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<?xml version="1.0"?>

<!DOCTYPE TEI.2 SYSTEM "base.dtd">





<publicationStmt><distributor>BASE and Oxford Text Archive</distributor>


<availability><p>The British Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading, under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Centre for English Language Teacher Education, Warwick) and Paul Thompson

(Department of Applied Linguistics, Reading), with funding from BALEAP,

EURALEX, the British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. The

original recordings are held at the Universities of Warwick and Reading, and

at the Oxford Text Archive and may be consulted by bona fide researchers

upon written application to any of the holding bodies.

The BASE corpus is freely available to researchers who agree to the

following conditions:</p>

<p>1. The recordings and transcriptions should not be modified in any


<p>2. The recordings and transcriptions should be used for research purposes

only; they should not be reproduced in teaching materials</p>

<p>3. The recordings and transcriptions should not be reproduced in full for

a wider audience/readership, although researchers are free to quote short

passages of text (up to 200 running words from any given speech event)</p>

<p>4. The corpus developers should be informed of all presentations or

publications arising from analysis of the corpus</p><p>

Researchers should acknowledge their use of the corpus using the following

form of words:

The recordings and transcriptions used in this study come from the British

Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus, which was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Warwick) and Paul Thompson (Reading). Corpus development was assisted by

funding from the Universities of Warwick and Reading, BALEAP, EURALEX, the

British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. </p></availability>




<recording dur="00:50:05" n="8025">


<respStmt><name>BASE team</name>



<langUsage><language id="en">English</language>

<language id="de">German</language>



<person id="nm0146" role="main speaker" n="n" sex="m"><p>nm0146, main speaker, non-student, male</p></person>

<person id="sf0147" role="participant" n="s" sex="f"><p>sf0147, participant, student, female</p></person>

<person id="sf0148" role="participant" n="s" sex="f"><p>sf0148, participant, student, female</p></person>

<person id="sm0149" role="participant" n="s" sex="m"><p>sm0149, participant, student, male</p></person>

<person id="sm0150" role="participant" n="s" sex="m"><p>sm0150, participant, student, male</p></person>

<person id="sm0151" role="participant" n="s" sex="m"><p>sm0151, participant, student, male</p></person>

<person id="sm0152" role="participant" n="s" sex="m"><p>sm0152, participant, student, male</p></person>

<person id="sm0153" role="participant" n="s" sex="m"><p>sm0153, participant, student, male</p></person>

<person id="sm0154" role="participant" n="s" sex="m"><p>sm0154, participant, student, male</p></person>

<person id="sm0155" role="participant" n="s" sex="m"><p>sm0155, participant, student, male</p></person>

<person id="sm0156" role="participant" n="s" sex="m"><p>sm0156, participant, student, male</p></person>

<personGrp id="ss" role="audience" size="m"><p>ss, audience, medium group </p></personGrp>

<personGrp id="sl" role="all" size="m"><p>sl, all, medium group</p></personGrp>

<personGrp role="speakers" size="13"><p>number of speakers: 13</p></personGrp>





<item n="speechevent">Lecture</item>

<item n="acaddept">Philosophy</item>

<item n="acaddiv">ah</item>

<item n="partlevel">UG/PG</item>

<item n="module">Aesthetics</item>




<u who="nm0146"> okay before we start <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> brief announcement which is this <pause dur="0.2"/> # advertising <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> Philosophy Society weekend <pause dur="0.2"/> away <pause dur="1.3"/> that's not quite right is it <pause dur="1.0"/> a philosophy weekend away day <pause dur="1.8"/> still not right never mind <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="1.1"/> right <pause dur="0.2"/> # you may or may not have know about this but every year we have a weekend away in Wantage <pause dur="0.6"/> # it's in the sort of <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> Oxfordshire <pause dur="0.4"/> countryside <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="1.1"/> and <pause dur="1.2"/> right there'll be three presentations by students and i think you're let off some essay if you do this <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="1.3"/> but we already have do we already have papers <pause dur="1.9"/> don't know <pause dur="0.4"/> but anyway <pause dur="0.3"/> there's three there's # three presentations <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> and a discussion of those <pause dur="0.2"/> on the the topic for this year is # personal identity <pause dur="1.6"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> and then there's # a long walk along this very nice countryside <pause dur="0.6"/> and <pause dur="0.6"/> some modest drinking <pause dur="0.7"/> which gets a bit <pause dur="0.6"/> immodest towards <pause dur="0.6"/> late Friday evening <pause dur="1.5"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> so that's all good fun # <pause dur="0.3"/> if anybody's interested <pause dur="0.8"/> # some leaflets up here <pause dur="0.4"/> <gap reason="name" extent="2 words"/>'s organizing it <pause dur="1.0"/> so further details can be got from her <pause dur="0.8"/> and i'll <pause dur="0.4"/> leave these with the handouts at the

end of the lecture <pause dur="1.4"/> okay so any questions on that just yet <pause dur="0.2"/> # it's in June <pause dur="0.9"/> the twenty-second to the twenty-third <pause dur="1.3"/> any queries <pause dur="1.1"/> going <pause dur="2.0"/> okay <pause dur="13.5"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="2.8"/> okay last week let me just close the door <pause dur="5.2"/> okay last week # <pause dur="0.5"/> i laid out <pause dur="0.9"/> various attempts to defend Kant's claim <pause dur="0.6"/> that the only morally good motive <pause dur="0.8"/> is the motive of duty it's the positive claim <pause dur="0.8"/> # and also to defend the negative claim that no <pause dur="0.6"/> motive of inclination can have any moral worth <pause dur="1.1"/> and we saw that there were problems with <pause dur="0.6"/> all of those arguments although <pause dur="0.8"/> one came out better than the others <pause dur="1.0"/> just had an unfortunate <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> implication which Kant wouldn't want to accept <pause dur="0.5"/> i don't want to go carry on <pause dur="0.7"/> trying to justify <pause dur="0.9"/> Kant's claims <pause dur="0.8"/> rather what i want to do now is assume <pause dur="0.7"/> that some sort of a case has been made <pause dur="1.5"/> and deal with some objections that are raised <pause dur="0.8"/> against this conception <pause dur="0.9"/> of what it is to be a morally good person or what it is <pause dur="0.4"/> for an action to be a morally good action <pause dur="2.0"/> right there's a number of <pause dur="0.6"/> sort of worries

that people have <pause dur="1.0"/> which can be found expressed in writers like Bernard Williams who i'll come onto later <pause dur="1.4"/> and # Michael Stocker <pause dur="1.3"/> who i'll also cover later <pause dur="1.9"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="5"/> # <pause dur="1.3"/> first of all a couple of preliminaries <pause dur="1.9"/> right <pause dur="0.3"/> a morally good action for Kant is one that's done solely from duty <pause dur="1.5"/> # <pause dur="1.7"/> now one question one might ask is if you're acting <pause dur="0.9"/> solely from duty if you're helping somebody just from <pause dur="0.5"/> a sense of duty <pause dur="1.8"/> and then whenever you ought to help them you only ever help them from a sense of duty <pause dur="0.6"/> does this mean that you don't really care about them <pause dur="1.5"/> a sort of worry here is <pause dur="0.8"/> that # <pause dur="1.4"/> the very notion of duty <pause dur="1.0"/> suggests <pause dur="0.2"/> or implies conversationally at least <pause dur="0.7"/> the idea <pause dur="0.2"/> that you don't really want to do it <pause dur="0.9"/> right if you do some action out of duty that kind of suggests <pause dur="0.5"/> that you don't want to do it <pause dur="2.6"/> right so you might feel <pause dur="1.1"/> yeah you might want to go and visit <pause dur="0.8"/> your elderly grandfather <pause dur="1.7"/> and do so quite happily <pause dur="1.0"/> then you think about the cases where you do it from duty from a sense of duty <pause dur="0.2"/> go and visit your

