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<?xml version="1.0"?>

<!DOCTYPE TEI.2 SYSTEM "base.dtd">




<title>Adverse Possession</title></titleStmt>

<publicationStmt><distributor>BASE and Oxford Text Archive</distributor>


<availability><p>The British Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading, under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Centre for English Language Teacher Education, Warwick) and Paul Thompson

(Department of Applied Linguistics, Reading), with funding from BALEAP,

EURALEX, the British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. The

original recordings are held at the Universities of Warwick and Reading, and

at the Oxford Text Archive and may be consulted by bona fide researchers

upon written application to any of the holding bodies.

The BASE corpus is freely available to researchers who agree to the

following conditions:</p>

<p>1. The recordings and transcriptions should not be modified in any


<p>2. The recordings and transcriptions should be used for research purposes

only; they should not be reproduced in teaching materials</p>

<p>3. The recordings and transcriptions should not be reproduced in full for

a wider audience/readership, although researchers are free to quote short

passages of text (up to 200 running words from any given speech event)</p>

<p>4. The corpus developers should be informed of all presentations or

publications arising from analysis of the corpus</p><p>

Researchers should acknowledge their use of the corpus using the following

form of words:

The recordings and transcriptions used in this study come from the British

Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus, which was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Warwick) and Paul Thompson (Reading). Corpus development was assisted by

funding from the Universities of Warwick and Reading, BALEAP, EURALEX, the

British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. </p></availability>




<recording dur="00:48:55" n="5571">


<respStmt><name>BASE team</name>



<langUsage><language id="en">English</language>

<language id="la">Latin</language>



<person id="nm1158" role="main speaker" n="n" sex="m"><p>nm1158, main speaker, non-student, male</p></person>

<personGrp id="ss" role="audience" size="l"><p>ss, audience, large group </p></personGrp>

<personGrp id="sl" role="all" size="l"><p>sl, all, large group</p></personGrp>

<personGrp role="speakers" size="3"><p>number of speakers: 3</p></personGrp>





<item n="speechevent">Lecture</item>

<item n="acaddept">Law</item>

<item n="acaddiv">ss</item>

<item n="partlevel">UG</item>

<item n="module">unknown</item>




<u who="nm1158"> <kinesic desc="overhead projector is on showing transparency" iterated="n"/> yesterday i <pause dur="0.2"/> i started to introduce a a a <pause dur="0.2"/> a a large number of quite difficult concepts and ideas to you <pause dur="0.4"/> # the idea of a a tenure <pause dur="0.7"/> a historical system of <trunc>landown</trunc> landowning in this country and how it developed <pause dur="0.7"/> the idea <pause dur="0.2"/> that flowed from that <pause dur="0.5"/> that it was impossible for people directly to own land <pause dur="0.7"/> so <pause dur="0.3"/> lawyers had invented <pause dur="0.2"/> this idea of the estate <pause dur="0.4"/> the abstract concept <pause dur="0.4"/> an estate <pause dur="0.5"/> which defines rights and interests in land <pause dur="0.5"/> it is the estate <pause dur="0.4"/> that <pause dur="0.8"/> people own <pause dur="2.0"/> i went on to look <pause dur="0.2"/> at the idea of <pause dur="0.2"/> possession <pause dur="0.5"/> being of fundamental <pause dur="0.2"/> importance <pause dur="0.9"/> in the English law <pause dur="0.8"/> and the concept of title <pause dur="1.1"/> as being <pause dur="0.5"/> a legal right <pause dur="0.7"/> to possess land <pause dur="1.7"/> so these <pause dur="0.2"/> four concepts <pause dur="0.4"/> tenure estate <pause dur="0.3"/> possession <pause dur="0.3"/> and title <pause dur="1.9"/> and i then went on to explain <pause dur="0.4"/> the doctrine of <pause dur="0.3"/> relativity of title <pause dur="2.6"/> and argued that this had arisen as a result <pause dur="2.4"/> of the adversarial system of adjudication <pause dur="0.3"/> that we have in this country <pause dur="1.3"/> and in particular the idea <pause dur="0.4"/> that when <pause dur="0.3"/> people have disputes <pause dur="1.1"/> about land and they take them to court <pause dur="1.3"/> the court is concerned solely with

<trunc>det</trunc> determining <pause dur="0.3"/> the claims <pause dur="0.5"/> as between the parties <pause dur="2.4"/> the court doesn't go around <pause dur="0.2"/> looking for <pause dur="0.2"/> the true owner of the land <pause dur="0.6"/> it's simply concerned with <pause dur="0.2"/> resolving the dispute <pause dur="2.1"/> that it has before it <pause dur="3.7"/> and i looked at some ideas <pause dur="0.2"/> about <pause dur="0.5"/> relativity of title <pause dur="0.5"/> in that context <pause dur="0.2"/> first of all the idea <pause dur="0.2"/> that <pause dur="0.2"/> possession <pause dur="0.3"/> of land <pause dur="0.5"/> is prima facie evidence of title so if you physically possess land <pause dur="1.2"/> that gives rise to a presumption that you have a right <pause dur="1.3"/> to possess the land <pause dur="1.3"/> so possession and title are <pause dur="0.4"/> are <pause dur="0.9"/> linked together in that way <pause dur="1.9"/> moving on from that <pause dur="1.9"/> the idea that no one can acquire <pause dur="0.6"/> a better title to land <pause dur="0.4"/> or to any other form of property <pause dur="0.5"/> than the person from whom they acquired it <pause dur="1.0"/> or to put it the other way round <pause dur="0.2"/> you can't give <pause dur="0.6"/> someone a better title to property <pause dur="0.2"/> than <pause dur="1.7"/> than you yourself have <pause dur="3.1"/> this was the principle <pause dur="0.7"/> put in in in <pause dur="0.6"/> terms of its Latin tag <pause dur="0.4"/> of <distinct lang="la">nemo dat</distinct> <pause dur="0.3"/> <distinct lang="la">quod non habet</distinct> <pause dur="1.8"/> and then <pause dur="0.5"/> a final principle under <pause dur="0.2"/> this idea of relativity of title <pause dur="0.3"/> that when you have a <trunc>comple</trunc> competing <pause dur="0.6"/> claims to

title so when people go to court <pause dur="2.0"/> and argue <pause dur="1.9"/> that they each have better title than the other <pause dur="1.3"/> then the first <pause dur="0.3"/> time <pause dur="0.2"/> prevails so the person who can show <pause dur="0.4"/> the longest historical claim to title <pause dur="0.7"/> is going to prevail <pause dur="1.3"/> there are some quite complex concepts and ideas here <pause dur="0.6"/> # i'd encourage you <pause dur="0.3"/> to read <pause dur="1.4"/> whichever textbook you've got with <trunc>i</trunc> in Smith i think it's <trunc>ch</trunc> it's chapter four in Smith which <trunc>i</trunc> # explication of his concepts # at greater length than i'm able to do <pause dur="0.4"/> in the context of a lecture so i would encourage you to go away and <pause dur="0.3"/> and read about these things we'll come back <pause dur="0.4"/> to many of these ideas later on in the course <pause dur="0.2"/> particularly <pause dur="0.4"/> # the doctrine of estates <pause dur="1.9"/> i then tried to to explain or tried to apply these these principles show how they were applied <pause dur="0.2"/> in the context of a specific case so and tried to bring them to life <pause dur="0.3"/> with this case from eighteen-sixty-five <pause dur="0.4"/> of Asher against Whitlock <pause dur="1.0"/> we saw <pause dur="0.2"/> that <pause dur="1.0"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.5"/> character called Thomas Williamson <pause dur="1.1"/> had <pause dur="0.5"/> taken <pause dur="0.3"/> a piece of land he was

