur="0.7"/> despite it <pause dur="0.5"/> but it doesn't mean that we have to do the physics <pause dur="0.5"/> to catch the cricket ball <pause dur="0.9"/> any more than the stars <pause dur="0.3"/> have to perform <pause dur="0.3"/> calculations <pause dur="0.6"/> to stay where there are in the sky or planets to <pause dur="0.3"/> perform calculations to move around the sun <pause dur="1.1"/> okay <pause dur="1.4"/> that's the point of it <pause dur="0.5"/> chapter four tomorrow