elderly grandfather <pause dur="0.7"/> well those'd be the cases where you don't really want to do it but you know you think oh i really should this # <pause dur="0.8"/> up off you go and <pause dur="0.2"/> go and get the visit out of the way <pause dur="3.7"/> well does someone <pause dur="1.3"/> <trunc>do</trunc> does the <trunc>con</trunc> very concept of duty and acting from duty imply <pause dur="0.6"/> that people really don't want to do what it is they ought to do <pause dur="0.5"/> and hence don't care about <pause dur="0.7"/> you know the <trunc>cons</trunc> # <pause dur="0.7"/> the needs of others or other people in particular <pause dur="0.9"/> that's one <trunc>wo</trunc> worry <pause dur="0.2"/> one might have <pause dur="0.4"/> i don't know what do you think i mean given <pause dur="0.6"/> what you know about or what i said last week about <pause dur="0.9"/> what it is to act from duty <pause dur="1.5"/> do you think that if you do act from duty <pause dur="0.6"/> that suggests that you can't <pause dur="1.1"/> really want to do what <pause dur="0.2"/> you ought to do <pause dur="0.2"/> and hence you can't care about <pause dur="0.5"/> say the needs of the other person or the other person <pause dur="6.5"/> well what is it to act from duty <pause dur="1.9"/> anybody <pause dur="0.3"/> what are you what are you <pause dur="0.7"/> what is it to act from duty </u><pause dur="8.0"/> <u who="sf0147" trans="pause"> is it when <pause dur="0.2"/> duty is the <pause dur="0.4"/> the solely <pause dur="1.1"/> <unclear>is</unclear> the only # <pause dur="0.3"/> motivation for it </u><pause dur="0.8"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> # <pause dur="0.6"/> that that that's true but # <pause dur="0.4"/> is there another way of

expressing the thought that your motive is duty <pause dur="1.0"/> you know that you're acting solely from duty <pause dur="5.5"/> which make <pause dur="0.2"/> you know well what i'm looking for is another way of expressing that sort of motivational structure <pause dur="0.7"/> which doesn't carry with it the sort of negative connotations that duty does <pause dur="1.3"/> duty <trunc>n</trunc> it sounds sort of burdensome <pause dur="0.5"/> yeah like a nuisance you talk about the sort of duties one has in a certain job <pause dur="0.7"/> and the sort of <pause dur="0.2"/> always the implication is that this is rather burdensome <pause dur="0.5"/> something that <pause dur="0.8"/> # you may take on but it only because it's part of your job or <pause dur="0.5"/> you know <pause dur="0.2"/> 'cause morality requires it <pause dur="0.8"/> so what we're looking for is some sort of construal of duty <pause dur="0.7"/> acting from duty which doesn't carry <pause dur="0.9"/> those negative connotations with it </u><pause dur="1.9"/> <u who="sf0148" trans="pause"> # perhaps instinct <gap reason="inaudible" extent="5 secs"/></u><pause dur="1.3"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> # </u><u who="sf0148" trans="overlap"> rather than them actually thinking about it </u><pause dur="1.1"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> yeah <pause dur="0.8"/> well should <pause dur="0.4"/> yeah the notion of should i mean it <trunc>s</trunc> it captures the same sort of <pause dur="0.9"/> # feelers' # duty <pause dur="0.7"/> but already it's starting to lose some of its <pause dur="0.6"/>

negative connotrations <pause dur="0.3"/> connotations doesn't sound quite so contractual <pause dur="0.9"/> you know duty sounds very contractual <pause dur="0.7"/> sounds like the sort of things that <pause dur="0.8"/> you know you're bound by some sort of contract to do <pause dur="0.2"/> they're your duties <pause dur="0.5"/> your duties as <pause dur="0.9"/> a lecturer or whatever </u><pause dur="0.3"/> <u who="sm0149" trans="pause"> can we know that the that the word duty was used in the same way the same context as it is today <pause dur="0.3"/> than <pause dur="0.5"/> than when <pause dur="0.3"/> say Kant was writing </u><pause dur="0.4"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> right <pause dur="0.3"/> # well i can't tell you the answer to that as a <trunc>ju</trunc> sort of general thesis # <pause dur="0.5"/> about sort of nineteenth <trunc>s</trunc> or eighteenth century Prussia <pause dur="1.1"/> but it is true that Kant didn't for Kant it didn't have <pause dur="0.6"/> this implication so it was a good one point to make <pause dur="0.9"/> but the notion of duty <pause dur="1.0"/> as Kant understood it <pause dur="0.7"/> didn't carry these negative connotations <pause dur="0.8"/> it didn't as we saw <pause dur="0.5"/> i mean i quoted something <trunc>e</trunc> # from Kant <pause dur="0.3"/> # it was either last lecture or the lecture before <pause dur="1.0"/> where he says that actually if you're unhappy in the performance of your duty <pause dur="0.5"/> that rather casts doubt on your virtue <pause dur="1.3"/>

you know <pause dur="0.7"/> so acting from duty from him mean a virtuous person is one who acts from duty <pause dur="0.8"/> clearly if that's right then somebody who acts from duty <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="1.4"/> mean the concept of duty as it's being used there can't carry these negative connotations of disinclination <pause dur="0.6"/> or burdensomeness <pause dur="0.6"/> and it certainly didn't have that connotation for Kant <pause dur="1.3"/> right <pause dur="1.0"/> so if you can't shed those modern <pause dur="0.4"/> connotations those negative connotations <pause dur="0.5"/> then use some other concept <pause dur="0.6"/> <unclear>right</unclear> don't talk about acting from duty <pause dur="0.4"/> but talk about <pause dur="0.2"/> say doing the right thing just because it's right <pause dur="1.3"/> and rightness doesn't carry those strong negative connotations that duty does even though <pause dur="0.6"/> these concepts <pause dur="0.5"/> are close to being synonyms </u><pause dur="0.8"/> <u who="sm0150" trans="pause"> did Kant <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> was your best possible will <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/></u><pause dur="0.5"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> your best possible what </u><u who="sm0150" trans="latching"> yes the best possible will <unclear>i mean</unclear> good will </u><pause dur="0.9"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> well this is what it is to have a good will is to be disposed to act from duty </u><pause dur="0.2"/> <u who="sm0150" trans="pause"> is that <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> about duty <pause dur="0.4"/> what is duty <pause dur="0.6"/> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> <pause dur="1.0"/> under your eyes <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> under in the circumstances <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> you don't know what your best possible will is <pause dur="0.3"/> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/></u><u who="nm0146" trans="overlap"> # i don't i don't think you have to have thoughts about your will when you act from duty you've got to have thoughts about what you

should do </u><u who="sm0150" trans="overlap"> so <trunc>d</trunc> <pause dur="0.5"/> i thought Kant said it was <pause dur="0.2"/> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> <pause dur="0.5"/> good will </u><u who="nm0146" trans="latching"> no it's the other way round a good will is one that acts from duty <pause dur="0.2"/> acting from duty is not acting with explicit thoughts <pause dur="0.4"/> about what a good <trunc>per</trunc> willed person would do </u><pause dur="0.2"/> <u who="sm0150" trans="pause"> yes </u><pause dur="0.5"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> # <pause dur="0.5"/> you know it's just to do the right thing because it's the right thing to do <pause dur="2.4"/> okay so that's one word of warning just a preliminary <pause dur="0.7"/> point <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> what makes it seem as though you can't really care about others when you act from duty <pause dur="0.7"/> is the idea that <trunc>ac</trunc> # duty carries with it <pause dur="0.6"/> that what you're doing is in some way burdensome <pause dur="0.7"/> yeah <pause dur="0.2"/> or a nuisance <pause dur="1.0"/> or the implication you don't really want to do it <pause dur="1.5"/> and if that were true if that implication were true <pause dur="0.7"/> # then whenever you help somebody from duty it couldn't be because you cared about them <pause dur="1.4"/> right 'cause the duty would carry with it that negative connotation which meant you didn't really <pause dur="0.5"/> but you've got to do it anyway <pause dur="1.5"/> right <pause dur="0.3"/> it doesn't have that negative connotation for Kant <pause dur="1.0"/> so don't let <pause dur="0.3"/> this the sort of the those modern <pause dur="0.2"/>

connotations <pause dur="0.5"/> influence the way in which you understand this notion <pause dur="2.3"/> another worry some people have is a worry about spontaneity <pause dur="4.3"/> think somebody who always acts from duty will lack a certain spontaneity <pause dur="2.1"/> do you think <pause dur="0.3"/> you know <pause dur="0.6"/> every situation they come to they got to think mm <pause dur="0.5"/> right now what should i do here on the one hand i've got these considerations <pause dur="0.4"/> weighing in favour of this action mm not sure i want to do that <pause dur="0.4"/> and then all things considered well perhaps i should do that and eventually you get round to doing something <pause dur="1.0"/> right <pause dur="2.6"/>