a a squatter and he'd enclosed it in other words he'd <pause dur="0.3"/> he'd <pause dur="0.3"/> put some kind of fence round it <pause dur="0.8"/> and claimed it as his own took possession of it <pause dur="0.4"/> from someone who we don't know that person doesn't appear <pause dur="0.7"/> # anywhere in the proceedings <pause dur="1.1"/> # and he then proceeded to make <pause dur="0.2"/> a will <pause dur="0.6"/> leaving <pause dur="1.6"/> an interest <pause dur="1.0"/> in the land the interest that he'd acquired <pause dur="0.3"/> by taking physical possession <pause dur="0.5"/> to his wife for the rest of her life <pause dur="0.3"/> or until she remarried <pause dur="1.0"/> then <pause dur="0.7"/> after that to his daughter <pause dur="0.8"/> the chain of events that occurred was that <pause dur="0.4"/> Williamson then died so the land passes <pause dur="0.4"/> # to his wife <pause dur="0.2"/> for her for her life for the rest of her life <pause dur="0.3"/> or until she remarries <pause dur="0.8"/> she has what's known as a determinable <pause dur="0.5"/> life interest <pause dur="0.9"/> so the interest for life can be brought <pause dur="0.4"/> to an end <pause dur="0.5"/> by the occurrence of some future event <pause dur="0.6"/> remarriage <pause dur="1.2"/> we found out that she <pause dur="0.2"/> then remarried a character called Whitlock <pause dur="0.5"/> and she continued to live in the land with <trunc>whit</trunc> on the land with Whitlock <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="2.8"/> she then dies <pause dur="1.4"/> Mary Williamson the daughter <pause dur="0.2"/>

also dies but before she dies <pause dur="0.4"/> she's made <pause dur="0.5"/> a will <pause dur="0.6"/> leaving <pause dur="1.1"/> her interest in the land <pause dur="0.4"/> and her interest <pause dur="0.3"/> is <pause dur="0.2"/> a reversionary interest in other words she acquires <pause dur="0.9"/> a title immediate possession of the right to immediate possession of the land <pause dur="0.6"/> once her mother has <pause dur="0.2"/> has died or has remarried <pause dur="1.4"/> she's made a will leaving it <pause dur="0.8"/> to a Mrs Asher <pause dur="1.4"/> and we've got a dispute between <pause dur="1.0"/> the mother's second husband <pause dur="0.9"/> Mr Whitlock <pause dur="1.0"/> and the daughter's <pause dur="0.4"/> heir <pause dur="0.5"/> under her will <pause dur="0.9"/> Mrs Asher </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm1158" trans="pause"> <kinesic desc="overhead projector is on showing transparency" iterated="n"/> these parties go to court and the <pause dur="1.9"/> arguments that they present are as follows <pause dur="0.5"/> first of all Whitlock <pause dur="0.4"/> argues <pause dur="1.3"/> that he's in actual possession of the land <pause dur="2.9"/> that gives rise to a <pause dur="0.3"/> presumption <pause dur="1.2"/> that he has good title to be there <pause dur="1.0"/> the fact that he's in possession <pause dur="0.7"/> implies that he has a right to possession <pause dur="3.3"/> secondly he argues <pause dur="0.2"/> that his title <pause dur="0.7"/> is at least as good <pause dur="0.4"/> as Williamson's <pause dur="2.2"/> Thomas Williamson's <pause dur="0.8"/> and better <pause dur="0.6"/> than Mrs Asher's <pause dur="1.0"/> because <pause dur="0.3"/> he and Williamson are both squatters <pause dur="1.8"/> neither of them had any right to be on the land <pause dur="2.3"/> so

the court shouldn't decide as between them <pause dur="3.6"/> on the basis that one has some kind of better claim than the other <pause dur="0.3"/> they should simply look at the fact <pause dur="1.0"/> that <pause dur="0.8"/> he is in possession in these circumstances <pause dur="1.2"/> and then there's <pause dur="0.5"/> this further argument <pause dur="1.1"/> that <pause dur="1.1"/> because both <pause dur="0.2"/> he and and Thomas Williamson are squatters <pause dur="0.2"/> that there's some <pause dur="0.3"/> other true owner out there <pause dur="0.9"/> and therefore the court shouldn't decide the case in favour of Mrs Asher <pause dur="0.7"/> because of the existence of <pause dur="0.7"/> we'll call this character X <pause dur="0.2"/> we don't know who he is <pause dur="0.8"/> she is <pause dur="5.8"/> <kinesic desc="reveals covered part of transparency" iterated="n"/> the arguments that Asher puts forward <pause dur="0.9"/> are that she has derived her title <pause dur="0.5"/> from <pause dur="0.3"/> Thomas Williamson <pause dur="2.2"/> Thomas Williamson passed it to Lucy Williamson passed it to Mary Williamson <pause dur="0.5"/> passed it <pause dur="0.5"/> to Mrs Asher <pause dur="1.9"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="2.2"/> and she claims that Williamson's title <pause dur="0.3"/> is better than Whitlock's because although admittedly they're both squatters <pause dur="1.0"/> Williamson was squatting first <pause dur="1.2"/> so <pause dur="0.2"/> we've got the idea <pause dur="0.3"/> principle of the principle of the first

in time <pause dur="0.2"/> prevails in these circumstances <pause dur="2.2"/> and <pause dur="0.2"/> the third argument that she makes <pause dur="1.6"/> in rebuttal of the of the the third point made by Whitlock <pause dur="1.6"/> is that the identity of X is irrelevant <pause dur="0.3"/> X isn't a party <pause dur="0.2"/> to the proceedings before the court <pause dur="1.0"/> so we see <pause dur="0.4"/> an illustration <pause dur="0.6"/> of <pause dur="0.4"/> that principle <pause dur="0.7"/> i mentioned at the earlier at the outset in connection with the concept of relativity of title <pause dur="0.3"/> that when you get cases before the courts <pause dur="0.5"/> the courts are only interested in the dispute between the parties they don't embark on this <pause dur="0.4"/> search for X <pause dur="0.4"/> and the court upholds <unclear>#</unclear> Asher's argument <pause dur="0.9"/> they're not interested in the identity of X <pause dur="0.7"/> as between Williamson <pause dur="0.7"/> Thomas Williamson <pause dur="0.9"/> and Mr Whitlock <pause dur="0.5"/> Thomas Williamson's title is better <pause dur="0.2"/> because he was there first <pause dur="2.4"/> and therefore <pause dur="0.4"/> although Whitlock is in actual possession of the land <pause dur="1.7"/> that possession can be overturned <pause dur="0.3"/> by evidence of a better title <pause dur="0.8"/> and Mrs Asher can show <pause dur="0.2"/> a better title <pause dur="0.2"/> because she's <trunc>direc</trunc> derived it directly <pause dur="0.7"/> by this chain of <pause dur="0.7"/> # # #