and if you're concerned about the morality of your action <pause dur="2.7"/> does this mean that your actions will lack a certain spontaneity <pause dur="0.5"/> 'cause you'll always be worrying about whether you're going to be doing the right thing or not <pause dur="0.9"/> mm <pause dur="9.5"/> well <pause dur="0.2"/> any thoughts <pause dur="0.4"/> got a fifty per cent chance of getting this right </u><pause dur="1.9"/> <u who="sm0150" trans="pause"> some action which seem to attract more worth can be <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> and spontaneous <pause dur="0.4"/> like the man who jumps on the hand grenade to save his comrades <pause dur="0.2"/> it's a spontaneous act </u><pause dur="0.5"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> right <pause dur="0.2"/> but does it <trunc>s</trunc> been suppose he

did that from a sense of duty <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>t</trunc> <trunc>th</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> would that prevent its being <trunc>spon</trunc> </u><u who="sm0150" trans="overlap"> well no i think it does i think he does it <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/></u><u who="nm0146" trans="overlap"> i know but the point is not whether he does or not it's point is whether <pause dur="0.2"/> if he did whether that would <pause dur="0.6"/> stop him from spontaneously reacting in that way when he first of all got to think well <pause dur="0.4"/> you know <pause dur="0.4"/> is it really what i should do leap on i mean on the one hand i'm going to save those other people other <trunc>pe</trunc> i'm going to be scattered all over </u><u who="sm0150" trans="overlap"> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/></u><u who="nm0146" trans="overlap"> <vocal desc="laughter" n="sl" iterated="y" dur="1"/> <pause dur="0.3"/> is this really what morality requires of me perhaps i'll try and persuade him to jump on it <pause dur="0.4"/> you know and then get the same effect but i end up in one piece </u><u who="sm0150" trans="overlap"> but we can have <trunc>s</trunc> have spontaneous acts don't know whether that's another thing <pause dur="0.2"/> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="2 secs"/></u><u who="nm0146" trans="overlap"> yeah sure sure nobody's arguing that we don't have spontaneous acts the question is <pause dur="0.3"/> if you're motivating the way that Kant thinks is a good way to be motivated <pause dur="0.7"/> could your actions still be spontaneous </u><pause dur="0.2"/> <u who="sm0150" trans="pause"> no </u><pause dur="0.9"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> why not <pause dur="2.9"/> actually i was fibbing when i said you

had a fifty-fifty chance as soon as you gave me an answer i was going to ask you why <vocal desc="laughter" iterated="y" dur="1"/><pause dur="0.9"/> yeah </u><pause dur="0.3"/> <u who="sm0151" trans="pause"> yeah i think you <trunc>c</trunc> # can be <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> so closely and <pause dur="0.2"/> act not directly from the motive of duty just <pause dur="0.3"/> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> <pause dur="0.4"/> this maxim <pause dur="0.3"/> is derived from <gap reason="inaudible" extent="2 secs"/> <pause dur="0.4"/> therefore <pause dur="0.2"/> felt a general maxim to act in certain circumstances <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> <pause dur="0.2"/> in a certain way <pause dur="0.3"/> you can act <pause dur="0.2"/> could act spontaneously like that </u><u who="nm0146" trans="latching"> yeah i'm not sure that <pause dur="0.2"/> really i mean that all of that's right <pause dur="0.5"/> i'm not sure if it helps because in many situations <pause dur="0.3"/> more than one of your principles is going to be <trunc>appli</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> # going to be applicable <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> so you've still got # instead of weighing up particular considerations <pause dur="0.5"/> you're going to be weighing up which principles over <trunc>wh</trunc> override which other principles <pause dur="0.4"/> 'cause it you know might be that you can only help somebody by breaking a promise <pause dur="0.3"/> and you got a <trunc>prin</trunc> # # <pause dur="0.8"/> a principle <pause dur="0.2"/> of promise keeping and a <trunc>pro</trunc> a principle of benevolence <pause dur="0.5"/> well which one are you going to act you can't act <trunc>wi</trunc> in accordance with both of them <pause dur="0.5"/> so you then got to think well which one overrides the other <pause dur="1.3"/> so i'm not sure that that helps <pause dur="1.7"/> i mean one thing one might <pause dur="0.2"/> i mean i don't think he <pause dur="0.2"/> that someone who acts from duty does lack spontaneity or need lack spontaneity <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="2.0"/> the thought <pause dur="0.7"/>

that they do is <pause dur="0.2"/> driven by the idea that <pause dur="0.6"/> in order to decide whether what you're doing is permissible <pause dur="0.5"/> you've got to make various complex judgements <pause dur="0.8"/> and typically that will take time <pause dur="1.6"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> but if you think about other areas of our lives where we're constantly having to make very complex judgements <pause dur="1.4"/> # but have no problem <pause dur="0.2"/> acting spontaneously <pause dur="0.2"/> on the basis of those judgements <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> we can see that there's no conflict here <pause dur="0.7"/> and what i'm thinking of is <pause dur="0.4"/> you know driving a car <pause dur="0.3"/> right <pause dur="1.4"/> right <pause dur="0.2"/> when you're driving in a car <pause dur="0.8"/> you're making hundreds <pause dur="0.6"/> of <pause dur="0.6"/> judgements about how you should sort of respond you know and whether so and so's going to pull out on you whether <pause dur="0.5"/> some pedestrian might run out whether there's a dog up there not on the lead whether he's going to pull out whether the person's braking in front of you how hard you should brake <pause dur="0.7"/> you know <pause dur="0.2"/> traffic coming at you from all directions <pause dur="0.4"/> traffic lights signs all these things you've got to make judgements <pause dur="0.5"/> all various very complex judgements about <pause dur="0.9"/> # and

you've got to <trunc>re</trunc> react very quickly <pause dur="1.5"/> right so it's a complex business any of you # who's learning to drive at the moment <pause dur="1.0"/> anybody here learning to drive <pause dur="1.2"/> guess you're already drivers <pause dur="1.2"/> anybody who's learning to drive know how horrible it is <pause dur="1.0"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> so when you start out you got to think explicitly about these things <pause dur="0.4"/> and of course you can't react very quickly because you're <pause dur="0.7"/> you know you're having to think about everything <pause dur="0.5"/> you know in a very mechanical way <pause dur="1.0"/> but the point is that the better you are you become at this the more skilled you become at driving <pause dur="1.1"/> the more internalized <pause dur="0.5"/> these judgements are the more spontaneous they are you're still making those very complex judgements <pause dur="0.4"/> but it's kind of like second nature to you <pause dur="1.2"/> it only slows you down <pause dur="0.2"/> it only means that you can lack spontaneity <pause dur="0.5"/> when you're a sort of novice <pause dur="1.5"/> but the more skilled you are at driving <pause dur="0.2"/> the quicker you internalize <pause dur="0.3"/> those judgements <pause dur="0.6"/> # they're still going on they're still being made <pause dur="1.0"/> but when

you see somebody's brake lights come on in front of you you've not got to think to yourself <pause dur="0.5"/> # ah you know is he braking or has he just turned his lights on <pause dur="0.3"/> ah hang on if he's <pause dur="0.4"/> both lights go on i've got to push this middle pedal down <pause dur="0.4"/> you know if you had all those thoughts you already hit him <pause dur="0.6"/> before you do anything <pause dur="0.8"/> # you just react straight away <pause dur="0.8"/> but all of those judgements are going on all those complex judgements are going on <pause dur="2.9"/> now i see no reason why it couldn't be just like that in the moral case <pause dur="0.7"/> when you're a moral novice <pause dur="1.1"/> right # right <pause dur="0.2"/> you got your <pause dur="0.3"/> moral L-plates on <pause dur="0.9"/> right and you're struggling away you think oh well this consideration pulls me that way and that consideration <pause dur="0.5"/> and # <pause dur="0.3"/> you know this this this this and # okay i think i should do that <pause dur="1.2"/> right when you're having mechanically to go through some process of <pause dur="0.5"/> moral deliberation in that way <pause dur="0.6"/> then sure <pause dur="0.4"/> as a moral novice <pause dur="0.3"/> you're going to your action's going to lack spontaneity <pause dur="0.3"/> just like <pause dur="0.5"/> the reactions of a learner driver are