of <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="1.3"/> gifts by by means of the will <pause dur="1.3"/> from Thomas Williamson </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm1158" trans="pause"> we've got a demonstration <pause dur="0.5"/> of <pause dur="1.9"/> quite a number of the principles that i <pause dur="0.2"/> i introduced yesterday <pause dur="0.4"/> going on from this case <pause dur="4.4"/> this <pause dur="0.4"/> method <pause dur="0.3"/> of <pause dur="0.5"/> dealing with disputes about land <pause dur="1.2"/> is <pause dur="0.5"/> efficient <pause dur="0.3"/> in terms of <pause dur="0.4"/> adjudication <pause dur="1.0"/> and i say that because <pause dur="2.2"/> another approach <pause dur="0.4"/> that the court could have adopted <pause dur="0.2"/> would have been to embark on a search for X <pause dur="0.3"/> in these circumstances and to say well <pause dur="0.3"/> neither Asher nor Whitlock have <pause dur="0.9"/> good claim here <pause dur="0.6"/> X owns the land <pause dur="5.7"/> but how are they supposed to go about <pause dur="2.1"/> that type of enquiry <pause dur="0.7"/> they don't have the evidence before them <pause dur="1.0"/> they only have <pause dur="1.4"/> the actual parties to the dispute <pause dur="0.6"/> there in the courtroom <pause dur="2.7"/> and their evidence is the only evidence <pause dur="0.2"/> that can be put <pause dur="0.8"/> to the test <pause dur="2.6"/> so it would be <pause dur="0.4"/> inefficient <pause dur="0.7"/> to embark on <pause dur="0.6"/> this search for <pause dur="0.7"/> the elusive character X in these proceedings <pause dur="0.4"/> the way they actually resolve <pause dur="1.1"/> the problem the dispute before them <pause dur="1.5"/>

is sensible in terms of <pause dur="0.8"/> judicial decision making <pause dur="2.4"/> <kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="15"/> but it raises <pause dur="0.7"/> a problem <pause dur="1.7"/> if you <pause dur="1.8"/> consider Asher's position now <pause dur="0.3"/> Asher's title has been <pause dur="0.5"/> confirmed as against Whitlock by the court <pause dur="2.3"/> but what happens if Asher wants to sell <pause dur="0.8"/> the land <pause dur="0.7"/> to someone else <pause dur="3.0"/> how are we <pause dur="0.3"/> to say <pause dur="0.6"/> that this <pause dur="0.4"/><kinesic desc="indicates point on transparency" iterated="n"/> character <pause dur="0.3"/> X <pause dur="0.4"/> question mark <pause dur="0.5"/> is not going to reappear <pause dur="0.5"/> at some point <pause dur="0.4"/> in the future <pause dur="2.7"/> and say well actually <pause dur="1.0"/> i have a better title than Williamson <pause dur="1.8"/> and as <pause dur="0.3"/> you Asher can have no better title than Williamson did <pause dur="2.2"/> i therefore <pause dur="0.2"/> have better title <pause dur="0.7"/> better claim to the to a right to possession <pause dur="0.5"/> than you do <pause dur="2.0"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.8"/> so while <pause dur="1.0"/> the approach that that the court adopts in Asher and Whitlock <pause dur="0.3"/> is efficient <pause dur="0.3"/> in terms of <pause dur="0.3"/> judicial decision making <pause dur="0.6"/> it's potentially <pause dur="0.4"/> inefficient or ineffective <pause dur="2.2"/> in terms of looking at the way that markets <pause dur="0.4"/> for land might work <pause dur="0.3"/> who's going to buy the land from Asher <pause dur="0.7"/> if there is a risk <pause dur="0.2"/> that at some point in the future <pause dur="0.3"/> they may

be dispossessed <pause dur="1.2"/> and this is a significant problem <pause dur="0.3"/> with the doctrine of relativity of title <pause dur="1.1"/> it creates <pause dur="0.3"/> uncertainty <pause dur="0.7"/> as to who it is that has powers <pause dur="2.0"/> to deal with and dispose <pause dur="0.7"/> of interests <pause dur="0.3"/> in land <pause dur="1.1"/> and makes it <pause dur="0.5"/> potentially very expensive <pause dur="0.3"/> for anyone <pause dur="0.4"/> who <pause dur="0.3"/> is thinking of buying a piece of land <pause dur="2.4"/> to carry out investigations to find out <pause dur="0.8"/> whether they've covered <pause dur="0.3"/> all the bases as it were <pause dur="0.4"/> as far as potential <pause dur="0.4"/> owners of that land are concerned </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm1158" trans="pause"> the solution <pause dur="0.2"/> to this problem <pause dur="2.3"/> is <pause dur="7.1"/> to introduce a system <pause dur="2.1"/> whereby <pause dur="0.8"/> after <pause dur="0.6"/> a certain period of time <pause dur="1.5"/> X <pause dur="0.5"/> or question mark's <pause dur="0.3"/> ability <pause dur="0.6"/> to step forward and say <pause dur="0.4"/> i've got a better claim <pause dur="0.7"/> than you have <pause dur="2.5"/> that ability to step forward and make that claim <pause dur="0.2"/> comes to an end <pause dur="2.8"/> okay to say <pause dur="0.3"/> that after <pause dur="0.4"/> the passage of a particular period of time <pause dur="2.7"/> question mark or X is <pause dur="0.2"/> debarred in some way <pause dur="0.7"/> from <pause dur="0.9"/> stepping up <pause dur="0.9"/> and saying <pause dur="0.2"/> well i've got a better right than you </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm1158" trans="pause"> <kinesic desc="overhead projector is on showing transparency" iterated="n"/>

# there are two <pause dur="0.3"/> principal methods if you look at <pause dur="0.4"/> at # <pause dur="0.6"/> continental <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> system and the position in in Scotland <pause dur="3.5"/> they favour <pause dur="0.2"/> # a technique that's known as prescription <pause dur="0.9"/> and we find examples of prescription in English law and we'll talk about them later in the course in the context <pause dur="0.4"/> of easement <pause dur="2.3"/> # what prescription does is to say <pause dur="1.4"/> that after a certain period of time <pause dur="0.8"/> we assume <pause dur="0.7"/> that the person who <pause dur="0.5"/> is <pause dur="1.0"/> # a squatter or who's in in what we call adverse possession <pause dur="0.3"/> of the land <pause dur="0.7"/> was actually granted some kind of right to be there <pause dur="1.0"/> so we're making it's an assumption <pause dur="0.4"/> of some sort of grant of a right <pause dur="1.1"/> by <pause dur="0.5"/> parties unknown <pause dur="1.6"/> the other approach and the approach that English law adopts <pause dur="0.2"/> in this context <pause dur="0.6"/> as far as <pause dur="1.2"/> title to the land is concerned <pause dur="1.5"/> is the technique known as limitation <pause dur="2.8"/> # this is a procedural <pause dur="0.5"/> solution to the problem <pause dur="0.5"/> in that <pause dur="0.3"/> it places a restriction <pause dur="1.0"/> on the ability <pause dur="2.2"/> of a person to go to court <pause dur="1.2"/> and claim <pause dur="0.8"/> that their rights <pause dur="0.2"/> are superior <pause dur="1.9"/> to those of a person in adverse possession

or those of a squatter <pause dur="0.3"/> after <pause dur="0.3"/> the passage <pause dur="0.5"/> of <pause dur="0.2"/> a period of <pause dur="0.3"/> twelve years <pause dur="3.6"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="5.4"/> now <pause dur="3.6"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="4"/> the idea that someone can acquire rights in the way that Williamson has done <pause dur="0.9"/> by <pause dur="1.1"/> effectively <pause dur="0.3"/> taking land enclosing it and <pause dur="0.2"/> and claiming it as his own <pause dur="0.6"/> is <pause dur="0.2"/> controversial <pause dur="1.9"/> you'll all be familiar with the <pause dur="0.2"/> idea that <pause dur="2.3"/> squatting is a controversial practice <pause dur="2.1"/> in addition to the argument that i've i've just made to you <pause dur="0.4"/> that <pause dur="0.3"/> a system of <pause dur="0.2"/> of adverse possession of limitation of claims <pause dur="1.6"/> # is is essential to a workable system of land transfer <pause dur="0.2"/> you can make various other arguments in favour of adverse possession <pause dur="1.2"/> i've put it to you so far in terms of looking at the Asher and Whitlock case <pause dur="0.8"/> that <pause dur="1.4"/> it's necessary <pause dur="0.7"/> to have some kind of of <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> scheme for extinguishing <pause dur="0.5"/> old claims <pause dur="0.7"/> in order to <pause dur="0.3"/> make a market <pause dur="0.4"/> for land <pause dur="0.5"/> transfer to work <pause dur="1.1"/> there are other arguments as well <pause dur="1.1"/> # closely linked to that is the idea <pause dur="0.4"/> that <pause dur="1.8"/> it's desirable to eliminate <pause dur="0.4"/> stale or old claims <pause dur="1.1"/> and again if