going to be very slow <pause dur="0.5"/> because of the complex <pause dur="0.2"/> judgements that have to be gone through in a very mechanical way <pause dur="1.6"/> we're just like the driver who eventually masters <pause dur="0.4"/> these skills <pause dur="1.8"/> can react spontaneously once they're mastered <pause dur="0.6"/> so in the moral case <pause dur="0.5"/> once you actually <pause dur="0.5"/> you know <pause dur="0.4"/> come good at making these sorts of judgements <pause dur="1.0"/> or at least think you are <pause dur="1.3"/> then you can make <pause dur="0.3"/> very there's nothing to stop you <pause dur="0.5"/> # responding very <pause dur="0.2"/> spontaneously <pause dur="0.5"/> even though your actions are informed by these very complex judgements <pause dur="2.0"/> # </u><pause dur="0.4"/> <u who="sm0152" trans="pause"> # sometimes though # <pause dur="0.4"/> <trunc>w</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> it's easy to decide what you want to do when you're in a car 'cause if you're going to hit something you know you want to stop and you don't want to run into it whereas if you're making a moral decision <pause dur="0.3"/> it <pause dur="0.3"/> sometimes you might # <pause dur="0.2"/> you know it might be difficult to choose what you want to do </u><pause dur="0.3"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> oh yeah sure i mean this is not to say i mean sometimes in a car <pause dur="0.4"/> <trunc>ma</trunc> how skilled you are <pause dur="0.7"/> you might not be sure what to do 'cause or it's an

unusual situation <pause dur="0.9"/> # so you may not be sure what the best thing to do <pause dur="0.6"/> the what the way you'll react in a car is not just 'cause you don't want to kill yourself yeah <pause dur="0.4"/> if you wanted to then you ought not to drive in this <trunc>i</trunc> you might drive in some completely different way <pause dur="1.0"/> # <pause dur="1.0"/> yeah you just sort of <pause dur="1.1"/> <trunc>th</trunc> it's a <trunc>s</trunc> just the idea that i mean it <trunc>do</trunc> doesn't depend upon that the sort of judgements that are made <pause dur="0.7"/> are judgements about you know just what's going on around you and your own desires and preferences don't really come into it apart from you know <pause dur="0.3"/> your desire to get somewhere or other <pause dur="1.6"/> and of course in many moral situations where they're complex <pause dur="0.6"/> you really have to stop and think about it but then <pause dur="0.2"/> clearly <pause dur="0.6"/> you know it'd be inappropriate to try and make a snap judgement <pause dur="1.3"/> the real worry is is not that <pause dur="0.2"/> somebody who acts from duty <pause dur="0.7"/> is <pause dur="0.5"/> never <pause dur="0.2"/> spontaneous <pause dur="1.3"/> sorry the criticism is that they're never spontaneous not that they must always be spontaneous <pause dur="1.2"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> but they'd lack a certain <pause dur="0.2"/>

sort of <pause dur="0.6"/> immediacy in their responses <pause dur="0.7"/> and that would be a bit peculiar if we were like that <pause dur="1.3"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> well once you think about what it is to master other skills and master other complex judgements in other areas <pause dur="1.3"/> you realize that it only slows you down <pause dur="0.6"/> when you're a novice once you get good at it you can make snap decisions <pause dur="0.3"/> and that there's no reason to think why that just couldn't be the case <pause dur="0.6"/> in morality <pause dur="0.5"/> actually morality is no more complex seems to me than driving a car </u><pause dur="2.0"/> <u who="sm0153" trans="pause"> when you're driving a car <pause dur="0.3"/> you're <trunc>try</trunc> trained to make a <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> reaction <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> certain stimulations <pause dur="0.9"/> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="6 secs"/> </u><pause dur="0.4"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> well it's not just stimulus-reflex </u><u who="sm0153" trans="overlap"> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/></u><u who="nm0146" trans="overlap"> i mean there's all sorts of judgements going on </u><pause dur="0.7"/> <u who="sm0153" trans="pause"> i mean <pause dur="0.2"/> child in the road <pause dur="0.3"/> you don't think do you <pause dur="0.3"/> because you've been trained child <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/></u><u who="nm0146" trans="overlap"> yeah i know but if you're a novice you'll be thinking oh right # child right <pause dur="0.3"/> clutch down <pause dur="0.6"/> brake hard splat <pause dur="0.2"/> <vocal desc="laughter" iterated="y" dur="1"/> </u><u who="sm0153" trans="overlap"> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> </u><u who="nm0146" trans="overlap"> <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/>dead child <vocal desc="laughter" iterated="y" dur="2"/> <pause dur="0.5"/> yes <vocal desc="laughter" iterated="y" dur="1"/><shift feature="voice" new="normal"/></u><u who="sm0153" trans="overlap"> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="3 secs"/></u><u who="nm0146" trans="overlap"> yeah but the thing is you're

making snap judgements they're not just <trunc>i</trunc> it's not like <pause dur="0.2"/> tapping your knee <pause dur="0.4"/> and the foot <pause dur="0.2"/> sticks out <pause dur="0.7"/> it's just that you know you're not you don't go through those judgements <pause dur="0.3"/> you know and your reason doesn't go through some slow mechanical process <pause dur="0.8"/> # </u><pause dur="0.5"/> <u who="sm0153" trans="pause"> but i told you the prior training was there </u><u who="nm0146" trans="latching"> well that's right </u><u who="sm0153" trans="overlap"> yes </u><u who="nm0146" trans="overlap"> but there's no reason why moral training couldn't be just like that </u><u who="sm0153" trans="overlap"> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> of duty </u><pause dur="0.7"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> well as i say there's no reason why moral training <trunc>coul</trunc> you know # <pause dur="0.4"/> if you're going to say that it there's something very different then you have to point out what the differences are <pause dur="0.5"/> why <pause dur="0.4"/> being trained to <pause dur="0.6"/> to drive a car works <pause dur="0.5"/> but being trained to be a sort of moral agent must always fail so you always got to have your L-plates on <pause dur="2.2"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="4"/> okay <pause dur="0.2"/> don't want to labour this point so i'm going to move on <pause dur="2.4"/> the rule <trunc>cri</trunc> so there's a couple of preliminary points a worry about <pause dur="1.2"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> you know a sort of lack of concern for others <pause dur="0.4"/> and a lack of spontaneity <pause dur="0.6"/> i think they should they should be quickly put aside

really 'cause they're not the main worries <pause dur="1.0"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> with the notion of acting from duty <pause dur="1.2"/> the main worry that comes from this has been put forward by <pause dur="0.8"/> Michael Stocker <pause dur="0.9"/> and Bernard Williams <pause dur="4.5"/> i'll start with Michael Stocker and it's the the worry that <pause dur="0.6"/> the motive of duty's in some way alienating <pause dur="2.0"/> okay so this is what i'm going to focus on in the rest rest of the lecture <pause dur="1.4"/> # i'll just give you a quote <pause dur="1.2"/> # <pause dur="1.3"/> as to why Michael Stocker thinks that acting from duty <pause dur="1.4"/> might be <pause dur="0.3"/> # alienating <pause dur="0.9"/> what he thinks it might alienate you from is your friends and loved ones <pause dur="1.1"/> right so the worry here is that morality as Kant conceives it <pause dur="0.5"/> seems to stop you entering fully into relations of friendship <pause dur="0.5"/> and love <pause dur="0.2"/> I-E these valuable but non-moral relationships <pause dur="1.3"/> and he gives the example of a guy who's hospitalized <pause dur="0.9"/> and his <pause dur="0.3"/> well he somebody he thinks is his friend Smith <pause dur="0.2"/> they're always Smith <pause dur="1.1"/> # comes and visits him <pause dur="1.2"/> right so i'll just quote from Stocker here <pause dur="1.1"/> <reading>right you're very bored and restless and at loose ends <pause dur="0.4"/>

when Smith comes in once again <pause dur="0.9"/> you're now convinced more than ever that he's a fine fellow and a real friend <pause dur="0.3"/> taking so much time to cheer you up <pause dur="0.5"/> travelling all the way across town <pause dur="0.2"/> and so on <pause dur="1.6"/> you're so effusive with your praise and thanks he protests he always tries to do what he thinks is his duty <pause dur="0.6"/> what he thinks will be best <pause dur="0.9"/> you at first thinks he <pause dur="0.2"/> think <pause dur="0.2"/> he's engaging <pause dur="0.4"/> in a polite form of self-deprecation <pause dur="0.6"/> relieving a moral burden <pause dur="1.1"/> but the more you two speak <pause dur="0.4"/> the more clear it becomes <pause dur="0.3"/> he was telling the literal truth <pause dur="0.8"/> but it's not essentially because of you that he came to see you <pause dur="0.5"/> not because you're friends <pause dur="0.4"/> but because it was his duty <pause dur="0.2"/> perhaps as a fellow Christian or Communist or whatever <pause dur="0.7"/> or simply because he knows of no one <trunc>a</trunc> more in need of cheering up <pause dur="0.7"/> and no one easier to cheer up</reading> <pause dur="1.8"/> unquote <pause dur="0.6"/> that's from Michael Stocker <pause dur="0.7"/> The Schizophrenia of model <pause dur="0.2"/> Modern Ethical Theories <pause dur="1.7"/> right so you imagine somebody who thinks <pause dur="0.5"/> doing something <pause dur="0.6"/> out of friendship <pause dur="1.2"/> and you

discover that he's not actually doing it out of friendship he's just saying well look you know <pause dur="0.7"/> this is what i think i ought to do and i really strive to do what i ought to do <pause dur="0.7"/> # it just happens <pause dur="0.4"/> that visiting you in hospital <pause dur="0.9"/> is something i think morality requires and it's because of that that i'm coming to visit you <pause dur="3.0"/> not because you're my friend <pause dur="0.6"/> or because i'm worried about you <pause dur="1.9"/> right but because <pause dur="0.6"/> morality requires this of me <pause dur="2.5"/>

right <pause dur="0.2"/> now if you <pause dur="1.1"/> i mean if Kant's account of moral worth meant that you got to be like this person like Smith <pause dur="3.8"/> then it does seem as though you're not going to be able to at least fully engage <pause dur="0.7"/> with non-moral relations of friendship and love <pause dur="1.4"/> loving relations 'cause morality <pause dur="0.5"/> you know you'll be always be doing things for the wrong reasons <pause dur="1.9"/> you'll be doing it because morality requires you to <pause dur="0.7"/> not because you know <pause dur="0.4"/> this person's your mate <pause dur="0.5"/> and he's bored <pause dur="2.1"/> # </u><u who="sm0154" trans="latching"> # i don't know just surely <pause dur="0.7"/> in <pause dur="0.5"/> # maybe he's deciding that morality i don't know your it's your duty to go see this person <pause dur="0.2"/> you still have to choose which person you're going to see and you choose that person because he's your friend </u><pause dur="0.8"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> # </u><pause dur="0.5"/> <u who="sm0154" trans="pause"> as as opposed to </u><u who="nm0146" trans="overlap"> yes </u><u who="sm0154" trans="overlap"> the person lying next to him that you don't know </u><pause dur="0.5"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> yeah <pause dur="0.7"/> yes but suppose

# <pause dur="1.0"/> you did it not because he's your friend but because you feel you ought ought <pause dur="0.2"/> you know morally <trunc>r</trunc> morality requires you <pause dur="0.7"/> to help someone <pause dur="0.5"/> and you might yeah it's much easier to you know to help your friends than it is some stranger who doesn't know you <pause dur="0.6"/> you know going to cheer him up much more you know <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> than if i impose myself myself on some stranger <pause dur="0.7"/> okay <pause dur="0.4"/> who may not like me <pause dur="1.6"/> # <pause dur="1.0"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> yeah some of the <trunc>example</trunc> i mean <pause dur="0.2"/> part of the quote says that # <pause dur="0.6"/> you know he chooses to go and visit <pause dur="0.6"/> you know his friend <pause dur="0.3"/> not 'cause he's his friend but because he's a fellow Christian or a fellow Communist <pause dur="0.4"/> or something like that <pause dur="0.7"/> not because he's in <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> his friend <pause dur="1.0"/> but it may be because he's his friend he knows that he needs cheering up <pause dur="0.4"/> and he's very easy to cheer up <pause dur="0.8"/> so you go for something you're pretty sure is going to work <pause dur="1.2"/> but that seems <pause dur="0.9"/> to be the wrong sort of reason to go and visit your friend in hospital <pause dur="6.5"/> right so i'm just sort of <pause dur="1.0"/> but i think you're right that there's something

fishy about this <pause dur="0.7"/> and it stems partly from the first point i raised at the beginning of the lecture <pause dur="0.9"/> that it's making it look as if you're concerned with the morality of your action <pause dur="0.5"/> that will sort of take over and push out all other concerns <pause dur="0.9"/> but that's just the worry that Stocker's <pause dur="0.2"/> has <pause dur="1.0"/> thinks it's sort of <pause dur="1.5"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> has this <pause dur="1.0"/> sort of dominating <pause dur="0.9"/> influence that once morality as Kant conceives of it <pause dur="0.5"/> gets in on the picture all other values are going to be pushed out <pause dur="7.8"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="5"/> right now the <pause dur="0.5"/> the way to respond to this # and i here follow <pause dur="0.2"/> # Marcia Baron <pause dur="1.6"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> on this i mean all of the reading for this is in the # <pause dur="0.3"/> the reading list for the <pause dur="0.5"/> the lecture on the course handout <pause dur="1.5"/> the way to deal with this is actually to locate what it is that's disturbing about this particular case <pause dur="2.3"/> and once you've located where it is what you want to do is <pause dur="0.5"/> you know <pause dur="1.1"/> if the <trunc>le</trunc> if you find in locating what's disturbing about this <pause dur="0.5"/> it turns out that what's disturbing is his motivation Smith's motivation <pause dur="1.2"/> then <pause dur="2.1"/>

you know that will cast doubt on Kant's picture of <pause dur="0.2"/> a morally good person <pause dur="1.1"/> but if it turns out to be somewhere else <pause dur="0.7"/> then it may not be that he's acting in this way <pause dur="0.6"/> 'cause he's a Kantian good-willed individual <pause dur="0.9"/> may just be because he's insensitive cold <pause dur="0.5"/> or something else but that's not Kant's fault <pause dur="2.0"/> right <pause dur="1.1"/> and the two things that Marcia Baron locates <pause dur="0.5"/> is wrong with him his A his <trunc>b</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> # his behaviour <pause dur="1.1"/> right the fact that he's so cold and uncaring he must realize that saying <pause dur="0.3"/> well i i'm not coming here to see you because i care about you <pause dur="0.5"/> i'm coming here just because i feel morally required to <pause dur="0.5"/> he must realize that's going to upset his friend <vocal desc="laughter" iterated="y" dur="1"/> <pause dur="0.4"/> or if he doesn't then he's # <pause dur="0.7"/> he's suffering from some other vice namely complete and <pause dur="0.3"/> sort of <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> complete <pause dur="0.7"/> # insensitivity <pause dur="1.2"/> to others even <pause dur="0.2"/> even <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> people who seem to be his close friends <pause dur="2.6"/> what's wrong with <pause dur="0.3"/> what he <trunc>do</trunc> # <pause dur="0.4"/> with this situation <pause dur="0.7"/> is his actual behaviour <pause dur="0.4"/> his coldness his insensitivity <pause dur="0.8"/> his thoughtlessness <pause dur="2.3"/> okay <pause dur="0.4"/> but <pause dur="0.5"/> this

is focusing on <pause dur="0.2"/> the way the things he says <pause dur="0.5"/> and <pause dur="0.4"/> his thoughtlessness <pause dur="0.8"/> and his insensitivity <pause dur="0.6"/> and none of those things are focusing on motivation <pause dur="1.5"/> i mean if <pause dur="0.9"/> i mean <trunc>morali</trunc> if his motivation is a concern for the morality of his actions <pause dur="1.7"/> it'd be very peculiar if he thought that morality required him <pause dur="0.7"/> to be cold <pause dur="0.2"/> insensitive <pause dur="0.7"/> indifferent <pause dur="1.7"/> # distant <pause dur="0.7"/> and all of these other things <pause dur="1.9"/> surely he doesn't think that <pause dur="1.6"/> so in acting in this <trunc>co</trunc> even if he does have no feelings for his friend at all <pause dur="0.6"/> it seems that morality would require him not to show that <pause dur="0.8"/> right you don't wear a great big placard saying i don't really care about you but <pause dur="0.5"/> you know i've got to come so here i am <pause dur="0.5"/> trying to cheer you up <pause dur="3.8"/> right so that the first thing that we locate is <trunc>a</trunc> what he actually <pause dur="0.7"/> does and says <pause dur="0.8"/> and certain <pause dur="0.3"/> vices that these <pause dur="0.3"/> his actions <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> express <pause dur="1.0"/> it doesn't seem to cast <pause dur="0.2"/> # for come to focus <pause dur="0.3"/> on the motive of duty <pause dur="0.2"/> the motive of duty's just doing <pause dur="0.8"/> the right thing because you think it's right <pause dur="0.7"/> but morality in no way