we go back historically and look at this <pause dur="0.4"/> in the times before <pause dur="0.9"/> everything was recorded in writing <pause dur="1.9"/> then the difficulties of actually proving <pause dur="1.0"/> things in court based on <pause dur="0.6"/> people's memory of past events <pause dur="1.1"/> becomes more and more difficult <pause dur="0.2"/> as time passes <pause dur="2.7"/> witnesses <pause dur="0.8"/> die disappear <pause dur="0.3"/> their memory becomes less reliable over time <pause dur="0.8"/> nowadays it's arguable that it's it's less <pause dur="0.4"/> of a concern because <pause dur="0.5"/> most of the types of evidence that we're looking at <pause dur="0.5"/> in <pause dur="0.4"/> cases concerning <pause dur="0.2"/> land <pause dur="0.4"/> is actually written down in some form so we've got documentary evidence <pause dur="0.8"/> but this basic idea that <pause dur="0.3"/> it's desirable to eliminate old or stale claims <pause dur="2.9"/> remains <pause dur="1.7"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> and the third argument that we can make in favour of adverse possession <pause dur="0.8"/> system of extinguishing old claims <pause dur="0.8"/> is that it provides incentives for efficient land use <pause dur="1.9"/> and this is # <pause dur="1.9"/> you can you can you can you you'd be familiar with the popular term <pause dur="0.2"/> use it or lose it <pause dur="1.1"/> this is really a an argument along those lines <pause dur="0.4"/> that if people don't actually make use of their land and

don't <pause dur="0.8"/> force their claims <pause dur="1.0"/> in relation to land <pause dur="0.4"/> then <pause dur="0.6"/> it's efficient to allow other people <pause dur="0.6"/> to come along <pause dur="0.6"/> and make use of it for <pause dur="0.4"/> some beneficial purpose <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> and to give you give you an example of the way that that that <pause dur="1.2"/> this kind of <pause dur="1.1"/> issue arises <pause dur="1.0"/> i've got some some data here on <pause dur="0.7"/> # empty dwellings <pause dur="1.0"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="4"/> in five <pause dur="0.5"/> local authority areas <pause dur="0.5"/> from <pause dur="0.4"/> a <pause dur="0.3"/> survey carried out in the nineteen-eighties by the Department of Environment <pause dur="1.2"/> they found that <pause dur="0.7"/> in certain areas of the country <pause dur="0.3"/> notably in in the London borough of Kensington and Chelsea <pause dur="0.6"/> a very high proportion <pause dur="0.7"/> of the housing stock <pause dur="1.4"/> is actually empty <pause dur="0.6"/> at any given point in time <pause dur="0.4"/> so <pause dur="0.5"/> we're talking about total housing stock <pause dur="0.6"/> voids <pause dur="0.6"/> are <pause dur="0.3"/> empty <pause dur="0.2"/> empty dwellings empty properties <pause dur="0.5"/> and we see that in the case of Kensington and Chelsea <pause dur="0.5"/> twelve-point-three per cent <pause dur="1.1"/> of all the dwellings <pause dur="0.7"/> in that borough <pause dur="0.7"/> were empty were not used <pause dur="0.9"/> at the same time <pause dur="1.4"/> as <pause dur="2.6"/> London faced <pause dur="1.0"/> if you like a a housing crisis a homelessness crisis <pause dur="0.8"/> so in those circumstances you can argue <pause dur="0.8"/> # make a

moral argument <pause dur="1.2"/> that <pause dur="1.4"/> adverse possession or squatting is justified in these circumstances <pause dur="6.0"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="7"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="5.3"/> the government of the day took a took a different <pause dur="0.5"/> view <pause dur="1.0"/> # <pause dur="1.4"/> and in nineteen-ninety-one the Home Office issued a consultative <pause dur="0.2"/> document on squatting <pause dur="4.5"/> which <pause dur="1.2"/> expounds the premise that there are no <pause dur="0.2"/> valid arguments <pause dur="0.7"/> in defence of squatting <pause dur="0.8"/> and that consultative document <pause dur="0.8"/> formed the basis for the enactment <pause dur="0.4"/> of <pause dur="0.8"/> legislation in <pause dur="0.2"/> the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act <pause dur="0.6"/> nineteen-ninety-four <pause dur="0.8"/> which <pause dur="1.1"/> # introduced <pause dur="0.7"/> # new criminal <pause dur="0.3"/> penalties and new procedures <pause dur="1.0"/> against <pause dur="1.2"/> squatters </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm1158" trans="pause"> even so <pause dur="1.2"/> the basic principle <pause dur="0.7"/> that you can acquire rights <pause dur="1.8"/> by adverse possession <pause dur="1.8"/> is not <pause dur="0.6"/> overturned or <pause dur="0.3"/> affected by the introduction of those <event desc="takes off transparency" iterated="n"/> those new criminal remedies <pause dur="2.9"/> and got two cases in the materials <pause dur="1.5"/> which <pause dur="1.1"/> illustrate this issue <pause dur="1.0"/> of Buckinghamshire County Council against

Moran <pause dur="0.9"/> and Hyde against Pearce </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm1158" trans="pause"> <kinesic desc="puts on transparency" iterated="n"/> i think the best way of showing <pause dur="0.7"/> how adverse possession <pause dur="0.9"/> works today in practice is by <pause dur="0.3"/> working through the Buckinghamshire County Council and Moran case <pause dur="1.1"/> # what we've got here is a dispute between a local authority <pause dur="0.8"/> and <pause dur="0.3"/> a landowner <pause dur="1.3"/> over <pause dur="1.5"/> what i've <pause dur="0.6"/> called here a disputed <pause dur="0.9"/> plot of land <pause dur="2.1"/> historically what's happened is that in nineteen-fifty-five <pause dur="1.8"/> Buckinghamshire County Council <pause dur="0.6"/> have acquired <pause dur="0.9"/> this <pause dur="0.5"/> disputed <pause dur="0.8"/> plot of land for the purpose <pause dur="0.5"/> of <pause dur="0.5"/> a road <pause dur="0.5"/> development they're going to <pause dur="0.4"/> to <trunc>e</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> extend we don't know exactly the <pause dur="0.2"/> extent that they're going to extend or widen the road or <pause dur="0.4"/> or run a new road across <pause dur="0.4"/> this disputed plot <pause dur="1.2"/> this is in nineteen-fifty-five <pause dur="1.3"/> but the land lies idle <pause dur="0.2"/> nothing <pause dur="0.4"/> happens <pause dur="1.9"/> in terms of the use of the land <pause dur="0.7"/> and <pause dur="0.5"/> twelve years later <pause dur="1.3"/> the defendant's predecessor in title <pause dur="0.8"/> and <trunc>mora</trunc> the people who owned the land before <pause dur="0.5"/> Moran <pause dur="1.9"/> began <pause dur="0.7"/> to cultivate <pause dur="0.2"/> this area of land <pause dur="0.4"/> it seems that there was no