requires him to be cold and indifferent <pause dur="0.8"/> in this very peculiar way <pause dur="2.6"/> another thing that's disturbing here <pause dur="0.6"/> is his lack of genuine concern for his friend <pause dur="1.4"/> there's well i'm not coming here because i care about you i'm coming here just because <pause dur="0.6"/> morality requires me to come here <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> and i know that you're a bit miserable <pause dur="0.6"/> and are pretty easy to cheer up so here i am <pause dur="0.2"/> trying to cheer you up <pause dur="3.4"/> there's nothing as i said at the beginning there's nothing about <pause dur="0.4"/> duty as such or the thought <pause dur="0.3"/> or a concern for the morality of one's action <pause dur="0.8"/> the means <trunc>w</trunc> that one must lack a genuine concern <pause dur="1.3"/> for other people or for one's friends or for one's loved ones <pause dur="2.6"/> mm <pause dur="0.7"/> now since the motive of duty doesn't make Smith act as he does in fact <pause dur="0.5"/> the motive of duty should make him act in quite a different way <pause dur="1.1"/> even if he doesn't care about his friend especially if he doesn't care about his friend <pause dur="2.3"/> and since it's not responsible that sort of motivation is not responsible <pause dur="0.7"/> for the apparent lack of concern he has for his friend <pause dur="1.3"/>

it's not clear <pause dur="0.6"/> that the call although this is a very disturbing case it's one where <pause dur="0.6"/> you know you won't if that's what a friend is you don't want friends like that <pause dur="2.0"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> the problem is not located in his motivation <pause dur="0.9"/> it's located elsewhere <pause dur="2.7"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> does anybody want to come back on that <pause dur="1.3"/> yeah </u><pause dur="0.3"/> <u who="sm0155" trans="pause"> what if his # <vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.6"/> morality <pause dur="0.7"/> # said that he couldn't lie <pause dur="0.6"/> and so he wouldn't be <pause dur="0.6"/> untruthful when his friend <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> so thankful and like <pause dur="0.2"/> didn't want to claim praise where it wasn't due </u><pause dur="0.3"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> yeah <pause dur="0.2"/> yeah <pause dur="0.4"/> well there's i mean there's going to be cases where what morality requires of you is going to conflict and one thing it requires you not to do is not to <pause dur="0.5"/> to <pause dur="0.3"/> to lie <pause dur="0.7"/> # but also tells you not to <pause dur="0.3"/> hurt people <pause dur="0.7"/> unnecessarily and so this is one of those conflict cases <pause dur="0.6"/> and it may be that <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> you know <pause dur="0.7"/> you think that <pause dur="0.2"/> the requirement not to lie outweighs the requirement not to upset people <pause dur="0.3"/> but even so and you <trunc>sh</trunc> that still doesn't mean that you should sort of <pause dur="0.5"/> tell the truth in this cold way </u><u who="sm0156" trans="overlap"> not totally i mean <unclear>from the suggestion</unclear> i got from the the <pause dur="0.5"/> example was that <pause dur="0.3"/> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> was so <vocal desc="laughter" n="nm0146" iterated="y" dur="1"/> overtly <pause dur="0.5"/> thanking him he was like saying thank you every <trunc>se</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> every couple of you know words </u><u who="nm0146" trans="overlap"> right </u><u who="sm0156" trans="overlap"> the other person would be like oh well you know <pause dur="0.4"/> he wouldn't have up to that point <pause dur="0.4"/> had he not be so over the top in his

thanks </u><pause dur="0.2"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> yeah yeah </u><u who="sm0156" trans="overlap"> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> it and say well it was my duty </u><pause dur="0.8"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> yes well # <pause dur="0.6"/> that's one construal of it <pause dur="0.2"/> perhaps sort of gets the blame somewhere else <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> seems to me that # <pause dur="0.8"/> well you can imagine a similar situation where somebody's just all too willing to reveal <pause dur="0.8"/> their true feelings of indifference and coldness <pause dur="0.6"/> and so at every opportunity it will pop up even though they're not being <pause dur="0.3"/> you know praised for something <pause dur="0.4"/> # you they don't think they deserve praise for <pause dur="0.9"/> # so you can think of a sort of a a very close situation <pause dur="0.6"/> where no blame can be put on <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> his hospitalized friend <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> well you know praising him too much <pause dur="1.0"/> # where all the blame would land on this individiual and then all the same questions would pop up <pause dur="5.9"/> okay well # <pause dur="1.4"/> let's move on <pause dur="2.0"/> that's Michael Stocker's criticism <pause dur="0.4"/> if # move on to Bernard Williams' criticism <pause dur="3.5"/> and these are all <pause dur="0.2"/> very closely <pause dur="1.4"/> # aligned these are all really <pause dur="1.1"/> driving at the same sort of worry but from slightly different angles <pause dur="2.3"/> now Bernard Williams has two worries <pause dur="8.7"/> the first

is that the motive of duty rules out other motives <pause dur="1.1"/> that if you act from duty you can't act from friendship <pause dur="0.2"/> or love <pause dur="2.6"/> right <pause dur="1.3"/> so the worry here is that other other <pause dur="0.2"/> motivations get pushed out <pause dur="0.8"/> and since those other motivations are constitutive of what it is to enter into these valuable non-moral relationships <pause dur="1.0"/> if they're pushed off the scene by the motive of duty <pause dur="1.0"/> then it means then being moral will stop you fully engaging <pause dur="0.7"/> in non-moral but nonetheless valuable relationships <pause dur="2.0"/> that's the first worry <pause dur="1.2"/> the second is <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> that the <trunc>moti</trunc> that if you always act from duty <pause dur="1.1"/> then you'll <pause dur="0.4"/> be motivated by explicitly moral thoughts about what you should and shouldn't do about what's permissible <trunc>w</trunc> about <pause dur="0.4"/> what's not permissible <pause dur="0.6"/> in situations when that's quite inappropriate <pause dur="1.4"/> # and the example very famous example Bernard Williams gives <pause dur="1.7"/> is of a situation <pause dur="0.7"/> where <pause dur="0.2"/> you know your ship sunk <pause dur="0.6"/> you're on the lifeboat <pause dur="0.8"/> and you've got a choice between saving your wife <pause dur="0.7"/> and saving some stranger <pause dur="1.7"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> and he

has this example of a Kantian good-willed agent <pause dur="0.8"/> who's <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> motivated to save his wife <pause dur="0.2"/> not just because she's his wife <pause dur="1.2"/> but because she's his wife <pause dur="0.2"/> and because it's permissible to save your wife in preference to a stranger <pause dur="0.6"/> so <pause dur="0.4"/> you know the sort of motivation there is partly moral it's a <pause dur="0.2"/> a thought about the moral permissibility of his action <pause dur="2.1"/> and he says that you know <pause dur="0.2"/> some <pause dur="0.5"/> for example his wife <pause dur="0.7"/> may have thought <pause dur="0.2"/> that the thought that she is his wife would be sufficient <pause dur="0.6"/> to get him to save her <pause dur="1.1"/> # the moral thought seems to be <pause dur="0.5"/> as # Bernard Williams famously put it one thought too many <pause dur="2.7"/> it's not clear what's quite so disturbing there but # <pause dur="0.6"/> i'll deal with these points <pause dur="0.8"/> # in order <pause dur="4.8"/> now once again # <pause dur="0.2"/> Barbara Herman <pause dur="1.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> well it's the first time i've <trunc>menti</trunc> Barbara Herman and <pause dur="0.2"/> Marcia Baron <pause dur="0.7"/> tried to deal with this and they tried to deal with this <pause dur="0.8"/> first objection by distinguishing between primary and secondary motives <pause dur="4.2"/> they say that duty can function <pause dur="0.2"/> both as a primary motive <pause dur="0.6"/> and as a secondary