clear <pause dur="0.7"/> boundary <pause dur="0.5"/> between the defendant's land <pause dur="0.4"/> and this disputed plot <pause dur="5.1"/> they began to cultivate it in the sense of <pause dur="0.7"/> maintaining it if you like as a bit of extra garden <pause dur="6.4"/> in nineteen-seventy-one <pause dur="3.0"/> the defendant's predecessor in title transferred the land <pause dur="0.4"/> to him <pause dur="0.8"/> to Moran <pause dur="0.6"/> and when they did so <pause dur="0.8"/> they made a declaration <pause dur="1.0"/> concerning their use of the land <pause dur="0.5"/> the disputed plot <pause dur="1.5"/> in other words when <pause dur="1.4"/> the land's conveyed <pause dur="0.3"/> to them <pause dur="1.5"/> they <pause dur="1.3"/> complete a statement <pause dur="2.0"/> showing what they've used the land for a written statement indicating what they've land used the land for <pause dur="0.2"/> how long they've used it and <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="1.1"/> what they've done to it <pause dur="1.5"/> and that declaration <pause dur="1.1"/> forms <pause dur="1.2"/> the basis if you like for a claim that since <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>nineteen-sixty-ni</trunc> sixty-seven <pause dur="1.0"/> this plot <pause dur="0.3"/> has <pause dur="0.5"/> been <pause dur="0.7"/> used by <pause dur="0.3"/> people occupying <pause dur="1.1"/> the adjacent land <pause dur="2.0"/> # <pause dur="1.2"/> when <pause dur="0.3"/> Moran acquired the land <pause dur="0.7"/> he <pause dur="0.5"/> changes the locks on this gate there's a gate <pause dur="2.5"/> whereby <pause dur="0.2"/> it's possible to get access <pause dur="0.4"/> from the roadway <pause dur="0.6"/> onto the disputed <pause dur="0.5"/> plot of land <pause dur="0.9"/> but <pause dur="0.2"/> at that point Moran

takes it upon himself <pause dur="0.5"/> to put a new lock and chain on that gate <pause dur="2.2"/> presumably because <pause dur="0.6"/> it would be possible for someone getting access to <kinesic desc="indicates point on transparency" iterated="n"/> this plot of land could <kinesic desc="indicates point on transparency" iterated="n"/> get access to his land as well i've said that there's no <pause dur="0.3"/> clear boundary between them <pause dur="3.3"/> five years later <pause dur="0.5"/> there's some correspondence between Moran <pause dur="0.5"/> and <pause dur="0.4"/> the county council <pause dur="2.0"/> # <pause dur="1.4"/> concerning <pause dur="0.6"/> the rights of <pause dur="1.1"/> Moran to <pause dur="0.2"/> continue using the land <pause dur="0.6"/> and Buckinghamshire County Council's claim <pause dur="1.0"/> in relation or their claims in relation <pause dur="0.2"/> to their ownership <pause dur="0.5"/> they continue <pause dur="0.2"/> obviously to be <pause dur="0.4"/> the paper <pause dur="0.2"/> title owners of this piece of land <pause dur="0.9"/> and Moran at that point asserts that it's always been his firm understanding <pause dur="0.5"/> that the land should be kept <pause dur="2.1"/> by <pause dur="0.3"/> him or whoever owns <pause dur="0.4"/> his house <pause dur="0.5"/> until the proposed <pause dur="0.8"/> roadworks take place <pause dur="3.6"/> the county council at that point <pause dur="0.9"/> deny <pause dur="0.8"/> that Moran has any rights at all <pause dur="0.4"/> in relation to the land this is in nineteen-seventy-six and they don't take any action <pause dur="0.7"/> at that

point <pause dur="1.2"/> in fact nothing happens <pause dur="0.6"/> for another nine years <pause dur="1.3"/> until nineteen-eighty-five <pause dur="1.4"/> when <pause dur="0.7"/> the county council <pause dur="0.6"/> bring <pause dur="0.2"/> an action for possession <pause dur="0.9"/> against <pause dur="0.4"/> Moran <pause dur="3.2"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.3"/> the question before the court is that <pause dur="0.2"/> in these circumstances given this chain of events <pause dur="0.7"/> can we say <pause dur="0.3"/> that Moran has acquired <pause dur="0.4"/> a right <pause dur="1.1"/> as against the county council <pause dur="1.0"/> to <pause dur="0.3"/> the title of the disputed plot <pause dur="0.7"/> by means of adverse <pause dur="0.5"/> possession </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm1158" trans="pause"> the legislation <pause dur="2.7"/> that deals <pause dur="0.6"/> with the idea of limitation <pause dur="2.2"/> is the Limitation Act nineteen-eighty the current version <pause dur="2.0"/> and i've reproduced the key sections <pause dur="0.9"/> on <pause dur="1.3"/> the flip side of the handout <pause dur="0.7"/> the top of the page the second <pause dur="1.1"/> side <pause dur="1.7"/> sections fifteen <pause dur="0.3"/> seventeen <pause dur="0.5"/> and schedule one <pause dur="4.8"/> section fifteen basically provides that <pause dur="0.4"/> a right to recover <pause dur="0.7"/> possession of land <pause dur="0.4"/> Buckinghamshire County Council's right to recover <pause dur="0.2"/> possession of land in this case <pause dur="0.2"/> expires twelve years <pause dur="0.5"/> from the date <pause dur="2.6"/> on which that right to recover accrues <pause dur="5.0"/> so <pause dur="1.0"/> as soon as Buckinghamshire County Council <pause dur="1.9"/> have a right <pause dur="0.2"/> to recover that land <pause dur="0.3"/> the

twelve year period starts to run <pause dur="1.2"/> and the twelve year period would start to run <pause dur="0.3"/> in this case <pause dur="1.1"/> from <pause dur="0.3"/> the point at which <pause dur="2.8"/> Moran or his predecessors in title <pause dur="3.2"/> undertook actions <pause dur="0.6"/> which <pause dur="0.7"/> effectively <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> dispossess <pause dur="1.3"/> the county council <pause dur="0.2"/> of the land </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm1158" trans="pause"> # <pause dur="4.4"/> the Limitation Act nineteen-eighty doesn't simply <pause dur="0.7"/> doesn't stop <pause dur="1.6"/> at barring the right to recover possession <pause dur="0.8"/> it also goes on <pause dur="0.2"/> in section seventeen <pause dur="0.9"/> to say <pause dur="0.6"/> that after that <pause dur="0.2"/> time limit <pause dur="0.2"/> that twelve year time limit <pause dur="0.4"/> on the right to recover possession <pause dur="0.4"/> has expired <pause dur="2.4"/> the paper <pause dur="0.2"/> title owner's <pause dur="1.9"/> title is extinguished <pause dur="0.8"/> but it's not simply <pause dur="0.6"/> a question of <pause dur="1.0"/> barring the right to recover <pause dur="1.0"/> the act <pause dur="0.2"/> now <pause dur="0.4"/> where historically this this wasn't the case <pause dur="0.4"/> the act now also said <pause dur="0.2"/> and this is really for the <pause dur="0.3"/> for for the sake of clarification <pause dur="1.3"/> that <pause dur="1.3"/> in these circumstances <pause dur="0.3"/> if someone can show that they've acquired title <pause dur="0.4"/> by adverse possession <pause dur="0.7"/> then the person from whom they have taken possession <pause dur="1.8"/> not only doesn't have a right to recover <pause dur="1.1"/> their rights

are actually extinguished <pause dur="0.4"/> are brought to <pause dur="0.4"/> a complete close </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm1158" trans="pause"> # <pause dur="0.4"/> the point about schedule one <pause dur="0.3"/> goes back if you like <pause dur="0.4"/> to this <pause dur="0.4"/> issue of when the right <pause dur="0.7"/> to recover accrues <pause dur="0.4"/> and it specifies <pause dur="1.1"/> that <pause dur="0.3"/> the right of action accrues <pause dur="0.5"/> on the date <pause dur="0.3"/> at which <pause dur="1.4"/> either <pause dur="1.1"/> the person in adverse possession dispossesses <pause dur="0.8"/> the paper title owner <pause dur="0.6"/> or <pause dur="0.2"/> the alternative scenario <pause dur="0.3"/> is that the paper title owner discontinues their use of land <pause dur="0.2"/> and somebody else <pause dur="0.9"/> simply takes it over <pause dur="0.7"/> the distinction between is a is really a fine one and is of very little <pause dur="0.4"/> significance in practice </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm1158" trans="pause"> that right of action only starts to run <pause dur="1.0"/> if <pause dur="0.5"/> the possession of the other party <pause dur="0.3"/> is <pause dur="0.3"/> adverse so we have to explore <pause dur="0.4"/> what we mean <pause dur="0.4"/> by <pause dur="0.4"/> adversity <pause dur="0.9"/> in this context <pause dur="1.2"/> and if you go <pause dur="1.0"/> in the materials <pause dur="1.3"/> to page <pause dur="0.3"/> A-fifteen <pause dur="28.0"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="3"/><event desc="covers part of transparency" iterated="n"/> you'll see that in order to establish at the top of the page the judge <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="1.2"/> gives # a quotation in the case

of Treloar against <pause dur="0.5"/> Nute <pause dur="0.5"/> he then summarizes <pause dur="0.3"/> what the requirements <pause dur="0.2"/> for someone who's claiming adverse possession <pause dur="0.6"/> are <pause dur="1.3"/> he says first of all they must show <pause dur="0.4"/> they have factual possession of the land <pause dur="4.7"/><kinesic desc="reveals covered part of transparency" iterated="n"/> secondly they must show <pause dur="0.3"/> that they have <pause dur="0.9"/> what's called <pause dur="1.8"/> an <distinct lang="la">animus</distinct> <pause dur="0.4"/> <distinct lang="la">possidendi</distinct> <pause dur="1.1"/> <distinct lang="la">possidendi</distinct> <pause dur="3.7"/> the point about this is that it's not sufficient <pause dur="0.7"/> simply <pause dur="1.1"/> to physically take possession <pause dur="0.6"/> you also have to show <pause dur="0.2"/> an intention <pause dur="0.4"/> to possess <pause dur="2.2"/> <distinct lang="la">animus possidendi</distinct> <pause dur="0.2"/> translated means <pause dur="0.5"/> simply a mind <pause dur="0.6"/> to possess <pause dur="2.8"/> so in addition to <pause dur="0.5"/> physical factual elements <pause dur="0.7"/> there is <pause dur="0.2"/> a psychological <pause dur="0.7"/> focal dimension <pause dur="0.6"/> to <pause dur="0.4"/> adverse possession <pause dur="0.4"/> as well <pause dur="2.1"/> thirdly <pause dur="0.2"/> you have to show <pause dur="0.4"/> adversity <pause dur="3.4"/> and the point here is that possession can only be adverse <pause dur="3.1"/> if it is not permitted <pause dur="1.0"/> or not licensed <pause dur="2.2"/> if you've got <pause dur="0.2"/> the permission to occupy land <pause dur="1.7"/> then <pause dur="2.5"/> you can't be said to be <pause dur="1.6"/> in adverse possession <pause dur="0.5"/> vis-à-vis <pause dur="0.5"/> the paper owner <pause dur="3.5"/><kinesic desc="reveals covered part of transparency" iterated="n"/> and the fourth

requirement <pause dur="0.5"/> is this <pause dur="0.2"/> twelve year period <pause dur="0.4"/> established by <pause dur="0.6"/> the statute <pause dur="4.5"/> so these are the four key elements <pause dur="1.6"/> in a claim <pause dur="0.2"/> for adverse possession <pause dur="0.6"/> factual possession <pause dur="0.3"/> intention to possess <pause dur="0.9"/> showing that <pause dur="1.8"/> that possession is adverse <pause dur="0.6"/> vis-à-vis <pause dur="0.6"/> the owner of the paper title <pause dur="1.0"/> and <pause dur="0.8"/> that these things have been present for a period of twelve years </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm1158" trans="pause"> the problem that arises in the Moran case <pause dur="1.1"/> is <pause dur="2.5"/> quite a common one <pause dur="0.6"/> in the sense that <pause dur="0.7"/> land is often <pause dur="0.6"/> left <pause dur="1.0"/> idle <pause dur="0.2"/> pending some <pause dur="0.7"/> future development <pause dur="2.6"/> and the problem <pause dur="0.2"/> that the judge confronts <pause dur="0.2"/> first of all in this case <pause dur="0.4"/> is that there's a series of <pause dur="0.2"/> of of <pause dur="0.9"/> # authority and precedence from the nineteen-seventies <pause dur="0.3"/> suggesting that in this particular type of case <pause dur="0.8"/> where you're dealing with <pause dur="2.1"/> land <pause dur="0.9"/> for which there is some identifiable future use <pause dur="2.4"/> then the courts can <pause dur="0.4"/> imply <pause dur="0.9"/> permission <pause dur="3.2"/> where <pause dur="0.3"/> the use that's made <pause dur="0.4"/><kinesic desc="puts on transparency" iterated="n"/> by the squatter <pause dur="5.1"/> doesn't substantially interfere with those <pause dur="0.2"/> future plans <pause dur="5.6"/><event desc="covers part of transparency" iterated="n"/> okay <pause dur="0.9"/> and this

is referred to in the judgement as the implied <pause dur="0.3"/> licence theory <pause dur="3.9"/> given <pause dur="0.4"/> the controversial nature of of squatting that i # <pause dur="0.2"/> identified <pause dur="0.5"/> earlier <pause dur="1.5"/> judges are somewhat have been historically somewhat reluctant <pause dur="0.7"/> to uphold <pause dur="1.0"/> squatters' claims <pause dur="0.4"/> against <pause dur="1.5"/> the owners of the paper title <pause dur="0.3"/> even where those four basic elements that i outlined <pause dur="0.6"/> a moment ago seemed to be satisfied <pause dur="1.6"/> so <pause dur="0.4"/> as i say during the nineteen-seventies <pause dur="1.1"/> the courts developed this notion of <pause dur="0.7"/> an implied <pause dur="0.2"/> licence <pause dur="0.4"/> theory <pause dur="2.4"/> whereby adversity <pause dur="0.4"/> claim that <pause dur="0.4"/> possession was adverse <pause dur="0.4"/> would be negated <pause dur="0.8"/> in circumstances where <pause dur="0.4"/> there was some <pause dur="0.6"/> identifiable <pause dur="0.6"/> use for the land that was going to take effect <pause dur="0.2"/> in the future <pause dur="0.3"/> so precisely the type of # situation <pause dur="0.3"/> that we have in the Buckinghamshire County Council and Moran case itself <pause dur="0.4"/> where the County Council is proposing to use <pause dur="0.4"/> the disputed <trunc>dot</trunc> plot of land <pause dur="0.2"/> at some future point <pause dur="1.2"/> for <pause dur="0.2"/> a road <pause dur="0.3"/> development project <pause dur="1.8"/> the way in which the judge <pause dur="0.2"/><kinesic desc="reveals covered part of transparency" iterated="n"/> deals with this