motive <pause dur="0.8"/> and that once you distinguish these and realize that a <trunc>mo</trunc> a Kantian morally good person <pause dur="0.6"/> doesn't always have to have duty as a primary motive <pause dur="1.3"/> then sometimes other primary motives can come in and that's perfectly okay <pause dur="0.4"/> other motives could be friendship or love <pause dur="0.2"/> or whatever <pause dur="2.3"/> what is the primary secondary motive distinction <pause dur="1.4"/> well a primary motive is what you and i <pause dur="0.2"/> ordinarily think of as somebody's motives <pause dur="0.5"/> it's <pause dur="0.4"/> to act from some primary motive <pause dur="0.7"/> is to act from a consideration that you would cite if somebody asked you why did you do that <pause dur="1.1"/> right <pause dur="1.2"/> and your answer might be quite simple mightn't you <pause dur="0.2"/> why did you pull that woman out of the water <pause dur="0.4"/> the answer might just be <pause dur="0.3"/> well because she's my wife <pause dur="1.6"/> and # that might be it <pause dur="0.9"/> right in that case <pause dur="0.7"/> your primary motive is just the thought <pause dur="0.2"/> that she's my wife <pause dur="1.5"/> or it might be <pause dur="0.6"/> more complicated might be <pause dur="0.4"/> what motivates you might be a thought she's my wife and the thought that it's permissible to save my wife in preference to <pause dur="0.4"/> a stranger in

such situations <pause dur="2.1"/> right so primary motives are just the specific reason you'd cite <pause dur="0.5"/> in support of your action <pause dur="3.6"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> in a specific # situation <pause dur="1.0"/> it's the reason why you did what you did the specific reason for doing <pause dur="0.4"/> that specific <pause dur="0.3"/> <trunc>s</trunc> action <pause dur="4.0"/> now secondary motives or <pause dur="0.7"/> are are more like regulative principles <pause dur="1.2"/> which needn't always function as primary motives <pause dur="0.2"/> though sometimes they might <pause dur="3.1"/> for duty to function as a secondary motive <pause dur="0.9"/> is just for <trunc>y</trunc> # certain counterfactuals to be true <pause dur="1.5"/> right <pause dur="0.8"/> for example <pause dur="0.5"/> for duty to function as a secondary motive <pause dur="1.4"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> would just entail <pause dur="0.5"/> that if you thought your action was wrong <pause dur="0.5"/> you wouldn't do it <pause dur="1.6"/> right so your actions are regulated by a concern <pause dur="0.8"/> for the morality of your action <pause dur="1.6"/> and that may just imply <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> that if you thought <pause dur="0.8"/> that your action was wrong you wouldn't do it <pause dur="0.5"/> or alternatively a subjunctive conditional <pause dur="0.4"/> you'll # <pause dur="0.5"/> you'll only well it's the conditional statement that if <pause dur="1.1"/> you'll only do some act if you

think it's permissible <pause dur="5.3"/> now if to have duty as a secondary motive just means <pause dur="0.5"/> that if you only just means that if you thought your action were wrong you wouldn't do it <pause dur="1.0"/> as long as you don't think it's wrong <pause dur="0.4"/> duty needn't not figure as a primary motive <pause dur="0.8"/> it need not figure <pause dur="0.4"/> amongst the reasons you would cite <pause dur="0.8"/> for doing a particular action <pause dur="5.2"/> you presumably you've got all sorts of regulative principles all sorts of secondary motives <pause dur="0.6"/> right you might have a <trunc>s</trunc> a sort of self-interested regulative motive <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> principle namely if some action's going to kill you <pause dur="0.2"/> you won't do it <pause dur="2.7"/> right <pause dur="0.3"/> but does that mean that thoughts about your own <pause dur="0.6"/> you know <pause dur="0.3"/> death <pause dur="1.3"/> are always going to figure in your motivations well no <pause dur="1.1"/> you know if he asked you well why did you come in here today you might say well <pause dur="0.4"/> to hear the lecture <pause dur="0.7"/> it wouldn't be to hear the lecture and because you were sure that you weren't going to die if you came in here <pause dur="0.6"/> right <pause dur="0.6"/> even though if you thought you were going to die if

you came in here you wouldn't come <pause dur="0.3"/> i take it <pause dur="0.3"/> you're not that keen to learn Kant <pause dur="0.7"/> right <pause dur="0.5"/> learning Kant were fatal <pause dur="0.8"/> then you'd <pause dur="0.4"/> i take it be happy to be ignorant <pause dur="3.8"/> right so even if you've got these regulative second order <pause dur="0.3"/> not second order secondary motives <pause dur="1.0"/> it doesn't mean that they're always going to be <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>f</trunc> # <pause dur="0.7"/> figure in your in the thoughts that act as your primary motives <pause dur="1.3"/> it just means that your action is regulated in a certain way <pause dur="0.5"/> and that'd mean you'd have no <pause dur="0.9"/> implication <pause dur="0.9"/> that you have thoughts with a certain content <pause dur="0.5"/> about your own eventual death or <pause dur="0.5"/> you know in the Kantian case about duty <pause dur="5.0"/> okay so is that is you get a a sort of basic idea of the primary-secondary motive <pause dur="0.5"/> distinction <pause dur="0.5"/> one is a particular consideration for doing <pause dur="0.5"/> or reason you have for doing a particular action <pause dur="1.0"/> the other is more of a general principle regulating <pause dur="0.7"/> the sorts of actions you're going to do <pause dur="1.2"/> you might have a <trunc>regula</trunc> you know i'll do this as long as it's not self-destructive <pause dur="0.8"/>

right <pause dur="0.3"/> that might be it <pause dur="0.5"/> but in doing some particular action one of the reasons you would cite for why you did it would not be <pause dur="0.4"/> 'cause you <pause dur="0.2"/> didn't think it was going to destroy you you wouldn't have thoughts about your own destruction <pause dur="0.5"/> for the most part <pause dur="0.7"/> unless you thought there was some very good reason for thinking something's going to be dangerous <pause dur="1.8"/> similarly if your secondary motive is duty <pause dur="0.5"/> that just means <pause dur="0.6"/> so long as you don't think the action is wrong <pause dur="1.2"/> sorry you just means that you wouldn't do some action if you thought it was morally wrong <pause dur="1.2"/> that needn't imply that every time you act <pause dur="0.6"/> you've got a <trunc>th</trunc> a moral thought <pause dur="0.5"/> as a primary motive <pause dur="1.4"/> it need not actually impinge on your moral <trunc>deliberatio</trunc> # <pause dur="0.2"/> in your deliberation about why you should do particular actions <pause dur="7.6"/> that <trunc>o</trunc> is that okay <pause dur="1.9"/> questions on that </u><pause dur="0.6"/> <u who="sm0153" trans="pause"> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="2 secs"/> <pause dur="0.6"/> probably draw that out from the meaning </u><pause dur="0.3"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> # </u><u who="sm0153" trans="latching"> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/><pause dur="1.7"/> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> </u><pause dur="0.9"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> oh i don't see why <pause dur="0.3"/> well actually Kant doesn't talk about motives very much </u><u who="sm0153" trans="latching"> no </u><pause dur="0.2"/> <u who="nm0146" trans="pause"> he talks about inclinations incentives <pause dur="0.4"/> well

actually inclination's just a particular sort of <pause dur="0.6"/> incentive <pause dur="0.4"/> talks about <distinct lang="de">triebfedern</distinct> <pause dur="0.6"/> # which gets translated as # incentives <pause dur="0.9"/> and he talks about maxims <pause dur="0.7"/> so he actually very seldom talks about motives he <trunc>say</trunc> <trunc>a</trunc> one place he distinguishes motives from <pause dur="0.4"/> # incentives <pause dur="0.7"/> but it's just one of these many places where Kant makes a distinction just forgets about it straight away <pause dur="1.0"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> and what does most of the work in Kant actually is maxims principles of action <pause dur="0.9"/> and they're not <pause dur="0.6"/> primary motives although they'll be picking out the sorts of things <pause dur="0.7"/> which # would count as motives for you counts as reasons for you <pause dur="1.0"/> so i think <pause dur="0.2"/> mean you're right Kant doesn't actually make this distinction himself <pause dur="0.7"/> but it's a a distinction that fits very neatly into the Kantian framework <pause dur="0.4"/> of practical rationality <pause dur="4.6"/> but # no <trunc>y</trunc> there is nowhere where he makes this distinction <pause dur="2.7"/> # that's not a problem i mean there's two ways you can go you i mean <pause dur="0.3"/> as long as it fits neatly into the Kantian framework <pause dur="0.9"/> then this could be a