is actually to look to the statute <pause dur="0.3"/> to the Limitation Act <pause dur="10.0"/> and <pause dur="0.5"/> the argument is that <pause dur="5.2"/> the act itself has negated <pause dur="0.4"/> this and if you look at the top of page <pause dur="0.3"/> A-sixteen in the materials <pause dur="0.4"/> you'll see <pause dur="0.2"/> a quotation from <pause dur="0.2"/> schedule one <pause dur="0.4"/> paragraph eight schedule one <pause dur="0.3"/> of the nineteen-eighty act <pause dur="3.4"/> where it says <pause dur="0.2"/> <reading>for the purpose of determining whether a person occupying any land <pause dur="0.3"/> is in adverse possession <pause dur="1.3"/> it shall not be assumed by implication of law</reading> <pause dur="1.3"/> of this implied licence <trunc>theor</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> theory <pause dur="0.4"/> <reading>that his occupation is by permission</reading> <pause dur="2.7"/> so the act clearly disposes <pause dur="0.5"/> of this implied licence theory <pause dur="0.9"/> # # # # <pause dur="0.3"/> if you like a <pause dur="0.3"/> a <pause dur="1.5"/> a judicial <pause dur="0.2"/> fiction <pause dur="0.9"/> that permission had been granted <pause dur="0.7"/> in circumstances where <pause dur="2.0"/> there was no real interference <pause dur="1.1"/> with the paper title <pause dur="1.2"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>pa</trunc> with the owner of the paper titled <pause dur="0.8"/> future intended use </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/><u who="nm1158" trans="pause"> <kinesic desc="overhead projector is on showing transparency" iterated="n"/> the defence then tried to run a second argument <pause dur="0.9"/> based on <pause dur="0.4"/> somewhat older authority <pause dur="5.1"/> under what they've called the special rule or the special purpose rule <pause dur="3.1"/> where <pause dur="0.8"/> it's argued that <pause dur="0.2"/> if you can

actually identify not just <pause dur="0.3"/> some intended future use but a specific <pause dur="0.2"/> purpose <pause dur="1.0"/> for which land has been retained <pause dur="1.0"/> so again in this case a specific purpose of using the land for <pause dur="0.4"/> for for <pause dur="0.3"/> a road building project <pause dur="1.5"/> and there's no inconsistency <pause dur="1.1"/> between <pause dur="2.4"/> what the defendant is doing <pause dur="0.2"/> the squatter is doing <pause dur="0.6"/> and that future purpose <pause dur="3.1"/> then <pause dur="1.3"/> again <pause dur="1.4"/> the result will be no <pause dur="0.2"/> adversity <pause dur="0.7"/> the special purpose rule and the implied licence theory <pause dur="0.4"/> are <pause dur="0.4"/> obviously very similar <pause dur="1.4"/> they're claiming <pause dur="0.2"/> different <pause dur="1.0"/> if you like bases <pause dur="0.2"/> find different bases in authority <pause dur="1.1"/> and the judge <pause dur="2.2"/> i think quite rightly concludes that <pause dur="0.2"/> if the implied licence theory fails <pause dur="0.8"/> then the special purpose <pause dur="0.2"/> rule <pause dur="0.2"/> must fail <pause dur="0.2"/> as well <pause dur="0.9"/> though he rejects <pause dur="0.7"/> these arguments <pause dur="1.6"/> about <pause dur="0.4"/> implied <pause dur="0.3"/> permission <pause dur="0.7"/> if you actually look <pause dur="0.2"/> at the facts of the case <pause dur="2.0"/> it would be <pause dur="0.6"/> i think quite wrong to come to the conclusion <pause dur="0.4"/> that the county council has <trunc>im</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> has <pause dur="0.8"/> has # in any way given permission to him to do what he wanted to do <pause dur="0.3"/> there is <pause dur="0.4"/> correspondence in which <pause dur="0.4"/> they expressly <pause dur="0.3"/>

deny <pause dur="0.7"/> his rights </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm1158" trans="pause"> <kinesic desc="overhead projector is on showing transparency" iterated="n"/> having established then that the possession is adverse <pause dur="0.4"/> and disposed of these arguments about <pause dur="0.6"/> implied licences and and special purposes <pause dur="1.3"/> the judge goes on to consider <pause dur="2.1"/> the positive requirements what Moran must do to show <pause dur="0.5"/> that he's acquired <pause dur="0.4"/> rights by means of adverse possession <pause dur="2.6"/> and the first <pause dur="0.2"/> heading that he deals with <pause dur="0.3"/> is <pause dur="0.2"/> factual possession <pause dur="1.3"/> here we're concerned about the question of whether <pause dur="0.7"/> what <pause dur="0.4"/> the squatter <pause dur="0.6"/> did <pause dur="1.1"/> amounted to exercising sufficient <pause dur="0.7"/> control <pause dur="0.9"/> physical control <pause dur="0.7"/> over the plot of land <pause dur="0.9"/> and the evidence in this case <pause dur="0.6"/> is <pause dur="1.5"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.5"/> first of all <pause dur="0.7"/><kinesic desc="reveals covered part of transparency" iterated="n"/> that Moran has achieved <pause dur="0.5"/> complete <pause dur="0.2"/> enclosure <pause dur="0.5"/> of the plot <pause dur="3.3"/> if we go back to <pause dur="2.9"/> the diagram <pause dur="11.0"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="2"/> there's <pause dur="0.4"/> a <kinesic desc="indicates point on transparency" iterated="n"/> boundary here <pause dur="0.5"/> and a <kinesic desc="indicates point on transparency" iterated="n"/> boundary here and it backs onto a <pause dur="0.4"/> tennis club <pause dur="0.4"/><kinesic desc="indicates point on transparency" iterated="n"/> there's a

boundary here there's a gate <pause dur="0.4"/><kinesic desc="indicates point on transparency" iterated="n"/> that's been locked by the defendant <pause dur="0.5"/> and the only <pause dur="0.4"/> means of access to the disputed plot <pause dur="0.6"/> is <pause dur="0.7"/> through Moran's land <pause dur="0.9"/> so he's achieved <pause dur="1.2"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="2"/> complete <pause dur="1.2"/> enclosure <pause dur="0.5"/> in that sense <pause dur="3.2"/><kinesic desc="reveals covered part of transparency" iterated="n"/> he's also put <pause dur="0.4"/> a lock <pause dur="0.4"/> and chain <pause dur="0.3"/> on this gate <pause dur="9.5"/><kinesic desc="reveals covered part of transparency" iterated="n"/> and thirdly he's taken possession <pause dur="0.5"/> by <pause dur="2.1"/> act of maintenance <pause dur="0.9"/> he's cultivated the plot he's <pause dur="0.8"/> mowed the grass <pause dur="0.7"/> put plants in it <pause dur="0.6"/> treated it as part of his garden <pause dur="2.5"/> in other words he's dealt with the disputed plot <pause dur="0.7"/> in the same way <pause dur="0.9"/> effectively as you would expect <pause dur="0.9"/> a person who owned a piece of land <pause dur="1.0"/> to deal with their own <pause dur="0.5"/> land <pause dur="6.0"/> so <pause dur="0.3"/> the court concludes that Moran <pause dur="0.5"/> by means of these acts <pause dur="0.3"/> that he's carried out <pause dur="0.6"/> predecessor in title carried out <pause dur="0.6"/> has established <pause dur="0.2"/> factual possession <pause dur="0.5"/> of the plot of land <event desc="takes off transparency" iterated="n"/></u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm1158" trans="pause"> <kinesic desc="puts on transparency" iterated="n"/> the next thing he has to establish <pause dur="0.8"/> is the necessary <pause dur="0.4"/> <distinct lang="la">animus</distinct> the necessary intention <pause dur="3.0"/> can we say <pause dur="0.9"/> that <pause dur="0.7"/> Moran

intended <pause dur="1.7"/> as the lawyers put it <pause dur="0.5"/> to exclude the world at large <pause dur="2.6"/> to prevent <pause dur="0.2"/> other people from getting access to the land <pause dur="0.6"/> including <pause dur="0.8"/> the county council itself <pause dur="1.8"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.0"/> there was no evidence that the county council had ever physically tried to get access <pause dur="0.4"/> to the land during this period <pause dur="0.6"/> but if they'd wanted to do so <pause dur="0.5"/> they wouldn't have been able to <pause dur="1.3"/> they would have had to go and ask Moran for a key to unlock <pause dur="0.7"/> the gate <pause dur="1.8"/> suppose they could have # <pause dur="1.6"/> could have knocked the gate down or something of that kind <pause dur="3.3"/> but the fact that he had <pause dur="0.4"/> enclosed the land <pause dur="0.9"/> put this lock and chain in place <pause dur="1.8"/><kinesic desc="reveals covered part of transparency" iterated="n"/> was itself evidence of an intention to exclude <pause dur="1.6"/> and the argument here basically is that if you <pause dur="0.5"/> chain up a gate <pause dur="2.7"/> and lock it <pause dur="2.4"/> then <pause dur="0.8"/> by means of that action you've got <pause dur="0.4"/> prima facie evidence of intention to exclude </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm1158" trans="pause"> part of the problem though in this case <pause dur="4.5"/><kinesic desc="reveals covered part of transparency" iterated="n"/> is <pause dur="0.4"/> the evidence about <pause dur="2.7"/> whether or not Moran intended <pause dur="0.6"/> to exclude <pause dur="0.5"/> forever <pause dur="1.5"/> the county

council <pause dur="0.7"/> or <pause dur="0.4"/> just until the occurrence of <pause dur="1.0"/> a future event <pause dur="0.8"/> the correspondence i referred to earlier <pause dur="2.7"/> he's actually said <pause dur="0.3"/> it's always been my firm understanding that the land should be kept <pause dur="1.1"/> by him <pause dur="1.2"/> until the proposed road diversion <pause dur="1.0"/> so he seems to be recognizing he seems to have recognized in that correspondence <pause dur="0.5"/> that <pause dur="0.6"/> his rights in relation to the disputed plot of land <pause dur="0.9"/> are limited <pause dur="0.3"/> in time <pause dur="0.6"/> there may come <pause dur="0.4"/> a future point in time <pause dur="0.7"/> of which <pause dur="0.3"/> the council wants to go ahead with the road diversion <pause dur="3.8"/> and at that point <pause dur="0.7"/> his rights will presumably come to an end <pause dur="1.4"/> so the question that the court is confronted with is what does Moran actually need to show does he need to <trunc>en</trunc> show <pause dur="0.3"/> an intention <pause dur="0.8"/> to <pause dur="0.5"/> possess the land <pause dur="1.2"/> whatever happens in the future <pause dur="0.3"/> in all future circumstances <pause dur="0.6"/> in which case he's in difficulty <pause dur="0.9"/> because he's admitted in the correspondence <pause dur="0.8"/> that <pause dur="0.5"/> his rights are limited <pause dur="2.1"/> potentially by <pause dur="2.0"/> what the county council is proposing at a future point to do with the land <pause dur="0.3"/> or does

he simply need to show <pause dur="1.3"/> that his intention is to possess for the time being <pause dur="1.2"/> and then once the twelve years have accrued <pause dur="2.1"/> he gets the right to adverse possession <pause dur="0.3"/> 'cause his rights are <pause dur="0.3"/> are are effectively confirmed <pause dur="0.4"/> at that point <pause dur="2.1"/> and the court <pause dur="0.2"/> comes to the conclusion that effectively you deal with these things on a <pause dur="0.2"/> on a day by day basis <pause dur="0.4"/> all that he is required to show <pause dur="0.4"/> is that he intends to possess <pause dur="0.3"/> for the time being <pause dur="2.9"/> and once <pause dur="1.5"/> that's coupled with factual possession <pause dur="0.5"/> over the twelve year period <pause dur="1.6"/> then that is sufficient <pause dur="3.8"/> to make his <pause dur="0.5"/> claim to adverse possession <pause dur="0.8"/> operative </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm1158" trans="pause"> so here we've got # a a concrete example of how <pause dur="0.2"/> adverse possession actually works in practice <pause dur="0.4"/> and someone acquires <pause dur="0.2"/> rights <pause dur="0.6"/> as a result of <pause dur="0.4"/> of that adverse possession <pause dur="3.0"/> i think it's important to say <pause dur="0.4"/> that it's actually <pause dur="1.3"/> quite rare in practice <pause dur="0.4"/> for people <pause dur="1.3"/> to <pause dur="0.8"/> have their claims <pause dur="0.5"/> sustained by the court <pause dur="0.3"/> in other words <pause dur="0.2"/> these tests <pause dur="0.5"/> of factual

possession intention to possess <pause dur="0.3"/> a twelve year <pause dur="0.2"/> period and adversity <pause dur="0.5"/> are actually quite difficult to maintain in practice <pause dur="0.9"/> one reason is that <pause dur="1.9"/> Buckinghamshire County Council here are are clearly being <pause dur="0.2"/> being negligent with regard to to their use of land they could have <pause dur="0.6"/> effectively <pause dur="0.6"/> brought the issue to a head <pause dur="0.9"/> much earlier <pause dur="0.7"/> by bringing a claim to possession within the twelve year period <pause dur="0.4"/> or <pause dur="0.7"/> just by giving <pause dur="0.2"/> Moran permission to continue using the land until <pause dur="0.4"/> # they <pause dur="0.3"/> needed it <pause dur="0.5"/> that would have brought <pause dur="0.6"/> the adversity to an end if they had actually written to him <pause dur="0.3"/> # and said well <pause dur="0.3"/> either <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> we'll either take you to court or we'll give you <pause dur="0.5"/> # # permission to continue to occupy the land <pause dur="0.7"/> # until we need it <pause dur="0.9"/> either of those actions or those interventions would have been sufficient <pause dur="0.9"/> to bring <pause dur="0.8"/> Moran's claims to an end <pause dur="0.2"/> so <pause dur="0.4"/> it's quite rare for these things to run on for this length of time <pause dur="1.5"/> where it most commonly happens <pause dur="0.3"/> is in relation to <pause dur="0.2"/> disputes over or <pause dur="0.5"/> # uncertainties if you like with

regard to the boundaries of land and you can see this as a <pause dur="0.3"/> as a kind of extended example of that <pause dur="0.3"/> the area of land is is probably in this case is probably larger <pause dur="0.3"/> than those in most cases but where <pause dur="0.2"/> # # a fence has <pause dur="0.5"/> been put up it's <pause dur="0.3"/> two or three metres to <pause dur="0.6"/> the left or the right of where it should be <pause dur="0.6"/> then and <pause dur="0.4"/> that situation is allowed to rest and to continue <pause dur="0.4"/> that <pause dur="0.4"/> is the most common type of example <pause dur="0.3"/> in which <pause dur="0.2"/> you actually find <pause dur="0.4"/> adverse possession <pause dur="0.3"/> working <pause dur="0.5"/> today <pause dur="1.3"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> the <pause dur="0.2"/> other example that i've got in the case <pause dur="0.2"/> in in in in the cases in the in the materials <pause dur="0.2"/> of Hyde and Pearce <pause dur="0.6"/> shows an example of <pause dur="0.2"/> of a claim to adverse possession <pause dur="0.5"/> # not working <pause dur="0.9"/> despite <pause dur="2.0"/> what <pause dur="0.9"/> seems to be <pause dur="1.1"/> fairly outrageous behaviour <pause dur="0.4"/> on the part <pause dur="0.2"/> of the person <pause dur="0.4"/> who comes to own the land </u><gap reason="break in recording" extent="uncertain"/> <u who="nm1158" trans="pause"> # <pause dur="4.8"/><event desc="takes off transparency" iterated="n"/> i'm going to have to <pause dur="0.2"/> bring it to an end today to allow you to have your <pause dur="0.3"/> staff-student liaison committee elections <pause dur="0.5"/> but i'll talk a bit about Hyde and Pearce at the beginning of next time