way he <pause dur="1.0"/> # this would be a <trunc>w</trunc> # a legitimate way for Kant to respond <pause dur="0.5"/> the fact that he doesn't respond in this way or <unclear><trunc>s</trunc></unclear> say these things is not really the point <pause dur="0.5"/> with all of these figures historical figures <pause dur="0.7"/> we're really considering how defensible their position is <pause dur="0.7"/> and even if they don't have a response to a particular criticism 'cause it wasn't made at that time <pause dur="0.4"/> or they just didn't think of it <pause dur="0.8"/> the real issue's whether they could respond <pause dur="1.8"/> # <pause dur="1.0"/> so <pause dur="0.5"/> i don't mean <pause dur="0.3"/> i don't think you need get too worried about that <pause dur="1.3"/> this is a perfectly decent way for somebody who's sympathetic to Kant <pause dur="0.6"/> to respond to the Williams style objection <pause dur="5.6"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="15"/> okay well once we've got <pause dur="2.5"/> this distinction up and running <pause dur="4.3"/> it's easy to see how you can apply it to Williams' objection <pause dur="0.9"/> about how <pause dur="0.7"/> duty seems to push out other motives <pause dur="3.1"/> remember <pause dur="0.4"/> the first worry you had was that <pause dur="0.5"/> once duty gets on the scene it <trunc>pu</trunc> it all <pause dur="0.3"/> i mean you can't act from friendship <pause dur="0.6"/> or

from love <pause dur="0.7"/> and hence can't fully engage in those non-moral relations <pause dur="2.7"/> well once you've got duty as a primary and secondary motive on <pause dur="0.7"/> # established <pause dur="1.0"/> then <pause dur="0.2"/> you can see that there's plenty of room for non-moral motives to get in <pause dur="1.8"/> at the primary level at primary as primary motives for a a Kantian good-willed agent <pause dur="1.6"/> right <pause dur="0.4"/> to do something from friendship <pause dur="1.3"/> from a a for a Kantian <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> good-willed individual <pause dur="0.7"/> would just be for friendship to be their primary motive <pause dur="1.0"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> and although they're they'll have duty still as a secondary motive <pause dur="0.7"/> that just means that they'll do <pause dur="0.6"/> they'll act from the primary motive so long as it doesn't prompt them <pause dur="0.5"/> to do something they believe is wrong <pause dur="1.6"/> right so <pause dur="0.2"/> any sort of non-moral <trunc>rela</trunc> # motive can get in at the primary level <pause dur="1.4"/> and the agent may act just from that motive <pause dur="2.2"/> all it means <trunc>i</trunc> for duty to act as a secondary motive <pause dur="0.8"/> is <pause dur="0.6"/> for them to regulate the sorts of actions they'll do from those non-moral motives at the primary level <pause dur="1.3"/> # in a certain way <pause dur="0.2"/> namely they won't

act <pause dur="0.5"/> from those motives if those motives <pause dur="0.4"/> point them towards doing something wrong <pause dur="5.4"/> okay <pause dur="0.2"/> so is it clear how that works <pause dur="1.5"/> have to <trunc>mo</trunc> get a bit of a move on 'cause i'm running out of time here <pause dur="2.0"/> okay let me move on quickly to the final point i wanted to make which is the second part of Williams' objection <pause dur="0.9"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="7"/> this is about <pause dur="2.1"/> whether <pause dur="2.2"/> a Kantian good-willed agent can <pause dur="0.2"/> would would have too many moral thoughts explicitly moral thoughts <pause dur="1.5"/> and exactly the same <pause dur="0.6"/> point could be made with the primary-secondary <pause dur="0.6"/> motive distinction <pause dur="3.4"/> i mean a Kantian good-willed agent doesn't have to have an explicit thought at the primary motivating level <pause dur="0.7"/> about duty <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="1.3"/> in saving his wife in preference to a stranger he doesn't his motive his first <pause dur="0.7"/> his primary motives don't have to be <pause dur="0.6"/> A <pause dur="0.2"/> well because she's my wife and B <pause dur="0.4"/> 'cause it's morally permissible <pause dur="0.3"/> to save my wife in preference to a stranger in situations like this <pause dur="0.4"/> at the primary level <pause dur="0.7"/> the motivating thought could be solely a thought about

his wife <pause dur="1.1"/> and his concern for her <pause dur="1.4"/> nonetheless he's still a Kantian good-willed agent <pause dur="0.6"/> 'cause his action is regulated <pause dur="0.5"/> by duty at the second <pause dur="0.6"/> as a secondary motive <pause dur="0.8"/> what that means is <pause dur="0.5"/> he'll save his wife <pause dur="0.3"/> just 'cause she's his wife <pause dur="0.5"/> unless <pause dur="0.8"/> saving her would involve <pause dur="0.3"/> doing something he takes to be wrong <pause dur="3.0"/> okay <pause dur="0.2"/> that this is morally permissible to save my wife <pause dur="1.1"/> now you make think even that's <pause dur="0.9"/> too <pause dur="1.0"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> restrictive or <pause dur="0.2"/> sort of inappropriate having duty at the the <pause dur="0.2"/> as a regulative principle <pause dur="0.5"/> it's still <pause dur="0.5"/> there's something inappropriate about that <pause dur="0.9"/> but at that point i think the Kantian just dig their heels in and say well <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="1.0"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="7"/> that there's nothing objectionable <pause dur="0.2"/> about duty <pause dur="0.5"/> as a secondary motive <pause dur="3.8"/> and to make that clear <pause dur="1.1"/> you know just consider <pause dur="0.3"/> somebody who <trunc>d</trunc> who <pause dur="0.2"/> is whose actions aren't regulated by duty as a secondary motive <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> they're just motivated at the primary level <pause dur="0.2"/> by a concern for their wife <pause dur="1.7"/> that means <pause dur="0.2"/> that <pause dur="0.6"/> no matter <trunc>w</trunc> whether this action is right or wrong <pause dur="0.6"/> or whether they

think it's right or wrong they're going to save their wives <pause dur="0.5"/> so you know just imagine a situation <pause dur="0.5"/> in which the only way you can save your wife <pause dur="0.4"/> is by throwing two kids off the lifeboat <pause dur="0.9"/> so you think oh great <pause dur="0.6"/> out they go <pause dur="1.0"/> wife in <pause dur="1.0"/> right <pause dur="1.1"/>

well in such a situation like that <pause dur="0.2"/> as <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="1.0"/> Barbara Herman clearly points out <pause dur="0.6"/> this seems like a case where the the the individual has one thought too few <pause dur="1.2"/> right <pause dur="0.2"/> rather than one thought too many <pause dur="0.7"/> it seems if saving a wife involves doing something like that <pause dur="0.5"/> then you should <pause dur="0.3"/> pause to think well you know is this really <pause dur="0.6"/> <trunc>sh</trunc> okay <pause dur="0.6"/> to do this <pause dur="1.3"/> right <pause dur="1.8"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> right and but <pause dur="0.2"/> you know being willing to pause to think about whether you should do this action <pause dur="0.4"/> in situation where it looks as though the only way you can do <pause dur="0.6"/> what a motive of love or friendship prompts you to do <pause dur="0.9"/> is by doing something that looks like it's wrong <pause dur="0.8"/> i mean that sort of moral regulatively <pause dur="0.2"/> regulative function <pause dur="0.9"/> doesn't seem at all

objectionable it doesn't stop you <pause dur="0.5"/> spontaneously reacting <pause dur="0.3"/> to the <trunc>c</trunc> # the needs of your loved one <pause dur="0.5"/> or the concerns of your friend <pause dur="0.9"/> doesn't mean you've got to <pause dur="0.8"/> in some way not care about them <pause dur="1.0"/> all it means is <pause dur="0.6"/> that <pause dur="0.5"/> you won't do anything for them no matter what it is <pause dur="0.9"/> right there'll be a limit <pause dur="0.7"/> to the <trunc>s</trunc> # <pause dur="1.4"/> to what <trunc>frien</trunc> you'll think that friendship will permit you <pause dur="0.4"/> or will allow you to do <pause dur="1.6"/> okay right i'll stop there <pause dur="1.4"/> handouts at the front <pause dur="0.8"/> anybody who wants the <pause dur="0.4"/> leaflets on the philosophy weekend they'll be here as well